For more than three decades, Michael Gove has been a leading figure in British Conservatism. As a journalist, government minister and now editor of the Tory bible the Spectator, he has helped shape the right even as it has moved further rightwards. In the latest episode of Radical Thinking, Gove joins Aditya Chakrabortty to discuss the future of the right, his record on Brexit and austerity, and the Spectator’s position on Islam
Watch the full episode with Michael Gove here.
Aditya’s suggested reading:
To read the fruits of Michael Gove’s dalliance with the Marxism Today gang, look up his essay in a 1998 collection called The Moderniser’s Dilemma: Radical Politics in the Age of Blair
For a slalom ride through Michael Gove’s years in power, read The Demented Dalek by the historian Richard J Evans in the London Review of Books
To learn more on what’s become of the British right, there’s a Guardian column by Aditya
Phil Burton-Cartledge analyses in depth why the most successful political party is now failing in his book The Party’s Over: The Rise and Fall of the Conservatives from Thatcher to Sunak
Phil also writes a very good blog on British politics, which keeps a close eye on how each party is trying to marshall a coalition of voters. Here he is on Kemi Badenoch
Geoffrey Wheatcroft does an entertaining short narrative in Bloody Panico!:
or, Whatever Happened to The Tory Party
For more on the economics of the Cameron years, this paper is acute on how the Tories failed to move the UK away from being a country of renters towards a country of makers. Two of its authors will join us for a podcast later in the series.
And if you want to read how Brexit may have cost the UK 8% of GDP, there’s this paper based on data from the Bank of England
Finally, on the Spectator, read Nesrine Malik’s recent Guardian column
Why has Britain’s oldest political magazine become such a rabid cheerleader for Islamophobia?
Continue reading...
© Photograph: James Tindale/The Guardian
© Photograph: James Tindale/The Guardian
© Photograph: James Tindale/The Guardian
For more than three decades, Michael Gove has been a leading figure in British Conservatism. As a journalist, government minister and now editor of the Tory bible the Spectator, he has helped shape the right even as it has moved further rightwards. In the latest episode of Radical Thinking, Gove joins Aditya Chakrabortty to discuss the future of the right, his record on Brexit and austerity, and the Spectator’s position on Islam
Watch the full episode with Michael Gove here.
Aditya’s suggested reading:
To read the fruits of Michael Gove’s dalliance with the Marxism Today gang, look up his essay in a 1998 collection called The Moderniser’s Dilemma: Radical Politics in the Age of Blair
For a slalom ride through Michael Gove’s years in power, read The Demented Dalek by the historian Richard J Evans in the London Review of Books
To learn more on what’s become of the British right, there’s a Guardian column by Aditya
Phil Burton-Cartledge analyses in depth why the most successful political party is now failing in his book The Party’s Over: The Rise and Fall of the Conservatives from Thatcher to Sunak
Phil also writes a very good blog on British politics, which keeps a close eye on how each party is trying to marshall a coalition of voters. Here he is on Kemi Badenoch
Geoffrey Wheatcroft does an entertaining short narrative in Bloody Panico!:
or, Whatever Happened to The Tory Party
For more on the economics of the Cameron years, this paper is acute on how the Tories failed to move the UK away from being a country of renters towards a country of makers. Two of its authors will join us for a podcast later in the series.
And if you want to read how Brexit may have cost the UK 8% of GDP, there’s this paper based on data from the Bank of England
Finally, on the Spectator, read Nesrine Malik’s recent Guardian column
Why has Britain’s oldest political magazine become such a rabid cheerleader for Islamophobia?
Continue reading...
© Photograph: James Tindale/The Guardian
© Photograph: James Tindale/The Guardian
© Photograph: James Tindale/The Guardian
By Konstantin Asmolov – New Eastern Outlook – October 17, 2026
South Korean President Lee Jae-myung is trying to maneuver between pressure from the United States, which demands participation in the conflict with Iran, and risks to national security and reputation, opting for a strategy of stalling and minimizing a direct military presence.
