By Peter VAN BUREN

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Critics of Trump’s diplomatic staffing don’t address why it’s important to have a top man on the ground in the Zoom era.

During my more than two decades at the State Department as a diplomat, my well-meaning mother often asked what I’d have to do to make ambassador. The answer was simple: Dad would have to die young, and Mom would then have to donate the whole estate to the winner of the next presidential election. Then I’d get appointed ambassador to a small, unimportant country. For so many reasons, I am glad Dad lived to a ripe old age, and that Mom looks forward to taking care of the Humane Society in her will instead. I would have made a terrible ambassador.

Since 1960, 72 percent of America’s ambassadors to desirable posts in Western Europe and the Caribbean have been political appointees like the recently departed Kimberly Guilfoyle, as I might have been if the plan with Mom had worked out. Their primary and often only qualification is spending big on the guy who won the presidency. Career diplomats on the other hand are often promoted as ambassador into politically less important hardship posts, no donation required. All must be confirmed by the Senate. The United States is unusual among developed democracies in the scale of political ambassadorial appointments. Unlike the U.S., most developed democracies, including Britain, Germany, Japan, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, reserve ambassadorships almost entirely for career diplomats.

So while the debate over political ambassadors versus career diplomats has gone on for more than a century, in 2026 the more interesting question may be whether we need ambassadors in every capital at all. What useful and productive thing was Guilfoyle doing in Greece anyway?

It is important to have a good person in the role; he acts as the personal representative of his country’s leader, in America’s case, answerable to the Oval Office. He receives confidential instructions from the White House before taking up his job abroad, and for many political ambassadors, can often pick up the phone and call the president and cabinet officials directly. I was in the room as a subject matter expert when ambassador Howard Baker simply picked up the phone and dialed Vice President Dick Cheney at his ranch in Wyoming and untied a significant bureaucratic knot that was burdening our relationship with Japan. This demonstrates something well-connected political ambassadors can uniquely do. On the other hand, communication inside an embassy can be problematic for political appointees; many Foreign Service Officers (FSO) see them as outsiders come to mess up their way of doing things and slow-walk ambassadorial initiatives because they are sure they know better. Political appointees, especially those taking leave from large businesses to serve, also tend to spend a lot of their time back in the U.S., creating friction with the staff.

In the American system, because most career ambassadors owe their own bottom-line allegiance (and pension) to the State Department, communication is often not that close and friendly with the Executive under most circumstances. A White House unsure of whether the State Department is even on its side will be unlikely to be reassured by a career ambassador in place, not to mention State’s long-standing institutional resistance to too many political appointees in general. Careerists usually do have strong host-country knowledge and maybe language skills. Some, however, can get too deep into the weeds on administrative, visa, or personnel matters a political appointee usually leaves to subordinates, and some use their new-found authority to settle old scores or pursue personal projects adjacent to core foreign policy.

The ambassadorial title remains the profession’s highest achievement. It would be surprising if ambitious FSOs did not aspire to it. But just being the most qualified for anything inside State is rarely enough. That leaves plenty of careerist yes-men around looking to get into an ambassador’s chair.

The struggle over who is better at the job, political appointees or careerists, will never conclusively end. It has been a factor of American diplomacy for decades, under all flavors of administrations. The mainstream media negatively focus on some of Trump’s ambassadorial choices, but to anyone familiar with diplomacy it is nothing more than another round in a century-old political argument.

The new question, unique to the second Trump administration, is whether or not the president should appoint anyone at all, career or political, to a particular ambassadorial job. Trump currently has 92 ambassadorial seats empty, with either the candidate stuck in the Senatorial confirmation process or the chair simply left vacant by Trump’s choice. The same number of empty offices at comparable points of their presidencies was only 54 under Biden, and 55 under the first Trump administration. A lot of the empties are in smaller countries of lesser political importance, but a few larger embassies stand out, including Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Germany. Some have pending nominees, some do not. Senate intransigence aside, this seems to be by choice. The real question is, however, how much it matters.

Any American embassy without an ambassador is led by a charge, someone temporarily in the ambassadorial role, typically the embassy’s deputy chief of mission (DCM). The DCM is usually a State Department career FSO, typically the most experienced and senior one at post, and often has done multiple tours in the country in subordinate roles. This seems like the kind of person State would want in charge, yet the American Foreign Service Association and most rank-and-file FSOs curiously complain about not having enough career officers in leadership roles. One wonders whether for some critics the temporary nature of the title itself has become too much the issue.

Things are complicated by the fact that until something goes wrong, most ambassadors work without real oversight. One of the criticisms in Dennis Jett’s excellent book American Ambassadors is the lack of standards and definitions of success for an ambassador. They report to the president after all, who is usually too busy to pay much attention to things on a day-to-day basis in Lesotho, no matter who the ambassador is. Underlings in the embassy by culture and negative experience tend to be sparse in their suggestions upward, and State has little of the military’s tradition of after-action summaries, tough lessons-learned reports, and sincere historical evaluation of mistakes. Ambassadors tend to choose their own path. Some try to be local celebrities, scoring photo-ops and ribbon-cuttings and hosting VIPs. Others focus near-exclusively on American business promotion abroad, while others remember their own days in the bureaucracy and dive deep into political or economic reporting. This all further complicates what is and is not a “good” ambassador. So do we really need them?

Some Democrats think so. Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s top Democrat, accused the administration of retreating from the world stage by leaving ambassadorial postings vacant. “China has ambassadors in nearly every country it has diplomatic relationships with, advancing its interests at the expense of America’s,” she said in a statement. Yet she and others rarely provide specific examples of what America’s ambassadors are doing or might be doing. Critics rarely identify policy outcomes that required a Senate-confirmed ambassador rather than a competent charge. That is the problem in these discussions, an unwavering belief that diplomatic presence is inherently valuable, even when its measurable effects are difficult to identify, and that if we’re not careful China will do it better. Remember of course the exact argument was made during the Cold War about the Soviet Union, leading the U.S. to open embassies in countries with little global importance, only to close them when priorities changed.

Ambassadors are increasingly curiosities left over from the 19th century, a past when Washington, DC, needed trusted representatives empowered to make decisions a world away. Embassies as they exist today were created for a world without Zoom, encrypted messaging, presidential and cabinet travel, celebrity special envoys, global media reporting, and easy direct leader-to-leader calls. It raises the question in 2026 that few people are willing to ask: If 92 embassies can function for months without ambassadors, how indispensable were those ambassadors in the first place?

Original article:  www.theamericanconservative.com

The realities obscured by the “One Nation” narrative intersect with broader imperialist power struggles, extending from the energy resources of the Caspian Basin to the trade routes of Eurasia.

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Although Ankara and Baku maintain a strong partnership spanning Karabakh, energy corridors, the defence industry and the Organization of Turkic States, the 2009 rapprochement with Armenia, the natural gas dispute of 2010 and the political tensions that have resurfaced today show that the two countries have long been engaged in a relationship marked by rivalry as well as cooperation.

Relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan have evolved since the dissolution of the Soviet Union through numerous partnerships in the political, economic and security spheres.

Turkey was the first country to recognise Azerbaijan’s independence. Its support for Baku during the Karabakh conflicts, joint oil and natural gas projects, and increasingly close military cooperation in recent years have all been presented through the political slogan “One Nation, Two States.” Yet several episodes have demonstrated that the two states do not necessarily interpret this supposed unity in the same way.

The tensions that have recently emerged over dress regulations and debates about secularism in Azerbaijan are particularly revealing in this respect. The responses from senior Azerbaijani officials to criticism originating in Turkey have exposed significant differences in how the two countries perceive their relationship.

While the Turkish side has promoted a vision of a “Greater Turkic World” under Ankara’s leadership through the “One Nation, Two States” narrative, the Azerbaijani side has responded with a different emphasis: “One nation, but two states.”

From 1991 to the present: How the foundations of the relationship were laid

Turkey recognised Azerbaijan’s independence on 9 November 1991, becoming the first country to do so. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were established on 14 January 1992. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a new era of interstate relations between Ankara and Baku began.

For Turkey, Azerbaijan was more than a country linked to it through a shared Turkic identity. The relationship also provided a strategic gateway to the Caspian Basin, Central Asia and the South Caucasus—an objective that aligned with the broader strategic interests of the United States as well. For Azerbaijan, meanwhile, Turkey was an important partner capable of providing political support on the international stage, facilitating access to Western markets and cooperating on security matters.

The famous slogan “One Nation, Two States,” popularised by former Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev, came to express a degree of closeness that went beyond ordinary diplomatic relations between the two countries.

One of the most important issues on the agenda in the early 1990s was the Karabakh conflict. In 1993, Turkey closed its land border with Armenia after Armenian forces took control of the Kelbajar district. This decision marked a defining moment in Ankara’s diplomatic position on the Karabakh conflict.

Turkish-Armenian relations thus became an integral part of Ankara’s relationship with Baku. Turkey’s policy towards Armenia began to be shaped not only by the dynamics of bilateral relations but also by its strategic partnership with Azerbaijan.

The first major tension: The rapprochement with Armenia

The problems that have periodically emerged in Turkey–Azerbaijan relations are not new. A closer look at the 2008–2010 period reveals how disagreements in both diplomacy and economics brought underlying tensions between the two countries into the open for the first time.

In 2008, Turkey and Armenia launched a renewed initiative to normalise relations. On 6 September 2008, then-Turkish President Abdullah Gül travelled to Yerevan at the invitation of Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan to watch a football match between the national teams of the two countries. The visit became one of the symbolic moments in the normalisation process between two countries pursuing different paths towards transatlantic integration. The initiative would subsequently become known as “football diplomacy.”

Following negotiations, Turkey and Armenia signed protocols in Zurich in October 2009 aimed at establishing diplomatic relations and developing bilateral ties.

The Azerbaijani leadership, however, viewed the process with considerable reservations. Baku regarded any normalisation between Ankara and Yerevan conducted independently of the Karabakh issue as contrary to its core foreign policy interests. Such moves raised concerns in Azerbaijan that Turkey’s political support could weaken.

The protocols signed by Turkey and Armenia never entered into force. The process failed to advance through the parliamentary ratification stages and eventually came to a standstill. Lobbying efforts by pro-Baku circles, drawing heavily on Azerbaijani financial resources, are also understood to have influenced the process.

This first major test therefore became an illustration of Azerbaijan’s ability to exert influence over Turkish policy.

Partnership and bargaining

During the same period, the two countries experienced a serious dispute over natural gas prices and energy transportation.

Natural gas produced at Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz field was becoming an important source of supply for Turkey. However, when negotiations to renew earlier agreements began in 2008, disagreements emerged over gas prices, the recalculation of past purchases, Turkey’s ability to resell the gas to third countries, and transit fees.

At this point, Ankara’s ambition to establish itself as a central energy corridor to Europe intersected with Baku’s efforts to secure more direct commercial arrangements for its natural gas exports.

The dispute between the two supposed partners lasted approximately two years. Azerbaijan sought to strengthen its bargaining position against Ankara by drawing on its relations with alternative partners, including Russia and Iran.

Agreements signed in June 2010 ultimately resolved the disagreements over natural gas prices, sales and transit conditions.

This dispute was a clear indication that relations between the two countries were shaped by far more complicated dynamics than the rhetoric of “brotherhood” suggested.

Turkey offered a critical transit route for Azerbaijan’s access to European markets, while Azerbaijan used its energy resources to gain leverage over Ankara’s strategic objectives.

“Blood brothers” or energy partners?

Energy cooperation can be seen as one of the most important long-term foundations of Turkey–Azerbaijan relations. Energy projects have not only tied the two countries’ economic interests together; they have also influenced Turkey’s position in the European energy market and Azerbaijan’s ability to bring Caspian resources to international markets.

From the Caspian to the Mediterranean: The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline

One of the clearest manifestations of this partnership is the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline. Beginning full-capacity operations in 2006, the pipeline transports Azerbaijani oil through Georgia to the Turkish Mediterranean terminal at Ceyhan. The project was implemented under agreements signed by Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia in 1999.

The significance of BTC extends beyond oil transportation. Most importantly, it enables Caspian energy resources to reach global markets through routes that bypass Russia. Azerbaijan has thus expanded its export options, while Turkey has become a major energy transit hub. At the broader geopolitical level, the project also represented an important step in the Atlantic alliance’s strategy to reduce Russia’s influence over regional energy routes.

Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum and TANAP

Natural gas cooperation between the two countries developed along similar lines. The Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum pipeline began transporting gas in 2007, facilitating the delivery of Azerbaijani natural gas to the Turkish market.

The Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) subsequently became one of the most important projects in the bilateral partnership. The first gas flowed through TANAP in June 2018. The pipeline delivers Azerbaijani natural gas to Turkey and contributes to its transportation to European markets through the Southern Gas Corridor.

A turning point for Azerbaijani capital: SOCAR

Energy relations are not limited to pipelines. Investments by the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) in Turkey have become one of the largest components of the two countries’ economic relationship.

SOCAR Turkey operates in sectors including refining, petrochemicals, logistics and port management. In a statement concerning 2024, the company said its total investments in Turkey had exceeded $18 billion and described itself as the country’s largest foreign direct investor. The STAR Refinery in Aliağa, İzmir, is another major Azerbaijani investment in Turkey.

The economic relationship, therefore, is not simply a matter of Turkey gaining access to Azerbaijan or Azerbaijan reaching European markets through Turkey. Azerbaijani capital has also established a significant presence in Turkey’s industrial and energy infrastructure.

Why is bilateral trade falling short of its target?

Despite close political ties and major investment projects, bilateral trade remains below the target set by the two countries’ leaders.

According to figures published by the Azerbaijani Embassy in Turkey, bilateral trade reached $5.72 billion in 2025. Of this total, $3.38 billion consisted of Azerbaijani exports to Turkey, while $2.34 billion represented Turkish exports to Azerbaijan.

The two governments aim to increase bilateral trade to $15 billion. Achieving this target would require the current volume to grow by approximately 2.6 times.

Although energy, defence industry cooperation and major infrastructure projects keep bilateral relations at a strategic level, a comparable leap in trade has yet to materialise.

Transport corridors, Eurasia and rivalry within the OTS

Following the development of energy corridors, transport projects became another major dimension of relations between the two countries.

The Baku–Tbilisi–Kars (BTK) railway, inaugurated on 30 October 2017, connected Azerbaijan to Turkey’s railway network through Georgia. The project forms an important part of a route through which goods from China and Central Asia can travel across the Caspian Sea and the South Caucasus towards Turkey and Europe.

These interests have gained further importance in recent years within the framework of the international transport route known as the Middle Corridor.

The 2020 Karabakh War

One of the most important turning points in Turkey–Azerbaijan relations was the Second Karabakh War in 2020.

During the 44-day war, Turkey emerged as one of Azerbaijan’s most important political and military supporters. Military training, defence industry cooperation and security ties between the two countries had deepened considerably. For Turkey, the conflict also provided an environment in which its defence industry—regarded in recent years as one of the country’s most important export sectors—was put to the test on the battlefield.

Azerbaijan’s use of Turkish-made unmanned aerial vehicles, including the Bayraktar TB2, and the depth of military cooperation between the two countries were among the key issues highlighted in assessments of the war.

The Shusha Declaration: Relations elevated to an alliance

It was in 2021 that relations between the two countries were formally elevated to the level of an alliance. On 15 June 2021, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev signed the Shusha Declaration on allied relations in Shusha.

The declaration provided a more comprehensive political framework for the strategic partnership, incorporating military and security cooperation.

It stipulates that the parties will hold consultations if either country faces a threat or attack by a third state against its independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity or security. The document also provides for expanded defence cooperation, modernisation of the armed forces, joint military exercises and coordination between security institutions.

In other words, the agreement further facilitated access for Turkish defence companies to the Azerbaijani market and for Azerbaijani capital to the Turkish economy.

The Karabakh victory and shifting balances of power

Azerbaijan’s re-establishment of control over Karabakh in September 2023 did more than alter the course of the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict. It also ushered in a new phase in the political psychology of relations between Ankara and Baku.

Turkey continued to support Azerbaijan’s position on territorial integrity. But the picture in Baku began to change. Having strengthened its military and diplomatic position, Azerbaijan increasingly pursued regional policies independently of Ankara, including in areas where its preferences might diverge from those of Turkey.

Both sides continued to tell their own story of “brotherhood,” but their relative leverage varies depending on the issue. Turkey has greater overall military and economic capacity, yet Azerbaijan possesses instruments of influence—particularly in the energy sector—that can affect Ankara’s decisions.

Nakhchivan and the Zangezur issue

Transport connections and the status of Nakhchivan are becoming increasingly important to the future of Turkey–Azerbaijan relations.

The absence of a direct land connection between mainland Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic is one of the region’s fundamental transport challenges. Turkey’s border with Nakhchivan and its connections to the exclave therefore occupy a special place in Ankara–Baku relations.

The Iğdır–Nakhchivan natural gas pipeline, inaugurated on 5 March 2025, contributes to diversifying Nakhchivan’s energy supply. With an announced initial capacity of 730 million cubic metres per year, the pipeline delivers natural gas to Nakhchivan through Turkey.

The main dispute, however, concerns road and railway routes that would connect mainland Azerbaijan directly to Nakhchivan.

The joint declaration signed by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in Washington on 8 August 2025 included efforts to establish unimpeded connectivity between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan through Armenian territory. Subsequently, the United States and Armenia developed an implementation framework for a project known as the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP).

This route is not merely about Azerbaijan gaining access to Nakhchivan. For Turkey, it also promises easier access to the Caspian Basin, Central Asia and other countries in the Turkic world.

This is precisely where Turkish, Azerbaijani and Armenian companies are preparing for new battles over contracts and tenders associated with the Trump corridor.

As of October 2026, however, a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan has yet to be formally signed. Despite significant progress in the process, the final text remains to be brought into force.

Although Ankara’s and Baku’s interests appear to overlap substantially on this issue, competition over contracts, commercial opportunities and the distribution of the spoils could generate new sources of tension.

The Organization of Turkic States: Partnership or rivalry?

Another source of tension in Turkey–Azerbaijan relations is the Organization of Turkic States (OTS).

