UK defence secretary says he has been ‘reassured directly’ counterpart Pete Hegseth that Starlink system has been restored as he seeks to cool tensions
Wes Streeting urged the US to stand by Ukraine on his visit to the American capital and sought to cool tensions between the two countries in the wake of the Starlink row that is threatening to set back Kyiv’s war effort.
The British defence secretary, giving a speech before a meeting with his US counterpart, Pete Hegseth, argued that supporting Ukraine was in the long-term interests of Washington, and a business opportunity.
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© Photograph: Manuel Balce Ceneta/AP
© Photograph: Manuel Balce Ceneta/AP
© Photograph: Manuel Balce Ceneta/AP
The federal government just closed fiscal year 2026 with a deficit of nearly $2 trillion, according to figures the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) released last Thursday. Only the two pandemic years of 2020 and 2021 were worse. Today, though, there is no recession and no emergency. These enormous budget deficits are the new normal.
The usual response to a deficit warning is that the government just needs more money. It doesn't. Thanks to the remarkable strength of the private sector, federal revenue rose by 3 percent, to more than $5.4 trillion, over the fiscal year. But spending rose by 6 percent, reaching $7.4 trillion.
Some will blame the Supreme Court for striking down most of President Donald Trump's tariffs and forcing the government to issue refunds. But even if Washington had kept the $130 billion in illegal levies, it would cover less than one-tenth of the gap. Tariffs were never a serious revenue source at our insanely high level of spending.
Look at where the money went. Spending on the three main entitlement programs—Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid—grew by 7 percent. That's faster than total spending growth. Defense grew by 5 percent. Interest on the debt rose by 11 percent, exceeding $1.1 trillion. That last figure is the bill for every earlier year of borrowing—years when Washington was sending clear signals that it isn't serious about fiscal responsibility.
If you want to see where such irresponsibility can lead, look at France. The country that big spenders from Paul Krugman to Sen. Bernie Sanders (I–Vt.) have cited as proof that big government is viable and full of upsides is now on the brink of a serious crisis. France's debt equals 120 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP), and interest payments are rising quickly. Slow growth and social unrest aren't helping.
The U.S., of course, has some advantages that France doesn't, largely because we're a country of innovators with a private sector unmatched at creating wealth. Nonetheless, debt that is swelling out of control should still worry us. First, the same anti-wealth and anti-growth forces that brought France to where it is now are gaining popularity here. Second, we too will see debt reach 120 percent of GDP in a few years, and our interest payments are already consuming an alarming share of resources.
A wise Congress would put us on safer footing if only because debt raises interest rates for everyone, from homebuyers to small businesses. This operates as a drag on growth, and hence on wages. In other words, controlling debt should be part of an affordability agenda in the same way as streamlining regulation.
When legislators decide to take affordability seriously, I recommend looking at a September Advancing American Freedom (AAF) report on this topic. Its section on fiscal restraint offers a useful menu of reforms, including targeting the programs that most drive the debt.
Start with Social Security. Under current law, benefits will be cut by roughly 20 percent when the program's trust fund runs dry in the early 2030s. Nobody believes Congress will actually let that happen, but we'd better hope its answer isn't to double down by borrowing the difference between payroll taxes and benefits.
Nor are tax increases an option. The payroll tax meant to fund entitlements is now 12.4 percent of wages. It began at 2 percent when Social Security was first rolled out. It is also the most burdensome tax for many Americans. Enough already. The fixes AAF fellow Rachel Greszler proposes are worth considering: Index the retirement age to life expectancy, use an accurate inflation measure for cost-of-living adjustments, and move gradually toward a flat universal benefit that protects lower-income retirees while ending Social Security's de facto welfare for the wealthiest.
Next is Medicare. More than 40 percent of its financing already comes from general revenue rather than from payroll taxes. The report recommends converting the program to premium support, giving beneficiaries a fixed contribution to spend on traditional Medicare or on competing private plans. It would also raise the eligibility age to 67, matching Social Security, and trim subsidies for well-off seniors. That's a start.
As for Medicaid, the problem is one of pricing. And yet competition based on price—the best cost-control tool—has never been seriously tried. Washington covers 90 percent of the cost of states' expanded Medicaid programs for adults. A state can buy a dollar of spending with just a dime of its own money. Changing the states' incentives would be key here. Implementing risk-adjusted per-capita caps, through which the federal government would give states a fixed amount per enrollee, would do just that. States would pay for their own inefficiencies or would be able to use every dollar they save by becoming more efficient.
The same logic supports returning more welfare programs to states, starting with the federal share of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program. State governments have to balance their budgets in some form.
None of these reforms are painless. But the alternatives will prove far more painful. The U.S. will either continue paying a slow, unlegislated tax called inflation or face a fast, ugly fiscal crisis when bond buyers stop giving Washington the benefit of the doubt.
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The post The Federal Government Collected $5.4 Trillion. It Still Can't Pay Its Bills. appeared first on Reason Magazine.
Thanks to a 2005 DUI conviction in Pennsylvania, Edward Williams permanently lost the constitutional right to keep and bear arms. But he did not realize that until a decade later, and his confusion on that point is understandable.
