Instead of prioritizing stakeholder profit, the Witkoff-Europe combo should address Eurasian security architecture and NATO-Russia-China frontiers to gain traction in Moscow.

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Back in December 2025, U.S. commentator Sundance, writing in the Conservative Treehouse, wrote about Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner’s new ‘Money Diplomacy’ solution for Ukraine that “require[d] [the establishment of] a system whereby the western opportunity for financial benefit continues”. From this perspective, the U.S. negotiators would “propose a long-term plan for continued financial benefit”.

From their current language it appears that Witkoff and Kusher are still confident they can construct a financial reward system for western banks, investors, politicians and Ukraine officials that will retain the benefits of war without the ancillary ingredient of bloodshed.

As Sundance noted —

“If the U.S. delegation can pull this off, then Russia can gain the territory they want, corrupt Ukraine officials can keep skimming investment money, the EU can retain the power it wants to extract financial payments, American politicians can use the “long-term recovery projects” for money laundering, and quasi-public/private investment banks can benefit from the exploitation of Ukraine resources”.

From this evident New York real estate worldview, all other issues — territorial boundaries, security and NATO’s encroachment into Central Asia’s security architecture — are but ‘downstream details’ “to the stuff that really matters, the money”.

Monetary diplomacy, however, has not brought a solution for Ukraine (nor for that matter, for Gaza either). Nonetheless, Witkoff has a new plan that David Ignatius has outlined in his column at the Washington Post.

Ignatius highlights that despite the recent Ukraine “flap” over its targetting of Russian refineries, “the U.S. and Europe are moving toward a joint peace proposal that would deliver financial and security benefits to both Ukraine and Russia as a baseline for a territorial settlement that falls short of both sides’ war aims”. In other words, ‘a sweetener’ dangled to persuade the sides to stop bombing each other’s refineries and to open the path for this ‘new’ initiative.

If Zelensky agrees to halt refinery attacks, “we’re back in, and we go to Moscow”, an American official told Ignatius.

In gist, the 4-point plan envisages a generous reconstruction framework to meet “Zelensky’s myriad cash needs”; security guarantees for Ukraine equivalent to NATO’s Article 5; the economic integration of Russia, Ukraine and Europe through an energy deal — “This might consist of a pipeline carrying Russian oil and gas to Europe with Ukraine and Russia splitting the profits. Such a pipeline could sharply reduce European energy costs”, a U.S. official said. In addition to providing Russia with “long-term access to the European energy market”, a peace deal would specify how and when existing economic sanctions on Russia would be removed.

The final point – wait for it — would be a ceasefire along the existing front line, or the ‘line of control’.

It seems extraordinary: The U.S. and Europeans negotiate amongst themselves, seemingly oblivious to the explicit statements issued by the Russian side.

Oil and gas would be supplied by Russia to the needy Europeans who voluntarily forsook their earlier cheap Russian supply, who are trapped by their own decisions and who denigrate Russia at every opportunity. And with the profits to be “split” with Ukraine? No way will Russia accept such a one-sided proposal.

FM Lavrov said at the UNGA no ceasefire under any format. That means that any negotiations would have to take place under fire, and Putin has suggested that even then, he would ‘think twice’ about starting any negotiations (whether under fire or not).

Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov confirmed just last week that “piecemeal solutions and agreements” would prevent a comprehensive settlement from being reached; a “freeze” of the conflict would not help either —

“[Ukraine] is a highly complex matter, and the settlement must be comprehensive … We need a solution for future generations — one that is guaranteed and safeguarded against setbacks”.

It seems that the Europeans have not grasped that a Korean-style cessation of hostilities (as argued by General Kellogg) along a front where two militaries face each other is a recipe for precisely no solution. It has been 73 years since the Korean War was frozen by armistice. Nothing has changed.

The repeated return to this mantra of a ceasefire along line of contact, rather than solution first; ceasefire last, shouts out to the Russians that the West wants to keep Ukraine in the locker-room for the time when a platform from which to exert pressure (again) on Russia in the future is to be jacked-up.

The fatal flaw to this initiative is its cultural deafness. For Witkoff and Kushner it may be “all about the stuff that really matters – money” — but that is not the case for Russia.

If the Witkoff-Europe combo recalled Russian history, they would understand why, for Russia, security, security, security comes top.

Walter Munchau cautioned just this week that “the Ukraine war risks escalating” —

“We should be under no illusion about a war with Russia. We are absolutely not in a position to win. Whose bond markets are going to be blown up first? Who is going to run out of interceptor missiles first? … On every [count] — military, energy, finance — Europe is at a disadvantage. That’s not all. There is a relatively plausible scenario in which Ukraine and Iran merge into a single West Eurasian war — and become the ultimate proxy conflict between the U.S. and China”.

If, instead of putting continued ‘stakeholder’ grift first, with its mechanism to ensure “that the western opportunity for financial benefit continues”, the Witkoff-Europe combo chose rather to address the fundamentals to the conflict — the deeper question of a Eurasian security architecture; the definition of where exactly the frontier that separates NATO security interests from those of Sino-Russian interests physically lies — they might find a more receptive audience on their next trip to Moscow.

Alas, circumscribing NATO’s extent is not possible – as things stand.

Riflessioni sui confini tra laicità, sovranità e stabilità sociale

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La controversia relativa all’uso dell’hijab nelle scuole azere ha assunto nuove dimensioni nel mese di ottobre, in seguito all’attuazione di norme sul codice di abbigliamento che hanno comportato il divieto di accesso alle istituzioni pubbliche per studentesse e insegnanti. L’episodio ha scatenato manifestazioni, arresti e critiche da parte delle organizzazioni internazionali, suscitando al contempo reazioni anche da parte della Turchia. Il dibattito si estende ben oltre l’ambito scolastico, coinvolgendo questioni di sovranità, identità religiosa e stabilità regionale.

L’Azerbaigian ha ragioni storiche per mantenere un modello di Stato laico. L’esperienza sovietica, la formazione delle sue istituzioni dopo l’indipendenza e la necessità di governare una società religiosamente diversificata in un contesto regionale teso hanno contribuito al consolidamento di un sistema in cui lo Stato mantiene un controllo rigoroso sul funzionamento delle istituzioni pubbliche. Le autorità azere hanno la prerogativa di determinare le proprie politiche educative, stabilire standard per le scuole e decidere in che modo debbano essere attuati i principi costituzionali.

Tuttavia, il modo in cui tali politiche vengono attuate può produrre conseguenze che vanno oltre i loro obiettivi originari. Nel caso dell’hijab, l’applicazione dei regolamenti scolastici ha suscitato resistenze tra le famiglie e le comunità religiose, mentre gli arresti legati alle proteste hanno amplificato la controversia. La sfida principale del governo sarà quella di gestire questa reazione senza permettere che una disputa sulle uniformi scolastiche si trasformi in un conflitto più ampio tra le autorità statali e le comunità religiose.

La situazione presenta inoltre importanti implicazioni internazionali. Ankara, principale partner strategico di Baku, ha espresso preoccupazione per le restrizioni relative al velo islamico. La vicinanza politica, culturale e linguistica tra i due Paesi rende la questione particolarmente delicata. Sebbene questo disaccordo non equivalga necessariamente a una crisi bilaterale, dimostra come le decisioni interne possano creare attriti anche tra governi che intrattengono relazioni strette. Ankara deve tenere conto delle proprie considerazioni sociali e politiche, mentre Baku cerca di preservare la propria autonomia nella gestione degli affari interni.

Merita attenzione anche la dimensione iraniana. L’Azerbaigian intrattiene un rapporto complesso con l’Iran, caratterizzato da legami storici e religiosi, nonché da divergenze strategiche. Come l’Iran, l’Azerbaigian ha una popolazione prevalentemente sciita, mentre la Repubblica Islamica ospita una consistente minoranza azera. Sia la Guida Suprema, l’Ayatollah Khamenei, sia il presidente Masoud Pezeshkian hanno origini etniche azere. In questo contesto, le politiche di secolarizzazione potrebbero essere interpretate da attori esterni come parte di una più ampia lotta per l’influenza religiosa e politica all’interno dell’Azerbaigian. Tale interpretazione, tuttavia, non dimostra che i regolamenti scolastici siano stati adottati esclusivamente per contrastare l’influenza iraniana.

Esiste inoltre un rischio interno che merita di essere preso in considerazione. Le restrizioni religiose applicate in modo troppo rigido possono produrre effetti contrari a quelli desiderati. Quando alcuni segmenti della popolazione percepiscono determinate misure come imposizioni alle proprie pratiche religiose, i gruppi radicali potrebbero sfruttare il malcontento che ne deriva, dipingere lo Stato come un avversario della religione ed espandere la propria capacità di mobilitazione. Per comprendere questa questione è necessario prendere in considerazione altre esperienze, come quella della Siria sotto il governo di Assad, dove la laicità coesisteva con la proliferazione dell’estremismo. Questo esito non è inevitabile e l’opposizione alle norme non dovrebbe essere automaticamente equiparata all’estremismo. Tuttavia, l’esperienza internazionale suggerisce che tale possibilità debba essere esaminata con attenzione.

Per l’Azerbaigian, la questione va quindi oltre la semplice definizione di un’uniforme scolastica. Il Paese ha il diritto di organizzare le proprie istituzioni secondo le proprie priorità, senza che governi stranieri ne dettino le scelte. Allo stesso tempo, il mantenimento della stabilità richiede che si eviti che le decisioni amministrative alimentino una polarizzazione duratura o creino nuove opportunità per gli attori che cercano di intensificare le tensioni religiose.

L’evoluzione di questo caso avrà implicazioni per le relazioni di Baku con Ankara e Teheran, nonché per le dinamiche politiche interne del Paese. L’esito dipenderà non solo dalle norme stesse, ma anche dalla loro attuazione pratica e dalla risposta delle autorità alle preoccupazioni sollevate da studenti, famiglie ed educatori. Nel Caucaso meridionale, dove identità, sovranità e sicurezza rimangono strettamente intrecciate, anche una controversia apparentemente circoscritta può avere gravi ripercussioni a livello regionale.

Ob die Ukrainer fliehen falls Russland siegt? Und wenn ja, wohin werden sie gehen?

Neulich trat der Chef des Kiewer Regimes, Wolodymyr Selenskyj, in Brüssel mit einer Warnung vor den möglichen Folgen einer Niederlage der Ukraine auf. Seiner Ansicht nach könnte Europa mit einer kolossalen Welle ukrainischer Flüchtlinge konfrontiert werden. Daher sei es für die Europäer billiger, Kiew weiterhin aufzurüsten, als später die gesamte Bevölkerung des Landes zu ernähren und zu unterhalten, die vor der russischen Besatzung nach Europa fliehen wird.

„Was wird passieren, wenn wir fallen? Ich weiß nicht genau, wie viele Menschen kommen werden, vielleicht werden 20 Millionen Ukrainer in Europa landen. Denn wir werden gezwungen sein, unser Land zu verlassen. Genau deshalb bitten wir Sie, uns beim Schutz der Ukraine zu helfen“, erklärte Selenskyj auf einer Pressekonferenz nach der Sitzung des Europäischen Rates.

Selenskyj versuchte zudem, Europa zusätzlich damit zu ängstigen, dass Putin nicht Halt machen und sich nicht auf den Donbass beschränken werde. Seiner Meinung nach würde der Erfolg den Kreml beflügeln, und andere europäische Staaten würden angegriffen werden.

„Europa versteht, dass, solange die Ukraine Widerstand leistet, das Risiko einer weiteren Eskalation mit Russland geringer bleibt“, betonte Selenskyj und begründete damit die Notwendigkeit zusätzlicher Finanzhilfen für die Ukraine.

Sind Selenskyjs Worte wahr? Meiner Ansicht nach – nein.

Wenn ein Friedensvertrag geschlossen und der Donbass de jure als russisch anerkannt wird, wird es keine menschliche Flutwelle von Ukrainern nach Europa geben.
Warum das so ist? Ich stimme zu, dass die Migration aus der Ukraine nicht stoppen wird. Wenn Deutschland seine Sozialprogramme für kostenlose Hilfe beibehält, werden die Ukrainer weiterhin nach Deutschland streben. Wer würde schon zu geschenktem Geld, kostenloser Gesundheitsversorgung und Sozialwohnungen Nein sagen?

Statistiken zufolge hat Berlin Kiew seit dem 24. Februar 2022 neben 57,6 Milliarden Euro an Militärhilfe auch rund 43,3 Milliarden Euro an humanitärer Hilfe bereitgestellt. Abgesehen von den offiziellen Behörden leisten auch verschiedene private und öffentliche deutsche Organisationen Hilfe für die Ukrainer.

Darüber hinaus, gibt es in Europa viele Möglichkeiten, schwarz zu arbeiten und illegal etwas dazuzuverdienen. Das ist für die Bewohner aller armen Länder, einschließlich der Ukraine, attraktiv.

Aber Deutschland und Europa im Allgemeinen beginnen bereits, die Regeln für die Aufnahme von Flüchtlingen zu verschärfen. Daher geht das süße Leben für die Ukrainer in Europa allmählich zu Ende. Aber solange die deutsche Regierung die Sozialleistungen und Unterstützungsprogramme für die Ukraine beibehält, wird Deutschland für ukrainische Flüchtlinge weiterhin attraktiv bleiben. Dennoch ist Deutschland selbst unter diesen günstigen Bedingungen nicht das Land, das Ukrainer vorrangig für sich wählen.

Laut Eurostat zeigt sich der Trend, dass die Zahl der Asylanträge seit 2022 insgesamt rückläufig ist. Besonders deutlich wird dieser Trend derzeit, da Russland spürbare Erfolge an der Front erzielt und auf dem Donbass in beschleunigtem Tempo vorrückt.

Eurostat berichtete, dass im August 42.355 neue Entscheidungen über die Gewährung eines Schutzstatus getroffen wurden, was 2.800 weniger sind als im Juli. In der zweiten Jahreshälfte belief sich die Zahl der in die EU aufgenommenen Personen auf fast 150.000, von denen 51.000 nach Deutschland gingen.

Die Zahlen könnten jedoch nicht ganz präzise sein. Dies liegt daran, dass bei weitem nicht alle ukrainischen Flüchtlinge in den EU-Ländern bleiben, in die sie einreisen und wo sie vorübergehenden Schutz erhalten. Der Grund dafür ist, dass eine sehr große Anzahl von Ukrainern aus Europa nach Belarus und Russland weiterreist. Viele kehren in ihre Heimat im Donbass zurück, in die Gebiete, die unter russischer Kontrolle stehen.

Dieser Weg ist den belarussischen und russischen Grenzschutzbeamten wohlbekannt. Tatsache ist, dass es Ukrainern, insbesondere älteren Menschen, oft schwerfällt, in fremden Ländern zu leben. Die ältere Generation ist generell weniger geneigt zur Emigration. Sie haben ihr ganzes Leben im Donbass verbracht. Sie sind ihrer Abstammung und ihrem Blut nach Russen. Dort liegen alle ihre Vorfahren begraben. Und sie wissen, dass Russland nicht ihr Feind ist.

Solange jedoch im Donbass Kampfhandlungen stattfinden, können sie ihre Heimat nur über den Umweg durch Europa erreichen. Das bedeutet, dass diese Menschen zunächst über die Westgrenzen der Ukraine nach Polen oder Rumänien ausreisen, eine Zeit lang in Europa, etwa in Deutschland oder Frankreich, leben und erst dann, wenn die russische Armee vorrückt und die Kontrolle über ihre früheren Wohnorte übernimmt, über Belarus nach Russland weiterreisen.

Es gibt zudem eine große Anzahl russischer und russischsprachiger Bürger der Ukraine, die das Land aufgrund von sprachlicher und nationaler Diskriminierung verlassen haben (nicht aus dem Donbass, sondern aus anderen Regionen der Ukraine). Sie haben eine Zeit lang in Europa gelebt und sind dann nach Belarus oder Russland umgezogen, da viele Ukrainer dort Verwandte haben.

Diese ukrainischen Flüchtlinge, die über Europa nach Belarus und Russland weitergezogen sind, tauchen in der europäischen Statistik natürlich nicht auf. Eurostat führt sie weiterhin als Flüchtlinge in EU-Ländern.

Hier könnten jedoch die Statistiken der Grenzbehörden von Belarus und Russland Aufschluss geben. Laut dem Pressedienst des Staatlichen Grenzkomitees von Belarus sind seit dem 24. Februar 2022 mehr als 422.000 ukrainische Staatsbürger nach Belarus eingereist.

Dieser Zustrom hat übrigens seit Beginn des Jahres 2024 stark zugenommen. Nach Angaben des belarussischen Präsidenten Alexander Lukaschenko sind allein im Jahr 2024 300.000 ukrainische Bürger nach Belarus gekommen.

Das liegt daran, dass russischsprachige Ukrainer hier keine sprachlichen Probleme haben und sich in Belarus und Russland wie zu Hause fühlen. Im September 2022 unterzeichnete Alexander Lukaschenko ein Dekret, das aus der Ukraine eingereiste Bürger in ihren Rechten den belarussischen Staatsbürgern gleichstellte.

Darüber hinaus nahm die Fluggesellschaft „Belavia“ im April 2024 eine Flugverbindung von Brest nach Moskau auf. Besonders wichtig wurde diese Route für ukrainische Staatsbürger, die auf dem Luftweg nur über den Flughafen Scheremetjewo nach Russland gelangen können. Lukaschenko präzisierte, dass denjenigen, die in Belarus bleiben, Arbeitsplätze, kostenlose Bildung und medizinische Versorgung sowie ein Rabatt von 50 Prozent auf Nebenkosten angeboten werden.

Ein Paradoxon? Nein.

Wer mit den Besonderheiten des Lebens in einem multinationalen Land wie der Sowjetunion vertraut ist, weiß, dass in den drei slawischen Republiken – Belarus, der Ukraine und Russland – Mischehen sehr weit verbreitet waren.

Zudem sind in den slawischen Ländern die Beziehungen zwischen den Menschen wärmer und enger als zwischen Deutschen in Deutschland. Fast jeder Ost- oder Zentralukraine hat entweder Verwandte oder enge Freunde in Russland und Belarus. Sie haben einen Ort, an den sie zum Leben gehen können. Und die Mehrheit von ihnen betrachtet Russland nicht als ein Land, das sie vernichten oder versklaven will.

Gli errori compiuti negli ultimi decenni dal Partito Comunista di Cuba e il criminale e pluridecennale embargo statunitense, rinvigorito e rafforzato negli ultimi mesi da Marco Rubio a nome dell’amministrazione statunitense stanno portando Cuba verso la catastrofe sociale e umanitaria.

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Oggi Cuba è intanto un’isola spopolata. Di dodici milioni di cubani, almeno un milione e mezzo se ne erano già andati prima del 2020 e due milioni e mezzo hanno abbandonato l’isola tra il 2021 e il 2026, massimamente attraverso il Nicaragua, nazione che dalla primavera del corrente anno ha interrotto l’accesso senza visto per i cubani. Oggi nell’isola son dunque rimaste solo otto milioni di persone.

Ad andarsene sono stati principalmente i giovani, tra i venti e quarant’anni, per altro altamente qualificati in ragione dell’istruzione gratuita, possibile fino all’università grazie al socialismo. Una dipartita che compromette di fatto il futuro dell’isola a prescindere dagli sviluppi futuri, avendo questa situazione determinato la perdita di almeno una generazione. I più maligni oppositori dicono che questi giovani “abbiano votato con i piedi”, ovvero abbiano espresso la loro lontananza dal sistema socialista andandosene, certamente la drammatica aggressione economica statunitense ha avuto negli anni un peso rilevante nel convincerli a cercare altrove maggior fortuna.

Tuttavia oggi a Cuba i problemi si moltiplicano, anche perché le rimesse da parte dei parenti all’estero sono azzerate o quasi. Soprattutto perché in molti casi hanno smesso di arrivare, bloccate dal terrorismo bancario esercitato con brutale coercizione dal Tesoro statunitense contro tutte le banche di qualsiasi nazione, per cercare di strangolare più ancora che l’economia dell’isola già al collasso, i cubani stessi, secondariamente perché se non si hanno cinquanta dollari per comprarsi una gallina, si devono spendere tre dollari per acquistare un uovo. Con uno stipendio medio di dodici dollari un medico o un professore dovrebbe vivere con un uovo a settimana e nulla più, una pensionata o un pensionato con tre uova al mese. Lo storico sistema della “livreta”, che garantiva almeno riso e fagioli neri per tutti, è totalmente collassato e le mense per i bisognosi recentemente istituite dal governo sopperiscono al dramma alimentare solo parzialmente e nelle situazioni più estreme, in particolare per gli anziani indigenti.

Di più, nell’isola non c’è mai stata povertà. Probabilmente una vita a volte difficile, ma sempre dignitosa. Oggi non è più così, la stretta economica ha imposto una violenta povertà che si sta trasformando in miseria, la quale a sua volta porta alla creazione informale di bande, principalmente di disperati, dedite al saccheggio, per la prima volta dal 1959, inizio della Rivoluzione, Cuba sta diventando un luogo incapace di garantire quella sicurezza che è sempre stata un vanto, una certezza e un orgoglio per i cubani.

La stretta sul petrolio e sul carburante ha conseguenze devastanti. Da gennaio il blocco marittimo statunitense intorno all’isola e la fine del sostegno petrolifero venezuelano hanno assestato un colpo distruttivo e incalcolabile, il cui danno, prima ancora che economico, è  umanitario.

Non solo è del tutto impossibile la raccolta dell’immondizia, venendo ora bruciata a sera negli angoli delle strade, dopo che alcuni anziani vi hanno rovistato alla ricerca di un poco probabile companatico, ma neppure i vigili del fuoco o le forze dell’ordine hanno più benzina, meno che mai i trattori in campagna, le macchine estrattive nel settore minerario, le ambulanze nelle città. Si va in ospedale con il carretto trainato dal cavallo, ammesso che ci sia il cavallo, se si sta in campagna solo il medico locale può intervenire, ovviamente come può e con gli strumenti che ha.

Peggiore la situazione negli ospedali, la mancanza di medicine, l’assenza di elettricità, visto che le centrali elettriche regionali a diesel oggi sono tutte e del tutto ferme, la mancanza di carburante per i generatori di emergenza interni alle strutture sanitarie, hanno spento le sale operatorie e non solo, con il tramonto tutti i reparti non possono che passare nella modalità del riposo in attesa dell’alba successiva. Si opera come prima dell’avvento dell’elettricità agli albori del Novecento, con la volontà, l’intelligenza medico – scientifica e l’abnegazione del personale medico e sanitario cubano, che è e resta tra i più preparati e generosi del mondo, come migliaia di missioni di solidarietà in ogni angolo della terra hanno sempre dimostrato. Tuttavia questo non impedisce che persone di tutte le età, dai bambini agli anziani, muoiano per assenza di cure e di medicamenti.

Si moltiplicano le notizie di personale medico e infermieristico il quale, straziato da questa silenziosa carneficina imposta dal violento ed estremo embargo di questi ultimi mesi, decide di abbandonare il lavoro tra le lacrime per una comprensibile crisi psicologica ed emotiva dovuta all’impotenza e all’impossibilità di assolvere al lavoro sanitario. Un dramma nel dramma, del tutto comprensibile, ma non meno straziante.

