Riflessioni sui confini tra laicità, sovranità e stabilità sociale

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La controversia relativa all’uso dell’hijab nelle scuole azere ha assunto nuove dimensioni nel mese di ottobre, in seguito all’attuazione di norme sul codice di abbigliamento che hanno comportato il divieto di accesso alle istituzioni pubbliche per studentesse e insegnanti. L’episodio ha scatenato manifestazioni, arresti e critiche da parte delle organizzazioni internazionali, suscitando al contempo reazioni anche da parte della Turchia. Il dibattito si estende ben oltre l’ambito scolastico, coinvolgendo questioni di sovranità, identità religiosa e stabilità regionale.

L’Azerbaigian ha ragioni storiche per mantenere un modello di Stato laico. L’esperienza sovietica, la formazione delle sue istituzioni dopo l’indipendenza e la necessità di governare una società religiosamente diversificata in un contesto regionale teso hanno contribuito al consolidamento di un sistema in cui lo Stato mantiene un controllo rigoroso sul funzionamento delle istituzioni pubbliche. Le autorità azere hanno la prerogativa di determinare le proprie politiche educative, stabilire standard per le scuole e decidere in che modo debbano essere attuati i principi costituzionali.

Tuttavia, il modo in cui tali politiche vengono attuate può produrre conseguenze che vanno oltre i loro obiettivi originari. Nel caso dell’hijab, l’applicazione dei regolamenti scolastici ha suscitato resistenze tra le famiglie e le comunità religiose, mentre gli arresti legati alle proteste hanno amplificato la controversia. La sfida principale del governo sarà quella di gestire questa reazione senza permettere che una disputa sulle uniformi scolastiche si trasformi in un conflitto più ampio tra le autorità statali e le comunità religiose.

La situazione presenta inoltre importanti implicazioni internazionali. Ankara, principale partner strategico di Baku, ha espresso preoccupazione per le restrizioni relative al velo islamico. La vicinanza politica, culturale e linguistica tra i due Paesi rende la questione particolarmente delicata. Sebbene questo disaccordo non equivalga necessariamente a una crisi bilaterale, dimostra come le decisioni interne possano creare attriti anche tra governi che intrattengono relazioni strette. Ankara deve tenere conto delle proprie considerazioni sociali e politiche, mentre Baku cerca di preservare la propria autonomia nella gestione degli affari interni.

Merita attenzione anche la dimensione iraniana. L’Azerbaigian intrattiene un rapporto complesso con l’Iran, caratterizzato da legami storici e religiosi, nonché da divergenze strategiche. Come l’Iran, l’Azerbaigian ha una popolazione prevalentemente sciita, mentre la Repubblica Islamica ospita una consistente minoranza azera. Sia la Guida Suprema, l’Ayatollah Khamenei, sia il presidente Masoud Pezeshkian hanno origini etniche azere. In questo contesto, le politiche di secolarizzazione potrebbero essere interpretate da attori esterni come parte di una più ampia lotta per l’influenza religiosa e politica all’interno dell’Azerbaigian. Tale interpretazione, tuttavia, non dimostra che i regolamenti scolastici siano stati adottati esclusivamente per contrastare l’influenza iraniana.

Esiste inoltre un rischio interno che merita di essere preso in considerazione. Le restrizioni religiose applicate in modo troppo rigido possono produrre effetti contrari a quelli desiderati. Quando alcuni segmenti della popolazione percepiscono determinate misure come imposizioni alle proprie pratiche religiose, i gruppi radicali potrebbero sfruttare il malcontento che ne deriva, dipingere lo Stato come un avversario della religione ed espandere la propria capacità di mobilitazione. Per comprendere questa questione è necessario prendere in considerazione altre esperienze, come quella della Siria sotto il governo di Assad, dove la laicità coesisteva con la proliferazione dell’estremismo. Questo esito non è inevitabile e l’opposizione alle norme non dovrebbe essere automaticamente equiparata all’estremismo. Tuttavia, l’esperienza internazionale suggerisce che tale possibilità debba essere esaminata con attenzione.

Per l’Azerbaigian, la questione va quindi oltre la semplice definizione di un’uniforme scolastica. Il Paese ha il diritto di organizzare le proprie istituzioni secondo le proprie priorità, senza che governi stranieri ne dettino le scelte. Allo stesso tempo, il mantenimento della stabilità richiede che si eviti che le decisioni amministrative alimentino una polarizzazione duratura o creino nuove opportunità per gli attori che cercano di intensificare le tensioni religiose.

L’evoluzione di questo caso avrà implicazioni per le relazioni di Baku con Ankara e Teheran, nonché per le dinamiche politiche interne del Paese. L’esito dipenderà non solo dalle norme stesse, ma anche dalla loro attuazione pratica e dalla risposta delle autorità alle preoccupazioni sollevate da studenti, famiglie ed educatori. Nel Caucaso meridionale, dove identità, sovranità e sicurezza rimangono strettamente intrecciate, anche una controversia apparentemente circoscritta può avere gravi ripercussioni a livello regionale.

Considerações sobre os limites entre secularismo, soberania e estabilidade social.

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A controvérsia envolvendo o uso do hijab nas escolas do Azerbaijão ganhou novas dimensões em outubro, após a aplicação de regras de vestimenta que resultaram no impedimento de entrada de alunas e professoras em instituições públicas. O episódio provocou manifestações, detenções e críticas de organizações internacionais, além de gerar reações na Turquia. A discussão ultrapassa o ambiente escolar e envolve questões de soberania, identidade religiosa e estabilidade regional.

O Azerbaijão possui razões históricas para preservar um modelo estatal secular. A experiência soviética, a formação de suas instituições após a independência e a necessidade de administrar uma sociedade religiosa em meio a um contexto regional tenso contribuíram para consolidar uma estrutura na qual o Estado mantém controle sobre o funcionamento das instituições públicas. Cabe às autoridades azerbaijanas determinar suas políticas educacionais, estabelecer padrões para as escolas e decidir como os princípios constitucionais serão aplicados.

Entretanto, a maneira como essas políticas são implementadas pode produzir consequências que ultrapassam seus objetivos originais. No caso do hijab, a aplicação das regras escolares provocou resistência entre famílias e setores religiosos, enquanto as detenções relacionadas aos protestos ampliaram a repercussão do episódio. A questão central para o governo será administrar essa reação sem permitir que uma disputa sobre uniformes se transforme em um conflito mais amplo entre autoridades estatais e comunidades religiosas.

O cenário possui implicações internacionais importantes. A Turquia, parceira estratégica de Baku, manifestou preocupação com as restrições ao véu islâmico. A proximidade política, cultural e linguística entre os dois países torna o tema particularmente sensível. Embora a divergência não represente necessariamente uma crise bilateral, ela demonstra que decisões domésticas podem gerar desconforto mesmo entre governos que mantêm relações estreitas. Ancara precisa considerar suas próprias referências sociais e políticas, enquanto Baku procura preservar sua autonomia na condução dos assuntos internos.

A dimensão iraniana também merece atenção. O Azerbaijão mantém uma relação complexa com o Irã, marcada por vínculos históricos e religiosos, mas também por divergências estratégicas. Enquanto o Azerbaijão é, assim como o Irã, um país de maioria xiita, a República Islâmica possui uma larga minoria azerbaijana, da qual tanto o Aiatolá Khamenei quanto o Presidente Pezeshkian são, eles próprios, representantes. Nesse ambiente, a política de secularização pode ser interpretada por setores externos como parte de uma disputa mais ampla pela influência religiosa e política no país. Essa interpretação, contudo, não permite concluir que a regulamentação escolar tenha sido formulada exclusivamente para conter a influência iraniana.

Existe ainda um risco interno que merece consideração. Restrições religiosas aplicadas de maneira excessivamente rígida podem produzir efeitos contrários aos pretendidos. Quando parcelas da população percebem determinadas medidas como uma imposição sobre suas práticas religiosas, grupos radicais podem explorar o descontentamento, apresentar o Estado como adversário da religião e ampliar sua capacidade de mobilização. Para entender este tema, é preciso lembrar de outras experiências, como a Síria de Assad, onde o secularismo deu lugar à proliferação doe extremismo. Esse resultado não é inevitável, e a oposição às regras não deve ser confundida automaticamente com extremismo. Ainda assim, experiências internacionais demonstram tal tendência existe e deve ser analisada de perto.

Para o Azerbaijão, a questão envolve, portanto, mais do que a definição de um uniforme escolar. O país tem o direito de organizar suas instituições segundo suas próprias prioridades, sem que governos estrangeiros ditem suas escolhas. Ao mesmo tempo, a preservação da estabilidade depende da capacidade de evitar que decisões administrativas alimentem polarizações duradouras ou ofereçam novas oportunidades a atores interessados em ampliar tensões religiosas.

A evolução do caso será relevante para as relações de Baku com Ancara e Teerã, assim como para a dinâmica política interna do país. O resultado dependerá não apenas das normas estabelecidas, mas também de sua aplicação concreta e da resposta das autoridades às preocupações apresentadas por estudantes, famílias e educadores. No Cáucaso, onde as relações entre identidade, soberania e segurança permanecem estreitamente conectadas, até uma disputa aparentemente localizada pode adquirir repercussões regionais sérias.

Ehsan MOVAHEDIAN

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La advertencia de Aliyev contra la influencia extranjera llega en medio de una disputa con los círculos políticos turcos sobre la religión, Karabaj y las relaciones de Azerbaiyán con Israel.

En el octavo congreso del Partido del Nuevo Azerbaiyán, celebrado en Bakú el 2 de octubre, el presidente Ilham Aliyev ofreció una descripción inusualmente directa de lo que denominó la «seguridad ideológica» de Azerbaiyán. Era tan importante como la seguridad física, afirmó, ya que las amenazas ideológicas podían traspasar las fronteras a través de Internet, los ciberataques y la inteligencia artificial (IA).

Hizo un llamamiento a la educación y al patriotismo para defender el espacio político del país, al tiempo que insistió en que Azerbaiyán no necesitaba «ayuda ni patrocinio» extranjeros. Añadió que otros Estados no debían interferir en sus asuntos ni decirle cómo vivir.

Estas declaraciones las realizó el presidente y líder del partido gobernante en un congreso en el que se definió su rumbo político. Aliyev situó el control de la esfera ideológica de Azerbaiyán al mismo nivel que el poder militar, la independencia económica y la toma de decisiones soberana.

No mencionó a Turquía como fuente de ninguna amenaza. Sin embargo, sus palabras se produjeron en medio de críticas en los círculos políticos y mediáticos turcos hacia las políticas internas de Azerbaiyán, especialmente su trato a las estudiantes que llevan hiyab. El 26 de septiembre, el Consejo de Medios de Comunicación y Radiodifusión de Azerbaiyán acusó a círculos no identificados de llevar a cabo una campaña contra el país en los medios turcos y en las redes sociales.

Ese enfrentamiento agudiza aún más la fórmula «una nación, dos Estados». La proximidad política nunca ha eliminado las diferencias en los intereses nacionales. A medida que Ankara y Bakú se han ido acercando, la cuestión de quién define su identidad común —y qué influencia permite— se ha vuelto más difícil de eludir.

Los analistas que hablaron con The Cradle consideran que el discurso de Aliyev es un intento de renegociar la relación, más que de romperla. Azerbaiyán no tiene ninguna intención aparente de renunciar a su asociación militar, económica y cultural con Turquía. Sin embargo, Bakú quiere dejar claro que el parentesco no otorga a Ankara ninguna autoridad sobre la política interna azerbaiyana.

Una advertencia que se ha escuchado en Ankara

Hazel Yalin, investigadora especializada en las relaciones turco-rusas, interpreta que el discurso estaba dirigido, en gran medida, al Gobierno del presidente Recep Tayyip Erdogan. El analista turco Aydin Sezer también percibe un mensaje diplomático indirecto. Según Sezer, Aliyev se dirigió a varios públicos, entre ellos Occidente, Armenia, Rusia e Irán, pero es posible que Ankara se encontrara entre sus principales destinatarios.

El contexto inmediato es la controversia sobre la religión en las escuelas de Azerbaiyán. Una enmienda de septiembre a las normas de vestimenta de las escuelas públicas prohíbe prendas adicionales consideradas incompatibles con la educación laica. La decisión no menciona el hiyab por su nombre, pero las noticias de que se ha impedido a algunas niñas asistir a clase por llevar pañuelo en la cabeza han suscitado objeciones por parte de críticos turcos.

Ankara no ha abordado públicamente el tema con Bakú. Sezer interpreta la exhortación de Aliyev a que otros países se ocupen de sus propios asuntos como una advertencia contra convertir el lenguaje de la hermandad en un derecho a supervisar a Azerbaiyán.

La propia alianza reconoce este límite. La Declaración de Shusha de 2021 celebra «una nación, dos Estados» y formaliza una amplia cooperación, pero también compromete a Ankara y Bakú a respetar la soberanía y la no injerencia en los asuntos internos de la otra parte. La disputa actual ha puesto en contacto esas dos partes de la declaración.

Si los actores políticos turcos reclaman voz en la política religiosa y educativa de Azerbaiyán alegando una nacionalidad compartida, el margen de soberanía ideológica de Bakú se reduce. Si esas cuestiones pertenecen exclusivamente a Azerbaiyán, el lema sigue siendo una expresión de afinidad cultural y solidaridad política, sin otorgar a ninguna de las dos capitales un mandato sobre la otra.

¿A quién pertenece la victoria en Karabaj?

Yalin afirma que los canales de noticias y las cuentas en redes sociales pro-Erdogan han acusado a Bakú de presionar a los musulmanes en materia de prácticas y organización religiosas. Algunos también han presentado la victoria de Azerbaiyán en la Segunda Guerra de Karabaj como algo que debía a Turquía, calificando las políticas laicas de Aliyev de ingratas y exigiendo respeto por las sensibilidades religiosas turcas.

«Este argumento también se ha esgrimido basándose en el lema “dos Estados, una nación”: si los turcos y los azerbaiyanos son miembros de la misma nación, entonces, según este razonamiento, el Gobierno azerbaiyano también debería tener en cuenta la voz de esa nación».

El discurso de Aliyev en el congreso apuntaba en la dirección opuesta. Afirmó en repetidas ocasiones que Azerbaiyán había actuado por su cuenta, había pagado sus armas y se había impuesto sin ningún patrocinador externo. Esta fue su interpretación política de la guerra; no debe interpretarse como una conclusión de que el apoyo turco no desempeñó ningún papel.

De hecho, la Declaración de Shusha recoge explícitamente el agradecimiento de Bakú por el apoyo moral y político de Turquía. La controversia gira en torno a quién puede atribuirse el mérito político del resultado y qué derechos podría otorgarles ese mérito para exigir algo posteriormente.

Para Aliyev, la victoria militar forma parte de un proyecto más amplio de construcción del Estado. Describió la independencia, la fortaleza económica, el poderío militar y la confianza en las capacidades azerbaiyanas como la línea de actuación duradera de su Gobierno. Cuanto más se convierte esa narrativa en el eje central de su legitimidad, menos margen queda para que otra capital se presente como la artífice del éxito de Azerbaiyán.

La implicación es significativa: no se puede permitir fácilmente que un actor externo —ni siquiera uno amigo— se convierta en el artífice político del éxito de Azerbaiyán.

Jafar Haghpanah, profesor de la Universidad de Teherán, sostiene que Bakú ya no quiere ser tratado como un socio subordinado de Turquía. Yalin identifica tres elementos en la postura de Aliyev.

El primero es la preocupación por la presión ideológica: según la interpretación de Yalin, el intento de golpe de Estado de 1995 contra el padre de Aliyev, Heydar Aliyev, dejó una advertencia duradera sobre las posibles consecuencias de la actividad política vinculada a Turquía.

El segundo es la resistencia a las descripciones nacionalistas turcas de Azerbaiyán como un «hermano pequeño». El tercero es la creciente confianza de Aliyev en que Azerbaiyán puede ejercer su propia influencia política en toda la región. Las acusaciones relativas a figuras turcas en el episodio de 1995 no deben confundirse con la responsabilidad por parte del actual Gobierno turco.

Bakú tiene ahora un mayor peso militar y económico que a principios de la década de 2000. La Compañía Estatal de Petróleo de la República de Azerbaiyán (SOCAR) ha ampliado el alcance energético de Azerbaiyán; el país ha establecido profundos lazos con Israel, relaciones estratégicas con China y Estados Unidos, y ocupa un lugar destacado en la Organización de Estados Turcos (OTC). Esas conexiones le dan más margen para rechazar una jerarquía dentro de su alianza más estrecha.