The federal law that stripped Williams of his Second Amendment rights is commonly described as applying to "felons," and Williams' offense was a misdemeanor. But although his sentence did not include any time behind bars, his crime theoretically could have sent him to prison for up to five years. That was enough to trigger 18 USC 922(g)(1), which covers anyone convicted of "a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year."
When a lawyer alerted Williams to that wrinkle, which made his continued ownership of firearms a federal felony, he got rid of his guns. But he did not think that requirement was fair, reasonable, or constitutional, and this week a federal appeals court agreed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit recognized a historical tradition of disarming "physically dangerous individuals" whose possession of firearms would pose a threat to public safety. But it said Williams plainly does not fit into that category.
"The federal government spent nearly a decade trying to permanently disarm a peaceable man over a nonviolent misdemeanor—and it lost bigly," says Brandon Combs, president of the Firearms Policy Coalition, which supported Williams' lawsuit. "The government does not get to turn a nonviolent conviction into a lifetime ban on exercising a constitutionally protected right."
The 3rd Circuit's en banc decision in Williams v. Attorney General affirms a 2023 ruling by a federal judge who likewise concluded that disarming Williams was unconstitutional. It elaborates on the logic of Range v. Attorney General, a 2023 decision that restored the gun rights of a Pennsylvania man who had been convicted of food stamp fraud. In both cases, the 3rd Circuit held that applying Section 922(g)(1) to the plaintiffs was not "consistent with this Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation"—the Second Amendment test established by the Supreme Court's 2022 decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen.
Writing for the majority in Williams' case, 3rd Circuit Judge Paul Matey acknowledges that the Supreme Court has described "longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons" as "presumptively lawful." But "those longstanding customs restricted the violently dangerous (within which some felons would be included), not felons writ large," he says. "Felons were restricted because they posed a physical danger, rather than for their offense of conviction."
Matey argues that "focusing on physical dangerousness corrects the erroneous argument" that "only law-abiding and responsible citizens can exercise the rights protected by the Second Amendment"—a claim that the Supreme Court rejected in the 2024 case United States v. Rahimi. "We find no history that supports disarming irresponsible people, where 'responsible' is defined by the whim of the sovereign or the will of the majority," he says, alluding to the danger of allowing legislators to whittle away at the Second Amendment by criminalizing an ever-widening range of conduct.
Matey emphasizes "the novelty of forever restricting all felons from possessing firearms for lawful purposes." The original restriction, which Congress approved in 1938 as part of the Federal Firearms Act, applied only to violent crimes such as murder, manslaughter, rape, kidnapping, robbery, and assault with a deadly weapon. In 1961, Congress expanded the ban to cover nonviolent crimes punishable by more than a year in prison.
Williams' 2005 DUI conviction qualified for two reasons. He had a prior DUI conviction, stemming from a 2000 arrest in State College. And when he was arrested again in Philadelphia four years later, his blood alcohol concentration was a whopping 0.223 percent. That made his second offense a first-degree misdemeanor, which carries a maximum prison sentence of five years.
Since then, Williams has stayed out of trouble. "He has done nothing violent, let alone dangerous, for over twenty years, and has held steady employment at the same job for over three decades," Matey notes. Williams drinks only occasionally, and a psychological evaluation found he "has a normal personality, without psychopathology and without addiction or violent tendencies."
The Justice Department nevertheless argued that Williams' continuing disarmament is consistent with the Bruen test, which requires historical analogs that are "relevantly similar" in motivation and scope. In making that case, the government relied mainly on early laws aimed at "habitual drunkards"—the same analogy that the Supreme Court unanimously rejected last June in United States v. Hemani, which involved the federal ban on gun possession by "unlawful" drug users.
Although the Justice Department "acknowledges it may proscribe Williams's possession of firearms only if he 'presently poses a physical danger if armed,'" Matey says, it "offers no evidence to establish this as the aim of the habitual drunkard laws." Those laws, the Supreme Court noted in Hemani, "did not seek to protect the public from violence so much as to protect habitual drunkards from themselves and their families from financial devastation."
Nor did the habitual drunkard laws permanently disarm people, as Section 922(g)(1) does. "Most statutes capped the commitment of habitual drunkards to the state inebriate asylum, prison, or hard labor to a few months or years," Matey notes. "Others provided for an indefinite period of incarceration, but had no indication that upon release individuals continued to forfeit their arms. Rather, once someone was 'safe' to 'go at large,' they were restored to the status of a full rights-bearing citizen."
Contrary to the considerations that the Supreme Court deemed relevant in Hemani, Matey says, the Justice Department "fails to show that Williams threatens to 'misuse[] a gun while intoxicated,' or that he 'poses a danger to himself or others as a result' of
alcohol abuse. In fact, much like those nineteenth-century drunkards released from custody and restored their rights, the record shows that Williams poses no present physical danger from the use of a firearm, or anything else."