The previous article explained why South Korea refused to join the United States in the “denuclearization of Iran” and how, in response, Donald Trump struck at Lee Jae-myung’s ambitions, nudging him toward the desired choice. And although President Lee’s rhetoric ultimately seems anti-war, in reality there are many loopholes remaining: for example, not a new contingent, but a decisive increase and expansion of the existing contingent’s mandate.
“No!” or “Maybe”
On September 16, Donald Trump said on social media that countries that “provided no assistance” would, after the war with Iran ended, have to “compensate” the United States for damages. Trump did not say whom he meant.
On September 17, First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea Park Yun-ju stated that the ROK’s participation in an international operation in the Strait of Hormuz region depends on a number of factors and is tied not only to relations with the United States but also to the safety of navigation, energy supplies, and the protection of the country’s citizens.
On September 18, Lee Jae-myung stated that South Korea would not deploy troops or military equipment in a way that would draw the country into the war between the United States and Iran. However, he allowed for minimal measures to protect South Korean vessels, oil delivery routes, and citizens, pointing to disruptions in crude oil supplies as one of the risks.
Apparently, eyebrows were raised in Washington, after which on September 19 the Blue House indicated that President Lee Jae-myung’s remarks did not amount to a rejection of Trump’s call for military cooperation. An administration official said that the government is considering practical ways to assist in close contact with the international community, including the United States.
The Specifics of the Future Conflict
Because the war with Iran follows a sine curve, and Donald Trump’s promises to “flatten Iran” alternate with talk of peace, it is possible that, once Trump enters a peace phase, Seoul’s need to rush to help the United States will temporarily disappear. Therefore, let us consider the scenario in which Seoul is actively pressed to help Washington—at least as proof of the Republic of Korea’s allied status.
Compared with previous deployments of South Korean troops as U.S. allies—whether in Vietnam or Iraq—they find themselves in a far more difficult situation. In both cases, this was a ground war in which South Koreans performed auxiliary tasks and mainly carried out clearing operations and fought poorly armed guerrillas, or guarded South Korean specialists while stationed in territory controlled by the Kurds.
However, although Iran does not have nuclear weapons, it has ballistic missiles and kamikaze drones in abundance. This means that wherever South Korean troops are located, they could become targets, especially since South Koreans have no experience countering such a threat, and any serious losses would both damage the country’s domestic political standing and hurt the president’s reputation. As the saying goes, victory has many fathers, but defeat always has one—and he is often the scapegoat.
If anything goes wrong, President Lee will be symbolically held responsible as the person who initiated South Korean participation in the war. At the same time, he may also be criticized for the fact that, in seeking to neutralize the threat of a military coup, he carried out a whole set of measures that could be seen as a certain decline in military readiness—which, alas, performed poorly when confronted with Iranian drones.
Lee Jae-myung’s Two Strategies
Lee Jae-myung understands this situation perfectly and will therefore adhere to two strategies.
The first is to stall for as much time as possible, especially since, under the country’s constitution, sending troops abroad must go through parliament. Because the conflict is escalating and there is domestic opposition, the timing of any troop deployment remains in question.
The situation is interesting: parliament is generally under President Lee’s control, and if he says “yes,” the National Assembly will vote according to his will. But if Lee throws up his hands and says, “I’m in favor, but the Korean people are against it, and we have a democracy, which I cannot go against,” then, on the one hand, outside observers may perceive this as a mutiny on board; on the other, the United States may find another painful way to push Seoul in the right direction. The hope here is rather that the geopolitical situation or Trump’s mood will change and assistance will not be needed.
The second strategy is to send assistance but minimize Korean participation in direct combat: patrol operations, intelligence and surveillance, demining assistance, medical or other humanitarian aid. As a government source told Yonhap, “we are discussing how to contribute safely, without direct participation in combat,” and according to the Dong-A Ilbo, South Korea is considering sending a P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft designed for long-range maritime surveillance, a supply ship, and explosive ordnance disposal specialists.