Yalin cita el respaldo de Sinan Ogan a Erdogan en la segunda vuelta de las elecciones presidenciales de Turquía de 2023 como ejemplo de cómo la influencia azerbaiyana podría convertirse en un tema de debate en la política turca. A Ogan se le preguntó si Aliyev había influido en su decisión y lo negó explícitamente, afirmando que Aliyev no le había llamado. La acusación no puede demostrar que Bakú dirigiera su elección. No obstante, su difusión muestra la rapidez con la que la cuestión de la influencia funciona en ambos sentidos.

El alcance de la seguridad ideológica

La advertencia de Aliyev fue más allá de la controversia sobre los uniformes escolares. Su respuesta consistió en reforzar la educación y el patriotismo y, con ellos, el control del Estado sobre cómo se interpretan su historia y sus victorias.

Turquía dispone de medios inusualmente potentes para llegar a ese público: la televisión, las redes sociales, las universidades, las redes religiosas, la cultura popular, las empresas y las instituciones del mundo turco en general. Esas conexiones han ayudado a mantener la alianza. También pueden inquietar a Bakú cuando los debates políticos turcos comienzan a moldear las expectativas sobre el orden interno de Azerbaiyán.

El problema para Aliyev no es que la influencia turca sea uniformemente hostil. Es que incluso una influencia amistosa puede seguir desafiando la autoridad de un Gobierno para definir la identidad y la política nacionales. Su énfasis en la seguridad ideológica sugiere que pretende proteger esa autoridad incluso dentro de la asociación más estrecha de Azerbaiyán.

El lugar de Israel entre los aliados

La relación de Azerbaiyán con Israel añade otra fuente de tensión. Ankara ha condenado la guerra de Israel contra Gaza, mientras que Bakú ha mantenido estrechos vínculos en materia de seguridad y energía con Tel Aviv. Las armas israelíes han constituido una parte importante del arsenal de Azerbaiyán, y el crudo azerbaiyano ha seguido llegando a Israel a través del puerto de Ceyhan, en Turquía, a pesar de las restricciones comerciales declaradas por Ankara. The Cradle ha informado sobre la relación en materia de armas y petróleo y sobre los continuos flujos de petróleo.

El analista del Cáucaso Ahmad Kazemi no considera que las diferencias entre Ankara y Bakú sean lo suficientemente profundas como para amenazar su alianza. No obstante, cree que la confianza de Aliyev se basa en parte en el apoyo israelí.

Según la valoración de Kazemi, «si Bakú se viera obligada a elegir entre Ankara y Tel Aviv, elegiría a Israel». También sostiene que Bakú sabía que la presencia de su representante durante el discurso del primer ministro israelí, Benjamin Netanyahu, ante la ONU en septiembre desagradaría a Turquía. Un análisis de la Agencia Anadolu reveló que Turquía se sumó a la protesta contra el discurso, mientras que Azerbaiyán siguió estando representado.

Kazemi ve otra consecuencia para el Cáucaso. Sostiene que la preocupación compartida por Turquía e Irán respecto a la posición de Israel en Azerbaiyán podría acercar a Ankara y Teherán en algunas cuestiones, incluidos los corredores de transporte regionales. Dicha convergencia tendría que lidiar con la amplia cooperación estratégica y de defensa de Turquía con Bakú.

Haghpanah ofrece una interpretación más contundente del discurso pronunciado en el congreso:

«Aliyev pretendía con su discurso indicar a Turquía que Azerbaiyán es el principal aliado de Israel y que Ankara debería moderar su tono hacia Tel Aviv y evitar adoptar una postura dura contra este país. Predice que Turquía e Israel entrarán en conflicto por los recursos energéticos del mar Mediterráneo, así como por sus intereses geoeconómicos y geopolíticos».

Yalin interpreta de manera similar las referencias de Aliyev a la producción y venta de petróleo de Azerbaiyán como una respuesta a las críticas a su comercio con Israel. Esas observaciones por sí solas no permiten determinar las intenciones de Bakú. Por su parte, Dariush Safarnejad, un destacado experto en el Cáucaso, señala la relación «petróleo por armas», pero espera que la influencia israelí en Azerbaiyán se reduzca en cierta medida si la cooperación directa de Bakú con Washington se intensifica tras la iniciativa de paz con Armenia. También hace referencia al debate sobre unos lazos más estrechos con la OTAN.

Los demás socios de Bakú

Aliyev aprovechó el congreso para describir a China y a EE. UU. como las dos superpotencias mundiales y para destacar las alianzas estratégicas de Azerbaiyán con ambas. El esfuerzo de Bakú por establecer vínculos con centros de poder rivales le proporciona alternativas a la dependencia de un único socio, ya sea turco, ruso, chino u occidental.

Sus comentarios sobre Armenia y Rusia encajan en ese contexto. Yalin llama la atención sobre la afirmación de Aliyev de que Armenia reconoció la integridad territorial de Azerbaiyán en octubre de 2022, con el consiguiente reconocimiento de la soberanía azerbaiyana sobre Karabaj.

Aliyev presentó el restablecimiento del control azerbaiyano como un logro conseguido frente a la presión de las grandes potencias. Yalin considera que esto forma parte del intento de Bakú de reposicionarse tras la guerra.

Azerbaiyán y Armenia rubricaron un borrador de acuerdo de paz en Washington en agosto de 2025, aunque aún no se ha firmado el tratado definitivo. Safarnejad sostiene que unos lazos más estrechos con Washington podrían dar a Bakú más margen para tratar directamente con EE. UU. y, con el tiempo, reducir su dependencia de Israel.

Hermandad sin un socio dominante

Ninguno de los cinco analistas sugiere que sea inminente una ruptura entre Ankara y Bakú. Safarnejad destaca la profundidad de su interdependencia: la cooperación militar, las infraestructuras energéticas, los corredores de transporte, la inversión, las industrias de defensa y las instituciones culturales confieren a la alianza una base sólida.

La OTS refuerza esos lazos. En septiembre, funcionarios turcos y azerbaiyanos seguían debatiendo una cooperación más profunda en materia de defensa y seguridad.

Azerbaiyán sigue queriendo a Turquía a su lado en materia de seguridad, comercio y diplomacia regional. Aliyev marca el límite en lo que respecta a la influencia de Ankara sobre la política religiosa de Bakú, sus vínculos con Israel y sus relaciones exteriores en general. Para él, el lema «una nación, dos Estados» otorga a Azerbaiyán la última palabra sobre sus propios asuntos.

Hasta qué punto Bakú podrá hacer valer esa reivindicación dependerá, en parte, de la política interna de Turquía tras Erdogan, de la durabilidad de la relación de Azerbaiyán con Israel y de su capacidad para gestionar las relaciones con Washington, Moscú, Pekín y Teherán sin perder el apoyo de Ankara.

Para Irán, un Bakú más seguro de su independencia pero más dependiente de Israel difícilmente resultaría tranquilizador. La alianza puede perdurar; la discusión sobre quién establece sus límites ya está en marcha.

By Bill ASTORE

A strange conceit of American exceptionalism is the naked ambition of full-spectrum dominance. The idea is this: America must dominate every realm of potential conflict, land-sea-air as well as space and cyber and any other realm you can imagine, for that is the only way Americans can truly be “safe.” Such a conceit comes with a hefty price tag as Pentagon spending soars toward $1.5 trillion a year. But money is the least of it. The heftiest price tag is the constant state of warfare (and preparations for yet more war) that has characterized U.S. foreign policy since 1945.

That, and the erosion of personal liberty and freedom and the hollowing out of the American middle- and working classes as money flows upward to war contractors in the service of boundless imperial ambition.

There’s a god-like quality to this ambition, the idea America must be omnipotent, dominating all realms of warfare, and omniscient, sweeping up all data everywhere, in an unapologetic quest for global reach and global power together with the unapologetic exercise of that murderous power against peoples generally having brown or black skin and therefore treated as inferiors.

With only slight exaggeration, the U.S. government can be said to be projecting power everywhere and helping ordinary Americans nowhere. Destruction is favored over construction. Enriching the already rich is the goal even as the impoverished are made poorer.

The U.S. taxpayer, in the old days known as citizens, are paying through the nose for unneeded weapons systems (Sentinel ICBMs, B-21 nuclear bombers, Golden Dome), unwanted wars (Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran), and an imperial structure of force projection that virtually guarantees the violence will be unending. This imperial structure, with its goal to control all, to know all, to dominate all, is supported by Democrats and Republicans. Critics of this structure, present in both parties but in small numbers, are attacked and otherwise kept on the margins.

None of this is new. In the early 1960s, Senator George McGovern, a decorated bomber pilot during World War II, argued against the pursuit of nuclear “overkill” and called for substantial cuts to defense spending and reinvestment in civilian infrastructure. In support of this initiative, he cited Republican President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s military-industrial complex warning of January 1961. McGovern’s initiative was quickly abandoned as the Johnson administration ramped up its disastrous war in Southeast Asia.

Nearly a decade later, with Southeast Asia ravaged if not defeated, McGovern urged his fellow citizens to “come home,” to stop the folly of overseas wars and ever-increasing military budgets. He was overwhelmingly defeated by Richard Nixon in the 1972 Presidential election.

Ever since that defeat, the Democratic Party has conspired to silence candidates who are antiwar and who dissent from the idea of imperial dominance. Dennis Kucinich comes to mind here. Even moderate calls for reform from candidates like Bernie Sanders are dismissed as naive or dangerous. The result has been Democrats like Obama, Biden, Hillary Clinton, and Harris who openly embrace “good” wars (Afghanistan, for Obama) and who eagerly celebrate military lethality (Harris).

Meanwhile, the Republican Party never met a military budget increase it didn’t like. Rare indeed are voices like Ron and Rand Paul and Thomas Massie who question the wisdom of endless wars and their adverse impact on rights and freedoms here.

What is to be done? Bernie Sanders called for a political revolution, surely a correct call, but he was neutered by the establishment of both parties. Elizabeth Warren spoke of “big, structural changes,” but that was for the domestic economy; her foreign policy was basically that of Biden/Harris. A few rogue Republicans speak up against the Iran war today, but rare indeed are those who openly call for major cuts to war spending.

In short, electing our way out of imperial dominance and colossal war and weapons spending is unlikely in the extreme. Many many people (myself included) have written sensible articles calling for deep cuts to military spending, but good ideas that go against the grain gain little traction without a strong and concerted movement behind them.

America desperately needs a coordinated mass movement against endless war and massive military spending, yet the “powers that be” keep doubling down on yet more wars and even more massive war spending. That same establishment continues to multiply U.S. “enemies.” It may be Iran today, but Russia and especially China always loom, with North Korea and other “rogue” states held in reserve just in case.

The sheer folly and massive expense of it all will likely lead to the end of the (however imperfectly practiced) American democratic experiment. That’s a grim conclusion, I know, but I’m less than hopeful as the tools America has used in its unjust wars overseas are now increasingly applied in the “homeland” against alleged dissenters.

Remember when “dissenters” used to be called concerned citizens? Remember when war was considered to be bad and weapons spending was seen as the unwisest of ways to spend our resources?

America doesn’t have to be a warrior-state or in a state of constant war. A “silent majority” of Americans clearly doesn’t want endless war and outspokenly wants better lives for their children. But better days will not come if this majority remains silent or otherwise demobilized.

The Main Obstacle

As Ike said in 1961, the main obstacle is the military-industrial complex (MIC), to which he added Congress as an abetter and accomplice. That complex in 65 years has greatly added to its power and cultural penetration. The term MICIMATT adds the intelligence “community,” the media, academe, and think tanks. To that we might add the sporting world, Hollywood, video games, and now wildcard tech billionaires. All these interests conspire to absorb trillions of dollars from U.S. taxpayers, ostensibly in the name of national security, while waging or supporting endless war.

Ike said only alert and knowledgeable citizens, actively participating in democracy, could compel the MIC to curb its worst and most grandiose ambitions. Sadly, this is precisely why the American people are constantly lied to, especially about wars, why so much is kept hidden or “classified,” and why people are encouraged to salute smartly and let the military experts handle everything.

Even worse, the very idea of active citizenship is now degraded; the only “duty” apparently left is voting, where you’re encouraged to vote Democrat or Republican and otherwise to reject any third-party candidate who may be antiwar as irrelevant if not invalid (and possibly un-American).

Our ultimate security doesn’t reside in guns or other weapons or in boundless violence. It resides in strong institutions committed to the rule of law in which individuals of character stand up and speak out against abuses of power. Come home, America, to a land of generosity and hope and peace.

Be an alert and knowledgeable citizen. And act.

Original article:  bracingviews.com

The BBC has been accused of using its Bitesize website to push open borders, Net Zero and woke ideology on children as young as 11, teaching them that more immigration is great and anyone who disagrees is likely a bigot.

The post BBC Bitesize Accused of ‘Brainwashing’ Schoolchildren with Left-Wing Views on Migration and Net Zero appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.

By Patrick LAWRENCE

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In her revelatory work The Cultural Cold War, the late British author was the first to shine so unblinking a light on the sprawl of the C.I.A.’s cultural interventions.

Frances Stonor Saunders was fond of epigraphs (as am I). At the front of The Cultural Cold War: The C.I.A. and the World of Arts and Letters (The New Press, 1999), the British journalist, documentarian and author quotes some lines from Dante’s Inferno, the last of which is, “Before my age was full, I went astray.”

I had not lived half my life when I succumbed to complacency and moral blindness: This is my reading of the line from Canto XV. And how fitting it is at the start of Saunders’ exhaustively researched account of how the Central Intelligence Agency, its tentacles reaching into every corner of American culture, did so much to lead our republic into what the Italian poet would call its selva oscura, its dark wood —the state of lostness America has never since escaped.

Frances Stonor Saunders died on the last day of August, having suffered from a virulent strain of brain cancer. She was a mere 60. We had a few acquaintances in common, but I never met her. It was nonetheless something like losing a friend when, just this past week, I heard of her death. And so this brief appreciation.

The Cultural Cold War made Stonor Saunders’ reputation. It took a prominent place on my shelf of Cold War books as soon as it was published. At last the curtain parted on the insidious use the C.I.A. made, or attempted to make, of painters, poets, playwrights, novelists, editors, jazz musicians, singers, dancers, actors, scholars and other cultural figures in its long-running operation to promote the appeal of American life as against the Soviet Union and altogether the postwar socialist alternative.

This was an immense “soft power” operation avant la lettre — before we had the term. One could also call it an early variant of the “cognitive warfare” to which we are now incessantly subjected, the primary object of which was to keep postwar Europe from swinging leftward, as the French, the Italians and others were poised to do.

From Saunders’s Introduction:

“Drawing on an extensive, highly influential network of intelligence personnel, political strategists, the corporate establishment, and the old school Ivy League universities, the incipient CIA started, from 1947, to build a ‘consortium’ whose double task was to inoculate the world against the contagion of Communism and to ease the passage of American foreign policy abroad. The result was a remarkably tight network of people who worked alongside the Agency… Whether they liked it or not, whether they knew it or not, there were few writers, poets, artists, historians, scientists, or critics in postwar Europe whose names were not in some way linked to this covert enterprise.”

Who Was Who & Who Stood Where

Jackson Pollock and others among the Abstract Expressionists, Leonard Bernstein and others among the American composers then prominent, Robert Lowell, James Baldwin, Mary McCarthy and other writers of their generation, Duke Ellington and other jazz stars — if they weren’t sent abroad on the C.I.A.’s nickel, their work was.

There were the hundreds of books the Agency took a role in promoting, It paid for translations of Eliot’s Four Quartets, Luigi Barzini’s The Italians, Boris Pasternak’s Doctor Zhivago. It covertly supported magazines — Encounter and The Paris Review famous among them — along with radio stations and, of course, newspapers — and those who wrote and edited for them. As of 1956 the Agency owned a considerable piece of the Rome Daily American.

Saunders, who did years of interviewing and archival research for this book, lays out her findings over 427 well-written pages and was the first to shine so unblinking a light on the sprawl of the C.I.A.’s cultural interventions.

One of the things I like about Saunders’s book, among many, is her exposure of those artists and writers who knew of the Agency’s interventions and wanted nothing to do with them, those who knew and cooperated and those who served its purposes unwittingly.

Pollock had no idea of the use to which the Agency put his work, Baldwin wanted nothing to do with the Congress for Cultural Freedom (C.C.F.), infamous as a C.I.A. front. Ever true to her tough-minded politics, neither did Lillian Hellman.

Mary McCarthy knew all about the Agency’s funding of the C.C.F. and its other projects and was fine with all of it. I’ve never liked McCarthy’s novels, and Saunders gave me a good reason to distrust her. She was prominent among that group of Americans known as Cold War liberals, for whom I have long nursed an abiding contempt.

