Trudy weakens to tropical storm after warnings of strong winds and heavy rain, while one person killed in Greece
In contrast to the quiet Atlantic hurricane season, there has been ongoing activity in the Pacific, with Trudy being the 22nd and latest named system. The category 2 hurricane remained roughly 100 miles (160km) south-west of the coast of Mexico, meaning the worst of the conditions stayed offshore. However, the US National Hurricane Center put coastal parts of the states of Jalisco, Michoacán and Colima under hurricane warnings, with sustained winds of up to 60-90mph forecast on Sunday.
Rainfall totals of 100-150mm were likely for these areas, prompting warnings of flooding and landslides. Warnings also covered the risk of a dangerous storm surge accompanied by damaging waves in areas of onshore winds across the coast of south-western Mexico. By Monday morning, Trudy had weakened and been downgraded to a tropical storm, with coastal warnings being lifted.
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© Photograph: Javier Verdin/Reuters
© Photograph: Javier Verdin/Reuters
© Photograph: Javier Verdin/Reuters
Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides announced the planned meeting on 16 October during the European Council summit in Brussels, saying discussions would address both the resumption of negotiations over the island’s division and the possibility of improving relations between Ankara and the EU.
The initiative follows diplomatic contacts in New York involving Guterres, European institutional leaders and the Cypriot government. However, renewed differences over the conditions for negotiations have already cast doubt on whether the process can produce substantial progress.
On Sunday, 18 October, Christodoulides accused Turkish Cypriot leader Tufan Erhürman of imposing preconditions before formal negotiations could resume, particularly concerning arrangements for a rotating presidency in a reunited Cyprus.
The disagreement underlines the difficulties facing an initiative intended to reconnect the UN peace process with the EU’s broader relationship with Turkey.
Christodoulides said the planned meeting between the EU and Turkey would examine how to establish the necessary conditions for negotiations to restart within the previously agreed UN framework.
He indicated that any improvement in EU–Turkey relations would be linked to progress over Cyprus.
The president’s announcement in Brussels follows months of diplomatic consultations involving the Commission, European Council and UN.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa have urged Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to support the renewed peace initiative.
Turkey’s relationship with the EU encompasses trade, customs cooperation, migration and regional security. Ankara remains an EU candidate country, although accession negotiations have been effectively stalled for years.
Cyprus remains one of the principal obstacles to any substantial improvement in that relationship.
The island has been divided since Turkey’s military intervention in 1974. The internationally recognised Republic of Cyprus joined the EU in 2004, but EU law remains suspended in areas where its government does not exercise effective control.
The self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is recognised only by Turkey.
The UN has traditionally sought a settlement based on a bizonal, bicommunal federation with political equality between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.
Negotiations collapsed at Crans-Montana in Switzerland in 2017 amid unresolved disputes over security guarantees, political representation, territory and the presence of Turkish troops.
Erhürman, who became Turkish Cypriot leader in 2025, has expressed support for renewed negotiations within a federal framework. However, he wants assurances about political equality and the structure of future talks.
The latest dispute concerns whether the principle of a rotating presidency between the two communities should be accepted before negotiations resume.
Christodoulides rejected that demand on 18 October, arguing that substantive questions should be negotiated together rather than settled in advance.
The Turkish Cypriot leadership regards rotating executive power as an essential element of political equality, while the Greek Cypriot side objects to making agreement on that arrangement a prerequisite for restarting discussions.
The disagreement has emerged despite recent efforts by the United Nations to improve relations between the communities.
In a statement issued on 13 October, the UN confirmed that Christodoulides and Erhürman had met in Nicosia and agreed to continue discussions, including participation in bicommunal initiatives.
The two leaders subsequently attended a joint event in Pyla, although their public differences persisted.
A Cyprus settlement would require agreement not only between the island’s communities but also on Turkey’s military presence and the system of security guarantees established at independence.
Ankara has long maintained that Turkish Cypriots require effective political equality and credible security arrangements.
Greek Cypriot leaders argue that the continuation of foreign intervention rights and Turkish military deployments would be incompatible with a fully sovereign and reunited state.
The EU cannot resolve those differences independently of the UN process, but it can influence the economic and institutional framework within which a settlement might operate.
A comprehensive agreement would affect property ownership, trade, customs arrangements, border administration and the application of European law throughout the island.
The European Commission has sought a greater role in supporting the UN-led peace process, reflecting Brussels’ interest in progress towards a settlement.
The UN Secretary-General’s personal envoy, María Ángela Holguín, has warned that the opportunity for renewed negotiations may be narrowing.
Disagreements over diplomatic representation, contacts with foreign missions and the status of Turkish Cypriot institutions have complicated relations between the two communities.
Christodoulides has also referred to a series of proposals intended to advance discussions, including the future of the fenced-off area of Varosha. Their full contents have not been publicly disclosed.
The proposed EU–Turkey meeting offers a separate diplomatic channel through which Brussels can assess Ankara’s willingness to support renewed negotiations.
No final date, detailed agenda or list of participants had been publicly confirmed by 18 October.
The immediate test will be whether the parties can agree on the basis for formal talks without attempting to settle disputed constitutional questions before negotiations begin.
The dispute has exposed differences over secularism, religious freedom and Azerbaijan’s relationship with Israel, raising questions about the durability of one of the region’s closest strategic alliances.
Azerbaijan is facing an unusual wave of protests after new school dress regulations led to girls wearing Islamic headscarves being excluded from classrooms and teachers reportedly being ordered to remove their hijabs. The controversy has escalated into a diplomatic dispute with Turkey, whose governing party has been accused by President Ilham Aliyev’s administration of interfering in Azerbaijan’s internal affairs.
