Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla on Friday rejected a new threat from U.S. President Donald Trump, who said U.S. ships would make a “small stop” off the island on their return from Iran.
President Donald Trump has issued a new threat against Cuba as U.S. officials reportedly press ahead with military planning for the Caribbean country, an escalation that coincides with an intensified oil blockade and UN vote scheduled for October 28.
At a campaign rally in Fort Myers, the Republican President laid out his plan in vivid terms. “What we are going to do with Cuba is we are going to come back from Iran. Those beautiful ships, we will pass by Cuba, we will have one of them stop about 50 yards (45 meters) from the coast. They will raise their hands and then we will send Marco Rubio to close the deal,” he said.
The U.S. President closed the scene with a concrete promise: “We will take care of Cuba on our return from Iran. We will make a small stop.”
Cuba answered on X. “We reject all threats related to the ambitions of United States toward Cuba,“ wrote the Caribbean nation’s FM Bruno Rodriguez Parrilla.
He added a description of the coastline that carried an unmistakable warning. “Our coastline is full of beautiful beaches, but there ara also razor-sharp limestone spikes,” he said, referring to the karst rock formations along the shore. “Inhospitable to those who arrive with hostile intentions and dreams of domination,” he warned. The jagged coastal limestone, sharp and cutting, gave the response its edge.
We reject every threat related to US ambitions toward Cuba.
Our coastline is full of beautiful beaches, but there are also razor-sharp limestone spikes, an inhospitable environment for those who make it to our shores with hostile purposes and lust for domination.… pic.twitter.com/jrrBc1jR8S
Meanwhile, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio used the same platform to urge those pushing for “change” on the island to engage in “discreet collaboration with the CIA.” In August, The New York Times reported that the intelligence agency had secretly set up a task force focused on Cuba.
The threat came amid a heated campaign in a state that is home to the largest Cuban community in United States. Its lawmakers and an influential segment of that community shape Washington’s decisions on Cuba.
Rodriguez Parrilla’s post also echoes another phrase from the current U.S. President. In March, speaking at the White House, Trump said he would have “the honor of taking Cuba” and that he “could do whatever he wanted with it.” He described Cuba then as a beautiful place, with “good land, landscapes, wonderful weather and great potential for tourism centers.”
On that occasion his unfamiliarity with the territory was on display. He argued that taking control would be good because the country is “not in the path of hurricanes.” “They won’t ask us for money for hurricanes every week,” he said in that time.
Passing by the island after Iran is not a new idea. In early May, while signing the Executive Order that launched an unprecedented wave of unilateral and illegal penalties against Cuba, Trump had already spoken of “taking control” once his military objectives in Iran were met. Following that, he has promised the war will end “immediately” after the November 3 elections, without explaining how.
The new threat coincides with the campaign Rubio himself is leading to sway the votes of UN member states on the resolution against the blockade against Cuba. In a recent press conference, Rodriguez Parrilla denounced the pressures and threats against governments to make them change their position.
In recent weeks the U.S. administration has seized fuel shipments bound for Cuba as part of an oil blockade. The campaign against Cuba’s international medical cooperation has intensified in parallel.
Elections Add Pressure
The escalation arrives at a difficult political moment for the U.S. President. Midterm elections take place on November 3, and the Republican Party could lose control of Congress. Trump’s approval has sagged, and a majority of voters now reject his management of the country’s main fronts, a rejection that cuts across every issue.
The domestic scenario is complicated further by the conflict with Iran. Tehran retains control of the Strait of Hormuz and has inflicted significant destruction on U.S. military bases in West Asia.
Fuel prices keep climbing in the meantime. The increase strikes U.S. households directly, and every rise deepens the damage to the President’s public standing at a moment when he can least afford it.
The pattern toward Cuba has hardened even as those pressures mount at home. The fuel seizures, the diplomatic campaign and the military planning all point in the same direction, toward an increasingly explicit posture of confrontation against the island.
With the United Nations vote set for October 28 and the U.S. midterm elections following days later on November 3, the coming weeks will reveal whether the planning described in U.S. media translates into further concrete action against Cuba, or whether it remains a lever of pressure in a campaign that already weighs heavily on the island.
The president made the comment in an interview with ABC News two days after U.S. Envoy Steve Witkoff praised Vladimir Putin as "a humanitarian." Hours later, Russia struck Kyiv with ballistic missiles and cluster munitions.
‘Cambridge Analytica’ is by now a byword for the social media Wild West of 2016, when regulations were non-existent and unscrupulous brokers sold personal user data to advertisers and political operatives. RT explores the scandal that Meta CEO Mark Zuckerberg still can’t dodge.
On October 22, Meta was ordered by a New Mexico judge to pay $25 billion in civil penalties over the collection of personal data from 44 million Facebook users by Cambridge Analytica more than a decade earlier.
The judge concluded that Meta’s misconduct warranted a penalty exceeding $219 billion under state law, but reduced the amount to $25 billion, making it one of the largest fines ever imposed on an American corporation.
Meta, operating at the time as Facebook, knowingly and systematically deceived users about how it managed their personal data and allowed its harvesting by third-party companies like Cambridge Analytica. The jury also found Meta’s senior executive team knew of, and lied about, deceiving users about how it planned to investigate data-harvesting companies after the Cambridge Analytica scandal became public.
To understand how Meta ended up owing an eighth of its annual revenue in just one judgment, it’s necessary to go back to 2013, when Cambridge Analytica emerged from Britain’s shadowy private intelligence sector.
What was Cambridge Analytica?
Cambridge Analytica was founded in 2013 as a subsidiary of SCL Group, a London-based private intelligence firm that has provided data analytics and “behavioural analysis” services to the British Defense Ministry and Foreign Office.