The organisation aims to strengthen transport connectivity, expand trade, promote economic cooperation and improve coordination on security issues. For Turkey, however, it also represents a means of expanding access to Central Asia and projecting an image of leadership over the “Turkic world” to its domestic audience. For Azerbaijan, the critical objective is to preserve its dominant position along the Trans-Caspian route.

The adoption of the Karabakh Declaration at the OTS informal summit held in Shusha on 6 July 2024 was also followed by an increase in Azerbaijani media narratives promoting Baku’s leadership of the “Turkic world.”

In other words, political leadership within the Turkic world, the form of economic integration and the distribution of influence among member states are all arenas of ongoing competition concealed beneath the rhetoric of a “single nation.”

The OTS summit that Turkey is expected to host in Ankara on 29–30 October 2026 is significant in this context. Ankara and Baku can be expected to emphasise the language of “brotherhood” at the summit, but it remains unclear whether they will offer concrete solutions to the issues dividing them.

The Israel question: Do Ankara and Baku have different priorities?

Relations with Israel are sometimes described as a major point of disagreement between Turkey and Azerbaijan. Contrary to this assumption, however, cooperation with Israel is one of the areas in which the two countries’ interests overlap most significantly.

Turkey continues to express opposition to Israel in its public rhetoric while also making statements about having halted trade with the country. Yet the continuation of trade through other channels is no secret. On the Azerbaijani side, critics of Baku among supporters of the ruling AKP in Turkey are accused of hypocrisy over the issue.

In a statement dated 10 November 2024, Turkey’s Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources argued that BOTAŞ International had no authority over the buying and selling of oil transported through BTC and maintained that no cargoes destined for Israel were being loaded. According to the ministry, the oil companies using the pipeline were complying with Turkey’s decision to halt trade with Israel.

In contrast, a Reuters report published in January 2026, citing data from the ship-tracking company Kpler, stated that Israel’s imports of Azerbaijani crude oil from Ceyhan averaged 94,000 barrels per day in 2025, a 31 per cent increase compared with the previous year.

Why did the headscarf debate become a diplomatic issue?

The immediate trigger for the latest tensions between Turkey and Azerbaijan was a set of dress regulations governing state schools in Azerbaijan.

On 21 September 2026, Azerbaijan’s Cabinet of Ministers amended the dress code rules for state schools. Although the regulation did not explicitly mention headscarves, reports and footage showing students wearing headscarves being denied entry to schools provoked a backlash in Turkey.

Oktay Saral, a chief adviser to President Erdoğan, and several AKP lawmakers spoke out against the obstruction of headscarved students’ right to education. The debate quickly expanded beyond school regulations in Azerbaijan to encompass the two countries’ differing understandings of secularism and the limits of one state’s right to comment on another’s domestic affairs.

On 13 October, the ruling New Azerbaijan Party (YAP), led by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, issued a statement directly targeting the AKP. YAP described the statements coming from Turkey as irresponsible and argued that the principle of “One Nation, Two States” could not legitimise interference in the domestic affairs of one country by the other.

The controversy thus brought tensions between Turkey and Azerbaijan into the open, with the headscarf issue serving as the immediate point of contention.

While Azerbaijan has delivered particularly strong messages on the matter, Ankara has maintained institutional silence, despite statements from individual figures.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s remarks during his visit to Baku on 15 October emphasised that the two countries had weathered numerous tests in the past, that the relationship between their leaders remained strong, and that the “Two States, One Nation” principle continued to manifest itself across all areas of cooperation.

What does the overall picture reveal?

Relations between the two countries have long been shaped by a combination of rivalry and cooperation. Yet the relationship is generally treated as an almost untouchable domain, with both sides behaving as though no tensions exist.

The slogan “One Nation, Two States” does less to explain the actual nature of Turkey–Azerbaijan relations than to conceal the conflicts of interest embedded within them. It functions as a nationalist political narrative that obscures the competing interests of the two states.

The decisive factors in bilateral relations, however, are energy resources, transport corridors, the defence industry, capital investments and the struggle for influence within the Organization of Turkic States.

Despite the many sources of tension, the economic ties and agreements established between the two countries’ business interests have helped sustain the rhetoric of “brotherhood.” This is because nationalist discourse can place these relationships behind a shared identity narrative, rendering the interests of big capital operating in the name of “Turkic unity” and serving US strategic interests largely immune from scrutiny.

Moreover, this partnership is not confined to the independent choices of the two countries. The realities obscured by the “One Nation” narrative intersect with broader imperialist power struggles, extending from the energy resources of the Caspian Basin to the trade routes of Eurasia.

La « paix » factice des Gontcharenko ukrainiens et les « Wunderwaffen » de Kiev.

par Paolo Hamidouche

6 octobre 2026. La nouvelle — si l’on peut l’appeler ainsi, étant donné qu’il s’agit essentiellement d’une tentative maladroite et manifeste de « rouler » Moscou — est que le député de la Rada Alekseï Gontcharenko, un homme habitué par le passé à se faire photographier en compagnie de Joe Biden ou au cœur des scènes les plus violentes du Maïdan ukrainien, a récemment fait une déclaration dictée par la panique, tout en surfant sur l’humeur de la population qui, selon les sondages officiels ukrainiens, penche à 72 % en faveur d’un accord avec la Russie. « Ponts partiellement fermés à Kiev », a déclaré Gontcharenko, « attaques contre le secteur énergétique. Attaques contre les entreprises. Attaques contre les dépôts. Attaques contre les centres de données. Nous sommes confrontés à un problème énorme. Et la stratégie choisie par le gouvernement, à savoir la quête d’une « Wunderwaffe » [arme miracle] qui résoudrait tous nos problèmes, est absurde ».

Gontcharenko appartient au groupe parlementaire « Solidarité européenne », dirigé par l’ancien président issu du coup d’État Petro Porochenko, bien que, officiellement, ce groupe ne soutienne pas de telles positions ; celles-ci sont en revanche partagées par certains députés du groupe « Serviteur du peuple » de Vladimir Zelensky — chef de file du régime issu du coup d’État néo-nazi —, selon qui, toutefois, la sortie de Gontcharenko répondrait à des instructions précises reçues d’émissaires non identifiés de Donald Trump. « La réalité est la suivante : nous sommes en train de perdre la guerre », affirme Gontcharenko ; « nous perdons un nombre considérable d’hommes ; nous n’avons pas assez de fonds propres pour financer la guerre, et encore moins pour gouverner le pays ; nous perdons des activités commerciales et économiques : pour la première fois en 100 ans, nous n’avons pas produit une seule tonne d’acier en une semaine ». Il propose donc de parvenir à un accord avec la Russie, tout en tablant sur le fait que le régime bandériste conserve le contrôle de la majeure partie de l’Ukraine. « Si nos alliés américains veulent des prix de l’énergie bas… et que les sanctions contre la Russie sont de toute façon levées, peut-être ne devrions-nous pas être assez stupides pour ne pas en profiter. »

Goncharenko propose donc d’accepter de renoncer à l’adhésion à l’OTAN — bien que, comme le laisse entendre son raisonnement, ce ne soit qu’en paroles, l’Ukraine demeurant une force agissant par procuration pour l’Alliance atlantique, sous le parapluie occidental : « Pour tenter de parvenir à un accord, nous devons envoyer un signal. Prenons la question de la neutralité, par exemple. Revenons à la réalité. Serons-nous admis dans l’OTAN ? Si nous sommes admis, l’OTAN nous aidera-t-elle en cas de guerre ? Nous connaissons la réponse à ces questions… Laissons entendre que nous sommes prêts à discuter de neutralité… Nous poursuivrons notre coopération avec l’OTAN comme c’est le cas actuellement. Nous créerons un budget européen commun pour financer notre armée. Nous poursuivrons le réarmement. » Telle est l’idée maîtresse, exprimée sans détour et assez ouvertement pour, d’une part, s’aligner sur un sentiment populaire las de la guerre et, d’autre part, éviter d’être accusé de « trahison » par les nazis et les nationalistes.

Le politologue Vladimir Fesenko, proche du camp présidentiel ukrainien, estime que la déclaration de Goncharenko reflète un sentiment répandu dans le pays : « Beaucoup de gens disent qu’il est nécessaire d’entamer des pourparlers de paix avec la Russie et qu’il faut faire des concessions ; certains le disent à voix basse, d’autres entre eux, et d’autres encore lors de discussions privées. » Goncharenko se contente d’exprimer publiquement la même position que celle qui, d’une manière ou d’une autre, fait déjà l’objet de discussions à huis clos au sein de notre société… Je ne m’avancerai pas sur une évaluation chiffrée pour l’instant — bien qu’il existe des données sociologiques —, mais je pense que le nombre réel de ces personnes est plus élevé ; tout le monde ne répond pas aux questions des sociologues. » Quoi qu’il en soit, ajoute-t-il, Goncharenko cherche à tirer parti de la situation militaire, politique et socio-psychologique actuelle : « Il se rend compte que les gens sont fatigués, que beaucoup sont déprimés. De plus en plus de personnes souhaitent sincèrement mettre fin à la guerre, quitte à faire des concessions. Il a perçu ce sentiment et veut surfer sur cette vague, en devenir le leader, élaborer son programme politique et exploiter ce moment favorable. Telle est sa stratégie politique. »

« Le sien », tout est relatif, objecte le politologue ukrainien et farouche russophobe Iouri Romanenko : connaissant le personnage, on peut dire que Trump est en train de façonner une fausse image de « pacificateur » à travers ce « prostitué » qu’est Gontcharenko, lequel est promu par les Américains comme l’une des alternatives politiques pour l’Ukraine de l’après-guerre. Quant à Porochenko, bien que le groupe « Solidarité européenne » ait pris ses distances avec les déclarations de Gontcharenko, l’ancien président joue un jeu bien précis, puisque Gontcharenko n’a pas été exclu du groupe à la Rada : Porochenko « est habile à cet égard. Sa stratégie est rationnelle… on se prémunit contre les risques, on lance un appât et, s’il se passe quelque chose, on a les outils adéquats en main… Supposons que Gontcharenko se présente à la présidence et lance sa campagne ; Porochenko observera les sondages et évaluera les chances respectives de Zaloujny et de Gontcharenko, ou de quelqu’un d’autre… si des élections ont lieu, s’il reste un pays, si un État existe encore à ce moment-là. Voilà comment les choses vont se passer ».

Outre les velléités « pacifistes » de Gontcharenko, Romanenko évoque également la situation militaire, qu’il est légitime de supposer étroitement liée à la sortie du député de « Solidarité européenne ». Ainsi, selon Romanenko, dans la guerre contre la Russie, l’Ukraine a misé sur un miracle, espérant un coup de chance. La référence est évidente aux fameux « Flamingo » (FP-7), dont la production, en accord avec l’Allemagne, a également été abordée lors de la visite de Friedrich Merz à Kiev le 4 octobre. Romanenko explique : « Le schéma est à peu près celui-ci : on croit aux miracles, on attend une arme miracle qui changera tout, on espère que la Russie s’effondrera d’elle-même ou que l’OTAN interviendra. En attendant, combien de temps combattrons-nous ? Jusqu’au bout, jusqu’au dernier Ukrainien. Le gouvernement est en quête d’une « Wunderwaffe », une arme miracle qui résoudra tous nos problèmes. »

Le fait est, affirme le politologue, que même l’apparition de missiles balistiques ukrainiens ne changerait pas la donne, étant donné que la Russie en posséderait de toute façon bien davantage, même si Kiev, précise-t-il, pourrait trouver une parade aux drones à réaction russes.

Mais la Russie en concevra alors de nouveaux et « nous chercherons à nouveau une parade. Et ainsi de suite, dans un cercle vicieux. Chaque cycle nous coûte des milliers de vies et d’immenses destructions. Les Ukrainiens aiment le mysticisme. Nous croyons aux signes, au salut miraculeux qui surviendra on ne sait comment, à l’idée que nous finirons par nous en sortir. Mais la réalité est cruelle. Les bons meurent, et les armes miracles arrivent trop tard ou n’arrivent jamais. »

Même un nazi convaincu, comme l’ancien commandant de compagnie du bataillon « Aïdar », Evgueni Dikiy, affirme qu’il est inutile d’annoncer sans cesse des dates de lancement de missiles balistiques ukrainiens contre Moscou, puisque la Russie a déjà frappé avec succès les sites de production de FirePoint et de ses sous-traitants. Indiquer des « dates précises, dans ces circonstances, est à mon avis une erreur : il aurait mieux valu garder le silence, comme cela a été fait pour le FP-7. » « Ils ne l’ont annoncé qu’une fois le déploiement au combat déjà entamé… Je pense qu’il serait judicieux d’imposer le silence également au sujet du FP-9, destiné au Moskva. » Les inquiétudes des nazis sont compréhensibles, commente Anatoli Lapine sur PolitNavigator ; mais, alors que les « Géraniums » « décommunisent » quotidiennement les infrastructures de Kiev, le régime de Zelensky a simplement besoin d’apaiser tant bien que mal le mécontentement de la population, et les promesses de représailles via les nouveaux « Flamingos » servent précisément à cela.

À cet égard, l’ancien secrétaire adjoint du Conseil de sécurité ukrainien, Serhiy Kryvonos, soutient que le programme de missiles balistiques FirePoint est une pure farce et que la démonstration du lancement du FP-7 n’est rien d’autre qu’une tentative de justifier le détournement de milliards de dollars. « Ce n’est pas le premier lancement de ce missile dont je me souvienne ; c’est le quinzième ou le seizième. Et, une fois de plus, il n’a donné aucun résultat. S’il y avait eu un résultat, les autorités l’auraient claironné sur tous les toits. Il s’agit d’une énième escroquerie populiste bon marché destinée aux naïfs… plus de deux milliards de dollars ont été dépensés ces deux dernières années pour la campagne FirePoint… avec cette somme, nous aurions pu bombarder l’Empire russe avec de simples tabourets, en termes de quantité… nous ne voyons pas de cibles effectivement touchées en territoire ennemi, nous ne voyons rien, et nous ne voyons pas l’argent investi dans ce projet… Regardez plutôt avec quelle systématicité, malheureusement, opère l’industrie de défense ennemie et comment elle accélère la modernisation de ses drones aériens, en étendant leurs capacités. Nous poursuivons un projet qui remonte à la Seconde Guerre mondiale, en essayant de présenter comme une arme miracle un missile dont le potentiel est épuisé. Que ferons-nous de cette arme miracle, même si elle parvenait à voler sur les 250 à 300 kilomètres promis ? Pour nous, cela ne résout absolument rien. »

En effet, affirme le politologue ukrainien Ruslan Bortnik, Kiev a amélioré ses contre-mesures face aux drones russes, mais en paie le prix fort. Selon lui, la proportion de drones russes atteignant Kiev aurait chuté à 10-15 % : « Nous pourrions assister à une baisse d’efficacité des drones russes — les fameux « paquets » — qui sont abattus plus fréquemment. Par ailleurs, une attaque balistique a visé Kiev cette semaine, mais certains missiles, y compris balistiques, ont été interceptés ; cela indique que le système de défense aérienne ukrainien s’est doté de munitions, notamment antimissiles, qui sont partiellement utilisées… et pourtant, la défense aérienne a un coût élevé… le rapport coût-efficacité ne joue pas en faveur de l’Ukraine. En d’autres termes, la Russie mobilise moins de ressources tout en infligeant des dégâts plus importants. L’Ukraine doit dépenser davantage pour abattre ces armes relativement bon marché. »

D’après Bortnik, la phase la plus intense de la guerre aérienne connaîtra un premier pic en décembre et un second en février ; « alors, amis, préparons-nous ». Surtout — permettons-nous d’ajouter — ne prêtons aucune importance aux discours de propagande de personnages comme Goncharenko : s’il en était encore besoin, la visite du chancelier allemand à Kiev a précisément servi à rappeler où et par qui se prennent les décisions concernant la guerre en Ukraine contre la Russie. La paix, nécessaire aux calculs électoraux de la Maison Blanche, pourra très bien faire fi des déclarations à la Goncharenko.

Publié à l’origine par Divergence Politique

The U.S. negotiates with Moscow and Europe is left commenting. Zakharova’s “none of her business” says it all.

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A Senate session

On October 14, 2026, in her address to the Senate ahead of the European Council, Giorgia Meloni did something that, until just a few years ago, would have seemed unthinkable for a right-wing Italian government: she publicly distanced herself from the President of the United States to defend a position even more uncompromising than his own. The issue at hand was the diesel fuel agreement announced by Donald Trump following a phone call with Vladimir Putin, accompanied by a temporary license from the U.S. Treasury that reopens the global market to Russian fuel. For the prime minister, this is a “very risky” decision: it legitimizes Moscow while bombs are falling on Ukrainian cities, provides it with new revenue, and weakens the leverage of sanctions. During the same session, Meloni argued that Putin is seeking a new enemy, and that that enemy could be Europe; and that a Ukraine that stopped defending itself would not achieve peace, but occupation.

So much for the news report. The rest was left to the chamber and the newspapers. The applause from the majority was joined by that of a portion of the opposition: Azione, Italia Viva, and the reformist wing of the Democratic Party. La Stampa framed support for Kiev as a matter of values and borders – those borders that “are being defended there.”

There is also a detail that speaks louder than many analyses. When questioned by ANSA, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova dismissed the prime minister’s remarks with a curt response: “It’s none of her business.” At the same time, Volodymyr Zelenskyy was in London, welcomed by Prime Minister Andy Burnham, and denouncing the restriction of military satellite services provided to the Ukrainian army. Elon Musk, for his part, clarified that the StarShield network belongs to the U.S. government and that any restrictions depend on the U.S. military and, ultimately, on the president. Washington deals with Moscow; Moscow responds to Washington. Rome applauds itself. Pathetic, isn’t it?

Not an exclusively Italian case

It would be a mistake to view the October 14 session as merely an episode of domestic politics. Italy’s stance is the national manifestation of a framework that today unites nearly all European capitals, and which has three rules. The first: the conflict in Ukraine is presented as an existential clash between political civilizations, in which any compromise amounts to surrender. The second: the Russian threat is projected beyond Ukraine, onto EU territory, so as to make rearmament an indisputable necessity. The third, the most insidious: internal dissent is attributed to the enemy’s influence.