Another option is the Cheonghae Unit (the newest destroyer with a special forces team aboard), which has long been in the Middle East and is engaged in protecting shipping and responding to threats, including piracy. Increasing its size is not the same as deploying a new contingent, and when, on July 24, 2019, during one of the previous rounds of escalation, the United States demanded not only an increase in South Korea’s share of the costs of maintaining American troops but also the deployment of South Korean naval forces to the Strait of Hormuz, the Cheonghae contingent, which was supposed to fight Somali pirates, “expanded its area of operations” from the Gulf of Aden to the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Gulf. In 2021, Cheonghae was also in the strait, but it was withdrawn to leave a window of opportunity for negotiations after Iran seized a South Korean tanker.
Iran’s Response: What Matters to Tehran Is the Fact Per Se, Not the Scale
It seems that the Iranian side responds in this respect much as North Korea does: what matters is the very fact of Seoul’s participation on the side of the United States, not the scale of such measures. Diplomats and officials have already issued a series of warnings, voicing fairly specific and inconvenient response options for Seoul.
On September 7, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei published a warning in Korean, stating that Tehran would regard the military presence or participation of any third country in operations in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz as direct support for the aggressor, which could entail “serious consequences.” At the same time, the diplomat stressed the importance of friendly relations with Seoul.
Earlier, Iranian expert Mohammad Marandi said that South Korea’s participation in the war could make it an enemy of Iran, and retaliatory strikes could affect not only military but also economic assets of South Korean companies in the Persian Gulf countries. South Korea gets most of its energy resources from the Near and Middle East, and a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and attacks on vessels delivering petroleum products to South Korea would force it to urgently rethink its supply chains.
At the same time, the most convenient and safe backup supply-chain option is also uncertain, because it involves obtaining petroleum products from Russia. Talks on this issue have already begun, and South Korea is trying to prepare its European partners for the possibility of obtaining Russian petroleum products. But, first, the EU still has to be persuaded; second, it is not at all clear that Moscow would welcome this with open arms, knowing that this is not a conceptual turn toward Russia but a desire to solve a problem now that is de facto completely irrelevant to Moscow.
In Lieu of a Conclusion
Lee Jae-myung remains trapped. Refusing to send troops could lead to a further deterioration in relations with Trump, who could take actions against South Korea, such as imposing new tariffs. Sending troops carries certain reputational and domestic political risks. This is harder than a “test of strategic thinking” and a choice between two great evils.
Therefore, we will follow with great interest whether a parliamentary discussion finally takes place and what its verdict will be. It is interesting to see how ready South Korean military personnel and South Korean weapons are to take part in a modern war.
Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, leading research fellow at the Center for Korean Studies of the Institute of China and Modern Asia at the Russian Academy of Sciences
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In recent years, one of the predominant policy initiatives of the progressive left has been raising the minimum wage in locales around the country. At the same time, left-leaning politicians have sought the elimination of what's known as the tip credit, which allows employers to pay restaurant servers and other tipped employees a lower hourly base wage that they then bolster with gratuities.
Just a few years into this experiment, however, policymakers are showing signs of an about-face on the tip credit's abolition as they grapple with the unfortunate, and predictable, economic results.
In 2022, Washington, D.C., made news headlines when voters passed Initiative 82. As originally designed, it would have repealed the tip credit and required servers to be paid the District's full statutory minimum wage by 2027. (D.C.'s minimum wage was $16.10 per hour in 2022, but has since risen to $18.40 due to inflation indexation.) Prior to Initiative 82, D.C. servers could be paid a $5.35 tipped wage, so long as they earned enough tips to make up the difference between the lower tipped wage and the higher traditional minimum wage.
D.C.'s Initiative 82 was just the beginning. One Fair Wage, a progressive group that lobbies against subminimum wages, quarterbacked an all-out push to eliminate the tip credit in jurisdictions across America. Chicago became the second prominent city to follow suit. States like New York, Connecticut, and Illinois also quickly saw legislation introduced to eliminate the tip credit at a statewide level. (Apart from this recent wave, a small handful of American states—including California, Oregon, and Alaska—have long operated without a tip credit).
But just when it seemed like momentum against the tip credit had reached its apex, progressive politicians started to see the writing on the wall. In the aftermath of the tip credit's repeal, D.C. saw a close to 5 percent decline in full-service restaurant jobs. Tipped worker earnings also dropped by just under $12 million—likely a result, at least in part, of restaurants reducing hours for staff in the face of higher labor costs. At the same time, many D.C. restaurants began implementing service fees or so-called auto-gratuity policies that added mandatory 10-20 percent charges onto customers' bills.