Cambridge Analytica CEO and SCL Group Director Alexander Nix has admitted under oath that his companies worked with American and British intelligence agencies, provided psychological warfare training to several Western militaries, employed multiple staff with security clearances in the UK and US, and hired former Israeli spies.
SCL Group’s work for NATO, Israel, Ukraine, and other governments and militaries was extensive, and Cambridge Analytica drew on its parent company’s experience in military psyops to become one of the world’s most effective election influence operations, according to whistleblower Christopher Wylie. On the other hand, SCL insists that its military and political wings were separate entities. Whichever account is true, Cambridge Analytica had been hired by political candidates in 200 elections by 2018, according to company documents. These included parliamentary elections in the Czech Republic, India, and Italy, the Brexit referendum in the UK, and most infamously, the 2016 presidential election in the US.
What did Cambridge Analytica do in 2016?
Cambridge Analytica was paid nearly $6 million by then-candidate Donald Trump’s campaign in the runup to the 2016 election. The company used its unprecedented access to Facebook user data to identify persuadable voters and potential donors, select effective markets for television ads, and target certain Hillary Clinton supporters for “deterrence” – adverts discouraging them from going to the polls on election day.
How did this become a scandal?
Cambridge Analytica did not break any laws to obtain this data. It was scraped from tens of millions of Facebook users who had, unbeknownst to themselves, given a third-party Facebook quiz application access to their messages, their profile data, and that of their friends.
Cambridge Analytica hired a Cambridge University professor, Aleksandr Kogan, to develop a personality quiz app, named ‘This is Your Digital Life’. Between 250,000 and 270,000 American Facebook users took the quiz in 2015, and by accessing their data, but crucially, under Facebook terms, accessing the data of all of their friends on the platform, Cambridge Analytica was able to compile detailed psychological profiles on roughly 87 million users.
Cambridge Analytica employee Christopher Wylie revealed the workings of the scheme to The Observer in 2018, telling the British newspaper that “we exploited Facebook to harvest millions of people’s profiles, and built models to exploit what we knew about them and target their inner demons. That was the basis the entire company was built on.”
Was Cambridge Analytica the only data-scraper doing this?
“Facebook never cared,” Kogan told NBC News in 2018, explaining that “tens of thousands” of developers created apps like his quiz, and sold user data to companies like Cambridge Analytica. Among the developers were CubeYou, which used a “one-click personality test” app to gather information for commercial use, and LocalBlox, which scraped data from 48 million users, which it then sold to marketers.
AggregateIQ, Global Science Research, and Eunoia Technologies all used data gleaned by Kogan for political ends. However, long before these companies existed, Blue State Digital, an American political consultancy, surreptitiously harvested Facebook data, including friends’ data, for use by Barack Obama’s 2012 campaign.
Cambridge Analytica, however, had its work for the Trump campaign exposed at the height of the ‘Russiagate’ hoax, at a time when Democrats and liberal media outlets were convinced that Russia intervened in the election on behalf of Trump. Cambridge Analytica’s data-scraping dovetailed neatly into a narrative of “Facebook bots” and “Russian military hackers” working with the Trump campaign, and the company became a whipping boy for an industry that transcended partisan lines.
US Special Counsel Robert Mueller and the Senate Intelligence Committee eventually investigated claims that Cambridge Analytica helped the Russian government target political ads at American voters, but both determined that these claims were untrue, and neither investigation found any proof of “collusion” between the Trump campaign and the Kremlin.
Has Facebook been punished?
At the time that the information was collected, Facebook had stopped allowing third-party apps to access friends’ data. However, a loophole allowed apps active on the platform before this change to continue harvesting information through 2015. Within days of Wylie’s revelations hitting the headlines, SCL Group and Cambridge Analytica were suspended from Facebook. Two months later, both companies ceased operations, leaving Facebook to handle the fallout.
Facebook initially went into damage control mode, insisting that “People knowingly provided their information” to Kogan’s app, and that “everyone involved gave their consent.”
However, the US Federal Trade Commission determined that Facebook made its privacy settings deliberately opaque, spreading them out over 20 separate screens and opting users into sharing data with third-parties by default. Facebook settled with the FTC for $5 billion in 2019, setting the stage for a series of similar payouts in the following years.
In 2018, Zuckerberg told lawmakers on Capitol Hill that Facebook was aware that user data had been transferred from Kogan to Cambridge Analytica (this transfer was in breach of its policies) since 2015, but opted not to inform users. He said that Facebook asked Cambridge Analytica to delete the data, but never followed up and made sure the company did. “We considered it a closed case,” he told Congress.
The following year, the US Securities and Exchange Commission accused Facebook of misleading investors by presenting “the risk of misuse of user data as merely hypothetical,” when it knew since 2015 that “a third-party developer had actually misused Facebook user data.” Facebook settled the case with the SEC for $100 million.
In 2022, Meta settled a $725 million class-action lawsuit brought by a group of Facebook users, who alleged that the company violated privacy and consumer protection laws by misrepresenting its data-sharing laws and failing to protect their personal information.
Meta attempted to shut down further legal action over the Cambridge Analytica scandal this August, when it reached an $18 billion settlement with 51 attorneys general across US states, territories, and the District of Columbia. Although the cases concerned the addictive design of Meta’s platforms and their effect on children’s mental health, the settlement included a clause resolving a multistate investigation into Facebook’s sharing of user data with third parties “whether known or unknown,” including Cambridge Analytica.
Even if participating states were to discover new facts about the data sharing, they have now waived their right to sue Meta. New Mexico was one of two states that was not party to this agreement, hence the $25 billion penalty.
Did Cambridge Analytica get Trump elected?
Ten years after the fact, it remains unclear how prominent a role Cambridge Analytica played in Trump’s victory over Clinton. The Trump campaign’s use of Facebook and X (then called Twitter) is widely cited as instrumental in his win, but the campaign’s digital director, Brad Parscale, has since said that he stopped using the company’s data several months before election day, considering it inaccurate.