Germany offers the clearest example. Defense Minister Boris Pistorius, who as early as 2023 had called for the country to become kriegstüchtig – capable of waging war – and who has since pointed to a timeframe of just a few years within which Russia could attack a member of the Alliance, has argued in recent days that the widespread fear of war in German society is being deliberately fueled by Putin and the AfD. This line of reasoning deserves attention. In a country that lost millions of lives in the two world wars, the fear of a new conflict would not need external agents to explain itself. Attributing it to Moscow and the main opposition party means transforming a legitimate political sentiment into a national security issue.

The same pattern is repeated elsewhere, albeit with different nuances. Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski claims credit for the results of Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries and infrastructure; his German counterpart, Johann Wadephul, argues that now is not the time to ease sanctions, but to tighten them. France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are acting as a negotiating bloc, so much so that Meloni herself has asked that they do so at least with a formal mandate from all partners. These words are backed by numbers: the ReArm Europe plan presented by the Commission in March 2025; the commitment made at the NATO summit in The Hague to raise defense and security spending to 5% of GDP by 2035; and the 90-billion loan to Kiev approved by the European Council in December 2025. This rhetoric is not the eccentricity of some minister; it is literally the official language of the Union – and unfortunately, we have grown accustomed to it.

A foolish and counterproductive stance

Calling this approach foolish is not polemical hyperbole, if by “foolishness” we mean the stubborn persistence in repeating behavior that produces effects opposite to those declared. This is evident on three levels.

The first is strategic. Deterrence theory has taught us for decades that a threat is only as valuable as the credibility of the one making it, and that credibility depends on the ability to back up one’s words with action. Today’s Europe is raising the tone without having the tools to back it up. The Starlink affair has demonstrated this with almost textbook clarity: the Ukrainian military, which Europeans fund and encourage, depends for communications and drone guidance on infrastructure owned by an American company and controlled by the Pentagon. All it takes is a decision in Washington for part of the operations to grind to a halt. Promising victory in a war where one does not control the satellites is a form of strategic hypocrisy, and adversaries see it for what it is.

The second aspect is economic, of course. As early as 2024, Mario Draghi’s report on European competitiveness identified the energy price differential with the United States as one of the factors behind the continent’s industrial lag. Since then, the rejection of Russian hydrocarbons has become dogma; the war in Iran has driven fuel prices even higher; and the commitment to spend 5% of GDP on defense promises to absorb resources that public budgets simply do not have – unless at the expense of healthcare, pensions, and civilian investments. The paradox is clear: just as Washington, for entirely domestic reasons tied to the midterm elections, is seeking cheap diesel even from Moscow, European governments are touting the fact that they pay more for energy than their competitors as a moral principle.

The third level is diplomatic, and perhaps the most decisive one. A foreign policy that rules out negotiation on principle dooms itself to being left out of the talks when negotiations finally begin. And that is exactly what is happening: the United States and Russia are hammering out energy agreements, the pace of the war, and the terms of a possible truce, while Europe merely comments. Zakharova’s response to the Italian prime minister is not merely a diplomatic snub.

It is the exact measure of the weight Moscow currently attributes to European capitals. One can debate whether it is right; it is harder to argue that it is wrong as a description.

The price of credibility

The deepest damage, however, is not measured on the front lines or even in the markets. It is measured in the relationship between institutions and citizens. When the gap between what is proclaimed and what actually happens becomes visible to the naked eye, public discourse loses its value. For four years, European citizens have been told repeatedly that Russia’s defeat is near, that sanctions are bringing it to its knees, and that every new aid package will be the decisive one. Now they see their main ally negotiating with Moscow, Ukraine dependent on decisions made in Washington, and their own governments increasing military spending while public services deteriorate. No foreign disinformation campaign is needed to breed mistrust. A simple comparison between rhetoric and results is enough.

This distrust stems from a crisis of representation with deeper roots. About a decade ago, in his book *Ruling the Void*, Peter Mair described – well in advance – the withdrawal of political parties from society toward the state, and the gradual separation between responsible government – that is, one faithful to external constraints – and representative government – that is, one responsive to the demands of voters. Together with Richard Katz, he coined the term “cartel party” to describe political formations that compete in the electoral arena but share the management of resources and fundamental policy decisions. The cross-party applause on October 14 is an almost perfect illustration of that model. On an issue of life-and-death importance – the cost of energy and the fate of industry – voters who dissent find no political alternative in Parliament that represents them.

The effects are plain for all to see. In France, governments fall one after another without a stable majority emerging. In Germany, the ruling coalition governs with the strongest postwar opposition breathing down its neck. In Italy, abstention has become the largest “party.” Procedures remain intact, elections are held regularly, but significant decisions are made elsewhere, and the vote ends up merely confirming choices that have already been made.

Governing through distrust

At this point, a less obvious question arises. If distrust damages institutions, why do Europe’s ruling classes continue down a path that fuels it? The simplest answer would be incompetence. But there is a more robust hypothesis that better explains the facts: distrust, within certain limits, is a resource for governance.

Here’s how the mechanism works. A disillusioned electorate becomes fragmented, abstains from voting, and scatters among new and unstable parties. Fragmentation leads to ungovernability; ungovernability, in turn, makes “responsible” grand coalitions, technocratic governments, and cross-party agreements – which keep forces deemed unreliable out of power – indispensable. The more unstable the system is, the more necessary the center becomes, as it promises stability. The crisis of representation, rather than weakening those in power, consolidates their position, because it makes them the only bulwark against the chaos that the crisis itself has produced.

War perfects this mechanism in two ways. First, it allows dissent to be treated as a security issue. When the fear of conflict is attributed to Putin and the opposition, those who call for negotiations cease to be political adversaries and become vehicles of enemy influence. Carl Schmitt identified the state of exception as the place where sovereignty is revealed; Giorgio Agamben has shown how the exception tends to become an ordinary technique of governance.

A permanent state of emergency – whether health-related, financial, or military – removes decision-making from democratic debate and entrusts it to those who present themselves as guarantors of collective survival. Second, war justifies shifting decision-making to forums beyond electoral control: the European Commission, the European Council, NATO, and small-group formats such as the E3.

We must be precise on one point, so as not to slip into caricature. This interpretation does not presuppose a plan agreed upon in some secret room. There is no need for that. It is enough that interests converge: the defense industries seeing orders increase, the European bureaucracies acquiring new powers, the ruling parties finding a raison d’être in the emergency, and the major media conglomerates peddling moral mobilization. Each acts in its own self-interest, and the sum of these self-interests produces a self-perpetuating system. We are, to all intents and purposes, in a Gramscian “organic crisis” – the phase in which the old dies and the new cannot be born, and in which morbid phenomena proliferate. The management of mistrust is one such phenomenon: a way to survive the crisis without resolving it.

Winning at any cost

The final question remains – and it is the most serious one. What are these elites willing to sacrifice to emerge victorious from the current phase? Looking back at recent years, the answer is that part of the sacrifice has already been made. Politics was sacrificed when fundamental decisions were shifted outside of parliaments and the distinction between majority and opposition became merely ornamental. The economy was sacrificed when the continent’s industrial competitiveness was subordinated to geopolitical objectives set elsewhere, accepting unsustainable energy prices and the very real risk of deindustrialization. Those who have already given up these two pillars have little to lose when it comes to the third – the human cost.

For now, that cost is being borne primarily by the Ukrainians. Even members of the Verkhovna Rada who zealously supported the line of all-out war – such as Mar’jana Bezuhla – or who have distanced themselves from it – such as Anna Skorochod – describe a country with destroyed infrastructure, forced mobilization marked by abuses, and a population on the brink of collapse, and admit that the conflict has become a business opportunity for some; but the cost is also beginning to fall on European societies: in public budgets, in wages eroded by energy inflation, and in the idea – now voiced without embarrassment by sitting ministers – that we must get used to the prospect of fighting.

Here, the rhetoric of war reveals its deepest function, for it does not serve to win the war against Russia, which no European government has the means to win on its own. It serves to win the domestic battle, to maintain control over political systems that can no longer generate consensus and that need an external enemy to justify their continued existence. In this sense, the human cost is not a side effect of the calculation. It is a variable, adjusted according to the convenience of the moment, in the perpetual dance of death that is political utilitarianism.

There is an alternative, and it does not amount to surrender: it consists of bringing diplomacy back to the center of European foreign policy, recognizing that a now multipolar international order cannot be governed by moral crusades, and restoring to parliaments and voters the power to decide on war and peace. The indicators for gauging whether anything is changing are concrete: the mandate that the next European Council will – or will not – entrust to the negotiators; the fate of the sanctions regime following the U.S. exemption on diesel fuel; and the stability of national budgets in the face of the 5% target.

As long as the response remains the one applauded on October 14, Europe will continue to pay an ever-increasing price for a war it does not control, while those who govern it will find in its very instability the reason to remain where they are.

The war in Ukraine has always been about fomenting a proxy war to defeat Russia.

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The contradictions are absurd but instructive of the criminal proxy war that the U.S. and European powers have perpetrated against Russia under the guise of “defending Ukraine”.

Western sanctions on Russia – the most heavily sanctioned nation on Earth – were meant to supposedly punish Moscow for its alleged unprovoked aggression against Ukraine.

The United States recently signed into law a “sanctions bill from hell” in honor of the late war hawk Senator Lindsey Graham, aimed at crushing the Russian economy, principally by shutting down its energy exports.

Likewise, the European Union has implemented more than 20 rounds of sanctions imposed on Russia over the past four years, again purportedly to block Russian exports of oil and gas. The EU has vowed to terminate all Russian energy imports by the end of this year.

The official rationale out of Washington and European capitals is to exact retribution on Russia for its alleged invasion and violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty. Western embargoes on Russia’s economy were immediately announced after Moscow launched its Special Military Operation in February 2022. (The real background to the SMO – unreported by Western media – was the NATO-backed coup in Kiev in 2014, and the arming of NeoNazis to conduct a proxy war against Russia.)

The U.S. and European Union, as well as Britain of course, presented the attempted economic blockade of Russia as a demonstration of the West enforcing international law and supporting Ukraine. The latter is portrayed in Western media as a fair maiden of democracy assailed by a drooling Russian tyrant.

In a nutshell, the sanctions are sold to the Western public as a plausible way of neutralizing “Russia’s war machine.” If Moscow’s oil and gas exports could be cut off, then, the dubious logic goes, Russia would not be able to continue its war effort in Ukraine.

However, laughably, the supposedly noble Western rationale is in tatters this week after the U.S. Treasury lifted sanctions off Russian diesel exports for the next six months in order to boost global oil supplies and curb soaring energy prices.

Another shattering blow to the facade of Western “principles” was the disclosure by Russia’s energy minister, Alexander Novak, that the European Union has continued to buy Russian energy exports at nearly pre-war levels. (Cue Western media silence on that!)

Since 2022, the EU has bought a total of $320 billion worth of Russian hydrocarbons. To put the expenditure in perspective, that far exceeds what the European governments have donated to Ukraine, some $226 bn, according to EU data.

How’s that for a contradiction? The European governments are throwing hundreds of billions of taxpayers’ money at Ukraine supposedly to defend itself against Russia, yet these same governments are giving Russia much, much more by buying its energy resources. In other words, to use their own rhetoric, Brussels and other European capitals are “fuelling the Russian war machine.”

As for the United States, it is equally duplicitous. The Americans blew up the Nord Stream pipeline in 2022 so that Europe would not be at the mercy of Russian oil dependency. Washington also imposed sanctions on Russian energy while increasing its more expensive gas exports to Europe. Yet last Friday, October 9, President Donald Trump announced, to the dismay and alarm of the Europeans and Ukraine, that he had made a deal with Vladimir Putin to release 3.5 million tonnes of Russian diesel onto the world market to ease pressure on crippling pump prices.

Whatever happened to American laws against “trading with the enemy”?

Of course, Trump is desperate for relief over record-high fuel prices as a result of his criminal aggression against Iran and Iran’s closure of the Persian Gulf oil route in retaliation. With the mid-term Congressional elections only three weeks away, Trump is seeking to assuage angry American consumers and spare his Republican Party from an electoral drubbing that will tarnish his presidency.

Out of sheer expedience, Trump wants Russian diesel exports to save his political neck. Some observers may question whether Moscow should oblige Trump considering that Washington is arming the NeoNazi Kiev regime with missiles and intelligence. Perhaps the Kremlin is calculating that Trump could finally pull off a peace deal in Ukraine.

Another smart move by Moscow, perhaps, is that the diesel deal with Trump has managed to unleash a storm of recriminations from Europe and Ukraine, which is severely undermining the transatlantic axis. Is this political judo by Putin?

The European NATO partners and the Kiev puppet president Vladimir Zelensky reacted with unprecedented insults and defiance of Trump. They accused the American leader of treachery and of siding with Russia. Within Washington, Trump has also been lambasted for “betrayal”.

Trump and his aides hit back furiously, dismissing the Europeans as “hypocrites” over their own record purchases of Russian energy exports. Trump even called for Zelensky to be replaced by someone who he can work with.

For his part, Zelensky doubled down with truculence, badmouthing Trump for being “weak” and accusing him of putting Ukrainian lives at risk. He refused to stop Ukrainian air strikes on Russia’s oil refineries, as requested by the White House. And the little money-grabbing, narco-Führer also attempted blackmail by suggesting to Trump that he would halt air attacks on Russian energy infrastructure “if” the Pentagon supplied more Patriot missiles.

Trump’s anger has exploded over Zelensky and his European patrons. He sees their obstruction of his diesel deal with Russia as not only hypocritical but a political attack on his presidency ahead of the crucial November polls.

The debacle is a rich farce. American and European posturing is seen for what it is, without any principle or genuine motives. It is a plague on all their houses.

Both the U.S. and its European partners are buying Russian energy like never before to sustain their struggling economies. The sanctions they imposed on Russia never had anything to do with “upholding international law” or “defending Ukraine”.

Using their own disingenuous logic, the NATO nations are fuelling the Russian war machine with their continuing business-as-usual purchase of Russia’s oil and gas.

That contradiction, in turn, exposes the fraud of the war in Ukraine. It was never about defending democratic Ukraine – a corrupt NeoNazi dictatorship – or European security from Russian “threat”.

The whole murderous episode has always been about fomenting a proxy war to defeat Russia. That covert policy is a gargantuan crime of aggression that has cost millions of lives and bankrupted Western societies. What’s more, it is an utterly failed policy which Western governments are covering up to avoid accountability. The destruction and deception go hand in hand.

What is all the more damning is that this travesty could have been easily exposed years ago if the Western news media had actually reported on facts instead of being the propaganda service they so evidently are to enable criminal aggression by their imperialist masters.

The best local leaders know they cannot deliver at home without engaging abroad. 

By Ted SNIDER

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Events of the last few days will have limited economic impact but bring political benefits for Russia.

While Ukraine’s negotiating team was meeting with the U.S. envoys Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff last Friday, they were blindsided by President Donald Trump’s announcement that he had made a deal with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin.

Trump announced that Moscow had agreed to lift its export ban on diesel fuel and immediately supply 300,000 tons to the American and global market, followed by another 500,000 in November, then a further 1,000,000, and, eventually, another 3,000,000. To facilitate these imports, the U.S. would provide a sanctions waiver, and the U.S. Treasury would issue a temporary general license for Russia to sell diesel on the global market through April 7, 2027.

Kiev reacted with fury. The Ukrainian negotiators left Miami, flying home without attending the planned second day of talks. A senior Ukrainian official said that the deal “completely” ruined trust between Kiev and Washington. Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky complained, “It is certainly not how partners should treat each other.” Hours later, Ukraine struck a Russian oil refinery, as senior officials in Kiev had threatened it would do.

Trump and his supporters say the deal will lower diesel prices for the U.S. and the world. Ukraine, Europe, and Trump’s detractors say the deal will send more money into Moscow’s war machine. The deal will have less of an impact on either front than both sides claim—but that doesn’t mean it won’t prove significant.

Though it provides the appearance of a quick fix and may have briefly reduced oil prices, such effects could only be brief and trivial. Russia is now set to export 1.8 million tons of diesel fuel over the next few months and, eventually, another 3 million. But the world uses 3.5 million to 4 million tons a day, and the U.S. alone burns through half a million.

The deal won’t do much to boost the Russian economy, either, which is still functioning despite massive Western sanctions. Russia’s diesel production has apparently been running at a surplus for a while, and its own ban on exporting diesel would probably have been lifted shortly anyway. Exports to Central Asia were up dramatically last month. Though Europe may still refuse to purchase Russian diesel under the U.S. waiver, world demand is acute, and Russia would easily have found a market for its diesel amid a general supply crunch caused by the Iran War.

But the deal is symbolically and politically significant. It comes amid plummeting popular support in Ukraine for Zelensky. Trust in the Ukrainian leader and desire for him to stay on as president after the war are sinking. Polls show that he would likely lose the next election. The deal only worsens Zelensky’s political challenges, forcing him to either abide by Trump’s wishes for Ukraine to cease strikes on Russian oil refineries or risk further inflaming tensions with Washington. So far, Zelensky is choosing the latter.

When Ukraine struck another refinery after the announcement of the deal, Trump reacted with fury. “Do whatever you want, but don’t hit the diesel fuel,” Trump says he told Zelensky. “So, what does he do? He goes and hits refineries…. He’d better damn well stop.”

This rupture is the worst crisis in Zelensky’s relationship with Trump since their public confrontation in the Oval Office in February of last year. This summer, Trump seemed to be swinging in Zelensky’s favor—but not anymore. Zelensky said Trump’s deal was “not fair and not honest.” He accused Trump of using talks with Ukraine “as a smokescreen” while the U.S. cut “backroom deals” with Russia, and he said the episode demonstrated Trump’s weakness to the world.

Trump shot back. “I think it’s time for Ukraine to get a new president,” he said. “I suggest they get a new leader who can make a deal because he could have made many deals, but for some reason, he never does.”