The confrontation intensified on 13 October when Azerbaijan’s ruling New Azerbaijan Party (YAP) publicly condemned senior figures in President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP). The dispute has since widened to encompass Azerbaijan’s relations with Israel, exposing political differences between two countries accustomed to describing themselves as “one nation, two states”.
The controversy began on 21 September, when Azerbaijan’s government adopted Resolution No. 309, amending the regulations governing uniforms in state schools. The changes prohibit clothing that conflicts with prescribed uniforms or the secular character of public education.
Although the new regulations do not explicitly mention Islamic headscarves, some schools have interpreted them as prohibiting the hijab. A further decision on 6 October introduced similar requirements for teachers. Women in Baku and Sumgayit subsequently reported being instructed to remove their headscarves or risk losing their positions.
The enforcement of these regulations prompted demonstrations outside schools, with girls carrying placards demanding access to education. Male pupils also joined protests in support of their classmates. Such demonstrations are unusual in Azerbaijan, where public assemblies face extensive restrictions.
On 12 October, the Interior Ministry reported that 37 people had been detained in Baku, alleging disruption of public order, damage to property and obstruction of school activities. Activists claimed that more than 200 people had been detained, although that higher figure has not been independently confirmed.
In a statement issued on 16 October, Amnesty International criticised the exclusion of pupils and called for the release of peaceful demonstrators. The organisation also raised concerns over the reported detention of a mother protesting her daughter’s exclusion and the disappearance of an activist who had organised educational assistance for affected children.
Access to TikTok and Instagram was disrupted as the protests spread online. Internet monitoring organisations documented restrictions, although Azerbaijani authorities have not publicly explained their cause.
The dispute acquired an international dimension when Oktay Saral, a senior adviser to Erdoğan, condemned the exclusion of girls wearing headscarves.
In a public statement on 12 October, Saral questioned how preventing a girl from attending school because of her religious clothing could be reconciled with justice. He demanded that Azerbaijan reverse the restrictions. Several AKP parliamentarians subsequently joined the criticism.
The response from Baku was unusually confrontational. In its official statement, the New Azerbaijan Party accused Turkish political figures and media organisations of conducting a systematic campaign against Azerbaijan.
The party argued that religious solidarity did not entitle one Muslim-majority country to dictate another’s domestic policies. It described the Turkish politicians’ interventions as irresponsible and warned against attempts to interfere with Azerbaijan’s sovereignty.
The disagreement reflects contrasting approaches to secularism. Azerbaijan, a predominantly Shia Muslim country, has maintained strict state control over religious institutions since independence from the Soviet Union. Turkey, by contrast, has progressively removed restrictions on Islamic headscarves under Erdoğan’s government, reversing policies previously associated with its secular establishment.
The dispute has also reopened disagreements concerning Azerbaijan’s relationship with Israel.
Baku maintains substantial security and defence cooperation with Israel, including military technology and equipment supplied during its conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkey supported Azerbaijan during that conflict but has adopted an increasingly confrontational position towards Israel.
As EU Today has previously examined, the relationships between Turkey, Azerbaijan and Israel reveal competing strategic interests beneath Ankara and Baku’s declared solidarity.
In its October statement, the New Azerbaijan Party specifically rejected criticism of Azerbaijani-Israeli relations, insisting that its dealings with Israel were legitimate bilateral arrangements. The inclusion of Israel in a response ostensibly concerning school uniforms indicates that the disagreement extends beyond religious clothing.
A further escalation emerged on 16 October when Azerbaijani prosecutors announced charges against Turkish journalist Celal Çiftçi, accusing him of advocating the violent overthrow of the Azerbaijani government in social media posts connected to the controversy. An arrest warrant was reportedly issued in his absence. Prosecutors did not publish the posts, and Çiftçi’s response was not available.
Despite the increasingly hostile exchanges, there is little evidence of an imminent diplomatic rupture.
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan travelled to Baku on 15 October and met President Aliyev. The meeting addressed recent developments in bilateral relations, while Fidan publicly emphasised the enduring strategic partnership between the countries.
He acknowledged that differences could arise but argued that they should be resolved through direct dialogue rather than political confrontations on social media. Senior AKP figures have also sought to reduce tensions, stressing respect for Azerbaijan’s sovereign decisions.
The relationship extends far beyond shared language and cultural identity. Turkish military cooperation has been central to Azerbaijan’s regional security policy, while energy infrastructure and transport corridors connect the countries economically. Ankara also remains an important actor in the changing strategic balance of the South Caucasus.
For the European Union, the confrontation is relevant because Azerbaijan remains an important energy supplier and trading partner, while Turkey occupies a central position in regional transport and security arrangements.
The immediate question is whether Baku will reconsider the application of its school regulations. The wider political dispute concerns the extent to which Turkey can criticise Azerbaijan’s domestic policies without jeopardising a partnership that both governments have consistently presented as a cornerstone of their foreign policy.
The public confrontation has exposed differences that had previously been managed within the bilateral relationship. However, Fidan’s intervention and the continued diplomatic engagement suggest that both governments are seeking to contain the dispute rather than dismantle their alliance.
File image.
United States President Donald Trump said on October 13 he may ask Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to help address Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia, despite Ankara’s stated refusal to participate in offensive military operations against the Yemeni group.
“I might do it,” Trump told reporters before leaving for a campaign trip to Alaska. “President Erdogan, I think, would do as I ask.”