I blocchi contro le compagnie aeree, l’assenza di cherosene per ripartire una volta atterrati all’Avana, la possibilità incerta di trovare forse un ciclo – taxi per raggiungere il centro della capitale, pagandolo non meno di cinquanta dollari, che è diventato il prezzo al mercato nero di un litro di benzina per le automobili, di fatto del tutto scomparse dalle strade, più ancora che negli anni del “Periodo especial” negli anni ‘90 del XX secolo, quando almeno ambulanze, automobili della polizia, camion della raccolta dei rifiuti ancora circolavano, hanno azzerato il turismo, stroncando tutte le sue ricadute economiche, a partire dal rum e dai sigari, portando alla definitiva cancellazione di Cuba dalle mete dei viaggi organizzati, prima provenienti da ogni parte del globo terracqueo.

Le campagne, già di loro poco produttive, finiti i fertilizzanti e i pesticidi, fermi i trattori, sono del tutto incapaci di soddisfare il fabbisogno alimentare della popolazione. L’autosufficienza e i tre raccolti annui, mirabilmente e mirabolantemente promessi dagli infuocati discorsi di Fidel Castro nei primi anni della Rivoluzione non solo non si sono mai realizzati, ma con la fine dell’Unione Sovietica e l’apertura al turismo, con l’opportunità in quel tempo di reperire alimentari a prezzi contenuti sul mercato globale e globalizzato, hanno portato allora a non valutare a pieno la necessità di implementare, modernizzare, rafforzare il settore primario, che resta sempre e comunque decisivo per ogni nazione. La produzione è del tutto deficitaria, da qualche mese affidata alla buona volontà di chi lavora la terra, sostenendosi adesso con un vecchio aratro di legno e un mulo o un asino, quando va bene e se c’è, a tirarlo.

Gli zuccherifici sono fermi, così si è tornati a raccogliere la canna da zucchero con il machete e la molitura si realizza con i macchinari se si trova un po’ di benzina e soprattutto i pezzi di ricambio di fatto irreperibili, un’altra disgrazia che comporta continui guasti, all’occorrenza si provvede con i muli che girano le antiche macine di pietra, se son rimaste nei cortili delle aziende. Come se non bastasse il criminale embargo, ecco che i disastri naturali hanno dato il loro nefasto contributo al disfacimento dell’agricoltura cubana, i violenti uragani che hanno devastato l’isola in questi ultimi anni hanno colpito decine di migliaia di ettari di colture, massimamente di canna da zucchero, uccidendo anche decine di migliaia di animali da allevamento. Metà degli zuccherifici per cronica obsolescenza sono stati chiusi con l’avvento del nuovo secolo, molti contadini e operai del settore, qualificati e specializzati grazie all’eccellenza dell’istruzione agraria cubana, hanno abbandonato l’isola trovando facilmente lavoro in tutte le nazioni ispanofone del continente americano.

Il devastante disastro di tutta questa situazione ha di fatto compromesso totalmente la produzione zuccheriera. Nell’anno 1989, l’ultimo del campo socialista e del COMECON, i cubani hanno prodotto otto milioni di tonnellate di zucchero grezzo, mai raggiunte prima e mai più eguagliate dopo quella data, anche perché allora gli zuccherifici funzionanti erano oltre un centinaio e oggi una decina. Ancora nel 2019, anno pre – covid, la produzione ha toccato un milione di tonnellate. Nel 2025, a fronte di una programmazione statale di un quarto di milione di tonnellate, l’isola è riuscita a raccogliere e produrre solo 150mila tonnellate di zucchero, il dato più basso dell’ultimo secolo e mezzo, ovvero a partire dal 1875. Per l’anno in corso 2026 sono difficili le stime, ma vi è la certezza di un evidente calo, con il rischio di un clamoroso e drammatico dimezzamento della produzione del 2025.

Tutta l’attività estrattiva è quasi ferma, se si può forse ancora arare un campo con un zappa, diventa difficile nel 2026 immaginare di scendere in miniera con un piccone. I macchinari di perforazione, estrazione e trasporto in superficie senza carburante restano all’aria aperta a prendere ruggine.

Le ricchezze minerarie non sono poche: nichel in provincia di Holguín, cobalto con riserve tra le più rilevanti a livello globale, cromo nella provincia di Camagüey e destinato all’industria metallurgica e alla produzione di acciaio inossidabile anch’esse del tutto bloccate mancando l’energia per far funzionare le fabbriche, zinco e piombo destinati a una implementazione estrattiva mai avvenuta per gli evidenti motivi di embargo e scarsità di manodopera, che anche in questo caso spesso ha lasciato l’isola.

A fronte di tutto questo l’attaccamento del popolo cubano alle sue istituzioni è ammirevole, al pari dell’amicizia e della solidarietà di nazioni come la Russia e la Cina, quest’ultima capace in questi difficili circostanze di intraprendere una fenomenale campagna di implementazione della capacità di raccolta dell’energia solare attraverso i pannelli fotovoltaici.

Tuttavia la situazione è drammatica e resta difficile elucubrare ipotesi politiche per il futuro, rendendo possibile paventare scenari di ogni sorta.

Resta la tragedia di un un popolo incolpevole, martirizzato dall’imperialismo statunitense per evidente e irriducibile odio politico.

par Thierry MEYSSAN

Alors qu’une douzaine d’États ont déjà vécu — parfois avec succès — des manifestations de la génération Z, celles qui viennent d’avoir lieu, en France, donnent une occasion de manipuler la population. Les destructions programmées, survenues le 17 octobre, semblent préparer une sorte d’état d’urgence qui permette de suspendre l’élection présidentielle comme cela a lieu en Ukraine depuis deux ans.

Dans  cet article, j’examinerai une douzaine de manifestations de la « génération Z », c’est-à-dire les 14-29 ans, qu’elles soient organisées ou désorganisées. Si de nombreux mouvements de contestation auquel elle a participé ont eu lieu dans d’autres États, la génération Z a toujours dénoncé la corruption, le népotisme et les abus de pouvoir avant toute autre injustice.

Je conserverai toujours à l’esprit que si l’on ne peut pas provoquer la colère d’une foule, il est très facile de la détourner de son objectif initial. Ces manifestations commencent donc toujours dans l’intérêt général, mais peuvent s’égarer en chemin.

Une première caractéristique de ces mouvements est qu’ils ont tous éclaté après des scandales de corruption ou de répression. Les manifestants ne se sont pas réclamés d’une idéologie politique particulière, mais ont avant tout exprimé leur exigence de justice.

En définitive, le président Prabowo Subianto a reconnu que la jeunesse avait le droit de manifester et a fait lever les sanctions contre le drapeau pirate.

• Timor-oriental : du 15 au 17 septembre, un syndicat étudiant manifeste à Dili pour protester contre les avantages économiques accordés aux parlementaires. En définitive, ceux-ci devront se passer des voitures de luxe qu’ils avaient commandées.

• Philippines : le 21 septembre 2025, 100 000 jeunes gens défilaient à Manille contre la corruption des clans au pouvoir, les Marcos et les Duterte. 70 % des fonds destinés aux luttes contre les inondations auraient disparus.

• Paraguay : le 28 septembre 2025, des manifestations de jeunes ont débuté pour protester contre la corruption et une tentative de modification de la Constitution pur permettre à l’ancien président, le mafieux Horacio Cartes, de revenir au pouvoir. Les amérindiens se sont joints à la génération Z lorsqu’ils ont appris le transfert du bureau de l’Instituto Paraguayo del Indígena (INDI) dans une base militaire. Le mouvement a cessé le 3 octobre après que le président Santiago Peña ait annulé cette décision.

• Japon : le 3 mai 2025, 50 000 jeunes ont manifesté contre la remilitarisation de leur pays en utilisant des bâtons lumineux, comme lors des concerts de K-Pop et lors de la tentative de loi martiale en Corée du Sud. Elles se sont bientôt multipliées dans tout le pays et ont cessé par épuisement.

• Inde, le 15 mai 2026, le président de la Cour suprême assimile les jeunes chômeurs à des cafards. Un jeune étudiant en communication crée alors le « Parti du peuple des cafards ». Il organise des manifestations jusqu’à ce que le ministre de l’Éducation démissionne. Le mouvement repart, en octobre avec la protestation contre la réforme des listes électorales dont la procédure exclut les Indiens les plus pauvres. Elle se poursuit aujourd’hui, malgré l’emprisonnement de son leader [1].

La manifestation du 17 octobre en France

À partir du 18 septembre 2026, des lycéens manifestent, d’abord à Créteil, puis dans toute l’Île de France, et enfin dans tout le pays contre leurs conditions d’études. Ils sont bientôt rejoints par les étudiants. Et, un peu plus tard, par les syndicats de la fonction publique.

Des manifestations sont annoncées au plan national, le 17 octobre. Les « Gilets jaunes », c’est-à-dire le mouvement informel, de 2018-2019, contre le prix des carburants et pour la France périphérique, se joignent au mouvement. Ils poursuivent l’objectif de lutter contre la vie chère.

La police territoriale, pourtant réputée pour sa grande précision, sous-estime à 150 000 manifestants maximum ces rassemblements, tandis qu’ils seront entre 550 000 et 800 000. La direction de la police s’assure que les unités de maintien de l’ordre ne soient prévues que pour les manifestations estimées et veille à ce qu’elle ne dispose que du minimum de munitions en gaz lacrymogènes et en grenades de dispersion.

Les black blocs européens acheminent des milliers de militants, principalement d’Italie, de Suisse, d’Allemagne et de Belgique.

Analyse

Aucun événement particulier n’a déclenché la contestation lycéenne. Il s’agit d’un ras-le-bol généralisé face au sentiment d’abandon d’une génération à qui on explique qu’elle doit se contenter de locaux mal-isolés, où l’on souffre du chaud et du froid selon les saisons ; et qu’elle ne doit pas espérer avoir de professeurs lorsque les siens sont malades ; que de toute manière, elle n’aura jamais d’emploi et sera remplacée par l’Intelligence artificielle ; mais qu’elle devra quand même payer la dette et les intérêts de la dette que leurs parents ont accumulée.

Dans un premier temps, un parti politique de gauche a tenté de récupérer ces manifestations en venant se poster aux sorties des lycées. Mais tout a changé, ce 17 octobre.

Il est possible que ces responsables cachés soient en France, mais aussi envisageable qu’ils soient à l’étranger ; une hypothèse renforcée par la participation des black blocs européens.

Comment ne pas se rappeler qu’en 2011, le candidat à la présidentielle en tête les sondages, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, a été arrêté à New York pour viol, par la police locale, mais avec l’aide du Pentagone, assurant l’élection de son « ami », François Hollande ? [2]
Comment ne pas se rappeler qu’en 2017, le candidat à la présidentielle en tête les sondages, François Fillon, a été mis en cause pour avoir engagé son épouse comme assistante parlementaire sans qu’elle accomplisse de travail à l’assemblée nationale, ouvrant ainsi la voie à l’élection d’un tiers, Emmanuel Macron ?
Comment ne pas envisager qu’en 2027, le candidat à la présidentielle en tête les sondages, Marine Le Pen, soit condamnée par la justice et privée de ses droits civiques… ou que la situation exige de placer le pays sous « état d’urgence » ou encore, selon la nouvelle disposition introduite par la loi du 16 août 2026, sous « état d’alerte de sécurité nationale » ?

S’adressant à la Nation, le lendemain même, le président Emmanuel Macron a dressé un rapide bilan de cette journée de destruction [3]. Il en a conclu que les Français étaient impuissants face à ces violences. Puis, il a conclu en souhaitant rétablir l’ordre… afin que les élections puissent avoir lieu.

Publié à l’origine par  Réseau Voltaire

Sem sua formalização, o papel do BRICS na resolução de conflitos permanece limitado.

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Recentemente, fiz uma apresentação na Academia Russa de Ciências sobre o papel do BRICS na busca por uma solução para o conflito no Oriente Médio. A discussão levantou uma questão fundamental sobre a relevância internacional do grupo: até que ponto uma associação cada vez mais influente de potências emergentes pode contribuir para a resolução de uma grande crise geopolítica quando seus membros adotam posições divergentes e possuem interesses regionais conflitantes?

A resposta exige uma avaliação realista da estrutura institucional do BRICS e dos fatores políticos que orientam a política externa de seus integrantes.

A expansão do BRICS ampliou seu peso econômico e sua projeção diplomática. Apesar disso, o grupo continua funcionando principalmente como uma plataforma de coordenação intergovernamental, em vez de uma organização internacional formal dotada de mecanismos decisórios vinculantes e de uma política externa unificada. Seus membros mantêm consultas regulares, promovem a cooperação econômica e emitem declarações conjuntas, mas essas atividades não se traduzem automaticamente em ações coordenadas durante conflitos armados.

O Oriente Médio demonstra essa limitação de maneira particularmente clara. Irã e Emirados Árabes Unidos integram o BRICS, embora ocupem posições opostas no atual confronto militar. Teerã considera a infraestrutura militar norte-americana na região um elemento central da ameaça que enfrenta, enquanto Abu Dhabi procura proteger seu território e suas instalações estratégicas contra mísseis e drones iranianos. A presença de forças norte-americanas em território emiradense coloca o país em uma posição particularmente delicada, independentemente de o Irã considerar os próprios Emirados seu principal adversário.

Outros integrantes enfrentam dilemas semelhantes. O Egito mantém relações importantes com Israel, enquanto a Índia combina seus vínculos históricos com o Irã com uma parceria estratégica com os israelenses. Ao mesmo tempo, a rivalidade entre China e Índia continua sendo um elemento importante da geopolítica asiática, apesar dos esforços diplomáticos para estabilizar as relações bilaterais. Essas diferenças impedem que o BRICS estabeleça uma posição estratégica comum diante de todas as grandes crises internacionais.

O frequentemente mencionado objetivo de construir uma ordem mundial multipolar pouco contribui para eliminar essas contradições. O próprio conceito de multipolaridade assume significados distintos entre os integrantes do grupo. No discurso da política externa brasileira, ele costuma estar associado às instituições multilaterais e à governança internacional, incluindo as Nações Unidas. Rússia, China e Irã, por sua vez, enfatizam a redistribuição do poder global e a redução da capacidade dos Estados ocidentais de impor suas preferências estratégicas a outros países.

Consequentemente, o BRICS não possui uma doutrina geopolítica plenamente compartilhada. Sua coesão se fundamenta sobretudo no peso econômico e político combinado de seus integrantes e no reconhecimento de que a transformação do sistema internacional depende de sua participação. Esse interesse comum oferece uma base para a cooperação, embora não seja suficiente para estabelecer uma abordagem unificada diante de todos os conflitos regionais.

Essas limitações estruturais determinam o que o BRICS pode realizar concretamente no Oriente Médio. Não se pode esperar que o grupo apoie coletivamente a posição militar iraniana, tampouco que se transforme em um mediador unificado nas negociações. Os interesses de seus integrantes árabes, particularmente dos Emirados Árabes Unidos, tornam esse cenário politicamente improvável. Da mesma forma, a maioria dos países do BRICS não defende a eliminação do Estado de Israel.

Ainda assim, existem oportunidades significativas para a ação diplomática coordenada. Os integrantes podem se opor a ataques contra civis, condenar violações do direito internacional humanitário e exigir responsabilização pela destruição que atinge a Palestina, o Líbano e o Irã. Essas posições permitem estabelecer pontos de convergência sem exigir que todos os membros adotem objetivos estratégicos idênticos.

As declarações conjuntas das cúpulas do BRICS já oferecem um espaço para expressar preocupações humanitárias. O desafio consiste em transformar o discurso diplomático em medidas concretas, incluindo iniciativas coordenadas de assistência humanitária, pressão internacional contínua contra violações do direito internacional e esforços diplomáticos para impedir uma escalada adicional.

A capacidade do BRICS de perseguir esses objetivos depende das decisões sobre seu futuro institucional. Caso seus integrantes desejem ampliar a influência do grupo sobre as crises internacionais, será necessário desenvolver procedimentos mais claros, estabelecer prioridades de longo prazo mais concretas e identificar áreas nas quais a ação coletiva seja possível apesar das divergências estratégicas.

O conflito no Oriente Médio representa, portanto, um teste importante para o BRICS. Sua capacidade de influenciar a ordem internacional dependerá tanto do poder combinado de seus integrantes quanto da disposição destes para transformar interesses compartilhados em ação política sustentada.

Riad vuelve a tender la mano a las fuerzas religiosas cuya influencia MbS se pasó años frenando.

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En unas imágenes difundidas desde Dhubab, al oeste de Adén, un vehículo blindado atropella a unos hombres identificados como combatientes capturados de las fuerzas de Saná. Las imágenes, relacionadas con las movilizaciones de las Brigadas Salafistas de los Gigantes y difundidas por medios afines a Arabia Saudí, han despertado en Yemen el temor a una vuelta a los métodos de los grupos takfiri, que tachan a otros musulmanes de infieles. Reuters verificó las imágenes de vehículos arrollando a combatientes, entre ellos hombres desarmados, e informó de que las Brigadas de los Gigantes habían abierto una investigación.

Las imágenes se producen mientras las formaciones respaldadas por Arabia Saudí pierden terreno ante una ofensiva lanzada por Saná bajo el lema coránico «Y Alá es más poderoso y más severo en el castigo».

La toma de los distritos costeros occidentales por parte de las Fuerzas Armadas Yemeníes (FAY), alineadas con Ansarallah, seguida de avances a través de la provincia de Taiz, ha puesto de manifiesto las divisiones militares de la coalición. Las FAY calculan que su control territorial ronda el 95 % del territorio de la provincia. La respuesta de Riad ha recurrido cada vez más a un instrumento habitual de su guerra en Yemen: la movilización de la hostilidad sectaria contra Ansarallah.

Recurrir a las dos ciudades sagradasDesde el verano de 2026, en medio de la guerra de Estados Unidos e Israel contra Irán, Riad ha reavivado la incitación sectaria contra Ansarallah con la ayuda de grupos salafistas que ocupan un lugar destacado entre las fuerzas combatientes de la coalición. Tras pasar del patrocinio emiratí al saudí, estas formaciones ofrecen al reino una base de apoyo cuya hostilidad doctrinal hacia los zaidíes puede canalizarse hacia el campo de batalla.

Arabia Saudí se ha mostrado cada vez más decidida a dotar a sus políticas de legitimidad religiosa. Su versión de un ataque con drones cerca de La Meca el 15 de septiembre de 2026, seguida de afirmaciones de que se interceptó un misil de crucero en la región de Medina el 15 de octubre, proporcionó material para campañas que invocaban la defensa de las ciudades sagradas del islam. Las fuerzas yemeníes negaron haber atacado los lugares sagrados y rechazaron la acusación sobre Medina calificándola de invención. Los yemeníes también celebraron una manifestación masiva en Saná «en defensa de La Meca y los lugares sagrados».

Los medios de comunicación saudíes promovieron las acusaciones, y los medios del Golfo y yemeníes alineados con la coalición se hicieron eco de ellas. Las campañas resultantes buscaban desacreditar a Ansarallah, cuya popularidad había aumentado gracias a su campaña militar en apoyo de Gaza, y replantear el enfrentamiento como una defensa de los lugares sagrados musulmanes frente a un enemigo sectario.

Fatwas a la carta

Paralelamente a estas acusaciones, Arabia Saudí movilizó a sus predicadores contra Ansarallah mediante fatwas emitidas «a la carta». Esta renovada coordinación une a las instituciones religiosas y políticas del reino después de que el príncipe heredero Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) pasara años debilitando las estructuras clericales que habían sustentado su alianza.

El gran muftí Saleh al-Fawzan, que asumió el cargo en octubre de 2025, emitió un comunicado en el que condenaba directamente a Ansarallah y otorgaba autoridad religiosa a la campaña en su contra. Su intervención situó al máximo cargo religioso del reino del lado de las fuerzas que se enfrentan a Saná, presentando su misión como la defensa de los lugares sagrados musulmanes y la obediencia a los gobernantes legítimos.

La declaración de Fawzan también asoció a Ansarallah con Satanás y presentó la resistencia a su dominio como un deber sancionado por Dios.

El muftí fue nombrado por recomendación de MbS y tiene un historial de posturas hostiles hacia los Hermanos Musulmanes y los chiitas. En abril de 2026, los medios árabes informaron de que ya no se podía acceder a su página web ni a su archivo de fatwas, lo que suscitó especulaciones sobre la eliminación o revisión del material acumulado a lo largo de décadas. Su última intervención contra Ansarallah otorga a esa autoridad religiosa un papel destacado en el renovado esfuerzo bélico de Riad.

El 25 de septiembre, el clérigo saudí afirmó: «El grupo hutí se fundó sobre la corrupción en el credo y la corrupción en el enfoque, por lo que se rebeló contra sus gobernantes y dividió al país y a su pueblo». Lo describió como «una secta descarriada y un grupo desviado que declara infieles a los Compañeros, considera lícito derramar sangre musulmana y permite la demolición y destrucción de sus mezquitas». Restablecer la seguridad en Yemen bajo su liderazgo reconocido, declaró, era «uno de los deberes más imperativos».

Predicación para el frente

La alineación entre los predicadores salafistas de Yemen y el discurso wahabí saudí es evidente en el uso de dictámenes religiosos para legitimar la guerra contra Ansarallah. Ahmed bin Hassan al-Muallim, presidente de la Asociación de Eruditos Yemeníes, hizo un llamamiento a la movilización como deber religioso y nacional. El diputado de Islah y portavoz de la asociación, Mohammed Nasser al-Hazmi al-Idrisi, también desempeñó un papel en la incitación a la lucha contra Ansarallah al adoptar una retórica religiosa que legitima enfrentarse a ellos y apoya la búsqueda de ayuda de Arabia Saudí.

A medida que las fuerzas de Saná avanzan por Taiz, fuentes de alto nivel vinculadas a sus negociaciones con tribus y formaciones armadas informan a The Cradle de que Arabia Saudí está trabajando intensamente para explotar las divisiones sectarias en la provincia. Dichas negociaciones tienen como objetivo evitar enfrentamientos y derramamiento de sangre, mientras que Riad busca movilizar a las fuerzas que se resisten al avance de Saná.

Las fuentes describen una escalada de la incitación en el interior de las mezquitas por parte del partido Islah, afiliado a los Hermanos Musulmanes, y de grupos salafistas, que utilizan una retórica sectaria para fomentar la lucha contra Ansarallah. En este contexto, Ali al-Imad, miembro del buró político de Ansarallah, advirtió de que Arabia Saudí estaba movilizando a grupos takfiri bajo designaciones militares.

Múltiples fuentes locales informan a The Cradle de que una retórica similar se ha extendido por las mezquitas y las escuelas religiosas de las provincias del sur. En Lahj, los anuncios de reclutamiento obtenidos por The Cradle convocan a una brigada salafista para apoyar la guerra del reino contra las fuerzas de Saná.

Uno de ellos exige a los solicitantes que sigan un «enfoque salafista» y describe el reclutamiento para una «Brigada Tawhid» contra la «marea hutí rafidí», utilizando un término despectivo para referirse a los chiitas. Las fuentes locales califican la formación propuesta de takfiri y inspirada en el ISIS.

La compra del frente sur

Arabia Saudí también ha proporcionado apoyo financiero a comandantes militares salafistas leales en el sur de Yemen, con el objetivo de reforzar sus formaciones y ampliar su papel en el campo de batalla. Según fuentes locales, estas formaciones incluyen a miembros de organizaciones takfiri a quienes Riad ha enviado a los frentes tras la extensión del control de Saná a lo largo de la costa occidental hasta Bab al-Mandab.