As the rift widened, Witkoff and Kushner warned the Ukrainian team that crucial intelligence-sharing could be cut off if Kiev doesn’t fall in line with Washington’s demands. On Monday night, when Kiev was struck by Russian ballistic missiles without warning, it was unclear if the U.S. had followed through on the threat. “Regarding this strike,” Zelensky said, “unfortunately, there was no warning from our partners.” But Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Sybiha said Ukraine is still receiving U.S. intelligence and that the failure was not due to policy but to the difficulty of tracking “specific type of weapons used by the Russian side.” Trump has since said intelligence sharing has not stopped. But on Tuesday night, Kiev was once again bombarded by ballistic missiles, and Zelensky again said his government had received “‌no advance warning from our partners.”

Adding to the danger for Ukraine, Elon Musk, whose Starlink satellites are crucial for the Ukrainian armed forces’ battlefield communications, tracking of Russian troops, and selections of targets, backed Trump’s call for Zelensky to be replaced, posting that “Zelensky has gone too far.” On Wednesday, Ukrainian officials said that SpaceX, Musk’s company, “had introduced a limit ‌on some Starlink services within the country, disrupting combat drone missions for which the technology is crucial.”

The significance for Moscow is that it has managed to make an economic deal with Washington that required no Russian concessions in peace negotiations with Ukraine. It is this unshackling of U.S.–Russia diplomacy from the war, not any financial windfall for American’s or Putin’s war machine, that is the true victory for Russia.

The events of the past few days, centering around the Trump–Putin diesel deal, will not have the economic effects the media is focusing on, but they have already brought significant political consequences for both Russia and Ukraine.

Original article:  www.theamericanconservative.com

Through a landmark agreement, America once again had to eat humble pie, which appears to have become the new normal for Washington. In this era of multilateralism, state actors cannot act in a way they want because other actors have emerged as equally strong centers of power and influence. No matter how strong you are, […]

U.S. President Donald Trump criticized President Volodymyr Zelensky in an interview with Newsmax published on Oct. 15, describing the Ukrainian president as "not a good guy for (the U.S.) to deal with."

Dopo questa decisione sul diesel, la guerra potrebbe essere appena diventata molto più semplice e più netta.

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Trump sta forse pensando di avvalersi di Putin per tirarsi fuori dal pasticcio causato sia dai suoi bassi consensi nei sondaggi sia dalla guerra con l’Iran? A prima vista potrebbe sembrare inverosimile, ma egli è completamente intrappolato nella questione iraniana, e qualsiasi opzione prenda in considerazione sembra portare a uno scenario apocalittico. Potrebbe Putin aiutarlo sia a risolvere la questione dei prezzi del gasolio nel Paese, sia a negoziare un accordo con l’Iran che faccia apparire agli americani che lui, e l’America, siano in qualche modo i vincitori?

Il fatto che il presidente russo venda quasi 2 milioni di tonnellate di gasolio ai Paesi occidentali, compresi ovviamente gli Stati Uniti, sembra un cerotto su una ferita enorme nelle economie americana e occidentale. A meno che, ovviamente, non vi sia un secondo accordo dietro le quinte di cui giornalisti ed esperti non siano a conoscenza, o che semplicemente scelgano di non riportare. Per quanto riguarda l’iniziativa di Putin sul gasolio, la quantità offerta non è enorme, ma vi sono un paio di precedenti che essa stabilisce e che sono più importanti.

In primo luogo, apre le porte a un’ulteriore revoca delle sanzioni (che potrebbe essere abbinata a quella relativa all’Iran, date le relazioni di Mosca con Teheran), ma, cosa forse ancora più importante, rende il presidente ucraino Zelensky un bersaglio ancora più importante per Trump. Molto dipenderà dai prossimi giorni e dalla decisione che Zelensky prenderà riguardo al proseguimento dei bombardamenti contro gli impianti petroliferi russi. Prenderà quella pillola suicida? Le guerre sono spesso caotiche e vi sono sempre zone d’ombra in cui i due paesi in conflitto si trovano di fronte a situazioni illogiche e impraticabili. Forse i bombardamenti degli impianti petroliferi russi nell’ambito della guerra in Ucraina hanno raggiunto il loro punto di svolta e, indipendentemente da quanto i leader dell’UE siano vicini a Zelensky – che, nella migliore delle ipotesi, possiamo definire un leader ad interim – ciò metterà alla prova questo rapporto fino al punto di rottura.

È necessario che un gran numero di cittadini in Francia e Germania muoia quest’inverno semplicemente a causa di una crisi energetica e/o di una crisi economica nei propri paesi, che hanno investito miliardi per mantenere viva la guerra in Ucraina? Putin è così sicuro che quest’inverno sarà l’ultimo per le sue truppe, dato che la linea difensiva tra le forze ucraine e quelle russe sembra sul punto di cedere da un momento all’altro? Gli stessi ucraini sono pronti ad affrontare un inverno gelido a Kiev, incapaci di fornire elettricità o riscaldamento ai propri appartamenti? Tante guerre sono iniziate per le riserve energetiche, ma non quella in Ucraina. Eppure potrebbe finire proprio per quelle.

I commenti minacciosi di Trump sui social media riguardo a Zelensky dovrebbero essere presi sul serio. Se la stessa cricca di consiglieri incompetenti di Trump riesce davvero a convincerlo che un’invasione terrestre dell’Iran sia fattibile, se non addirittura vincente, si potrebbe semplicemente sostenere che un cambio di regime in Ucraina dovrebbe essere un gioco da ragazzi e garantirgli un enorme guadagno – dal punto di vista politico, economico e geopolitico. La rimozione di Zelensky porrebbe immediatamente fine alla guerra, e Trump potrebbe rivendicarne la vittoria, mentre chiede al suo amico Putin di intervenire discretamente in Iran e di risolvere la questione dello Stretto di Hormuz.

Il fatto che Trump abbia effettivamente reagito allo sfogo di Zelensky davanti ai giornalisti – secondo cui la decisione di acquistare gasolio russo fosse «debole» – minacciando di destituirlo, dimostra che la sua pazienza ha raggiunto un punto in cui sta iniziando a considerare il presidente ucraino come la fonte dei problemi. Rimuovere Zelensky sostenendo un rivale sarà difficile e lo metterà in contrasto con i leader dell’UE, ma si potrebbe sostenere che le relazioni non potrebbero davvero peggiorare ulteriormente e che, una volta che Macron e Merz avranno compreso che la pace è l’unica opzione e che Zelensky è in realtà l’unico vero ostacolo a ciò, faranno ciò che fanno tutti i leader dell’UE e seguiranno l’esempio degli Stati Uniti.

Spesso sentiamo gli analisti su YouTube parlare del gioco del «chi ha più coraggio», ma non c’è mai stato un momento più fugace di questo, poiché sia Trump che Zelensky si osserveranno a vicenda per vedere chi batterà ciglio per primo. Zelensky, fino ad ora, ha condotto un gioco pericoloso fingendo di essere servile nei confronti dell’egemonia statunitense, mentre in realtà si limitava a incassare denaro e armi e a ridere di Trump in mezzo a una cerchia di deboli leader europei nelle loro residenze sontuose. La guerra è stata complessa sin dall’inizio, poiché gli Stati Uniti e l’UE raramente erano d’accordo, ma se Trump dovesse dare seguito alla sua minaccia di negare agli ucraini la condivisione di informazioni di intelligence, ciò costituirebbe un pessimo presagio per il futuro di Zelensky, poiché egli eserciterà una pressione ancora maggiore su britannici, francesi e tedeschi affinché forniscano ulteriori armi e denaro in una guerra impossibile da vincere, su cui hanno puntato tutto e da cui dipendono le loro intere carriere politiche.

La guerra, dopo questa decisione sul gasolio, potrebbe essere appena diventata molto più semplice e binaria, e dalla follia delle farneticazioni dell’UE potrebbe emergere una narrativa collettiva da parte di paesi che non riescono nemmeno a proteggere la propria popolazione sul proprio territorio dall’invasione di falsi richiedenti asilo. Non sarà solo la prova definitiva per le relazioni tra Stati Uniti e Ucraina, ma anche per quelle tra Stati Uniti e UE, e potrebbe forse rappresentare la fine della NATO così come la conosciamo.

La dichiarazione di Trump offre una prospettiva mediatica molto interessante e potrebbe segnare la fine del “Progetto Ucraina”, un argomento che merita di essere approfondito.

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Nessuno si sarebbe aspettato che Donald Trump, dopo una telefonata di auguri di compleanno al suo omologo russo, dichiarasse che il gasolio russo si sarebbe rivelato la soluzione all’attuale carenza di carburante negli Stati Uniti. Se la presidenza Trump ha prodotto qualcosa, sono stati molti titoli interessanti che sembrano spuntare dal nulla e che, purtroppo, molto spesso, svaniscono nuovamente nella nebbia da cui sono emersi. A volte le parole di Trump possono riempirci di speranza, come in questo «accordo sul gasolio», mentre altre, come il suo recente discorso alle Nazioni Unite, in cui ha minacciato di uccidere potenzialmente tutti gli iraniani, ci riempiono di terrore. Questa dichiarazione del nostro enigmatico leader presenta una narrazione mediatica molto interessante e una potenziale conclusione del «Progetto Ucraina» che vale la pena approfondire.

Trump ha accusato Zelensky della carenza energetica globale, in particolare per quanto riguarda il gasolio. All’epoca, tutti pensavano che si trattasse solo di una banale manovra diversiva in stile Twitter per sviare l’attenzione dalla fallita guerra contro l’Iran, che certamente ha causato notevoli interruzioni nel trasporto di carburante. In altre parole, la Casa Bianca stava proiettando questa crisi – che aveva permesso che si verificasse, o che aveva attivamente provocato – addossandola al capro espiatorio Zelensky. Tuttavia, questa forma di diversione o proiezione non è più solo una questione di parole in una narrativa pre-elettorale, ma si è trasformata in azione concreta. Le sanzioni sul gasolio russo sono state revocate e la prima spedizione è già in viaggio mentre scrivo queste righe. È accaduto qualcosa di tangibile.

Zelensky è stato infatti avvertito circa sei volte di smettere di attaccare le infrastrutture petrolifere russe. Far saltare in aria dei bambini nel Donbass e oltre va «bene», ma attaccare ciò che l’Occidente vuole dalla Russia più di ogni altra cosa è «assolutamente inaccettabile». Zelensky, al quale – come indicato sopra – era stato intimato una mezza dozzina di volte di sospendere gli attacchi alle infrastrutture petrolifere e del gas, dopo aver appreso della decisione di Trump di acquistare gasolio russo, ha agito come segue:

1) Ha rapidamente attaccato nuovamente le infrastrutture petrolifere russe, apparentemente per fare un dispetto al Presidente degli Stati Uniti

2) Ha immediatamente interrotto i colloqui di pace a Miami con i collaboratori di Trump, il duo Kushner-Witkoff, il che rappresenta l’ennesimo schiaffo in faccia a Donald Trump.

La cosa più incredibile di tutte è che il «narcisista» Trump abbia già pubblicamente ringraziato il presidente Putin due volte per questo accordo. Durante un comizio, gli americani in piedi dietro a Trump hanno applaudito con grande entusiasmo all’annuncio della pace con la Russia e dell’approvvigionamento extra di carburante per l’America. La russofobia è un passatempo della borghesia globalista e di «Epstein Island», non dei camionisti e degli agricoltori americani.

È una narrazione eccellente, speriamo che duri

Trump ha ora attribuito il 100% della colpa dei problemi energetici e di approvvigionamento globali direttamente a Zelensky, accusandolo personalmente di aver alimentato la guerra negli ultimi due anni. Pertanto, la narrazione sta prendendo forma più o meno così: Se la guerra in Ucraina è la causa della carenza di carburante e Zelensky è la causa del protrarsi della guerra, ciò significa che gli Stati Uniti possono stringere un accordo con la Russia anche se «sono stati loro a iniziare», con la conseguenza logica che Zelensky debba logicamente andarsene, poiché è lui la fonte del problema. Ma approfondendo ulteriormente la narrazione, possiamo cogliere l’aspetto più interessante di tutti o, come si suol dire online, «la parte taciuta»: Trump ha sostanzialmente dichiarato che la produzione energetica russa riveste un interesse strategico vitale per gli Stati Uniti.

Sono proprio queste parole a togliermi la «pillola nera» dalla bocca e a iniettarmi direttamente «hopium» nel sangue. L’idea che il Presidente americano dichiari che NON essere in guerra con la Russia riveste un interesse strategico vitale per gli Stati Uniti è qualcosa che ho sognato per tutta la mia vita da adulto. Questa è esattamente la logica di cui abbiamo bisogno per porre fine, una volta per tutte, alla mentalità della Guerra Fredda e del «Progetto per un Nuovo Secolo Americano» in politica e consentire finalmente agli Stati Uniti di ricostruirsi e investire in se stessi. Questo potrebbe benissimo rappresentare il risveglio multipolare dell’America, utilizzando una trappola logica simile a quelle che sono state impiegate in passato per ottenere l’esatto contrario e mantenere gli Stati Uniti intrappolati in eterne guerre all’estero, condotte per il puro lusso della «sicurezza nazionale».

Questa nuova trappola logica potrebbe presentarsi più o meno così: «Quindi volete la guerra con la Russia? Ciò significa che volete danneggiare l’America, sporco traditore! Prenderete il carburante al contadino Joe e i nostri figli moriranno di fame, mostro che non siete altro! Lasciare che la Russia produca carburante in pace è un interesse di sicurezza nazionale per l’America; siete forse contrari alla sicurezza nazionale del nostro Paese? Volete indebolire la virile America per conto di quegli europei omosessuali?».

Ma mentre ci iniettiamo quella dose di «hopium» nelle vene, dobbiamo ricordare che Donald Trump ha detto molte cose, ha cambiato idea numerose volte, o è stato costretto a farlo, e forse non è proprio il decisore unilaterale che si dipinge in televisione.

Ci vogliono due per ballare il tango, ma basta un uomo arancione per mantenere la parola data.

Le trascrizioni di questa ormai famosa conversazione telefonica di compleanno appaiono molto diverse tra la versione americana e quella russa, il che è del tutto normale. Il team di Trump tende a riportare gli argomenti discussi come fatti accertati, mentre i russi utilizzano un linguaggio più evasivo. Ma le sanzioni sul gasolio sono state sospese per ora e le navi si stanno muovendo, quindi la cosa sembra essere reale… almeno fino a quando non si terranno le elezioni di medio termine.

Da allora la parte americana ha minacciato di escludere Zelensky dalla condivisione di informazioni di intelligence, il che potrebbe rappresentare un colpo mortale immediato per i loro sforzi militari, poiché molti esperti ritengono che solo le informazioni degli Stati Uniti abbiano permesso loro di sopravvivere così a lungo. Senza tali dati di puntamento, verrebbero immediatamente riportati alla guerra del XX secolo e non sarebbero più in grado di sferrare attacchi in profondità nel territorio russo. RT ha scritto quanto segue su questo tema:

Un funzionario ucraino ha riferito ad Axios che Witkoff e Kushner hanno minacciato di interrompere la condivisione delle informazioni di intelligence statunitensi con Kiev qualora questa continuasse a ignorare le richieste di Trump di sospendere gli attacchi alle raffinerie di petrolio russe, ma il funzionario statunitense ha negato che fosse stata formulata una simile minaccia.

Ma è qui che dobbiamo trattenere il respiro, poiché nonostante questa nuova narrativa possa sembrare allettante e rappresenti l’uscita perfetta per gli Stati Uniti dalla loro partecipazione al «Progetto Ucraina», non dovremmo dimenticare le parole del presidente Putin di qualche tempo fa, quando parlò del vero potere di qualsiasi presidente degli Stati Uniti:

«Quindi una persona viene eletta — arriva con delle idee… Poi vanno a trovarlo persone con le valigette, ben vestite, in abiti scuri — un po’ come i miei.»

Quindi la vera domanda potrebbe essere: la lobby sionista, l’élite di Epstein, le agenzie di intelligence a tre lettere, i miliardari influenti e tutti gli altri agenti segreti di Capitol Hill permetteranno davvero al presidente Trump di porre fine a questa guerra? Al Presidente degli Stati Uniti sarà consentito farlo?

Dovremmo ricordare che, dopo che Zelensky si è comportato in modo vergognoso alla Casa Bianca all’inizio del secondo mandato di Trump, tutti pensavano che questo conflitto sarebbe finito. Trump, il famoso narcisista, appariva visibilmente arrabbiato e offeso davanti alle telecamere durante il loro scontro verbale. Ma la guerra è proseguita. C’è stato il vertice di Anchorage, che ha suscitato un enorme clamore e tutti pensavano allora che gli Stati Uniti avrebbero ritirato il sostegno a Kiev. Ma così non è stato. I nemici di Trump, compreso il clan Biden, sono coinvolti in un enorme scandalo di corruzione in Ucraina, ormai tutto allo scoperto. Questa sarebbe stata un’ottima via d’uscita dal conflitto, ma Trump non l’ha colta o non ha potuto farlo. E, in generale, la retorica di Trump nei confronti di Zelensky e di altri politici europei è stata palesemente dura e irrispettosa. L’uomo accusato di essere un «spaccone» in qualche modo parla sempre in modo piuttosto cortese sia alle spalle che in faccia a Putin e Xi.

Pertanto, sebbene io desideri la pace e una cooperazione improntata al rispetto reciproco tra gli Stati Uniti e la Russia, forse questo accordo durerà solo fino alle elezioni di medio termine, quando all’improvviso Zelensky tornerà a essere «un bastardo, ma è il nostro bastardo», e il conflitto proseguirà senza sosta.

Forse questa è la nostra «sorpresa di ottobre» da parte della fazione repubblicana? E a dicembre potremo tutti essere «di nuovo sorpresi» quando la guerra riprenderà con tutta la sua forza e altre migliaia di slavi moriranno sul campo di battaglia?