Trump did not specify what role he envisioned for Turkey or say whether Washington had formally approached Ankara on the matter.
His remarks came as Saudi Arabia faced a renewed wave of Houthi missile and drone attacks, including a strike on King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh that killed 13 people and wounded more than 300, and another that hit Aramco headquarters in Dhahran.
Turkey is a signatory to the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, established in August with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. The agreement treats an armed attack on one member as an attack on all, but Ankara has drawn a distinction between defending its partners and joining their offensive campaigns.
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan explicitly ruled out the latter on October 8, stressing that Ankara will aid in defense only.
“But this is a defensive agreement. When a country party to the pact comes under attack, you stand by it in its defense. This is not an offensive agreement. Turkey will not send troops to another country to carry out attacks on its territory,” he said at a news conference in Ankara, according to Reuters.
Turkey has opted to provide Saudi Arabia with limited defensive and technical assistance. Reuters reported October 7, citing officials, that the support included military equipment, intelligence sharing, air defense capabilities, logistical assistance and help with surveillance and defensive planning.
Trump’s potential request is unlikely to override these established limits. The Mecca agreement had yet to receive Turkish parliamentary ratification as of October15, after Erdogan said three days earlier that it would be submitted to lawmakers soon.
Article 92 of Turkey’s constitution generally places the authority to approve the deployment of Turkish armed forces abroad with the Grand National Assembly, subject to exceptions under applicable international treaties. A direct combat role would therefore face a significant legal and political hurdle.
Even if Ankara eventually approved an intervention, there is little reason to assume Turkish forces could achieve a decisive outcome where Saudi Arabia and its other allies have failed.
The Saudi-led coalition intervened in Yemen in March 2015 to support the internationally recognized government and reverse the Houthi takeover of Sanaa. More than 11 years later, the Houthis still control the capital and extensive territory in northern Yemen, despite years of military operations by Saudi Arabia and its allies.
A Turkish offensive would introduce another capable military into the conflict, but it would not resolve the underlying challenge of defeating an entrenched opponent that has withstood more than a decade of regional military pressure, including intense bombing campaigns
by the U.S. and Israel.
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Belgium’s foreign minister has called on the EU to deepen its economic, trade, and defence ties with Turkey, amid concerns from Ankara that it risks being shut out of the bloc’s new rules on industrial supply chains and multi-billion euro defence procurement scheme.
Speaking at a Turkey-EU business forum in Brussels on Tuesday (13 October), Belgian foreign minister Maxime Pévot said that European manufacturers were increasingly looking for reliable partners closer to home as they seek to reduce their reliance on Chinese inputs.
“We should make values of its proximity, particularly in sectors where Europe needs to reduce strategic dependencies,” he added.
“Our economic relationship should no longer be limited to buying and selling goods. We should also be developing, producing, and investing together,” he said.
For his part, following talks with Ankara’s trade minister, Ömer Bolat, EU trade commissioner Maroš Šefčovič told reporters that the two sides had agreed on reforms to Turkey’s import control system to make the system easier for EU exporters to use and a mutual recognition pact on trusted traders.
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Azerbaijan’s ruling New Azerbaijan Party on October 13 urged Turkey’s governing party to stop interfering in Azerbaijan’s domestic affairs after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s chief adviser and ruling-party lawmakers criticized restrictions on headscarves in Azerbaijani schools.
In a statement released through its press service, the New Azerbaijan Party accused Turkish media outlets and social media platforms, including sources close to Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party, or AKP, of spreading what it described as false, biased and defamatory information about Azerbaijan.
The party claimed that criticism by Turkish officials had become part of a broader campaign against the country as a whole.
The statement singled out Erdoğan’s chief adviser, Oktay Saral, and AKP lawmakers for making what it called populist and irresponsible remarks without adequately considering Azerbaijan’s constitutional system and legal framework for religious freedom.
“Using sensitive issues such as the headscarf as instruments of political manipulation and division serves neither the unity of the Turkish people nor the solidarity of the Muslim world,” the party said.
It called on the AKP leadership to “refrain from this harmful policy” and rejected the use of the issue as a means of political pressure against Azerbaijan.
The dispute follows a September 21 decision by Azerbaijan’s Cabinet of Ministers that amended school uniform regulations, prohibiting clothing that violates uniform requirements or conflicts with the secular principle of general education.
The decision does not explicitly mention the hijab, but some schools have prevented girls wearing Islamic headscarves from attending classes. Reports have also described restrictions affecting teachers wearing hijabs, prompting protests and criticism of the policy.
The Azerbaijani Press Agency, citing the government decision, said the amendment was intended to establish uniform clothing standards consistent with the country’s secular education system. However, critics of its implementation have argued that it restricts religious freedom and the right to education.
Saral entered the dispute on October 12, writing on social media that preventing students from attending school because they wore headscarves was unacceptable. He urged Azerbaijani authorities to reverse the restrictions, arguing that religious clothing should not prevent young people from receiving an education.
“Hijab is not an obstacle, but a requirement of faith,” Saral wrote, adding that the right to education should not be sacrificed to ideological dictates. His remarks were reported by Turkish and Azerbaijani media.
The criticism has extended beyond political statements. Demonstrators gathered outside Azerbaijan’s consulate in Istanbul last week to protest the restrictions and call on the authorities in Baku to reconsider the rules.
Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev responded indirectly to the growing criticism, warning against interference in the country’s way of life without explicitly naming Turkey.