Mugged by this economic reality, D.C. Mayor Muriel Bowser called for the full repeal of Initiative 82. Ultimately, the D.C. Council settled for a partial repeal in 2025, maintaining at least some semblance of a tipped wage that sits below the traditional minimum wage into the years ahead (although the tipped wage eventually rises to 75 percent of the traditional wage by 2034). This was a familiar story: The council had previously repealed Initiative 77, a near-identical attempt to abolish the tipped wage that voters passed in 2018.
After Chicago moved to eliminate the tip credit, the Illinois Restaurant Association found that 89 percent of Windy City restaurants raised menu prices; another 79 percent responded by reducing worker hours. Again bowing to economic reality, the progressive Chicago City Council voted to freeze the tip credit's planned elimination, only to see the effort vetoed by Mayor Brandon Johnson. Eventually, a compromise was brokered to at least pause the tip credit at its current level for two years—which punts the issue until after Johnson stands for election again, allowing a potential successor to endorse a more lasting reversal.
In Michigan, a 2024 state supreme court ruling set the tip credit on the path toward elimination by 2030. But state lawmakers intervened last year, deciding to maintain a 50 percent tip credit in perpetuity after 2031. Notably, Michigan is currently governed by a Democratic trifecta in the governorship and both houses of the Legislature. The tip credit's revival garnered key support from Republican lawmakers to pass in a bipartisan fashion, before being signed into law by Democratic Gov. Gretchen Whitmer.
While progressive efforts to eliminate the tip credit may be motivated by an earnest desire to ensure waiters are paid more, the math isn't that simple. Requiring a server to be paid a $16 traditional minimum wage—up from a $5 tipped wage—might appear to raise their pay on paper. But this fails to consider several important factors.
Under our "No Taxes on Tips" new normal, raising the minimum wage for servers could lead to a partial reduction in tips, which under certain scenarios can result in less take-home pay for waiters once the taxman takes his cut. If more server earnings come in the form of "auto-gratuity" policies—which are treated as taxed wages under the law—then the tax repercussions may grow even grimmer.
But more broadly, these laws attempt to subvert basic economics. As of 2025, Bureau of Labor Statistics data show that D.C. restaurants shed over 1,600 jobs in aftermath of Initiative 82; meanwhile, between 2022 and 2025, restaurant job growth in the District declined by more than 8 percent. This is just one example. The fallout is the inevitable result of restaurants responding to labor costs that suddenly skyrocket, forcing establishments to cut worker hours and sometimes transition to quick-service models that require less hourly staff. And that's to say nothing of the diners who bear the cost with higher prices and new service fees.
"We're watching a beloved bar back, a beloved busser, a dishwasher have their jobs taken away," D.C. restaurant worker Valerie Graham told Reason in 2024. "Not because our owner-operator is an evil billionaire but because they're an independent business owner who had to make some business decisions and there's a callousness with which our industry is talked about."
To be sure, the tip credit has only survived in modified and reduced form in D.C., Chicago, and Michigan—and in the case of Chicago, the about-face is only temporary. But the partial reversals show the tip credit's elimination is not a foregone conclusion. Economic reality continues to rear its head.
The post Some Progressives Tried To Abolish the Tipped Minimum Wage. Now They're Backtracking. appeared first on Reason Magazine.
For more than three decades, Michael Gove has been a leading figure in British Conservatism. As a journalist, government minister and now editor of the Tory bible, the Spectator, he has helped shape the right even as it has moved further rightwards. In the latest episode of Radical Thinking, Gove joins Aditya Chakrabortty to discuss the future of the right, his record on Brexit and austerity, and the Spectator’s position on Islam
Watch the full episode with Michael Gove here.
