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EU Parliament’s defence chair urges ‘no compromises on security funding

The EU should not accept any cuts to the proposed allocation of funds to defence and security in the next long-term EU budget, German MEP Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann said in Strasbourg on Wednesday.

“Without security, we have no discussion anymore about anything,” the chair of the European Parliament’s committee on defence and security (SEDE) told the European Newsroom (enr) on the sidelines of Parliament’s plenary session.

The European Commission has proposed €131 billion for investment in defence, security and space under the European Competitiveness Fund in the EU’s 2028–2034 budget. This represents a five-fold increase compared with the current budget period.

Asked what compromise she would accept on the size, funding or allocation of defence spending to secure a budget agreement, Strack-Zimmermann said: “We need everything without compromises.”

The next long-term budget requires unanimous agreement among EU member states and the European Parliament’s consent.

Support for Ukraine

Strack-Zimmermann accused Russia of trying to deter European leaders from visiting Kyiv and undermine their support for Ukraine following attacks during German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s visit last Sunday.

Asked about accelerating deliveries to Ukraine to defend itself against Russia’s war of agression, Strack-Zimmermann said funding was available but action required approval from national governments.

Ukraine needed humanitarian, military and economic assistance, including money to produce more weapons to protect its people, she said.

All in on SAFE

Strack-Zimmermann urged countries to move faster on joint defence procurement, backing the EU’s Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument.

SAFE provides up to €150 billion in competitively priced loans to member states aimed at accelerating large-scale investment in critical capabilities.

“We have more than 150 different weapons systems and to protect Europe we need this SAFE program,” the German politician said.

She said the programme had attracted interest both within and outside the EU. According to the European Commission, 19 EU member states have submitted defence investment plans, such as France, Italy and Poland, but not Germany.

The first non-European country to participate in SAFE was Canada, which concluded an agreement with the EU in June.

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The Makkah Pact Enters Into Force: The End of American Dominance or Its New Form?

On October 5, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan activated the Makkah Pact, taking their new alliance to war for the first time, and potentially revealing the future of American power in the Middle East: Washington provides the security umbrella while regional partners increasingly do the fighting. From treaty to military alliance Only two months after […]
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The Middle East Breathes a Sigh of Relief

The withdrawal of American troops from Iraq is a watershed moment in the geopolitics of the Middle East. There comes a moment in global politics where imperialism loses and the world clings to the hope of a better future, a future based on prosperity, inclusivity, and promotion of human dignity. This moment has found its […]
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Latvia Reports Armed Belarus Border Provocation Followed by Sabotage of Surveillance Equipment

Three armed men accompanying at least 20 migrants from Belarus threatened Latvian soldiers and attempted to force the group across the frontier, according to Latvia’s National Armed Forces.

Hours later, masked intruders crossed into Latvia, damaged an electrical distribution unit and stole surveillance cameras before retreating into Belarus.

Latvia has reported an unusually aggressive incident on its border with Belarus in which armed, masked men threatened Latvian troops during an attempted migrant crossing, followed several hours later by an incursion targeting surveillance infrastructure.

The confrontation began on Monday evening when at least 20 people approached the Latvian border from Belarus accompanied by three masked men. Latvia’s National Armed Forces said the escorts were armed, issued threats to Latvian soldiers and actively drove the migrants towards the frontier. Latvian troops prevented the group from entering the country.

Several hours later, masked individuals crossed from Belarus into Latvian territory and targeted equipment used to monitor the border. Interior Minister Jānis Dombrava said they damaged an electrical distribution cabinet and removed surveillance cameras before returning across the frontier ahead of the arrival of a Latvian border-guard unit. Latvian authorities have not publicly identified the intruders or established whether all of those involved in the second incident were the same men who had earlier accompanied the migrants.

Dombrava described the events as markedly more aggressive than previous episodes on the frontier. He warned that Belarus should understand that incidents of this kind could have “more serious consequences” for the country.

The episode comes amid sustained pressure on Latvia’s 172km border with Belarus. According to the Latvian State Border Guard’s latest figures, 21 people were prevented from crossing illegally from Belarus on Tuesday, taking the total number stopped at that frontier since the beginning of 2026 to 11,946.

Latvia has for several years treated irregular migration from Belarus not simply as an immigration issue but as a security operation. Riga accuses the Belarusian authorities of deliberately facilitating migrant movements towards the EU border as a means of exerting political pressure.