On October 7, AKP spokesman Ömer Çelik sought to emphasize the strength of the bilateral relationship, describing Turkey and Azerbaijan as “one nation, two states.” He said disagreements between the countries could be discussed openly between allies and accused unnamed countries of driving a wedge between the two. Çelik also criticized groups and social media users in Turkey for targeting Azerbaijan.
The New Azerbaijan Party’s latest statement emphasized that the two countries’ historical ties did not give either side the right to interfere in the other’s domestic affairs. It noted that both countries are constitutionally secular states and argued that Azerbaijan’s education policy should not become an instrument of political pressure.
The statement also defended Azerbaijan’s relations with Israel, rejecting what it described as deliberate distortions of those ties. It said Baku maintains normal interstate relations with Israel while supporting Palestinian rights, providing financial and humanitarian assistance to Palestinians, and backing a two-state solution with East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine.
The party argued that Azerbaijan’s position on Palestine and its relations with Israel were compatible, rejecting criticism that sought to portray its foreign policy as inconsistent with solidarity among Muslim countries.
Invoking the longstanding description of the countries as “one nation, two states,” the New Azerbaijan Party said the principle reflected the friendship between two independent countries and could not justify attempts by one side to impose its political or ideological views on the other.
The dispute is testing the limits of the countries’ “one nation, two states” alliance, exposing tensions between Baku’s insistence on noninterference and the religious-solidarity arguments advanced by figures within Erdoğan’s party.
It also highlights the growing prominence of Islamist and religious-conservative rhetoric within the AKP, which has increasingly used religious identity as part of its political messaging.
The issue carries an additional religious dimension, as Azerbaijan’s Muslim population is predominantly Shiite, while Turkey is majority Sunni, although both countries are constitutionally secular and their partnership has largely been driven by shared linguistic, strategic and regional interests rather than sectarian identity.
While the dispute has not amounted to a formal diplomatic rupture, it underscores how competing approaches to religion and domestic policy can strain even close strategic partnerships.
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Saudi Arabia is desperately trying to reverse its losses on the ground in the Yemeni conflict, while Houthi attacks reach its airports and threaten its oil trade. Yet the coalition Riyadh has assembled does not match the war it wants to fight. Washington is engaged in the conflict with Iran, Turkey excludes offensive deployments, and Pakistan draws the line at crossing into Yemen. The kingdom has foreign support, but the burden of recovering and holding territory still falls on its weakened Yemeni partners.
Retreat Before the Counteroffensive
By early October 2026, Riyadh was responding to a deteriorating military position. The Houthis’ September advance along Yemen’s western coast brought the loss of Mokha and strategic positions around Bab el-Mandeb. These setbacks exposed the weakness of Saudi-backed forces and strengthened the Houthis’ leverage over a shipping route increasingly important to Saudi oil exports.
The renewed Saudi–Houthi escalation began with the July 13, 2026, strike on Sanaa airport’s runway. Saudi aircraft sought to prevent an Iranian Mahan Air flight carrying a senior Houthi delegation from landing without coalition permission. The plane later landed in Hodeida after Omani mediation, but the Houthis retaliated against Abha airport and subsequently announced a blockade on Saudi shipping. The strike broke the relative calm established by the 2022 truce; September’s coastal offensive then turned the confrontation into a major territorial setback for Riyadh’s partners.
The retreat exposed divisions within the anti-Houthi camp. Saudi–Emirati cooperation had broken down, and the withdrawal of the UAE left command arrangements that Riyadh failed to replace effectively. The factions expected to carry the offensive remained divided and poorly prepared for a sustained campaign. Saudi airpower could not compensate for the absence of a coherent local force.
The cost is also being felt inside Saudi Arabia. The October 10, 2026, attack on Riyadh’s King Khalid International Airport killed 12 people and wounded 309, according to Saudi authorities, and temporarily suspended operations. Riyadh blamed the Houthis, who renewed their warning against using Saudi airports and airspace on October 11. Airport disruption, cancelled flights and attacks on oil facilities bring the economic consequences of the war directly into the kingdom. The Saudi air campaign has not secured its civilian infrastructure.
Operation Dawn of Yemen began on October 5, 2026, after Saudi-backed Yemeni leader Rashad al-Alimi announced military action the previous day. The immediate objective was to recover the coastal positions lost in September, alongside the Saudi-backed Yemeni government’s broader ambition to restore its authority over Houthi-held territory. On October 11, the coalition announced the destruction of 136 military targets in a large-scale operation. That tally says little about whether Saudi-backed units can hold territory, secure supply routes or reopen shipping lanes.
Houthi footage released October 10, 2026: Shawaz drone strikes on Saudi-backed forces in Kahbub and Al-Waziya, as presented by the movement’s military media
Why Taiz Matters
The counteroffensive has produced conflicting accounts of control on the coast. On October 9, 2026, Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to Yemen announced that Bab el-Mandeb and Mayun Island had been cleared of Houthi forces. The Houthis maintained that they still held those positions. Control of the waterway remains contested, despite Riyadh’s announcements of success.
Taiz adds another strain after the coastal setbacks. Pressure on its approaches threatens supply routes and forces Saudi-backed units to divide their effort between the inland front and the Red Sea coast. The Houthis can disrupt their opponents’ counteroffensive without winning every coastal engagement: sustained pressure inland prevents those opponents from concentrating their forces. Saudi airpower does not resolve the fragmentation of the Saudi-backed Yemeni forces expected to hold the ground.