Aditya’s suggested reading:
To read the fruits of Michael Gove’s dalliance with the Marxism Today gang, look up his essay in a 1998 collection called The Moderniser’s Dilemma: Radical Politics in the Age of Blair
For slalom ride through Michael Gove’s years in power, read The Demented Dalek by the historian Richard J Evans in the London Review of Books
To learn more on what’s become of the British right, there’s a column by me for the Guardian
Just why the most successful political party is now failing is analysed in-depth by Phil Burton-Cartledge in his book The Party’s Over: The Rise and Fall of the Conservatives from Thatcher to Sunak
Phil also writes a very good blog on British politics, which keeps a close eye on how each party is trying to marshall a coalition of voters. Here he is on Kemi Badenoch
Geoffrey Wheatcroft does an entertaining short narrative in Bloody Panico!:
or, Whatever Happened to The Tory Party
For more on the economics of the Cameron years, this paper is acute on how the Tories failed to move the UK away from being a country of renters towards a country of makers. Two of its authors will join us for a podcast later in the series.
And if you want to read how Brexit may have cost the UK 8% of GDP, there’s this paper based on data from the Bank of England
Finally, on the Spectator read Nesrine Malik’s recent column in The Guardian
Why has Britain’s oldest political magazine become such a rabid cheerleader for Islamophobia?
Continue reading...
© Photograph: James Tindale/The Guardian
© Photograph: James Tindale/The Guardian
© Photograph: James Tindale/The Guardian
IRINN | October 11, 2026
“We have lost the war with Iran.” Donald Trump admitted this by signing the Islamabad MoU.
Don't skip this episode of @Bevaqteiran with @SarbazRezvi, featuring American political scientist @MearsheimerJ, as he discusses America’s military failures, the dangers of Washington’s… pic.twitter.com/eJPQ6CchWK
— Iran Talks (@theirantalks) October 11, 2026
Today's guest is Brazilian economist Fernando Ulrich, one of Latin America's leading experts on Bitcoin and a longtime advocate of free market economics. His 2014 book, Bitcoin: The New International Currency, helped popularize the cryptocurrency in Latin America, where decades of inflation and government mismanagement have made alternatives to state-controlled money especially appealing. But Ulrich doesn't believe Bitcoin needs to replace the dollar to succeed, and he argues that its greatest contribution may be challenging the government's monopoly on money.
Nick Gillespie spoke with Ulrich at the Winds of Change conference in Buenos Aires, where they discussed why the AI investment boom may be drawing capital away from Bitcoin, whether Javier Milei has delivered on his promise to transform Argentina's economy, and how stablecoins are threatening national currencies. They also explore the Austrian school of economics, the risks of protectionism, and why Ulrich believes Bitcoin can expand individual freedom even if it never becomes the world's dominant currency.
0:00—Is Milei delivering on his economic promises?
4:29—Argentina's central bank
7:35—Bitcoin as a payment system
10:10—Bitcoin's adoption rate and volatility
16:38—Is AI a bubble?
19:03—What does Paul Krugman get wrong about Bitcoin?
23:13—China's relationship with Bitcoin
24:24—Differences between Bitcoin and stablecoins
28:25—Subjective value theory
32:40—The Cypherpunks and the concept of exit over voice
37:49—Will an economic crash accelerate Bitcoin adoption?
40:04—Tariffs and free trade
44:18—Why Bitcoin won't replace all currencies
45:26—Nationalism
48:39—2046 Bitcoin prediction
The post Bitcoin Is a Threat to Government-Controlled Money appeared first on Reason Magazine.
© Illustration: Fatima Ruiz
Shevaun Haviland argues PM is right to revisit Labour’s EU red lines as current trading relationship is bad for business
Repairing the economic damage of Brexit should be the top priority for Andy Burnham as he reconsiders Labour’s red lines on EU membership, the head of one of Britain’s leading business groups has said.
Shevaun Haviland, the director general of the British Chambers of Commerce (BCC), said she welcomed the prime minister reopening the Brexit battle lines despite the uncertainty it could create, arguing that the UK’s current trading relationship with the EU was bad for business.
Continue reading...