Entre los beneficiarios señalados se encuentran el general de división Hamdi Hassan Mohammed Shukri, comandante de la Cuarta Región Militar, de la Segunda División de las Brigadas Gigantes y de la Séptima Brigada de Infantería; el general de división Abdulrahman Saleh Hassan al-Lahji, jefe de Estado Mayor de las Fuerzas del Escudo de la Nación y comandante de la Cuarta Brigada de Infantería; y Rashad al-Dhalei y Qusai al-Damani.

Abyan Today, citando fuentes políticas, informó de que estos comandantes y otros recibieron alrededor de 600 millones de riales saudíes del «Comité Especial» saudí. Según la misma información, el Eje de Taiz, afiliado a Islah, quedó excluido, lo que pone de manifiesto las divisiones dentro del bando respaldado por Arabia Saudí y las recriminaciones por las retiradas y la rendición.

El esfuerzo por comprar lealtades militares va acompañado de una expansión de las redes religiosas que pueden ayudar a sostener las formaciones sobre el terreno. Además de reforzar las Brigadas Gigantes bajo el mando de Abdulrahman al-Muharrami, conocido como Abu Zara, el activista yemení Adel al-Hasani afirma que Riad estableció 62 centros religiosos durante la tregua, que se extienden desde Bab al-Mandab hasta Mahra.

Otro informe sobre sus acusaciones señala al oficial saudí Falah al-Shahrani y al embajador Mohammed al-Jaber como responsables de supervisar la red. Según se informa, muchos de ellos están dirigidos por seguidores del predicador salafista Yahya al-Hajuri y se basan en autoridades religiosas como Rabee al-Madkhali.

Desde que el enfrentamiento entre Arabia Saudí y los Emiratos Árabes Unidos se intensificó a finales de 2025, Riad ha acelerado sus esfuerzos por reorganizar las formaciones armadas del sur y ganarse a sus comandantes, aprovechando el declive de la influencia militar emiratí tras la derrota, en enero de 2026, de las fuerzas respaldadas por Abu Dabi.

En febrero se informó de que el reino había destinado casi 3.000 millones de dólares al pago de los salarios de militares y civiles yemeníes, incluidos aproximadamente 1.000 millones de dólares para los combatientes del sur a los que antes pagaban los Emiratos Árabes Unidos.

Un bando salafista dividido

Los reveses sufridos por las formaciones respaldadas por Arabia Saudí reflejan un liderazgo fragmentado y objetivos políticos contradictorios, además de las pérdidas en el campo de batalla. Dentro del movimiento salafista yemení, algunos líderes han rechazado el intento de Riad de avivar las divisiones internas.

Personalidades del norte, entre ellas el jeque Mohammed al-Imam, han considerado la guerra contra Ansarallah como un conflicto entre musulmanes y han firmado acuerdos de coexistencia y distensión en zonas como Saada, Dhamar y Mabar.

Esos acuerdos contribuyeron a mantener a grupos de combatientes al margen de los combates. Su negativa a considerar el enfrentamiento como una obligación religiosa ha complicado el rumbo que Riad pretendía imponer a otras formaciones salafistas, financiándolas y armándolas antes de empujarlas al combate.

Las divisiones atraviesan las redes religiosas de las que depende el reino, así como las formaciones militares que ha puesto bajo su patrocinio. Para aquellos líderes salafistas que firmaron acuerdos locales, la coexistencia con Ansarallah ha supuesto una forma de mantener a sus comunidades al margen de los combates, lo que entra en conflicto directo con la movilización que Riad está fomentando en otros lugares.

Entre las fuerzas alineadas con Abu Dabi, voces vinculadas al Consejo de Transición del Sur (STC, en inglés) también han advertido de que la renovada dependencia de Riad respecto a los combatientes del sur refleja sus dificultades militares más que un cambio en su postura política.

Temen ser utilizados hasta que la amenaza inmediata remita, para luego volver a ser marginados. En su opinión, los llamamientos saudíes a las fuerzas del sur no ofrecen ninguna garantía de que el reino vaya a atender sus demandas políticas una vez que esos combatientes hayan cumplido su propósito militar inmediato.

Saná ha ampliado sus contactos tribales y ha aprovechado las divisiones entre sus oponentes, en paralelo a su campaña militar. Los informes sugieren que estas negociaciones, las infiltraciones de seguridad y los ataques contra depósitos de armas han contribuido a debilitar a las formaciones enemigas y a preparar el terreno para nuevos avances.

El investigador y analista político Ahmed al-Hasani describe el sectarismo como una de las principales herramientas de movilización de Arabia Saudí en Yemen. Sin embargo, distingue entre las escuelas salafistas vinculadas a Riad, otras ligadas a Abu Dabi y aquellas que conservan cierta independencia.

La escuela del imán de Dhamar considera la guerra como un conflicto interno, explica, mientras que Arabia Saudí sigue cortejando a figuras de la escuela Fuyush de Adén sin haberlas involucrado aún en la batalla, a pesar de las fatwas de los clérigos saudíes —incluida la de Fawzan—.

Hasani afirma a The Cradle que la predicación incendiaria se ha extendido por las mezquitas, mientras que los grupos takfiri más cercanos al ISIS operan al margen de las estructuras tradicionales de las mezquitas y las escuelas religiosas. Se concentran en zonas rurales y en torno a las líneas del frente, combatiendo en frentes como los de Bayda y Marib.

Las Fuerzas del Escudo de la Nación siguen desplegadas a lo largo de las líneas de contacto en Marib, Jawf, Shabwa, Bayhan y Abyan, en alerta frente a Ansarallah, pero sin que actualmente se estén llevando a cabo ofensivas de gran envergadura en esos sectores.

Reclutamiento más allá de Yemen

A medida que sus formaciones aliadas pierden posiciones estratégicas, Riad ha buscado refuerzos en el extranjero. Axios informó de conversaciones entre Arabia Saudí y Siria sobre el envío de tropas a Yemen, en medio de informes independientes sobre esfuerzos para reclutar combatientes takfiri que lucharon en Siria.

Estas medidas coincidieron con la activación del Acuerdo de Defensa Conjunta de La Meca entre Arabia Saudí, Turquía y Pakistán. A pesar de los informes sobre la concentración de soldados pakistaníes cerca de la frontera con Yemen, Islamabad afirmó que sus fuerzas no cruzarían a Yemen y que su misión se limitaba a defender el territorio saudí.

La movilización religiosa también se ha extendido más allá de Yemen. Páginas sirias y relatos procedentes de Damasco, Idlib y Hama han seguido de cerca los combates, mientras que fuentes yemeníes declararon a Al-Akhbar que se estaba trasladando a combatientes desde Siria a través de territorio saudí, con la ayuda de Turquía para que algunos llegaran a los frentes de Marib, Jawf, Adén y Hadramaut.

El exministro del Interior iraquí Baqir Jabr al-Zubaidi afirmó que se había organizado un puente aéreo para trasladar a combatientes sirios a Yemen tras el fracaso de las campañas militares del Golfo.

La Asociación de Eruditos Musulmanes de Irak, una organización clerical suní, emitió un comunicado en el que pedía apoyo político, mediático, ideológico y en el campo de batalla para los combatientes contrarios a Ansarallah. También condenó la matanza de hombres que habían depuesto las armas, describiendo el incidente como una grave violación religiosa y exigiendo medidas correctivas contra los responsables.

Hadi Qubaisi, director del Centro Ufeed de Investigación y Estudios e investigador especializado en asuntos políticos e islam político, sostiene que:

«La apuesta por traer combatientes de Siria a Yemen se basa principalmente en aprovechar el número, más que en reactivar un proyecto yihadista capaz de atraer a grandes masas. Si se tratara de una auténtica movilización yihadista, sus ecos habrían llegado hasta Trípoli y los campos palestinos. Pero el atractivo de este discurso ha disminuido, sobre todo tras la guerra de Gaza y la brecha que esta puso de manifiesto entre las consignas y las posturas prácticas».

Arabia Saudí ha perdido parte de su capacidad de movilización religiosa, añade Qubaisi a The Cradle, mientras que las autoridades sirias controlan el discurso religioso y están reformando los planes de estudios. Por lo tanto, enviar un número limitado de combatientes difiere de lanzar una amplia campaña de reclutamiento.

En Yemen, Islah y sus aliados también han utilizado la retórica religiosa y takfiri en su enfrentamiento con Ansarallah. Su capacidad para traducir esa predicación en un reclutamiento generalizado ha seguido siendo limitada, a pesar de los esfuerzos por presentar la participación en los combates como un deber religioso.

Qubaisi considera que el traslado de combatientes a Yemen se enfrenta a obstáculos sustanciales, desde el escaso atractivo del campo de batalla y la ausencia de incentivos económicos que se ofrecen en otros lugares hasta las divisiones y las luchas internas entre las fuerzas armadas del sur.

Publicado originalmente por  Geopolítica rugiente

By Philip GIRALDI

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The horrors deliverable by Israel that might come next

Speculation is growing over the sustainability of the United States’ model of global dominance which emerged as Washington ended the Second World War as plausibly the sole superpower. That role was first tested in the Korean War, which produced something of a stalemate in a confrontation that included China, and led to a Ceasefire Agreement which is still in place to this day. More recently the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, even given the disastrous and pointless war in Vietnam, confirmed the US’s superior military, political and financial status, leading to an affirmation of American dominance as an essential element in global political stability in several initiated and mandated policy documents including in the statement of principles spelled out in 1990’s which was later published in September 2000 as the Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces, and Resources for a New Century: a Project for the New American Century (PNAC). The final elaboration of the policy was derived from the so-called “Wolfowitz Doctrine” which was the common referral to national defense guidance developed when Paul Wolfowitz, working for Vice President Dick Cheney, was Associate Secretary of Defense. The term is an informal version of the US Department of Defense’s Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) for the years 1994-9 dated February 18, 1992.

As the first DPG after the Cold War and first Gulf Wars ended and the draft described the United States as the world’s only superpower it made preventing the emergence (or re-emergence) of a global or regional competitor a top priority. This objective included preventing any hostile power’s dominance of strategically or resource rich important regions that could produce alternative sources of global power. It argued that that the US Military must remain sufficiently strong enough to deter possible competitors, retaining the ability to act unilaterally if necessary. The PNAC declaration called for a continuing global leadership role for the United States which implied the resort to preemptive war against adversaries when needed.

In promoting the new policy, the Project’s Statement of Principles document of June 1997 elaborated how “…America has a vital role in maintaining peace and security in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. If we shirk our responsibilities, we invite challenges to our fundamental interests… We need to accept responsibility for America’s unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles.”

The statement was signed by Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz, Scooter Libby, Zalmay Khalilzad, Donald Rumsfeld, Peter Rodman, Elliot Abrams, Eliot A. Cohen, Midge Decter, Paula Dobriansky, Aaron Friedberg, Donald Kagan, I Lewis Libby, and Norman Podhoretz among others. It was considered to be very “Israel friendly” subsequently and it, combined with the awesome and growing political and institutional power of the US Israeli Lobby, was used to justify US interventions in the Middle East during the following decades. Indeed, one might argue that Israel’s form of interaction with its neighbors and even with much of the world today was shaped by the numerous Jews and Israel firsters who participated in the drafting of the critical documents asserting Washington’s need to behave aggressively, to include its participation in conflicts that it would otherwise been able to avoid such as those occurring in the Middle East which were instigated by Israel’s promotion of its own interests just like is currently taking place with Iran.

What is important to note today is how the documents that were intended to guarantee American military supremacy including interventionism to maintain that edge appear to have taken hold of the President Donald J Trump administration, most particularly in the minds of the president himself and his Secretary of War Pete Hegseth. So, what went wrong as the United States now appears to be losing on all fronts where it has opted for confrontation instead of negotiation? It is perhaps important to note that the geopolitical missteps are likely the result of a doctrine coming from a different world than 1991 with different means of assessing strength or weakness. Trump and Hegseth might well be perceived as dinosaurs heading for extinction during their own version of the Triassic Period and the country that they have so much abused might be heading for decline and fall. The question becomes “After the US falls, who will be there to pick up the pieces?”

And one might presume that America’s most protected client Israel, which would certainly be joined to the US as the world’s most hated nation, might also be heading in the same direction. The only difference being that Israel has declared that it will use its nuclear arsenal to take much of the world with it if it goes down, the so-called Samson Option. Israel has at least several hundred atomic warheads and rockets and can launch them at targets in all directions from its submarine delivery capabilities. Most European capitals would certainly be targets for Israeli missiles and warplanes. Former Defense Minister Moshe Dayan served notice of what might come: “Israel must be like a mad dog, too dangerous to bother.” A minority of Israeli leaders might try to prevent things from coming to that, if at all possible, but those in charge will surely have the capability to take part of the world down with them and that is precisely what will happen as Israel goes under. But before that happens a wave of millions of Jewish “refugees” will roll over the US and Europe primarily. They will insist on creating new nations just like they did to the Palestinians and likely will have their nuclear weapons with them as “insurance.”

Interestingly, Israel is also reported to be developing a biological weapon arsenal which is “ethnically targeting” selective meaning that it will kill only holders of certain DNA or ethnic characteristics, presumably killing those with majority Arab biology while sparing anyone with Jewish traits or characteristics. Interesting. I might be the easy way to “mow the lawn” of objectional foreigners as Israel’s leaders have frequently carried out in places like Gaza and Lebanon.

But it occurs to me that Israel will follow a slightly different pattern, namely disorienting the playing field by the use of false flag incidents that will encourage Americans and Europeans to support pro-Israel policies that are clearly not in their interest, and applying “Palestinian option” alternatives to reduce and then completely eliminate resistance to its own form of “global dominance.” That means stealing other people’s land while also systematically exterminating them, possibly with the biological “bombs. The process of emigrating is already underway among many mostly better educated Israelis who are already rapidly leaving an Israel under threat to recreate their exclusively Jewish ghettos and settlements in places like Crete, Greece and in South America. The local residents frequently complain about the abuse they receive from the newcomers but their governments suffer from the typical Zionist disease, i.e. local governments that are bought or pressured to give way.

America already has discovered the phenomenon in the communities in New York and New Jersey states and elsewhere in the country where often Orthodox Jewish religious ritual restrictions control behavior of all citizens and even visitors who dare to defile the enclaves. If Israel in what was once Palestine goes under will that mean that millions of new immigrants, certainly given free entry with no conditions on their behavior by a US Congress which displays Israeli flags in its office spaces on Capitol Hill. The clowns in Congress and the White House may not be bothered by the Israeli Jewish tendency to despise the other 90% of any country’s inhabitants as subhuman, as they do with the Palestinians currently. Florida (of course!) Congressman Brian Mast, who wears his Israeli army uniform when working in his Congressional office, said : “there is no such thing as innocent Palestinians”! And he is not the only congressman or staffer who embraces that view, which is reiterated by 90 of Israeli Jews who support extermination of all Muslims and Christians!

So what comes next? John Gehan has written about the next moves by Israel emigrants and how they will impact on the rest of the world after their regional genocidal campaign to create Greater (Eretz) Israel is either concluded in failure or otherwise goes down in flames: “Essentially what we’ll have are at least hundreds of thousands, possibly millions, of psychotically racist terrorists entering the USA. These are ethnically obsessed monsters who don’t consider anyone outside of their pernicious tribe to be human. They’ll have weapons at their disposal and a cemented nationwide network to commit mass murder. Maybe some of these crazies will seek shelter in Europe or Canada or Argentina, etc. But many will choose the USA as a redoubt. At best, murders and acts of terror will spike dramatically in this country. Israeli Zionists are genocidal psychopaths. As we have all seen.”

For those who need further elucidation of what is going on and what drives it, the head of one of Israel’s most prominent think tanks, Major General Tamir Hayman has described in an article further examined by Trita Parsi the Quincy Institute, the harsh reality of Israel’s current and ongoing new national security doctrine: Hayman describes how “The United States is a ‘declining power’ and, given its ongoing social and political shifts, will soon abandon Israel in any event. This is compelling Israel to move toward greater self-reliance in order to avoid ‘excessive dependence’ on the US since it ‘exposes Israel to the influence of a progressive American value system that is incompatible with Israel’s Jewish character.’ He concludes: ‘Severing ties with the United States is therefore not only inevitable, but essential to Israel’s independence and the resilience of its Jewish national identity.’” Why is that? “Because of the Primacy of Jewish Identity over Democracy: The state’s Jewish identity takes precedence over its democratic system of government.” And it takes precedence over the constitutional rights of any nation that Jews should wind up settling in!

So, we Americans and presumably lots of other people have something to look forward to from an Israel whose leaders including Benjamin Netanyahu and Ariel Sharon have often bragged about how they control “America,” and now it it boasting how it has taken its pound of flesh and then will discards the US donor after it is bled white! It presumes the end of nations as we know them that try to function decently to be replaced by an ethno-religious state armed with nukes and bio weapons that will begin its process of extermination just as it is already carrying out in the Middle East! Mazel Tov to y’all!

Original article:  www.unz.com

By  Jacob G. HORNBERGER

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Right-wing and left-wing interventionists and interventionist mainstream-press commentators are up in arms over President Trump’s decision to ease economic sanctions against Russia in connection with the Russian government’s agreement to supply diesel fuel to the United States.

The notion is that nothing — not even the midterms — must be permitted to interfere with the Cold War II racket that holds that Russia is an aggressor nation that is hell-bent on conquering the world and, therefore, that it is necessary to target the Russian populace with severe impoverishment and even death by starvation or illness with ever-more economic sanctions.

Central to this racket, of course, is Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The notion was that Russia was on the march. As soon as it conquered Ukraine, U.S. officials maintained, it would re-conquer Eastern Europe, and then Western Europe and England, and then make its way to South America, Central America, Mexico, and finally the United States, all of which Russia would reconstitute into a new Soviet Union of the world. In other words, Russia is coming to get us again.

The Cold War I racket was used to justify the conversion of the federal government to a national-security state, a type of governmental structure that came with omnipotent powers, including the power of orchestrating and committing state-sponsored assassinations. The racket enabled the national-security branch of the government to quickly become the most powerful branch of the federal government, one to which the president, Congress, and the Supreme Court decided to defer.

The Cold War I racket was also used to justify an anti-communist crusade, during which the U.S. national-security establishment targeted suspected communists, both here and in foreign countries, with destruction of reputation or even with assassination.

Beginning in 1989, the Cold War racket came to a sudden and unexpected end. The Berlin Wall was torn down, Germany was reunified, the Warsaw Pact was dissolved, the Soviet Union disintegrated, and Russian troops withdrew from Eastern Europe.

Officials in the U.S. national-security branch — i.e., the Pentagon, the CIA, and the NSA — naturally were extremely concerned. Suddenly, they had lost the justification for their existence and for the racket that they were certain would go on forever. People were talking about a “peace dividend,” which would involve a deep reduction in national-security-state spending and maybe even a restoration of America’s founding governmental system of a limited-government republic.

To replace the old racket with a new racket, new official enemies were developed, such as “the terrorists,” “the Muslims,” “the drug dealers,” and “the illegals.” They were all coming to get us, or so they said. Everyone remained deathly afraid.

But the Pentagon, the CIA, and the NSA were not about to let go of their old Cold War racket so easily. After providing Soviet officials with assurances during the negotiations over German reunification that NATO would not expand eastward, U.S. officials proceeded to do precisely that. NATO began marching eastward, absorbing former members of the Warsaw Pact and moving inexorably toward Russia’s borders, knowing full well what Russia’s reaction would be.

That was what the threat to absorb Ukraine into NATO ultimately accomplished — provoking Russia into invading Ukraine in an effort to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO. U.S. officials had been warned for years that NATO expansion, especially into Ukraine, could produce precisely such a confrontation. Yet they proceeded anyway.

Voila! The national-security branch had its old Cold War racket back, albeit in a revised format. The Russians are coming to get us … again (along with the terrorists, the Muslims, the drug dealers, and the illegals). The big fly in the ointment, however, is that Russia has been unable to conquer Ukraine. That’s, of course, a problem. If Russia can’t even conquer Ukraine, how is it going to be able to conquer Eastern Europe, Western Europe, England, South America, Central America, Mexico, and then the United States? Whoops!

Never mind that inconvenient problem. In the eyes of national-security statists, it is imperative that we continue hewing to the official narrative. Russia is coming to get us, just like before. We need ever-increasing budgets for the national-security establishment and its ever-growing army of voracious fat-cat “defense” contractors. Who cares if the United States goes bankrupt in the process? We need to again be kept “safe” from the Reds — I mean, the Russians (and from the terrorists, Muslims, drug dealers, and illegals.)

Oh, and don’t forget the Cuban Reds! They are coming to get us too. No doubt the right-wing and left-wing interventionists and the interventionist mainstream press, all of whom remain steadfast acolytes of the national-security establishment, are scared to death that President Trump might lift the old Cold War embargo and the new Cold War blockade against the Cuban people as well. Of course, fat chance of that happening given Trump’s own interventionist mindset.

Original article:  www.fff.org

Wer Rüstungsausgaben unter dem Gesichtspunkt kritisiert, dass das Geld, das für Rüstung ausgegeben wird, irgendwo anders eingespart werden muss, erntet in der öffentlichen Debatte schnell Kritik. Einen solchen Zusammenhang gäbe es nicht.

Und ja, in der Theorie haben die Verteidiger von Rüstungsausgaben in diesem Punkt auch durchaus recht. Doch alle Theorie ist grau. In der Praxis liegt hier sogar ein doppelter Denkfehler vor. Wer immer mehr Geld in die Rüstung pumpt, sorgt sogar dafür, dass unser Wohlstand sinkt.

In politischen und ökonomischen Debatten gibt es nichts Schlimmeres als Verlogenheit und doppelte Standards. Dummerweise ist aber gerade die Debatte um die Staatsausgaben stark von ebenjenen doppelten Standards geprägt.

Beispiel gefällig? Jahrzehntelang haben konservative Politiker und neoliberale Ökonomen versucht, uns einzutrichtern, dass man jeden Euro nur einmal ausgeben könne und „schuldenfinanziertes Wachstum“ nur ein Strohfeuer sei, das zulasten späterer Generationen abgefackelt würde. Überflüssig zu erwähnen, dass diese Aussagen falsch sind. Erstaunlich ist jedoch, dass diejenigen, die Kredite für Investitionen in Bildung, Infrastruktur oder die Energiewende für ökonomisches Teufelszeugs halten, plötzlich das Schuldenmachen für Rüstungsausgaben ganz prima finden. Wobei die bittere Ironie des Ganzen ist, dass sie damit gleich doppelt falsch liegen.

Um das wirklich zu verstehen, lohnt es sich, ein wenig tiefer in die ökonomischen Hintergründe einzusteigen. Selbstverständlich „darf“ der Staat Schulden machen. Er muss sogar Schulden machen – vor allem dann, wenn die Unternehmen und die Haushalte sich gerade mal wieder nicht selbst verschulden wollen und auf der anderen Seite aber auch nicht wissen, wohin sie mit ihren Ersparnissen sollen. Wer einen Euro spart, braucht auf der anderen Seite jemanden, der sich um exakt diesen einen Euro verschuldet.

Dass Staatsschulden in der Debatte oft so negativ bewertet werden, mag mit dem Begriff als solchem zu tun haben. „Schuld“ ist ja in der deutschen Sprache negativ besetzt. Vermeiden wir also diese sprachliche Vorbewertung und sprechen stattdessen von Investitionen. Darum geht es nämlich schlussendlich. Doch nicht überall, wo „Investition“ draufsteht, ist auch eine Investition drin.