In January, the Latvian National Armed Forces published what it described as evidence of Belarusian state involvement in organising illegal crossings. The military said documented cases included migrants being transported in Belarusian military vehicles and Belarusian officials participating in operations to direct people towards Latvia. That earlier material does not, however, establish the identities or affiliation of those involved in this week’s armed confrontation.

Pressure on the frontier intensified during the summer. In July, Latvian soldiers used tear gas and fired a warning shot when a group attempting to enter from Belarus refused orders to withdraw and, according to Latvian authorities, threw logs towards security personnel.

The methods used to circumvent the fortified border have also become more elaborate. In August, border guards found Latvia’s first known tunnel used for an illegal crossing from Belarus after intercepting 15 people near Skrudaliena. A second tunnel was discovered nine days later near Krāslava after another 28 people crossed the frontier. The State Border Guard said both incidents formed part of the continuing pressure on Latvia’s eastern border.

Riga responded in August by launching Operation VILKATIS, bringing together border guards, police and the armed forces under a co-ordinated security operation. Surveillance drones and other military capabilities have been deployed to reinforce monitoring of the frontier.

On Tuesday, the same day Latvian authorities disclosed the latest confrontation, the government extended Operation VILKATIS until 31 December. The Cabinet described the instrumentalisation of migration by Belarus as a hybrid threat and said additional resources would continue to be used along the eastern border.

The involvement of armed escorts changes the immediate security calculation for Latvian personnel. Previous incidents have largely centred on migrants, smugglers and attempts to bypass physical barriers. This week’s episode included direct threats against serving soldiers, followed by an unauthorised crossing and deliberate interference with border-monitoring equipment.

Latvia has not publicly attributed the operation to a particular Belarusian military, security or border agency. The account released by Riga therefore establishes an armed incident originating from Belarusian territory, but not yet who ordered or organised it. For Latvia, however, it adds another element to a border that is already being managed as part of the country’s wider response to hybrid threats on NATO and the EU’s eastern flank.

Main Image: By Saeima – https://www.flickr.com/photos/saeima/53117747287/, CC BY-SA 2.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=136391897
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France Extends Schengen Border Checks Until April 2027

France will maintain controls on all its internal Schengen borders for another six months, adding to a growing network of national checks that has made temporary border control an increasingly persistent feature of Europe’s passport-free area.

France has notified the European Commission that it will extend controls at its internal Schengen borders from 1 November 2026 until 30 April 2027, maintaining checks with Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Spain and Italy as well as at relevant air and sea borders.

The notification, published in the Commission’s official register of temporary internal border controls, means the restrictions currently due to expire on 31 October will continue for another six months.

Paris cites a combination of security and migration concerns, including persistent jihadist threats, antisemitic attacks, organised migrant-smuggling networks and risks associated with irregular movements towards the Channel coast.

The French notification also refers to instability in the Middle East, Afghanistan and Somalia, Russia’s continuing war against Ukraine and security considerations surrounding the Paris Peace Forum on 10–11 November.

France is not alone.

Germany has extended controls on all of its land borders until 15 March 2027, citing irregular migration, migrant smuggling and pressure on its asylum system. Austria is maintaining controls on borders with Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia until the same date, while Poland has notified Brussels of checks on its borders with Germany and Lithuania through 30 March.

Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Italy also have temporary internal controls in force.

The expansion has created an increasingly complicated map inside an area established around the principle that people should normally be able to cross internal borders without routine checks.

EU Today has been following that change closely. In September, EU Today reported that Germany had extended checks on all nine of its land frontiers, while a subsequent examination found that temporary controls were spreading across the Schengen area.

The French extension takes that trend into spring 2027.

Under the Schengen Borders Code, governments retain the right to restore controls when they identify a serious threat to public policy or internal security. The Commission stresses that such action must remain exceptional, proportionate and limited to what is necessary.

The revised rules permit controls responding to a foreseeable threat for an initial period of up to six months, with extensions possible under defined conditions. Governments maintaining controls for extended periods must provide additional risk assessments and reporting.

There is therefore no legal contradiction between Schengen membership and temporary border checks. The political question concerns their frequency and duration.

In June, the European Commission had called for a gradual reduction in internal controls where conditions allowed. EU Today reported at the time that Brussels regarded the restoration of normal passport-free movement as possible in several countries.

The direction since then has largely been the opposite.

Migration remains one factor, but national notifications increasingly cite several threats simultaneously: terrorism, organised crime, Russian sabotage, war in Ukraine, Middle Eastern instability and pressure on asylum systems.