The 3rd Circuit is one of three federal appeals courts that have allowed people with nonviolent felony records to argue that Section 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to them. But such challenges have been blocked in six circuits, notwithstanding compelling historical evidence that the law reaches much farther than the Second Amendment allows. So far, the Supreme Court has declined to accept any of the many petitions asking it to resolve that circuit split.
The post The 3rd Circuit Upholds the Gun Rights of a Man Who Committed a Nonviolent Misdemeanor 2 Decades Ago appeared first on Reason Magazine.
Di recente, un ospedale di Shanghai ha impiantato un’interfaccia cervello-computer (brain-computer interface, Bci) per aiutare un paziente con una lesione del midollo spinale a recuperare il movimento della mano. L’intervento è stato eseguito nell’ambito della pratica clinica ordinaria, e non di una sperimentazione clinica, dopo che Pechino ha recentemente approvato l’impiego commerciale del dispositivo Bci invasivo: una prima assoluta per la Cina e a livello mondiale. Sviluppato dalla Neuracle medical technology di Shanghai, il dispositivo ha consentito a 32 pazienti di recuperare l’uso delle mani. È un segnale di quanto la Cina consideri strategica questa tecnologia di frontiera e rappresenta una tappa significativa nel campo delle neuroprotesi, dove l’approvazione delle Bci per l’impiego sui pazienti richiede generalmente anni.
Una delle ragioni alla base dell’approvazione del dispositivo risiede nella sua progettazione relativamente meno invasiva, che comporta rischi inferiori rispetto a soluzioni concorrenti come N1 di Neuralink. Il sistema consiste in un elettrodo delle dimensioni di una moneta, posizionato sopra la membrana protettiva del cervello, che rileva i segnali generati quando il paziente immagina di compiere determinati movimenti. Questi segnali vengono quindi trasmessi in modalità wireless a un guanto robotico. N1 di Neuralink, al contrario, viene impiantato direttamente nella corteccia per registrare l’attività neurale, con un rischio maggiore di emorragie e cicatrici gliali. È proprio questo compromesso tra capacità e invasività a spiegare perché la maggior parte delle Bci sia ancora in fase sperimentale.
La Cina si sta muovendo rapidamente in questo settore nascente, con l’obiettivo di diventare un leader globale negli impianti cerebrali entro il 2030. Un forte sostegno governativo e consistenti finanziamenti stanno contribuendo ad accelerarne lo sviluppo. Altre Bci, infatti, sono attualmente in fase di approvazione. Tra queste c’è Beinao-1, un dispositivo minimamente invasivo che sarà testato negli ospedali il prossimo anno. Oltre 30 ospedali in tutta la Cina dispongono ormai di unità dedicate alle interfacce cervello-computer, mentre le applicazioni si stanno estendendo anche alla cura delle malattie neurodegenerative e dei disturbi psichiatrici. Anche la propensione dei consumatori ad adottare nuove tecnologie sta accelerando la diffusione su larga scala delle applicazioni, mentre in Europa la sperimentazione di tecnologie sul cervello umano suscita ancora preoccupazioni nell’ambito degli studi clinici.
L’Europa vanta eccellenze mondiali nella ricerca, soprattutto nel campo delle Bci non invasive, ma è in ritardo nello sviluppo dei prodotti. Svizzera, Germania e Spagna ospitano, infatti, un numero significativo di aziende attive nel settore, tra cui MindMaze, CorTec e InBrain Neuroelectronics. L’Europa registra comunque progressi anche sul piano clinico: lo scorso anno, a Monaco di Baviera è stato realizzato il primo impianto Bci in Europa su un paziente affetto da tetraplegia, mentre CorTec ha impiantato il dispositivo in un terzo paziente nell’ambito della propria sperimentazione sulla riabilitazione motoria dopo un ictus. L’ecosistema europeo delle Bci resta tuttavia indietro rispetto a quelli cinese e statunitense. Alcune aziende europee stanno completando sperimentazioni cliniche negli Stati Uniti, dove i percorsi regolatori e i finanziamenti destinati agli impianti cerebrali sono più consolidati. La Food and drug administration statunitense, ad esempio, è più preparata per approvare le sperimentazioni sulle Bci rispetto all’Europa. Tra le aziende statunitensi, Synchron, Neuralink, Paradromics e Precision Neuroscience figurano da anni tra le principali protagoniste dello sviluppo di queste interfacce. Un’altra società americana, Axoft, ha avviato una collaborazione con un’azienda cinese e un ospedale di Shanghai per sperimentare la propria Bci su quattro pazienti, in un raro esempio di cooperazione tra Stati Uniti e Cina nel campo delle neurotecnologie.
Sebbene la tecnologia abbia compiuto progressi, le applicazioni pratiche restano al momento limitate. L’impianto di Bci, siano esse invasive o non invasive, è ancora circoscritto a determinate categorie di pazienti, e le sfide tecniche rimangono rilevanti. La raccolta e l’interpretazione dei segnali neurali costituiscono ancora un ambito scientifico in una fase iniziale di sviluppo. Il potenziale trasformativo, tuttavia, è enorme, con un mercato globale che, secondo le proiezioni, dovrebbe crescere dai 2,8 miliardi di euro del 2026 a oltre 9 miliardi di euro entro il 2034. I decisori politici europei devono perciò sostenere gli operatori locali e aiutarli a crescere, intervenendo al tempo stesso sulla definizione degli standard prima che Stati Uniti e Cina arrivino a dominare il mercato.