What about Brexit?
Cambridge Analytica worked with Nigel Farage’s Leave.EU organization in late 2015 and early 2016, and carried out some preliminary data analysis for the campaign. However, the data was never used, and the UK Information Commissioner’s (ICO) office concluded in 2020 that the company had no impact on the referendum. As in the US, the ICO found no links between Cambridge Analytica and Russia, and no evidence that Russia interfered in the vote.
Is Zuckerberg in the clear?
The $25 billion judgement handed down on October 22 may be the largest fine ever imposed on Meta, but it does not mark the end of Zuckerberg’s legal woes. In addition to a Washington DC lawsuit holding him personally responsible for the Cambridge Analytica debacle, Zuckerberg’s company is being sued by investors in California over Facebook’s alleged efforts to conceal the misuse of user data by the company.
Meta will likely settle the latter case, just as it did with the similar SEC case in 2019. However, should Zuckerberg fight the lawsuit, he could find himself in the dock, as the plaintiffs have sought recorded depositions from him, former COO Sheryl Sandberg, and former CFO David Wehner – all of whom could be forced to shed more light on just how much Facebook knew about the scandal, and when.
Venezuela’s Acting President, Delcy Rodríguez, inspected progress Friday on a package of 17 oil agreements signed with the United States, as the state of Zulia reported record output of 115,000 barrels per day.
The inspection covered joint projects aimed at extracting crude from national reserves. Eight of the 17 agreements involve the development of so-called green fields, new areas set aside for exploration and exploitation.
“We want to show the country the progress, to make clear that we do not leave things unfinished, that we go further: to action and to production. Once again, Zulia state broke its production record, reaching 115,000 barrels per day today,” Acting President Delcy Rodriguez said.
Rodriguez added that projections call for closing December at 120,000 barrels. The Acting President framed the tour as proof that the partnership has moved beyond paperwork into concrete output.
The cooperation framework was signed in August through North American Blue Energy Partners (NABEP). The 17 strategic agreements target the extraction of 65 million barrels of crude from Venezuela’s reserves.
On maritime infrastructure and logistics, Rodriguez said activity in Zulia will jump from 100 to 900 vessels, an increase of 800% in mobilized capacity. The figure signals a major expansion of port and transport operations tied to the oil sector.
The Acting President also outlined a plan for the progressive creation of jobs driven by industrial activity. Employment will begin in the food sector, continue in ironworks and industrial areas, and later extend to public accounts with the goal of raising working-class incomes.
Rodríguez said the central objective of the alliance is to develop the hydrocarbon industry and consolidate the country’s sovereign position. She stressed that Venezuela seeks to affirm itself as the nation with the largest oil reserves on the planet and to rank among the world’s leading producers and exporters. “We want to show the country the progress of these agreements,” she said.
Acting President Delcy Rodriguez insisted that rising production must translate directly into the welfare of the population. Following this, she pointed to concrete areas where the gains should appear: “In the daily life of Venezuelan men and women: in pay for workers, in health, public hospitals, schools, food, roads, water and public services. That is where Venezuela’s development goes,” she said.
The comments link oil revenue to social spending at a time when the government has promised greater transparency over hydrocarbon and mining income. The Acting President’s emphasis on hospitals, schools and food echoes longstanding official messaging that resource wealth should fund public services.
The Zulia figures mark a significant benchmark for the country’s oil industry, which has sought to recover output after years of decline. The jump from 100 to 900 vessels suggests broader commercial activity around the crude operations, beyond the wells themselves.
Eight green-field projects form part of the package, indicating that the partnership extends into undeveloped territory rather than relying solely on existing infrastructure. Rodríguez described the agreements as a path toward consolidating Venezuela’s position in global energy markets.
The inspection tour took place as the government pushes to showcase tangible results from the August accords. The Acting President’s visit to the field operations was intended to demonstrate that the agreements are generating activity on the ground, not only on paper.
The production target of 120,000 barrels by December would extend the record reported Friday. If achieved, it would reinforce the government’s narrative of recovery built around the US partnership and the state of Zulia’s role as the engine of national output.
Rodríguez closed her remarks by linking the oil gains to broader national development, arguing that the industry’s expansion must reach Venezuelans through wages and public services rather than remaining confined to export statistics.
In a public letter, Democratic Senators and Representatives listed five questions concerning Starlink restrictions impacting Ukrainian forces, addressed to Musk. The demand comes as Ukrainian forces continue to experience severe problems operating Starlink military systems.
Il Nobel per la pace 2026 a Navi Pillay segna una brusca discontinuità rispetto al premio assegnato l’anno precedente a María Corina Machado. La reazione di Donald Trump e Benjamin Netanyahu rivela quanto il nodo del diritto internazionale sia divenuto terreno di scontro geopolitico.
A distanza di appena un anno, il Premio Nobel per la pace sembra aver cambiato completamente direzione. Nell’ottobre 2025, il Comitato norvegese aveva scelto María Corina Machado, principale esponente dell’opposizione venezuelana, premiandola «per il suo instancabile lavoro nella promozione dei diritti democratici del popolo venezuelano e per la sua lotta per ottenere una transizione giusta e pacifica dalla dittatura alla democrazia». Lo scorso 9 ottobre, lo stesso riconoscimento è invece andato alla giurista sudafricana Navanethem “Navi” Pillay «per i suoi sforzi nel promuovere la pace e il diritto internazionale». Dietro la somiglianza delle formule ufficiali, tuttavia, si nascondono due messaggi politici quasi opposti.