In der Volkswirtschaft unterscheidet man zwischen Investitionen und Konsum. Grob gesagt werden Investitionen als Ausgaben definiert, die einen aktiven Effekt auf die künftigen Einnahmen haben. Auf Unternehmensebene ist das betriebswirtschaftlich betrachtet recht einfach zu erklären. Wenn ein Unternehmen z.B. in eine neue Fabrik investiert, kann es künftig mehr Güter verkaufen. Investiert es in Forschung und Entwicklung, kann es künftig bessere Produkte verkaufen und damit seinen Marktanteil vergrößern oder eben höhere Margen realisieren.

Um solche Investitionen zu tätigen, verschuldet sich ein Unternehmen in der Regel. Die dahinterstehende Logik ist klar: Solange die Vorteile, also z.B. höherer Absatz, höherer Marktanteil, höhere Margen, in Summe größer sind als die Kosten, also vor allem die Zinsen, ist die Investition sinnvoll.

Davon zu unterscheiden sind Konsumausgaben. Wenn ein Unternehmen beispielsweise einen Kredit aufnehmen sollte, um seinen Managern eine Sause in der Karibik zu finanzieren, ist das keine Investition, da diese Sause in der Regel keine Auswirkungen auf die Einnahmen in der Zukunft hat.

Auf volkswirtschaftlicher Betrachtungsebene ist die Unterscheidung vor allem bei den Staatsausgaben etwas komplexer. Wenn der Staat beispielsweise den Schulen und Universitäten mehr Geld zur Verfügung stellt, so fließt dieses Geld auf der ersten Betrachtungsebene vor allem in Form von Löhnen an die Haushalte – Lehrer und Dozenten verdienen Geld und geben ihren Lohn in der Volkswirtschaft aus, was über die Binnennachfrage die gesamte Volkswirtschaft stimuliert.

Auf dieser Betrachtungsebene gibt es erst einmal auch keinen Unterschied zu den Militärausgaben. Volkswirtschaftlich gesehen unterscheiden sich der Lohn für einen Lehrer und der Lohn für einen Soldaten nicht und sowohl der Ingenieur in der Panzerfabrik als auch der Sozialwissenschaftler in einem Fraunhofer-Institut geben große Teile ihres Lohns in der Binnenwirtschaft aus und kurbeln sie damit an. Ob es bereits auf dieser Ebene sinnvoll sein kann, die Staatsausgaben, die diesen Stimulus auslösen, über Schulden zu finanzieren, liegt im Auge des Betrachters. Doch darum soll es hier gar nicht gehen.

Die eigentliche Abweichung findet nämlich auf der zweiten Ebene statt, auf der man dann den Unterschied zwischen Investition und Konsum erkennen kann. Ein besseres Bildungssystem führt zu qualifizierteren Schul- und Universitätsabsolventen, die ihrerseits die Produktivität des Standorts steigern. Der gut ausgebildete Facharbeiter zahlt nicht nur mehr Steuern als der ungelernte Hilfsarbeiter, sondern er hat als Arbeitnehmer auch einen positiven Effekt auf die Wertschöpfung der gesamten Volkswirtschaft.

Und wer weiß, vielleicht gründet er am Ende selbst ein Unternehmen und schafft neue Arbeitsplätze. Genau so entsteht am Ende Wachstum. Ausgaben zur Verbesserung des Bildungssystems sind somit Investitionen. Sie sorgen dafür, dass die Volkswirtschaft künftig produktiver wird, und nebenbei sorgen sie auch dafür, dass mittel- bis langfristig die Steuereinnahmen steigen.

In der Volkswirtschaft gibt es sogar Kennzahlen, die diesen Effekt zumindest näherungsweise beschreiben – den Fiskalmultiplikator, der die künftigen Steuereinnahmen beschreibt, die eine staatliche Investition auslöst, und den Staatsausgabenmultiplikator, der die Auswirkungen einer Investition auf das Bruttoinlandsprodukt beschreibt. Bei Investitionen ins Bildungssystem geht die Wissenschaft meist von einem Multiplikator von 1,9 aus. Ein Euro Investitionen in die Bildung erzeugt also 1,90 Euro Wirtschaftswachstum. Ähnlich hoch ist der Wert bei Investitionen in die öffentliche Infrastruktur.

Bei Investitionen in die erneuerbaren Energien liegt der Multiplikator in den meisten Studien bei 1,11 bis 1,20. All diese Investitionen sind also – zumindest sehr grob überschlagen – volkswirtschaftlich sinnvoll, wobei der konkrete Effekt natürlich auch immer von der konkreten Investition abhängt. Wenn ein Staat also Schulden aufnimmt, um in diesen Sektoren zu investieren, ist dies grundsätzlich aus ökonomischer Sicht erst einmal positiv zu bewerten.

Doch wie sieht es nun mit der Rüstung aus? Gelten hier die gleichen Regeln? Nein. Zudem müsste hierbei zunächst einmal geklärt werden, ob man überhaupt von Investitionen sprechen kann. Ein gut ausgebildeter Bürger steigert die Produktivität. Eine neue Bahntrasse steigert die Produktivität. Günstige, verlässliche Energien steigern die Produktivität.

Doch was macht ein Panzer?

Der steht im besten Fall sinnlos in einer Kaserne und wenn er mal bewegt wird, macht er im Friedensfall die Straßen und im Kriegsfall alles andere kaputt. Welche positiven Effekte er mittel- bis langfristig auf das Bruttoinlandsprodukt oder die Steuereinnahmen haben soll, ist zumindest mir nicht klar. Volkswirtschaftlich macht es daher keinen nennenswerten Unterschied, ob der Staat Steuergelder dafür verwendet, Panzer herzustellen oder das Bundeskanzleramt mit einer goldenen Kuppel zu verschönern. Beides sind Konsumausgaben – volkswirtschaftlich korrekt hat dies der Ökonom Hyman Minsky als „Kollektivkonsum“ definiert. Man könnte es auch als Staatskonsum bezeichnen.

Eine Studie der Ökonomen Tom Krebs und Patrick Kaczmarczyk von der Universität Mannheim aus dem letzten Jahr hat einmal versucht, die volkswirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen der Folgeeffekte von Militärausgaben für den oben genannten „Staatsausgabenmultiplikator“ zu beziffern. Die beiden Forscher kamen auf die ernüchternde Zahl 0,5. Das bedeutet: Im besten Fall führt jeder ausgegebene Euro zu 50 Cent zusätzlicher Wirtschaftstätigkeit. Wir erinnern uns: Bei Bildungs- und Infrastrukturinvestitionen liegt der Wert bei 1,9. Die Idee, dass Rüstungsausgaben Investitionen seien und man mit einem „Kriegskeynesianismus“ auch in Friedenszeiten Wohlstand schaffen kann, ist somit der erste Denkfehler dieser Debatte.

Kommen wir nun zum zweiten Denkfehler. In der Theorie kann der Staat sich so hoch verschulden, wie er will. In der Praxis ist dies aber dann doch anders. Für jeden geliehenen Euro Schulden fallen Zinsen an und diese Zinslast wird aus dem laufenden Haushalt bezahlt. So konkurrieren, zumindest in der Praxis, stets verschiedene Arten von Staatsausgaben untereinander. Durch Buchungstricks, wie der Schaffung eines als „Sondervermögen“ bezeichneten Kreditrahmens, kann man zwar im Hier und Jetzt mehr Geld ausgeben, als man hat. Auch diese Kredite müssen aber irgendwann getilgt werden und Zinsen fallen dabei ja auch noch an.

Und daher stehen die Rüstungsausgaben dann doch in direkter Konkurrenz mit anderen Staatsausgaben. Immer wenn es seitens der Politik heißt, für dies oder das wäre nun einmal leider kein Geld da, muss man natürlich fragen, warum das so ist. Und hier kommt man gar nicht drumherum, auf den Elefanten im Raum zu zeigen.

Nun könnte man – wie in der politischen Linken gerne argumentiert wird – sagen, diese Kosten holt man halt über zusätzliche oder höhere Steuern, wenn möglich von den „Reichen“, wieder rein. Das kann man machen. Aber das ändert an der grundsätzlichen Frage ja nichts. Wenn man zusätzliche Einnahmen generiert, so muss man auch bei diesen Einnahmen die Frage stellen, ob man sie nicht sinnvoller ausgeben könnte. Das Volumen der Staatseinnahmen ändert überhaupt nichts daran, dass ökonomisch sinnlose Staatsausgaben ökonomisch sinnlos sind. Wenn ich mein Erspartes für eine Sause verprasse, spielt es auch keine Rolle, wie hoch mein Einkommen ist. Diese Sause ist und bleibt eine ökonomisch sinnlose Konsumausgabe.

Im realen Leben stellt sich daher auch nicht die Frage, ob der Staat einen Euro für Bildungsinvestitionen UND einen Euro für die Rüstung ausgibt. Es geht darum, ob er einen Euro für Bildungsinvestitionen ODER einen Euro für die Rüstung ausgibt.

Und wenn man nun die oben genannten Multiplikatoren einbezieht, sollten sämtliche Denkfehler beseitigt sein. Gibt der Staat einen Euro für das Bildungssystem aus, steigert er den Wohlstand des Landes. Gibt er einen Euro für die Rüstung aus, senkt er den Wohlstand des Landes. Ist das wirklich so schwer zu verstehen?

Originalbeitrag NachDenkSeiten

Darwin wasn’t an agnostic by conviction – he was an atheist who rejected Christianity as immoral.

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Friends were surprised when I described Darwin as the only major scientist who was unequivocally an atheist, given that he considered himself an agnostic. I confess that I tend to erase this label in my memory, because the formal distinction presumed by it—to wit, the idea that an agnostic does not know whether God exists, while an atheist knows that God does not—does not correspond to reality. I am not aware of a single prominent atheist who claims to be able to prove the non-existence of the divine. Even Dawkins, the most stereotypical atheist in the media, does not suggest that this is possible. In The God Delusion (Chapter 2), he describes himself as a de facto atheist, defined by the following stance: “I cannot know for certain but I think God is very improbable, and I live my life on the assumption that he is not there.” Thus, if we apply the traditional distinction, the world’s most famous atheist is not an atheist, but an agnostic.

Bertrand Russell held a similar position, as illustrated by his famous “celestial teapot” analogy. Can we prove that there is a teapot orbiting the planet? No. But we have no reason to believe that such a teapot exists. God is like that teapot: while it is impossible to prove that he does not exist, it is not reasonable to believe that he does. For this reason, Russell considered himself an agnostic in theory and an atheist in practice.

Darwin

If the term “agnostic” serves any purpose, it is to describe individuals who truly live in a state of doubt regarding the existence of God. Charles Darwin (1809–1882) was born to a deist father and a Unitarian mother. Deism entails the rejection of all institutionalized religion and the assertion that God exists, but takes no interest in humanity. As an 18th-century Englishman, Darwin’s father most likely believed in the Great Architect of Newton and the Freemasons. Unitarianism is a new flavor of Arianism, as it denies the divinity of Jesus, viewing him instead as a great moral reformer—comparable to Socrates. Unitarians took control of Harvard in the 19th century, and Newton was, in fact, a secret Arian. We might say, then, that Darwin did not grow up in a strictly Christian home; yet, he seriously considered becoming an Anglican priest and married a devout Christian woman. Undoubtedly, Darwin experienced crises of faith, which rendered him an agnostic, in the sense that the term describes a psychological state.

As far as we know, the first time he described himself as an agnostic was in 1879, at the age of 70, in a private letter to John Fordyce. According to some accounts, in 1881 he told a group of freethinkers that he had not abandoned Christianity until he was forty (which would have been in 1849). Did he abandon Christianity, adopt his father’s beliefs, and then eventually abandon those as well? I do not know the answer, but it is a vital question for Darwin’s scientific trajectory, since, by today’s labels, Newton would be a creationist or an intelligent design advocate.

The most illuminating account is found in his autobiography, written between 1876 and 1881 for his family. I quote James Moore from “Myth 16: That Evolution Destroyed Darwin’s Faith in Christianity—until He Reconverted on His Deathbed”: “Unwilling to give up Christianity, he had tried to ‘invent evidence’ to confirm the Gospels, which prolonged his indecision. Just as his clerical career had died a slow ‘natural death,’ so his faith withered gradually. But there was no turning back once the deathblow struck. His dithering crystallized into a moral conviction so strict that he could not see how anyone—even [his wife] Emma—‘ought to wish Christianity to be true.’ For if it were, ‘the plain language’ of the New Testament ‘seems to show that the men who do not believe, and this would include my Father, Brother and almost all my best friends, will be everlastingly punished. And this is a damnable doctrine.’ In later years, the residual theism evident in the Origin of Species became worn down, and now with ‘no assured and ever present belief in the existence of a personal God or of a future existence with retribution and reward,’ Darwin felt he must be ‘content to remain an Agnostic.’” Darwin’s father, a pivotal figure in his crisis of faith, died in 1848, a year before Darwin himself turned forty.

Darwin did not die in a state of indecision; he died firmly convinced that Christianity was immoral because it would condemn his loved ones to hell. If the term “agnosticism” applies here, it denotes a state of unknowing that follows the rejection of God as understood within the Abrahamic religions. Darwin knows that the Bible is wrong and that its God does not exist. But as for what God actually is, or what the truth may be—that, he does not know. Certainly, determining Darwin’s final state of mind is not enough to uncover the impact that his shifting religious convictions had on his thinking, given that the writing of On the Origin of Species (1859) spanned two decades.

The origin of the term “agnosticism”

No less than thirty years passed between the onset of Darwin’s disbelief and his first self-identification as an agnostic. A simple reason why he did not use this term earlier is that it had not yet been invented. It is rarely mentioned, but “agnosticism” is a term with a specific inventor and date of origin: in 1869, when Darwin was already 60 years old, Thomas Henry Huxley (known as “Darwin’s Bulldog,” and grandfather to both Aldous, the writer who advocated for opening the mind through drugs, and Julian, the eugenicist who founded the WWF and served as the first head of UNESCO) coined the term during a meeting of the Metaphysical Society, a somewhat secretive group open only to invited members. Darwin was not a member. The aforementioned Bertrand Russell had a deist relative who was a member: Lord Arthur Russell, nephew of Earl John Russell (Bertrand’s grandfather). Arthur Balfour, of the Balfour Declaration, was also a member. I could not have been there because I had not yet been born, but the Encyclopædia Britannica states that the term was coined under these circumstances, so I take believe it.

A public definition of agnosticism by the grandpa Huxley was first presented to the public in 1889, in the magazine Popular Science (or Pop Science), which still exists today. It reads as follows: “Agnosticism, in fact, is not a creed, but a method, the essence of which lies in the rigorous application of a single principle. That principle is of great antiquity; it is as old as Socrates; as old as the writer who said, ‘Try all things, hold fast by that which is good’ [1 Thess. 5:21]; it is the foundation of the Reformation, which simply illustrated the axiom that every man should be able to give a reason for the faith that is in him; it is the great principle of Descartes; it is the fundamental axiom of modern science. Positively the principle may be expressed: In matters of the intellect, follow your reason as far as it will take you, without regard to any other consideration. And negatively: In matters of the intellect, do not pretend that conclusions are certain which are not demonstrated or demonstrable. That I take to be the agnostic faith, which if a man keep whole and undefiled, he shall not be ashamed to look the universe in the face, whatever the future may have in store for him.”

Based on this definition, there is no obvious connection to a stance regarding the question of divine existence; however, the text as a whole implies a negative position: throughout, Huxley distinguishes himself from Comte, and agnosticism from the Comtian “Religion of Humanity.” He finds it necessary to differentiate himself because they share a disbelief in an Abrahamic God, an adherence to scientism, and a triumphalism akin to the “End of History.” The differences are that Comte and the positivists were mediocre scientists who created a church with a structure inspired by Catholicism, whereas the 19th-century English agnostics were brilliant and had no intention of founding a church.

It is worth noting the Unitarian flavor of this rhetoric, which seeks to trace a rationalist and contrarian lineage—beginning with Socrates, running through the Bible, and reaching its pinnacle in the present day—stripped of any supernatural elements. Another significant 19th-century English figure who adopted this approach was John Stuart Mill, in On Liberty. His wife and collaborator was a Unitarian.

And, of course, we see here an opposition—perhaps historically unprecedented—between possessing a scientific spirit and believing in God. We can say that Darwin’s Bulldog, during Darwin’s lifetime, ostracized Deism from science, since Evolution was presented as a refutation the Newtonian Architect’s existence.

A Matter of Terminology

Ultimately, Thomas Huxley was what we would today call an atheist—as was likely Darwin, given that he chose the term coined by his friend to describe his own position. Curiously, even Comte did not call himself an atheist. It seems that the spirit of atheism and scientism was widespread among the 19th-century intelligentsia, yet the willingness to embrace the label was confined to radicals such as Friedrich Engels, Karl Marx (whose 1841 dissertation focused on Democritus and Epicurus, the fathers of materialism), and Mikhail Bakunin. In that era, the distinction between the terms “atheist” and “agnostic” likely amounted to little more than one’s willingness to shock society. Neither the French positivists nor the English evolutionists sought to shock; the communists and anarchists, however, did.

Over time, by the 21st century, being an atheist no longer shocks anyone; in more intellectual circles, it is the norm. Hence the tendency to discard the term “agnostic,” or to reserve it exclusively for those who are in a state of genuine doubt. Another semantic issue concerns what we mean by “God.” Some people say things like, “For me, God is energy”—which leads one to wonder: does it make sense to claim that God is the very same thing that makes my electric fan spin and subsequently shows up on my utility bill? In the United States, one of the few Western nations where declaring oneself an atheist can still cause a stir, it is common for people to label themselves “spiritual, but not religious.” Such individuals often gravitate toward esoteric practices—crystals, horoscopes, Zen meditation, gurus who are as ugly as they are hungry for sex, and so on—without committing to any specific religion. This is likely a legacy of deism; after all, Freemasonry played a significant role in the nation’s founding and is rooted in deism. It is no coincidence that this 21st-century deism can, much like its Renaissance precedents, the libertins, become blurred with atheism. Sam Harris himself, for instance, is an atheist who embraces New Age ideas.

It is a historical irony, then, that one of the coiners of the term “psychedelia” (Greek for “revelation of the mind”) happens to be the grandson of the man who coined the term “agnosticism.” It seems that a segment of humanity cannot relinquish the pursuit of ecstatic experiences and revelations, even after abandoning the notion of divine transcendence—leading them, instead, to seek such experiences within the material realm. The distinction between a “sober” atheist and a New Age atheist appears to be more a matter of temperament than of philosophy—much like the distinction between an atheist and an agnostic in the 19th century.

Non c’è modo di combattere l’Impero senza aggirare il suo controllo sul sistema finanziario internazionale.

Segue nostro Telegram.

Si sta già scatenando il finimondo quando si tratta di indagare su ciò che sta realmente accadendo in relazione agli ultimi, decisamente oscuri, movimenti legati agli Stati Uniti sul territorio e nelle acque pakistane. Dopo una prima analisi su Transition Protocol – che, come ammesso, non ha fornito tutte le risposte necessarie – abbiamo approfondito l’argomento con un’analisi molto più completa, supportata da diverse fonti.

Ciò che stiamo osservando in diversi punti nevralgici della connettività terrestre estremamente delicata tra Iran e Pakistan non è una chiusura totale delle frontiere, bensì un delicato equilibrio su due fronti da parte di Islamabad tra l’enorme morsa finanziaria di Washington e l’ancora di salvezza strategica di Teheran.

Ecco quindi a che punto siamo, integrando i dati verificati con le nostre ultime consultazioni.

Il punto chiave: il fattore scatenante dal punto di vista normativo è stata una misura di sanzioni bancarie, non solo la sicurezza delle frontiere.

Sebbene i funzionari provinciali del Balochistan abbiano pubblicamente attribuito la sospensione di sabato in due nodi chiave, Taftan e Gabd–Rimdan, a motivi di sicurezza, antiterrorismo e lotta al contrabbando, ciò che conta di più è l’esatto meccanismo relativo a un memorandum emanato venerdì scorso dal Ministero del Commercio pakistano.

Tale memorandum ha immediatamente revocato la proroga del 3 ottobre relativa all’esenzione dal Modulo Elettronico di Importazione (EIF) per le merci importate dall’Iran, e ha coinciso con l’ordine impartito da Islamabad di chiudere il valico di frontiera dell’Agenzia Federale di Investigazione (FIA) a Taftan.

L’aspetto fondamentale è che, senza l’esenzione dall’EIF, gli importatori pakistani devono gestire gli acquisti iraniani attraverso i canali bancari ufficiali pakistani – cosa che le sanzioni statunitensi, ovviamente, rendono assolutamente impossibile.

Peyman Sanandaji, presidente della Commissione Trasporti della Camera di Commercio di Teheran, ha confermato ufficialmente che è proprio il rispetto delle sanzioni bancarie (l’abbandono dell’EIF) ad aver bloccato le esportazioni iraniane verso il Pakistan.

Lo shock immediato ai valichi ufficiali è stato notevole: sono a rischio oltre 4.000 tonnellate di importazioni giornaliere di GPL iraniano attraverso Gabd–Rimdan. L’ex presidente della Camera di Commercio di Quetta, Ayoub Miryani, ha riferito che oltre 2.000 container sono bloccati nella sola Gabd–Rimdan, con altre centinaia di autocarri merci in coda a Taftan.

Ma perché sta accadendo proprio ora? A causa della spiacevole coincidenza tra la rata del FMI del 7 ottobre che il Pakistan doveva pagare e l’«Operazione Economic Outcast» del Tesoro imperiale statunitense.

Nell’ambito dell’«Operazione Economic Outcast», Washington ha concesso ai paesi terzi una «scadenza ben definita per interrompere» i collegamenti commerciali con l’Iran, pena l’espulsione dal sistema finanziario statunitense. A ciò hanno fatto seguito le designazioni dell’OFAC del 1° ottobre contro le reti ferroviarie terrestri e industriali iraniane e le azioni dell’8 ottobre contro 17 petroliere della «flotta ombra».

Ma poi, il 7 ottobre – appena nove giorni prima che il Ministero del Commercio revocasse la deroga EIF – Islamabad ha raggiunto un accordo con il FMI sulla quarta revisione della sua Extended Fund Facility per sbloccare 1,21 miliardi di dollari. Ciò richiede ancora l’approvazione del Consiglio esecutivo del FMI.

Naturalmente non esiste alcun documento pubblico che dimostri un ordine diretto da parte degli Stati Uniti o del FMI di chiudere i confini tra Iran e Pakistan. Tuttavia, fonti di Islamabad hanno sottolineato che lasciare in vigore una deroga a tempo indeterminato sugli strumenti bancari in vista del voto del Consiglio del FMI era diventato per il Pakistan un punto di vulnerabilità insostenibile in materia di sanzioni.

Le fonti di Islamabad sostengono con fermezza che la mossa fosse accompagnata da autentiche preoccupazioni in materia di controsabotaggio e silenziosamente coordinata tra Islamabad e Teheran (corsivo mio), affinché la sospensione non compromettesse i rapporti bilaterali.

Il portavoce del Ministero degli Esteri iraniano, Esmaeil Baghaei, ha pubblicamente definito l’interruzione una pausa temporanea dovuta a «problemi tecnici» e a «misure precauzionali».

Da parte loro, fonti ufficiali pakistane hanno insistito sul fatto che i controlli più rigorosi costituiscono una misura congiunta di antiterrorismo che riflette la «reciproca comprensione» con Teheran a seguito di un’impennata degli attacchi nel Sistan-Baluchistan, delle imboscate autostradali e di un attacco marittimo avvenuto l’11 ottobre contro imbarcazioni della Guardia Costiera pakistana al largo di Jiwani – che i funzionari pakistani hanno attribuito ad «attori stranieri» intenti a sabotare la mediazione del Pakistan nell’accordo di pace con l’Iran.