La Cina, dal canto suo, sta cercando di definire vocabolari globali, formati dei dati e architetture di riferimento attraverso l’Organizzazione internazionale per la normazione e l’Unione internazionale delle telecomunicazioni. Pechino ha inoltre già introdotto nel 2025 una terminologia sulle Bci destinata all’uso interno. Esponenti dell’industria, come la China pharmaceutical innovation and research development association (Phirda), stanno sollecitando la Cina a trasformare il proprio vantaggio in valore economico attraverso la definizione di standard globali. Stabilire una terminologia condivisa tra decisori politici, ricercatori, aziende e istituzioni contribuirà a determinare gli standard tecnici e le architetture di riferimento delle Bci a livello mondiale.
L’Unione europea dispone di norme che disciplinano alcuni aspetti dello sviluppo delle interfacce cervello-computer, tra cui la sicurezza dei dispositivi medici e la protezione dei dati. Spagna e Francia hanno adottato politiche per lo sviluppo responsabile delle neurotecnologie. Bruxelles, tuttavia, non ha ancora affrontato il tema degli standard per la sicurezza cognitiva o per l’impiego etico di questi dispositivi, tanto in ambito medico quanto per applicazioni non mediche. Eppure, se l’Ue riuscisse a definire gli standard tecnici prima che il relativo vocabolario venga consolidato altrove, si assicurerebbe qualcosa di più di una quota di mercato: potrebbe contribuire a stabilire i criteri sui quali saranno costruiti i dispositivi di tutti gli altri.
(Pubblicato su Healthcare Policy 20)
Moscow sends swarms of drones to attack infrastructure in central Ukraine as Zelenskyy says Kyiv will restart strikes on Russian oil refineries
The White House’s unilateral effort to negotiate an energy ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine has collapsed as Moscow sent a record swarm of drones overnight to attack infrastructure in central Ukraine and Kyiv appeared to resume strikes on Russian oil refineries despite warnings from Donald Trump.
Moscow accused Ukraine of launching a strike against a Russian oil refinery in the Ryazan region, its first since Trump abruptly declared an “energy ceasefire” that neither Russia nor Ukraine said they had agreed to.
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© Photograph: Reuters
© Photograph: Reuters
© Photograph: Reuters
Kimberly Guilfoyle’s departure has renewed scrutiny of the president’s picks for diplomatic posts, from France to Jamaica
Donald Trump has appointed family members, friends and loyal political allies to represent the US on the world stage, dispatching an extraordinary array of characters to embassies across the world.
While presidents of both parties have long rewarded donors and allies with plum ambassadorships, Trump has chosen loyalists willing to go to bat for him regardless of the implications for US-foreign relationships.
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© Photograph: Getty Images
© Photograph: Getty Images
© Photograph: Getty Images
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has abandoned much of the diplomatic restraint that characterised his dealings with Donald Trump since their confrontation in the Oval Office in February 2025. In an interview on 14 October, the Ukrainian president accused his American counterpart of moving towards Russia and choosing the wrong side of history.
His intervention followed a series of American decisions that have increased pressure on Kyiv while offering Moscow economic and diplomatic advantages. A controversial agreement involving Russian diesel exports, uncertainty surrounding the provision of American intelligence and sudden restrictions on military satellite communications have brought relations between the two countries to their most difficult point since Trump’s return to the White House.
Zelenskyy’s criticism was unusually personal. Questioned about whether he felt betrayed by Washington’s recent decisions, he acknowledged the sense of betrayal but emphasised that Ukraine’s survival could not be treated as a commercial negotiation. He said Ukraine was not selling its country and argued that an American president claiming to act as an intermediary must not favour one of the belligerents.
The shift reflects the apparent exhaustion of a strategy Kyiv has pursued for more than a year: avoid openly challenging Trump, maintain personal contact with the White House and hope that American support can be preserved through diplomatic accommodation. That calculation is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain as Washington’s demands threaten to constrain Ukraine’s military operations without producing corresponding concessions from Russia.
The immediate demonstration of Ukraine’s dependence on American technology came during the night of 13–14 October, when SpaceX imposed restrictions on Starshield, the military-grade version of its Starlink satellite communications service.
According to accounts provided by Ukrainian frontline commanders, the changes disrupted connections to terminals travelling above approximately 160 kilometres per hour, forcing the abandonment of several drone missions. The restrictions affected systems used for reconnaissance, interception and strikes against Russian military targets.
As EU Today reported on 14 October, the disruption exposed a weakness extending beyond individual drone missions. Satellite communications form part of Ukraine’s operational infrastructure, supporting the movement of battlefield information, remote weapons control and communications across areas where conventional networks are vulnerable to Russian electronic warfare.