Ora, Donald Trump, a denti stretti, sta lanciando l’idea secondo cui ritiene «sia giunto il momento che l’Ucraina abbia un nuovo presidente». Ma una volta conteggiati i voti in America, potrebbe semplicemente tornare a odiare passivamente e a tollerare Zelensky fino alla fine del suo mandato o fino a quando un giorno un certo Oreshnik non colpirà nel segno. Non possiamo inoltre dimenticare che l’Occidente sta da tempo esercitando pressioni affinché i russi concedano un cessate il fuoco di ampia portata. Presumibilmente ciò verrebbe utilizzato per riorganizzarsi, riposarsi, riarmarsi e poi tornare semplicemente a combattere fino all’ultimo ucraino. Ora Trump vuole che si tengano elezioni a Kiev, il che probabilmente richiederà un cessate il fuoco per poter essere attuato. Ma spingerà per un cessate il fuoco di tre giorni, o cercherà di indurre con l’inganno i russi ad accettare una tregua di un mese o più?

Un «buon» segnale su questa questione dal punto di vista russo è che ora ci sono già richieste di dimissioni di Zelensky su Twitter/X provenienti da tutte le parti, persino da quelle filo-ucraine:

«“Zelensky deve dimettersi” – media ucraini. Ci hanno messo poco. Zelensky ha ignorato per ben SEI volte gli avvertimenti di Trump di non attaccare le raffinerie di petrolio russe. Questa mattina, Zelensky ha bombardato un’altra raffineria di petrolio russa. Gli ucraini chiedono le dimissioni di Zelensky.

L’ex deputato ucraino e comproprietario di Metinvest, Vadym Novynskyi, ha esortato Zelensky a dimettersi e a cedere tutti i poteri alla Verkhovna Rada ucraina a seguito degli accordi tra Trump e Putin.»

Dobbiamo ricordare che l’Ucraina del 2026 è già uno Stato di polizia in cui qualsiasi dissenso comporta il rischio di essere caricati su un autobus e portati al fronte a morire, oppure di scomparire in una prigione con l’accusa di essere una «spia» russa. Pertanto, quando personalità di rilievo si coalizzano apertamente contro Zelensky, si tratta di una dichiarazione ben più incisiva rispetto agli attori di Hollywood che, al sicuro nelle loro lussuose camere da letto, realizzano video su TikTok contro Trump.

Il resto del mondo non resterà a guardare senza fare nulla.Presto dagli account bot di Kiev emergerà sicuramente qualche stupida contro-narrazione del tipo «Putin ha tradito i BRICS». Ovviamente qualcuno dirà che il Cremlino ha gettato i propri fratelli iraniani in pasto alla macchina della lobby sionista! Ma in realtà, sembra che gli iraniani si limiteranno semplicemente a spedire il proprio petrolio attraverso la Russia e a venderlo come «russo», e tutti ne saranno soddisfatti. Il Mar Caspio sarà ancora più trafficato nel prossimo futuro. Se le sanzioni hanno ottenuto qualcosa, è stato proprio quello di aumentare il commercio tra Russia e Iran.

A Mosca nessuno ha intenzione di tradire Teheran; si vuole che l’America entri a far parte del mondo multipolare, salvando al contempo la faccia e riducendo il livello globale di minaccia di guerra nucleare, che attualmente è decisamente troppo elevato. L’Iran e la Cina sono stati sicuramente consultati su questa questione prima che qualsiasi accordo sul diesel fosse finalizzato.

Il vero pericolo che Trump invochi la destituzione di Zelensky proviene dall’Europa, dove alcune fazioni, politici e i loro finanziatori potrebbero intraprendere azioni radicali in risposta. E la reazione di Trump a tale risposta potrebbe ora rivelarsi ancora più radicale. Sarebbe possibile che la NATO desse il via libera ai Paesi baltici per aprire semplicemente un altro fronte e «vedere cosa succede»? La Francia metterà finalmente in atto la propria minaccia e schiererà apertamente truppe in massa per salvare il «Napoleone in verde» dalla morte politica o, potenzialmente, fisica? Finora l’UE si è limitata a minacciare ulteriori sanzioni. Se gli oltre 20 pacchetti di sanzioni precedenti hanno fallito, mi chiedo cosa rimanga effettivamente da sanzionare. Ursula promette il pacchetto di sanzioni più ampio e di maggiore portata per lunedì 12 ottobre, ma dubito che cambierà qualcosa. L’unica cosa che potrebbe cambiare la situazione sarebbe un’azione militare da parte dell’UE davvero aggressiva, drastica e sconsiderata.

E il resto delle sanzioni?I media russi hanno reso un disservizio al pubblico scrivendo ripetutamente che «Trump revoca le sanzioni», quando le uniche sanzioni revocate riguardano le esportazioni di gasolio per sei mesi. Tutte le altre sanzioni sono ancora in vigore. Non è ancora possibile volare direttamente da Mosca a New York e i trasferimenti di denaro tramite SWIFT sono ancora in gran parte bloccati. Dobbiamo ricordare che, almeno in teoria, le sanzioni sono una forma di punizione per i crimini commessi contro, in questo caso, il diritto internazionale e gli Stati Uniti. Come possono quindi normalizzarsi veramente le relazioni tra gli Stati Uniti e la Federazione Russa quando l’una parte accusa ancora l’altra di crimini che ritiene non siano stati nemmeno commessi?

Una volta concluso il «Progetto Ucraina», le cose potrebbero cambiare rapidamente, ma non potrà esserci vera amicizia finché Washington non avrà fiducia in Aeroflot al punto da consentirle di atterrare sul territorio statunitense. Non possiamo trovarci contemporaneamente in una guerra di sanzioni e in una situazione di normalizzazione. Ma questa nuova narrativa di Trump, se riuscirà a portarla avanti fino alla sua logica conclusione, rappresenta la via d’uscita perfetta per l’America e il modo in cui potremo finalmente porre fine a questa guerra e tornare a un certo senso di normalità, con l’apocalisse relegata in un futuro lontano, ben oltre la durata delle nostre vite.

La vittoria del Parti Québécois e il referendum del 19 ottobre in Alberta riportano al centro il problema della coesione canadese. La separazione resta minoritaria, soprattutto nell’Ovest, ma il riemergere simultaneo delle spinte centrifughe rappresenta una sfida politica per Mark Carney.

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A pochi mesi dal consolidamento parlamentare del governo liberale di Mark Carney, il Canada si trova ad affrontare una questione che sembrava essersi progressivamente allontanata dal centro della scena politica: quella della propria coesione interna. La vittoria del Parti Québécois (PQ) nelle elezioni provinciali del Québec del 5 ottobre e il referendum previsto per il 19 ottobre in Alberta, nel quale gli elettori saranno chiamati a pronunciarsi sull’eventuale avvio del procedimento verso un successivo referendum vincolante sulla separazione dal Canada, hanno riportato contemporaneamente alla ribalta due forme molto diverse di contestazione dell’assetto federale.

Sarebbe eccessivo sostenere che il Canada si trovi alla vigilia della disgregazione. In Alberta, soprattutto, tutti i dati disponibili indicano che l’opzione favorevole alla permanenza nella federazione dovrebbe prevalere con un margine molto ampio. Tuttavia, il fatto stesso che una delle province economicamente più importanti del Paese abbia ritenuto politicamente possibile sottoporre agli elettori una domanda di questo genere dimostra il malcontento di una parte della popolazione: una questione che fino a pochi anni fa apparteneva soprattutto alle frange più radicali del cosiddetto western alienation è entrata nella sfera della politica istituzionale.

Il caso del Québec, invece, ha radici molto più profonde. Le elezioni provinciali del 5 ottobre hanno riportato al governo, dopo oltre un decennio, il Parti Québécois guidato da Paul St-Pierre Plamondon. Il PQ ha conquistato 59 dei 127 seggi dell’Assemblée nationale, fermandosi cinque seggi sotto la maggioranza assoluta. Ottenendo circa il 28% dei voti, ha chiuso la consultazione elettorale davanti al Parti Libéral du Québec, attestatosi poco sopra il 24%, al Parti Conservateur du Québec, con circa il 21%, e a Québec Solidaire, che ha raccolto oltre il 12% conquistando nove seggi. La Coalition Avenir Québec (CAQ), al governo dal 2018, è invece crollata al 13,3% senza ottenere alcun seggio.

Un tale esito impone certamente una lettura prudente, in quanto il successo del PQ non equivale a un mandato maggioritario per l’indipendenza. Il partito, infatti, ha beneficiato della frammentazione del voto e ha ottenuto la percentuale più bassa mai registrata da una formazione vincitrice nella storia elettorale del Québec, mentre i sondaggi continuano inoltre a collocare il sostegno alla separazione dal Canada intorno al 30%, ben lontano da una maggioranza sociale. Lo stesso St-Pierre Plamondon ha indicato che non intende convocare un nuovo referendum finché Donald Trump resterà alla Casa Bianca, sostenendo che la pressione tariffaria e l’instabilità derivante dai rapporti con gli Stati Uniti rendono necessario evitare, per il momento, un’ulteriore crisi costituzionale.

Ciò non riduce tuttavia la portata della vittoria del PQ. Per la prima volta dopo molti anni, il governo della seconda provincia più popolosa del Canada sarà guidato da una formazione che considera esplicitamente l’indipendenza del Québec il proprio obiettivo storico. Inoltre, sommando i 59 deputati del PQ ai nove di Québec Solidaire, anch’esso favorevole alla sovranità del Québec sebbene attraverso un percorso politico e sociale profondamente diverso, nell’Assemblée nationale esiste una maggioranza numerica di deputati eletti sotto le insegne di partiti indipendentisti. Questo non significa che PQ e Québec Solidaire formeranno automaticamente un blocco comune, né che un referendum sia imminente, ma conferma che la questione nazionale québécoise è tutt’altro che scomparsa.

La sua natura, inoltre, resta profondamente diversa dal separatismo emergente in Alberta. Il nazionalismo del Québec dispone di una propria continuità storica, linguistica e culturale, di una tradizione intellettuale e politica consolidata e di istituzioni che hanno progressivamente acquisito un grado considerevole di autonomia rispetto a Ottawa. I referendum del 1980 e del 1995, quest’ultimo perduto dagli indipendentisti per uno scarto inferiore all’1%, hanno mostrato quanto la questione possa arrivare a mettere in discussione l’esistenza stessa della federazione canadese.

La situazione dell’Alberta nasce invece prevalentemente da fattori economici, fiscali ed energetici. La provincia, cuore dell’industria petrolifera canadese, ha sviluppato da tempo un forte risentimento nei confronti del governo federale, accusato da settori rilevanti dell’opinione pubblica occidentale di utilizzare la ricchezza prodotta dalle province delle praterie per finanziare politiche redistributive decise nell’Est, imponendo contemporaneamente vincoli ambientali e normativi penalizzanti per il settore degli idrocarburi.

Sebbene tutti i sondaggi siano concordi sul fatto che il referendum non dovrebbe avere esito positivo, la trasformazione di una rivendicazione precedentemente marginale in una questione sottoposta ufficialmente all’intero corpo elettorale provinciale rappresenta un passaggio qualitativo da non sottovalutare. Significa che una parte della classe politica dell’Alberta considera ormai il ricorso alla minaccia separatista uno strumento legittimo di pressione nei confronti del governo federale. La premier Danielle Smith ha annunciato che voterà per la permanenza nel Canada e non sostiene personalmente la separazione, ma è stato il suo governo ad aggiungere la domanda al referendum provinciale (che consiste di un totale di dieci quesiti). La stessa Smith ha presentato la consultazione come uno strumento attraverso il quale permettere agli albertani di esprimere il proprio malcontento nei confronti di Ottawa.

Una vittoria del 70% o persino superiore dell’opzione federalista non cancellerebbe il fatto che circa un quinto dell’elettorato di una provincia fondamentale per l’economia canadese sia disposto a considerare almeno l’avvio di un processo di separazione. Nel gennaio 2026 Ipsos aveva addirittura registrato un sostegno iniziale alla prospettiva separatista del 28% in Alberta, praticamente identico al 31% rilevato in Québec, salvo poi constatare che il consenso si dimezzava quando agli intervistati venivano prospettati i costi concreti dell’indipendenza. In altre parole, per una parte consistente degli elettori il separatismo albertano funziona soprattutto come voto di protesta e strumento negoziale nei confronti del centro federale.

Per Mark Carney, la contemporaneità dei due fenomeni costituisce una sfida particolarmente delicata. Il primo ministro ha costruito la propria strategia economica e internazionale attorno al concetto di “autonomia strategica” canadese. Di fronte all’uso crescente delle tariffe, delle catene di approvvigionamento e delle dipendenze economiche come strumenti di pressione, soprattutto da parte dell’amministrazione Trump, Carney ha sostenuto che il Canada debba ridurre la propria vulnerabilità nei confronti degli Stati Uniti, diversificando mercati, partner e infrastrutture.

Nel suo discorso al Lowy Institute di Sydney dello scorso marzo, il premier aveva affermato esplicitamente che l’integrazione economica non deve più trasformarsi in subordinazione e che le medie potenze devono costruire capacità sovrane nei settori strategici, dall’energia ai minerali critici, dall’intelligenza artificiale ai sistemi di pagamento. La stessa impostazione è stata successivamente ripresa nei rapporti con l’Unione Europea e nell’apertura di nuovi canali economici verso l’Asia.

Particolarmente significativa, in questo senso, è stata la normalizzazione dei rapporti con la Cina. Nello scorso mese di gennaio Carney è stato il primo capo di governo canadese a recarsi ufficialmente a Pechino dal 2017, incontrando Xi Jinping e Li Qiang e inaugurando un nuovo partenariato strategico sino-canadese incentrato su energia, commercio, agroalimentare, sicurezza e multilateralismo. Ottawa ha indicato apertamente la Cina come uno dei mercati necessari per ridurre l’eccessiva dipendenza economica dagli Stati Uniti.

Questa strategia incontra però un paradosso fondamentale. Per ridurre la dipendenza dagli Stati Uniti e rivolgersi maggiormente ai mercati asiatici, il Canada ha bisogno proprio delle risorse energetiche dell’Alberta. Il nuovo oleodotto Pacific Link, che dovrebbe trasportare un milione di barili al giorno verso la costa della Columbia Britannica, è uno dei pilastri materiali di questo progetto. Il 1° ottobre Carney ha annunciato l’accelerazione dell’iter autorizzativo, definendo il progetto di interesse nazionale e collegandolo esplicitamente all’obiettivo di raddoppiare le esportazioni canadesi verso mercati diversi dagli Stati Uniti. Oltre il 90% delle esportazioni petrolifere canadesi è stato storicamente diretto verso il mercato statunitense: aprire una nuova grande direttrice verso il Pacifico significa tentare di trasformare l’Alberta da provincia dipendente dall’accesso al mercato statunitense in piattaforma energetica della proiezione canadese verso l’Asia.

Non è dunque casuale che Carney abbia scelto di presentare il progetto proprio a Fort McMurray, nel cuore delle sabbie bituminose albertane, accanto a Danielle Smith e a poche settimane dal referendum. La politica energetica diventa così contemporaneamente politica estera e politica di coesione nazionale. Offrire all’Alberta infrastrutture, accesso diretto ai mercati mondiali e un ruolo centrale nella strategia di diversificazione canadese significa rispondere alle spinte centrifughe non attraverso una semplice riaffermazione dell’autorità federale, ma cercando di modificare le condizioni economiche che le alimentano.

Una logica analoga, sebbene applicata a un contesto completamente diverso, emerge nel rapporto con il Québec. Dopo la vittoria di St-Pierre Plamondon, Carney ha evitato un confronto frontale con il nuovo governo provinciale, insistendo invece sulla necessità di un “federalismo cooperativo” fondato su infrastrutture, abitazioni, crescita economica e difesa degli interessi canadesi di fronte alle pressioni statunitensi. Il premier sa che trasformare immediatamente la questione in uno scontro tra Ottawa e Québec City potrebbe offrire agli indipendentisti esattamente il terreno politico di cui hanno bisogno per allargare un consenso alla sovranità che oggi resta minoritario.

L’atteggiamento dell’amministrazione Trump produce quindi un duplice effetto sulla politica del vicino settentrionale. Da un lato, le pressioni economiche statunitensi hanno accelerato la ricerca canadese di una maggiore autonomia e hanno reso più urgente la costruzione di un mercato interno maggiormente integrato. Dall’altro, proprio la percezione di una minaccia esterna contribuisce per il momento a frenare i separatismi: St-Pierre Plamondon ritiene troppo rischioso organizzare un referendum sull’indipendenza mentre il Canada è impegnato in uno scontro commerciale con Washington; parallelamente, in Alberta la ricerca di nuovi mercati per il petrolio può ridurre alcune delle ragioni economiche del malcontento verso Ottawa.

Il Canada non appare dunque prossimo alla dissoluzione. Ma il ritorno simultaneo della questione nazionale del Québec e del separatismo albertano indica che il modello federale sta attraversando una fase di crescente tensione. In una fase nella quale Mark Carney cerca di costruire un Canada più autonomo dagli Stati Uniti, più presente sui mercati asiatici e dotato di maggiori capacità economiche e strategiche proprie, emerge con forza una contraddizione: per conquistare maggiore autonomia all’esterno, Ottawa deve prima garantire la propria coesione all’interno. Il petrolio dell’Alberta, il peso demografico ed economico del Québec, le infrastrutture interprovinciali e il consenso delle popolazioni che compongono la federazione non sono questioni separate dalla politica internazionale canadese, ma ne costituiscono la condizione materiale.

Per Carney, la costruzione dell’“autonomia strategica” canadese passa ormai anche dalla capacità di dimostrare che il Canada possiede ancora un progetto federale sufficientemente credibile da tenere insieme le sue componenti.

Two giant pandas recently landed in Atlanta, a week after Donald Trump and Xi Jinping met in Washington. The summit produced no immediate breakthrough on trade deals, Taiwan or AI, but it did produce something cuddly for the American public: a pair of giant pandas, Ping Ping and Fu Shuang, which are on a ten-year […]

The post How Beijing combines conservation and trade in panda diplomacy appeared first on Asia Times.

par Russia TRUTH

Une succession rapide de manœuvres diplomatiques a permis à Donald Trump d’être publiquement réhabilité, à Vladimir Poutine de garder le contrôle stratégique total et à Volodymyr Zelensky de sombrer dans une rage sans bornes :

• L’accord bilatéral sur le diesel : La Maison Blanche et le Kremlin ont conclu un accord en vertu duquel le Trésor américain accorde une dérogation renouvelable aux sanctions sur les exportations russes de diesel jusqu’au 7 avril 2027. En contrepartie, Moscou a accepté de lever son interdiction temporaire d’exportation nationale de distillats moyens, apportant ainsi un soulagement immédiat, tant psychologique que concret, à un marché mondial du diesel mis à mal par les interdictions de transport maritime imposées au Moyen-Orient.