I wish Saunders had given more attention to the profligate corruptions of generations of American journalists and newspaper editors, but her definition of culture is narrower than mine; I speculate that journalism’s service to the Agency was a room so large she chose not to enter it.

The surrender of many American journalists to the Cold War cause is well-enough documented in any case. See, for example, Carl Bernstein’s celebrated “The C.I.A. and the Media,” which Rolling Stone published in October 1977, and the House hearings that Bernstein’s piece prompted a couple of months later — the Church Committee, whose hearings ran from January 1975 to April 1976, having flinched from this responsibility.

Chronicler of Secrecy

The who-was-who and the who-stood-where and the who-did-what of The Cultural Cold War give Saunders’s book an historical specificity I do not think anyone has matched, with the exception of Joel Whitney’s Finks (OR Books, 2016), which draws heavily on Saunders’s work. She did not leave those of whom she wrote any place to hide.

As I reflect back on her accomplishment now, it seems to me to lie in something she never mentions. Saunders gave us a chronicle of the U.S. culture of secrecy in its earliest days, the first decades after the 1945 victories, when America set about making itself a global imperium.

What comes through in The Cultural Cold War is how little those alive at the time were able to know about their time. Too many events, too many decisions, too many reasons for things happening as they did were hidden, rendered inaccessible.

The C.I.A.’s Cold War interventions have had many enduring consequences. The Agency systematically discredited the principle of nonalignment, which was held high among then-emergent non–Western nations. America brings the same with-us-or-against-us fallacy to the 11 members and 10 partners comprising the BRICS  — a complete failure to grasp one of the 21st century’s significant realities.

It is the same with the out-of-hand dismissal of all suggestions of moral equivalence in global affairs with those it deems adversaries: The United States is always righteous and never acts but in defense of itself or its always-democratic allies and/or clients. It is never to be accused of aggression. This is what I mean by moral blindness.

The Agency’s most disturbing legacy, at least to me, is how little of our world we are able actually to see. Daniel Patrick Monihan warned us of this just before the U.S. century turned in Secrecy: The American Experience (Yale, 1998). So, in her way, did Saunders a year later. Foolish it would be, naïve in the extreme, to think the time she described so piercingly is not the time in which we live.

It is the historians now who tell us who we are — this by telling us who we were.  This is why I honor Frances Stonor Saunders as I do. She told Americans of their past, and, so, of their present.

Original article:  consortiumnews.com

Considerations on the boundaries between secularism, sovereignty, and social stability\

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The controversy surrounding the wearing of the hijab in Azerbaijani schools took on new dimensions in October, following the implementation of dress code rules that resulted in female students and teachers being denied entry to public institutions. The episode sparked demonstrations, arrests, and criticism from international organizations, while also drawing reactions from Turkey. The debate extends far beyond the school environment, involving questions of sovereignty, religious identity, and regional stability.

Azerbaijan has historical reasons for maintaining a secular state model. The Soviet experience, the formation of its institutions after independence, and the need to govern a religiously diverse society amid a tense regional environment have contributed to the consolidation of a system in which the state maintains strict control over the functioning of public institutions. Azerbaijani authorities have the prerogative to determine their educational policies, establish standards for schools, and decide how constitutional principles are to be implemented.

However, the way these policies are implemented can produce consequences that extend beyond their original objectives. In the case of the hijab, the enforcement of school regulations has provoked resistance among families and religious communities, while arrests related to the protests have amplified the controversy. The government’s central challenge will be to manage this reaction without allowing a dispute over school uniforms to develop into a broader conflict between state authorities and religious communities.

The situation also has important international implications. Ankara, Baku’s main strategic partner, has expressed concern over restrictions on the Islamic headscarf. The political, cultural, and linguistic proximity between the two countries makes the issue particularly sensitive. Although this disagreement does not necessarily amount to a bilateral crisis, it demonstrates how domestic decisions can create friction even between governments that maintain close relations. Ankara must take its own social and political considerations into account, while Baku seeks to preserve its autonomy in managing domestic affairs.

The Iranian dimension also deserves attention. Azerbaijan maintains a complex relationship with Iran, shaped by historical and religious ties as well as strategic disagreements. Like Iran, Azerbaijan has a predominantly Shiite population, while the Islamic Republic has a substantial Azerbaijani minority. Both Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and President Masoud Pezeshkian have Azerbaijani ethnic backgrounds. In this environment, secularization policies may be interpreted by external actors as part of a broader struggle for religious and political influence within Azerbaijan. This interpretation, however, does not establish that the school regulations were adopted exclusively to counter Iranian influence.

There is also a domestic risk worth considering. Religious restrictions implemented too rigidly can produce effects contrary to those intended. When segments of the population perceive certain measures as impositions on their religious practices, radical groups may exploit the resulting discontent, portray the state as an adversary of religion, and expand their capacity for mobilization. Understanding this issue requires consideration of other experiences, such as Syria under the Assad government, where secularism coexisted with the proliferation of extremism. This outcome is not inevitable, and opposition to the regulations should not automatically be equated with extremism. Nevertheless, international experience suggests that this possibility needs close examination.

For Azerbaijan, the issue therefore involves more than the definition of a school uniform. The country has the right to organize its institutions according to its own priorities, without foreign governments dictating its choices. At the same time, maintaining stability requires preventing administrative decisions from fueling lasting polarization or creating new opportunities for actors seeking to intensify religious tensions.

The evolution of this case will have implications for Baku’s relations with Ankara and Tehran, as well as for the country’s domestic political dynamics. The outcome will depend not only on the regulations themselves but also on their practical implementation and the authorities’ response to concerns raised by students, families, and educators. In the South Caucasus, where identity, sovereignty, and security remain closely intertwined, even a seemingly localized dispute can have serious regional repercussions.

Macron, com 15% de aprovação, prepara guerra com Rússia e dissolve associação Egalité et Réconciliation de Alain Soral por “extremismo político”.

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Macron é, hoje, muito possivelmente, o presidente mais impopular do planeta, contando com apenas 15% de aprovação, segundo uma enquete Ipsos BVA-Cesi. Sob seu comando, a França se depara com a estagnação econômica (crescimento de 0,6% em 2025) e com o endividamento (120% do PIB). Sob Macron, a França viu também a desindustrialização acelerada do país, com as indústrias correspondendo a apenas 9% do PIB, menor patamar da União Europeia, e não surpreendentemente, o poder de compra despencou, com metade dos franceses dizendo que sua renda dá apenas para o essencial e apenas 70% dos cidadãos em idade ativa ocupando um posto de trabalho, atualmente.

Como se isso já não fosse o bastante, em aproximadamente 10 anos de governo Macron, aproximadamente 4 milhões de imigrantes entraram no país (muitos dos quais não trabalham, mas recebem benefícios sociais); quantia que torna impossível a absorção econômica bem como a assimilação etnocultural dos recém-chegados. Naturalmente, ao descontrole imigratório estão vinculadas taxas de criminalidade, favelização de centros urbanos e aumento das tensões sociais. Muitos franceses étnicos sentem-se demograficamente substituídos em sua terra natal, e não por acaso, tudo indica que Marine Le Pen ganhará (finalmente) as eleições presidenciais francesas em 2027.

Não sabemos quais seriam os resultados de uma presidência Le Pen e é razoável ser cético a respeito, mas claramente o atual curso da França é perigosíssimo, inclusive em sua política externa.

Gradualmente, nos últimos 2 anos, começaram a aparecer inúmeros sinais de que Macron estaria preparando o país para uma guerra com a Rússia. O governo francês criou um serviço militar voluntário e aprovou a expansão das forças armadas permanentes a 275 mil homens, bem como um aumento orçamentário para a defesa. O general Fabien Mandon, do Estado-Maior, afirmou em 2025 que a França deveria se preparar para um conflito de alta intensidade com a Rússia no prazo de três a quatro anos, e agora em setembro de 2026 Macron declarou que a França “poderia” se tornar alvo de drones explosivos. Constantemente, também, se ouve discursos sobre a necessidade de transformar a economia francesa numa “economia de guerra”.

Por isso, talvez seja surpreendente para muitos (mas não para nós) que em meio a tudo isso que tem acontecido no país, o governo Macron ainda encontre tempo para a implementação de um aparato de censura e repressão de níveis totalitários.

Sua nova vítima é a associação Egalité et Réconciliation (Igualdade e Reconciliação), criada pelo sociólogo e escritor Alain Soral. A associação se identifica como “nacionalista de esquerda” e tem como principal slogan “esquerda do trabalho, direita dos valores”, apelando a uma superação da falsa dicotomia entre esquerda e direita e, ainda mais importantemente, por uma reconciliação nacional entre todos os setores sociais; em anos recentes, ela esteve envolvida nas manifestações dos Coletes Amarelos, em algumas atividades ligadas ao partido Reagrupamento Nacional (apesar de, simultaneamente, manter uma postura de “crítica construtiva” contra certas tendências sionistas e liberais presentes no partido) e à militância pró-Palestina.

Ocorre que, no dia 9 de outubro, o Ministro do Interior do governo de Macron, Laurent Nuñez, anunciou a abertura de um procedimento de dissolução contra a associação Egalité et Réconciliation, sob a acusação de “extremismo político”. A sua equipe jurídica recebeu um prazo de 1 semana para se defender, e a decisão a respeito deve ocorrer, ainda, em outubro.

O próprio Alain Soral é uma figura de elevado espírito inconformista, razão pela qual já foi vítima de incontáveis perseguições judiciais – dezenas de fato – majoritariamente por “delitos de opinião”, ou seja, por comentários críticos contra pessoas específicas ou “minorias protegidas”. Em condenações, Soral já acumulou milhões de euros a serem pagos em indenização para ONGs globalistas diversas, soma obviamente impagável, bem como já foi encarcerado algumas vezes, também pelos mesmos motivos. A perseguição judicial foi tão intensa que Soral teve que se exilar de sua pátria, primeiro na Suíça e depois na Rússia.

Agora, para além das justificativas oficiais, por qual motivo o Estado francês baniria uma organização relativamente pequena e de poucos recursos financeiros?

É possível analisar o “ângulo” da presença de Alain Soral na Rússia, em mais de um sentido. Primeiro, porque ao estar na Rússia Soral finalmente tornou-se imune à constante perseguição judicial e às ameaças de prisão que ele sofria na França, ao mesmo tempo em que seguia tomando parte ativa no debate político e cultural francês, mesmo à distância. Nisso, ele era capaz de exercer e expandir a sua influência, “sob a proteção dos russos”, o que certamente alimenta as típicas paranoias atuais da elite francesa sobre uma “guerra informacional” russa.

Existe, porém, também um aspecto interno. Recentemente, Alain Soral voltou a ser bastante comentado pela mídia francesa por dois motivos. Um é o “caso Bardella”, o qual diz respeito à descoberta de supostos escritos “politicamente incorretos” de Jordan Bardella, presidente do partido Reagrupamento Nacional, e à informação de que em sua juventude a principal influência intelectual de Bardella era Alain Soral. O segundo é uma pesquisa de opinião indicando que 15% dos homens franceses com menos de 35 anos de idade se identificam com as ideias de Soral.

Isso às vésperas das eleições presidenciais representa um risco significativo para Macron e para o establishment francês. Ainda que, aparentemente, não haja chance de vitória para qualquer candidato contra Le Pen, não podemos duvidar da possibilidade de manipulação do processo eleitoral, tal como aconteceu na Romênia.

Esse silenciamento é ainda mais preocupante pelo fato de que Soral e o E&R serem praticamente os únicos personagens socialmente e culturalmente relevantes na França hoje que defendem a reconciliação nacional e que evitam a incitação do tensionamento interno, promovido pelos elementos mais islamofóbicos do RN e pela própria liderança do LFI de Mélenchon com seu “exército” de antifas e imigrantes.

Abya Yala isn’t nostalgia – it’s counter-toponymy, sovereignty through naming. Empires die; names endure.

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A name imposed from outside

Every October 12, history once again becomes a battlefield. This year, the two events took place just a few days apart and a few thousand kilometers from one another. On one side, the White House, where on October 9, Donald Trump honored Christopher Columbus in front of a marble statue reassembled from fragments of the Baltimore monument that had fallen into the harbor in 2020, and signed a proclamation linking the 1492 voyage to the 1776 Declaration of Independence and promising that the explorer’s legacy will not be erased by “radical extremists.” On the other side were Indigenous organizations that for more than thirty years have rejected even the name of the continent, calling it Abya Yala.

The dispute over the continent’s name is a dispute over sovereignty, and the fact that it is resurfacing with such intensity in 2026 – while Washington is rewriting its relations with the Western Hemisphere in an openly hegemonic manner – is no mere coincidence of the calendar.

The name “America” originated in a cartographic workshop in the Vosges Mountains. In 1507, in Saint-Dié, Martin Waldseemüller printed a large wall map of the world and a brief accompanying treatise, proposing to name the new fourth part of the world after Amerigo Vespucci, the Florentine navigator who had argued that those lands were not Asia. On the map, the name appears in the southern part of the continent. Within a few decades, it came to apply to the entire continental landmass. None of the people who lived there were consulted.

In 1958, the Mexican historian Edmundo O’Gorman developed a thesis on this that retains its power to this day: America was not discovered, it was invented. Not in the trivial sense that it did not exist before, but in the sense that Europe constructed a new geographical and conceptual entity, placing it within its own image of the world and assigning it a role in its own universal history. The name was the first act of this construction. Before being conquered by force of arms, the continent was conquered on paper.

There is also a second appropriation, less discussed in Europe and deeply felt south of the Rio Grande. In common usage, “America” means the United States. The shift is not merely lexical. On December 2, 1823, James Monroe declared to Congress that the American continent was no longer to be considered open to European colonization: the phrase “America for Americans” already contained, in embryo, the idea that the Americans par excellence were those of Washington. Two centuries later, the same logic has led to pressure regarding the Panama Canal in 2025 and the military operation in Venezuela in January 2026. When an indigenous movement utters “Abya Yala,” it thus challenges two names at once: the one imposed by Europe and the one annexed by the United States.

The nomos of discovery

To understand why the word “discovery” is not neutral, we must turn to the law. Carl Schmitt, in a 1950 book that remains one of the foundational texts of legal geopolitics, argues that 1492 ushered in the first global nomos of the earth: an ordering of space based on the seizure of land. The European powers recognized one another as legal subjects and treated the New World as a free space, available for occupation. The papal bull Inter caetera of 1493 and the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494 drew a line from pole to pole that divided the planet between Castile and Portugal. Those who lived on those lands did not participate in the division: they were its objects.

Schmitt describes this order with a jurist’s admiration for an effective legal construct, and his analysis must be read with that in mind. But the mechanism he identifies is real and has had a long institutional life. In 1823, the same year as the Monroe Doctrine, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the case Johnson v. M’Intosh: Justice Marshall ruled that “discovery” conferred sovereign title to the land upon the European power – and later upon the United States as its successor – leaving the indigenous peoples with a mere right of occupation. The Doctrine of Discovery has remained part of American jurisprudence to this day. It was not until March 2023 that two Vatican departments issued a joint statement formally distancing themselves from it, acknowledging that 15th-century papal bulls were used to justify the expropriation of indigenous peoples.

The human cost of this system is measured in figures that remain uncertain, though their order of magnitude is not. A study published in 2019 in *Quaternary Science Reviews* estimated that between 1492 and 1600, the population of the Americas plummeted by about 90 percent, due to the combined effects of epidemics, war, forced labor, and social disintegration; the reforestation of abandoned lands was so extensive that it left a trace in the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. Tzvetan Todorov, in his book The Conquest of America, had already spoken of the greatest genocide in human history, questioning how knowledge of the other could coexist with its destruction. The “discovery,” in other words, was also the disappearance of most of those who were there.

What Abya Yala means

Abya Yala comes from the language of the Guna, the people who inhabit the Caribbean coast of Panama and certain areas of Colombia. In its form “Abiayala,” it is usually translated as “land in full maturity”; other renderings such as “living land” or “land of vital blood” are also in circulation. The transition from a local place name to a continental name is recent. According to the most widely cited accounts, it was the Bolivian Aymara leader Takir Mamani who proposed that indigenous peoples adopt this name in their documents, in place of that of the colonizers. The proposal took shape during the wave of protests that accompanied the 500th anniversary in 1992, when counter-celebrations marking “500 years of resistance” stood in opposition to the official commemorations. In the 2000s, the summit meetings of indigenous peoples across the continent permanently adopted it as part of their name.

The Guna’s choice is no accident. This is a people who, in 1925, rose up against the Panamanian state and eventually secured an autonomous comarca – now known as Guna Yala – with its own institutions and effective control over the territory: one of the most successful examples of indigenous self-governance on the continent. Borrowing their word means choosing as an emblem a concrete experience of territorial sovereignty, not mere nostalgia.