That makes it harder to identify a single event after which controls could simply be removed.

The system also creates practical consequences for cross-border regions. Millions of Europeans live in one Schengen state and work, study or conduct business in another. Selective checks can therefore cause delays even when passports are not examined systematically.

France’s controls are especially significant because of the number and economic importance of its neighbours. The extension covers land connections with six countries and internal air and sea routes.

It also comes as the EU operates new systems intended to strengthen the external Schengen frontier. Europe’s Entry/Exit System has introduced biometric registration for many non-EU travellers, while the migration and asylum pact has changed procedures for handling irregular arrivals.

The original political bargain behind Schengen was that stronger management of the common external frontier would support open internal borders.

The growing use of national internal controls shows that several governments remain unwilling to rely on that external system alone when confronted with migration, terrorism and wider security risks.

France’s latest notification is formally temporary. But by the time the new period expires on 30 April 2027, internal checks will have become a long-running feature of travel across several of Europe’s most important borders.

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Von der Leyen Offers Extra Year on EU Methane Rules as Energy Costs Bite

The European Commission is preparing to give fossil-fuel exporters another year of flexibility under the EU’s methane regime as Brussels responds to high energy prices, pressure on European refineries and concerns over security of supply.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has announced an additional year of flexibility for energy exporters facing new EU methane requirements, marking the latest adjustment to climate legislation as Brussels attempts to contain rising energy costs.

Addressing the European Parliament in Strasbourg on Tuesday, von der Leyen said Europe remained exposed to high energy prices and volatile international fossil-fuel markets and confirmed that exporters would receive “one more year” to prepare for the methane rules.

She also announced a strategic dialogue with the European refining sector aimed at reducing costs and protecting supplies, according to the Commission’s published remarks.

The announcement affects a regulation that has increasingly become an energy-security issue rather than solely an emissions policy.

The EU’s Methane Regulation, adopted in 2024, introduced progressively stricter requirements for companies supplying oil, natural gas and coal to the European market. Importers have already been required to provide information about the origin of fuel and the systems used to measure and reduce methane emissions.

A more demanding stage was due from January 2027. Importers would have to demonstrate that fuel supplied under contracts concluded or renewed since August 2024 came from producers operating monitoring, reporting and verification systems equivalent to EU standards.

The rules are technically complex because European importers do not always buy directly from producers. Gas and oil may pass through traders, hubs, blending systems and several contractual relationships before reaching Europe.

The Commission’s own guidance for importers acknowledges those difficulties, particularly where companies must trace production information through complicated supply chains.

EU Today highlighted the problem in July, when an International Energy Agency assessment raised concerns that the rules could restrict Europe’s available oil supply. The dispute has since intensified because European fuel markets have become considerably tighter.

That pressure can also be seen in the cost of imported energy. EU Today reported last month that the value of EU petroleum imports had risen by 55.8 per cent in the second quarter of 2026 even though the physical volume purchased increased by only 1.2 per cent.

Von der Leyen’s intervention therefore comes against a different market background from the one in which the methane legislation was originally adopted.

The Commission has not abandoned its objective of reducing methane emissions from fossil-fuel production. Methane remains one of the most powerful greenhouse gases, and the regulation is intended to use the size of the European energy market to influence production standards outside the EU.

Instead, Brussels is attempting to adjust implementation so that regulatory requirements do not further restrict supply at a time of elevated energy prices.

The precise legal form of the additional year of flexibility has not yet been detailed in von der Leyen’s announcement. Existing requirements remain contained in Regulation (EU) 2024/1787, meaning that changes to deadlines or enforcement will have to be translated into the appropriate legal or administrative measures.

The Commission had already moved towards greater flexibility earlier this year. In July it issued recommendations designed to clarify contractual arrangements and advised national authorities on the application of penalties to importers while security-of-supply concerns persisted.

The broader problem is European energy competitiveness.

Von der Leyen told Parliament that Brussels intends to begin a strategic dialogue with refineries. European refining capacity has contracted over the longer term, leaving the continent more dependent on imported diesel and other finished petroleum products when individual plants close or external supply routes are disrupted.

The Commission is also expected to propose measures aimed at increasing electricity’s share of European energy consumption as part of its attempt to reduce dependence on imported fossil fuels.

The latest methane adjustment therefore fits a wider shift in Brussels. Climate targets remain formally intact, but implementation is increasingly being examined alongside energy prices, industrial competitiveness and the security of physical supplies.