An interruption imposed remotely by a commercial provider can therefore affect military capabilities without any physical attack on Ukrainian equipment. Decisions taken outside Ukraine’s military command structure can alter the effectiveness of systems already deployed on the battlefield.
Ukraine’s Defence Ministry subsequently opened discussions with American officials, SpaceX and NATO partners while examining alternative communications arrangements.
Later on Wednesday, former Ukrainian defence minister Mykhailo Fedorov announced that Starlink functionality at speeds up to 160 kilometres per hour was being restored. Work was still required to remove the restrictions on Starshield altogether. The partial reversal offered immediate operational relief but did not resolve the underlying dependency.
There is no established evidence that the Trump administration ordered SpaceX to impose the restrictions. Nevertheless, their timing, amid mounting disagreements over Ukraine’s military operations, has reinforced Kyiv’s concerns about relying on communications infrastructure controlled by an American company.
The dispute over satellite access coincides with growing uncertainty about American intelligence cooperation.
Following Russian ballistic missile strikes on Kyiv on 12–13 October, Zelenskyy complained that Ukraine had received no advance warning from its international partners. The attacks damaged residential buildings and energy infrastructure, while Ukraine’s authorities raised concerns about the absence of advance intelligence.
Advance information about Russian missile launches is particularly important when ballistic weapons leave civilians only minutes to reach shelters. Intelligence cooperation also supports Ukrainian air-defence units in assessing threats and preparing interceptions.
Trump denied on 13 October that Washington had stopped sharing intelligence with Ukraine. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha likewise confirmed that cooperation continued. The absence of warnings about particular attacks therefore cannot be equated with a complete suspension of American assistance.
Yet the consequences of unreliable warning arrangements remain serious. For Ukraine, the distinction between information withheld, delayed or simply unavailable offers little protection when Russian ballistic missiles reach civilian neighbourhoods without sufficient warning.
The wider concern is that intelligence provision could become another instrument of diplomatic pressure. Accounts of negotiations over Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries have raised the possibility that Washington might use such assistance as leverage. Reports of explicit threats have been disputed, but the controversy has increased uncertainty surrounding a capability central to Ukraine’s defence.
The confrontation has also exposed a contradiction in Washington’s approach to the war.
Trump’s agreement allowing Russian diesel to return to international markets offers Moscow additional export opportunities at a time when Ukrainian attacks have damaged refining capacity and disrupted domestic fuel supplies.
The American administration has justified the arrangement partly through the need to ease fuel prices. Yet the initially announced quantities are modest in relation to international petroleum markets, raising questions about how much immediate relief the measure can realistically provide.
For Putin, its diplomatic significance may be considerably greater. Russia has secured a relaxation of American economic restrictions while Washington simultaneously presses Kyiv to limit attacks on the infrastructure that generates revenue for Moscow’s war economy.
The commercial implications of Washington’s sanctions reversal extend beyond the initial shipment volumes. The Treasury authorisation permits certain transactions involving Russian-origin diesel until April 2027, creating opportunities for international traders and financial intermediaries while leaving the broader sanctions framework formally intact.
Trump’s proposed energy ceasefire has compounded the difficulty. As EU Today examined earlier this week, Kyiv has offered to suspend strikes against Russian energy facilities if Moscow reciprocates. Russian attacks on Ukrainian power infrastructure have nevertheless continued.
An arrangement in which Ukraine stops targeting Russian refineries while Russia retains the ability to strike Ukrainian electricity generation would remove an important source of pressure on Moscow without protecting Ukrainian civilians.
Such an outcome would change the military and economic conditions of the war in Russia’s favour, regardless of how Washington describes its diplomatic objectives.
Zelenskyy’s sharper language also reflects a possible reassessment of where influence over American policy can be exercised.
For much of Trump’s second presidency, Kyiv’s diplomacy has concentrated on preserving a workable relationship with the president himself. That approach assumes that personal engagement can influence White House decisions even when Trump’s broader political instincts favour accommodation with Putin.
The events of October suggest that this strategy has reached its limits.
Ukraine’s alternative is not necessarily an outright confrontation with Washington. Rather, it involves placing greater weight on Congress, the American defence establishment and the institutional relationships that have supported Ukraine since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.
There is a historical precedent. During Trump’s first presidency, Congress supported military assistance to Ukraine despite differences within the administration over relations with Russia. Under Joe Biden, congressional resistance also demonstrated how domestic American politics could determine the timing and scale of weapons deliveries.
The months-long delay in approving the 2024 military assistance package contributed to severe ammunition shortages at a critical stage of Russia’s offensive operations. Ukraine’s loss of Avdiivka illustrated the danger of making battlefield planning dependent on political negotiations in Washington.
The congressional elections on 3 November 2026 could alter the balance of power. A change in control of either chamber would increase opportunities for oversight, investigations and legislative pressure on the administration, although Congress cannot independently direct every aspect of intelligence sharing or presidential diplomacy.
A less compliant Congress could nevertheless make it politically harder for the White House to restrict Ukrainian assistance without explanation.