It should be noted that Abya Yala does not erase the plurality of local names: Anáhuac for the Nahua world of central Mexico, Tawantinsuyu for the political and territorial organization of the Incas, and Pindorama for the Tupi lands of present-day Brazil. Each of these names expresses a different cosmology of space. Abya Yala functions as common ground, a sort of federal name that does not replace the specific ones. This is an important detail, because it signals that the project is not the invention of a single, symmetrical indigenous identity mirroring the “American” one, but rather a coordination among diverse actors.

Cartography as an act of sovereignty

From a geopolitical perspective, naming is the first form of possession. This is well understood by states that rename gulfs and seas, contest place names on official maps, and impose transliterations in international institutions. The year 2025 provided a textbook example with the U.S. renaming of the Gulf of Mexico. In this context, Abya Yala is a counter-toponym: a name that does not seek to occupy school atlases, but rather to wrest from hegemonic power the monopoly on the description of space.

The Latin American decolonial school has given this insight a precise theoretical form. Aníbal Quijano has termed the structure that survives the end of formal colonialism “the coloniality of power”: a hierarchy of peoples, knowledge, and territories that continues to organize the international division of labor and the production of knowledge. Walter Mignolo has shown how “Latin America” itself is a designation that originated in the nineteenth century in French and Creole circles, with specific political functions. The year 1492 marks not only the beginning of the conquest of the Americas but also the birth of the world-system centered first on Europe and later on the Atlantic. Challenging the continent’s name therefore means challenging the founding date of the unipolar order, tracing it back to its very roots.

Here, the issue intersects with the debate on multipolarism. A multipolar order is not merely a different distribution of power among great states. It implies the recognition that there are multiple civilizations, each with its own concepts of space, law, and relationship to the land. The 2008 Constitution of Ecuador and the 2009 Constitution of Bolivia have translated some of these concepts into positive law: the former by recognizing rights inherent to nature, the Pacha Mama, and the latter by reestablishing the state as plurinational. These are imperfect experiments, but they represent the most serious attempt in the hemisphere to build a form of statehood that does not derive entirely from the European model.

Columbus, Italy, and two identity politics

For the Italian reader, the story takes an additional turn. Columbus Day did not originate as a celebration of conquest. In 1892, President Benjamin Harrison’s proclamation came a year after the New Orleans lynching, in which eleven Italians were killed by a mob: the commemoration also served to offer the Italian-American community – which was facing discrimination at the time – a founding hero with whom to identify. Columbus thus became a tool for the integration of a minority that Anglo-Saxons considered little more than white.

Today, that history is being enlisted in a different battle. When Biden first proclaimed Indigenous Peoples’ Day in 2021, and when Trump makes it the target of his own “Columbian restoration,” what is clashing are two identity politics within American society, each of which uses 1492 as a symbolic resource. Italian Americans find themselves serving as a shield for an operation that primarily concerns the definition of the U.S. nation and its relationship with the rest of the hemisphere.

Italy and Europe can avoid this dilemma. Remembering Columbus as a navigator, as a figure of Mediterranean and Genoese culture, and as a man of his time does not oblige one to subscribe to the “nomos” of discovery or the legal doctrine that derived from it. One can honor the sailor while rejecting the claim of ownership. Indeed, it is precisely from Europe that a gesture of historical maturity might emerge, similar to the one made by the Holy See in 2023: distinguishing the memory of the person from the legitimization of a spatial order that has produced expropriation and death on a continental scale.

October 12, 2026, revealed two opposing ways of approaching the same date. Washington used Columbus to reaffirm a narrative of national founding that, in foreign policy, translates into a renewed claim to guardianship over the hemisphere. Indigenous movements used Abya Yala to remind us that that hemisphere had names, political systems, and sovereignty before 1492 – and that it still retains some of them today.

There is no symmetry between the two positions. One has aircraft carriers, sanctions, and courts; the other has a word and territories to defend one by one, but the history of maps teaches us that names have a long life – longer than the empires that imposed them. “America” appeared on a map printed in a small town in the Vosges and ended up designating half the planet.

No one can say today what fate awaits Abya Yala, but the mere fact that millions of people refuse to call their land by another’s name already speaks volumes about the crisis of the order that name had ushered in.

Police investigation into antisemitic chants underway as suspects detained, Croatian president calls incident 'unacceptable and shameful'

par Jules  SEYES

Si l’Allemagne désirait interrompre les aéroports français, elle pourrait équiper ses Typhoon de missiles et créer une bulle de supériorité aérienne au-dessus du sol français. L’affirmation sonne-t-elle ridicule ? C’est exact, elle est pourtant l’exact miroir de l’alerte qu’El Mundo prête à la CIA selon laquelle les Russes pourraient équiper un navire de drones pour désactiver des aéroports occidentaux¹. Comprendre pourquoi l’une sonne comme folle alors que l’autre paraît terrifiante suppose de saisir les méthodes d’analyse sur lesquelles elles reposent, avant d’analyser justement les présupposés des intentions.

Celles-ci étant un peu complexes, commençons par la doctrine, qui aura le mérite de clarifier le brouillard mental actuel. Un peu comme le brouillard de guerre auquel les militaires sont confrontés. Deux méthodes offrent un moyen de le briser : la méthode des moyens et celle des intentions.

La première repose sur un inventaire des ressources connues de l’adversaire pour évaluer l’ensemble des points qu’il peut toucher. C’est aujourd’hui l’exercice de la CIA : les Russes disposent de drones, ceux-ci peuvent être basés sur un navire, donc les Russes peuvent équiper un navire. L’exercice en début d’article relève de la même logique : prendre le nombre de chasseurs de la Bundeswehr, le nombre de Taurus en stock, puisque contrairement à nos SCALP ces armes n’ont pas été envoyées en Ukraine, et établir que cette combinaison a la capacité de mener une attaque surprise au-dessus de la France.

Le problème de cette méthode est de livrer un arc de menace souvent inutilisable, car il existe trop d’axes de vulnérabilité pouvant être exploités. L’automne 1944 en offre l’illustration². Les Allemands retirent alors plusieurs divisions du front. La reconnaissance aérienne alliée photographie, à partir de la mi-novembre, un trafic ferroviaire intense autour de Cologne, de Coblence et dans l’Eifel : gares de triage saturées, locomotives sous pression, une vingtaine de wagons plats chargés de chars Tigre sur la ligne d’Euskirchen. Début décembre, cent soixante-dix wagons plats chargés de blindés et de véhicules roulent entre Cologne et Limbourg. La nuit, les chasseurs de nuit repèrent des convois aux phares masqués. Des dépôts de ravitaillement apparaissent à Rheinbach et à Schleiden, des piles de bois propres à jeter des ponts près d’Echternach, des trains sanitaires à l’ouest du Rhin. Les écoutes radio identifient une armée blindée nouvelle, la 6e Panzerarmee. À la mi-décembre, face aux Ardennes, le VIIIe corps américain signale une activité d’artillerie inhabituelle, aucun mouvement visible et presque plus de prisonniers. Cette force, dont la valeur combative était connue, pouvait être engagée de bien des manières.

Une seconde méthode doit alors entrer en jeu : celle des intentions. En fonction des moyens connus, on établit ce que l’ennemi voudra toucher. Plus précise, celle-ci possède l’inconvénient de reposer sur des déterminants bien moins solides, puisque liés à la compréhension de la psychologie de l’adversaire.

Ces indices remontent à tous les états-majors alliés, et chacun les interprète selon le tempérament de son chef. Au quartier général d’Eisenhower, commandant suprême des forces alliées, homme de coalition et de logistique, domine une conviction : les Allemands sont trop fatigués pour attaquer. Les divisions retirées sont donc évaluées comme des rotations de repos et une reconstitution de réserve. Le 15 décembre encore, son bureau des opérations n’a rien à signaler dans les Ardennes. Patton, chef de la Troisième Armée, passe pour le plus offensif des généraux américains : il ne conçoit la guerre qu’en mouvement et à l’attaque. Son état-major projette cette volonté offensive sur l’ennemi allemand. Elle reflète en réalité la psychologie des analystes, elle-même dérivée de la psychologie des chefs. Son chef du renseignement, le colonel Oscar Koch, lit les mêmes indices comme la préparation d’un coup et présente à Patton, le 9 décembre, sa conclusion : une contre-offensive allemande est possible dans les Ardennes. Patton fait aussitôt préparer les plans qui permettront à la Troisième Armée de pivoter vers le nord. Le lendemain du rapport rassurant d’Eisenhower, l’offensive allemande éclate. Autrement dit, la méthode des intentions en dit souvent plus sur la manière de penser des analystes que sur leur compréhension fine de l’adversaire. Bien conscients de ces défauts, les militaires appliquent les méthodes classiques d’analyse stratégique pour filtrer l’ensemble. La première d’entre elles est le rapport coût-avantage : qu’est-ce que l’adversaire a à gagner ? Pour quel coût ?

Ici, vous constatez par exemple la différence de pensée entre Eisenhower et Patton. Pour le premier, le coût est en carburant ; le second pense en termes d’avantage moral de l’offensive. D’où la divergence d’analyse. Si nous prenons notre exemple d’avions allemands équipés de Taurus, le coût est une guerre franco-allemande, voire OTAN-Allemagne si l’article 5 venait à jouer. Aucune attaque, même couronnée de succès, ne pourrait provoquer des dégâts suffisants pour compenser les coûts d’un conflit avec une puissance nucléaire. En pratique, l’Allemagne aurait beaucoup à perdre et peu à gagner, puisque son influence dans l’appareil d’État et l’UE lui permet d’obtenir satisfaction dans des domaines cruciaux, telle la fermeture de Fessenheim.

Alors, la Russie ?

La CIA vient de nous gratifier d’un de ces mémos qui relèvent à la fois de la plus pure vérité et du plus pur mépris du public destiné à recevoir la fuite. Voici la menace : «Le point faible de l’Europe» : la menace d’une attaque russe contre la France et l’Espagne est réelle, selon la CIA.

Le scénario de l’attaque impliquerait des drones Gerbera³, de petits appareils à la charge explosive réduite dont l’intérêt est perturbateur et non de faire des victimes : fermer un aéroport, par exemple. Ils seraient lancés depuis des navires marchands déguisés en trafic commercial ordinaire et postés en Méditerranée.

Je vous avouerai qu’en ouvrant ce mémo, je m’étais attendu à un scénario sérieux, pas à cela. À la découverte du propos, son outrance m’a fait passer à la limite de l’insulte. Voilà une proposition d’attaque étatique dont le but serait de «perturber» ? Se rend-on compte du terme ? Une attaque pour perturber ? Schlieffen se retourne dans sa tombe, Napoléon s’étrangle avec sa bataille décisive, Manstein est fort heureusement mort. Car, hélas, un État ne gaspille pas la surprise en lançant un tapotage gentil. S’il faut recourir à la violence, alors il faut d’emblée prendre un avantage définitif pour maintenir au plus court la durée de la campagne. Sun Tzu le notait déjà : aucun pays n’a jamais tiré profit d’une guerre prolongée.

Le projet proposé contredit tous ces principes et, dès lors, il ne pose qu’une seule question : le code militaire russe a-t-il supprimé la peine de mort pour les traîtres ? Eh oui, désolé de décevoir ces intervenants de plateaux qui se prétendent experts malgré leurs abus propagandistes, mais ce que la CIA nous propose est de lancer une attaque inefficace pour ruiner la réputation que les Russes ont acquise auprès du reste du monde. Nous parlons bien sûr des pays sérieux, hors de l’Occident malade où les journalistes reprennent ce scénario comme un sujet sérieux.

En clair, une balance coût-bénéfice où il n’y aurait que des coûts pour la Russie et aucun bénéfice. Eh oui, car fermer un aéroport fait peut-être perdre quelques millions à des entreprises, mais cela n’a AUCUN impact stratégique. Pire, il est inutile de mobiliser un drone Gerbera, un navire ou tout autre moyen militaire : un coup de fil d’un gamin pour annoncer une bombe suffit. Ou bien une voiture piégée.

Bref, l’aventure proposée n’apporte aucun bénéfice stratégique et se fait avec des moyens disproportionnés qui coûteraient énormément à la Russie. Seul un traître à la Russie peut avoir cette idée. Je sais, en Occident, nous sommes habitués avec les relais US, mais plus en Russie : les réseaux qui ont soutenu V. Poutine après son arrivée au pouvoir s’en sont assurés. Ou en tout cas, ils ont fait monter le prix de la passe. Un officier russe réclamerait une méga-malle de billets pour seulement proposer cela à ses chefs, vu qu’il sait que ce serait (si ses chefs sont gentils) la fin de sa carrière. Quant à le mettre en œuvre sans validation politique, il aurait intérêt à avoir le bon billet d’avion pour s’éclipser au plus vite.

Car là est le point qui permet aux individus tarés que l’Occident nomme journalistes de procéder à cette propagande goebbelsienne (enfin, je m’excuse auprès du docteur Goebbels pour cet amalgame insultant) : les moyens existent. Exact, la Russie possède les drones, les navires. Elle aligne même un porte-avions et surtout un arsenal de missiles de toute première qualité. Depuis les années cinquante, l’URSS dispose de bombardiers stratégiques et de missiles capables de frapper le territoire français. La menace n’a donc rien de nouveau, puisque la Russie peut transformer la France en parking si elle le désire.

L’alerte de la CIA ajoute-t-elle de nouvelles capacités ? La réponse est non, une fois, deux fois, mille fois NON !

Héritière, État successeur de l’URSS, la Russie dispose depuis sa naissance des moyens de nous mettre à terre si elle accepte les millions de morts qu’exigera l’absorption de la salve nucléaire française. Une poignée de drones n’y ajoute rien, n’y retranche rien. D’autant plus que la Russie dispose de missiles hypersoniques Orechnik en mesure d’infliger de douloureux dégâts à notre territoire. Par exemple, mais je ne voudrais pas exciter LCI, par une frappe d’Orechnik contre des centrales nucléaires ou, en non nucléaire, contre nos barrages. Nous n’aurions aucun moyen de riposte non nucléaire.

Dès lors, oui, les Russes peuvent monter des drones sur un navire, ils peuvent monter des Grad aussi, ou toute autre arme à plus ou moins grande portée. Dans un tel scénario, l’élément coûteux est le navire sacrifié, pas les munitions embarquées. L’alerte donnée, qui n’est que l’une des alertes autour desquelles on nous a fait résonner tambours et trompettes, n’apporte rien de structurellement nouveau. Un bricolage de drones pour frapper notre territoire n’a rien de complexe. Après tout, le gouvernement de Kiev a bien réussi à introduire des drones sur le territoire russe pour frapper des bombardiers stratégiques.

Seulement, à ce jeu, tout le monde peut jouer ou presque. Il faut le restreindre : l’équipe Le Maire, Breton ne peut pas jouer, mais c’est lié à l’incompétence des joueurs. La France, par exemple, possède encore quelques officiers de valeur capables d’organiser l’affaire. (Non, pas le colonel monté hors de propos en lui accrochant des étoiles comme des guirlandes de Noël, et qui fait aujourd’hui comme s’il dirigeait l’armée française.)

Le problème est que ces gens refuseraient de monter une telle opération. Frapper la Russie, comme frapper la France pour la Russie, exige que la première balle soit mortelle. On tire au cœur ou on ne tire pas, et dans ce cas, entre puissances nucléaires, la question n’est pas celle des moyens, mais celle de la volonté. Même si nous avons TOUT fait, par une politique irresponsable, pour irriter les Russes, ils n’ont nullement annoncé leur intention de répondre à la hauteur de notre bêtise.

Reste l’intention : les Russes peuvent nous frapper, c’est acquis, ils peuvent le faire depuis des décennies pour un coût fixé. Resterait le gain d’une frappe : faire cesser l’appui français à l’Ukraine. Dans ce domaine, hélas, hormis l’agacement entre les oreilles d’entendre les rodomontades et pseudo-discours d’Emmanuel Macron, qui justifient toute envie de retourner une paire de claques justement méritée, la vérité commande de constater l’épuisement de nos moyens : la macronie a déjà envoyé à peu près tout ce qu’elle pouvait racler dans les fonds de tiroirs ; quant à l’argent, l’Allemagne ou la Grande-Bretagne peuvent le fournir. Les véritables acteurs sont les Anglais, par l’usage des moyens de leurs services secrets très actifs dans la guerre des drones, et les Allemands pour la livraison de munitions. Pour peser sur les opérations en Ukraine, une frappe russe devrait cibler en priorité ces deux pays.