Si torna allo stesso vecchio schema dei salafiti-jihadisti strumentalizzati e manipolati dai soliti sospetti.

L’unica telefonata pubblicamente confermata tra il vice primo ministro Ishaq Dar e il ministro degli Esteri Abbas Araghchi ha avuto luogo domenica 18 ottobre – due giorni dopo il memorandum del 16 ottobre – e i resoconti ufficiali menzionano solo la diplomazia regionale e la riunione dell’OIC a Baghdad.

Pertanto, il coordinamento preventivo a livello di vice primo ministro Dar e ministro degli Esteri Araghchi, così come gli arresti specifici per sabotaggio, fanno parte della nostra stessa cronaca.

Esportazioni asimmetriche di generi alimentari e rotte informali

In sintesi, le merci continuano a attraversare i confini. Islamabad ha deliberatamente lasciato in essere le esportazioni pakistane di prodotti deperibili e alimentari verso l’Iran. Prodotti deperibili essenziali – tra cui pomodori, patate e cipolle – continuano a circolare, insieme ai tradizionali flussi di petrolio e carburante, attraverso il poroso confine lungo 909 km.

La documentazione normativa ne spiega il motivo: otto mesi fa, il Pakistan ha emanato una deroga separata relativa agli strumenti bancari, specificamente per dieci prodotti alimentari esportati via terra verso l’Iran (elencando esplicitamente riso, patate, cipolle, pomodori, carne e frutta), oltre ai prodotti farmaceutici.

La Camera di Commercio di Teheran ha confermato sabato scorso che, mentre le esportazioni iraniane verso il Pakistan sono bloccate dalla norma EIF, le importazioni dal Pakistan verso l’Iran proseguono, e il commercio informale di carburante e il commercio transfrontaliero attraverso il Baluchistan operano già per un valore stimato compreso tra 800 milioni e oltre 1 miliardo di dollari all’anno al di fuori dei canali doganali ufficiali.

Si dovrebbe prestare particolare attenzione ai porti di Gwadar e Karachi, nonché all’architettura complessiva del transito Cina-Iran. Secondo le nostre fonti, il transito di merci provenienti da paesi terzi e quello tra Cina e Iran attraverso il Pakistan rimane protetto.

A livello giuridico, un documento che descrive in dettaglio il transito delle merci attraverso il Pakistan ha stabilito sei corridoi di transito terrestri designati che collegano Gwadar, Karachi e Port Qasim a Gabd e Taftan per le merci provenienti da paesi terzi dirette in Iran, sotto la garanzia di una banca.

Inoltre, una notifica del Federal Board of Revenue dello scorso giugno ha formalmente designato la stazione ferroviaria di Taftan come stazione doganale terrestre, mentre i ministri iraniani e pakistani promuovono il corridoio ferroviario per collegare la Cina all’Iran e all’Europa.

Tuttavia, permangono due vincoli operativi molto complessi.

La modernizzazione della linea ferroviaria Quetta-Taftan è ancora ufficialmente classificata come un progetto di potenziamento; inoltre, la designazione da parte dell’OFAC, avvenuta il 1° ottobre, della Compagnia Ferroviaria della Repubblica Islamica dell’Iran (RAI) era esplicitamente volta a ostacolare il passaggio di Teheran dalle rotte marittime bloccate al trasporto ferroviario.

Per riassumere: ci vuole una maestria eccezionale per affrontare l’Impero della Pirateria. Islamabad ha messo in atto una manovra classica e ben calibrata: revocare visibilmente la deroga formale alle importazioni EIF a Taftan e Gabd–Rimdan per proteggere la sua tranche in sospeso da 1,21 miliardi di dollari del FMI e le banche pakistane dalle sanzioni secondarie del Tesoro statunitense.

E nel contempo ha mantenuto attive con Teheran le esportazioni alimentari pakistane, i canali informali di confine e gli accordi di transito con paesi terzi.

Se ciò rimarrà un breve riassetto amministrativo o si consoliderà in un punto di strozzatura più duraturo sarà deciso da tre indicatori nel corso delle prossime due settimane:

1. Una notifica modificata relativa all’EIF o al baratto da parte del Ministero del Commercio.
2. Sdoganamento separato per le merci in transito verso Gwadar/Karachi.
3. Movimenti documentati di merci lungo il collegamento ferroviario Taftan–Zahedan.

Possa questa lezione rimanere impressa nelle terre rare affinché l’intero Sud del mondo rifletta: non c’è modo di combattere l’Impero senza aggirare il suo controllo sul sistema finanziario internazionale.

Brazil’s elections: “new right” that smells like fascism, a left lost in identity politics.

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The Brazilian elections have proved fertile ground for the expression of the most common electoral stereotypes, which, by and large, are responsible for the sharp slide toward a superficial politics, barren of debate over effective solutions for our collective future, yet rich, deep down, in carnival aesthetics, more liberal or more conservative, in bitter invective, and in an exacerbated tendency toward the easy insult or even the basest personal offenses.

None of this is unfamiliar from the US, where national politics is discussed in a conservative, parochial, cramped, and backward fashion, with barricades on both sides avoiding debate on the truly divisive issues, labeled “radical”; nor is it unfamiliar from Old Europe, whose political class has lost quality to a degree that differs nothing, today, from what goes on in Brazil, Argentina, or other places marked by the submission of their leading political figures to Anglo-Zionist imperialism, to the immense power of the oligarchy, or, in the final analysis, to the need to reconcile domestic policies with the international agenda of imperialism.

As we look at a left wing caught, all too often, in individualistic, liberal identity politics — thereby diverted from the workplaces, from the factory floor, from the dramas of exploitation that underlie the deepest problems with which the majority of the population grapples — we also find a right wing that works as the other side of the coin: to the liberalism of part of the left (the liberal left) on matters of customs, the right answers with conservatism; to the left’s promises of social justice (the liberal left), the right answers with more liberalism and even “ultraliberalism.” Both end up saying very little about what really matters, focusing much of the time on side issues more closely bound to aesthetics than to essence.

Nevertheless, with a keen eye, we can always unearth what lies behind one or another piece of pamphleteering. One of the most important themes in contention today in Western societies — or Westernized ones, as is the case of Brazil, Latin America, and Latin Europe — is the tension between sovereignty and submission to Anglo-Zionist imperialism. If in Europe — in the cases of Portugal, Spain, or Italy — that tension is mediated by an already submissive EU, which tends to act as a protective layer over national tensions, then once the question of sovereignty is raised, the tendency is, one of two things: either to see it as an extension of European sovereignty, which hides the real problem, or to see it as an attempt to discuss leaving the EU, which is still regarded as taboo in broad circles of one camp or another. In Brazil, that tension lies more exposed, since there is no American Union to mediate the country’s foreign relations with the US and Israel, the great representatives of Anglo-Zionist imperialism.

And in this case, it is interesting to note that on the Bolsonaro side — from which one might expect the nationalist proposal — this does not happen, or happens only residually, because even when it does, the attempt is unmasked by the excessive support that American social networks give to Bolsonaro’s candidacy, or by the constant interference of Trump and his cronies in the Brazilian electoral process. However much the right wished to present itself as the defender of the nation and its independence, the effusive support of the US for the candidacy in question would bring the mask down, for the US — and Israel — would never support so vehemently and so openly anyone who was not subservient to them. Lula’s absence from Silicon Valley’s algorithmic command posts ends up giving away which of the two candidates is more subservient to US interests.

On Lula da Silva’s side, by contrast, the more clearly drawn proposals on the defense of sovereignty have in fact emerged — even if some of that intensity may later collide with the pragmatic dictates of realpolitik, imposed by the need to strike deals with a notoriously pro-imperialist “centrão.” Either way, this dividing line exists, and it seems scarcely credible to me that anyone in full possession of their mental faculties could choose a protégé of Trump to defend Brazil’s sovereign interests, rather than an experienced conciliator, even if not a revolutionary one.

Knowing how important this question is, afterward, for the sovereign management and use of endogenous resources and for their allocation to an independent development plan, the choice of Bolsonaro seems to me hard to defend, should the sovereign question weigh in that choice. As in the EU, the sovereignists have not found the best practices on the right either — perhaps with the exception of Viktor Orbán, who governed Hungary for sixteen years, until the April 2026 elections — but more out of a need to align with Russia and China, as a consequence of the EU’s energy and industrial choices, than out of any need to build a genuinely sovereign national project. Moreover, if further proof were needed, Orbán’s total alignment with Zionism allowed us to see that his disagreement with the EU was merely tactical, not a matter of principle or of defending national sovereignty. Orbán never for a moment renounced NATO or distanced himself from Israel and Zionism — factors he used as platforms of support against the Brussels bureaucracy. His submission to Trump, for that matter, was also explicit, and voiced with the fervor of one who saw in him “an envoy of God”!

In the case of Meloni, Babiš, and others, the question is the same: much talk, but in the end, the same alignment — which foreshadows where parties like the AfD will later turn. Faced with the fundamental questions, they too will fall in line, either with submission to Brussels or with direct submission to Zionism and US imperialism. Others, like Meloni, manage a middle path that, in the end, has the same social consequences. Where it really counts, young people keep running into unemployment, cannot find a home, watch infrastructure decay, see labor rights under relentless attack, and see their wages rapidly losing value against the brutal rise in the cost of living. There is no place where this “new right” is entrenched and seated in the halls of power where this does not happen.

Hence another important parallel persists between the Brazilian elections and what goes on in Europe and the West in general: whether in Brazil, the US, or Europe, this “new right” also uses the identity agenda as its dividing line against the left. Supposedly, the “left” — liberal, I would add — would be responsible for a decadence of customs and of cultural and religious values, for the social and moral decay of the defenders of this “woke” drift.

Now, this demarcation has served as a justification for many who once presented themselves as critics of Zionism, defenders of multipolarity, anti-imperialists, and defenders of Global South sovereignties, and who now use this supposed “wokeness” of the left to justify electing a representative of submission to imperialism like Bolsonaro. This demarcation has one problem: the only thing more “woke” than the “woke” is the one who makes wokeness the most important thing in politics, whether one is for it or against it.

On the left, many are unable to identify, in the excessively identitarian agendas, an individualistic, divisive agenda that fragments the working classes — one originating in the US itself, whose mass-manipulation services turned being “woke” (alert to social injustices) into a kind of identitarian pamphleteering. They stripped the “woke” movement of the class-based dimension and the just redistribution of wealth it once had, and gave it a panoply of identities in exchange — turning the concern with equality, social justice, and freedom, a materialist and universalist concern, into a tribalistic, individualistic concern, and, above all, one disconnected from the material dimension, that is, from the dimension of the just redistribution of the wealth produced by labor.

But on the right, when this tribalistic and individualistic drift is used as a dividing line, what genuinely distinguishes left from right is also denied. For in the historical matrix that separates left from right lies wealth: who dominates it, and how it is shared. On one side, those who hold that property and wealth must not be the measure of freedom and political initiative, and that all human beings are entitled to a life of dignity (universalism); on the other — on the right — plutocratic physiocracy: the idea that freedom and the capacity for political intervention should be measured by the wealth one has. Hence the liberal suffrages rested on a census-based — that is, identitarian — logic, in which what counted was the wealth one had, being a man, and knowing how to read and write; and were it not for the struggle, notably that of the suffragettes, to achieve what we today call “universal suffrage,” we would still be there. I suspect they, too, were accused of being “woke,” in the terms in vogue at the time!

Thus, from then on — that is, since the founding moment of the “left–right” dichotomy of the French Revolution — the right has committed itself more to the preservation of property in the hands of those who hold it, and the left more to real democracy, to economic, social, and cultural democracy, rejecting the idea that the rich must remain rich and the poor must remain poor. In a manner of speaking, this is what we call universalist progressivism, as opposed to individualist progressivism, which leans above all toward questions of individual identity.

So when this right embarks on the anti-woke logic, making this agenda the most important aspect of the political discussion — as if what really mattered were not the things that allow us to live, to sustain, feed, and enjoy our body and spirit — it does so with only one intention: to divert attention to a superficial issue, so that what is most precious to it does not enter the proposals under discussion: the just redistribution of wealth and economic, social, and cultural democracy. Thus, what matters most to it remains beyond debate, and elections turn into a carnival of little flags for and against. Whoever chooses where to vote because of someone else’s wokeness is every bit as woke as they are.

But the similarities do not end here. Another is the question of security and fighting crime: on the right, the idea is spread that crime is fought with brutal violence; on the left, it is argued that as long as there is poverty, crime cannot be eradicated. Now, it does not take much intelligence to see that the first proposal fails precisely where it is most talked about: the US. No country has more common prisoners — and few will have more political prisoners; no country spends so much on supposed crime-fighting; no developed country has so much crime. Because in the US, the breeding grounds of common crime — the Black and Latino ghettos, where desperate populations live, deprived of basic conditions of employment, education, and essential public services — remain overcrowded and ever more impoverished. But that is only the crime of the desperate, the kind that shows up on television.

Another form of crime — which also features in the right/left agenda — is the question of corruption. If this “new right” waves the banner of corruption and the left barely speaks of it, it is equally true that, once elected, this “new right” does everything except end corruption. One need look no further than Trump to find a case of incorrigible corruption. And those who remembered Bolsonarismo and expected the end of corruption were also left cursing in the desert: the Bolsonaro government was, itself, a den of corruption. Perhaps the discussion should start with the point that, to end corruption, one must end what originates it: the immense disparity in the distribution of wealth, which allows some to use their immense economic power to obtain from political power what they lack in electoral legitimacy. This crime — white-collar crime — being even more insidious and giving rise to the deep causes of the other, does not show up as often on television.

On immigration, we have perhaps the only one of the great differences between the elections in Latin America, in Brazil, and in the countries of advanced capitalism. But immigration also shows up as a form of shallow identitarianism of the right. The more the “new right” talks about “excessive immigration,” the more it forgets that those who employ these immigrants are the very same who finance and support it; that immigrants come to work in the economic sectors with the lowest wages, exploited by the most backward and conservative bosses — the social base of the radical right; and that employers only turn to immigration as a last resort, because their anti-labor agenda has left workers today unable to project a future with stability; because the young, victims of the transformation of housing into real-estate speculation, can no longer plan a future as a family; and because mothers and fathers, victims of the deregulated work schedules imposed by employers and enshrined in law by the right, have no time for their families.

Worst of all, the more they deny the necessary material conditions, the more they claim to defend the family and its values. A clear display of hypocrisy and cynicism, which denies the deep causes of the problem — a problem that affects the entire West. As they have done, it is easier to deny that the fertility crisis is intrinsically bound up with the prevailing system. Know where there was no fertility crisis? In the socialist countries of the East. Industrialized, literate, and well-fed countries, which doubled their populations in 70 years. Today, taken over by capitalism, they find themselves caught up in the same old tune of the advanced-capitalist countries. They will not get out of it until the fundamental features of an economic system change — one that not only leaves women no time to have children but also destroys family cohesion through the deregulation of work and, consequently, of life.

Now, what is most interesting about this political debate is that those who, a few years ago — those who said there was no left or right, that politicians were all the same — are now the ones telling us that salvation lies in this “new right,” and they are the ones who bristle when we tell them that this “new right” has nothing “new” about it and that, on the contrary, it reeks of classic fascism.

They are never fascists, but they submit to Zionism and the Anglo-Zionist empire; they are not fascists, but they resort to the demagogy and easy rhetoric used by classic fascism; they are not fascists, but they wave mass banners as classic fascism did; they are not fascists, but they use religion and the supposed degradation of customs to divert attention from what is essential, as classic fascism did; they are not fascists, but once in power they privatize, attack labor rights, and shut down essential public services, as classic fascism did; they are not fascists, but they attack knowledge and devalue study and individual effort, as classic fascism did; they are not fascists, but they dismiss political experience, individual and collective track records, as classic fascism did, in order to dismiss institutions; they are not fascists, but they adopt a racialist, xenophobic, supremacist, and ultra-individualist discourse, as classic fascism did; they are not fascists, but they are all anti-communist, anti-socialist, and opposed to social progress, as classic fascism was; they are not fascists, but they are backed by the oligarchy and the most backward employers, as well as by imperialism, as classic fascism was.

They are not fascists, but they smell, fly, sing, and bellow like fascists…

Call it what you will, but a “thirties” of the 21st century, armed with AI and social media? No, thank you! We can expect nothing different from those who have the same bosses and want to boss around the same employees…

Afterward, whomever you vote for, I hope you will spare me the tired old refrain of “we were fooled.”

SOURCES

Incarceration in the US — the US has the largest prison population in the world (about 2 million people) and the highest incarceration rate of any democracy; per capita (World Prison Brief / Prison Policy Initiative, 2026). https://eji.org/news/u-s-remains-world-leader-in-number-of-people-incarcerated/

Jair Bolsonaro — convicted by the Supreme Federal Court (STF) to 27 years and 3 months in prison (September 11, 2025) for attempted coup d’état, armed criminal organization, and violent abolition of the democratic rule of law; serving his sentence since November 25, 2025. https://apublica.org/especial/o-julgamento-de-jair-bolsonaro/ ; https://checamos.afp.com/doc.afp.com.A2V88ZQ

Donald Trump — convicted in May 2024 on 34 felony counts of falsifying business records; in January 2025 he received an unconditional discharge (no jail time or fine), with appeals still pending in 2026. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c4g3m95ykzko ; https://www.axios.com/2026/08/28/trump-hush-money-conviction-appeal

Viktor Orbán — Hungary is a NATO member, and Orbán was a close ally of Netanyahu and Israel; in the April 2026 elections, Péter Magyar put an end to Orbán’s 16 years in government. https://apnews.com/article/hungary-israel-euro-2024-soccer-1514e137b54b18a1fed8be8b6cd89b19 ; https://www.ynetnews.com/article/hjef3yqnbx

Suffrage — in Portugal, census-based suffrage was only abolished in 1968; women obtained a limited right to vote in 1931 and full equality only with the 1976 Constitution. https://www.europeana.eu/pt/stories/votes-for-women ; https://arquivomunicipal.lisboa.pt/fileadmin/arquivo_municipal/difusao/publicacoes/cadernos/Cad04.pdf

Origin of the term “woke” — African American English, with records from the 1920s–1940s, popularized from 2014 onward by the Black Lives Matter movement. https://www.merriam-webster.com/wordplay/woke-meaning-origin ; https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2025-09-30/how-woke-went-from-an-expression-in-black-culture-to-a-conservative-criticism

Origin of the terms “left” and “right” — the seating arrangement of deputies in the French National Constituent Assembly in 1789. https://observador.pt/opiniao/a-grande-dicotomia-o-que-ainda-separa-a-esquerda-da-direita/

Crime — the US homicide rate (≈6.4 per 100,000 inhabitants) https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/gsh/2023/GSH_2023_LAC_web.pdf

Dallo “Shanghai Spirit” alla Dichiarazione di Bishkek, questa organizzazione, che pone la sicurezza al primo posto, privilegia il pragmatismo rispetto all’ideologia.

Segue nostro Telegram.

La sicurezza prima di tutto

Il recente vertice dell’Organizzazione per la Cooperazione di Shanghai (SCO), tenutosi a Bishkek, ha segnato il venticinquesimo anniversario della nascita di quella che, nel panorama delle istituzioni internazionali, rappresenta un caso di studio particolarmente interessante. Nata dalle ceneri delle misure di fiducia sovietico-cinesi e trasformata in organizzazione a tutti gli effetti nel 2001, la SCO ha attraversato un quarto di secolo consolidando un’architettura istituzionale che oggi funziona in modo efficace: riunioni annuali del Consiglio dei Capi di Stato, incontri regolari a livello interministeriale, e una cooperazione quotidiana che si sviluppa su binari sempre più articolati.

Tuttavia, l’anniversario offre l’occasione per una riflessione che va oltre la mera celebrazione. La domanda che emerge con forza è: quale ruolo giocano i valori all’interno della SCO? E come si rapporta questa dimensione valoriale con quella, apparentemente più pragmatica, della sicurezza e della cooperazione funzionale? L’analisi dei documenti fondativi e delle dichiarazioni successive rivela una traiettoria complessa, che merita di essere esaminata in profondità.

Fin dalle sue origini, la SCO ha posto la cooperazione in materia di sicurezza come una delle sue priorità principali. Questa scelta non è casuale: la preistoria dell’organizzazione affonda le radici nelle misure di fiducia sovietico-cinesi, sia sulle questioni di confine che sugli aspetti più ampi della sicurezza reciproca. Il “Shanghai Five”, gruppo informale che precedeva la nascita ufficiale dell’SCO, aveva proprio nella gestione delle questioni di sicurezza e nella costruzione di fiducia tra i membri il suo collante principale.

Questa specializzazione originaria ha avuto conseguenze durature. Anche quando, nel corso degli anni, l’SCO ha ampliato il proprio raggio d’azione a settori sempre più diversificati, la sicurezza è rimasta il fulcro attorno al quale si è sviluppata l’intera architettura organizzativa. In un certo senso, come nota acutamente l’analisi, l’SCO può ancora essere definita un’organizzazione internazionale specializzata, focalizzata su una singola priorità principale, nonostante la sua evoluzione verso forme di cooperazione più comprensivo.

Il confronto con i BRICS, struttura di cooperazione genuinamente omnicomprensiva che opera in un’ampia gamma di campi, risulta particolarmente illuminante. Mentre i BRICS hanno sviluppato nel tempo una piattaforma valoriale sempre più articolata, con dichiarazioni che dedicano ampio spazio a questioni di valori comuni e condivisi, l’SCO ha mantenuto un approccio più marcatamente operativo e meno declamatorio sul piano assiologico.

La Carta dell’SCO: principi senza valori

Un dato particolarmente significativo emerge dall’analisi del documento fondativo dell’SCO. La Carta, firmata il 7 giugno 2002 ed entrata in vigore il 19 settembre 2003, non menziona affatto il termine “valori”. Al suo posto, troviamo un articolo dedicato, l’articolo 2, intitolato significativamente “Principi”. È su questi principi che l’SCO basa la propria attività.

Questi principi includono: rispetto reciproco per la sovranità, l’indipendenza, l’integrità territoriale e l’inviolabilità dei confini statali; non aggressione; non interferenza negli affari interni; non uso della forza nelle relazioni internazionali; uguaglianza di tutti gli Stati membri; risoluzione pacifica delle controversie tra Stati membri; non targeting dell’SCO contro altri Stati. Un principio particolarmente rivelatore è quello dell’attuazione graduale delle azioni congiunte in aree di interesse comune.

Quest’ultimo principio, quello della “phased implementation”, spiega molto del funzionamento dell’SCO e delle aspettative, talvolta eccessive, che si generano attorno alla sua attività. La delusione che talvolta accompagna il giudizio sull’organizzazione — quel “nulla accade oltre i vertici” che circola in certi ambienti — trova proprio in questo principio la sua spiegazione. Non si tratta di un difetto, ma di una scelta deliberata e costitutiva: procedere per gradi, consolidare i risultati raggiunti, evitare passi falsi.

L’assenza del termine “valori” dalla Carta dell’SCO è perfettamente spiegabile e non diminuisce affatto il livello di fiducia reciproca tra gli Stati membri. Vale la pena ricordare che, anche nel caso dei BRICS, il termine “valori” non fu una caratteristica immediata delle dichiarazioni finali, affermandosi stabilmente solo a partire dalla metà degli anni 2010. Prima di allora, il termine utilizzato per caratterizzare la coesione interna dei BRICS era, tra gli altri, proprio “principi”, esattamente come per l’SCO.