© Photograph: Toby Melville/Reuters
© Photograph: Toby Melville/Reuters
© Photograph: Toby Melville/Reuters
For many Americans overseas, the scariest day this month is not Halloween, but October 15—the final extended deadline for filing income tax returns with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
An estimated 3.3 million U.S. citizens live abroad, although the number is likely an undercount because the government doesn't keep a comprehensive list or require Americans overseas to register their residence. Still, American citizens and resident aliens living abroad must pay U.S. income taxes and comply with domestic tax filing requirements, regardless of where they live or work. They must also complete the dizzying process of reporting any foreign bank accounts, assets, and financial interests in foreign institutions.
When filing their income tax returns, most Americans living abroad have zero tax liability. In its 2025 Annual Report to Congress, the Taxpayer Advocate Service—an independent organization within the IRS that helps people navigate tax problems—found that for Americans overseas, "the percent of individual international tax returns reporting no tax liability is significantly higher than domestic taxpayers." Yet, the agency reports that the filing process is "complex, overlapping, and punitive." The report says failure to comply results in "harsh and disproportionate penalties…even when taxpayers make good-faith mistakes or owe no U.S. tax."
The U.S. income tax rate is low compared to other high-income countries, so Americans living overseas typically pay more in local taxes than they would here. Still, Brandon Mitchener, executive director at Tax Fairness for Americans Abroad, tells Reason that Americans living outside the U.S. are often oblivious to their income tax obligations, assuming they're exempt because they already pay taxes in their country of residence. He says that complex U.S. tax laws and financial regulations force many Americans living overseas to request an extension to October 15.
The date also coincides with the final deadline for the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) and the Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR)—regulations that require Americans with foreign financial assets above a certain threshold to declare the value of their assets to the IRS or Treasury Department.
Under FATCA, Americans living overseas with foreign financial assets exceeding $200,000 at year-end or more than $300,000 at any point during the year must declare their assets when filing their income tax return. The law also requires foreign financial institutions to report information about U.S. account holders directly to the IRS. Originally enacted to catch Americans overseas engaged in tax evasion or other criminal financial activity, it has instead made American citizenship an impediment for expatriates looking to save or invest money outside the U.S.
"Because of FATCA, many foreign financial institutions shun American clients," Mitchener says. This includes Trade Republic, a German digital bank and online brokerage firm that doesn't accept U.S. citizens living abroad, a category of people it tellingly describes as "FATCA customers."
"Some charge a premium for banking-while-American," he adds, while some have "even de-banked American clients." The latter is a very real concern for Madison Berry, an American living in the Netherlands. She tells Reason she's "a little bit worried" that her European bank will one day "come back and be like, 'Oh, you're a U.S. citizen. We're gonna close your account.'"
This "reduces choice and raises the cost and complexity of everyday financial products for Americans abroad, from basic savings accounts to mortgages and retirement savings," Mitchener says, creating problems unique to America and Eritrea, the only two countries that tax citizens living outside their borders.
Compounding matters, Americans with foreign financial accounts exceeding $10,000 must file an FBAR with the Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, even though the form duplicates much of the same information already reported through FATCA. The reporting requirements make investing or saving money abroad prohibitive for Americans and foreign financial institutions, with foreign banks opting to close existing accounts or outright denying Americans the opportunity to open a bank account, according to a 2019 report by the Government Accountability Office. Seven years later, little has changed. The IRS itself admits that its systems and functions are "inaccessible to or incompatible with the needs of taxpayers living abroad, creating unnecessary barriers to compliance."
Berry says figuring out her tax obligations and reporting requirements has left her "in a financial limbo." "I seriously considered renouncing my U.S. citizenship as part of the process just to make life easier." She's not alone.
Several Americans living overseas who spoke to Reason on condition of anonymity said they were also considering renouncing their U.S. citizenship rather than deal with the onerous annual tax filing process. One American living in Ireland who owns and operates a U.S.-based business says she uses a remote desktop and virtual private network to access her financial institutions to avoid scrutiny.
Another tells Reason she's considering renouncing her citizenship because America's tax system is "predatory in how complicated it is and how much responsibility it puts on ordinary people to figure everything out themselves."
The post Why Some Americans Living Abroad Would Rather Renounce Their Citizenship Than File Taxes appeared first on Reason Magazine.