Il Nobel a Machado si inseriva infatti in maniera pressoché naturale nel quadro della pressione esercitata da Washington contro il governo venezuelano. L’oppositrice di Nicolás Maduro era da tempo sostenuta apertamente dagli Stati Uniti e da governi latinoamericani allineati con Washington. La scelta del Comitato norvegese rafforzava quindi, indipendentemente dalle intenzioni dichiarate dai suoi membri, una delle parti di un conflitto politico interno sul quale gli Stati Uniti esercitano da anni una forte pressione attraverso sanzioni economiche, riconoscimenti politici selettivi e tentativi di isolamento internazionale del governo bolivariano.
Il rapporto personale fra Machado e Trump rese ancora più evidente questa convergenza. Il giorno stesso dell’assegnazione del premio, nell’ottobre 2025, Trump riferì che la dirigente venezuelana gli aveva telefonato affermando di accettare il Nobel anche in suo onore. Nel gennaio successivo, Machado arrivò poi a consegnare al presidente statunitense la propria medaglia del Nobel, nel tentativo di consolidare il sostegno di Washington alla propria strategia politica in Venezuela. Lo stesso Trump, pochi giorni prima dell’annuncio del premio 2026, ricordava pubblicamente quell’episodio come una sorta di riconoscimento indiretto della propria presunta attività di pacificatore.
Il Nobel 2026 ha prodotto invece un effetto praticamente opposto. Navi Pillay, infatti, non rappresenta un movimento politico sostenuto dagli Stati Uniti contro un governo avversario, ma una tradizione giuridica che rivendica almeno formalmente la possibilità di sottoporre anche le grandi potenze e i loro alleati alle norme del diritto internazionale.
La biografia della nuova vincitrice contribuisce a spiegare la portata della scelta. Sudafricana di origine tamil, Pillay iniziò la propria attività professionale durante l’apartheid, difendendo oppositori politici e battendosi per i diritti di Nelson Mandela e degli altri detenuti del regime segregazionista. Dopo la fine dell’apartheid divenne la prima donna non bianca a sedere nell’Alta Corte sudafricana. In seguito, fu giudice e presidente del Tribunale penale internazionale per il Ruanda, giudice della Corte penale internazionale dal 2003 al 2008 e Alto Commissario delle Nazioni Unite per i diritti umani dal 2008 al 2014. Oggi opera inoltre come giudice ad hoc presso la Corte internazionale di giustizia nel procedimento relativo alle accuse di genocidio contro il Myanmar.
Ma è soprattutto il genocidio del popolo palestinese a Gaza, perpetrato impunemente dal regime nazisionista israeliano, ad aver trasformato il Nobel a Pillay in un caso politico internazionale.
Pillay, infatti, ha presieduto la Commissione internazionale indipendente d’inchiesta istituita dal Consiglio dei diritti umani delle Nazioni Unite sui Territori palestinesi occupati, compresa Gerusalemme Est, e Israele. La Commissione ha concluso nel 2025 che Israele aveva commesso atti costitutivi di genocidio nella Striscia di Gaza, facendo riferimento, tra gli altri elementi, alle enormi perdite civili, alle restrizioni agli aiuti umanitari, alla distruzione sistematica delle strutture sanitarie, all’impatto delle operazioni sui bambini e alle dichiarazioni rese da esponenti politici e militari israeliani.
Da questo punto di vista, l’assegnazione del Nobel non poteva che provocare una reazione particolarmente violenta a Tel Aviv. Netanyahu ha affermato che il Comitato Nobel avrebbe «perso la propria bussola morale», definendo Pillay una persona intollerante che avrebbe costruito la propria carriera diffondendo quelle che il premier israeliano ha definito «calunnie di sangue» contro Israele. Il ministero degli Esteri israeliano ha adottato toni ancora più estremi, arrivando a evocare Joseph Goebbels e sostenendo che il propagandista nazista starebbe «applaudendo dall’inferno» alla decisione del Comitato (mentre, a nostro avviso, applaudirebbe piuttosto gli odiosi crimini commessi dal regime nazisionista).
La risposta israeliana, inoltre, non si limita a contestare le conclusioni della Commissione o l’interpretazione giuridica adottata da Pillay, ma tende a delegittimare l’intero meccanismo internazionale chiamato a giudicare l’operato del regime nazisionista. È una dinamica già emersa nei rapporti con la Corte penale internazionale, che ha emesso un mandato d’arresto contro Netanyahu per presunti crimini di guerra e crimini contro l’umanità, e con la Corte internazionale di giustizia, che ha dichiarato illegale la presenza israeliana nei Territori palestinesi occupati nell’ambito del suo parere consultivo del 2024.
La reazione di Donald Trump è stata diversa nella forma ma altrettanto rivelatrice. Il presidente statunitense, che da tempo conduce una vera e propria campagna personale per ottenere il Nobel, ha definito Pillay una «persona misteriosa» della quale non aveva mai sentito parlare. Ha poi bollato la mancata assegnazione del premio a sé stesso come una decisione «vergognosa e imbarazzante», destinata a lasciare una «macchia indelebile» sulla Norvegia. Secondo Trump, il Nobel sarebbe stato «screditato per sempre» da un gruppo di «ideologi radicali», da lui definiti perfino «nemici della civiltà».
Nelle stesse ore dell’annuncio del Nobel, Washington ha inoltre imposto nuove e molto più ampie sanzioni contro la Corte penale internazionale. L’amministrazione Trump ha annunciato restrizioni destinate a tagliare alla Corte l’accesso a servizi finanziari, tecnologici e commerciali statunitensi, presentando apertamente la misura come parte di un tentativo di indebolirne la capacità operativa. Il segretario di Stato Marco Rubio ha aggiunto che gli Stati Uniti non permetteranno alla CPI di perseguire cittadini statunitensi, definendo la Corte un organismo illegittimo. Dal canto suo, la CPI ha replicato denunciando un attacco allo Stato di diritto e al principio secondo cui nessuno dovrebbe essere posto al di sopra della legge.