The extra year gives exporters additional time. It also gives the Commission another year to resolve a question that has become much more urgent in 2026: how far Europe can tighten conditions on imported energy while remaining heavily dependent on those imports.

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Drone Strikes Sink Merchant Ship in Bulgaria’s Black Sea Economic Zone

Two merchant vessels have been attacked by aerial and maritime drones in Bulgaria’s exclusive economic zone in the Black Sea, sinking one ship and forcing the evacuation of another. The incident follows a deadly attack on a grain carrier off Romania a day earlier and has prompted concern over the growing risks to civilian shipping close to EU and NATO territory.

Two commercial vessels were struck by drones in Bulgaria’s exclusive economic zone early on Tuesday, 6 October, in the first known attack of its kind on merchant shipping in Bulgarian waters.

The Togo-flagged ALFA WATAN suffered severe structural damage and sank, while the Palau-flagged ABLE caught fire. Bulgarian Prime Minister Rumen Radev said the vessels were attacked at around 3am by both aerial and maritime drones about 70 nautical miles east of the coastal town of Byala. The Bulgarian government said a search-and-rescue operation was continuing for the crew of the ALFA WATAN, whose fate remained unknown.

All 18 people aboard the ABLE were rescued after abandoning the burning vessel. The Bulgarian-flagged passenger and freight ferry DIOSCURIA was diverted to the area and initially took the crew on board before Bulgarian Navy and Border Police vessels transferred them towards Varna.

The crew comprised 11 Turkish and seven Indian nationals. Two sailors were taken to hospital, including an Indian crew member suffering from burns and the Turkish captain, who sustained a head injury. Bulgarian public broadcaster BNT reported that the remaining 16 sailors subsequently arrived safely in Varna for medical checks.

The ABLE was reportedly carrying grain towards Istanbul. The cargo aboard the ALFA WATAN, which had been heading north towards Romania, has not been officially established.

Radev convened an emergency meeting involving the ministries of defence, interior, transport and environment, alongside the presidency and Bulgaria’s security services. He described the attack as an unacceptable violation of international and maritime law and warned of its effect on commercial navigation in the Black Sea.

Bulgarian authorities have not publicly identified who launched the drones. Investigations are examining both the weapons used and the circumstances surrounding the attack. One rescued Turkish sailor told Bulgarian television that he believed the ABLE had been hit by a Russian underwater drone, but that account has not been independently established and Sofia has made no formal attribution.

Foreign Minister Velislava Petrova said Bulgaria was in contact with its European and NATO partners and described Black Sea security as inseparable from wider European security. She said civilian crews and freedom of navigation must be protected and that Bulgaria would work with its allies to assess the wider consequences for maritime security.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen also condemned attacks against civilian shipping, saying the situation in the Black Sea was becoming increasingly concerning. She said commercial vessels and their crews were being targeted as investigations continued into the latest incidents.

Tuesday’s attack came less than 24 hours after another commercial vessel caught fire and sank in Romania’s exclusive economic zone. The Turkish-owned Royad Mammadov, sailing under the flag of Saint Kitts and Nevis, had left the Ukrainian Danube port of Izmail carrying corn for Ravenna in Italy.

Romanian authorities confirmed that two people died and 11 crew members were rescued. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said the vessel had been struck by two Russian drones, although Romanian authorities did not themselves publicly attribute the incident to Russia.

The two incidents in consecutive days mark a further geographical expansion of the risks facing commercial shipping in the western Black Sea. EU Today has previously reported how strikes near Romania have moved maritime war risks closer to NATO territory, while a separate maritime drone explosion at Constanța raised questions over the ability of coastal states to detect and respond to unmanned systems approaching commercial infrastructure.

The distinction between territorial waters and an exclusive economic zone remains important. The attacks occurred outside Bulgaria’s territorial sea and therefore do not amount simply to an attack on Bulgarian territory. They nevertheless took place in an area where Bulgaria has internationally recognised economic rights and responsibilities, including search-and-rescue and environmental obligations.

The immediate concern for Sofia is the search for the missing crew of the ALFA WATAN and the possibility of pollution from the wreck. The wider concern for the EU is the increasingly exposed position of civilian shipping routes linking Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey.

Ukraine’s maritime export routes remain particularly important for agricultural trade. Repeated attacks on merchant vessels can increase insurance premiums, discourage shipowners from entering the region and raise transport costs even when ports themselves remain operational. Russian attacks on Odesa and its export infrastructure have already placed Ukraine’s Black Sea grain corridor under sustained pressure.