Sauf à vouloir faire de l’éducation prioritaire, mais dans ce cas, l’ambassade de Russie peut se contenter d’engager un professeur de SEGPA pour l’envoyer à l’Élysée. Pour la fessée, il serait même inutile d’engager : Montjoie Saint-Denis a fait des petits.

Prise sous un angle militaire, l’information n’apportait rien, et si les journalistes en avaient fait une lecture correcte, ils l’auraient classée verticalement.

Ce n’était bien évidemment pas le but, mais au contraire d’avoir un thème pour parler de menace russe afin de poursuivre la propagande par martèlement, qui vise à abrutir les téléspectateurs de menaces pour leur faire admettre le concept sans esprit critique. Ça marche avec les résidents de maison de retraite au stade pré-Rivotril.

Tel est le problème de nos gouvernants. Faute d’agression russe, il faut créer le sentiment d’une agression, ce qui est le but de ces annonces : entretenir l’hystérie et donner un prétexte pour prononcer les mots agression, guerre, menaces, puissants générateurs d’un sentiment d’insécurité dans la population soumise à ce discours anxiogène.

Ça n’a qu’un défaut : messieurs les journalistes, vous avez repris en connaissance de cause une publication des services américains pour engager notre pays sur une trajectoire fausse et dangereuse pour sa sécurité.

Soit vous êtes des idiots congénitaux, ce que la CIA n’exclut peut-être pas, et je vais m’offrir de partager le soupçon. Soit vous le faites délibérément. Même en tenant compte de votre bêtise, tous les journalistes français ne peuvent pas être aussi désavantagés par la nature ; il aurait donc dû en rester assez pour faire échouer la manipulation.

Cela fait de vous, en tant que catégorie, des traîtres à votre nation, susceptibles de subir les foudres judiciaires au moment où le pouvoir changera de main et cessera de couvrir vos abus. Il ne s’agit pas de menaces, mais d’une évaluation juridique. VOUS mettez objectivement notre nation en danger !

La méthode marcherait si, justement, conscients de la menace sur leur esprit, beaucoup de citoyens ne s’étaient pas dirigés vers internet.

___

1. L’alerte a été rendue publique par le quotidien espagnol El Mundo le 24 septembre 2026 (article de Xavier Colás), reprise notamment par Euronews : «La CIA alerte sur des drones russes visant l’Espagne, la France ou l’Italie», https://fr.euronews.com/2026/09/24/la-cia-alerte-sur-des-drones-russes-visant-lespagne-la-france-ou-litalie ;
   i24news : «Les États-Unis alertent l’Europe sur une possible attaque de drones russes depuis la Méditerranée», https://www.i24news.tv/fr/actu/international/artc-les-etats-unis-alertent-l-europe-sur-une-possible-attaque-de-drones-russes-depuis-la-mediterranee ;
   Meduza, sur le démenti italien : https://meduza.io/en/feature/2026/09/24/no-one-needs-more-fuel-on-the-fire-italy-pushes-back-on-report-that-cia-warned-of-possible-russian-sea-launched-drone-attacks
2. Sur le renseignement allié avant l’offensive des Ardennes : U.S. Army, «Third Army G2 predicts Battle of the Bulge, 9 December 1944», https://www.army.mil/article/116038/third_army_g2_predicts_battle_of_the_bulge_9_december_1944 ;
   Carlo D’Este, «December 16, 1944 : Ardennes Offensive Begins, An “Abysmal Failure of Allied Intelligence”», https://www.thehistoryreader.com/military-history/december-16-1944-ardennes-offensive-begins-abysmal-failure-allied-intelligence/
   DVIDS, «First Army in the Battle of the Bulge», https://www.dvidshub.net/news/printable/385060 ;
   David T. Zabecki, «Patton at Bastogne», The Intelligencer (AFIO), vol. 29, n° 2, 2024, https://afio.com/publications/eprints_2024/ZABECKI_Patton_at_Bastogne_AFIO_INTELLIGENCER_Vol29_No2_SummerFall_2024.pdf ;
   Oscar W. Koch, G-2 : Intelligence for Patton, 1971.
   The Army Air Forces in World War II, vol. III, chap. 19, Third Army G2 Predicts Battle of the Bulge, First Army in the Battle of the Bulge, D’Este, The History Reader.
3. «Gerbera (drone)», Wikipédia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gerbera_(drone)

Publiéà l’origine par  Reseau International

Europa teatraliza la guerra con Rusia mientras su orden liberal se derrumba: un ritual de miedo sin promesa de redención, camino a la autodestrucción.

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MSIa Informa, 29 de septiembre de 2026.-En un arrebato de simulación, durante la Cumbre Europea del Ártico, realizada en Rovaniemi, Finlandia, líderes europeos se mostraron vistiendo ropas militares para transmitir claramente el mensaje de que estarían preparados para un enfrentamiento con Rusia. Mientras tanto, la maquinaria política y mediática de las principales capitales europeas repite, casi al unísono, la alerta contra la supuesta “amenaza rusa” representada por Vladímir Putin.

La propia declaración oficial de la Cumbre de Rovaniemi, realizada los días 13 y 14 de septiembre de 2026, acordó que la seguridad es el centro de las discusiones e insistió en la necesidad de fortalecer la presencia y la capacidad europeas en el Ártico, región considerada estratégica para la seguridad de todo el continente.

Pero hay algo profundamente más inquietante en esta escenificación. Esos dirigentes se disfrazan de portavoces de sociedades movilizadas para la guerra cuando gobiernan países profundamente divididos y desafían una creciente erosión de la confianza política. La distancia entre la retórica de los líderes y la disposición real de las sociedades que pretenden representar debería, por sí sola, recomendar prudencia. En lugar de eso, asistimos a la construcción de una atmósfera psicológica de choque. Y es justamente ahí donde comienza el peligro.

El riesgo real de autodestrucción

En primer lugar, simulan poder porque Europa no dispone hoy de todas las condiciones industriales necesarias para sostener autónomamente una movilización militar prolongada en la escala sugerida por la actual retórica de rearme. El propio esfuerzo europeo por reconstruir reservas, aumentar la producción de municiones y recuperar capacidad industrial demuestra hasta qué punto esa estructura ha sido reducida en las últimas décadas. Pero la cuestión más grave no es industrial. Es estratégica.

La Federación Rusa dispone de un enorme arsenal nuclear y ha desarrollado sistemas de ataques avanzados, incluso hipersónicos. Eso no significa que Rusia posea superioridad tecnológica en todos los campos, pero sí algo mucho más importante para esta reflexión: cualquier guerra directa entre la OTAN y Rusia involucraría fuerzas capaces de provocar una destrucción de escala civilizacional. Rusia y Estados Unidos siguen concentrando la abrumadora mayoría de las ojivas nucleares existentes, al mismo tiempo que los principales Estados nucleares modernizan sus arsenales y se debilitan los mecanismos de control de armas. Por lo tanto, tratar una confrontación directa entre Rusia y la OTAN como si fuera apenas una opción más de política exterior no es una demostración de valentía. Es jugar con una posibilidad cercana de autodestrucción.

Cuando se atraviesa cierto umbral, ya no existe garantía de que los acontecimientos permanezcan bajo el control de quienes los iniciaron. Éste es el punto que parece desaparecer de la actual teatralización belicista. Y hay algo todavía más perturbador. El lenguaje de la destrucción volvió a ser pronunciado abiertamente por los propios liderazgos occidentales.

En septiembre de 2026, ante la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas, el presidente Donald Trump llegó a advertir que Estados Unidos podría “aniquilar” a Irán si no se alcanzaba un acuerdo. Si una amenaza de esa naturaleza puede ser pronunciada ante las Naciones Unidas sin provocar una ruptura política proporcional a la enormidad de lo que se está diciendo, entonces algo profundamente grave está ocurriendo con la percepción occidental de los límites de la guerra. Porque la normalización del lenguaje de aniquilación no permanece necesariamente confinada al adversario contra el cual fue originalmente dirigida.

Hoy puede ser Irán. Mañana, en una espiral de escalada que nadie consiga ya controlar, podrían ser ciudades europeas. Es en este sentido que los actuales delirios belicistas dejan de ser una escenificación política y pasan a representar un peligro concreto de autodestrucción de la propia civilización europea. Europa, que durante siglos fue uno de los centros fundamentales de la civilización occidental, atravesó dos guerras mundiales y conoció directamente lo que significa transformar rivalidades políticas en guerras de aniquilación. Justamente por eso, cabría esperar que sus liderazgos fueran los primeros en comprender que una guerra entre potencias nucleares no ofrece una segunda oportunidad para corregir errores de cálculo.

Sin embargo, vemos dirigentes jugando con símbolos militares, discursos de movilización, enemigos existenciales y horizontes de confrontación como si aún estuviéramos en el mundo anterior a Hiroshima. La ficción consiste precisamente en eso: representar la guerra como un instrumento político todavía disponible sin enfrentar el final de aquello que semejante guerra podría significar. Y si la confrontación escapa al control, no serán solo gobiernos, partidos o alianzas militares quienes pagarán el precio. Podría ser la propia civilización que esos dirigentes afirman estar defendiendo.

¿Quién necesita la amenaza?

Entonces, preguntemos: ¿quién está detrás de toda esta falsedad? ¿Quién alimenta esta representación? ¿Quién necesita esta atmósfera permanente de amenaza? ¿Y por qué un orden político resquebrajado, sin legitimidad, parece encontrar en la perspectiva de la guerra una de las últimas coartadas para justificar su perennidad? La respuesta más ingenua consistiría en explicar esa patología en la tentativa de mantener regímenes impopulares bajo una imaginaria amenaza externa, al mismo tiempo que se condenan o reprimen fuerzas políticas emergentes, acusadas de “agentes externos” o instrumentos de una potencia enemiga; en este caso, vinculadas a la “bestia” rusa.

Hay, ciertamente, algo de eso. La historia registra numerosos ejemplos de gobiernos que recurren a la amenaza externa para reajustar cohesiones internas deterioradas, desacreditar adversarios y justificar medidas que, en circunstancias normales, encontrarían mayor resistencia. Pero esa explicación es insuficiente. Cuando hablamos de crisis, no nos referimos solamente a la legitimidad de un grupo de líderes europeos. La descomposición alcanza al propio sistema que los llevó al poder. Y es precisamente ese sistema el que se derrumba.

Desmoronamiento del orden liberal-financiero

El llamado “mundo basado en reglas”, la globalización financiera, el libre comercio elevado a dogma y la paulatina sustitución de la economía productiva por la intermediación financiera confrontan hoy el retorno del Estado nacional soberano. Este resurgimiento prioriza la política industrial, la seguridad energética, las cadenas productivas estratégicas y la defensa de los intereses económicos propios. Paradójicamente, dicho centralismo estatal podría mostrar también un camino para que Occidente recupere parte de sus raíces civilizatorias – esencialmente cristianas –, en las cuales el poder político no se concebía como algo absoluto, sino sometido a un orden moral superior.

En el fondo, detrás de estas quimeras se vislumbra una grieta aún más profunda: la crisis del modelo liberal-financiero articulado en torno a bancos centrales “independientes”. Esta lógica ha consolidado la creciente autonomía del capital frente a los Estados nacionales, impulsada por una concepción económica que, durante décadas, desplazó progresivamente el eje de la riqueza desde la producción real hasta llegar a la especulación rentista.

Las raíces de este entramado se remontan a la gestación del orden comercial angloholandés de los siglos XVII y XVIII, proyectado más tarde a escala global a través de la expansión imperial y bancaria británica. Con el paso del tiempo, ese modelo adquirió nuevas formas, pero conservó una característica esencial: la capacidad del poder financiero de proyectarse como una realidad exógena a la política y de presentar sus decisiones bajo la rúbrica de técnicas, neutrales e independientes de las elecciones soberanas de la sociedad. Es justamente esa arquitectura camuflada la que hoy comienza a ser cuestionada.

Una religión secular sin promesa de redención

El cerebro oculto de las oligarquías occidentales ha perdido la capacidad de generar ideas y proyectos capaces de movilizar a las sociedades hacia un horizonte prometedor. Esta esterilidad se refleja también en la mediocridad de gran parte de los liderazgos actuales, convertidos en meros administradores de un orden involutivo antes que en creadores de una nueva realidad política. Así, la política liberal se ha transformado en una especie de religión secular sin promesa de redención, siendo esta, tal vez, una de sus características más inquietantes.

Los grandes movimientos políticos de los siglos XIX y XX, incluso cuando condujeron a sociedades enteras hacia la catástrofe, todavía prometían alguna forma de redención histórica: la sociedad sin clases, la grandeza nacional, el imperio, la revolución, el hombre nuevo o un orden futuro supuestamente definitivo. En cambio, la religión secular del orden liberal en descomposición ya ni siquiera ofrece eso. Exige sacrificios sin presentar un paraíso futuro: demanda empobrecimiento en nombre de la estabilidad, pérdida de soberanía en nombre de las reglas, desindustrialización en nombre de la eficiencia y censura en nombre de la democracia. Finalmente, admite incluso el riesgo de la guerra para preservar un orden cuya finalidad ya no es capaz de explicar.

Ya no existe una verdadera promesa de redención. Existe solo la promesa de que el sistema seguirá existiendo. “Nosotros somos el jardín del Edén; el resto es la selva”. En ese punto, la política deja de defender a la sociedad y exige de la sociedad un sacrificio ciego para ¡defender el sistema! Es precisamente ahí donde una religión secular puede volverse autodestructiva: cuando la conservación del orden existente vale más que la conservación de quienes viven esclavizados bajo ese orden.

De la minoría creadora a la minoría dominante

Tal vez éste sea uno de los signos más profundos de agotamiento civilizatorio. Una élite deja de ser creadora cuando ya no consigue imaginar un futuro distinto de la simple continuación de sí misma, el gran historiador británico Arnold Toynbee percibió con enorme profundidad este fenómeno al distinguir la minoría creadora de la minoría dominante.

Una minoría creadora ejerce liderazgo porque ofrece respuestas capaces de inspirar adhesión. Su autoridad nace de su capacidad de responder a los desafíos históricos y producir nuevas formas de organización, cultura y de sentido del ser. Cuando esa capacidad desaparece, la antigua minoría creadora puede convertirse en una minoría dominante. Ya no conduce porque inspira. Se conserva porque controla. La persuasión es progresivamente sustituida por la disciplina; la imaginación, por la administración; el proyecto, por la propaganda; y la confianza, por el miedo. Es en ese momento cuando el sistema corre el riesgo de transformar su propia crisis en justificación para seguir existiendo. Cuanto más fracasa, más exige poder. Cuanto más pierde legitimidad, más necesita enemigos. Cuanto menos consigue imaginar un futuro, más dramáticamente necesita presentar el presente como una batalla existencial.

Cuando lo temporal ocupa el lugar de lo trascendente

Aquí es donde la reflexión del filósofo y politólogo germano-estadounidense Eric Voegelin (1901–1985) sobre las religiones políticas converge con la de Toynbee acerca de la desintegración de las civilizaciones. Cuando una sociedad pierde el referente de un orden trascendente, la necesidad humana de lo absoluto no se desvanece; simplemente se transfiere. La nación, la raza, la clase, el partido, la revolución, el mercado, las “reglas” o la democracia – entendida ya no en tanto régimen político, sino como categoría moral absoluta –: cualquier realidad temporal puede ser sacralizada y elevada a un estatus que no admite cuestionamiento. En este proceso, lo mundano usurpa el lugar de lo trascendente.

Sin embargo, existe una diferencia decisiva entre los antiguos movimientos políticos y esta potencial religión secular de un orden agotado. Los primeros prometían una redención futura, mientras que esta última parece exigir el sacrificio presente con el único fin de evitar el colapso del sistema. Se trata de una religión secular desprovista de escatología: sin paraíso, sin un hombre nuevo y sin un horizonte genuinamente inédito. Su único porvenir es la prolongación indefinida del presente.

Cuando el miedo sustituye a la imaginación

Tal vez sea exactamente esa ausencia de futuro la que explique la creciente importancia del miedo: al enemigo externo, a la ruptura, a la disidencia y a la pérdida de control. El temor a que aquello presentado durante décadas como inevitable deje súbitamente de serlo. Cuando un orden ya no consigue generar esperanza, se ve obligado a infundir pavor. Y si el terror sustituye a la imaginación, el conflicto puede convertirse en una vía de legitimación.

La guerra, entonces, deja de ser solo un instrumento externo de política para transformarse en una necesidad interna del sistema. Es justamente ahí donde los delirios belicistas contemporáneos adquieren una dimensión mucho más profunda que el debate cotidiano sobre Rusia, Ucrania, la OTAN o los gastos militares; la cuestión es civilizacional. Un orden que perdió la capacidad de proyectar su propio porvenir puede comenzar a aceptar riesgos que, en condiciones normales, parecerían impensables. Puede terminar confundiendo la continuidad de sus estructuras con la de la propia civilización.