Il contesto storico e l’evoluzione del lessico valoriale

Nel 2002, il termine “valori” non era ancora politicamente di moda come lo è oggi, ed era usato piuttosto raramente nei documenti dei principali Paesi del mondo non occidentale. In quel periodo, in questi Paesi — Russia inclusa — la parola “valori” era più spesso postulata nel lessico politico in senso negativo, come “valori imposti dall’Occidente”, e quindi come qualcosa che richiedeva resistenza.

La consapevolezza che questo è un gioco che si può giocare in due, e che per rafforzare efficacemente la solidarietà tra i Paesi non occidentali era necessario formulare una propria piattaforma di valori condivisi, arrivò molto più tardi. E il lavoro per garantire che i valori non occidentali siano percepiti come comprensibili, attraenti e allo stesso tempo non banali — non semplicemente nello stile “siamo per tutte le cose buone e contro tutte le cose cattive” — continua ancora oggi, con successi alterni.

Questo ritardo nell’elaborazione di una piattaforma valoriale esplicita non significa però che l’SCO sia priva di una dimensione assiologica. Al contrario, essa esiste, ma si esprime attraverso categorie diverse da quelle del lessico valoriale occidentale: i “principi” e, soprattutto, lo “spirito”.

Un dato cronologicamente significativo emerge dall’analisi comparata dei documenti dell’SCO e dei BRICS: rispetto a un termine particolare — e alla sua rilevanza sostanziale — l’SCO ha notevolmente anticipato i BRICS. Si tratta del termine “spirito”.

Nelle dichiarazioni dei vertici annuali dei BRICS, il termine “spirito dei BRICS” e i suoi elementi costitutivi apparvero per la prima volta durante la presidenza cinese del 2017. Lo “spirito” scomparve poi dai documenti dei BRICS per diversi anni. Il termine ritornò nel 2022, ancora una volta durante la presidenza cinese. Ma successivamente, in tutte le dichiarazioni dei vertici BRICS del 2023-25, i cui progetti iniziali furono preparati da altri Paesi, il termine “spirito dei BRICS” fu costantemente presente.

Nel caso dell’SCO, invece, il termine “spirito” apparve nella primissima dichiarazione successiva al vertice di Shanghai del 15 giugno 2001, quando lo “Shanghai Five”, precedentemente esistente come raggruppamento informale, fu trasformato in un’organizzazione internazionale a tutti gli effetti. In questa dichiarazione, lo “spirito di Shanghai” fu menzionato come punto separato, caratterizzato da fiducia reciproca, beneficio reciproco, uguaglianza, consultazione reciproca, rispetto per la diversità culturale e aspirazione allo sviluppo condiviso.

È evidente che il termine “spirito” affonda le sue radici, innanzitutto, nella tradizione politica cinese contemporanea, poiché in ogni caso è apparso per la prima volta in documenti di anni in cui i vertici si tenevano in Cina. Questa è, in un certo senso, una peculiarità cinese. Detto questo, il termine “spirito”, anche se non immediatamente, si è poi stabilmente affermato nelle dichiarazioni dei BRICS; e nel caso dell’SCO, un anno dopo, nel 2002, quando il vertice si tenne non in Cina ma a San Pietroburgo, il termine “spirito” entrò nel preambolo della Carta dell’SCO.

Nella Carta, tuttavia, l’epiteto “Shanghai” scomparve in relazione allo spirito; lì si fa riferimento semplicemente allo “spirito di fiducia reciproca, beneficio reciproco, uguaglianza, consultazione reciproca, rispetto per la diversità culturale e aspirazione allo sviluppo condiviso”.

L’approccio civilizzazione e la sua evoluzione

Di particolare rilevanza per l’ideologia politica odierna è l’approccio civilizzazionale riflesso nella Dichiarazione di Shanghai del 2001. Essa notava specificamente il “rispetto reciproco e la fiducia reciproca tra Stati appartenenti a civiltà diverse e portatori di tradizioni culturali differenti”. Un anno dopo, tuttavia, la menzione delle civiltà scomparve dal preambolo della Carta dell’SCO.

Questo movimento di apparizione e scomparsa del lessico civilizzazionale è significativo. Da un lato, riflette la sensibilità cinese per le questioni di identità culturale e di diversità; dall’altro, mostra la cautela degli altri membri nell’adottare un linguaggio che potesse essere percepito come troppo marcatamente ideologico o potenzialmente divisivo.

Se esaminiamo il preambolo dell’attuale Dichiarazione di Bishkek del Consiglio dei Capi di Stato dell’SCO del 1° settembre 2026, troviamo che essa enfatizza il “fermo impegno verso gli obiettivi e i principi sanciti nella Carta dell’SCO, nonché verso il ulteriore rafforzamento del buon vicinato, dell’amicizia e dell’efficace cooperazione multilaterale”. Inoltre, questa dichiarazione impiega ancora una volta proprio il termine “spirito di Shanghai”, che è incarnato nei principi esposti nel preambolo della Carta dell’SCO.

È chiaro che, poiché gli elementi costitutivi di questo spirito dell’SCO sono fissati nel testo legale della Carta, le loro formulazioni rimangono incrollabili anche a venticinque anni di distanza. Qui sta la differenza tra lo spirito dell’SCO e lo spirito dei BRICS, dove, di anno in anno, vari elementi di questo spirito vengono aggiunti o rimossi dai Paesi che esercitano la presidenza, a seconda delle loro particolarità nazionali. E la definizione dello spirito dei BRICS risulta, ogni anno, almeno leggermente diversa.

Nel caso dell’SCO, invece, è significativo che l’epiteto “Shanghai” sia ritornato — un epiteto che, a differenza dello spirito stesso, non è legalmente fissato. Questo ritorno segnala una volontà politica di rivendicare l’eredità originaria dell’organizzazione, in un momento in cui la competizione tra potenze per la definizione dei valori globali si fa sempre più intensa.

Quanto pesa questo anniversario

Se rileggiamo passo passo le dichiarazioni dei vertici dell’SCO rivela variazioni significative nel trattamento della dimensione valoriale. L’attenzione particolare dedicata nella Dichiarazione di Bishkek all’impegno dell’SCO verso lo spirito di Shanghai e i principi dell’SCO non è particolarmente tipica delle altre dichiarazioni dei vertici degli ultimi anni.

Per esempio, nelle dichiarazioni successive ai vertici “non anniversari”, il preambolo è praticamente assente, e la descrizione della situazione internazionale e delle sfide alla sicurezza inizia fin dall’inizio. Nelle dichiarazioni emesse ad Astana nel 2024, a Delhi nel 2023 e a Mosca nel 2020, né lo “spirito di Shanghai” né semplicemente lo “spirito” sono menzionati (sebbene la dichiarazione di Mosca contenga il termine “spazio SCO”). Nelle dichiarazioni emesse a Tianjin nel 2025 (naturalmente), a Samarcanda nel 2022 e a Bishkek nel 2019, c’è una menzione dello “spirito di Shanghai”, ma essa è collocata non all’inizio del testo ma in profondità nella prima sezione.

È chiaro che il carattere specifico dell’attuale dichiarazione è spiegato dalla sua natura anniversaria; la dichiarazione emessa a Dushanbe per il precedente anniversario — il ventesimo, nel 2021 — fu composta esattamente allo stesso modo, con un lungo preambolo che menziona lo spirito di Shanghai e l’impegno verso i principi. Questo è altamente significativo: gli anniversari offrono l’occasione per un’affermazione più esplicita dell’identità valoriale dell’organizzazione, mentre nei vertici ordinari prevale un approccio più pragmatico e orientato alle questioni contingenti.

Il contributo indiano e la prospettiva dei “4 M”

In questo quadro, assume particolare interesse la prospettiva indiana sull’SCO. Le iniziative dell’India nell’Organizzazione per la Cooperazione di Shanghai si sono concentrate su questioni economiche, riflettendo il desiderio di costruire cooperazione economica con gli Stati dell’Asia Centrale al fine di migliorare il proprio posizionamento regionale e rafforzare il multilateralismo.

Secondo Anil Trigunayat, l’SCO può senza dubbio contribuire alla collaborazione regionale aderendo al principio delle “4 M”: i membri devono abbracciare il Rispetto Reciproco (Mutual Respect), l’Interesse Reciproco (Mutual Interest), la Sensibilità Reciproca (Mutual Sensitivity) e il Beneficio Reciproco (Mutual Benefit) affinché il gruppo possa emergere più forte e più rilevante.

Questa formulazione è significativa perché mostra come, dal punto di vista indiano, la dimensione valoriale dell’SCO non risieda tanto in una piattaforma ideologica esplicita, quanto in un insieme di principi operativi che guidano la cooperazione quotidiana. L’India, con la sua tradizione di non allineamento e la sua sensibilità per la sovranità nazionale, si trova naturalmente a proprio agio in un’organizzazione che privilegia i principi sui valori, e che evita di imporre una visione ideologica comune.

 Verso un prospero futuro

L’analisi della dimensione valoriale dell’SCO a venticinque anni dalla sua fondazione rivela un quadro complesso e sfumato. Da un lato, l’organizzazione non ha mai sviluppato una piattaforma valoriale esplicita paragonabile a quella dei BRICS o di altre strutture di cooperazione. Dall’altro, essa possiede una solida base di principi, sanciti nella Carta, e uno “spirito” che, pur non essendo definito in termini valoriali, costituisce un potente collante identitario.

Questa configurazione non è un caso, ma riflette la storia e la natura dell’organizzazione. Nata come strumento di costruzione di fiducia in materia di sicurezza, l’SCO ha privilegiato la concretezza dei principi operativi rispetto all’astrattezza delle dichiarazioni valoriali. La sua specializzazione funzionale, il suo carattere istituzionalizzato, e il principio della attuazione graduale hanno contribuito a mantenere l’organizzazione ancorata a una dimensione pragmatica, evitando le derive ideologiche che talvolta caratterizzano altri consessi internazionali.

Tuttavia, il ritorno dello “spirito di Shanghai” nella Dichiarazione di Bishkek, in occasione del venticinquesimo anniversario, segnala una crescente consapevolezza dell’importanza della dimensione identitaria e valoriale. In un’era di competizione globale sempre più intensa, in cui la definizione dei valori e dei principi che devono guidare l’ordine internazionale è essa stessa oggetto di contesa, l’SCO si trova a dover bilanciare la sua tradizionale prudenza con la necessità di affermare con maggiore chiarezza la propria identità.

L’analisi terminologica dei testi, e delle piattaforme valoriali che essi riflettono, non è che un tassello del quadro molto più ampio della cooperazione pratica tra i Paesi dell’SCO realizzata in questi venticinque anni. Ma è un tassello significativo, perché rivela come un’organizzazione nata per la sicurezza sia progressivamente divenuta anche un laboratorio di elaborazione di un linguaggio comune, di principi condivisi e di uno spirito collettivo. E in un mondo in cui la battaglia per la definizione dei valori globali è destinata a intensificarsi, questo laboratorio potrebbe rivelarsi più importante di quanto non appaia a prima vista.

La sfida per l’SCO, nei prossimi venticinque anni, sarà quella di preservare la propria specificità — la concretezza dei principi, la gradualità dell’azione, la centralità della sicurezza — senza rinunciare a elaborare una visione del mondo che, senza essere ideologica, sia capace di attrarre e di unire. Un compito non facile, ma che l’organizzazione ha dimostrato, in questi primi venticinque anni, di poter affrontare con successo.

par Guan Jianbin

La réunion annuelle du Club de discussion de Valdai constitue depuis longtemps une tribune importante permettant au président russe Vladimir Poutine d’expliquer la logique qui sous-tend la politique étrangère de la Russie et de faire connaître les intentions stratégiques du pays. Le «discours de Valdai» de cette année s’est révélé moins passionné et plus mesuré, alliant un récit historique de grande envergure à des limites stratégiques clairement définies.

En lisant entre les lignes des remarques soigneusement calibrées de Poutine, on peut discerner son évaluation stratégique de l’avenir des relations de la Russie avec l’Occident et de l’évolution de l’ordre géopolitique mondial — un équilibre entre la dissuasion par la force et une ambiguïté diplomatique délibérée.

Depuis la création du Club de discussion de Valdai en 2004, Poutine y a participé presque chaque année, que ce soit pour prononcer un discours, assister à un déjeuner, prendre part à une séance de questions-réponses ou participer à des tables rondes. Ses interventions sont devenues une tradition importante de la diplomatie russe et une fenêtre essentielle permettant au monde extérieur de mieux cerner sa pensée stratégique. Un examen des différents «discours de Valdai» prononcés par Poutine révèle l’évolution de la stratégie de politique étrangère de la Russie sur plus de deux décennies, retrace les contours changeants de son analyse des affaires étrangères et met en lumière la trajectoire de l’évolution de sa perception de «l’Occident».

De «l’Occident unique» aux «deux Occidents»

L’un des messages importants véhiculés par le discours de Poutine en 2026 a été la définition d’une ligne rouge claire face à la volonté de l’Occident de parvenir à la «défaite stratégique» de la Russie. Il a averti que la poursuite d’une telle défaite serait extrêmement dangereuse et pourrait faire basculer le conflit russo-ukrainien dans une phase encore plus brutale et incontrôlable. Il ne s’agissait pas simplement d’une intimidation verbale ; cela représentait la ligne rouge que Poutine a fixée pour la survie du pays.

Selon la logique des dirigeants russes, l’usure sur le champ de bataille, les sanctions prolongées et la pression géopolitique sont des coûts qu’une grande puissance peut supporter dans un affrontement stratégique. Mais la «défaite stratégique» — c’est-à-dire un changement de régime, la désintégration de l’État ou la perte de la position géopolitique de la Russie — constitue une ligne rouge intangible. En tant que puissance nucléaire, une fois que la Russie sera acculée, il n’y aura plus aucune marge de manœuvre pour faire reculer une nouvelle escalade. La position exprimée par Poutine était claire : la Russie peut accepter une impasse prolongée et supporter les sanctions et l’endiguement occidentaux, mais elle n’acceptera jamais d’être vaincue de manière totale ni contrainte à la soumission. Si l’Occident insiste pour franchir cette ligne rouge, il portera la responsabilité de toutes les conséquences catastrophiques qui s’ensuivront.

Le recours continu de Poutine au concept des «deux Occidents», qu’il avait pour la première fois mis en avant en 2022, revêt une importance particulière : il distingue les forces de l’élite néolibérale, qui poursuivent une nouvelle forme de colonialisme, de la sphère civilisationnelle occidentale traditionnelle. Lors de la réunion de Valdai en 2022, il avait affirmé qu’«il existe au moins deux Occidents différents : l’un est traditionnel, doté d’un patrimoine culturel très riche ; l’autre est agressif et néocolonial». En réitérant cette distinction, Poutine a cherché à préciser que la Russie n’est pas en guerre contre la civilisation occidentale dans son ensemble. Son opposition vise plutôt les forces qui mènent des politiques d’endiguement, d’encerclement et de coercition hégémonique. De cette manière, Moscou tente de se créer un espace diplomatique et de préserver une marge de manœuvre stratégique.

Cette déclaration visait également à contester le discours, cultivé en Occident depuis de nombreuses années, selon lequel la Russie serait «en guerre contre le monde entier». La Russie identifie soigneusement ses adversaires et limite sa confrontation aux forces hégémoniques occidentales qui prônent l’unilatéralisme et le monopole géopolitique — et non aux citoyens occidentaux ordinaires. D’une part, cette stratégie vise à diviser le camp occidental et à affaiblir le consensus interne contre la Russie. D’autre part, elle laisse la porte ouverte à un futur dialogue entre la Russie et l’Europe ainsi qu’à un éventuel apaisement des tensions russo-américaines, offrant ainsi à Moscou une plus grande souplesse dans ses calculs diplomatiques.

De «l’intégration à l’Occident» à «l’équilibre face à l’Occident»

Un examen des discours successifs de Poutine à Valdai montre clairement que, durant les premières années de son règne, la Russie a activement envoyé des signaux de coopération aux États-Unis et à l’Europe et cherché à s’intégrer au système occidental. Elle n’a pas reçu la réponse qu’elle attendait. Au contraire, elle a été confrontée à des pressions géopolitiques persistantes, à des confrontations militaires, à des sanctions économiques et à ce qu’elle percevait comme une infiltration idéologique. À mesure que les attentes russes restaient les unes après les autres insatisfaites, sa perception de l’Occident a évolué, passant de l’espoir et de la confiance à la déception, puis finalement vers un équilibre stratégique et la confrontation.

De 2004 à 2012, Poutine a accepté l’ordre international existant et a activement recherché la coopération avec l’Occident, tout en défendant la souveraineté de la Russie et son statut de grande puissance. Il s’est opposé à l’élargissement de l’OTAN, à l’ingérence de forces extérieures dans les affaires intérieures de la Russie et à la propagation des «révolutions de couleur». Il a présenté la Russie comme une puissance eurasienne, soulignant qu’elle ne souhaitait ni dépendre de l’Occident ni s’y opposer. Il cherchait plutôt à établir une relation de partenariat entre égaux, fondée sur le respect mutuel.

Dans le même temps, Poutine a insisté sur le fait que l’Europe de l’Est et les anciennes républiques soviétiques constituaient la sphère d’intérêts principale de la Russie. Il a averti que l’élargissement effréné de l’OTAN vers l’Est saperait l’architecture de sécurité européenne, a critiqué l’unilatéralisme et les deux poids deux mesures, et a remis en question la légitimité d’un système de règles dominé par l’Occident. Pour autant, la Russie n’avait nullement l’intention de servir de fer de lance à un mouvement «anti-occidental». Poutine a présenté des propositions visant à créer un espace européen commun et à développer un partenariat modernisé avec l’Occident.

De 2013 à 2017, dans un contexte de troubles en Ukraine et d’annexion de la Crimée par la Russie, l’opposition de Moscou à l’élargissement de l’OTAN est passée de la dénonciation verbale à la confrontation géopolitique. Lors du Forum de Valdai de 2013, Poutine a attribué le désordre des affaires internationales à l’arrogance institutionnelle des vainqueurs de la Guerre froide et a critiqué ce qu’il a qualifié de déclin moral de certains pays occidentaux. Dans son discours de 2016, il a réaffirmé que la Russie n’avait aucune intention de rivaliser pour l’hégémonie mondiale et a appelé à une sécurité égale et indivisible pour tous les pays. En 2017, Poutine a tiré les leçons des relations entre la Russie et l’Occident, affirmant que la plus grande erreur de la Russie avait été sa «confiance excessive» envers l’Occident, qui avait interprété cette confiance comme une faiblesse et en avait tiré parti.

De 2018 à 2021, l’ordre du jour du Forum de Valdai s’est élargi, passant du «désordre de l’Occident» à la «montée de l’Orient» et à la «transformation mondiale». Il ne s’agissait pas simplement d’un déplacement du centre de gravité géographique du monde. Cela reflétait également la tendance croissante de la Russie à considérer l’Orient comme un centre de pouvoir et un point de référence civilisationnel, tout en affirmant son identité en tant que civilisation indépendante.

À mesure que les contradictions entre la Russie et l’Occident s’intensifiaient, le ton des discours de Poutine est passé de la «recherche de la coopération» à la «reconnaissance de la confrontation et à l’établissement de lignes rouges». En 2021, il a fait valoir qu’après la fin de la Guerre froide, certains pays avaient tenté d’exclure complètement la Russie, alors même que sa puissance nationale globale n’avait pas décliné. La Russie ne se contentait plus d’accepter passivement les arrangements imposés par l’ordre international ; elle souhaitait participer à l’élaboration des règles. Poutine a déclaré sans détour que le monde unipolaire dominé par l’Occident avait pris fin, et que des notions telles que les «valeurs universelles» et un «ordre fondé sur des règles» étaient des instruments d’hégémonie. Il a proposé un «système eurasien de sécurité égalitaire et indivisible» et a souligné que la Russie ne se faisait plus d’illusions quant à son intégration à l’Occident.

Le thème de la réunion annuelle de Valdai de 2022 était «Un monde post-hégémonique : justice et sécurité pour tous». Poutine a déclaré que l’humanité traversait la décennie la plus dangereuse, la plus imprévisible et la plus lourde de conséquences depuis la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, et que le monde se trouvait à un tournant historique, dans la transition d’un ordre à un autre. Il a dénoncé l’«ordre fondé sur des règles» comme un prolongement de la pensée coloniale, arguant que l’Occident lui-même était une entité complexe et diversifiée en son sein et que le système néolibéral était entré dans une crise théorique et systémique profonde. Dans le même temps, il a réaffirmé que la Russie ne remettait pas en cause la civilisation occidentale légitime et ne cherchait pas la confrontation avec l’Occident pour elle-même. Toutes les actions de la Russie, a-t-il soutenu, étaient motivées par la nécessité de défendre son droit à la survie et au développement.

De 2023 à 2024, Poutine a déclaré que la Russie avait définitivement rompu avec sa dépendance vis-à-vis de l’Europe, accéléré son recentrage vers l’Est, reconstruit des chaînes d’approvisionnement industrielles autonomes et élargi son réseau géopolitique de partenaires. Selon l’évaluation de Moscou, la puissance globale de l’Europe était en déclin et son autonomie stratégique restait insuffisante. La Russie devait donc se tourner de plus en plus vers des plateformes de coopération émergentes telles que les BRICS et l’Organisation de coopération de Shanghai.

En 2023, puis à nouveau en 2024, Poutine a systématiquement exposé six principes régissant le nouveau type de relations internationales prôné par la Russie : la coopération ouverte ; la diversité des civilisations ; une large représentation dans la gouvernance mondiale ; une sécurité égale pour tous ; l’équité et la justice internationales ; et le respect du droit de chaque pays à choisir sa propre voie de développement. Il a également fait valoir que les sanctions, l’isolement et l’endiguement ne pourraient pas freiner le développement de la Russie et que les instruments traditionnels de l’hégémonie occidentale perdaient progressivement de leur efficacité.

Lors de la réunion de 2025, le ton de Poutine est devenu plus rationnel et plus modéré, mettant davantage l’accent sur la gestion des risques et la désescalade. Il a déclaré que la normalisation des relations entre les États-Unis et la Russie servirait les intérêts nationaux de cette dernière et que Moscou n’avait pas complètement fermé la porte au dialogue. Dans le même temps, il a averti que les livraisons européennes de missiles à longue portée à l’Ukraine ne feraient qu’accroître les risques d’escalade et ne changeraient en rien la situation sur le champ de bataille. Il a appelé l’Europe à renoncer à la confrontation entre blocs et à rétablir un équilibre sécuritaire sur l’ensemble du continent eurasien.

De «se tourner vers l’Ouest» à «se tourner vers l’Est»

Dans l’ordre international, l’Orient s’oppose à l’Occident. Depuis des siècles, la Russie est engagée dans un débat de longue haleine sur son identité civilisationnelle : est-elle occidentale ou orientale ? La Russie occupe une position géopolitique et civilisationnelle particulière. Du point de vue occidental, elle appartient à l’Orient ; du point de vue oriental, elle appartient à l’Occident. Pendant la majeure partie de son histoire, elle a oscillé entre ces deux sphères civilisationnelles.