Houthi military footage released October 10, 2026: the movement presents advances and the surrender of opposing fighters in Sami, As-Silw and Al-Mawasit, Taiz province. The fighting places further pressure on the ground forces on which Riyadh’s campaign depends
The Iran War Narrows Saudi Options
The US–Israeli war with Iran, which began in February 2026, has expanded the military demands on Washington. Regional deployments, shipping protection and operations against Iran compete with Saudi requests for a larger American role in Yemen. Riyadh cannot assume that American support will expand on its terms. Its dependence on outside assistance has grown at the same time as the regional war has made that assistance more conditional.
The Iran war compounds Saudi Arabia’s vulnerability. Disruption at Hormuz has increased Riyadh’s dependence on its westbound pipeline and Red Sea ports. Southbound cargoes from Yanbu must pass Bab el-Mandeb; northbound exports follow a different route. Moving crude across the peninsula bypasses Hormuz, but it does not remove the threat to shipping off Yemen.
Pressure at Bab el-Mandeb gives Iran an additional advantage while the Houthis gain territory and bargaining power of their own. Their overlapping interests put Riyadh under pressure on two fronts. A Washington–Tehran agreement would not automatically end the war in Yemen: the Houthis have their own territorial, political and economic demands.
Washington is already involved through military advisers, intelligence and targeting support. The issue is the extent of that involvement, not American neutrality. Earlier in October 2026, Trump rejected Saudi requests for direct strikes; after the Riyadh airport attack, he said the United States might join them. Riyadh still lacks a firm American commitment to the wider offensive. Its requests compete with Washington’s military operations and priorities in the Iran war.
Allies Draw Their Own Lines
Riyadh’s response is to widen its support network through the Mecca pact, signed with Turkey and Pakistan on August 7, 2026, and activated on October 5. But an agreement to defend Saudi Arabia is not an agreement to win its war in Yemen. Pakistan’s military presence and Turkey’s technical, intelligence and air-defense assistance address the kingdom’s security without supplying a joint ground campaign across the border.
The alliance has a secretary-general, retired Pakistani general Nauman Mahmood, but its detailed force-generation timetable, operational command arrangements, cost-sharing formula and mission duration remain unpublished. On October 8, 2026, Ankara excluded offensive operations while parliamentary ratification was pending. On October 9, Islamabad confirmed a substantial military presence in the kingdom but ruled out crossing into Yemen to attack the Houthis. Riyadh is obtaining defensive commitments, not a combined expeditionary army.
Pakistan’s decision-making has also shifted. In 2015, parliament unanimously rejected participation in the Yemen war while promising to defend Saudi territory and holy sites. In October 2026, reinforcement commitments are proceeding without a parliamentary vote. The government says it followed the necessary procedures. The political result is a narrower domestic debate over a commitment that could draw Pakistan further into the conflict.
Fewer political checks make deployments easier to authorize and harder to reconsider once costs and casualties accumulate. Pakistan’s own security pressures add another burden: the October 11, 2026, emergency in opposition-run Khyber Pakhtunkhwa coincides with its commitments to Saudi Arabia. Islamabad is extending support abroad while managing a deepening confrontation at home.
Peshawar, October 11, 2026: police guard the approach to the Red Zone. Pakistan’s overseas security commitments coincide with emergency measures at home
Saudi-led coalition footage, October 9, 2026: the coalition announces strikes on three Houthi missile launchers. The continuing attacks inside Saudi Arabia expose the limits of destroying individual launch sites
Defensive support can still sustain the offensive by freeing Saudi assets for use in Yemen. France’s support for the defense of Yanbu and Britain’s refueling assistance contribute to that effort. But none of this repairs the weakness of Riyadh’s Yemeni ground forces. Pakistan also has its border with Iran and its mediation role to consider, while Turkey keeps its commitment separate from offensive operations. Each partner sets limits according to its own interests.
Different Interests, No Shared Victory
Pakistan’s proposed $1.21 billion IMF disbursement awaits board approval. Turkey’s September 2026 inflation was 29.73%, with its policy rate at 37%. Both face financial pressures that favor limited missions over an open-ended expedition. Who pays for the current assistance remains undisclosed.
Saudi Arabia’s updated deficit forecast is 4.9% of GDP. September 2026’s non-oil purchasing managers’ index stood at 55.3, indicating expansion before the latest escalation. The airport attacks and disruption to transport now place that activity under additional pressure. Riyadh must finance the campaign while protecting the infrastructure and trade on which its wider economic plans depend.
The Houthis are using that pressure to advance their negotiating demands. On October 10, 2026, the Houthi authorities proposed reciprocal exclusion of airports, ports and other humanitarian infrastructure from blockade and attack. The proposal seeks to exchange limits on disruption for concessions over access and blockade. It puts the economic consequences of continued fighting at the center of the bargaining.
The conflict of interests runs through the entire coalition. Riyadh wants to reverse Houthi gains and protect Saudi infrastructure. The Saudi-backed Yemeni government wants to restore its authority. Turkey and Pakistan seek bounded commitments, and Washington calculates its involvement against the Iran war. The Houthis seek concessions while preserving their military leverage. A common adversary has not produced an agreed objective or a shared willingness to bear the cost.
Saudi Arabia therefore has partners willing to help defend the kingdom, but those partners have made no common commitment to reverse Riyadh’s setbacks in Yemen or sustain the ground campaign of the Saudi-backed Yemeni government. That is the gap behind the coalition’s announcements and strike tallies. Without stronger local forces and a political settlement addressing shipping, attacks and access, additional foreign support can prolong the campaign without resolving it. Riyadh risks remaining surrounded by allies while carrying a war none of them has agreed to finish.