With merchant ships now struck in the economic zones of both Romania and Bulgaria on consecutive days, Black Sea maritime security has moved further onto the agenda of EU and NATO governments along the western coast.

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Germany accuses Russia of a drone bomb attempt at Leipzig. Now its eight biggest airports get drone detection

The likely process of monitoring the airspace over airports connected to Germany’s new drone detection system. Photo: Deutsche Flugsicherung / Holger Matthies

Germany is expanding drone detection at its airports with a new system operated by German air traffic control provider Deutsche Flugsicherung (DFS), the German Federal Ministry for Transport (BMV) announced on 5 October.

Germany has accused Russia of attempting a hybrid attack at Germany’s Leipzig/Halle Airport near a Ukrainian An-124 aircraft using a drone carrying explosives. Earlier, Finnish President Alexander Stubb said Europe must be prepared for “continued hybrid and sabotage attacks” by Russia, adding that Russia seeks to sow panic through such actions.

On Monday, two more sites were added—Stuttgart and Hamburg. As of Monday, seven of Germany’s eight largest airports were equipped with the new drone detection system in their approach and departure areas.

Germany seeks responses to new hybrid threats

The Federal Ministry cited the reason for the new measure: drones near airports can affect air traffic very quickly.

Federal Transport Minister Steffen Bilger and Baden-Württemberg Transport Minister Nicole Razavi were briefed on the new system at Stuttgart Airport, where it is being put into operation, the ministry said. The system creates “an important technical basis for detecting potential threats at an early stage and quickly informing the competent authorities,” Bilger said.

“With today’s commissioning of the drone detection system at Stuttgart Airport, the federal government is fulfilling a key promise: it is not only talking about the dangers posed by unmanned aircraft, but is also following through with very concrete action. Protecting critical infrastructure and ensuring the safety of passengers at Stuttgart Airport require continuous adaptation to a changing security situation,” Razavi said, according to the ministry.

The new DFS system allows drones near airports to be detected at an early stage and information about possible threats to air traffic to be passed more quickly to the relevant authorities. This helps them assess risks and respond to them more quickly, the statement said.

DFS is responsible for detecting drones in approach and departure areas, while the Federal Police and other security services are responsible for preventing threats and defending against drones. The BMV, Federal Ministry of the Interior, DFS, Federal Police and airports coordinate their work to exchange information quickly and maintain a shared picture of the situation.

No further details about how the system operates have been disclosed.

The first stage of the expansion at Germany’s eight major commercial airports will be fully implemented this week, with the systems in Stuttgart and Hamburg being put into operation, the statement said.

Illustrative image of a Russian drone. Photo: RIA Novosti/Konstantin Mikhalchevsky
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A drone came down beside a Bundeswehr air base, weeks after Berlin blamed Moscow for the Leipzig airport attack

The system will also be installed at the airport where a bomb-laden drone was found

The system will also be put into operation at Leipzig/Halle Airport this week, meaning that the first stage will be fully implemented at all eight of Germany’s largest commercial airports, according to the press release.

A quadcopter drone carrying a Semtex explosive flew directly toward a parked Ukrainian An-124 Ruslan cargo aircraft and struck its wing at Leipzig/Halle Airport in Germany on the evening of 4 August, Die Zeit reported on 10 August. The drone hit the aircraft at around 19:30 local time, bounced off the wing, and fell to the ground without detonating, according to the media outlet.

Ukrainian An-124 at Leipzig/Halle Airport in Germany, 5 August 2026. Photo: screenshot from Bild video
Ukrainian An-124 at Leipzig/Halle Airport in Germany, 5 August 2026. Photo: screenshot from Bild video

Germany has accused Russia of attempting the drone attack and announced further sanctions against Russian citizens and institutions, Tagesschau reported on 1 September.

At the crime scene, investigators found the drone configuration, explosives and detonation technology that had already appeared in other Russian hybrid operations and in Russia’s war against Ukraine, Federal Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt said during a joint press conference with Federal Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul, the media outlet reported.

The German government assumes that Germany has been and will be a target of further such Russian attacks. Germany is not at war with Russia but is a “target of war,” Foreign Minister Wadephul said, according to the outlet.