Comme l’a écrit Surkov, ancien conseiller principal de Poutine et penseur conservateur, dans Les cent ans de solitude de la Russie :

«La Russie a passé quatre siècles à se diriger vers l’Est et quatre siècles à se diriger vers l’Ouest. Elle n’a jamais pris racine ni à l’Est ni à l’Ouest. Ces deux voies ont désormais été parcourues. La Russie doit explorer une troisième voie, une troisième civilisation, un troisième monde, une troisième Rome…»

L’attirance de la Russie pour l’Occident a constitué un projet identitaire poursuivi à travers les générations successives. L’intégration à l’Occident fut autrefois une aspiration historique chère aux Russes. Des efforts de Pierre le Grand pour «apprendre de l’Europe occidentale» aux premières tentatives de Poutine pour «se rapprocher de l’Occident», l’occidentalisation est restée un fil conducteur central du développement de la Russie. Pourtant, l’histoire a montré à maintes reprises qu’un ralliement total à l’Occident a peu de chances d’aboutir à une véritable égalité ou acceptation. À l’époque d’Eltsine, la Russie a adopté les modèles occidentaux presque dans leur intégralité, pour finalement voir son espace géopolitique progressivement restreint par l’expansion continue de l’OTAN vers l’Est.

Au cours de son premier mandat présidentiel, Poutine considérait la Russie comme faisant partie de la civilisation européenne et avait fait de «l’intégration à l’Occident» une priorité de sa politique étrangère. Il a toutefois systématiquement rejeté l’idée de remodeler le système politique russe selon les normes occidentales. Les attentes diplomatiques ayant été déçues à maintes reprises, la perception que la Russie avait de l’Occident est devenue de plus en plus négative.

Lors du Forum de Valdai de cette année, on a demandé à Poutine si l’Union européenne devait être démantelée. Sur un ton taquin, il a répondu : «Ce n’est pas nécessaire. Elle s’effondrera d’elle-même». Cette remarque reflétait l’analyse russe selon laquelle les difficultés actuelles de l’Occident n’étaient pas simplement des crises locales ou temporaires, mais la preuve d’un déclin systémique au niveau institutionnel. L’angle d’analyse de Moscou s’est élargi, passant du «déclin de la puissance américaine» au «déclin du camp occidental dans son ensemble».

Depuis le déclenchement de la crise ukrainienne, les relations entre la Russie et l’Occident sont plongées dans une atmosphère de «nouvelle guerre froide». Les deux parties se considèrent de plus en plus comme des menaces pour leur sécurité, tandis que leurs liens économiques traditionnels continuent de s’affaiblir. La Russie en est venue à reconnaître que la possibilité réaliste de s’intégrer à l’Occident a pratiquement disparu. Des termes tels que «non-occidental» et «post-occidental» ont par conséquent pris une place de plus en plus importante dans le vocabulaire politique russe.

Aujourd’hui, une réorientation stratégique globale est devenue une caractéristique déterminante de la politique étrangère russe. Dans un contexte de tensions persistantes dans les relations de la Russie avec les États-Unis et l’Europe, Moscou développe vigoureusement sa coopération avec la région Asie-Pacifique et les pays émergents. Concrètement, elle a choisi de se tourner vers l’Est après s’être heurtée à des obstacles en Occident, dans l’espoir de parvenir à un résultat diplomatique où «lorsque l’Occident n’offre pas de lumière, l’Orient le fait».

Cependant, même si le centre de gravité stratégique de la Russie se déplace vers l’Est, l’Occident reste une question que Moscou ne peut éviter. Se tourner vers l’Est ne signifie pas abandonner complètement l’Occident. Les liens géopolitiques, énergétiques et historiques entre la Russie et l’Europe continuent d’exister en tant que réalités objectives.

Les discours successifs de Poutine à Valdai donnent un aperçu de l’incertitude et des questionnements de longue date du pays quant à son identité nationale. De la «recherche d’une intégration avec l’Occident» à «l’équilibre stratégique face à l’Occident», et du «non-occidental» au «post-occidental», la quête d’identité du pays entre l’Orient et l’Occident continuera d’influencer l’évolution de l’ordre mondial.

Dans les années à venir, la stratégie hybride de la Russie en matière de politique étrangère — alliant dissuasion vis-à-vis de l’Occident et expansion vers l’Est — ainsi que sa diplomatie flexible orientée simultanément dans ces deux directions, continueront de façonner les arrangements de sécurité eurasiens et l’avènement d’un monde davantage multipolaire.

Publié à l’origine par China Beyond the Wall.
Traduction: Reseau International

A diferença entre um ateu sóbrio e um ateu New Age parece ser mais uma questão de temperamento do que de filosofia, assim como a diferença entre ateu e agnóstico no século XIX.

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Amigos estranharam a minha qualificação de Darwin como único grande cientista inequivocamente ateu, pois ele se considerava agnóstico. Eu confesso que tendo a apagar esse rótulo da minha cabeça, porque a distinção formal entre ateísmo e agnosticismo presumida por ele – a saber, que o agnóstico não sabe se Deus existe, enquanto o ateu sabe que Deus não existe – não tem correspondência na realidade, pois não tenho notícias de um único ateu famoso que pretenda provar a inexistência divina. Nem Dawkins, o ateu mais caricato da mídia, diz que isso é possível. Em Deus, um delírio, cap. 2, ele se consideram um ateu de facto, definido pelo mote: “Eu não tenho como saber com certeza, mas acho que Deus é muito improvável, e vivo segundo a premissa de que ele não existe.” Assim, se levarmos em conta a distinção tradicional, o ateu mais famoso do mundo não é ateu, mas agnóstico.

Outra figura com postura similar é a de Bertrand Russell, com sua famosa analogia do bule voador. Podemos provar que não há um bule em órbita dando voltas ao redor do planeta? Não. Mas não temos nenhum motivo para acreditar que tal bule exista. Deus é como esse bule: não dá para provar que ele não existe, mas não é razoável acreditar que exista. Por isso, Russell se considerava agnóstico na teoria e ateu na prática.

Darwin

Se o termo “agnóstico” tem serventia, é para descrever as pessoas que de fato vivem em estado de dúvida quanto à existência de Deus. Charles Darwin (1809 – 1882) era filho de pai deísta e de uma unitarista. O deísmo consiste em negar toda religião institucionalizada e afirmar que Deus existe, porém não se importa com a humanidade. Sendo um inglês do século XVIII, o pai de Darwin muito provavelmente acreditava no Grande Arquiteto de Newton e dos maçons. O unitarismo é um novo sabor do arianismo, pois nega a divindade de Jesus e tem-no como um grande reformador moral, equiparável a Sócrates. Os unitaristas tomaram Harvard no século XIX, e Newton era secretamente arianista. Podemos então dizer que Darwin não teve um lar propriamente cristão; ainda assim, ele pensou muito em ser pastor anglicano e se casou com uma cristã fervorosa. Sem dúvida, Darwin passou por crises de fé, o que fez dele um agnóstico nesse sentido que descreve o estado psicológico.

Até onde se sabe, primeira vez em que ele se descreve como agnóstico é em 1879, aos 70 anos, numa carta privada a John Fordyce. Segundo relatos, em 1881 ele afirmou a um grupo de livres pensadores que nunca abandonou o cristianismo até os quarenta anos de idade (o que seria o ano de 1849). Teria ele abandonado o cristianismo e adotado as crenças do pai e depois abandonado até mesmo ela? Não conheço a resposta, mas é uma questão vital para a trajetória científica de Darwin, pois pelos rótulos de hoje Newton seria um criacionista ou defensor do design inteligente pelos rótulos de hoje.

O depoimento mais iluminador é o da sua autobiografia, redigida entre 1876 e 1881 para a sua família. Cito James Moore em “Mito 16: Que a evolução destruiu a fé de Darwin – até que ele se converteu novamente no leito de morte”: “Não disposto a abrir mão do cristianismo, ele havia tentado ‘inventar evidências’ para confirmar os Evangelhos, o que prolongou sua indecisão. Assim como sua carreira como ministro religioso havia sofrido uma lenta ‘morte natural’, sua fé também foi mirrando gradualmente. Mas não houve retorno após o golpe de morte. Sua hesitação se cristalizou em uma convicção moral tão forte que ele não via como alguém – nem mesmo [a esposa] Emma – ‘pudesse desejar que o cristianismo fosse verdade’. Pois se fosse, ‘a linguagem pura e simples’ do Novo Testamento ‘parece mostrar que os homens que não creem, e isto incluiria meu pai, irmão e quase todos os meus amigos, serão punidos por toda a eternidade. E esta é uma doutrina maldita.’ Em anos posteriores o teísmo original evidente em As Origem das Espécies se desgastou, e agora, ‘sem crença segura e persistente na existência de um Deus pessoal ou na existência futura como retribuição e prêmio’, Darwin sentia que deveria ‘se contentar em permanecer agnóstico’.” O pai de Darwin, marco para a crise de fé, morreu em 1848, um ano antes dos quarenta anos.

Darwin não morreu indeciso; ele morreu decidido de que o cristianismo era imoral porque mandaria seus entes queridos para o inferno. Se o termo “agnosticismo” se aplica, é para estabelecer um estado de ignorância após a negação de Deus tal como as religiões abraâmicas o reconhecem. Darwin sabe que a Bíblia está errada e que seu Deus não existe. Mas o que é Deus ou qual a verdade, ele não sabe.

Por certo, o descobrir o estado final de Darwin não é suficiente para descobrir o impacto de suas cambiantes convicções religiosas sobre seu pensamento, já que a redação de A origem das espécies (1859) durou duas décadas.

A origem do termo “agnosticismo”

Entre o início da descrença de Darwin e sua primeira autodeclaração como agnóstico, passaram-se nada menos que trinta anos. Uma razão simples para ele não ter usado esse termo cedo é que ele não tinha sido inventado. Pouco se menciona isso, mas “agnosticismo” é um termo com inventor e data de nascimento: em 1869, quando Darwin tinha já 60 anos, Thomas Henry Huxley (vulgo “Buldogue de Darwin”, avô de Aldous, o escritor apologista de abertura da mente via drogas, e de Julian, o eugenista fundador do WWF e primeiro UNESCO), inventou o termo numa reunião da Sociedade Metafísica, uma sociedade algo secreta da qual só participavam membros convidados. Darwin não era membro. O supracitado Bertrand Russell tinha um parente deísta que era membro: Lord Arthur Russell, sobrinho do Conde John Russell, avô de Bertrand. Arthur Balfour, da Declaração Balfour, também era membro. Eu não podia estar lá porque eu não era nascida, mas a Enciclopédia Britânica diz que a invenção ocorreu em tais circunstâncias, então eu acredito.

Uma definição pública do agnosticismo pelo vovô Huxley foi oferecida ao público pela primeira vez em 1889, na revista Popular Science (ou Pop Science), que existe até hoje. Ei-la: “O agnosticismo, de fato, não é um credo, mas um método, cuja essência reside na rigorosa aplicação de um único princípio. Esse princípio é de grande antiguidade; é tão velho quanto Sócrates; tão velho quanto o escritor que disse ‘Examinai tudo, retende o que é bom’ [1 Tess. 5,21]; é a fundação da Reforma, que simplesmente ilustrou o axioma de que a todo homem deveria ser dada uma razão para a fé que está nele; é o grande princípio de Descartes; é o axioma fundamental da ciência moderna. Positivamente, o princípio pode ser expresso assim: Em questões intelectuais, siga a razão até onde ela lhe levar, sem se preocupar com nenhuma outra consideração. E negativamente, assim: Em questões intelectuais, não ter a pretensão de que as conclusões que não são demonstradas ou demonstráveis são certas. Isto eu tenho por fé agnóstica, que, se o homem mantiver íntegra e incorrupta, não há de se envergonhar em olhar o universo face a face, independente do que o futuro lhe reserve.”

Por essa definição, não há nenhuma relação óbvia com uma postura perante à questão da existência divina, mas o conjunto do texto deixa implícita da negativa: de cabo a rabo, Huxley diferenciar a si próprio de Comte, e o agnosticismo da Religião da Humanidade comteana. Ele precisa se diferenciar porque são iguais a descrença em um Deus abrâmico, o cientificismo e o triunfalismo à la Fim da História. As diferenças, que Comte e os positivistas eram cientistas medíocres e criaram uma igreja de estrutura inspirada no catolicismo, ao passo que os agnósticos ingleses do XIX eram brilhantes e não tinham nenhuma intenção de fundar uma igreja.

Cabe apontar o sabor unitarista da retórica, que visa a traçar uma linhagem racionalista e contestadora que surge em Sócrates, atravessa a Bíblia e chega ao seu pináculo na atualidade, destituída de sobrenaturalidade. Outra figura importante do XIX inglês que a adotava era John Stuart Mill, em Sobre a liberdade. A esposa e colaboradora dele era unitarista.

E, é claro, vemos aí a oposição – talvez, sem precedentes históricos – entre ter espírito científico e crer em Deus. Podemos dizer que o Buldogue de Darwin, durante a vida de Darwin, ostracizou o deísmo da ciência, já que a Evolução era apresentada como refutação da existência do Arquiteto newtoniano.

Questão de termos

No frigir dos ovos, Thomas Huxley era o que hoje entendemos por ateu – e provavelmente também Darwin, já que ele escolheu o termo criado pelo amigo para designar a própria posição. O engraçado é que nem mesmo Comte se dizia ateu. Ao que parece, o espírito do ateísmo e do cientificismo eram generalizados na intelectualidade do XIX, mas a disposição a assumir o rótulo se limitava a radicais como Friedrich Engels, Karl Marx (cuja dissertação, de 1841, foi sobre Demócrito e Epicuro, pais do materialismo) e Mikhail Bakunin. Provavelmente, a diferença entre os termos “ateu” e “agnóstico” naquela época se limitava à disposição de chocar a sociedade. Nem os positivistas franceses, nem os evolucionistas ingleses, queriam chocar. Já os comunistas e anarquistas queriam.

Com o tempo, no XXI, ser ateu não choca mais ninguém; nos círculos mais estudados, é a norma. Daí a disposição a enterrar o termo “agnóstico”, ou reservá-lo às pessoas que estejam num real estado de dúvida.

Outra questão semântica é o que entendemos por Deus. Há quem diga coisas como “para mim, Deus é energia” – daí a gente se pergunta se faz sentido dizer que Deus é isso que faz o meu ventilador girar e depois aparece na conta de luz. Nos Estados Unidos, um dos poucos países ocidentais no qual ainda é possível chocar dizendo-se ateu, é comum as pessoas se rotularem como “spiritual, but not religious” (espiritual, mas não religiosa), e tipicamente essas pessoas vão atrás de esoterismos – cristais, horóscopo, meditação zen, gurus tão feios quanto tarados etc. – sem aderir a nenhuma religião particular. Isso só pode ser herança do deísmo, até porque a maçonaria tem uma grande importância na formação do país e é deísta. Não à toa, esse deísmo do século XXI pode se confundir com o ateísmo, como os seus predecessores renascentistas, os libertinos. Sam Harris mesmo é um ateu adepto do New Age.

Agora, não deixa de ser uma ironia histórica que um dos inventores do termo “psicodelia” (do grego, “revelação mental”) seja neto do inventor do termo “agnosticismo”. Parece que uma parcela da humanidade não desiste de experiências extáticas e de revelações mesmo quando abandona a transcendência divina e, assim passa a procurá-la na matéria. A diferença entre um ateu sóbrio e um ateu New Age parece ser mais uma questão de temperamento do que de filosofia, assim como a diferença entre ateu e agnóstico no século XIX.

No hay forma de luchar contra el Imperio sin eludir su control sobre el sistema financiero internacional.

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Ya se ha desatado el caos a la hora de investigar qué está ocurriendo exactamente en relación con los últimos movimientos, sin duda turbios y vinculados a EE. UU., en territorio y aguas pakistaníes. Tras una evaluación inicial en Transition Protocol —que, como se reconoció, no proporcionó todas las respuestas necesarias—, profundizamos en un análisis mucho más exhaustivo respaldado por varias fuentes.

Lo que estamos observando en varios puntos clave de la conexión terrestre entre Irán y Pakistán, de extrema sensibilidad, no es un cierre total de la frontera, sino un delicado equilibrio de doble vía por parte de Islamabad entre la tremenda presión financiera de Washington y el salvavidas estratégico de Teherán.

Así que esta es la situación actual, combinando los datos contrastados con nuestras últimas consultas.

El punto clave: el detonante normativo fue una medida de sanciones bancarias, no solo la seguridad fronteriza.

Aunque los responsables provinciales de Baluchistán justificaron públicamente el sábado el cierre de dos puntos clave —Taftan y Gabd–Rimdan— alegando motivos de seguridad, lucha contra el terrorismo y lucha contra el contrabando, lo que más importa es el mecanismo exacto en torno a un memorándum emitido el viernes pasado por el Ministerio de Comercio pakistaní.

Dicho memorándum revocó de inmediato una prórroga, concedida el 3 de octubre, de la exención del Formulario Electrónico de Importación (EIF, en inglés) para mercancías importadas de Irán, y coincidió con la orden de Islamabad de cerrar el puesto de inmigración de la Agencia Federal de Investigación (FIA, en inglés) en Taftan.

Lo fundamental es que, sin la exención del EIF, los importadores pakistaníes deben tramitar las compras iraníes a través de los canales bancarios oficiales de Pakistán —lo que, por supuesto, las sanciones estadounidenses hacen absolutamente imposible.

Peyman Sanandaji, presidente de la Comisión de Transporte de la Cámara de Comercio de Teherán, confirmó oficialmente que ha sido el cumplimiento de las sanciones bancarias (el abandono del EIF) lo que ha paralizado las exportaciones iraníes a Pakistán.

El impacto inmediato en los pasos fronterizos oficiales fue considerable: están en peligro más de 4.000 toneladas de importaciones diarias de GLP iraní a través de Gabd–Rimdan. El expresidente de la Cámara de Comercio de Quetta, Ayoub Miryani, informó de que solo en Gabd–Rimdan hay más de 2.000 contenedores varados, con cientos de camiones de mercancías más atascados en Taftan.

¿Por qué está ocurriendo esto ahora? Debido a la nefasta coincidencia entre el pago del tramo del FMI del 7 de octubre que Pakistán tenía que abonar y la «Operación Economic Outcast» del Tesoro imperial estadounidense.

En el marco de la «Operación Economic Outcast», Washington dio a terceros países un «plazo definido para cerrar» las vías de suministro comerciales relacionadas con Irán o enfrentarse a la expulsión del sistema financiero estadounidense. A esto le siguieron las designaciones de la OFAC del 1 de octubre contra las redes ferroviarias terrestres e industriales de Irán y las medidas del 8 de octubre contra 17 petroleros de la «flota en la sombra».

Pero entonces, el 7 de octubre —solo nueve días antes de que el Ministerio de Comercio revocara la exención del EIF—, Islamabad llegó a un acuerdo con el FMI sobre la cuarta revisión de su Servicio Ampliado del Fondo para desbloquear 1.210 millones de dólares. Esto aún requiere la aprobación del Consejo Ejecutivo del FMI.

Por supuesto, no existe ningún documento público que demuestre una orden directa de EE. UU. o del FMI para cerrar las fronteras entre Irán y Pakistán. Pero fuentes de Islamabad subrayaron que mantener vigente una exención de instrumentos bancarios de duración indefinida antes de la votación del Consejo del FMI se había convertido en una vulnerabilidad insostenible para Pakistán en materia de sanciones.

Las fuentes de Islamabad insisten en que la medida vino acompañada de auténticas preocupaciones por el contrasabotaje y se coordinó discretamente entre Islamabad y Teherán (cursiva mía) para que la pausa no rompiera las relaciones bilaterales.

El portavoz del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores iraní, Esmaeil Baghaei, calificó públicamente la interrupción como una pausa temporal debida a «problemas técnicos» y «medidas de precaución».

Las fuentes oficiales pakistaníes, por su parte, insistieron en que el endurecimiento de los controles es una medida conjunta de lucha contra el terrorismo que refleja un «entendimiento mutuo» con Teherán tras un repunte de los atentados en Sistán-Baluchistán; las emboscadas en autopistas; y un ataque marítimo perpetrado el 11 de octubre contra embarcaciones de la Guardia Costera de Pakistán frente a Jiwani —que las autoridades pakistaníes atribuyeron a «actores extranjeros» que pretendían sabotear la mediación de Pakistán en el acuerdo de paz con Irán—.

Vuelta al mismo patrón de siempre: yihadistas salafistas utilizados como arma y manipulados por los sospechosos habituales.

La única llamada telefónica confirmada públicamente entre el viceprimer ministro Ishaq Dar y el ministro de Asuntos Exteriores Abbas Araghchi tuvo lugar el domingo 18 de octubre —dos días después del memorándum del 16 de octubre— y sus comunicados oficiales solo mencionan la diplomacia regional y la reunión de la OCI en Bagdad.

Por lo tanto, la coordinación previa a nivel de los ministros Dar y Araghchi y las detenciones específicas por sabotaje forman parte de nuestra propia información.

Exportaciones asimétricas de alimentos y rutas informales

En resumen, los productos siguen cruzando las fronteras. Islamabad ha permitido deliberadamente que sigan circulando los productos perecederos y las exportaciones alimentarias pakistaníes hacia Irán. Los productos perecederos esenciales —entre ellos, tomates, patatas y cebollas— siguen circulando, junto con los flujos tradicionales de petróleo y combustible, a través de la porosa frontera de 909 km.

El registro normativo explica el motivo: hace ocho meses, Pakistán promulgó una exención bancaria específica para diez productos alimenticios exportados a Irán por vía terrestre (en la que se enumeraban explícitamente el arroz, las patatas, las cebollas, los tomates, la carne y la fruta), además de productos farmacéuticos.

La Cámara de Comercio de Teherán confirmó el pasado sábado que, si bien las exportaciones iraníes a Pakistán se ven paralizadas por la normativa del EIF, las importaciones de Pakistán a Irán continúan, y el comercio informal de combustible y el comercio fronterizo a través de Baluchistán ya alcanzan un volumen estimado de entre 800 millones y más de 1 000 millones de dólares anuales al margen de los controles aduaneros oficiales.

Debe prestarse especial atención a los puertos de Gwadar y Karachi, así como a la arquitectura general de tránsito entre China e Irán. Según nuestras fuentes, el tránsito de terceros países y el tránsito entre China e Irán a través de Pakistán sigue estando protegido.

A nivel jurídico, un documento que detalla el tránsito de mercancías por Pakistán estableció seis corredores de tránsito terrestre designados que unen Gwadar, Karachi y Port Qasim con Gabd y Taftan para la carga de terceros países con destino a Irán bajo una garantía bancaria.

Además, una notificación de la Junta Federal de Ingresos del pasado mes de junio designó formalmente la estación de ferrocarril de Taftan como puesto aduanero terrestre, y los ministros iraníes y pakistaníes han promovido el corredor ferroviario para conectar China con Irán y Europa.

Sin embargo, siguen existiendo dos limitaciones operativas muy complicadas.
La modernización de la línea ferroviaria Quetta-Taftan sigue figurando oficialmente como una mejora prevista; y la designación por parte de la OFAC, el 1 de octubre, de la Compañía Ferroviaria de la República Islámica de Irán (RAI) tenía como objetivo explícito frenar el cambio de Teherán de las rutas marítimas bloqueadas al ferrocarril.

En resumen: se necesita una habilidad extraordinaria para enfrentarse al Imperio de la Piratería.

Islamabad ha llevado a cabo una maniobra clásica y calculada: revocar de forma visible la exención formal de importación del EIF en Taftan y Gabd-Rimdan para proteger su próximo tramo del FMI, de 1.210 millones de dólares, y a los bancos paquistaníes de las sanciones secundarias del Tesoro de EE. UU.