RT | October 13, 2026
The Russian Embassy in Paris has accused France of “piracy” after its naval forces seized an oil tanker in international waters near Madagascar, rejecting claims that the operation complied with international maritime law.
French President Emmanuel Macron announced the detention of the DF Peak on Monday, saying the vessel was suspected of sailing under a false flag and involvement in illegal fuel transportation.
The tanker was intercepted 450 nautical miles south of Reunion, a French island territory east of Madagascar, Macron said.
According to MarineTraffic, the DF Peak sails under Benin’s flag. Macron did not identify the owner but described the seizure as part of France’s campaign to “fight the ghost fleet wherever it may be in the world.”
The Russian Embassy called the operation a “flagrant violation of international law,” dismissing France’s references to maritime regulations and “international sanctions” as a “fig leaf” concealing “outright piracy and robbery.”
The embassy denounced the sanctions as illegitimate unilateral measures and said the French authorities failed to notify Russian diplomats of the seizure. It added that officials are checking whether any Russian nationals were aboard.
Western governments have used the term ‘shadow fleet’ to describe vessels that allegedly help Russia circumvent sanctions on oil exports. Moscow rejects the designation, arguing that it has no basis in international maritime law.
France previously detained the Tagor tanker in the Atlantic in June, and British forces seized the Smyrtos in the English Channel later that month. Moscow condemned both operations as piracy.
In July, the EU adopted a mechanism allowing member states to sell oil and other cargo confiscated from sanctioned vessels. President Vladimir Putin subsequently warned that Russia could retaliate against ships carrying Western cargo.
The latest seizure comes days after Putin and US President Donald Trump agreed to expand Russian diesel supplies to American and global markets in an effort to ease soaring fuel prices.
Washington subsequently issued a temporary sanctions waiver covering Russian diesel trade until April 7, 2027. Trump announced initial deliveries of more than 300,000 tons, followed by another 500,000 tons in November, and 1 million tons thereafter.
The UK economy will grow 1.3% in 2026, according to the IMF. But will it really, asks David Craig. With unemployment rising, it's just an illusion of out-of-control borrowing. But try getting an economist to admit it.
The post How Many Economists Does it Take to Wreck an Economy? appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.
When a president starts with a predetermined policy and then goes looking for a statutory pretext to justify it, he is building on shaky ground. President Donald Trump illustrated that point once again in July, when he announced a third round of broad tariffs after his first two attempts ran into legal trouble.
Shortly after taking office in 2025, Trump claimed to have discovered a previously unnoticed delegation of extensive tariff authority in the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), a 1977 law that does not mention import taxes and had never been used to impose them. That claim was rejected by every court that considered it.
Last February, the Supreme Court ruled that IEEPA does not authorize tariffs at all. But Trump had a backup plan: Hours after that decision, he announced another sweeping set of tariffs, this time relying on Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974.
That provision allows tariffs in response to "fundamental international payments problems" caused by "serious United States balance-of-payments deficits." In May, the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT) ruled that the new tariffs were illegal because Trump had failed to "identify balance-of-payments deficits within the meaning of Section 122."
Although that decision was stayed pending appeal, Trump's Section 122 tariffs, which were subject to a 150-day statutory limit, expired on July 24. Trump then switched to Plan C, invoking Section 301 of the Trade Act, which authorizes tariffs in response to a foreign "act, policy, or practice" that is "unreasonable or discriminatory" and "burdens or restricts" U.S. commerce.
Trump's Section 301 tariffs supposedly targeted countries that had failed to "impose and effectively enforce a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labor." The alleged offenders included 86 economies that accounted for nearly all U.S. imports.
In separate complaints, the Liberty Justice Center (LJC) and the law firm Akin Gump, which had played leading roles in challenging Trump's prior tariffs, immediately asked the CIT to block the new import taxes. By and large, they noted, the government had failed to explain how the targeted countries had fallen short, how their alleged failures burdened U.S. commerce, or why the new tariffs could be expected to ameliorate the problem they were supposed to address.
The LJC argued that the forced-labor issue was "simply a pretext" for reinstating Trump's "invalidated global tariff regime." It added that Trump's reading of Section 301, like his interpretation of IEEPA, would violate the "major questions" doctrine, which requires clear congressional authorization for policies of "vast economic and political significance."