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Exercises Over, Typhon Stays

The recently concluded trilateral “Orient Shield” exercises in Japan became the first three-way maneuvers involving Washington, Tokyo, and Canberra in which the “Typhon” medium-range missile system was employed. How are the United States and its allies pushing the world toward the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)? The Land of the Rising WMD Proliferation […]
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France and Germany Seek New EU Power to Cut Market Access Over Trade Distortions

France and Germany have proposed giving the European Commission powers to respond within days to serious trade distortions, including the possibility of restricting access to the EU single market. The initiative comes as European concern grows over Chinese subsidies, industrial overcapacity and dependence on critical imports.

French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz have called for a new European Union trade instrument capable of acting rapidly against countries whose economic practices cause serious disruption to the European market.

In a joint initiative sent to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on Monday, the two governments proposed strengthening the EU’s ability to respond to what they describe as systemic market distortions, including dumping, widespread subsidies and restrictions affecting access to critical supplies.

The Franco-German proposal does not formally identify China as its target. However, many of the practices it describes correspond directly to long-standing European concerns over Chinese industrial policy, including excess manufacturing capacity, state support and restrictions on exports of critical minerals.

The initiative represents a further development in a harder European approach towards Beijing. EU Today reported last week that China had warned it would respond if the EU introduced new restrictions against Chinese companies or products.

Macron and Merz are proposing two additional instruments.

The first would be intended to reduce European companies’ dependence on single suppliers for strategically important products and raw materials. The second would allow the EU to restrict access to its internal market when a third country uses political or economic measures that seriously undermine fair competition.

Under the proposal, the Commission could initiate countermeasures unless a qualified majority of EU governments voted to block them. That would reverse the normal political dynamic in which Brussels must first secure sufficient support before acting.

German officials have argued that the EU needs powers comparable in effect to the United States’ Section 301 trade measures or China’s ability to restrict exports of critical raw materials.

The Commission has welcomed the Franco-German intervention as a contribution to its work on economic security and global trade imbalances. Any new instrument would, however, require legislation and approval by both EU governments and the European Parliament before it could be used.

The proposal comes amid growing concern in both Paris and Berlin over the effect of subsidised Chinese production on European manufacturers.

Germany’s position is particularly significant. Berlin has traditionally been more cautious than Paris about measures that could restrict trade with China, reflecting the importance of the Chinese market to German carmakers, engineering companies and chemical producers.

That position has shifted as German industry faces increased competition from Chinese electric vehicles, machinery and other manufactured goods.

EU Today has previously examined the emerging Franco-German alignment on tougher China trade defences and demands from German manufacturers for broader European action rather than product-by-product investigations.

The new proposals go considerably further by seeking a mechanism capable of dealing with entire sectors and acting much more quickly than conventional anti-dumping proceedings.

Chemicals, PET plastics and hybrid vehicles are among sectors identified in the Franco-German document as areas where additional action may be required.

The timing is also significant. EU leaders are due to discuss trade relations with China at their summit in Brussels on 15–16 October, while Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič is expected to hold talks with Chinese officials beforehand.

The Commission is already attempting to balance two objectives: maintaining Europe’s access to the Chinese market while reducing strategic dependencies that could be used as political leverage.

The Franco-German plan would give Brussels another instrument at the more coercive end of that policy. Its eventual importance will depend on whether governments agree to create it and how readily they would permit the Commission to use it against a major trading partner.

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Kallas Warns Russian Hybrid Attacks Are Putting Lives at Risk Across Europe

EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas has warned that Russia is intensifying hybrid operations across Europe, citing sabotage attempts, airspace violations and Russian drones and missiles crossing into Moldovan territory.

Her intervention adds pressure for a more coordinated European response to hostile activity below the threshold of conventional warfare.

Russia is putting lives at risk across Europe through an expanding campaign of hybrid activity, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said on Monday, after another series of Russian drones and missiles entered Moldovan airspace.

Speaking in Brussels alongside Moldovan Prime Minister Vasile Tofan and Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos, Kallas said Europe had experienced an increase in sabotage attempts and airspace violations during recent weeks.

“Russian missiles and drones violated Moldovan airspace again over the weekend,” she said, describing the incidents as unacceptable.

According to the official EU record of the press conference, Kallas said the Kremlin was seeking to create fear and interfere with European decision-making, and argued that the response should include greater resilience and continued support for Ukraine.

Her remarks follow Russia’s renewed large-scale attacks against Ukraine’s energy system and continued reports of drones crossing borders beyond Ukrainian territory.

Moldova’s defence authorities reported that three drones entered Moldovan airspace during Russia’s 30 September attack on Ukraine. Moldova, which shares a long border with Ukraine and is seeking EU membership, has repeatedly accused Moscow of attempting to destabilise the country.