Esta confusión es, tal vez, una de las más peligrosas que una élite pueda cometer. Las instituciones, los regímenes económicos y los esquemas políticos son históricos, mientras que las civilizaciones trascienden a todos ellos. Cuando un engranaje pasa a exigir que la humanidad se arriesgue para garantizar su propia supervivencia, la relación entre medios y fines se ha invertido por completo.

Las señales de un cambio de época

Es en este punto donde resulta posible hablar, verdaderamente, de autodestrucción. Una civilización puede comenzar a destruirse no por haber dejado de creer, sino porque transformó su propio orden histórico en un objeto de fe absoluta. Cuando los dirigentes dejan de proyectar un futuro diferente al que administran; cuando la guerra sustituye a la política y el miedo reemplaza al proyecto; cuando la conservación de las instituciones es más importante que las personas para quienes fueron creadas, no estamos solo ante una crisis política o económica. Nos enfrentamos a una profunda debacle civilizatoria.

El momento en que una élite pierde la capacidad de idear, crear y persuadir suele ser la señal premonitoria de que una época termina. Sin embargo, esto no significa necesariamente que la civilización esté condenada; puede implicar exactamente lo contrario. Indica que las estructuras incapaces de responder a los desafíos del presente están abriendo espacio para otras formas de organización, nuevas ideas y la recuperación de virtudes que parecían olvidados. Al fin y al cabo, el agotamiento creativo de un orden no agota la capacidad de invención humana. Cuando quienes gobiernan ya no conciben nada más allá de su propia perpetuación, quizá sea ese, precisamente, el primer indicio de que algo nuevo – completamente nuevo – está por llegar.

By John J. MEARSHEIMER

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

The Trump administration and its supporters – including the Wall Street Journal editorial page – are working overtime these days to spin the news around the Iran war to make it appear that the US is winning and Tehran had better submit to Washington’s demands before it is wrecked, maybe even “annihilated.” Indeed, Trump is preparing the option of bringing the military hammer down on Iran after the midterm elections if Tehran has not surrendered by then.

In effect, Trump and his supporters are waging a “maximum pressure campaign” against Iran in the mainstream media.

This campaign is sure to fail. If anything, it reflects the Trump administration’s desperation. The president started a war the United States was bound to lose, and there is little he can do now to change that basic fact.

Trump’s propaganda campaign has two dimensions – one economic and the other military.

First, the administration argues that Iran is being economically strangled by the US naval blockade coupled with Operation Economic Outcast, the strategy announced by Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent on 24 August 2026. At the same time, it maintains that oil is once again flowing out of the Gulf at rates not far below those that prevailed on 27 February 2026. The implications are obvious: the economic punishment being inflicted on Iran will force it to capitulate soon, while the US economy – and the international community more generally – is well on its way to recovery.

Second, the US is now building up its military forces for a massive military strike after the mid-term elections, when Trump will be free of electoral constraints. This growing threat of a devastating US attack, coupled with the economic pain being inflicted on Iran, is designed to get Tehran to quit now, before its situation becomes even worse.

There are huge problems with this strategy. It sounds persuasive when the mainstream media dutifully purveys it, but it falls apart when one looks closely at what is actually happening.

Consider the military dimension. The headlines say the US is sending 10,000 additional troops and a third aircraft carrier – the USS Theodore Roosevelt – to the Persian Gulf region, creating the impression that Iran will soon be confronting three American carriers. Moreover, the additional troops – on top of the roughly 50,000 US troops already in the region – are portrayed as evidence that Trump is seriously considering putting boots on the ground.

The aircraft carrier story, however, is quite different from what the headlines suggest. The Roosevelt is reportedly being sent to replace the USS George Washington, while the supposed third carrier, the USS George H.W. Bush, has already left the Middle East and is now in Thailand. Thus, there is presently only one carrier in the region. Indeed, this is the first time during the war that the US has only one carrier in the Middle East, and it is difficult to imagine that there will be more than two – if even that many – after the midterm elections.

The larger problem is that the Iran war is severely straining the US Navy. Its senior leaders warn that the current operational tempo is not sustainable indefinitely. Carriers and other warships are being rotated through extremely long deployments, which cause significant maintenance and readiness problems that will have to be addressed at some point. This problem is compounded by the fact that US ships have lost access to nearby logistics facilities and increasingly depend on a supply chain that reaches back to Diego Garcia, which is about 2,500 miles from the Persian Gulf.

But even if three carriers are available to strike Iran, what could they accomplish in a renewed air campaign that the US and Israel could not accomplish together during the failed 40-day bombing campaign between 28 February and 8 April 2026? Some might argue that the US could finally destroy Iran’s oil infrastructure. The problem, however, is that Iran retains a second-strike capability and could retaliate by wreaking havoc on the oil infrastructure of the GCC states. One shudders to think what the consequences would be for the international economy.

On top of all this, the US faces a serious shortage of high-end weaponry, which is one of the main reasons it ended the 40-day bombing campaign and has shied away in recent weeks from engaging in tit-for-tat bombing exchanges with Iran. One would think that the shortage of critical munitions – both for striking Iran and defending against Iranian retaliation – would limit the scope and intensity of any renewed strategic bombing campaign, thereby reducing its chances of success.

Regarding ground forces, simply counting the number of U.S. military personnel in the Middle East is misleading when assessing the possibility of putting boots on the ground. What matters most in a ground war is the number of troops in actual ground-combat formations. I estimate that, of the roughly 50,000 U.S. military personnel already stationed in the region, about 5,000 belong to such formations: roughly 2,200 Marines and sailors in the 11th MEU, 2,000 soldiers from the 82nd Airborne, and possibly another 800 Army personnel in Kuwait associated with Task Force Spartan. Of the roughly 10,000 additional personnel now being sent to the region, another 2,200 belong to the 13th MEU. Most of the remainder are sailors assigned to the Theodore Roosevelt carrier and its supporting warships. Thus, given present deployment plans, I estimate that by late November the United States will have just under 7,500 personnel in ground-combat formations in the Gulf region—roughly 4,400 in the two MEUs and 2,800 Army personnel.

There is no way a ground force that small provides a promising option against a country with Iran’s population and geography. Even tripling that number to roughly 23,000—which is highly unlikely—would not fundamentally alter the problem. Retired Army General Barry McCaffrey estimates that securing the Strait of Hormuz would require roughly 150,000 troops and three to six months of fighting. For comparison, Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022 with roughly 190,000 military personnel, and that force proved insufficient to hold much of the territory Russia initially captured. Iran has more than twice the population Ukraine had at the beginning of the Russian invasion, and its geography is considerably more forbidding for an invading army.

Simply put, the United States has not assembled anything remotely resembling the ground force required for a large-scale invasion of Iran. Indeed, from Tehran’s perspective, an American decision to launch such an offensive with anything resembling the forces presently available would present Iran with an opportunity to fight the United States under exceptionally favorable circumstances.

At the risk of beating a dead horse, two further points are in order. First, given how unpopular the Iran war is with the American public, there would almost certainly be a huge uproar if large numbers of US soldiers began coming home in body bags. Second, how are the Marines, who are aboard amphibious assault ships, supposed to land on Iranian territory if the missile and drone threat from Iran is forcing the US Navy to keep those large and vulnerable ships far from the Iranian coast?

Let’s turn to the economic dimension. There is no question that the US is doing great damage to Iran’s economy and inflicting enormous hardship on the Iranian people. But that has been true for a long time. The key question is whether that punishment can coerce Iran into surrendering to American demands.

There is no evidence that Iran is caving in to American pressure, and there are three reasons to doubt that it will. First, it is exceedingly difficult to find a case in the historical record in which an economic blockade by itself caused the target state to surrender. Second, Iran sees the US and Israel as existential threats to Iran – hardly surprising given the genocidal language Trump has used when talking about Iran – and states that believe their survival is at stake are exceptionally difficult to coerce. Third, Iran has a formidable escalation option if the economic pain becomes too great: it can attack the oil and gas infrastructure of the Gulf states and Israel, as well as their highly vulnerable desalination plants.

In short, it is difficult to see economic pressure alone forcing Iran to accept Trump’s terms. That is probably one reason the United States is once again talking about using military force. But, as I argued above, that option holds little promise of producing a favorable outcome.

Finally, there is no question that more oil is flowing out of the Gulf today than was the case in early September. But both Iran and the Houthis are working hard to reverse that trend. Iran is attacking US-escorted tankers on a daily basis, while the Houthis are targeting vital oil infrastructure inside Saudi Arabia. Moreover, despite the increased flow of oil out of the Gulf, gasoline prices remain very high, and a host of other economic problems show no signs of easing anytime soon, including high diesel prices, persistent inflation, elevated mortgage rates, and dangerously high bond yields across much of the West.

All of this is to say that the Trump administration has powerful economic incentives to shut this war down as soon as possible. Indeed, it would hardly be surprising if there were a growing sense of desperation behind closed doors among Trump and his advisers.

This, of course, helps explain why the Trump administration and its allies are waging a media campaign designed to persuade Iran that its days are numbered and that it had better concede to American demands before it is too late. The facts, however, tell a different story. The success of this strategy therefore depends on Trump being able to bamboozle the Iranians into believing that Godzilla is closing in on them. There is little reason to think Tehran will be hoodwinked.

Original article:  mearsheimer.substack.com

From 'birthing persons' to 'white tears' and 'zero tolerance', woke jargon is baffling by design. In the Mail, Andrew Doyle offers an A to Z guide to decoding the language of wokeness.

The post The A-Z of Woke: Your Essential Guide to the Language of the Permanently Offended appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.

By Craig MURRAY

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

Rather than abandoning the plainly nuts Fairford narrative, Burnham and his government are doubling down on the claim it is an Iranian terror plot.

It remains quite possible the men were indeed fuel thieves, simply stealing fuel from farms. They appear to have been equipped for fuel theft and all they were carrying was petrol. It is worth a footnote that there is a very real history of US military personnel, and indeed British personnel, selling military fuel from bases. Stolen red diesel meant for HMS Bulwark fuelled fairground rides throughout England, which I think is rather lovely. But if the Fairford Five were fuel thieves, farms are more probable as the target.

We should pause here to acknowledge that USAF Fairford is falsely designated RAF Fairford, itself a propaganda lie, just like “RAF Lakenheath” or “RAF Mildenhall”. The UK is full of US military bases, on which US law applies. (My birth certificate gives my father’s occupation as “Clerk USAF”. He was employed at Mildenhall at the time).

It is a classic example of state propaganda that the petrol discovered in the Fairford vans was described by counter terror police as a potential accelerant for a bomb.

Well yes, petrol is that. It has however, rather more obvious uses too. The same technique was used at the height of the War on Terror propaganda in the Great Easter Bomb Plot, that never was. Police rounded up and arrested many young Muslims across the Manchester region, which was front-page news. They were all later released without charge.

But at the time of arrest the police announced they had found a potential bomb-making ingredient in a kitchen.

Well, they had. It was a bag of sugar. Sugar is indeed a potential bomb-making ingredient. Yet most of us have a bag in the kitchen. At least it did not take the police ten days to find the bag of sugar in the kitchen, unlike when they searched Charlie Rowley’s flat for a vial of novichok, and it took them ten days to “find” a bottle of perfume sitting on the kitchen counter.

For Fairford, on balance I think a false flag gone wrong is a little more likely than just fuel thieves. We know the men had no bombs and no guns, which makes the terrorist narrative rather hard for the government to sustain. But if they were patsies set up in a false flag, there would be plenty of things already on the base that go bang which could have been used to create the “terrorist incident” around them.

Two key points make me think this was a false flag. Firstly the lady farmer who called 999 was adamant there were more men that the five arrested and bailed. The others would have been the spycops – agents provocateurs – who would have been quietly spirited away from the scene. That also fits with the released information that it was one of the men who phoned in a warning about the “attack”.

It looks to me like a false flag spectacular had been planned, with US involvement as claimed by Trump and possibly Israeli knowledge as claimed by Netanyahu. This operation by the security services was viewed as over the pay grade of local police (who might be inconveniently honest) who were not in the picture. It all went horribly wrong for the government when an alert local farmer called the local police, and when a participant also called it in. That could have been one of the recruited “terrorists” who got cold feet, or one of the agents panicked they had lost contact with their line of command.

The use of recruited patsies to carry out false flags is now better understood. I have been writing about it since before the Newburgh bomb plot which was a particularly egregious example. In the United States there has been more awareness of and reaction to agent provocateur incited plots than in the UK.

For anyone sceptical, here is a summary of Newburgh:

In May 2009 the FBI arrested four poor men from Newburgh, New York, and announced it had foiled a plot to bomb two synagogues in the Bronx and shoot down military planes at Stewart Air National Guard base. The plot, the targets, the inert bombs and the disabled Stinger missile were all supplied by the Bureau. The recruiter was Shahed Hussain, a Pakistani fraudster who had become an informant to avoid deportation after a driving-licence scam. Paid nearly $100,000, he spent more than a year fishing at a Newburgh mosque, posing as a wealthy Jaish-e-Mohammed agent, before latching onto James Cromitie, a Walmart stocker and petty drug dealer.

Hussain offered heavenly reward and as much as $250,000. Cromitie brought in three others: Onta Williams, David Williams and Laguerre Payen. Hussain drove them across a state line to inspect the fake weapons, which federalised the charges and carried a 25-year minimum. They were convicted in 2010.

The sentencing judge, Colleen McMahon, said she believed beyond a shadow of a doubt that there would have been no crime except that the government instigated it, planned it and brought it to fruition. In 2023 she ordered the release of three of them, calling it an FBI-orchestrated conspiracy and writing that the real lead conspirator was the United States. She freed Cromitie in 2024 on the same basis, describing him as a small-time grifter with no history of violence and Hussain as a villain who had lured him with promises of both heavenly and earthly rewards.

The Golders Green ambulances arson was a classic of this false flag genre. Four young Muslims were recruited, in this case online rather than in person, by someone they never saw who was almost certainly a Mossad agent. They were offered money to attack the ambulances, which they did. The attack is then blamed on Iran through a claim on a Telegram channel on behalf of an “Iranian organisation”, Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamia, which is a Mossad fabrication.

HAYI first became known to the world through simultaneous press releases on 16 March by five Israeli government outlets in Israel, US and UK (including BICOM) and an article by the Israeli front “Foundation for Defending Democracy”. The FDD’s Nick Stewart travels with Kushner and Witkoff as part of the US negotiating team on the Middle East.

There are numerous reasons for doubting the real existence of HAYI. None of its material is in Farsi. All of its “attacks” have been minor arson attacks on pointless targets that hurt nobody. The grammar, calligraphy and imagery of its materials are all wrong.

The UK state itself has now debunked some of the Mossad HAYI narrative. On 29 April, when Essa Suleiman stabbed three men, the entire media blocked out the first Muslim victim and claimed an antisemitic terrorist attack on the two in Golders Green. The HAYI Mossad run “Iranian” Telegram channel immediately put out a statement claiming responsibility for the attack. But yesterday police and prosecution were forced to drop the claim it was a terrorist attack at all. The stabbing of the Muslim is charged as attempted murder, though still ignored by the media. So “HAYI” claimed responsibility for a non-existent terrorist incident.

A false flag can be, but is not necessarily, the state planting a bomb and then blaming someone else. It can be more complex – the state recruiting people to plant bombs. Those people may believe they are genuinely part of an ideological campaign, or may just be doing it for money.

The opaque Starmer rent-boy arson plot, in which Ukrainian male models burnt property associated with Keir Starmer, remains unclear, largely because any discussion of what lay behind the attacks was banned by the judge in the trial. But the media, with government encouragement, continually relays the story that the arsonists were recruited online by a man known as “El Money”. An interesting twist here is that the media constantly refer to him as Russian-speaking. But the evidence in court is that he spoke both Russian and Ukrainian.

Almost all adult Ukrainians can speak Russian. The number of Russians who speak Ukrainian is very small. Yet El Money is now routinely portrayed as Russian.

Which brings us to the whole question of Russian “hybrid attacks”, where we are asked to believe the narrative of the security services of states whose leaders are openly promoting war with Russia, about desultory and mysterious attacks. The rather sorry Leipzig drone is a good example. We have a more recent claim of Russian arson from Estonia, a state which has instituted massive discrimination against the 29% of its population who speak Russian.

Not only has Estonia closed Russian schools, libraries, theatres, churches, cinemas and university courses, it even refuses passports to people born and bred in Estonia, whose parents were born and bred in Estonia, if they cannot speak Estonian. That is totally contrary to numerous UN, Council of Europe and OSCE instruments on protection of minority linguistic rights.