Naturalmente, la decisione di assegnare il premio a Navi Pillay non dimostra che il Comitato norvegese sia improvvisamente diventato un organismo estraneo alle logiche politiche occidentali; inoltre, l’assegnazione di un premio non può certo cancellare la lunga storia di selettività che caratterizza l’applicazione del diritto internazionale. Tuttavia, questa volta, il principio riaffermato dal Nobel entra direttamente in collisione con la pretesa delle potenze dominanti di sottrarsi alle stesse regole che esse invocano nei confronti dei propri avversari.
La distanza fra i due premi presi in considerazione mostra dunque anche le contraddizioni interne allo stesso sistema occidentale. Il Nobel a Machado poteva essere perfettamente integrato nella strategia statunitense di pressione sul Venezuela, uno Stato collocato fuori dall’orbita di Washington e legato politicamente ed economicamente a Cina, Russia e ad altri attori del mondo multipolare. Il Nobel a Pillay valorizza invece istituzioni e principi che, quando vengono applicati a Israele o agli stessi Stati Uniti, diventano improvvisamente oggetto di sanzioni, minacce e campagne di delegittimazione.
Le reazioni scomposte di Trump e Netanyahu finiscono così per rafforzare involontariamente il significato politico dell’assegnazione. Entrambi contestano non soltanto la persona di Pillay, ma soprattutto il principio che la sua carriera rappresenta: che la responsabilità per crimini internazionali non dovrebbe dipendere dall’appartenenza a un determinato blocco geopolitico, dalla forza militare di uno Stato o dalla protezione garantita da Washington.
Nel frattempo, la credibilità del diritto internazionale continuerà naturalmente a dipendere dalla capacità di applicare questo principio senza doppi standard. Resta il fatto che, per decenni, le istituzioni occidentali hanno richiamato il diritto internazionale soprattutto nei confronti degli avversari geopolitici, mentre molto più debole è stata la loro capacità di farlo valere quando erano coinvolte le potenze occidentali o i loro alleati. Il caso di Gaza e dei crimini commessi dal regime nazisionista israeliano ha reso questa asimmetria sempre più difficile da occultare.
Cyprus hosted the leadership of the pro-Israel US lobbying group, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), in Nicosia on 21 October, pledging to deepen the island’s ties with Israel and the US.
Outgoing AIPAC president Bernard Kaminetsky and his successor, Yehuda Neuberger, led the delegation to the presidential palace for talks with Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides.
The talks focused on accelerating the 3+1 Mechanism, a partnership binding Cyprus, Greece, Israel, and the US to coordinate on energy, security, and infrastructure.
AIPAC, in return, pledged to keep championing Cypriot interests in Washington.
Meanwhile, pro-Israel lobbies have been embedding themselves inside the Cypriot and Greek parliaments, with Israel Allies Foundation (IAF) launching caucuses in both legislatures to bring lawmakers into line with Israel’s regional agenda.
IAF president Josh Reinstein unveiled the Cypriot caucus on 14 October after meeting Christodoulides, explicitly pitting the initiative against Ankara by branding Turkiye a “common enemy” of Israel and Cyprus.
Cyprus’s main left-wing opposition party condemned the MPs for turning parliament into a lobby for Israel amid its ongoing genocide in Gaza, while in Greece, one left-wing party warned that it would turn parliament into a tool for whitewashing war crimes.
Israel’s deepening ties with Greece and Cyprus have developed over the past decade into a strategic alignment that combines energy cooperation, military coordination, and shared opposition to Turkish maritime claims in the Eastern Mediterranean.
The US has encouraged the relationship through the 3+1 format, which brings Washington into the Israel–Greece–Cyprus trilateral partnership and frames it as a vehicle for regional stability, energy security, and cooperation among “like-minded” partners.
Through the arrangement, Israel gains a gateway to European markets through Greece and Cyprus, along with diplomatic backing in disputes over offshore gas fields.
Athens and Nicosia, in turn, receive Israeli military technology and a partner against Turkiye’s assertive stance on maritime zones, airspace, and the divided island of Cyprus.
Washington, meanwhile, sees the axis as part of a broader effort to anchor energy routes and security cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean while reducing reliance on rival powers, even as the US courts Ankara with offers of F-35 sales and sanctions relief.
Israeli hostility toward Ankara, and its efforts to curb Turkish power, stem from fear that Washington’s growing dependence on Turkiye will erode Israel’s regional dominance.
Despite the friction, Turkiye continued to serve as a conduit for Azerbaijani crude to Israel through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan Pipeline (BTC) and Ceyhan Port, even after cutting direct trade in May 2024 and throughout Israel’s genocide of the Palestinians in Gaza.
The peace discussions will begin at the technical level with negotiation teams, Zelensky said. If those efforts prove productive, then meetings between Zelensky, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and U.S. President Donald Trump will be held.
A ship called the Agioi Fanendes, which had just left Russia's Baltic Sea port of Primorsk, was carrying 40,000 metric tons to New York and had been traveling westwards through the Baltic Sea ever since.
The first Russian diesel bound for the US following a surprise agreement reached between Moscow and US President Donald Trump is aboard a tanker heading for New York, ship-tracking data showed on Friday.
The first Russian diesel tanker under the new deal between Russia and the United States is now heading for New York with a 40,000-metric-ton cargo, enough to cover barely two hours of American demand.
The deal began with a phone call, in which Russian President Vladimir Putin seems to
After visiting all 50 US states, I'm often asked which ones I'd recommend to travelers.
Emily Hart
Over the past decade, I've traveled solo to all 50 US states and most major US national parks.
Although I've found beauty in every state, there are some that I want to visit over and over again.
I love traveling to places like New Mexico, Montana, New Hampshire, and Arizona.