• L’effondrement du mythe de la «trêve énergétique» : Les rumeurs relayées par les médias occidentaux alléguant que Moscou aurait accepté une cessation provisoire des frappes aériennes et des tirs de missiles sur le réseau électrique ukrainien en échange d’un allègement plus large des sanctions ont été totalement discréditées. La position russe reste inébranlable : pas de cessez-le-feu provisoire ni sur terre, ni en mer, ni dans les airs.

• Moscou suspend officiellement les négociations : Lors d’un point presse officiel rendant compte du sommet téléphonique entre Poutine et Trump, le conseiller du Kremlin en matière de politique étrangère, Youri Ouchakov, a lancé une bombe diplomatique : la Russie a officiellement révoqué sa décision de septembre dernier de reprendre les négociations trilatérales avec Washington et Kiev. Invoquant les tentatives d’attaques par drones menées par l’Ukraine contre des bureaux de vote russes lors des élections à la Douma d’État, Poutine a informé Trump que le processus de négociation est suspendu indéfiniment tandis que les forces russes progressent sur l’ensemble du front.

• Rupture entre Washington et Kiev : Axios a confirmé que Donald Trump a personnellement adressé six exigences distinctes à Zelensky, lui ordonnant de mettre immédiatement fin aux raids de drones ukrainiens visant les raffineries russes. Zelensky a défié ces six exigences. Piégé par la dépendance de son pays aux financements occidentaux, Zelensky s’en est ouvertement pris à Trump, qualifiant le dialogue entre Washington et Moscou de «trahison en coulisses» et accusant la Maison Blanche d’utiliser les réunions à Miami comme écran de fumée pour traiter directement avec le Kremlin.

1. La transaction sur le diesel : un levier stratégique négocié contre un répit électoral

L’accord conclu entre Washington et Moscou est présenté par la Maison Blanche comme une avancée majeure. En réalité, cet accord marque le recul logique d’une puissance hégémonique surendettée, confrontée aux réalités économiques à l’approche des élections de mi-mandat de novembre :

• Le mécanisme de la dérogation : tout comme le Trésor américain a discrètement délivré des licences renouvelables pour permettre aux raffineries indiennes d’acheter du pétrole brut russe acheminé par voie maritime à la suite des premières escalades dans le golfe Persique en février, Washington a de nouveau accordé une dérogation d’urgence pour le diesel russe. Confronté à la réalité des pénuries de diesel agricole et routier, Trump a cédé sur ce que son dispositif de sanctions s’efforçait d’empêcher depuis des années.

• Le levier calculé de Novak : le vice-premier ministre russe Alexandre Novak a signalé il y a plusieurs semaines que les stocks nationaux de diesel en Russie affichent un excédent, la récolte agricole de cette année étant suffisante et comparable à celle de l’année dernière. L’interdiction russe des exportations, loin d’être un acte de désespoir déclenché par les frappes de drones ukrainiens, constituait un instrument de levier géopolitique. Moscou a retenu les distillats hors du marché jusqu’à ce que Washington soit contraint de négocier un assouplissement des sanctions.

• L’arithmétique du réel : comme l’ont démontré les analystes énergétiques, les volumes de diesel exportables par la Russie couvrent environ neuf jours de consommation intérieure américaine. Le véritable moteur de la crise énergétique mondiale reste le blocus du golfe Persique et de la mer Rouge. Pourtant, en acceptant de libérer ce volume, Moscou a obtenu une concession politique majeure de la part de Trump tout en démontrant aux pays du Sud que les régimes de sanctions occidentaux sont mis de côté dès que les prix intérieurs menacent une élection américaine.

2. Le point presse d’Ouchakov : la Russie claque la porte des négociations

La révélation géopolitique cruciale du jour provient du compte-rendu officiel de Youri Ouchakov sur le sommet téléphonique Poutine-Trump.

Pour la première fois depuis le lancement de l’opération militaire spéciale en 2022, la Fédération de Russie a officiellement et publiquement retiré son offre de pourparlers diplomatiques :

Poutine expose à Trump la doctrine russe durcie :

Les tentatives du régime de Kiev de perturber notre processus démocratique par des attaques terroristes contre des bureaux de vote ont réduit à néant toute possibilité de négociations. Nos forces armées détiennent l’initiative et avancent avec assurance. C’est à nous de déterminer si et quand des pourparlers auront un sens.

Il s’agit là d’un tournant décisif.

Tout au long du conflit, Moscou a maintenu une position cohérente : nous restons ouverts à un règlement politique et diplomatique selon nos conditions.

En lançant des attaques massives de drones contre les capitales provinciales russes et les bureaux de vote pendant les élections à la Douma, Bankova a fait le jeu de l’état-major russe.

Poutine a profité de cet incident pour mettre définitivement fin à cette voie de négociation, informant Trump que la Russie n’envisagera pas de discussions trilatérales tant que ses forces auront l’initiative opérationnelle totale.

Selon Ouchakov, Trump n’a pas réagi ; il a promis d’envoyer des «signaux» fermes à la délégation ukrainienne qui attendait à Miami.

3. Le coup de folie de Bankova : six défis, l’arnaque des 27 milliards d’euros et la rupture de Séoul

À Kiev, la prise de conscience que Donald Trump négocie des accords énergétiques directement avec Vladimir Poutine a provoqué une réaction démesurée de la part de Volodymyr Zelensky :

• Les six exigences : un reportage d’Axios a confirmé que la Maison Blanche a émis six directives distinctes à l’intention de Bankova, ordonnant la fin immédiate des attaques contre les infrastructures de raffinage russes. La motivation de Trump est purement intéressée : chaque frappe contre un craqueur de catalyseur russe fournit aux traders de Wall Street un prétexte pour faire grimper les cours à terme du diesel. Zelensky a rejeté toutes ces directives. Mettre fin aux frappes reviendrait à admettre que toute la campagne estivale de drones n’a abouti à aucun résultat stratégique.

• Le racket des 27 milliards d’euros : les dirigeants ukrainiens ne peuvent se permettre d’arrêter l’offensive de drones, car celle-ci constitue leur principal argumentaire utilisé pour extorquer des fonds à Bruxelles. Des responsables du ministère ukrainien de la Défense ont récemment déclaré que sans 27 milliards d’euros de subventions européennes immédiates, le montage de drones sur le territoire national serait interrompu. En déployant des munitions volantes pour incendier des réservoirs de stockage périphériques dans des villes de province russes, Bankova fabrique des images destinées à persuader des dirigeants européens comme Friedrich Merz et Ursula von der Leyen de continuer à faire affluer l’argent des contribuables dans les caisses du régime.

• La crise diplomatique avec Séoul : l’irritabilité diplomatique de Zelensky s’est étendue au-delà de Washington. Après la capture de deux soldats nord-coréens dans la région frontalière de Koursk, un accord a été conclu avec Séoul pour transférer secrètement les prisonniers en vue de les interroger. Ignorant la demande explicite de confidentialité formulée par la Corée du Sud pour éviter tout conflit avec Pyongyang, Zelensky a annoncé publiquement l’opération à des fins de relations publiques. Lorsque Séoul a protesté, Bankova a refusé de présenter des excuses, déclenchant une rupture diplomatique sans précédent qui a abouti au retrait par la Corée du Sud de son ambassadeur à Kiev — s’aliénant inutilement un partenaire qui avait fourni plus de 500 000 obus d’artillerie de 155 mm pour la campagne de 2023.

4. Le théâtre de la décapitation : sous-stations, centres de la SBU et le «Collegium» de Surovikin

Tandis que les diplomates échangent leurs reproches, la campagne aérienne stratégique russe contre Kiev est entrée dans une phase opérationnelle meurtrière :

1. La destruction du réseau électrique : des observateurs indépendants du secteur électrique confirment que les frappes russes sur la sous-station de Kievska de 750 kV et les nœuds de transformation du nord ont contourné les boucliers de protection en béton en ciblant les transformateurs de réduction de tension, les disjoncteurs et les parcs de refroidissement. Toute la rive droite (moitié ouest) de Kiev reste plongée dans une coupure d’électricité totale. Le réseau de métro étant à l’arrêt et les pompes de relevage d’eau à haute pression hors service, l’assainissement municipal a cessé de fonctionner, provoquant des refoulements d’eaux usées généralisés dans tout le centre administratif.

2. Les ogives coupe-câbles : les Forces aériennes russes (VKS) ont introduit des sous-munitions spécialisées, déployées par des appareils Geran-4 à propulsion à réaction, conçues spécifiquement pour sectionner les lignes aériennes à haute tension. En coupant les lignes reliant la production nucléaire de base de l’ouest à Kiev, les forces russes s’assurent que, même si les transformateurs des sous-stations sont réparés, le courant ne puisse physiquement atteindre la capitale.

3. Le collège de Surovikin : des sources militaires faisant autorité confirment que, bien que le chef d’état-major général Valery Gerasimov conserve officiellement le commandement suprême, le général Sergei Surovikin dirige activement la campagne d’interdiction et de destruction des infrastructures sur l’ensemble du théâtre d’opérations, à la tête d’un collège restreint de généraux supérieurs, dont Andrey Mordvichev et le vice-ministre de la Défense Yunus-Bek Yevkurov. Les caractéristiques de ce groupe de commandement — blocus systématique des ponts, ciblage méthodique des nœuds administratifs du SBU et publication de coupes architecturales du bunker souterrain de Zelensky situé sous la rue Bankova — indiquent une opération destinée à rendre la capitale fonctionnellement inhabitable pour le régime.

5. Usure sur le front : Dobropillya nettoyée, mines saisies, poches encerclées

Sur le terrain, les formations interarmes russes progressent à un rythme accéléré à travers les dernières lignes de fortifications ukrainiennes :

• La prise d’assaut de la mine de Dobropilska : le ministère russe de la Défense a confirmé que des groupes d’assaut de la 51e armée interarmes et des formations spécialisées d’infanterie de marine ont nettoyé les secteurs ouest de Dobropillya, pénétrant dans les galeries fortifiées de la mine de charbon de Dobropilska. Plus de 82 structures fortifiées ont été nettoyées en l’espace de 24 heures. La prise des imposants terrils de la mine offre aux observateurs d’artillerie russes un contrôle de tir direct et panoramique sur les lignes arrière de Druzhkivka.

• La liquidation des poches de résistance du nord : dans le nord-est de l’oblast de Kharkiv, les dernières poches de résistance du groupement frontalier ukrainien, fort de 1 700 hommes, ont été éliminées. Les forces russes ont libéré les hameaux centraux de la région, déplaçant ainsi le centre de gravité opérationnel du Groupe de forces Nord vers l’encerclement direct du nœud logistique de Velykyi Burluk. Au nord de Soumy, les positions avancées ukrainiennes le long des lisières de forêt se sont effondrées, rapprochant les détachements russes avancés à portée d’artillerie des limites municipales de Soumy.

• Le couloir mortel du Dniepr méridional : à Zaporijia, la fermeture du pont de Vantovyi (Khortytsia) a transformé les voies d’approvisionnement de la rive est en champ de bataille meurtrier. Les opérateurs de drones FPV russes, bénéficiant d’une ligne de visée ininterrompue au-dessus des fonds asséchés du réservoir de Kakhovka, ont établi un contrôle total des tirs sur tout le trafic routier tentant de renforcer le front sud.

Le crépuscule de la guerre par procuration

Les événements du 10 octobre 2026 marquent la fin d’une époque dans l’art de gouverner moderne :

• Donald Trump a obtenu sa dérogation temporaire sur le diesel pour protéger ses arrières sur le plan politique intérieur, reconnaissant ainsi que l’arme unipolaire des sanctions est inopérante.

• Vladimir Poutine a fait savoir que la Fédération de Russie ne se prêtera plus au jeu des négociations trilatérales théâtrales alors que ses soldats traversent les lignes défensives ukrainiennes.

• Et à Kiev, Volodymyr Zelensky est confiné dans une capitale plongée dans l’obscurité et envahie par les eaux usées — hurlant des insultes à ses protecteurs américains, rompant ses liens avec ses fournisseurs asiatiques et regardant ses brigades d’élite périr dans les tourbières du Donbass.

La transaction est conclue. Les illusions sont brisées.

Le maître impérial a conclu son accord parallèle sur le carburant, son mandataire a été abandonné à son sort, et la machine militaire souveraine de la Fédération de Russie achève méthodiquement la guerre dans la steppe eurasienne.

Publiéà l’origine par RussiaTruth 

Traduction:  ReseauInternational

As the European Parliament prepares to welcome representatives from six Gulf monarchies, uncomfortable questions are emerging about the moral foundations of Europe’s foreign policy. Can Brussels credibly champion democracy and human rights while deepening relations with governments accused of suppressing dissent, restricting fundamental freedoms and exploiting migrant workers?

The European Union has long presented itself as a global defender of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Yet its growing enthusiasm for closer relations with the Gulf monarchies raises an increasingly uncomfortable question: how much are those principles worth when substantial economic and strategic interests are at stake?

On October 16th, the European Parliament will host senior parliamentary representatives from the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman.

The conference, chaired by European Parliament President Roberta Metsola, will address parliamentary cooperation, maritime security and the geopolitical consequences of Russia’s war against Ukraine.

On paper, the initiative represents an entirely reasonable diplomatic exercise. Europe needs reliable energy supplies, secure international shipping routes and constructive relations with influential Middle Eastern governments.

But there is another side to this developing partnership, one that Brussels cannot simply dismiss as an inconvenient complication.

Several Gulf governments maintain political systems in which meaningful democratic opposition is severely restricted, freedom of expression is curtailed and individuals can face imprisonment for challenging those in power.

The question is not whether Europe should maintain diplomatic relations with such countries. It plainly must.

The question is whether those relations should be celebrated as strategic partnerships without demanding meaningful improvements in the treatment of their own citizens.

The uncomfortable reality behind Gulf prosperity

Saudi Arabia’s international image has undergone a remarkable transformation in recent years.

Under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the kingdom has promoted ambitious economic reforms, tourism projects and international sporting events designed to present a modernising society. Yet this carefully cultivated image sits uneasily alongside its human rights record.

Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have repeatedly documented concerns over executions, restrictions on political dissent, arbitrary detention and the treatment of women’s rights activists.

The murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul in 2018 remains an enduring symbol of the dangers faced by critics of the Saudi leadership. A 2021 US intelligence assessment concluded that the Crown Prince had approved an operation to capture or kill Khashoggi, an assessment rejected by Saudi Arabia.

Qatar, meanwhile, has attracted sustained criticism over the treatment of migrant workers, particularly during preparations for the 2022 FIFA World Cup. Although labour reforms were introduced, human rights organisations continue to question their implementation and the effectiveness of protections against exploitation.

The UAE, despite its reputation for modernity and commercial sophistication, has similarly faced criticism over restrictions on political expression, detention of dissidents and the absence of meaningful electoral democracy at national level.

Bahrain has been criticised for imprisoning opposition figures and restricting political freedoms, while concerns about migrant labour protections and freedom of expression extend across other Gulf states, albeit with important differences in their individual records.

These are not minor administrative shortcomings. They concern fundamental rights that the European Union claims to regard as universal and non-negotiable.

When strategic interests outweigh principles

There is an unmistakable contradiction in Europe’s approach. The European Parliament routinely condemns authoritarian practices in Russia, Belarus and other countries where political freedoms are suppressed. It demands accountability, democratic reform and respect for international law.

Yet when dealing with wealthy Gulf monarchies, the language often becomes considerably more accommodating. Economic opportunity, investment, energy security and regional stability suddenly dominate the conversation.

Such selective emphasis risks creating the impression that Europe’s commitment to human rights is determined less by universal principle than by the commercial and geopolitical importance of the country concerned.

That is a dangerous perception for an institution whose international credibility depends heavily upon its moral authority.

If the imprisonment of political opponents is unacceptable in Moscow or Minsk, why should comparable abuses become less objectionable when committed by governments possessing substantial sovereign wealth funds or strategically important energy reserves?

Europe cannot reasonably demand consistency from others while appearing unwilling to apply it to itself.

The strategic argument remains compelling

None of this diminishes the genuine importance of cooperation with the Gulf. The Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea are essential maritime corridors connecting Europe with global energy suppliers and Asian markets. Threats to commercial shipping, regional instability and the activities of Iran-aligned armed groups present legitimate security concerns.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has also demonstrated the dangers of excessive dependence upon unreliable external partners. Diversifying energy relationships is therefore a sensible strategic objective.

Moreover, Gulf governments possess considerable diplomatic influence, including relationships with states and political actors that European governments may struggle to engage directly.

But strategic necessity does not automatically confer moral legitimacy.

Indeed, Europe’s previous dependence upon Russian energy offers a particularly sobering lesson. For years, European governments convinced themselves that extensive commercial engagement with Moscow would encourage moderation and political stability.

Instead, economic interdependence failed to prevent Russian aggression, leaving Europe exposed when that relationship collapsed. It would be reckless to assume that expanding commercial relations with authoritarian governments necessarily produces political liberalisation.

What does parliamentary cooperation actually mean?

The proposed conference also raises questions about the meaning of parliamentary dialogue.

The European Parliament is a directly elected institution, accountable to hundreds of millions of citizens through competitive democratic elections.

The political institutions of the Gulf states operate under markedly different arrangements, with varying degrees of appointed representation, limited electoral participation and executive authority concentrated within ruling families.

Describing these relationships simply as parliamentary cooperation risks obscuring fundamental differences in democratic legitimacy.

Dialogue can undoubtedly serve a useful purpose. But it should not be allowed to imply an equivalence between representative democratic institutions and political structures in which citizens have far fewer opportunities to challenge those governing them.

Nor should participation in prestigious European institutional events become an exercise in international reputation management for governments facing serious human rights allegations.