It is one thing to insist on language qualification for citizenship for new immigrants. Many countries do. It is quite another thing to deny citizenship to a native linguistic minority. Estonia was part of Russia from 1721 to 1919 and of the Soviet Union from 1941 to 1991. It has Russian speakers.

So I decline to believe the Estonian government on Russian “hybrid attacks”.

Which brings us to the amazing “FlyDubai” hijacking and the heroic plumber who knew how to rescue a plane from a death dive because he watched Air Crash Investigation.

There are real problems with this narrative. One is that the plane is said to have dived approximately 15,000 feet in about 30 seconds. This is said to be confirmed by independent flight trackers.

The force was so enormous that the rudder ripped off the plane.

Picture a dive of 500 feet – that is more than a 40 storey building – per second. Picture that. 500 feet in a second. Imagine yourself falling that fast. The forces would be enormous inside the cabin. Anybody not strapped in would be lifted right out of their seats and probably hit the ceiling. Many would be injured. Any unfastened object, including major ones like food trollies, would be hurled about with great force. Baggage lockers would come unlocked as the weight of the bags inside was hurled up. Remember this dive ripped the rudder off. It would be impossible for anyone not strapped into their chair to keep their footing or seat.

We have a great many videos from on board the plane but nothing like this is shown. No video shows this kind of extreme situation, and the cabin at the end of the flight is remarkably undisturbed.

There is also a problem with that flight-tracking data. As pointed out by this commercial pilot on CNN, a plan can’t easily slow down in mid-air. He is disbelieving of how quickly the flight trackers show the plane returning to normal speed. He is also deeply sceptical of the ability to control the plane after the rudder came off due to loss of hydraulic fluid, and of the chances of the airframe staying together. Now compare that to the lack of cabin tumult.

I have seen it argued that if you entered the dive very gently and carefully without sudden change of pitch, and exited it similarly smoothly, then you would avoid extreme G-forces and the cabin might be relatively undisturbed. Even if so, it is hard to imagine the kind of smooth transition into the dive in the circumstances we are told were occurring in the cockpit, with the co-pilot deliberately putting the plane in a death dive while fighting with the pilot.

The smooth transition out of the dive in the official story was achieved by a plumber who knew what to do from watching Air Crash Investigation. I don’t think I need to comment on that.

We will never find out the truth about FlyDubai. The plane diverted to Saudi Arabia. The copilot who is being painted as an Islamic extremist will be isolated there and tortured by the Saudis. Netanyahu has already said Israel will join the interrogation. Do not believe any confession or evidence from the co-pilot.

The plane was a Boeing, so the USA will join the initial investigation alongside UAE, Saudi Arabia and Israel. A more potent coalition of Zionist evil does not exist. We will certainly have faked flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder evidence coming from that shower.

I do feel something has snapped in people’s willingness to believe official narratives. The Skripal narrative was even more crazy than any of these, but most people still trusted government. Thankfully that faith has been seriously shaken.

Original article:  www.craigmurray.org.uk

L’obiettivo è, oggi come un anno fa, quello di creare una pressione mediatica e politica per la confisca dei 210 miliardi di assett russi da dare all’Ucraina. L’obiettivo è dunque, ancora una volta, preparare gli italiani alla guerra contro la Russia. 

Segue nostro Telegram.

Esattamente un anno fa, il primo settembre 2025, media e agenzie europee riportavano una notizia choc: attentato contro Ursula von der Leyen, hacker russi manomettono il gps del suo aereo a Plovdik, nel sud della Bulgaria. Piloti costretti ad atterrare avvalendosi di “mappe cartacee” e “metodi tradizionali”.

L’informazione, comunicata in conferenza dalla stessa portavoce della von der Leyen, venne smentita poco dopo da Flight Radar, il più importante sito di tracking aereo.

Valse a poco. La narrazione era stata avviata e nessuna smentita ufficiale riuscì a bloccarla. Ebbe inizio una stagione di avvistamenti mai confermati, verificati e dimostrati di “droni russi” nei pressi di aeroporti e basi militari di tutte le città europee.

Il bombardamento di tali notizie, con il richiamo continuo al “jamming contro l’aereo di Ursula von der Leyen” (questa la formula utilizzata dai media), contribuì a creare tra l’opinione pubblica europea un clima di paura e ostilità nei confronti della Russia, favorire un sentimento di empatia verso il punto di vista ucraino (le richieste del presidente Zelensky) e, in definitiva, rendere legittimo e accettabile il rischio derivante dalla confisca degli assett russi detenuti in UE (circa 210 miliardi di euro) per finanziare l’Ucraina.

La ferma opposizione del Belgio scongiurò tale decisione e il 19 dicembre il Consiglio europeo optò per un prestito da 90 miliardi da raccogliere emettendo debito europeo. Dopo ciò gli avvistamenti terminarono.

A un anno di distanza, si torna a parlare dei beni russi congelati. E si torna a parlare di “attentati russi”.

Con una lettera, 122 eurodeputati di diversi schieramenti hanno chiesto ai leader UE di riaprire i negoziati sull’uso dei beni russi congelati per sostenere l’Ucraina. Nonostante il sostegno economico e finanziario dei partner europei, Kiev ha un buco di 23 miliardi di euro nei finanziamenti per la difesa. I Paesi UE sono riluttanti a stanziare nuovi fondi dai propri bilanci nazionali.

Secondo quanto riporta Euronews, i firmatari sollecitano la Commissione europea a presentare una nuova proposta che superi le obiezioni sollevate dal Belgio e altri stati.

“La Russia deve sopportare le conseguenze finanziarie della sua guerra di aggressione”, si legge nel testo visionato dai giornalisti di Euronews.

La proposta è quella di trasferire i beni in un “nuovo strumento dell’UE che assumerebbe le obbligazioni giuridiche nei confronti della banca centrale russa. In questo modo si garantirebbe sostegno finanziario all’Ucraina mantenendo al tempo stesso la pressione economica su Mosca”.

La lettera è firmata da alcuni rappresentanti del Partito Popolare Europeo, di Renew Europe, dei Socialisti e Democratici, dei Verdi/ALE, dei Conservatori e Riformisti europei e del gruppo The Left, su iniziativa dei liberali Karin Karlsbro, Nathalie Loiseau e Petras Auštrevi?ius.

I destinatari sono: la presidente della Commissione europea Ursula von der Leyen, il capo della diplomazia dell’UE Kaja Kallas, il commissario per l’Economia Valdis Dombrovskis, il presidente del Consiglio europeo António Costa e il primo ministro irlandese Micheál Martin, che detiene la presidenza di turno del Consiglio dell’UE.

La lettera è stata inviata mercoledì. Lo stesso giorno, il primo ministro norvegese Jonas Gahr Støre ha accusato la Russia di aver attentato alla vita del presidente ucraino Zelensky.

“Il suo aereo è stato quasi colpito da un drone mentre stava per decollare dalla Moldavia. Questa è la realtà che si trova ad affrontare”, ha detto Støre, senza specificare la fonte dell’informazione né quanto vicino fosse arrivato il drone.

Questa versione è stata prontamente smentita dalla Moldavia, che non parla di attacco, ma di ritardo.

“Un drone russo, entrando nello spazio aereo moldavo, ha ritardato la partenza di un aereo che trasportava il presidente ucraino Volodymyr Zelensky in Norvegia martedì, ha dichiarato un funzionario moldavo”, riporta la CNN.

L’aereo di Zelensky non era in volo, ma sulla pista dell’aeroporto di Chisinau. L’intrusione del drone ha causato un ritardo di oltre un’ora. Solo dopo il suo schianto, avvenuto a circa 160Km da Chisinau, le autorità aeroportuali hanno autorizzato il decollo.

La versione delle autorità moldave non è compatibile con l’allarme lanciato dal primo ministro norvegese. L’intrusione non ha messo a rischio neanche per un momento la vita di Zelensky, ne ha soltanto ritardato la partenza di poco più di un’ora. Gli stessi ucraini ridimensionano gli allarmismi sull’episodio.

Inoltre, l’ambasciatore moldavo negli USA Vladislav Kulminski, interrogato dalla CNN sulla possibilità che il drone avesse come obiettivo il presidente ucraino, ha risposto che è in corso un’indagine ed è “troppo presto per dirlo”.

Per il momento pare che la natura del sorvolo fosse di intelligence, non un attacco.

Ciò non ha impedito alla stampa di speculare sulla notizia, per provocare un impatto choc sull’opinione pubblica. Ad esempio Repubblica ha aperto la prima pagina con il titolo a caratteri cubitali:

“ATTENTATO A ZELENSKY”.”L’aereo del presidente ucraino partito dalla Moldova e diretto a Oslo obiettivo di un drone russo. “Se vince Mosca vi terrorizzerà tutti”.

La Stampa titola: “Drone sfiora il volo di Zelensky”. L’incipit è drammatico: “Volodymyr Zelensky ha rischiato di morire”.

Poco importa che l’aereo non fosse affatto in volo e che una fonte del governo di Kiev abbia definito “esagerato” il rischio di vita.

L’obiettivo è non è riportare i fatti, analizzarli, fare previsioni. È mettere in moto una narrazione, mirare alla pancia dell’opinione pubblica per diffondere panico e ostilità, alimentare l’idea che la Russia sia un pericolo per il resto dell’Europa e che i cavalli dei cosacchi – probabilmente – si abbevereranno alla fontana di Trevi se non rinunciamo a ciò che resta della sanità e della scuola pubblica, per mandare i nostri  Samp-T e Storm Shadow a Kiev.

L’obiettivo è, oggi come un anno fa, quello di creare una pressione mediatica e politica per la confisca dei 210 miliardi di assett russi da dare all’Ucraina. L’obiettivo è dunque, ancora una volta, preparare gli italiani alla guerra contro la Russia.

Articolo originale  lantidiplomatico.it

Peace cannot be built through uninterrupted rearmament or by forcing one side into capitulation.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

This is the first part of Mats Alexandersson’s series on war, peace, and security. The next three parts will be published during September and October on the Clarté blog.

For a long time, the United States has united economic, financial, military, and political power to secure a U.S.-centered capitalist world order. This has often been legitimized with what has been called liberal hegemony: a rhetoric in which democracy, individual rights, market economy, and international rules are presented as universal norms. But in practice, these principles have repeatedly been subordinated to the demand to preserve American supremacy and prevent rival great powers from dominating strategic regions.

What has come to be called the rules-based world order has therefore also functioned as a self-image and a language of power. The United States has ascribed to itself a special historical task: to guarantee stability, open markets, and security in the world economy. This belief in an American superiority with a special historical task has become a kind of meta-ideology. Behind this universalism, however, a more tangible class and power interest has operated, in which the American state’s geopolitical role has ultimately served the expansion and security of capital.

Two figures clearly demonstrate this line. Henry Kissinger made American realpolitik visible in its most brutal form. In Chile, the United States helped undermine Salvador Allende’s democratically elected government and subsequently supported Pinochet’s dictatorship. The same logic recurred in Cambodia, East Timor, and support for Pakistan’s military regime: democracy and human life had to give way to geopolitical control.

When Zbigniew Brzezinski in The Grand Chessboard in 1997 more sophisticatedly formulated that no rival must be allowed to dominate Eurasia, this practice became an explicit doctrine.1 The line from Kissinger to Brzezinski is therefore clear: from secret intervention to open strategy for global supremacy. It is in this development that today’s bloc formation, war economy, and growing risk of great-power war must be understood.

The painting “Die Namenlosen” (1916) by the Austrian painter Albin Egger-Lienz.
Why Eurasia is gaining additional significance

Today, Secretary of State Marco Rubio constitutes a central node in the U.S. foreign and security policy apparatus, where the White House, the Pentagon, intelligence services, NATO, and financial policy bodies cooperate. At the same time, the strategic environment is increasingly shaped by the technology and defense industry: AI, cloud, satellite, semiconductor, and weapons companies influence the technology of war, information flows, and investments. American hegemony therefore appears not only as state exercise of power, but as an intertwined military, digital, and financial system.

On Brzezinski’s map, Europe was never peripheral. In The Grand Chessboard, Eurasia is described as the decisive geopolitical playing field, and Europe as the United States’ most important bridgehead on the continent. An integrated Europe, bound to the United States through the transatlantic link and NATO, would strengthen American influence in western Eurasia. Europe therefore appears less as an independent power pole than as a strategic platform in a U.S.-led order.

This logic becomes clearest in Brzezinski’s view of Russia and Ukraine. He argued that Russia’s most important geostrategic option lay in a Western orientation, but on terms that did not make the country an equal power pole. Ukraine was given a key role as a “geopolitical pivot”: without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire, while control over Ukraine would once again give the country decisive strategic weight. Here the limitation of the great-power perspective is also visible: Ukraine has been reduced to a piece in a larger power game, despite its own political agency and right to self-determination.

Brzezinski advocated a geopolitical pluralism in Eurasia, that is, an order in which no single power may dominate the entire continent. In practice, this meant that the United States should support regional counterweights, alliances, and independent states in order to limit both a revanchist Russia and a rising China. That model can be interpreted as a strategy for balance of power, but also as a manual for playing regional actors against one another in order to preserve American supremacy.

The same approach characterized Brzezinski’s analysis of Central Asia and the Caucasus, which he described as the “Eurasian Balkans”: an area where energy, transport routes, weak states, and ethnic conflicts make the region an object of great-power rivalry. The region thus becomes primarily of strategic value to external powers, not through the local societies’ own goals. Superpower thinking turns smaller countries into objects of geopolitics rather than equal political subjects.

There is rearmament for war

The historical retrospective is needed to understand today’s situation. The war in Ukraine, Europe’s rearmament, and the growing fear of a Russian conflict with NATO cannot be explained solely as the consequence of an isolated conflict. They must also be seen against the background of the U.S.-led security order that emerged after the Cold War — an order whose goal has been to preserve American dominance in Eurasia. Today, this policy has had contradictory consequences: Russia, China, and Iran have moved closer to one another, Europe’s room for maneuver has been limited, and the risk of great-power conflict has increased.

Brzezinski’s book formulated this strategy unusually openly. The United States was to prevent a rival power or coalition from gathering sufficient strength to dominate Eurasia. This meant limiting a resurrected Russia, preventing China from becoming an equal competitor, and keeping Europe politically and militarily tied to the United States. In this perspective, NATO is not only a defense alliance, but also a tool for American power projection in Europe and its neighborhood.

The Eurasian counterweight

Cooperation between China, Russia, and Iran is more than a temporary reaction to sanctions and individual wars. China contributes industry, capital, and market; Russia contributes energy, raw materials, military capability, and geographical depth; Iran contributes regional weight and a strategic location. Their interests are not identical, and the cooperation contains clear contradictions. But the relationship between China and Russia has acquired a material foundation that makes it more durable than many Western assessments previously assumed.

Here lies an ironic consequence. A policy intended to prevent a Eurasian counterweight may have helped create it. At the same time, the United States faces its own economic tensions: large budget deficits, growing national debt, and high interest rates increase vulnerability. The dollar’s status as a reserve currency continues to provide room for maneuver, but does not eliminate the risk of a crisis of confidence. The cost of such a crisis would likely be passed on to ordinary wage earners through inflation, cutbacks, and deteriorating public services.

Europe’s dilemma

Economist Jeffrey Sachs has argued that Europe has historically had significant economic complementarity with Russia: European industry and technology could be linked to Russian energy, raw materials, and market. According to Sachs, sanctions, conflict policy, and dependence on the United States have broken this possibility and weakened Europe’s strategic independence.2

That assessment is disputed, not least because Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has drastically changed the conditions for economic cooperation. But it raises a necessary question: Can Europe formulate its own security policy, or is the continent reduced to an arena for other powers’ conflict? Sachs advocates direct diplomacy with Moscow, a clearer separation between EU foreign policy and NATO, and a European defense that is more independent and less dependent on the United States.

The risk of war

The acute danger is escalation. There is no simple or risk-free path to a military defeat for Russia, but policy continues to sharpen the confrontation. If the goal slides from Ukraine’s defense to a lasting weakening or subjugation of Russia, the risk increases that the proxy war turns into a direct conflict between nuclear powers.

Peace cannot be built through uninterrupted rearmament or by forcing one side into capitulation. A sustainable peace requires diplomacy, recognized security interests, and an international order in which no great power is given the right to dominate others. Public opinion in Europe and the United States can become decisive: when the costs of the arms race, social cutbacks, and the risk of war become clear, pressure can grow for a different course.

Les civilisations peuvent-elles rassembler les fragments d’aperçus et de savoirs plus anciens pour redonner le contexte permettant de rendre le discours moral à nouveau intelligible ?