Over the past decade, I've successfully visited all 50 US states solo, and have even made it to most of the major US national parks along the way. Because of this journey, I'm often asked which states I'd recommend to travelers.
Although most international travelers gravitate toward states like Florida and New York, I've found fantastic beauty and history in every state.
However, these are the 10 I always return to.
New Mexico boasts a surprising variety of stunning landscapes.
Emily Hart
New Mexico is always at the top of my list of recommendations. Nicknamed "the land of enchantment," it lives up to its moniker — and then some.
Those who haven't visited New Mexico may think of the state as a mostly barren desert, but it's actually the diverse landscapes that keep me coming back.
From the otherworldly dunes of White Sands National Park to the snow-capped Sangre de Cristo Mountains, there's beauty to be found around every corner.
Outside the natural beauty, the state is chock full of history, art, food, wine, and culture.
California is full of diverse landscapes and experiences.
Emily Hart
Every time I visit California, I feel like I'm entering a completely different reality.
The sheer size and diversity of the state are impressive, and it has gorgeous beaches, cities, forests, deserts, mountains, and even volcanoes.
I love road-tripping up the coast, visiting Yosemite National Park, taking a boat to the Channel Islands, and wine tasting in places like Napa and Sonoma.
Montana is a must-visit state for any outdoor enthusiast.
Emily Hart
With its vast open spaces, majestic mountains, and endless opportunities for outdoor adventure, Montana is a must-visit state for any outdoor enthusiast.
The state is home to the breathtaking Glacier National Park and parts of Yellowstone National Park. The sky is vast and open, the mountains are towering, and the lack of development makes me feel like I'm entering another world entirely.
I've returned to West Virginia multiple times.
Emily Hart
Although it may not get as much attention as some of the other states on this list, I've returned to West Virginia multiple times since my first visit.
The state's natural beauty is stunning, from New River Gorge National Park to ample lush forests, underground caverns, historic small towns, and over 200 waterfalls.
Wisconsin is home to beautiful scenery and great dining options.
Emily Hart
Wisconsin has so much more than first meets the eye, from the natural beauty of the Apostle Islands and the 15,000 lakes in the state to the classic cheese curds, breweries, and wineries that dot the landscape.
I love spending time along the shores of Lake Michigan and Lake Superior, dining at one of the state's famous supper clubs, and exploring the many Wisconsin state parks.
There's no place quite like the Maine coast.
Emily Hart
There's so much to love about Maine, but my favorite part of the state is the coast. With jagged and dramatic cliffs, lighthouses, and lobster shacks, visiting the Maine coast is an unforgettable experience.
It's easy to find peace in the state that sees the first sunrise of the year and is home to Acadia National Park, which is one of the country's most-popular national parks.
I love to road trip up the coast, stopping in beautiful towns like Kennebunkport, Bar Harbour, and Lubec.
As my home state, Colorado will always hold a special place in my heart.
Emily Hart
I couldn't write a list like this without including my home state of Colorado. The state has so much to offer, from beautiful views to fun activities.
On the Front Range, I enjoy hiking in Boulder and exploring Cheyenne Cañon. I like to spend the night at the The Broadmoor hotel in Colorado Springs before heading over to Great Sand Dunes National Park.
In the Rockies, I love driving Independence Pass to Aspen, as well as exploring the underrated Grand Mesa, which is the biggest flat-top mountain in the world. I also enjoy taking road trips to the charming mountain towns of Telluride, Buena Vista, and Steamboat Springs.
No matter where you find yourself in Colorado, there's no shortage of incredible natural beauty and outdoor adventure.
New Hampshire boasts some of the best skiing and hiking in the Northeast.
Emily Hart
The Northeast is famous for its fall foliage, but I can't help but think that New Hampshire is sometimes overshadowed by its neighbors, Maine and Vermont.
I was stunned by its natural beauty during my first trip to the state. From the White Mountains to Franconia Notch State Park, the state boasts some of the best skiing and hiking in the Northeast.
Utah is home to five major national parks.
Emily Hart
Utah is a state that you have to see to believe. With five major national parks, 46 state parks, 15 ski resorts, and hidden gems at every turn — you'll never get bored here.
I love visiting Moab to hike in Arches National Park, Canyonlands National Park, and Dead Horse Point State Park before heading south to Bryce Canyon National Park, Kodachrome Basin State Park, and Zion National Park.
I also like making stops in Park City and Grand Staircase Escalante National Monument.
Arizona is the perfect escape for adventure and relaxation.
Emily Hart
Arizona is well known for the Grand Canyon, but the state has much more to offer. From Flagstaff's high-altitude forests to Sedona's iconic red rocks, Arizona's diversity is surprising and worth a trip.
I love hiking among the cacti in Sedona or Scottsdale before heading to one of the many resorts to jump in a pool or hit the spa — the perfect escape for adventure and relaxation.
This story was originally published on April 5, 2024, and most recently updated on October 23, 2026.
American voters’ antipathy toward Big Tech companies has become a central theme of campaigns in the 2026 midterm elections, according to an analysis published by The Guardian on Thursday. The Guardian noted that hundreds of midterm campaign ads attacking data centers have aired over the past two months, with both Republicans and Democrats accusing one […]
U.S. President Donald Trump may be considering further sanctions relief for Russia following his recent diesel deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin, several Ukrainian and U.S. officials familiar with the matter told the Kyiv Independent.
The potential move would fit an approach in which the Trump administration offers
Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence (HUR) warned that Russia may stage sabotage in Central and Eastern Europe, including the Baltic states, and blame Ukraine for the attacks, in a Telegram post on 23 October.
The warning comes three days after The Wall Street Journal reported that US intelligence traces Europe’s sabotage wave to Putin’s personal order. If Russia stages new attacks and pins them on Ukraine, as HUR warns, European anger could turn on Kyiv rather than the Kremlin. This goes further than HUR’s statement on 2 October, which named potential Russian targets in Europe but did not mention a plan to blame Ukraine for attacks.