A test of Europe’s credibility

The European Parliament has an opportunity to demonstrate that closer cooperation need not mean abandoning its principles.

It could insist that human rights form a substantive part of future engagement, including scrutiny of political imprisonment, freedom of expression, judicial independence and migrant worker protections.

It could also establish mechanisms for monitoring progress rather than relying upon diplomatic assurances.

Such measures would not necessarily undermine economic cooperation. They would establish that the relationship carries responsibilities as well as benefits.

Ultimately, the issue is not whether Europe should talk to the Gulf monarchies, but whether it possesses the political courage to challenge them.

A European Union that condemns authoritarianism in one part of the world while accommodating it elsewhere risks reducing its professed values to little more than diplomatic convenience.

Europe may need the Gulf’s energy, investment and strategic influence, but it should not have to surrender its conscience to obtain them.

And if Brussels cannot reconcile its commercial ambitions with its democratic principles, it must confront a deeply uncomfortable possibility: that Europe’s foreign policy is increasingly being guided not by the values it proclaims, but by the wealth and influence of those sitting across the negotiating table.

No fue la venta de ese diésel lo que le interesaba a Putin, pero no sabemos bien todavía qué.

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“Pero les diré que es raro tener conversaciones tan largas en las que ninguno de ellos quisiera terminar la conversación, ninguno de ellos quería colgar el teléfono si se puede decir así”

Yuri Ushakov. Asesor de la Presidencia rusa, 19 de mayo de 2025

“Fue una conversación muy intensa y amistosa. Nadie quería ser el primero en colgar”, reveló Ushakov, quien destacó el ambiente cordial del diálogo entre ambos mandatarios.

Yuri Ushakov. Asesor de la Presidencia rusa, 9 de octubre de 2026

El día 9 de octubre un desesperado Donald Trump -que no había extendido como gesto cordial y diplomático una felicitación por el cumpleaños de su homólogo ruso el 7 de octubre- llamó al Kremlin y entabló un acuerdo para nada modesto: habilitó la venta de petróleo y diésel rusos, mismo que había vetado apenas en septiembre con aranceles del 100% a quien comerciara con Moscú.

De esta forma:

…acordaron que Rusia suministrará inmediatamente más de 300.000 toneladas de combustible diésel a los mercados estadounidense y mundial. Según detalló, Moscú entregará otras 500.000 toneladas durante el mes de noviembre y un millón de toneladas adicionales inmediatamente después, así como otros tres millones de toneladas en un corto período de tiempo, dependiendo del estado de las refinerías rusas.

La noticia cayó mal en Kiev y en Europa e incluso congeló la conversación que mantenían una comitiva ucraniana con Kushner y Witkoff en Miami, terminándola un día antes de lo previsto.

La Europa desconcertada empezó a tener comunicaciones con Zelensky para mostrar de nuevo el apoyo a esta demencial apuesta por la guerra en donde Ucrania pone los muertos y los europeos endeudan a los ucranianos que quedan vivos.

Sin embargo, los vaivenes del presidente estadounidense no son nuevos y mucho menos en lo que tiene que ver con suministro energético. Una breve cronología lo confirma: 1) tras el inicio de la guerra contra Irán el 28 de febrero de este año, Trump se vio obligado el 5 de marzo a dar una licencia temporal para que India comprara petróleo a Rusia; 2) el 12 de marzo se emitió otra licencia temporal por parte del Departamento del Tesoro estadounidense por treinta días para venta de crudo ruso, que estaba sancionado; 3) el 18 de septiembre, Donald Trump firma la Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, que le daba el poder de imponer aranceles de hasta 100% a los 5 mayores compradores de petróleo y gas rusos (principalmente China e India); 4) finalmente este 9 de septiembre suspendió Trump esa ley exhibida con toda la parafernalia propia del siniestro gobierno Trump, por parte del senador Richard Blumenthal,  quien dijo: “Vladimir Putin, te tenemos fichado, tu economía se tambalea” … amenazó a China e India y hoy, Trump da las gracias al presidente Putin por salvarle el trasero en vísperas de elecciones.

Y así, como un Déjà vu, Yuri Ushakov volvió a decir las mismas palabras del año anterior: ninguno de los dos quería colgar. Y bueno esta vez colgaron a Zelensky y a la Unión Europea, la pregunta es: ¿cuándo volverá a dar otro bandazo Trump? ¿Cuándo volverá a ser amigo de von der Leyen, mentor de Zelensky y enemigo de Putin?

La Unión Europea, ridículo completo

Es sabido por ellos y por varios analistas esta cruda verdad: Trump no quiere a los europeos, a penas los soporta, siempre ha querido sacar las tropas de esa zona, siempre quiso salir de la OTAN, les puso en ridículo desde las primeras reuniones, les dijo que estaban muriendo las buenas costumbres con una Europa llena de migración desordenada y grupos LGBTI+Q por todo lado, hombres en competencias de mujeres y etc. etc. El propio J.D. Vance les dijo que había una caída moral de Europa y a eso se debía su crisis.

No siendo esto poco, Úrsula von der Leyen se comprometió en nombre de la UE a comprar 750.000 millones de dólares en energía a EE.UU. (gas natural licuado, petróleo y productos nucleares) hasta 2028. Además, se comprometió a realizar inversiones adicionales por 600.000 millones de dólares en Estados Unidos. Y a cambio, Estados Unidos fijó un arancel general del 15% sobre la mayoría de productos europeos, en lugar del 30%.

Y ahora, luego de tanto ir y venir, Estados Unidos le sigue comprando petróleo a Rusia, además de uranio y otros materiales que luego revende a Europa más caro. Ya los precios de gas están reventando al ciudadano común y mientras Trump viola las sanciones occidentales que pretenden asfixiar a Rusia, Europa tiene que pagar por tratos leoninos con EE.UU., invertir en la guerra en Ucrania y exprimir al poco Estado de Bienestar que les queda y del cual ya se ven revueltas nuevamente por vivienda, educación o empleo en Francia, España, Alemania, Portugal y Bélgica.

Este nuevo pacto comercial, que va hasta abril de 2027 ridiculiza a Europa, la pone en el lugar que le corresponde: el de una civilización – collage en decadencia. Europa anhela el regreso de los halcones demócratas para retornar a una presión unánime sobre Rusia y en franca escalada bélica como la llevaba ‘sleepy’ Biden. Esto no pasará. El nuevo rumbo estadounidense es Asia Oriental.

Rusia y sus socios, actores globales

Si bien esta venta es un golpe no sólo económico sino reputacional a favor del presidente Putin y Rusia, también deja abiertos otros aspectos no menos relevantes.

Por un lado, China mira con celo cualquier acercamiento entre Rusia y USA en este baile de tres potencias globales. Los chinos son los principales socios comerciales de los rusos y muy seguramente de mantenerse la restricción al diésel ruso, chinos e indios lo comprarían. Entonces, ¿qué ganó y condicionó Vladímir Putin en la llamada con Trump? Los rusos tienen acuerdos comerciales y han aprendido a maniobrar en medio de más de treinta mil sanciones así que este trato fue un guiño a Trump ante su SOS.

Es claro que no le cae mal esto a Rusia que ahora puede poner un precio no por debajo de los costos -de haberlo tenido que vender con restricciones por sanciones- pero quien marcó el teléfono fue Trump no Putin.

Por otro lado, Irán no creo que esté cómodo con esto. Con claridad Trump quiere no sólo estar bien con los precios y abastecimiento de combustible en su país, sino estar lo suficientemente seguro de que se mantiene un flujo nada modesto de diésel en el mercado mundial para atacar a Irán sin problemas o no tantos. Por cierto, hay que ser una potencia para decir sin duda alguna: ‘cuente señor Trump con tres millones de toneladas de diésel’. Sin lastimar su consumo interno, lo hace Rusia.

Además, la ruta por el Ártico plantea una alternativa a los cierres de Ormuz y Bab el-Mandeb que derivan de las resistencias al imperio y al sionismo por parte de Irán y Yemen. Lo que implica que como de costumbre EE.UU. celebra comerciar por Alaska con Rusia.

De tal suerte que, si Irán lleva a su manera una presión mediante la diplomacia y el cierre estratégico del flujo de petróleo, fertilizantes y mercancías con lo cual busca desgastar a los estadounidenses y una salida de la guerra en sus términos, el guiño del Kremlin a Trump no le favorece. Fortalece a su enemigo, quien gana tiempo y sin desesperar puede atacarlo de mejor manera. No implica una derrota de Irán, implica un cambio en los cálculos de presión, si en abril se extiende el plazo y si Trump decide atacar antes.

Finalmente, hay un socio que los propios rusos lo señalan como valioso. Cuba. La Isla, país que apoyó a millones de personas en el mundo de diversas formas y cuando sucedió en 1986 la catástrofe de Chernóbil en la URSS hace cuarenta años, en pleno Periodo Especial, Cuba recibió a 26 mil niños de Rusia, Bielorrusia, Moldavia y Ucrania para darles tratamiento y los adoptó como hijos propios. Esa Cuba amiga incondicional y solidaria no recibe petróleo desde hace un año largo y en septiembre la Guardia Costera de EE.UU. devolvió el buque Grace con combustible.

Sobre Cuba se teje un genocidio. No le llega combustibles ni mercancías. ¿Se habrá acordado el presidente Putin de la Isla, patria del más grande antiimperialista del siglo XX en todo occidente cuando negoció con Trump salvando el trasero a su enemigo, este republicano vetusto? Si Trump permitió liberar de sanciones el combustible para todo el mundo, ¿Ese ‘todo el mundo’ incluirá a Cuba?

Potencias: sin amigos y sin engaños

Es claro que cuando el asesor presidencial, Ushakov, señala que la conversación fue amable y llego a un punto de: ‘cuelga tú, ¡no!, ¡cuelga tú!’ entre los dos mandatarios, sólo desea crear una sobrecarga de cortisol en la UE y los ucronazis y seguro logró tal efecto. Esto no significa que crean que están tratando con la esperanza de una amistad. Por el contrario, sólo un pragmatismo puro y duro tiene las tripas para llegar a estos acuerdos.

Qué pasaría si el presidente Putin le dice a Trump: no te daré un gramo de diésel. No lo sabremos, pero seguro ofende a este tarado mental y lo pone del lado de Europa y Ucrania.

Es el mismo hombre que respaldó a Marco Rubio, su secretario de Estado, cuando hace unos meses celebraba los bombardeos sobre colegios de infantes en Rusia señalando que era válida la máxima presión. Es el mismo hombre que autoriza la entrega de datos de la CIA y el Pentágono a los ucronazis para atacar las mismas refinerías que condena que Zelensky ataque.

Esto también es claro, como nota al pie. El propio neonazi Volodómir Zelensky, presidente ilegítimo de Ucrania hace dos años y asesino de su pueblo, tiene razón al criticar la acción de Trump y hasta de tildarlo de débil. “La paz nunca llega gracias a la debilidad”, señaló. Trump salió a decir que era ya necesario cambiar de presidente por alguien que deseara negociar, que Zelensky perdió más de un millón de ciudadanos y 30% del territorio.

Y lo que diga la UE al respecto tiene su parte de verdad, así como de ingenuidad, como señaló el presidente eslovaco Robert Fico. Pero nadie está seguro con lo que se pacte con Trump ni con ningún gringo. Nunca han mantenido la palabra. Quizá la excepción es Kennedy en la crisis de los misiles.

Siempre los más pequeños saldrán lastimados en los acuerdos entre potencias, pero no aprenden no leen la historia. Le pasó a Cuba en 1962 en la crisis de los misiles. Le pasó a Libia, cuando decidió no tener armas nucleares y europeos y estadounidenses acordaron robarla. Europa todavía era algo fuerte. Hay más ejemplos.

Lo clave es que en este intempestivo acuerdo hay más de enemistad que de amistad. EE.UU. no desea salvar ni ayudar a Rusia. No le interesa la paz, se limpió el trasero con el acuerdo del Anchorage, sólo vela por su bienestar, el de su élite. Por su parte Putin sabe que le desean muerto, que, durante una llamada en 2025, mientras hablaba con Trump caían drones en una de sus residencias.

La diferencia sustancial radica en que Putin juega a largo aliento, tiene calculadas las contingencias. No fue la venta de ese diésel lo que le interesaba, pero no sabemos bien todavía qué. Mientras, Trump lleva una política de mentiras apalancada en el poder de los medios y el peso de la información salida de la boca del presidente de una potencia, con la cual improvisa, salva, ataja, corrige, omite y salta a otra cosa.

Lo cierto es que por ahora -y sin saber cómo despertará mañana, pensando o deseando el frustrado candidato auto propuesto a Nobel de paz- felizmente al terminar la llamada, los presidentes, además de colgar sus teléfonos, colgaron a Zelensky y a la Unión Europea.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

Is Trump planning on using Putin to get him out of the mess of both his low polling and the Iran war? Seems far-fetched perhaps at first, but he is completely snared in Iran, with whatever option he looks at appearing to be a doomsday scenario. Could Putin help him out both with diesel prices back home but also to broker a deal with Iran which makes it appear to Americans that he, and America, are somehow the winners?

For the Russian president to sell close to 2 million tonnes of diesel oil to Western countries, including the U.S. of course, seems like a sticking plaster to a huge wound in the American and Western economies. Unless, that is, there is a second deal behind it which journalists and pundits are not aware of, or are simply choosing not to report. For the diesel initiative from Putin, the amount which is being offered isn’t huge, but there are a couple of precedents which it sets which are more important.

Firstly, it opens the doors for further lifting of sanctions (which could be bundled into Iran’s, given Moscow’s relations with Tehran), but perhaps even more importantly, it makes President Zelensky of Ukraine an even bigger target for Trump. Much will rest on the coming days and the decision that Zelensky will take to continue bombing Russia’s oil facilities. Will he take that suicide pill? Wars are often messy, and there are always grey areas where the two countries at war with one another find situations which are illogical and impractical. Perhaps the bombing of oil facilities within Russia in the Ukraine war has reached its tipping point, and regardless of how close EU leaders are with Zelensky – who at best we can call a caretaker leader – this will test this relationship to breaking point.

Do great numbers of citizens in France and Germany need to die this winter simply because of an energy crisis and/or an economic malaise in their own countries which have poured billions into keeping the war in Ukraine alive? Is Putin so confident that this winter will be the last one for his troops, as the defensive line between Ukraine’s forces and those of Russia’s looks like it is about to break at any moment? Are Ukrainians themselves ready to face a freezing winter in Kiev, unable to power or heat their own apartments? So many wars started over energy reserves, but not Ukraine. Yet it might end over them.

Trump’s threatening comments on social media about Zelensky should be taken seriously. If Trump’s own cabal of unqualified advisers can seriously convince him that a ground invasion of Iran is feasible, if not winnable, one could argue simply that regime change in Ukraine should be a children’s picnic and gives him a huge payday – politically, economically and geopolitically. Removing Zelensky would stop the war immediately, and Trump could claim victory for that, while he asks his friend Putin to quietly intervene in Iran and fix the Straits of Hormuz.

For Trump to actually respond to Zelensky’s outburst to reporters that the move to buy Russian diesel was “weak” by threatening Zelensky with being removed shows that his patience has reached a point where he is starting to think of the Ukrainian president as the source of the problems. To remove Zelensky through backing a rival will be hard and will pitch him against EU leaders, but one could argue relations couldn’t really get any worse, and that once Macron and Merz understand that peace is the only option and Zelensky is actually the only real obstacle to that, they will do what all EU leaders do and follow America’s lead.

We often hear analysts on YouTube talk about the game of “chicken”, but there has never been a more fleeting moment than now, as both Trump and Zelensky will be watching each other to see who blinks first. Zelensky, until now, has been playing a dangerous game of pretending to be servile to U.S. hegemony, while really just taking the cash and weapons and laughing at Trump among a coterie of weak European leaders in their palatial residences. The war has been complex since it began, as the U.S. and EU rarely saw eye to eye, but if Trump goes ahead with his threat of denying the Ukrainians shared intel, then this will be a very bad omen for the future of Zelensky, as he will put even more pressure on the British, French and Germans to come up with more weapons and money in an unwinnable war which they’ve bet the farm on and their entire political careers depend on.

The war, after this diesel decision, might have just become much simpler and more binary, and a collective narrative might emerge from the insanity of EU gibberish from countries who can’t even protect their own people on their own soil against an invasion of bogus asylum seekers. It will not only be the ultimate test for U.S.-Ukraine relations, but also one for U.S.-EU ones, and perhaps represent the end of NATO as we know it.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

No one expected that Donald Trump, after a congratulatory birthday phone call to his Russian counterpart, would declare that Russian diesel fuel would prove to be the solution to America’s current fuel shortages. If the Trump presidency has yielded anything it is a lot of interesting headlines that seem to come out of nowhere, that can sadly, quite often, fade right back into the mist from whence they came. Sometimes Trump’s words can fill us with hope like this ‘Diesel Deal’, and others like his recent UN speech, where he threatened to potentially kill all Iranians, fill us with dread. This declaration by our enigmatic leader presents a very interesting media narrative and a potential end to ‘Project Ukraine’ that is worth taking a deeper dive into.

Trump has blamed Zelensky for the global energy shortages, especially those concerning diesel fuel. At the time, everyone thought this was just a cheap Twitter-style deflection from the failed war against Iran, which certainly caused a lot of fuel transport disruption. That is to say, the White House was projecting this crisis, that it allowed to happen, or actively caused, to be thrown onto the scapegoat Zelensky. However, this form of deflection or projection is no longer just words in a pre-election narrative, but has become action. Sanctions on Russian diesel have been lifted and the first shipment is already on its way as I write these words. Something tangible has occurred.

Zelensky was actually warned some six times to stop attacking Russian oil infrastructure. Blow up children in the Donbass and beyond ‘sure’, but attacking what the West wants from Russia more than anything is ‘totally unacceptable’. Zelensky, who as stated above was warned half-a-dozen times to back of strikes on oil/gas, upon hearing of Trump’s decision to purchase Russian diesel fuel did the following:

1) He quickly attacked Russian oil infrastructure again seemingly to spite the U.S. President

2) He immediately cut off peace talks in Miami with the Trump’s aides, the Kushner-Witkoff duo, which is yet another spitting in the face of Donald Trump.