The latest incidents broaden a European debate that has been developing for months: how governments should respond to hostile operations that are deliberate and potentially dangerous but fall short of an overt military attack.

EU Today reported on 28 September that European governments were discussing an emergency security protocol intended to improve coordination when member states face sabotage and other hybrid threats.

That followed earlier warnings concerning suspected attacks on infrastructure, cyber operations, interference campaigns and airspace violations across several European countries.

The problem is partly one of attribution and partly one of thresholds.

A conventional armed attack on a NATO member may trigger consultation under Article 4 or, in sufficiently serious circumstances, collective defence provisions under Article 5. The European Union also has its own mutual assistance provision under Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union.

Hybrid activity is frequently designed to remain below those thresholds.

Cyberattacks, covert sabotage, GPS interference, disinformation, drones and operations conducted through intermediaries can impose costs without giving governments an obvious basis for a military response.

Kallas’s warning comes as Germany has also reported an increase in activity it attributes to Russia.

Chancellor Friedrich Merz has warned that Germany faces growing hybrid pressure involving drones and cyber operations. European security services have separately investigated suspected Russian involvement in sabotage and attacks on infrastructure in several countries.

Moscow has denied Western accusations that it is directing such operations.

The EU has already used sanctions against individuals and entities accused of Russian hybrid activity, while governments are considering faster systems for sharing intelligence and attributing incidents.

EU Today examined the debate in September as the European Parliament considered proposals for quicker attribution, stronger intelligence-sharing and improved protection of critical infrastructure.

Moldova occupies a particularly exposed position.

The EU has provided €317 million through the European Peace Facility for Moldovan defence modernisation, according to Kallas, including €120 million allocated in 2026 for air defence. Brussels is also supporting Moldova through its EU Partnership Mission, which provides assistance against hybrid and cyber threats.

Unlike Ukraine, Moldova is not a NATO member and has constitutional neutrality. Its ability to counter Russian missiles or drones entering its airspace is therefore closely connected to the development of its own detection and air-defence capabilities.

For the EU, repeated incidents involving Moldova, NATO airspace and European infrastructure are increasingly being considered as parts of the same security problem rather than isolated events.

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The Ethiopia–Tigray Crisis: The Fragile Peace That Failed to Hold

The Pretoria Agreement brought an end to Ethiopia’s devastating Tigray war—but not its underlying disputes. Four years later, renewed fighting and shifting armed alliances are threatening to reopen the conflict. The consequences could extend far beyond Tigray, destabilising the wider Horn of Africa. Ethiopia’s fragile post-Pretoria peace is rapidly unravelling as renewed fighting between federal […]
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Merz Announces New Ukraine Package as German Defence Ties Deepen

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has announced a new package worth more than €1.3 billion for Ukraine during a visit to Kyiv, combining additional military assistance with support for the country’s damaged energy infrastructure as German-Ukrainian industrial co-operation expands.

Merz visited the Ukrainian capital on Sunday while Russian drone attacks continued against Kyiv.

According to the Ukrainian presidency’s account of the meeting, the package includes more than €1 billion for defence and additional financing for the energy sector ahead of winter. Separate reporting put the energy component at approximately €350 million.

The visit also produced an extensive group of bilateral agreements involving governments and companies.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Ukraine and Germany had concluded 15 agreements and documents, most concerning security co-operation, production, procurement, orders for German industry and joint projects in Ukraine. He put the total value of the agreements reached during the visit at more than €8.5 billion.

A narrower set of industrial agreements reported during the visit was valued at about €6.6 billion and included air-defence, radar and drone projects.

The visit went beyond another transfer of military aid.

Germany and Ukraine are increasingly constructing a defence relationship based on procurement, industrial production and the transfer of Ukrainian battlefield experience to European manufacturers.

At the Ukrainian-German Business Forum, Zelenskyy said the new security package would strengthen Ukraine’s armed forces immediately while industrial agreements were intended to build longer-term production capacity.

The direction corresponds with a wider shift in European support for Ukraine.

Military assistance is increasingly moving away from transfers of existing national stocks towards contracts financing new weapons production. In July, the EU released €3.47 billion for Ukrainian defence procurement, including financing intended for drones, missiles, air defence and combat aircraft requirements.

Kyiv has since asked European partners to accelerate further financing as the demands of the war outpace scheduled disbursements. EU Today reported in September that Ukraine was seeking early access to part of its 2027 EU funding to close a military budget gap.

The German agreements add a bilateral industrial track to that European system.