For European governments, the dispute carries implications extending well beyond the immediate confrontation between Trump and Zelenskyy.
The transatlantic security relationship has historically depended on the assumption that American military capabilities, intelligence networks and political commitments would remain available to European allies during a major security crisis.
That assumption is increasingly difficult to reconcile with an American administration prepared to link assistance to Ukraine with wider commercial negotiations and domestic political objectives.
The consequences are particularly acute in areas where European capabilities remain insufficient to replace American systems quickly, including satellite intelligence, strategic reconnaissance, missile defence and specialised communications.
Europe can expand weapons production, finance Ukrainian purchases and develop alternatives to American technology. Replacing the full range of capabilities provided by the United States, however, requires investment measured in years rather than months.
The problem will not necessarily disappear when Trump leaves office. His return to power demonstrated that the American foreign-policy consensus which supported European security for decades can be challenged through the electoral process.
Future American administrations may seek to restore traditional alliances, but European governments must now account for the possibility that another election could reverse those commitments.
For Zelenskyy, the immediate calculation is exceptionally difficult. Public criticism risks provoking further retaliation from a president whose administration still controls capabilities essential to Ukraine’s defence. Continued diplomatic restraint, however, has not prevented Washington from offering concessions to Russia or introducing uncertainty into Ukraine’s military planning.
His latest intervention suggests that Kyiv is no longer convinced that avoiding confrontation will preserve American support. The question is whether greater political scrutiny of Washington’s decisions can prevent a further erosion of assistance before Russia turns the resulting military advantages into territorial gains.
The head of Mercedes-Benz has warned that excluding British manufacturers from the European Union’s proposed industrial preference rules would damage the competitiveness of carmakers across Europe, challenging Brussels over legislation intended to protect European production from growing international competition.
Ola Källenius, chief executive of Mercedes-Benz and president of the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association (ACEA), criticised the prospect of restricting British participation in the forthcoming “Made in Europe” framework during discussions in Brussels on Wednesday, 14 October.
His intervention comes as European governments negotiate the Industrial Accelerator Act, which would introduce European-content requirements affecting public procurement and certain forms of industrial support.
The proposed legislation is intended to strengthen manufacturing within the EU, but its treatment of production in neighbouring countries has become contentious, particularly in an automotive industry whose factories and suppliers operate across national borders.
British manufacturing remains closely integrated with continental European automotive production despite the United Kingdom’s departure from the single market.
Components manufactured in Britain are incorporated into vehicles assembled in EU member states, while British factories depend on engines, batteries, electronics and other parts produced in continental Europe.
The value of this integrated manufacturing system depends on companies being able to source components across borders without unnecessary restrictions.
Källenius warned that excluding the UK from the proposed rules would weaken manufacturers operating on both sides of the Channel.
His position reflects industry concerns that a narrowly defined European-content regime could impose additional costs on companies already facing pressure from Chinese competition, slowing demand and substantial investment requirements.
As EU Today reported in September, British Prime Minister Andy Burnham has been pressing Brussels to recognise the UK as a trusted industrial partner under the emerging framework.
Germany has also supported a broader approach that would allow selected trading partners to qualify under European-content rules where reciprocal conditions are met.
France has favoured stronger preferences for production within the EU itself, reflecting differences among member states over how far European industrial policy should extend beyond the Union’s borders.
The Industrial Accelerator Act proposed by the European Commission is intended to strengthen Europe’s manufacturing base and support production in strategically important sectors.
Its provisions address public procurement and industrial incentives affecting products including vehicles, steel, aluminium and clean technologies.
The Commission wants European public spending to support local industrial capacity rather than reinforce dependence on imports from major international competitors.
China has become the principal focus of those concerns because of its expanding manufacturing capacity, particularly in electric vehicles and batteries.
However, measures designed to counter Chinese industrial competition could also affect established trading partners whose manufacturers form part of European supply chains.
The United Kingdom, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey occupy different legal positions in their economic relations with the EU, but all maintain important industrial connections with member states.
An approach that treats their production as equivalent to imports from countries with substantially different market conditions could require European companies to reorganise existing supplier relationships.
For manufacturers, replacing a supplier may involve more than simply ordering components from another factory. Production standards, technical certification, logistics and long-term investment arrangements can make changes expensive and difficult.
Following an ACEA board meeting on Wednesday, European manufacturers called for faster progress on the wider automotive legislative package.
In its 14 October statement, ACEA urged EU institutions to advance negotiations so that the package could be finalised early next year.
The association argues that manufacturers require a predictable regulatory framework to plan investments in electric vehicles, production facilities and new technologies.
Källenius linked the industry’s transition towards zero-emission mobility with the need to preserve employment and strengthen economic security.
European manufacturers are simultaneously investing heavily in electrification while competing against Chinese companies with established battery supply chains and significant production capacity.
The resulting financial pressures are particularly serious for manufacturers that must develop new vehicle platforms while maintaining existing factories and dealer networks.
Additional restrictions on component sourcing could complicate those decisions at a time when companies are seeking to reduce costs.