HUR says Moscow wants to discredit Ukraine’s army
Russia is stepping up its hybrid strategy to destabilize the European Union, according to HUR. The agency identified two aims: reducing foreign support for Ukraine by discrediting its Defense Forces, and intimidating European governments and societies.
The accusations would be spread through Russian propaganda channels and international platforms accessible to the Kremlin.
Potential targets include infrastructure and Russian Orthodox Church sites
HUR listed several potential targets for Russian provocations:
critical infrastructure and areas bordering Russia;
the Kaliningrad exclave;
areas of EU countries with Russian-speaking populations;
Kremlin-controlled sites, including properties belonging to the Russian Orthodox Church network;
historical sites associated with Russia.
The list reflects HUR’s assessment of potential targets, not confirmation that attacks at these locations are planned.
Earlier warnings and reported sabotage
On 2 October, HUR said Russian intelligence services had been ordered to increase activity in EU and NATO countries. It named military facilities, critical infrastructure, communications systems, and Starlink ground stations as potential targets and said it had alerted partners.
Warnings of Russian false flags on NATO’s eastern flank predate HUR’s. In August, Bloomberg reported, citing an unnamed European intelligence official, that Russia might expand hybrid attacks against Poland and the Baltic states, including false-flag attacks. A European government official separately told the agency that the CIA had warned countries in the region of a possible Russian attack. Lithuania’s military intelligence had warned earlier in August that Moscow might reassemble captured Ukrainian drones for false-flag strikes on critical infrastructure in the Baltic region.
Meanwhile, The Wall Street Journal reported on 20 October that US intelligence agencies believe the attempted drone attack on Leipzig-Halle Airport in Germany in early August was among the opening shots of a sabotage campaign ordered by Russian President Vladimir Putin. The Journal cited European officials briefed on the intelligence findings.
According to the newspaper, at least three drones carrying military-grade Semtex explosives were involved. One struck an Antonov cargo plane used to transport military aid to Ukraine but failed to explode. Another collided with a different aircraft, while a third detonated near the airport perimeter. German newspaper Welt am Sonntag has since named two suspects, citing German investigation files. Earlier German media reports described the sequence differently.
The Journal also reported sabotage attacks on Starlink stations in Poland, Lithuania, and Bulgaria in recent weeks. In August, Slovak authorities said they had foiled a planned arson attack on a Ukrainian drone factory, the Journal reported.
Russia denies involvement in sabotage in Europe. Responding to Berlin’s accusations over the Leipzig incident in early September, Putin asked where the evidence was.
Dans ce sixième numéro de Moreau Décrypte, Xavier Moreau analyse la grande désillusion qui s’empare d’une partie des Ukrainiens. À Kiev, beaucoup observent avec inquiétude l’évolution de la position américaine, marquée par une priorité croissante accordée aux négociations et à un rééquilibrage des relations avec les grandes puissances, tandis que des discussions diplomatiques impliquant Washington, Moscou et d’autres acteurs internationaux
Iran has condemned “parasitic” military relations between the United States and Israel, citing the spending of $11 billion in American taxpayers’ money on missiles for the occupying regime over the past three years.
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi made the remarks in an X post on Friday, saying the US has fired more interceptors to protect Israel than the usurping entity has.
“That is not a symbiotic relationship. It is a parasitic one,” he added.
He also attached to his post a table provided on social media by independent policy analyst Stephen Semler that showed the US had fired an estimated 609 ballistic missile interceptors to protect Israel against Iran’s retaliatory strikes between October 2023 and September 2026.
The figure, however, did not include the interceptors the US fired to protect its own military assets across West Asia in the face of Iran’s reprisal attacks.
Earlier, Semler had estimated that the US had fired approximately 1,800 Patriot missiles between February and September this year.
Estimates indicate that the illegal aggression against Iran has consumed up to 82 percent of pre-war US THAAD stockpiles and 61 percent of Patriot missile supplies.
Experts warn that the shrinking stockpile leaves the US vulnerable, noting that it would take years to replace the missiles used at the current build rate of 600 per year.
The US and the Israeli regime waged their first illegal war against Iran, which lasted 12 days, in June 2025. Their second aggression began on February 28, 2026, and came to a halt in early April after 40 days.
In both wars, Iran’s resistance and successful retaliatory operations forced the aggressors to accept a ceasefire.
Iran has also maintained a tight grip on the Strait of Hormuz since the early days of the second imposed war amid the US’s acts of mischief in the region.
El sistema de pago que Irán pretende imponer a los buques que atraviesan el estrecho de Ormuz está inspirando también a otros países. Esta fuente de inspiración amenaza no solo los equilibrios de poder regionales, sino también el propio «orden mundial».
Recientemente, Talmiz Ahmad, un diplomático que anteriormente ocupó el cargo de embajador de la India en Arabia Saudí, Omán y los Emiratos Árabes Unidos, advirtió de que está aumentando el riesgo de que el estrecho de Malaca se utilice para generar ingresos.
Indonesia, Malasia y Singapur bordean el estrecho de Malaca. Malaca es una ruta comercial tan importante como Hormuz. Aproximadamente dos meses después de que comenzara la guerra de Irán, el ministro de Hacienda de Indonesia propuso cobrar a los buques que atravesaran Malaca. Los ingresos se repartirían entre los tres países ribereños del estrecho.
Singapur rechazó la propuesta, Malasia abogó por un compromiso e Indonesia anunció que, por el momento, no se impondrían tasas de tránsito. Sin embargo, la idea de implantar un sistema de este tipo en Malaca u otros estrechos ha pasado a formar parte del debate mundial.