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Written by Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio this week hailed Greece as an “indispensable” NATO partner – and a pillar of stability in a region marked by “geopolitical uncertainty”. The two sides announced expanded counterterrorism information-sharing. A defense agreement has been reached – worth up to $4 billion. Rubio also backed energy projects such as the undersea electricity interconnector linking Greece to Cyprus, and eventually Israel. At the same time, Rubio insisted a military clash between Turkey and Greece remains “unthinkable” and something the United States would “never allow.” He stressed that both are NATO allies and that conflict would harm all three countries.
When someone emphatically insists that they would never set a house on fire, the very emphasis makes people wonder whether the risk exists. Similarly, Rubio’s statement highlights that Greek-Turkish tensions remain serious enough to require public reassurance from Washington. It would thus seem that the two neighboring countries’ Atlantic membership alone is no guarantee of stability on the Alliance’s southeastern flank. NATO itself has in fact long been split over the “Turkish Question”.
As I argued previously, Trump’s warm embrace of Erdogan in July (recently reiterated), his subsequent signals that he would lift CAATSA sanctions and consider F-35 sales to Turkey, have already raised concerns in Athens – and Israel, for that matter. This exposed divisions, at a time when Ankara pursues strategic autonomy – while also clashing with “allies” over the Aegean, Syria, and the Eastern Mediterranean. Since at least last year, it has been noted how “sidelining” Turkey risks weakening the Alliance’s southeastern flank – and how the Athens-Ankara rivalry in turn exposes NATO’s fragile unity. These tensions predate the current US-Greece deepening of ties.
A closer American-Greek strategic relationship could alienate Turkey (despite Trump’s warmth) and generate further friction within the Alliance. Ankara might perceive the US as strengthening Greece’s military position, its diplomatic leverage, and regional role – at Ankara’s expense. Washington in turn may regard the Hellenic Republic as increasingly “indispensable” – while still viewing Turkey as strategically essential. Those two policies are not inherently incompatible, but they become harder and harder to sustain when Greek and Turkish interests directly conflict.
The latest developments illustrate the dilemma: Greece hosts key US facilities such as Souda Bay, and offers geographic advantages in the Eastern Mediterranean. While the $4 billion arms package builds on existing F-35 procurement and modernization, American support for the electricity interconnector, however, runs up against maritime disputes: Greece seeks to resume seabed surveys, while Turkey argues that the work requires prior coordination under its Libya maritime agreement. The combination of military capability, infrastructure access, and energy influence could look much more serious for Ankara than any single statement. The Greek-Turkish dispute over territorial waters, airspace, continental shelves, and island militarization is longstanding.
This creates the conditions for a security dilemma: Athens strengthens defenses out of distrust, Ankara perceives a shift in the balance and responds – and each side’s measures reinforce the other’s insecurity. Moreover, perception matters in foreign relations. Calling Greece “indispensable” does carry symbolic weight. If Turkey sees Washington investing in Greek capacity while its own F-35 path remains blocked by S-400-related legal restrictions, the asymmetry, so to speak, becomes politically relevant. Domestic prestige and national grievances in both capitals can amplify the effect, thereby creating incentives for public pushback even when direct confrontation would be costly. How can the US and NATO “balance” this?
Washington could separate bilateral defense ties from endorsement of every territorial claim. “Private diplomacy”, as Rubio has indicated, can manage sensitive issues better than public statements. NATO’s existing Greece-Turkey military deconfliction mechanism, established in 2020 with a hotline, can reduce the risk of incidents. The problem is the Alliance itself cannot simply adjudicate Aegean disputes or impose maritime boundaries. Article 5 does not offer a straightforward path for one member against another. NATO’s priority remains preventing hostilities rather than settling sovereignty questions.
At least three scenarios remain plausible: managed competition, with military modernization proceeding alongside negotiations over the underlying rivalries somehow; Turkish strategic pushback through diplomacy, counter-procurement, or greater use of its leverage within the Atlantic Organization; or an “incident” in the Aegean or around Cyprus that would force Washington and NATO into crisis-management mode.
Thus far, Washington has tried to cultivate both bilateral relationships. Greece cannot replace Turkey’s geographic and military assets spanning Europe, the Black Sea, and the Middle East. Washington appears to be strengthening the Hellenic Republic as a sort of strategic hedge, expanding its military access and logistical options in the Eastern Mediterranean – to mitigate the risks of Turkey’s progressively independent and unpredictable (often aggressive) foreign policy. Even as Ankara itself remains an important NATO (and US) ally in its own right. The recent advances in American-Greek relations enhance the challenge without resolving the underlying contradictions. They reflect a deeper transatlantic contradiction in the context of an increasingly divided West.
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Illustrative image. (Telegram)
Pakistan has begun directly striking Yemen’s Houthis, a senior Pakistani military official told The New York Times on October 8, bringing Islamabad into Saudi Arabia’s renewed air campaign and exposing different interpretations among the members of a newly activated defense pact with Riyadh.
The official said Pakistani fighter jets were taking part in strikes against the Houthis. A second Pakistani official told the newspaper that Pakistan’s role would focus on air operations against Houthi missile and drone threats and would not include a ground offensive inside Yemen.
The reports came three days after Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey activated their Makkah Joint Defense Agreement following a series of Houthi attacks on Saudi territory.
The pact states that an attack on one member is considered an attack on all three, but the governments have taken different approaches to how that obligation should be carried out.
Pakistan had already confirmed that its forces were in Saudi Arabia. Lt. Gen. Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, spokesman for Pakistan’s military, said on October 8 that Pakistani forces were operating in the kingdom in “multiple capabilities and domains.”