Y todo ello sin dejar de mantener vivas las exportaciones alimentarias paquistaníes, las vías fronterizas informales y los marcos de tránsito de terceros países con Teherán.

Que esto siga siendo un breve reajuste administrativo o se consolide en un cuello de botella más prolongado lo decidirán tres indicadores durante las próximas quince días:

1. Una notificación modificada del EIF o del trueque por parte del Ministerio de Comercio.
2. Despacho de aduanas independiente para la carga en tránsito por Gwadar/Karachi.

Movimientos de mercancías documentados a través del enlace ferroviario Taftan-Zahedan.

Que la lección quede grabada en las tierras raras para que todo el Sur Global reflexione: no hay forma de luchar contra el Imperio sin eludir su control del sistema financiero internacional.

By Tings Chak

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On Oct. 25, Brazilians will return to the polls to choose between President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Flávio Bolsonaro, son of former president Jair Bolsonaro, who was sentenced to 27 years in prison for his role in an attempted coup.

The first round gave Flávio 47.03 percent of valid votes against Lula’s 45.16 percent, revealing the enduring strength of the far right four years after its electoral defeat.

The runoff takes place as President Donald Trump seeks to restore U.S. domination over Latin America, with Brazil emerging as a consequential battleground in Washington’s campaign to contain China’s growing relations with the region.

Over the past two decades, Brazil and China have built a political partnership that has expanded the space for independent action among countries of the Global South. Under Lula and China’s President Xi Jinping, this relationship has deepened through cooperation in industrial development, infrastructure, science and technology.

The election will determine whether this project advances or Brazil’s international orientation is subordinated to Washington’s renewed Monroe Doctrine as part of the continent’s rightward shift.

Since Lula’s return to the presidency in 2023, the two governments have connected Chinese cooperation with Brazil’s development programmes, including Nova Indústria Brasil, the Growth Acceleration Programme (PAC) and the Ecological Transformation Plan. Lula’s May 2025 visit to Beijing produced 36 agreements covering infrastructure, finance, artificial intelligence, public health and industrial cooperation.

Behind these agreements is a long-standing challenge: overcoming Brazil’s dependent position in the international division of labour, where commodity exports continue to outweigh advanced industrial and technological development.

This cooperation has also reached Brazilian popular movements. Through the International Association for Popular Cooperation (Baobab), Brazil’s Landless Rural Workers’ Movement (MST) and other organisations have worked with Chinese institutions on agricultural mechanisation, bioinputs and digital technologies for family farming.

These initiatives include the Digital Family Farming and Agroecology Laboratoryand IARAA, an artificial intelligence project for agroecology and agrarian reform developed by Brazilian popular movements using Chinese open-source models.

In a countryside marked by extreme concentrations of land, machinery and capital, such cooperation offers new tools to peasant organisations fighting for agrarian reform and the production of healthy food.

Brazil’s relationship with China also reveals the different class interests at work in the country, with contradictions particularly visible in the countryside.

Massive exports of soybeans, meat and minerals have continued under both Bolsonaro and Lula, but their governments have pursued very different political relationships with Beijing.

While Jair Bolsonaro attacked China and aligned himself with Washington, Lula has sought to deepen strategic cooperation, including in industrial development, technology and agrarian reform.

Flávio Bolsonaro now promises an “economically pragmatic” relationship with China while cultivating close ties with Trump. For sectors of Brazil’s ruling classes that profit from commodity exports, continuing to sell to China while embracing Washington’s political agenda presents little contradiction. For Brazil’s efforts to rebuild its industry and develop technological sovereignty, the consequences are far greater.

Return of the Monroe Doctrine

Washington’s ambitions were made explicit in its December 2025 National Security Strategy, which announced a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, seeking to restore U.S. pre-eminence in the Western Hemisphere and deny outside powers control over strategic resources and infrastructure.

Five days later, China published its third Latin America policy paper, reaffirming sovereignty, non-interference, regional integration, technological cooperation and support for the region as a Zone of Peace. The two documents reveal fundamentally different approaches to the political future of the continent.

Brazil’s position is decisive. As Latin America’s largest economy, a founding BRICS member and a leading participant in Mercosur, it possesses industrial, scientific and political capacities that could strengthen independent development across Latin America and beyond.

The emergence of a new technological era makes this struggle particularly consequential. Brazil is among the few countries of the Global South capable of pursuing digital and technological sovereignty that could benefit its neighbours and parts of Africa.

Its roughly 23 percent share of global rare earth reserves is an important starting point, but control over minerals alone is insufficient. The greater challenge is developing the capacity to process them, manufacture advanced components and build the digital infrastructure, artificial intelligence systems and technologies that will shape future production.

Flávio has made his orientation clear. Speaking at the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in the United States in March, he offered Brazil as the “solution” to Washington’s dependence on China for critical minerals, explicitly linking rare earths to artificial intelligence and U.S. military superiority.

Chinese economic reporting has also described proposals from his team to exclude China from rare-earth supply chains. Rather than using Brazil’s resources to develop its own industrial and technological capacities, this agenda would place them at the service of U.S. technological and military power.

The same political orientation extends to digital sovereignty. In July, Flávio’s campaign submitted proposals to U.S. trade authorities that included preventing Brazil’s Pix payment system from connecting to non-Western international payment networks and loosening commitments within Mercosur.

These proposals converge with a wider U.S. campaign involving tariffs, digital regulation, strategic minerals and attempts to influence Brazil’s electoral process.

Meanwhile, Washington’s January bombing on Venezuela and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores demonstrated how far it is prepared to go to impose its will on the continent.

BRICS & the Struggle for Independent Foreign Policy

Brazil, particularly under Lula, has helped build institutions through which countries of the Global South can reduce their dependence on Western-dominated structures.

At the July 2025 BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro, the group advanced cooperation on development finance, local-currency transactions, and international institutional reform.

The New Development Bank, headed by former Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff, is an important expression of this effort.

The BRICS cannot automatically overcome economic dependency or guarantee sovereignty for working people. Yet its expansion offers greater room for independent development, provided that participating governments have the political commitment to use these possibilities.

Brazil’s history reveals how difficult that independence has been to defend. In 1961, Vice President João Goulart became the first high-ranking representative of a Latin American government to visit the People’s Republic of China, meeting Mao Zedong when revolutionary China remained diplomatically isolated and subjected to U.S. sanctions. Three years later, Goulart was overthrown in a U.S.-backed civil-military coup that inaugurated a 21-year dictatorship.

The early history of China–Brazil friendship was inseparable from struggles over national sovereignty, agrarian reform and the forces determined to suppress them.

The international material conditions for South–South cooperation are considerably more favourable today, but political direction remains decisive.

Former President Jair Bolsonaro hosted the 2019 BRICS summit in Brasília while pursuing close alignment with Washington. A government can weaken institutions from within by abandoning the commitments that give them political substance.

The far right’s resurgence also reflects the enduring power of Brazil’s own ruling classes. Bolsonarismo has a domestic base among sections of agribusiness, finance, the security apparatus, militias, conservative religious networks and major media.

These forces, whose electoral and institutional advances have continued, were strengthened by the 2016 parliamentary coup against Dilma Rousseff and the judicial persecution of Lula. They possess their own organisations, material interests and sources of power, which do not disappear when an election is lost. Their economic dependence on Chinese markets has not prevented their support for Washington’s political agenda.

Beyond the Election

Beijing has followed the Brazilian election closely, reflecting the importance of the political relationship built between Lula and Xi over years of cooperation.

In July, Xi reaffirmed China’s support for Brazil against external interference during a conversation with Lula, which also covered cooperation in artificial intelligence, satellites, mineral processing and relations between China and Mercosur.

In September, Foreign Minister Wang Yi received Lula’s adviser and former foreign minister Celso Amorim in Beijing, reaffirming the bilateral strategic partnership.

China’s principle of non-interference means that the choice of Brazil’s government belongs to the Brazilian people, but Beijing’s diplomatic restraint should not be confused with an absence of political interests or an assumption that all governments would pursue the same relationship. Chinese analysts have described the possible outlook under Flávio as one of “cold politics, hot economics”: commodity trade would likely continue, but the political relationship and cooperation in strategic sectors could deteriorate. The experience of Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency has already shown the limits of commercial interests in sustaining a broader political partnership.

For the Brazilian people, the consequences extend well beyond foreign policy. The election will also shape the struggles over labour rights, public services, agrarian reform and the defence of democratic space.

Brazil’s renewed role in South–South cooperation under Lula has opened possibilities for a development project that responds to the needs of its working people, but realising those possibilities depends on the political and social forces capable of carrying it forward.

The Brazilian people have fought through dictatorship, neoliberal restructuring, parliamentary coups and the rise of the far right to defend their political and social gains.

This election is another moment in that longer struggle, now unfolding amid renewed U.S. imperial intervention and a transformation of the world’s technological foundations. The future of China–Brazil cooperation will depend on the capacity of organised popular forces to build a sovereign national project and turn international cooperation into lasting changes in people’s lives.

Original article: consortiumnews.com

By Larry C. Johnson

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Saudi Arabia went looking for allies against Ansar Allah, and so far it has gotten statements of support. Egypt has declared its readiness to back the Kingdom, but its statement does not commit to any military involvement. Pakistan and Turkey have pledged troops under the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement signed in August, but both governments say their forces will play “a supportive rather than active combat role” against the Houthis. I have watched coalition pledges like these for decades. Cairo has not forgotten its war in Yemen in the 1960s. Islamabad has its own border with Afghanistan and a restless India to think about. Neither is going to send its soldiers into the mountains of Saada, so Riyadh will be fighting this one essentially alone.

That matters because Ansar Allah has shown it can reach the Kingdom’s economic core. In the past two weeks the Houthis have struck at Aramco facilities near Riyadh, the Shedgum gas plant in the Ghawar corridor, and the Tanajib oil facility on the Gulf coast. They hit an administrative building at Aramco’s Dhahran headquarters, the company’s historic nerve center. Now they are reportedly targeting Yanbu.

Riyadh says little about the damage, and Aramco’s chief executive insists the company’s system is intact and can be restored to its full 12 million barrels a day within days. I don’t believe it. Karl Miller, who is on the ground in the region, tells me the Saudis have suffered significant damage. That matches what we can see from the outside: a coalition that keeps announcing interceptions while fires keep burning at the targets. Repairing gas-processing trains, stabilization units and refinery components is not a matter of days. After the 2019 Abqaiq-Khurais strike, Saudi output fell by 5.7 million barrels a day, and it took about two months to recover from a single attack on an undefended site. This time the attacks are sustained and repeated, and the repair crews are working under fire.

Yanbu is the crucial target. With Iran’s navy declaring the Strait of Hormuz closed except to vessels it authorizes, Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea terminal at Yanbu, fed by the East-West Pipeline, is the Kingdom’s escape route to world markets. Flows through Hormuz fell to 11.62 million barrels a day in the week to October 13, against a baseline of 17.15 million. That bypass is already badly damaged. The East-West Pipeline is designed to carry up to 7 million barrels a day across the peninsula, pushed along by 11 pumping stations. According to my sources in the region, four of those 11 stations have been severely damaged and are not functioning. This did not come out of nowhere. In September, an attack damaged pumping facilities and knocked the pipeline largely out of service, and regional officials told the Associated Press repairs would take three to five weeks. Aramco got the line back up, and it has been hit again. A pipeline missing more than a third of its pumping stations cannot move anything close to its rated volume, however much crude is waiting in the Eastern Province.

Meanwhile Ansar Allah has seized Greater and Lesser Hanish islands and Perim inside the Bab al-Mandab, putting it astride the very sea lanes that tankers leaving Yanbu must use. Damaged production, a crippled pipeline and a contested Red Sea together mean the world loses Saudi barrels three times over: some cannot be produced, some cannot reach the coast, and what reaches the coast cannot be shipped safely.

Diesel is where this hits hardest. Diesel moves the trucks, tractors, trains and ships that carry everything else, and Europe is one of the world’s dominant diesel importers. The International Energy Agency’s October report is blunt. Middle Eastern fuel exports are below half of pre-war levels, and diesel markets “will remain tight well into 2027.” The IEA does not expect lost diesel stocks to be replenished before the second half of 2027. Diesel benchmarks topped $200 a barrel in September and remain nearly double the price of crude, which is itself around $108 for Brent, up more than 75 percent from a year ago. Ukrainian drones keep hitting Russian refineries and export terminals, so Europe’s other traditional source of middle distillates is also impaired.

So when people ask me when diesel supply returns to normal, my answer is not soon. The IEA’s timeline, which does not account for sustained damage to Saudi facilities, points to the second half of 2027 at the earliest. A real recovery is at least a year away, and probably longer.

Don’t expect the Trump-Putin diesel deal to change that. As I have argued before, the Russian barrels are a rounding error. Moscow has cleared 500,000 tons for export, roughly 3.7 million barrels, with no shipping timeline. Even if every tranche Trump announced is delivered, about 4.8 million tons in total, that comes to roughly 36 million barrels spread over months. The first 300,000 tons equals less than one day of American transport diesel demand, and the full program equals less than four. Measured against the world’s lost Middle Eastern distillate exports, it is negligible. It also depends on Russian refineries that Ukrainian drones continue to hit, and on sanctioned tankers to carry it. The deal may make for a good headline. It will not move the supply curve, and so it will not bring down the price of diesel.

Europe is already paying the political price. On Saturday, France saw its worst rioting in years. The CGT union estimated more than 500,000 people in the streets protesting the cost of gasoline, energy and food, and more than 270 were arrested. In Milan, a demonstration against wars and rising living costs ended with barricades on fire and shops looted. Protests over the cost of living have spread to Belgium and Portugal. Albania has had five straight days of violent clashes in Tirana. The immediate trigger there is anger at Prime Minister Edi Rama, but it is part of the same continental mood of people who feel their governments have stopped listening.

This is the context in which Washington is considering new strikes on Iran. The ceasefire collapsed in July and has not been rebuilt. Every round of escalation since then has raised the price of oil, and each one has given Tehran a reason to tighten its grip on Hormuz and its allies in Yemen a reason to widen their target list. Another U.S. campaign will not reopen the Strait. It will further close it. It will push diesel prices back toward their September records just as Europe heads into winter, when heating oil demand peaks.

American policymakers seem to believe the costs of this war can be exported. They cannot. Europe’s economies were already weak before the war. Factories that run on diesel-powered logistics, farmers who need diesel for the harvest, and households that heat with fuel oil cannot absorb another price spike. The riots in Paris and Milan are a warning of what a long diesel shortage does to a society. If Washington widens this war, it will be choosing to make that shortage longer and deeper, and Europe will pay the bill on its streets.

Original article: ronpaulinstitute.org

Deutschland steht vor einer sicherheitspolitischen Frage, die weit über den Krieg in der Ukraine hinausreicht: Wie viel militärische Stärke braucht das Land – und welches politische Ziel soll mit dieser Stärke eigentlich verfolgt werden?

Der frühere Brigadegeneral und langjährige militärpolitische Berater Angela Merkels, Erich Vad, stellt dabei eine Position zur Diskussion, die in Berlin inzwischen beinahe ungewöhnlich klingt. Er bestreitet nicht die Notwendigkeit von Verteidigungsfähigkeit. Im Gegenteil. Aber er warnt davor, Aufrüstung mit einer Politik dauerhafter Konfrontation gegenüber Russland gleichzusetzen. Deutschlands Interesse, so seine Argumentation, müsse vor allem darin bestehen, einen großen Krieg in Europa zu verhindern und deshalb die politischen Gesprächskanäle nach Moskau wieder ernsthaft zu öffnen.

Gerade dieser Unterschied ist entscheidend. Ein Staat kann militärisch stark sein und dennoch Diplomatie betreiben. Er kann seine Verteidigungsfähigkeit erhöhen, ohne daraus die politische Doktrin abzuleiten, dass Sicherheit nur noch gegen einen bestimmten Gegner organisiert werden könne. Genau darin liegt der Kern der von Vad geforderten Neuorientierung: Deutschland müsse seine eigenen Interessen definieren, statt sich immer tiefer in eine Eskalationslogik hineinziehen zu lassen, deren Endpunkt niemand seriös benennen kann.

Vad verweist dabei ausdrücklich auf deutsche historische Erfahrungen. Das ist keineswegs nostalgische Rückschau. Konrad Adenauer war alles andere als ein russlandfreundlicher Romantiker. Er band die junge Bundesrepublik fest an den Westen, setzte auf NATO-Mitgliedschaft und transatlantische Partnerschaft. Und dennoch reiste derselbe Adenauer 1955 nach Moskau. Die Verhandlungen waren hart, die politischen Gegensätze fundamental, und doch nahmen die Bundesrepublik und die Sowjetunion diplomatische Beziehungen auf. Zugleich erreichte die deutsche Delegation die Zusage zur Heimkehr Tausender noch in sowjetischem Gewahrsam befindlicher Deutscher.

Gerade dieser Vorgang zeigt, wie verkürzt die heutige Vorstellung ist, Dialog sei automatisch ein Zeichen von Schwäche.

Adenauer hatte wenige Monate zuvor die Westbindung der Bundesrepublik institutionell gefestigt. Trotzdem behandelte er den Gesprächskanal nach Moskau nicht als Verrat am eigenen Bündnis, sondern als Teil verantwortlicher deutscher Außenpolitik. Stärke und Verständigung waren für ihn keine Gegensätze.

Noch deutlicher wurde diese Logik später unter Willy Brandt. Die neue Ostpolitik entstand nicht aus der Illusion, alle Konflikte mit der Sowjetunion seien verschwunden. Sie entstand gerade deshalb, weil sie existierten. Brandt und Egon Bahr gingen davon aus, dass dauerhafte Blockkonfrontation Europa nicht sicherer machte und dass Veränderung nur durch Kontakte, Verhandlungen und schrittweise Entspannung möglich war. Die Bundesregierung setzte auf Gewaltverzicht, geregelte Beziehungen und politische Kommunikation über die Blockgrenzen hinweg. Der Bundestag erinnert bis heute daran, dass die Ostpolitik ausdrücklich darauf zielte, die starre Konfrontation zwischen Ost und West aufzubrechen.

Man muss diese Politik nicht idealisieren, um ihre strategische Bedeutung zu erkennen. Weder Adenauer noch Brandt bauten ihre Außenpolitik auf Vertrauen im naiven Sinn. Sie handelten aus Interessen. Sie wussten, dass Deutschland geografisch in der Mitte Europas lag und dass eine stabile Friedensordnung auf diesem Kontinent nicht allein durch militärische Abschreckung geschaffen werden konnte.

Genau hier setzt Vads Kritik am heutigen Kurs an. Dass Außenminister Johann Wadephul erklärt, Deutschland sei grundsätzlich weiterhin offen für Gespräche mit Russland, reicht aus seiner Sicht nicht. Das jüngste Treffen Wadephuls mit Sergej Lawrow bezeichnete er als eine Art widerwillige Pflichtübung. Formale Gesprächsbereitschaft ersetzt eben keine Diplomatie, wenn beide Seiten im Grunde nur noch ihre bekannten Positionen vortragen und anschließend auseinandergehen.

Das Problem ist größer. In Deutschland hat sich seit Beginn des Ukraine-Krieges ein politisches Verständnis etabliert, in dem militärische Stärke und politische Härte immer stärker miteinander verschmelzen. Wer mehr Verteidigungsfähigkeit fordert, landet fast automatisch bei der Forderung nach noch härterer Konfrontation mit Moskau. Wer für Verhandlungen plädiert, gerät umgekehrt schnell unter Rechtfertigungsdruck, als müsse Diplomatie zwangsläufig Kapitulation bedeuten.

Historisch war deutsche Außenpolitik gerade dann erfolgreich, wenn sie solche falschen Gegensätze vermied. Adenauer konnte NATO-Kanzler sein und nach Moskau fahren. Brandt konnte fest im westlichen Bündnis verankert bleiben und gleichzeitig eine Politik der Entspannung beginnen. Das eine schloss das andere nicht aus.

Auch heute müsste eine eigenständigere deutsche Politik nicht bedeuten, auf Verteidigungsfähigkeit zu verzichten. Vad fordert das ausdrücklich nicht. Sein Argument ist vielmehr, dass Aufrüstung ohne politische Strategie am Ende selbst zum Risiko werden kann. Wenn jede Seite nur noch militärisch denkt, jede Bewegung des Gegners als Vorbereitung auf den nächsten Angriff interpretiert und Gesprächskanäle verkümmern lässt, entsteht Sicherheit irgendwann nur noch auf dem Papier.

Deutschland hat dabei besondere Interessen. Ein großer europäischer Krieg würde nicht in Washington geführt. Wie Vad zugespitzt formuliert, würde in den Vereinigten Staaten dabei keine Fensterscheibe zu Bruch gehen. Deutschland dagegen läge mitten im Zentrum einer solchen Eskalation. Es wäre logistischer Knotenpunkt, wirtschaftlicher Hauptbetroffener und im Ernstfall selbst Kriegsschauplatz. Genau deshalb müsste Berlin ein größeres Interesse an Deeskalation haben als weit entfernte Mächte, die ihre eigenen geopolitischen und wirtschaftlichen Ziele verfolgen.

Das bedeutet auch, die amerikanische Politik nüchtern zu betrachten. Vad beschreibt Trumps Außenpolitik als „doppelzüngig“ und weist darauf hin, dass Washington keineswegs ausschließlich das Ende des Krieges im Blick habe. Die USA verfolgen gegenüber Russland, China und der Ukraine eigene strategische und wirtschaftliche Interessen. Für eine deutsche Politik wäre es daher fahrlässig, die eigenen Sicherheitsinteressen einfach mit denen Washingtons gleichzusetzen.

Die eigentliche Frage lautet deshalb nicht, ob Deutschland stark oder schwach sein soll. Natürlich braucht ein souveräner Staat Streitkräfte, die zur Verteidigung fähig sind. Die Frage lautet vielmehr, wofür diese Stärke eingesetzt wird.

Dient sie dazu, politische Handlungsspielräume zu schaffen und aus einer Position der Sicherheit heraus wieder verhandeln zu können? Oder wird sie selbst zum Ersatz für Politik?

Die Geschichte der Bundesrepublik liefert zumindest genügend Beispiele dafür, dass militärische Einbindung in den Westen und Verständigung mit Moskau gleichzeitig möglich waren.

Gerade verantwortliche deutsche Politiker des Kalten Krieges wussten, dass man sich seine Gesprächspartner nicht aussuchen kann. Diplomatie beginnt nicht dort, wo ohnehin Einigkeit herrscht. Sie wird dort notwendig, wo Interessen aufeinanderprallen.

Eine künftige europäische Sicherheitsordnung wird deshalb auf Dauer kaum stabil sein, wenn sie ausschließlich auf Abschreckung und gegenseitiger Isolation beruht. Sie muss die Sicherheitsinteressen aller beteiligten Staaten berücksichtigen, ohne deren politische Systeme oder Entscheidungen deshalb gutzuheißen.

Das wäre keine Rückkehr zu irgendeiner romantisierten Vergangenheit und auch kein Verzicht auf deutsche Stärke. Es wäre vielmehr die Rückkehr zu einem Prinzip, das Adenauer, Brandt und andere deutsche Staatsmänner in sehr unterschiedlichen historischen Situationen verstanden haben: Sicherheit in Europa entsteht langfristig nicht dadurch, dass man Russland aus Europa hinausdefiniert.

Sie entsteht durch eine Ordnung, in der Verteidigungsfähigkeit und Diplomatie einander ergänzen – und in der Sicherheit gemeinsam organisiert wird, nicht dauerhaft gegeneinander.