Se proponen cortar el cordón umbilical de China
Los expertos entrevistados por The Diplomat advierten de que el estrecho de Malaca podría convertirse pronto en un punto donde «se cruzan los intereses comerciales, las preocupaciones de seguridad nacional y la competencia geopolítica». Tienen buenas razones para hacerlo, ya que la cuestión no se limita a la imposición de tasas de tránsito de una u otra forma, sino a la influencia estratégica que podría llegar a tener el estrecho. Las siguientes cifras bastan por sí solas para ilustrar la importancia geopolítica de Malaca:
Aproximadamente el 29 % del petróleo transportado por mar y el 24 % de todas las mercancías comerciales pasan por el estrecho de Malaca.
Entre el 75 % y el 80 % de las importaciones de petróleo por vía marítima de China se transportan a través de Malaca.
Si bien esta ruta satisface las necesidades de China, la dependencia que genera constituye también una vulnerabilidad estratégica. Esta situación se conoce como el «dilema de Malaca».
Sin embargo, la amenaza no proviene únicamente de la propia dependencia de China. Durante años, los estrategas estadounidenses también han estado debatiendo formas de convertir esta vulnerabilidad en un arma contra Pekín.
Un artículo publicado en el Georgetown Journal of International Affairs en 2023, titulado «El reto de la seguridad económica de China», sostenía que Estados Unidos y sus aliados deberían dificultar que China superara su dilema de Malaca.
Un estudio de 2024 de la Brookings Institution, titulado «After Primacy: US Military Options in Contemporary East Asia» (Tras la primacía: opciones militares de EE. UU. en el Asia Oriental contemporánea), incluía entre las opciones militares disponibles en caso de un conflicto en torno a Taiwán un contra-bloqueo basado en una coalición dirigido al tráfico marítimo comercial de China. Dicho bloqueo podría extenderse a puntos estratégicos clave como Malaca. El análisis también señalaba que tal medida podría acarrear elevados costes para la economía mundial.
De la vulnerabilidad a la ventaja
Según el periodista Andy Browne, ganador del Premio Pulitzer, los estrategas estadounidenses llevan aproximadamente 25 años considerando el bloqueo de las importaciones marítimas de petróleo de China como un arma poderosa contra Pekín. Aunque esta estrategia sigue siendo objeto de debate en la actualidad, la guerra de Irán ha presentado un panorama que pone en tela de juicio las hipótesis en las que se han basado los estrategas estadounidenses:
China ha demostrado que puede capear las interrupciones en el suministro de petróleo a través del estrecho de Ormuz sin sufrir daños significativos.
Además de utilizar sus reservas de petróleo para aliviar la presión sobre numerosos países, China también contribuyó a evitar que los precios de los combustibles se dispararan aún más fuera de control. Al mismo tiempo, los oleoductos terrestres, las tecnologías de conversión del carbón en productos químicos y la capacidad de energía verde han reforzado la posición estratégica de China.
Los aliados de EE. UU. en la región de Asia-Pacífico, incluidos Japón y Filipinas, que se han visto muy afectados por la guerra, siguen lidiando con el aumento de los precios de la gasolina y el gasóleo, la disminución de las reservas estratégicas y la creciente inflación. Los aliados de EE. UU. en Asia Occidental y Europa están sufriendo los mismos efectos.
La imagen de Estados Unidos como potencia capaz de proyectar su poderío militar ha sufrido un duro golpe.
A la luz de estas realidades, los expertos estadounidenses reconocen ahora que el cierre del estrecho de Malaca podría dejar a los aliados de EE. UU. en la región sin petróleo antes de que ello afectara de manera significativa a China.
Según Andy Browne, la Iniciativa de la Franja y la Ruta de China se ha convertido en una «medida defensiva», que crea rutas alternativas para eludir un bloqueo energético al tiempo que refuerza las conexiones euroasiáticas.
Pero la cuestión no termina ahí. La guerra de Irán también ha puesto de manifiesto las vulnerabilidades de las bases, los destructores y los portaaviones estadounidenses en la región de Asia-Pacífico. Los misiles hipersónicos, de crucero y balísticos de China podrían alcanzar estos objetivos, del mismo modo que los misiles iraníes han alcanzado activos estadounidenses en Asia Occidental. Las reservas chinas de misiles avanzados son enormes.
Dado que los actores asiáticos también debaten la posibilidad de generar ingresos a partir del estrecho, Washington se ve abocado a su propio «dilema de Malaca».
Una reacción en cadena que trastoca la doctrina estadounidense
La ecuación multidimensional que se está configurando actualmente indica que el objetivo de «controlar la alta mar» y «actuar como garante de la libertad de navegación» —la columna vertebral de la hegemonía estadounidense desde la Segunda Guerra Mundial— se enfrenta a su crisis más grave de la era posterior a la Guerra Fría.
La pérdida efectiva del control de Washington sobre estrechos estratégicos clave como Ormuz y Bab el-Mandeb está desencadenando una reacción en cadena que podría extenderse a la región de Asia-Pacífico y a otros estrechos críticos. A medida que convergen los avances en la tecnología de misiles, las amenazas asimétricas y las reivindicaciones de soberanía e ingresos de los actores locales, la capacidad de proyección de poder a escala mundial en la que Estados Unidos ha confiado durante décadas se está erosionando rápidamente.
El fin de la libertad de navegación garantizada por Washington en algunas regiones, y su creciente vulnerabilidad en otras, representa ahora algo más que un fracaso de la política exterior. Supone una grieta en el pilar marítimo fundamental que sustenta la hegemonía global de Estados Unidos.
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He also attached to his post a table provided on social media by independent policy analyst Stephen Semler that showed the US had fired an estimated 609 ballistic missile interceptors to protect Israel against Iran’s retaliatory strikes between October 2023 and September 2026.