Turkey has taken a more limited approach. Reuters reported on October 7 that Ankara was providing Saudi Arabia with mainly defensive and technical assistance, including air defense systems, logistical support, drone operators, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities.
Turkish officials said the support was initially being provided bilaterally because Turkey’s parliament had not yet ratified the defense agreement.
Following Reuters’ report, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan made clear that Turkey would not follow Pakistan into direct attacks inside Yemen.
Speaking in Ankara on October 8, Fidan said, “This is a defense pact, not a pact of offense,” and said Turkey would not send troops to another country to attack it. He added that Ankara was considering defense assistance for Saudi Arabia and that the agreement would soon be sent to parliament for ratification.
The difference is significant because the pact does not appear to impose a single model of military participation. Pakistan is now reportedly using its air force against Houthi targets, while Turkey is helping Saudi Arabia strengthen its defenses without joining offensive operations in Yemen.
The Pakistani contribution is relatively limited in size. Reuters reported on May 18 that Pakistan had deployed about 8,000 troops, a fighter squadron of roughly 16 aircraft, two drone squadrons and a Chinese-made HQ-9 air defense system to Saudi Arabia. The fighter squadron consisted mostly of JF-17 aircraft.
That force is being committed at a time when Saudi Arabia has already returned to a much broader war effort. Saudi-backed Yemeni forces launched a major offensive on October 4 to recover territory from the Houthis around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, with more than 100 Saudi warplanes supporting the operation, according to The Associated Press. The Houthis have largely repelled the offensive. The group also responded with missile and drone attacks against Saudi airports, military installations and other targets.
Saudi Arabia has fought this war before, with no success. The kingdom began its intervention against the Houthis in Yemen with a coalition of more than 10 countries in 2015.
At the time, Saudi Arabia was reported to have mobilized around 100 warplanes and 150,000 troops, while aircraft from Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Sudan, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain participated in the campaign.
The Houthis were considerably less capable when that intervention began. Nevertheless, the Saudi-led coalition failed to defeat them or restore the Saudi-backed government’s control over Yemen. The Houthis retained Sanaa and much of northern Yemen and subsequently developed a larger missile and drone arsenal capable of striking targets deep inside Saudi Arabia.
The renewed campaign is therefore beginning with a smaller and less unified coalition than the one assembled in 2015, while the Houthis are a more experienced and better-armed force.
Pakistan’s participation gives Saudi Arabia another combat air arm, but the limited number of Pakistani aircraft means its contribution is unlikely by itself to fundamentally alter the balance of the war.
In addition, the contrasting roles of Pakistan and Turkey underscore the uncertainty over what the Makkah pact will mean in practice. Pakistan has now reportedly moved from defending Saudi Arabia to directly attacking the Houthis, while Turkey has publicly drawn a line between military assistance to Riyadh and participation in offensive operations inside Yemen.
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introduction by Gospa News Editorial Staff
Originally posted on October, 7, 2026 – updated on October, 8, 2026
As the tragic anniversary of October 7, 2023, approaches —the day Hamas terrorists massacred Israelis near the Gaza Strip border, triggering the genocide in Palestine perpetrated by Benjamin Netanyahu’s Zionist regime —we are publishing an exclusive intelligence analysis.
This video marks the launch of a new Gospa News series titled “TOP SECRET Interview” by Fabio G.C. Carisio—founder and director of Gospa News—which will also be republished on the long-standing American site VT UnCensored Foreign Policy (where Carisio hosts a column).
This features an interview with Antonio Evangelista, a top Italian police official and counter-terrorism expert who spent seven years as Interpol official in Jordan, and who is now an author of geopolitical essayes and novels concerning international intrigue.
He confirms that the recent attack in the Holy Land—like the September 11 attack on the Twin Towers in New York—was a horrific “false flag” operations…
A “false flag” operation is one carefully premeditated over a long period by a foreign intelligence entity to implicate an enemy nation and discredit it in the eyes of global public opinion. It is planned down to the finest detail, carrying the risk of causing actual casualties.
In fact, if unforeseen “collateral damage”—such as unexpected deaths beyond the planned injuries or killings—occurs during the operation, the orchestrators are even more pleased, as the resulting bloodshed lends greater credibility to the terrorist attack.
Historically, the CIA (US counter-intelligence) and Mossad (Israeli counter-intelligence) have been recognized masters of such plots, occasionally utilizing partners such as the secret services of other nations or terrorist groups.
In the video, the former Interpol official answers the following questions by Gospa News director Fabio Giuseppe Carlo Carisio:
No summary today. If you want to hear the answers, watch the video to the end.
Below the video, you will find links to the major investigations mentioned in the footage.
“NATO’s LIES ON MEDITERRANEAN WARS FOR GAS”. Exclusive Interview to Former Interpol EU Officer
US Researchers: “Investors may have had Prior Knowledge of Hamas Attack on Israel”
Declassified Guantanamo Court Filing Suggests some 9/11 Hijackers were CIA Agents
Click to see the full-size image
Written by Damir Nazarov
Following Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, analysts interpreted the move as an attempt by Netanyahu to establish a foothold against Yemen’s Ansar Allah and gain leverage in the Red Sea. However, the recognition of officials from this separatist enclave in the Horn of Africa indicates that Israel’s plans extend beyond countering the Houthis; Turkey also figures among the adversaries of the Israeli state.