The wildest thing of all is that the ‘narcissist’ Trump has already publically thanked President Putin twice for this deal. Appearing at a rally, Americans standing behind Trump wildly cheered in favor of the announcement of peace with Russia plus extra fuel for America. Russophobia is a hobby of the globalist bourgeoisie and Epstein Island, not American truckers and farmers.

It’s a great narrative, let’s hope it lasts

Trump has now put 100% of the blame for global energy/fuel problems directly onto Zelensky, and called him out personally for keeping the war going over the last two years. Thus, the narrative is forming into something like: If the war in Ukraine is the cause of the fuel shortages, and Zelensky is the cause of the war continuing, that means the U.S. can make a deal with Russia even if ‘they started it’, with the corollary that Zelensky logically needs to go as he is the source of the problem. But going even deeper into the narrative we can see the most interesting thing of all or as they like to say online ‘the quiet part’: Trump has essentially declared that Russian energy output is of vital strategic interest to the United States.

It is these kind of words that take the black pill out of my mouth and directly inject ‘hopium’ into my bloodstream. The idea of the American President declaring that NOT being at war with Russia is of vital strategic interest to the USA is something I have been dreaming of my entire adult life. This is exactly the logic that we need to finally and ultimately end the Cold War + Project for a New American Century mentality in politics and finally allow the USA to rebuild and invest into itself. This very well could be America’s mulitpolar awakening by using a logic trap similar to the other ones that have been used to do the exact opposite and keep the USA locked in eternal foreign wars of luxury for ‘national security’. This new logic trap could look something like this: “So you want war with Russia? That must mean you want to harm America, you dirty traitor! You’ll take the fuel from farmer Joe and our kids will starve, you monster! Russia being left alone to produce fuel is a national security interest of America, are you against our country’s national security? Do you want to weaken manly America for those gay Europeans?”.

But as we slam that hopium injection into our veins we have to remember that Donald Trump has said a lot of things, changed his mind many times, or was forced to change it, and perhaps isn’t quite the unilateral decider that he makes himself out to be on TV.

It takes two to tango, but one orange man to keep his word.

The transcripts from this now famous birthday phone chat look very different on the American and Russian sides, which is par for the course. Trump’s team tends to write discussed things as proven facts whereas the Russians are more noncommittal in their language. But the diesel sanctions are gone for now and the boats are moving, so this looks to be real… at least until the mid-term votes are cast.

The American side has since threatened to cut Zelensky off from intelligence sharing, which could be an instant deathblow to their military efforts as many experts believe that only U.S. intel has allowed them to survive this long. Without such targeting data they will be sent back to 20^th century warfare instantly, and they would no longer be able to strike deep into Russia. RT wrote the following on this issue:

A Ukrainian official told Axios that Witkoff and Kushner threatened to cut off US intelligence sharing with Kiev if it continued to ignore Trump’s requests to halt strikes on Russian oil refineries, but the US official denied that any such threat had been made.

But here is where we have to hold our breath, for despite how nice this new narrative sounds, and how it is the perfect exit for the USA from its participation in Project Ukraine we should not forget the words of President Putin from some time ago when he talked about the true power of any U.S. President:

“So a person is elected — he comes with ideas… Then people with briefcases come visit him, well-dressed, in dark suits — kind of like mine.”

So the real question might be, will the Zionist Lobby, Epstein Elite, Three-Letter Organizations, Influential Billionaires, and all the other spooks on Capitol Hill actually let President Trump actually end this war? Will the POTUS be allowed to do this?

We should recall that after Zelensky acted disgracefully in the White House at the start of Trump’s second term everyone thought this conflict would be over. Trump the famous narcissist seemed visibly angry and offended on camera during their verbal spat. But the war went on. There was the Anchorage Summit, which had tons of hype and everyone thought then that the U.S. would pull support from Kiev. But it did not. Trump’s enemies including the Biden Clan are linked to massive corruption in Ukraine which has all been exposed. This would have been a great off ramp from the conflict, but Trump did not or could not take it. And in general, Trump’s rhetoric towards Zelensky and other European politicians has been overtly harsh and disrespectful. The man accused of being a ‘blowhard’ somehow always speaks quite politely behind the backs and to the faces of Putin and Xi.

Thus, although I want peace and mutually-respectful cooperation between the USA and Russia perhaps this deal will only last till the midterm elections, when all of a sudden Zelensky will go back to being “a bastard, but he’s our bastard”, and the conflict will go marching on. Perhaps this is our October Surprise from the Republican side of the aisle? And in December we can all be ‘surprised again’ when the war resumes full-force and thousands more Slavs die on the battlefield?

Now, Donald Trump with gritted teeth is slinging forth the idea that he thinks “it’s time for Ukraine to get a new President”. But after the votes are counted in America he may just go back to passively hating and tolerating Zelensky till the end of his term or till an Oreshnik finds the mark one day. We also cannot forget that the West has been lobbying for a major ceasefire from the Russians for a long time. Presumably this would be used to regroup, rest, rearm and then just go right back to fighting till the last Ukrainian. Now Trump wants elections in Kiev, which will probably demand a ceasefire to enact. But will he be pushing for a three-day ceasefire, or try to trick the Russians into agreeing to a month-long freeze or more?

One ‘good’ sign on this issue from a Russian standpoint is that there are now already calls for Zelensky to resign over this issue on Twitter/X coming from all sides even pro-Ukrainian ones:

“’Zelensky must resign’ – Ukrainian media. That was quick. Zelensky ignored Trump’s warnings not to attack Russian oil refineries SIX times. This morning, Zelensky has bombed another Russian oil refinery. Ukrainians are calling for Zelensky‘s resignation.

Former Ukrainian MP and Metinvest co-owner Vadym Novynskyi has called on Zelensky to resign and hand over all power to Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada following the Trump-Putin agreements.”

We have to remember that Ukraine in 2026 is already a police state where any dissent means you could get thrown into a bus and taken to the front to die or vanish into a prison as a Russian ‘spy’. Thus, when important people gang up against Zelensky openly it is much more of a potent statement than Hollywood actors safely making Tik-Toks against Trump from their luxurious bedrooms.

The rest of the world won’t sit around and do nothing.

Some moronic ‘Putin sold out the BRICS’ counter-narrative is sure to arise from Kiev’s bot accounts soon. Obviously someone is going to say that the Kremlin threw their Iranian brothers to the Zio-lobby machine! But in actuality, it looks like the Iranians are going to just ship their oil through Russia and sell it as ‘Russian’ and everyone will be happy. The Caspian Sea will be even more busy in the near future. If sanctioned accomplished anything they really increased trade between Russia and Iran.

No one in Moscow is planning on selling out Tehran; they want America to join the Multipolar World while still saving face and reduce the global threat level of nuclear war which is vastly too high at present. Iran and China were surely consulted on this issue before any Diesel Deal was finalized.

The real danger of Trump calling for the removal of Zelensky comes from Europe, where certain factions, politicians and their financiers may take radical action in response. And Trump’s reaction to this response could be even more radical now. Would it be possible that NATO might greenlight the Baltics to just open up another front to ‘see what happens’? Will France finally go through on its threat and just deploy troops openly en masse to save the Napoleon in Green from political or potentially physical death? So far the EU has only threatened even more sanctions. If the previous 20+ packages of sanctions failed, I wonder what is left to actually sanction. Ursula is promising the biggest and most expansive sanctions packet for Monday, October 12^th, but I doubt it will change anything. The only thing that would change the situation is if the EU did something really aggressive, drastic and stupid militarily.

What about the rest of the sanctions?

The Russian media has done a disservice to the public by writing that “Trump will lift sanctions” over-and-over again when the only sanctions being lifted are on diesel exports for half a year. All of the rest of the sanctions are still there. You still cannot fly directly from Moscow to New York, and money transfers via SWIFT are still mostly blocked. We have to remember that at least in theory sanctions are a form of punishment for crimes committed against, in this case, international law and the United States. So how can relations between the USA and Russian Federation truly be normalized when one still accuses the other of crimes it believes it did not even commit?

After Project Ukraine ends things could change rapidly, but there can be no true friendship until Washington trusts Aeroflot enough to let them land on U.S. territory. We cannot be both under a sanctions war and normalized at the same time. But this new Trump narrative, if he can stick with it to its logical conclusion, is the perfect off-ramp for America and the way we can finally end this war and go back to some sense of normalcy with the apocalypse pushed far off into the future beyond all of our lifespans.

By rejecting the transformation of their country into a new front against Russia, Georgians preserved their strategic autonomy.

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In recent years, Georgia has become the stage for a struggle whose implications extend far beyond its borders. The political conflict, often presented as a debate over democracy, European integration, and civil rights, should in fact be understood as another chapter in the delicate geopolitical game unfolding across the Caucasus.

It is against this backdrop that Tbilisi’s decision to distance itself from the confrontational policies promoted by its Western partners takes on particular significance.

The fundamental question is not whether Georgia should be “European” or “Russian.” Such a framework is excessively simplistic. The real issue is whether a small state situated between major centers of power should be free to determine its own foreign policy or whether its international position should be dictated by the strategic interests of outside actors.

The Georgian government chose the first option.

The rise of Georgian Dream brought about a significant shift in the country’s foreign policy. Rather than automatically echoing the anti-Russian rhetoric prevailing in  Brussels, Tbilisi adopted a more pragmatic approach. Its priority became avoiding another war while preserving economic relations with its neighbors.

For Georgia, this is no abstract matter. Russia remains an important economic partner. Trade, tourism, energy, and the movement of people create realities that cannot simply be erased by political decisions. Fully adopting the Western sanctions regime against Moscow would have particularly serious consequences for an economy far smaller and more vulnerable than those of Europe’s major powers.

This is where Tbilisi’s policy fundamentally diverges from the strategy advocated by Brussel’s hawks. Brussels wants Georgia to become increasingly integrated into European political structures. The Georgian government, however, has insisted that integration cannot mean automatically submitting to the European Union’s geopolitical priorities.

The adoption of the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence became the main symbol of this dispute. Its critics regard the legislation as a democratic setback. Its supporters see it as a legitimate attempt to limit the political influence of organizations financed from abroad.

The same divide is evident in cultural matters. Georgian legislation concerning LGBT propaganda provoked a strong European reaction and reinforced the perception among its critics that Tbilisi was abandoning the liberal values promoted by the European Union.

Yet one question rarely receives the same attention: who should determine Georgia’s political and cultural rules?

For Georgian Dream, the answer is the Georgian state itself. It was precisely this insistence on autonomy that made the government the target of increasingly intense international pressure.

Recently, Tbilisi Mayor Kakha Kaladze openly accused Brussels of financing an attempted coup in Georgia during last year’s protests. He claims that European actors funded groups involved in the demonstrations and supported efforts to bring about a change of government. According to Kaladze, the objective was to install political forces more closely aligned with the interests of the European Union.

In fact, such allegations should come as little surprise in the current geopolitical environment. Brussels is now discussing the possibility of imposing sanctions on most Georgian Dream leaders and government officials. These developments nevertheless reveal the broader geopolitical dimensions of the crisis. The dispute is not merely a controversy over domestic legislation, but a genuine struggle over the country’s strategic orientation.

Here lies the principal danger facing Georgia. The Caucasus is not a neutral space. The region lies between Russia, Turkey, Iran, and the Euro-Atlantic world. Any attempt to turn Georgia into a platform for confrontation with Moscow would have far greater consequences for Georgians themselves than for the powers supporting such a policy from a distance.

The experience of Ukraine has made this reality even more obvious. A state can receive political, financial, and military support from foreign powers while ultimately paying the highest price when rivalries between those powers escalate into open conflict. For a small country such as Georgia, avoiding this fate is a fundamental strategic consideration.

It was precisely on this point that Tbilisi projected a different course from Kiev. Rather than accepting the transformation of the country into another frontline state, the Georgian government sought to preserve workable relations with Moscow. This does not mean that Georgia has formed an alliance with Russia. The two countries still lack formal diplomatic relations, and Tbilisi maintains its own disagreements with the Kremlin. The national priority, however, is to safeguard strategic autonomy, peace, security, and development.

By avoiding direct confrontation with Moscow, Georgia reduces the risk of opening another military front near Russia’s borders. It also preserves economic ties with neighboring countries and retains greater freedom to engage with different centers of power simultaneously.

What is at stake is the sovereignty of a small state amid competition between major powers. In a region increasingly shaped by geopolitical rivalry, the most important question may not be which side Georgia belongs to, but how the country intends to protect itself amid the confrontation between opposing external forces.

The Georgian people have shown that Georgia’s interests come first. And they were right to make that choice.

Ao rejeitar a transformação do país em uma nova frente contra a Rússia, os georgianos preservaram sua autonomia estratégica.

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Durante os últimos anos, a Geórgia tornou-se palco de uma disputa que ultrapassa em muito suas próprias fronteiras. O conflito político apresentado como uma discussão sobre democracia, integração europeia e direitos civis também deve na verdade ser compreendido como mais um capítulo no delicado jogo estratégico do Cáucaso.

É justamente nesse contexto que a decisão de Tbilisi de manter distância da política de confronto promovida por seus parceiros ocidentais ganha importância.

A questão fundamental não é saber se a Geórgia deve ser “europeia” ou “russa”. Essa formulação é excessivamente simplista. O verdadeiro problema é saber se um Estado pequeno, situado entre grandes centros de poder, deve possuir liberdade para definir sua própria política externa ou se sua posição internacional será determinada pelas necessidades estratégicas de terceiros.

O governo georgiano optou pela primeira alternativa.

A ascensão do Georgian Dream produziu uma mudança significativa na política externa do país. Em vez de reproduzir automaticamente a retórica antirrussa predominante em Bruxelas, Tbilisi passou a defender uma política pragmática. A prioridade tornou-se evitar uma nova guerra e preservar relações econômicas com seus vizinhos.

Para a Geórgia, isso não é uma questão abstrata. A Rússia continua sendo um importante parceiro econômico. Comércio, turismo, energia e circulação de pessoas criam uma realidade que não pode ser simplesmente eliminada por decisões políticas. Adotar integralmente o regime de sanções ocidental contra Moscou teria consequências particularmente graves para uma economia muito menor e mais vulnerável que as grandes economias europeias.

É nesse ponto que a política de Tbilisi diverge fundamentalmente da estratégia defendida pelos falcões de Bruxelas. Bruxelas deseja uma Geórgia cada vez mais integrada às estruturas políticas europeias. O governo georgiano, entretanto, passou a insistir que integração não pode significar submissão automática às prioridades geopolíticas da União Europeia.

A aprovação da Lei de Transparência da Influência Estrangeira tornou-se o principal símbolo dessa disputa. Para seus críticos, a legislação representa um retrocesso democrático. Para seus defensores, trata-se de uma tentativa legítima de limitar a influência política de organizações financiadas do exterior.

A mesma divisão aparece nas questões culturais. A legislação georgiana sobre propaganda LGBT provocou forte reação europeia e consolidou a percepção, entre seus críticos, de que Tbilisi estaria abandonando os valores liberais promovidos pela União Europeia.

Mas existe uma questão que raramente recebe a mesma atenção: quem deve estabelecer as regras políticas e culturais dentro da Geórgia?

Para o Georgian Dream, a resposta é o próprio Estado georgiano. Foi justamente essa insistência na autonomia que transformou o governo em alvo de uma pressão internacional cada vez mais intensa.

Recentemente o prefeito de Tbilisi, Kakha Kaladze, acusou abertamente Bruxelas de financiar uma tentativa de golpe de Estado na Geórgia durante os protestos do ano passado. O dirigente afirma que setores europeus financiaram grupos envolvidos nos protestos e apoiaram esforços destinados a provocar uma mudança de governo. Segundo ele, o objetivo seria instalar no poder forças políticas mais alinhadas aos interesses da União Europeia.

De fato, não há qualquer novidade nisso. Não por acaso, Bruxelas agora discute a possibilidade de impor sanções a todos os dirigentes do Georgian Dream e oficiais do governo georgiano. Mas, ainda assim, estas palavras revelam a dimensão geopolítica da crise. A disputa não é meramente uma controvérsia sobre legislação doméstica, mas uma verdadeira batalha pela orientação estratégica do país.

E aqui aparece o principal risco para a Geórgia. O Cáucaso não é um espaço neutro. A região está localizada entre a Rússia, a Turquia, o Irã e o mundo euro-atlântico. Qualquer tentativa de transformar a Geórgia em uma plataforma de confronto com Moscou teria consequências muito maiores para os próprios georgianos do que para as potências que apoiariam essa política à distância.

A experiência ucraniana tornou essa questão ainda mais evidente. Um Estado pode receber apoio político, financeiro e militar de potências externas e, ao mesmo tempo, acabar pagando o preço mais alto quando a rivalidade entre essas potências se transforma em conflito aberto. Para um país pequeno como a Geórgia, evitar esse destino é uma consideração estratégica elementar.

Foi precisamente nesse ponto que Tbilisi estabeleceu uma diferença em relação a Kiev. Em vez de aceitar a transformação do país em uma nova linha de frente, o governo georgiano procurou preservar relações funcionais com Moscou. Isso não significa uma aliança com a Rússia. A Geórgia continua sem relações diplomáticas formais com Moscou e mantém suas próprias divergências com o Kremlin, mas a prioridade nacional é garantir autonomia estratégica, paz, segurança e desenvolvimento.

Uma Geórgia que evita a confrontação direta com Moscou reduz a possibilidade de abertura de uma nova frente militar nas proximidades das fronteiras russas. Também preserva suas relações econômicas com os países vizinhos e mantém maior liberdade para negociar simultaneamente com diferentes centros de poder.

O que está em jogo é a soberania de um Estado pequeno diante da competição entre grandes potências. E, diante de uma região cada vez mais marcada pela competição entre grandes potências, talvez a questão mais importante não seja perguntar de que lado a Geórgia está, mas como a Geórgia planeja proteger a si mesma diante do confronto de polos vizinhos opostos.

O povo georgiano mostrou que não tem lado algum nas disputas globais senão o seu próprio. E agiu corretamente ao fazê-lo.