The dispute has acquired a further dimension following remarks by British Business Secretary Jonathan Reynolds.
Speaking on Wednesday, Reynolds indicated that Britain would not automatically follow the European Union in imposing tariffs on Chinese vehicles.
The UK government maintains that trade measures must be determined according to British economic interests rather than adopted simply to align with Brussels.
That position complicates London’s attempt to secure favourable treatment under European industrial rules.
EU policymakers have argued that closer alignment on trade defences could support Britain’s claim to be treated as a trusted partner.
British ministers, however, must consider whether restrictions on Chinese imports would benefit domestic manufacturers and consumers.
The disagreement will form part of the broader economic relationship being discussed ahead of the next UK–EU summit, scheduled for 20 November.
The automotive dispute follows earlier negotiations over British participation in European defence procurement and other industrial programmes.
In both cases, London wants access to initiatives designed to strengthen European production while remaining outside the EU’s institutional framework.
Brussels must determine how far preferential treatment can extend to non-member countries without undermining the objectives of its industrial policy.
The Commission’s proposals have already revealed disagreements between governments favouring a tightly defined European manufacturing base and those seeking to preserve wider commercial partnerships.
Källenius’s intervention strengthens the argument that industrial protection cannot be considered separately from the supply chains on which European manufacturers depend.
The final legislation will influence investment decisions, procurement arrangements and the position of British suppliers within the continental automotive industry.
The outcome will also provide an indication of how far the EU is prepared to accommodate its closest trading partners as it attempts to strengthen European manufacturing against growing competition from China.
Throttling of mobile internet system will affect Kyiv’s air defences more than its strikes on oil refineries. Now Zelenskyy must be hoping that US intel holds
In Ukraine the situation was already jittery enough. Donald Trump has been inventing ceasefires and buying Russian diesel to shore up his flagging popularity, while a sinister new wave of faster, jet-powered drones are breaking through Kyiv’s stretched air defences. Casualties are rising as the weather turns.
Overnight, Russia bombed three power plants that supply Kyiv, aiming to cut off heating and electricity to the city. According to the president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, for a second night in a row no warning came from Ukraine’s western allies of the incoming ballistic missiles – and so no air raid alert was issued.
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© Photograph: Evgeniy Maloletka/AP
© Photograph: Evgeniy Maloletka/AP
© Photograph: Evgeniy Maloletka/AP
Sarebbe un errore credere che il lavoro dello scienziato si esaurisca tra le pareti di un laboratorio. Al contrario, il ruolo dello studioso si realizza pienamente nella società, nel momento in cui ciò che scopre del mondo che ci circonda acquista una dimensione collettiva e la conoscenza che ha contribuito a conquistare diventa di tutti. Si tratta di un ruolo sociale che comporta anche la responsabilità di offrire dati ed evidenze alla politica, come base per le decisioni che riguardano la comunità, e di difendere i fatti accertati dalla scienza quando questi vengono minacciati, volutamente distorti o rinnegati per interesse personale, consenso o per assecondare le paure istintive dei cittadini. Il biologo francese Jacques Monod, premio Nobel per la medicina, ha descritto questa enorme responsabilità sociale dello scienziato nel volume Per un’etica della conoscenza, che già nel titolo porta con sé un monito e una raccomandazione. Monod scrive che, quando nei nostri laboratori facciamo ricerca e scopriamo le cose che nessuno conosce, lo facciamo sulla base di un impegno tacito, ma non negoziabile, a essere sinceri, a dire come stanno le cose, a riportare i fatti, a mettere in atto ogni comportamento affinché si aprano spazi di libertà che permettano a ogni idea razionale di essere messa a confronto con le altre e a essere valutata.
Queste parole, che sono la mia bussola quotidiana, riguardano ogni scienziato e ogni persona che, a vario titolo, ha a che fare con la scienza e spiegano, in maniera inequivocabile, che il suo metodo non deve essere condizionato da interferenze o interessi di alcun genere. Altrimenti non è di scienza che stiamo parlando. L’etica dello scienziato consiste, quindi, nel diritto-dovere di non mentire mai: su tutti i temi, anche e soprattutto su quelli che nel senso comune sono percepiti come “controversi”, l’etica scientifica che deriva dalla rigorosa applicazione del metodo richiede che si lascino parlare dati e fatti accertati, rifuggendo dalla propaganda e da ogni tentazione di manipolare le prove, per attenersi esclusivamente a ciò che è “vero in modo accertabile”. In questo senso, per lo scienziato l’etica può e deve essere declinata in ogni aspetto della sua peculiare attività. Possiamo distinguere perciò un’etica “esterna” alla professione e una “interna”.