This was Trump's "third attempt" to "impose essentially the same set of sweeping global tariffs," Akin Gump's lawyers wrote. "The third time's not the charm."
The post Trump Keeps Coming Up With Legally Dubious Tariff Justifications appeared first on Reason Magazine.
Chip makers and tech investors such as Samsung and SoftBank plunge as potential interest rate hikes spook markets
An accelerating sell-off of AI-linked shares has hit global markets, as fears over rising inflation and future interest rate hikes spooked traders already wary of the heavily indebted sector.
South Korea’s benchmark Kospi 200 index, which is heavily skewed towards the companies that make memory chips, fell more than 8% overnight to a six-month closing low, triggering circuit breakers that brought trading to a halt at various points.
Continue reading...
© Photograph: Lee Jin-man/AP
© Photograph: Lee Jin-man/AP
© Photograph: Lee Jin-man/AP
Peak oil is real and we must prepare for its exhaustion now as it'll be too late once the price is spiking, says Richard Lyon as he responds to Tilak Doshi's review of his book The Energy Trap.
The post Preparing for the End of Oil: A Reply to Tilak Doshi appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.
In the final part of our series on the country, Poles tell how wages have soared – along with the cost of living
Will military spending help or hinder Poland’s growth story?
Poland’s push for EU energy resilience amid Russian aggression
Above the rain-soaked streets of Warsaw, the observation deck of the Varso tower overlooks Joseph Stalin’s gift to Poland that has divided opinion for decades.
For some, the Soviet-era Palace of Culture and Science is a drunk confectioner’s nightmare; standing as a relic of oppression that should have been demolished. For others, it is an icon on the skyline and a monumental warning from history.
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© Photograph: Anna Liminowicz/The Guardian
© Photograph: Anna Liminowicz/The Guardian
© Photograph: Anna Liminowicz/The Guardian
RT | October 14, 2026
Foreign nationals have filled 80% of new UK jobs over the past decade, while millions of Britons have remained on out-of-work benefits, according to a new report by the Centre for Social Justice (CSJ).
The UK think tank said on Tuesday that British nationals accounted for just 734,000 of the 3.7 million jobs added to payrolls between 2014 and the end of 2025. EU nationals accounted for 408,000 new jobs, while migrants from the rest of the world filled around 2.5 million.
“Employers have gained unprecedented access to overseas labour while taxpayers have absorbed the growing cost of domestic worklessness,” the report said.
The findings are part of a major inquiry chaired by former UK Work and Pensions Secretary Iain Duncan Smith. The report argues that successive governments have relied on low-skilled migrant labor while millions of Britons have been “written off” by the welfare system.
Since 2020, payroll employment among non-EU nationals has surged by 2.1 million, while the number of people claiming out-of-work benefits has risen by 2.3 million. Much of the employment growth was concentrated in health and social care, administrative services, hospitality and retail.
“Compounding this, ministers have repeatedly pulled the easy lever of immigration rather than providing a better deal for left behind communities,” Duncan Smith said, urging coordinated reforms to welfare, immigration and regional development.
Around 6.7 million people in England, Wales and Scotland now receive at least one out-of-work benefit, equivalent to roughly one in six working-age adults, according to the CSJ. Since 2019, the number of claimants exempt from requirements to seek or prepare for work has climbed by nearly 1.7 million.
Annual spending on working-age benefits is projected to reach £136.1 billion ($181 billion) in 2026-27.
The report comes amid mounting political pressure over immigration. Reform UK leader Nigel Farage has repeatedly accused successive governments of favoring migrants and minorities over the white working class, demanding tighter border controls and denouncing what he calls a “two-tier” system of unequal treatment.
Britain has also struggled to stop illegal crossings of the English Channel. Some 33,374 people arrived in small boats in the year ending June 2026, down 23% from the previous year, according to the Home Office. The crossings accounted for 88% of detected arrivals via illegal routes.
Public concern remains widespread. An August YouGov poll found that 69% of Britons believed immigration over the previous decade has been too high, while 43% considered it mostly bad for the country, up from 33% in 2016.
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