D’après une intervention donnée à la Higher School of Economics, Moscou, 7 septembre 2026

L’avenir global est souvent présenté comme celui d’un monde multipolaire ou multi-nodal, avec l’hypothèse implicite que les États s’entendraient mieux – et résoudraient leurs différends plus facilement par la discussion que par la guerre.

Ce fut un mème largement répandu dans les années précédant la Première Guerre mondiale. Des livres furent écrits pour suggérer que la guerre ne pouvait pas avoir lieu : le texte définitif sur ce concept, initialement publié en 1910 sous le titre The Great Illusion, devint un best-seller international.

Son auteur, Norman Angell, soutenait que, parce que les nations dépendaient fortement d’un système commercial mondial hautement imbriqué, le coût économique de la guerre dépasserait largement tout gain potentiel. Il affirmait qu’une nation victorieuse subirait tout autant de ruine économique que la vaincue – rendant obsolète le concept traditionnel de conquête militaire. Son argument fut populairement interprété comme rendant la guerre « impossible ».

Son argument se révéla fallacieux ; la Grande Guerre éclata en temps voulu.

Aujourd’hui, l’idée d’une certaine interaction multipolaire persiste, mais la menace de guerre demeure et est exacerbée par le refus de l’Occident d’entendre – ou de comprendre – ce que disent les États souverains civilisationnels. Cette incapacité à écouter avec un engagement empathique est à la racine des lectures catastrophiquement erronées du renseignement occidental concernant l’Iran et la Russie. Et de la présentation de la Chine comme si « autre » qu’elle en devient un livre fermé aux oreilles occidentales.

Dans son influent ouvrage de 1981, After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre soutenait que le projet des Lumières avait coupé l’homme occidental de ses racines traditionnelles, mais avait échoué à produire une morale contraignante fondée sur la seule Raison. Par conséquent, beaucoup de ceux qui vivent en Occident vivent dans un monde de « chaos moral et de fragmentation, où des forces “chaotiques” et désintégratrices ont presque entièrement effacé la véritable enquête morale de la culture européenne ».

Ce qu’il est important de comprendre, c’est que le « chaos moral et la fragmentation » de MacIntyre sont délibérément encouragés pour affaiblir l’attachement national, communautaire et religieux – précisément afin de cibler et d’affaiblir la cohésion nationale et la souveraineté civilisationnelle.

L’argument de MacIntyre est que seule la tradition culturelle, et ses récits moraux, fournissent un contexte aux termes tels que bien, justice et telos :

« En l’absence de traditions, le débat moral est disloqué et devient un théâtre d’illusions où la simple indignation et la simple protestation occupent le devant de la scène. »

« Les lignes sont tracées tôt, et les participants se précipitent pour prendre parti. Mais en prenant parti, ils semblent se rendre incapables d’entendre l’autre… Tout le monde ressent la chaleur, mais personne ne voit la lumière », souligne MacIntyre.

Ce que nous possédons aujourd’hui, suggère MacIntyre, ne sont rien de plus que de simples fragments d’une tradition plus ancienne (la société héroïque). Ces fragments sont tout simplement trop rares, puisque notre discours moral, qui utilise des termes comme bien, justice et devoir, a été dépouillé du contexte qui le rendrait intelligible. En d’autres termes, cela place la vertu du monde héroïque et homérique hors de portée de l’Occident.

Les lignes sont tracées. On se précipite pour prendre parti. Les forces « chaotiques » et désintégratrices d’aujourd’hui ont presque entièrement effacé l’enquête morale de la culture européenne. Le trait le plus frappant des débats moraux est leur tendance à ne jamais aboutir à une résolution.

Quand tous les jugements moraux – dépouillés de leur contexte – ne deviennent guère plus que des expressions de préférence, d’attitude ou de sentiment – l’émotivisme, en d’autres termes – le débat est disloqué ; il se transforme en un théâtre de récits où l’indignation et la polarité occupent le devant de la scène.

Mais, en prenant de tels partis émotifs, les acteurs se rendent incapables d’entendre l’Autre. Les « Autres », alors, qu’il s’agisse de la Russie, de l’Iran ou de la Chine, deviennent simplement invisibles selon les normes de cette approche – car leurs façons d’orienter l’attention humaine vers le monde sont tout à fait distinctes.

Ainsi, nous pouvons être (et sommes) conduits à la guerre par des messages narratifs spécifiquement destinés à contraindre les humains à spatialiser le monde d’une certaine manière, sans que nous en soyons conscients. Nous sommes conduits vers un « seul monde » issu des Lumières, dans lequel toute « altérité » – qu’elle soit russe, iranienne ou chinoise – devient invisible selon les normes, le mode de présence, par lesquels nous abordons les « choses ».

Dans cette « guerre », le monde est mis « sens dessus dessous ». La plupart des gens ne spatialisent pas activement le monde autour d’eux, mais semblent s’être contentés qu’il soit spatialisé pour eux. Les récits sont pétris et étalés sous nos yeux. C’est ainsi que la machine fonctionne. La plupart des gens en Occident croient avoir une prise ferme sur la réalité – les faits, les preuves et les conclusions. Mais en réalité, nous faisons face à une structure qui retourne délibérément comme un gant cette prise imaginaire sur la réalité.

Dans la machine, la « spatialisation » se fait à l’envers : d’abord, ils reçoivent le message, puis ils pétrissent et étalent un récit de la « réalité » comme de la pâte, jusqu’à ce qu’il corresponde au dessein. Et si nécessaire, ils mettent la machine médiatique en marche arrière et pétrissent cette même réalité dans la direction opposée.

Alors, comment les civilisations souveraines peuvent-elles échapper au « piège de MacIntyre » ? Les civilisations peuvent-elles rassembler les fragments d’aperçus et de savoirs plus anciens pour redonner le contexte permettant de rendre le discours moral à nouveau intelligible ?

Sortir de l’espace fustien de la pensée mécaniste et du récit manipulé n’est ni facile ni simple. Bien au contraire. Mais remarquez ce que cela exige – un changement dans notre mode de présence ; la manière dont nous disposons notre attention vers le monde.

La façon dont vous disposez la conscience vers le monde, nous dit le neurologue Iain McGilchrist, est cruciale : car la manière dont vous le faites altère et détermine ce que vous trouverez et comprendrez. Et à mesure que nous spatialisons le monde autour de nous différemment, la perception s’élargit et la spaciosité (jusque-là cachée) de ce qui se trouve au-delà devient visible.

Une récupération de modes de pensée plus anciens – la manière de penser « tout à la fois, tous ensemble » (penser par l’image) et d’autres sources de cognition – peut ouvrir une voie vers une médiation entre les polarités apparemment opposées du subjectif et de l’objectif que la rationalité mécanique laisse si souvent durcies en impedimenta insolubles. L’approche apophatique peut aussi émousser les arêtes vives de la pensée conceptuelle en introduisant l’« entre-deux », trouvant son espace entre les arguments angulaires et tranchants. Ces modes de pensée possèdent leur propre logique qui se tient à l’écart des rigidités des Lumières.

C’est la leçon que l’Iran et sa redécouverte de la pensée ancienne offrent au monde aujourd’hui.

Albert Einstein a un jour fait remarquer que « l’esprit rationnel est un serviteur ; mais l’esprit intuitif est un don précieux. Notre monde, cependant, honore le serviteur – mais oublie [ignore] le don ».

La teoria delle origini cazare degli ebrei ashkenaziti: un mito storico o una deliberata distorsione dei fatti? Gli argomenti storici, linguistici e genetici mettono in discussione l’idea delle radici cazare dell’ebraismo europeo.

Segue nostro Telegram.

Io amo la lingua, la cultura e la religione ebraica, che sono parte della comune famiglia abramitica, capace di legare indissolubilmente l’ebraismo al cristianesimo e all’Islam.

Allo stesso tempo reputo sempre necessario condannare e contrastare i crimini sionisti e dell’entità statuale israeliana, ugualmente criminale. Spiace, occorre dirlo, che molte comunità ebraiche in giro per il mondo solidarizzino con questi criminali, incrinando la possibile simpatia per la più antica tra le fedi abramitiche.

Ritengo altresì che si debba contrastare ogni forma di antisemitismo, a partire dalla volgare confusione tra l’odio per gli ebrei e l’ebraismo, sempre esecrabile, e la condanna di Israele e dei sionisti, sempre giusta, impellente e importante.

Tra i fenomeni di più spiacevole antisemitismo c’è la teoria, del tutto assurda e infondata, propalata da Arthur Koestler nel 1976 con il saggio “La tredicesima tribù”, secondo cui gli ebrei ashkenaziti d’Europa orientale non discenderebbero dagli antichi ebrei della Palestina romana, ma dai Cazari. Stupidaggine colossale e falsità assoluta.

I cazari, tribù nomade di origine turca dell’Asia centrale, governano tra il VII e il X secolo un khanato indipendente e potente, compreso tra il bacino della Volga, il Caucaso settentrionale e il Mar Caspio, poco dediti alle guerre e molto ai commerci, garantiscono il fluire delle mercanzie in viaggio attraverso la Via della Seta lungo le terre da loro controllate e gli scambi con i variaghi attraverso la Volga e il Don. Alleati dell’impero romano d’Oriente, si barcamenano nel difficile contenimento dei musulmani abbasidi che da Baghdad irradiano il potere e la scienza dello loro straordinario califfato.

Non è mai esistita una conversione dei cazari all’ebraismo, come ha spiegato con dovizia di documenti lo storico Shaul Stampfer, la conversione ha riguardato soltanto i sovrani e le loro famiglie, una bonaria scusa per sottrarsi a più vincolanti sottomissioni tanto verso l’Occidente cristiano, quanto vero l’Oriente islamico.

I cazari, popolo forte e numeroso, resta legato allo sciamanesimo di Tengrì, il cielo, tanto caro anche ai mongoli, pur con una porzione non indifferente di cazari convertitisi all’Islam e al cristianesimo, spesso per facilitare lo scambio commerciale con i vicini di quelle religioni.

Dunque i cazari non sono mai stati ebrei, solo i sovrani, ovvero una ristrettissima minoranza di quel popolo, hanno blandamente aderito alla religione mosaica. Insomma non si è mai prodotta una conversione di massa, come ad esempio a Kiev, quando il principe Vladimir nel 988 procede a far raccogliere gli abitanti della città sulle rive del Dniepr, infastidito dalle critiche di un vescovo venuto da Costantinopoli e inorridito dalle pratiche pagane osservate durante il lungo viaggio. Vladimir ordina contemporaneamente al popolo di immergersi nelle acque e al patriarca kievita, vicino a lui dall’alto della città fortificata, di impartire la benedizione per il più straordinario e colossale battesimo di massa della storia. Proprio in ragione di questa conversione al cristianesimo del popolo russo, Vladimir è ancora oggi celebrato come santo tanto dalla chiesa ortodossa, quanto da quella cattolica.

A quel tempo i cazari sono già scomparsi. Il padre e predecessore di Vladimir, il principe Sviatoslav I, sovrano della Rus’ di Kiev, scatena alla metà del X secolo una guerra insieme ai romani d’Oriente e ai nomadi peceneghi contro i cazari, ne conquista l’interezza del territorio, rade al suolo la capitale Itil e cancella, con la morte dei sovrani, ogni traccia di ebraismo cazaro.

Quelle terre saranno abitate e governate, oltre che dai russi, dai bulgari della Volga, dai cumani, dai calmucchi, dai cabardini. Ridicolo che si richiamino i cazari, scomparsi da oltre mille anni, per raccontare qualcosa che non li riguarda, ovviamente la popolazione cazara non evapora nel nulla, ma nemmeno migra, subisce come sempre accade nella storia in questi casi, un lento processo di frammentazione e assimilazione ai nuovi gruppi dominanti sul suo territorio, perdendo con il tempo, in assenza di una radicata alfabetizzazione, ogni traccia della passata cultura, in ogni caso in nulla e per nulla ebraica.

Consiglio piuttosto di visitare il museo ebraico di Mosca, delle grandi carte geografiche scorrono su uno schermo elettronico e raccontano con evidenza come nel regno di Ivan il Terribile alla fine del XVI secolo non abitasse nelle Russie nemmeno un ebreo, mentre, agli albori del XIX secolo oltre i tre quarti degli ebrei di tutto il mondo fossero cittadini dell’impero russo.

Come si è creato questo fenomeno in poco più di due secoli?

Occorre studiare la storia delle comunità ebraiche dopo la distruzione di Gerusalemme nel 70 dopo Cristo. Per capire come si siano formate le comunità sefardita e quella ashkenazita.

Laddove si preferisca evitare i polverosi tomi scritti dagli storici, ecco che ci viene in soccorso uno straordinario romanzo, forse il più bello di Abraham Yehoshua, ovvero “Viaggio alla fine del millennio”, i fatti narrati si svolgono nell’anno 999, quando gli ebrei franco – tedeschi, dopo aver assorbito la cultura dei loro vicini cristiani, provano orrore per il correligionario ebreo nordafricano che come i suoi vicini musulmani ha due mogli. I primi, gli europei, decidono di non commerciare più con il secondo, che reputano un peccatore. A poco servirà un tentativo di porre soluzione alla disputa con un confronto tra due rabbini, uno per parte, dentro la sinagoga di Worms, la più antica del vecchio continente.

Gli ebrei immersi nell’Islam son diventati sefarditi, quelli dell’Europa occidentale sono diventati ashkenaziti, questi ultimi in terra germanica hanno sviluppato una nuova lingua: l’yiddish, nata proprio negli anni in cui è ambientato il romanzo citato. L’yiddish è una lingua dalle profonde inferenze antico – tedesche, come qualsiasi linguista può confermare, per altro con nessuna connessione con le lingue turchidi o mongole e i pochi elementi slavi derivanti dalla successiva e tardiva prossimità con il mondo russo.

Quelle comunità ebraiche, per l’intolleranza prima cattolica e poi luterana si spostano verso Oriente, entrando nel regno polacco – lituano, formando i noti shtetl, piccoli villaggi di contadini poveri, quando queste terre sono entrare a far parte dell’impero russo, piccoli gruppi sono andati ancora più ad Oriente, nell’attuale Russia e Bielorussia.

Ecco spiegato in modo inequivocabile come la presenza ebraica in Russia sia il frutto di una migrazione da occidente verso oriente delle comunità ebraiche ashkenazite, che si sono portate appresso la loro cultura, la loro nuova lingua, le loro tradizioni.

L’invenzione del viaggio al contrario, da est a ovest, di un fantasmagorico ebraismo cazaro – ashkenazita è stato dimostrato essere totalmente falsa da tutti i documenti storici, dunque una pessima trovata antisemita.

Altro fatto è voler attribuire qualche malefatta nel corso della modernità o talune responsabilità alle arricchite borghesie occidentali, che del colonialismo, dello schiavismo, della subordinazione dei contadini e degli operai dopo la rivoluzione industriale hanno fatto il volano per le loro personalissime ricchezze a danno di porzioni rilevanti dell’umanità. A questa costruzione del bestiale sfruttamento dell’uomo sull’uomo hanno partecipato evidentemente anche i Rockefeller e i Rothschild, tenendo però presente che i primi sono forse di origine ebraico – francese, ma poi da secoli comunque cristiano – protestanti ugonotti in fuga verso le Americhe, i secondi ebreo – tedeschi, con origini nella nobiltà austriaca.

Di più. I fatti storici dovrebbero essere sufficienti a smentire anche le tesi palesemente assurde e sgangherate, tuttavia un’ulteriore dimostrazione dell’inesistenza di un ebraismo cazaro ci è offerta dalla scienza con le moderne modalità di studio genetico. Il DNA degli ashkenaziti rimanda agli avi mediorientali e ai più secolarmente recenti imparentamenti con gli europei occidentali, niente di slavo, mongolo, turchide o centro – asiatico, quindi nulla e poi nulla dei lontani cazari, anzi, i geni maschili sono chiaramente mediorientali, quelli femminili rimandano non solo all’Europa occidentale, ma anche a quella meridionale, in particolare italiana, a sostanziare una lunga permanenza delle comunità ebraiche nel territorio dell’impero romano, prima di muoversi verso settentrione dopo la scomparsa di questo al tempo delle invasioni barbariche.

Credo dunque che si debbano lasciare i simpatici cazari al loro sperduto passato mercantile, contrastare i crimini del presente operati da sionisti e israeliani e soprattutto agire sempre contro ogni forma di antisemitismo.

Faced with a fiscally incontinent state drowning in DEI and incapable of controlling its borders, it's easy for the Right to feel like its losing, says Dr Hugh Willbourn. But weirdly, so does the Left.

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