Per etica esterna si intende la responsabilità dello scienziato verso i decisori pubblici e i cittadini, nel cui nome e interesse è condotta l’attività di ricerca. Per etica interna, invece, mi riferisco in particolare alla necessità di condurre ogni studio nel rispetto del metodo scientifico, fino ad arrivare a un risultato certo e ripetibile, oltre che ad aspetti del lavoro del ricercatore che pongono implicazioni etiche, come la sperimentazione animale o quella sulle staminali embrionali. In questi casi, sono sempre le evidenze a indicare la strada. Con riferimento all’etica interna alla professione, non si può non considerare il tema dell’integrità nella ricerca, la science integrity laddove con questa locuzione si intende. Cito la definizione elaborata dal Cnr: “L’insieme dei principi e dei valori etici, dei doveri deontologici e degli standard professionali sui quali si fonda una condotta responsabile e corretta da parte di chi svolge, finanzia o valuta la ricerca scientifica nonché da parte delle istituzioni che la promuovono e la realizzano”.
Con particolare riguardo all’etica della ricerca biomedica, un discorso a parte meritano le frodi scientifiche. La tendenza a truccare i dati viene spesso legata alla pressione che il ricercatore subisce nel veder condizionato il proprio avanzamento professionale alla quantità delle pubblicazioni che riesce a produrre, fenomeno comunemente descritto come publish or perish. Quando la frode risponde alla volontà di falsificare un dato sperimentale, nessuna giustificazione può essere riconosciuta a chi mina alla base le fondamenta di una professione. La ricerca fatta con rigore, peraltro, non teme alcun controllo. Anzi: ai controlli è abituata.
Se un certo numero di ricercatori desistesse dall’intraprendere o continuare la propria attività a causa di una maggiore sistematicità dei controlli antifrode, non sarebbe un danno per la comunità scientifica. Chiunque entri in un laboratorio deve infatti garantire piena, continua e assoluta tracciabilità di ogni passo compiuto durante la giornata. Questo è il metodo della ricerca, che anche dopo una pubblicazione offre l’opportunità a migliaia di ricercatori di tutto il mondo di ripetere e valutare quegli esperimenti. Gli errori fanno parte del lavoro: di questo come di tutti gli altri. Falsificare i dati sperimentali è però un’altra cosa. Nell’istante in cui lo si fa con consapevolezza, ci si pone fuori dal perimetro dell’etica professionale dello scienziato. Come comunità scientifica dobbiamo fare affidamento sulla duplice dimensione etica della ricerca “interna ed esterna”, anche promuovendo una reciproca, libera e fattiva vigilanza metodologica, nella consapevolezza che solo in questo modo si potrà conservare, per tutti, quello spazio di libertà proprio dell’attività scientifica che ciclicamente viene minacciato da leggi e politiche volte a comprimerne gli orizzonti.
(Pubblicato su Healthcare Policy 20)
Exclusive: Douglas Alexander, on trade delegation to India, talks up economic benefits of joint trading arrangements with Europe
Britain will benefit from much closer trading relations with the EU even if that means giving up its ability to negotiate free trade agreements, the Scotland secretary has said.
Douglas Alexander helped negotiate deals with India and the US when he was a trade minister under Keir Starmer.
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© Photograph: X/Douglas Alexander
© Photograph: X/Douglas Alexander
© Photograph: X/Douglas Alexander
Ola Källenius says it will ‘weaken the industry on both sides’ ahead of act intended to counter non-EU competition
Locking the UK out of the EU’s flagship industrial “Made in Europe” legislation would amount to a “deliberate choice” by EU leaders to “hurt” the car industry across the bloc, the head of Mercedes-Benz has said.
Speaking in his capacity as president of the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association (ACEA), Ola Källenius said such a move would “weaken the industry on both sides”.
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© Photograph: Christoph Steitz/Reuters
© Photograph: Christoph Steitz/Reuters
© Photograph: Christoph Steitz/Reuters
Launch of Russian ballistic missiles on Ukraine, with no US warning, coincides with outage of Starlink managed by Musk’s SpaceX
Ukraine’s military has suddenly had its access to Starlink satellite internet terminals restricted as the Trump administration has increased pressure on Ukraine to halt long-range strikes on Russia’s oil industry immediately.
The terminals, which are produced by Elon Musk’s SpaceX but managed by the US government, are a key component of Ukraine’s military operations and the sudden restrictions on the terminals travelling at high speeds on Tuesday evening led to the failure of several combat missions, said an adviser on military technology to Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy.
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© Photograph: Reuters
© Photograph: Reuters
© Photograph: Reuters
Drawing on dozens of interviews with intelligence and police officers across two continents, a Guardian investigation reveals the murderous cost of our insatiable appetite for cocaine
Read more: Latin American organised crime ‘may operate in 16 European countries’
Explainer: What is state capture and why does it matter?
As abductions go, few have been more brazen. Alan Jalloh was with two friends outside Goodies supermarket, frantic as usual with late afternoon shoppers. Rush hour in downtown Freetown, Sierra Leone’s capital, was under way with familiar gusto.
A black Toyota Rav4 forced its way through the Peninsula highway traffic. Witnesses describe burly white men leaping out, yanking on balaclavas. Jalloh, 40, seemed to freeze. As did his two friends, one a famous Freetown footballer. All three were dragged into the waiting SUV. None of them have been seen since.
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© Composite: Guardian Design
© Composite: Guardian Design
© Composite: Guardian Design
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