They also reflect changes on the battlefield.

Russia has continued to expand large-scale drone and missile attacks, increasing the importance of interceptor production, radar coverage and lower-cost methods of destroying unmanned aircraft. Ukraine’s air-defence problem is increasingly an industrial one: inexpensive attack drones cannot sustainably be countered only with scarce and costly surface-to-air missiles.

EU Today has previously examined how Ukraine’s air-defence battle has become an industrial equation, determined as much by production rates and cost ratios as by the technical performance of individual systems.

German-Ukrainian co-operation is increasingly being shaped by that requirement.

Merz has presented continuing support for Ukraine as a direct German and European security interest, rather than assistance based solely on solidarity with Kyiv.

The argument has acquired greater force as German authorities investigate Russian-linked sabotage and hybrid operations on German territory.

In September, investigators reportedly traced the attempted bombing of a Ukrainian cargo aircraft at Leipzig/Halle Airport to a suspected Russian military-intelligence organiser, with EU Today reporting details of the alleged GRU-linked logistics network.

For Berlin, support for Ukraine is now increasingly seen as part of Germany’s own security.

Merz’s visit also carries a domestic political dimension. His government is committing Germany to considerably higher defence expenditure at a time when the CDU has suffered severe electoral setbacks in eastern Germany and voters remain concerned over public finances and economic performance.

Yet Germany’s military and industrial engagement with Ukraine is continuing to expand.

The new package announced in Kyiv is important in itself, particularly as Ukraine prepares for another winter of Russian attacks on its energy infrastructure. The wider development, however, lies in the growing number of defence-production agreements accompanying it.

European governments have spent much of the war debating how to replenish their own weapons stocks while sustaining Ukraine.

The German approach increasingly points towards a different model: Ukrainian operational experience, Ukrainian procurement requirements and European industrial capacity being brought into the same defence-production system.

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What does Europe want—a war with Russia?

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America has become an imperial power that aims to invade and dominate the weak countries. This tendency has created global insecurity and led America to lose wars. In terms of natural resources and firepower, America dominates like no other country. It has the largest and most flexible military, the most weapons, and the most devices […]
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Divided EU cyber defence faces real-life Russian and Chinese threats

Europe is facing more immediate cyber threats, but whether its member states are prepared to deal with it collectively is becoming a question harder to answer.

Even as drone threats, such as Russia’s bomb plot at the Leipzig-Halle airport in Germany in August, dominated European headlines in September, other, less visible hybrid attacks are also being waged against the EU every day, whose sheer weight of numbers should also cause grave concern.

Poland, for instance, recorded 4,200 cyber-security incidents in military networks and systems in 2024 and 7,100 in 2025, Polish cyber command spokesperson, Przemek Lipczyński, told EUobserver.

In 2025, Polish security systems blocked four million phishing emails targeted at soldiers and defence personnel.

And Poland aside, evolving technology meant Russian cyber-attacks “do not know any border”, said Jamila Boutemeur, the EU’s head of cybersecurity body, in what amounted to a single market for hacking.

For its part, the European Union has built its cybersecurity architecture around the Boutemeur’s European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, ENISA, in Athens, as well as the 27 national cybersecurity agencies.

But as Russia’s threat levels up, the European structure is seeing familiar problems: information is not always shared, responsibilities remain divided between national governments and EU institutions, while ENISA itself is being asked to do more with limited resources.

And the European Court of Auditors (ECA) confirmed it on 21 September in its ENISA study.

“The architecture is there, the structure is there. Now it’s a matter of willingness and trust,” to effectively fight back, said George-Marius Hyzler, the ECA’s main auditor.

Stress test shows EU cracks

“It always boils down to the same thing, lack of information sharing,” he said, identifying the EU’s key weakness.

And for Czech Greens MEP Markéta Gregorová, who is also the lead rapporteur on the EU’s incoming Cybersecurity Act 2 (CSA2), duplication of work also bedevilled the EU’s response.

“The [ECA] auditors describe a system that does not work” and was “wasteful”, she told EUobserver.

“Six European legal acts force the same company to report the same incident to different authorities. Two EU bodies monitor the same threats,” Gregorová said.

She also advocated a stronger operational role for ENISA.

But the EU fault lines have underlying political as well as legal tensions.

Cybersecurity remains largely within the competence of the member states, and governments differ in how much new power they are willing to delegate to European institutions.

And for Dimitar Lilkov, from the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, there were three main sources of friction: national security, trust, and money.

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