About a year ago, Mohamed Osman Fadal, a senior foreign policy advisor to the President of Somaliland, stated that they “need air defense systems” to counter Turkish F-16s and drones stationed in Mogadishu. He further noted, “We want Israel to support us in the confrontation with Turkey.” About a year ago, Mohamed Osman Fadal, a senior foreign policy advisor to the President of Somaliland, stated that they “need air defense systems” to counter the Turkish F-16s and drones stationed in Mogadishu. He further noted, “We want Israel to support us in the confrontation with Turkey.”
This stance reflects the sentiments within Somaliland’s self-proclaimed administration and aligns with Netanyahu’s ambitions, as both parties seek to prepare as fully as possible for a clash with the de facto government of Somalia. The official Somali army already possesses special forces and a navy trained by Turkey, as well as T129 ATAK helicopters, the renowned Bayraktar UAV, and even M48 and M60 tanks.
Recently, Somali President Sheikh Hassan Mohamud stated that Israel plans to establish a naval base in the port city of Berbera—located in Somaliland—and utilize its airport. Mohamud made this statement in an interview with Al Jazeera, warning that Mogadishu would oppose any Israeli military presence in territory it considers part of Somalia. “Under no circumstances will we allow an Israeli presence in the country based on the way Israel treats Somaliland.”
Circumstances are compelling the parties to arm themselves, and it is quite likely that the Horn of Africa will become the first theater of open confrontation between Israel and Turkey.
If the battle against separatists in Somalia is supposedly the first frontline, then who is next? The Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean sea, where Greece is gradually being drawn into Israel’s sphere of influence.
According to media reports, in late August, Ankara redeployed the 51st Commando Brigade—comprising approximately 2,000 professional special forces troops—from Hozat in the country’s east to the Söke district in Aydın province, directly opposite the Greek island of Samos.
Earlier in the spring, Greece purchased weapons from Israel worth approximately 2.3 billion shekels. The arsenal includes the Elbit-developed PULS system, training missiles, precision-guided munitions, loitering munitions, and ten years of logistical support. This new acquisition is part of Greece’s plan to modernize its armed forces by 2030. Athens intends to spend around 28 billion euros by 2036 to establish an Israeli-style defense system—known in Greece as the “Achilles Shield”—and to purchase up to 40 F-35 fighter jets from the US, as well as frigates from France and Italy.
While many experts believe Greece took this step in response to threats arising from the US-Israeli conflict with Iran—particularly given Tehran’s strikes on US allies in the Persian Gulf—it is also clear that Greece is concerned about Turkey’s growing capabilities in the field of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). On top of all this, let us not forget that Greece is preparing to establish a “Mediterranean Quadrilateral Dialogue” with India, Israel, and Cyprus, serving as a counterweight to the “Mecca Pact” involving Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan.
The region is gradually entering a new level of conflict, with blocs now forming in anticipation of a future redistribution of spheres of influence. Israel, the primary proponent of the IMEC project, views Turkey as an adversary due to its strategically important position along the Silk Road. Consequently, Somaliland and Greece are poised to become key players in Israel’s strategy to curtail the influence of Turkey and its allies.
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Click to see full-size image. (Aselsan)
Turkey supplied a small number of Korkut air defense systems to Ukraine earlier this year, allowing Kyiv forces to test the weapons during Russian attacks, the Middle East Eye reported on October 5, citing several people familiar with the matter.
The report said the systems were used both to strengthen Ukraine’s air defenses and to assess the equipment under combat conditions. Its sources did not disclose how many were delivered to Kyiv forces.
A Ukrainian official who spoke to Middle East Eye claimed that the system had performed well against Russian attacks, but admitted that there were problems.
“Korkut has been pretty much successful in countering the Russian attacks,” the official said. “There were of course some problems but nothing that couldn’t be overcome through some small adjustments.”
The official described Korkut as a battle-proven weapon and said Ukraine was interested in acquiring additional systems from Turkey.
“If the pricing is right, we would like to buy more,” the official said.
The report did not specify which version of Korkut Ukraine received. Korkut is a family of short-range air defense systems produced by Turkish defense company Aselsan, with variants using different guns and configurations, including 35 mm systems and newer 25 mm versions intended in particular for countering drones.
Aselsan chief executive Ahmet Akyol said the Korkut system was already in service in nine countries and that the company had begun exporting it after establishing its performance with the Turkish military.
“We will announce new Korkut export contracts in coming days,” he told Turkish television, according to Middle East Eye.
The reported delivery comes amid increasing signs of expanding Turkish weapons sales and defense cooperation with Ukraine.
Middle East Eye said several Turkish defense companies are working with Kyiv forces to test their weapons and improve their capabilities, while a separate deal on the transfer of American weapons through Turkey is moving forward. That package, approved by the United States in August, includes 70 M39 ATACMS tactical ballistic missiles.
Turkey has supplied Ukraine with a range of military equipment since the start of the Russian special military operation in Ukraine, including Bayraktar TB2 drones, laser-guided missiles, artillery ammunition and machine guns. Still, all of these weapons were sold to Kyiv, not provided as aid, which sets Ankara apart from other NATO members.
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SouthFront: Analysis and Intelligence
NOW hosted at southfront.press
Previously, SouthFront: Analysis and Intelligence was at southfront.org.
The .org domain name had been blocked by the US (NATO) (https://southfront.press/southfront-org-blocked-by-u-s-controlled-global-internet-supervisor/) globally, outlawed and without any explanation
Back before that, from 2013 to 2015, SouthFront: Analysis and Intelligence was at southfront.com
The post Turkey Supplied Ukraine With ‘Korkut’ Air Defense Systems appeared first on South Front.
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