With a flight deck packed with carrier-based aircraft, including stealthy fifth-generation F-35Cs, the USS Theodore Roosevelt pulled into Yokosuka, Japan, on Friday. Roosevelt is the first non-resident U.S. carrier to visit the key naval port, strategically located on the east side of Japan, in more than four years. Yokosuka is home to the USS George Washington and America’s only forward-based Carrier Strike Group (CSG).

The Roosevelt, which serves as the flagship of CSG 9, escorted by guided-missile cruiser USS Chosin and destroyer USS Decatur, completed the journey from San Diego in 19 days − maneuvering around a typhoon in the Western Pacific − and will participate in the upcoming combined exercise Keen Sword 27. Meanwhile, the USS George H.W. Bush departed Thailand after a five-day port call and returned to the Middle East, and the USS Abraham Lincoln arrived home after a nearly eleven-month combat deployment.

Here’s TWZ’s weekly carrier tracker monitoring America’s flattop fleet, including deployed CSGs and Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs), using publicly available open-source information. Check out last week’s report here.

Theodore Roosevelt Docks In Yokosuka, Japan; First Visiting Carrier In Four Years

Roosevelt and Chosin chopped into the U.S. 7th Fleet-Pacific Command (PACOM) area of responsibility (AOR) and arrived at Commander, Fleet Activities Yokosuka on the morning of October 16. The CSG will spend a few days in port before beginning participation in exercise Keen Sword, a “premier joint-bilateral field training exercise designed to increase readiness and interoperability between the Japan Self-Defense Forces and U.S. military forces,” according to the 7th Fleet press release. The brief visit allows the crew to complete maintenance, resupply, and disembark for liberty before resuming routine operations.

“Our crew is honored to visit Yokosuka and experience the rich culture and hospitality of Japan,” the commanding officer of Roosevelt, Capt. Will Mathis, said in the release. “Port visits like this are vital for crew morale and mission readiness, allowing our Sailors to rest, recharge, and prepare to operate seamlessly alongside our allies during exercise Keen Sword.”

The five-ship CSG, the composition of which a Navy official confirmed to TWZ, is currently operating on a disaggregated basis − a common practice employed by strike groups with multiple ongoing missions. The duo that departed the U.S. at the end of September linked up with another element of the group, Pearl Harbor-based guided missile destroyer USS Decatur, as they were steaming westbound past the Hawaiian Islands, based on public Automatic Identification System (AIS) data. Decatur arrived in Yokosuka the day after Roosevelt but was not mentioned in the press release.

USS Carl M. Levin, also stationed in Hawaii, was the first ship from the group to deploy, according to DVIDS, the military’s content-sharing platform. Levin departed on September 9 and is operating at an undisclosed location. USS Paul Hamilton, the final ship assigned to CSG 9 to deploy, left San Diego on October 10 after onloading ammo at Bravo Pier and moored at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam on October 15, AIS data shows. Henry J. Kaiser class fleet replenishment oiler USNS Tippecanoe supported the group’s transit across the Pacific, conducting multiple replenishments-at-sea (RAS), and recently entered the East Sea/Sea of Japan via the Tsugaru Strait before going dark on AIS.

Multiple reports indicated that medium unmanned surface vessel (MUSV) Seahawk (2) deployed with the group, which would represent a significant operational achievement and the first time a drone boat was assigned to a CSG, but the MUSV quietly slipped out of Point Loma on October 8, more than ten days after Roosevelt. Seahawk reappeared on AIS and docked in Hawaii for a couple days before continuing its journey westbound in the Pacific on October 16. If Seahawk is assigned to CSG 9, it is currently disaggregated, and whether it will join Roosevelt to participate in exercise Keen Sword 27 is unknown.

Acting Secretary of the Navy Hung Cao seemingly confirmed the deployment, saying during a panel at the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) convention that “the Teddy Roosevelt carrier strike group just deployed on October 8 with a medium sized unmanned surface vessel. This is the first carrier strike group to ever deploy with a large size unmanned surface vessel.” However, Roosevelt was more than halfway to Japan on the date referenced. “This is a force multiplier, imagine having more guns out there,” he added.

TWZ reached out to the Secretary’s office for clarification and to confirm the deployment but did not receive a response. “Seahawk’s operations represent continued progress in the Navy’s efforts to integrate unmanned systems into Fleet operations. As with any emerging capability, we continue to learn, adapt, and refine how these systems are employed,” a Navy official told us.

Abraham Lincoln’s Homecoming

Surrounded by small boats, with hundreds of spectators lining the channel in San Diego Bay and thousands more watching online, the USS Abraham Lincoln arrived home from a historic ten-and-a-half-month combat deployment. The flagship of CSG 3 and her crew of more than 5,000 Sailors and Marines served as the tip of the spear in the war against the Iranian regime, first during Operation Epic Fury and then the subsequent blockades, and set a new record for the most consecutive days at sea without a port call.

Lincoln pulled into Naval Air Station North Island and moored at Berth Lima on October 8, 321 days after casting off on November 21, 2025. Sailors in dress whites manned the rails as the carrier transited the bay, escorted on both sides by small boats and jet skis flying American flags, while family and friends eagerly waited pierside for their return. The video below, shared by the Pentagon, captures the moment.

Lincoln now lays claim to the second-longest deployment in the modern carrier era, falling just five days short of the 326-day post-Vietnam record held by the USS Gerald R. Ford. The flattop traveled over 93,000 nautical miles during the cruise − more than four trips around the Earth, a post by the public affairs officer highlighted − and conducted 72 replenishments-at-sea, received 20-plus million gallons of aviation fuel, and flew more than 14,000 sorties that totaled 28,500 flight hours, a press release from the Navy highlighted.

The release confirmed for the first time that Lincoln broke the previous record of 206 days set by USS Dwight D. Eisenhower during the COVID pandemic for days spent underway between port visits, as TWZ first reported. “The ship’s 208 uninterrupted days at sea between Guam and Oman, and its 286 consecutive days at sea between departing San Diego and arriving in Thailand, are record-breaking marks for modern aircraft carriers.”

Lincoln’s cruise took her through both U.S. 7th Fleet and U.S. 5th Fleet AORs. During Operation Epic Fury, which began on February 28 and lasted almost 40 days, Lincoln took up station in the northern Arabian Sea as Commander, Task Force (CTF) 50 and pressured Iran’s southern flank. When major combat operations wound down, the carrier and her air wing patrolled and enforced the blockade line during both rounds that followed.

Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 9, the “Navy’s premier next-generation air wing that served as the primary offensive power” for CSG 3, flew 14,037 sorties − including 4,000 combat missions − and dropped more than 1.37 million pounds of ordnance on thousands of targets while employing 1,499 precision weapons. “This concentrated firepower significantly degraded Iranian Navy capabilities,” a separate statement noted.

“The rapid mobilization and combat execution of CVW-9 during Operation Epic Fury demonstrated the unmatched flexibility of a U.S. Navy carrier strike group,” Capt. J.W. Stigi, commander of CVW-9, said in the statement. “Pairing fifth-generation F-35C stealth and sensor fusion with fourth-generation workhorse strike and electronic attack platforms, Team Shogun destroyed Iran’s conventional Navy and secured vital maritime chokepoints in support of our commander’s objectives.”

Kill marks painted on the island superstructure show CSG 3 destroyed 106 one-way attack drones fired by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), 34 Iranian Navy and IRGC ships, 23 inbound cruise missiles, and 10 enemy submarines. The strike group dropped 1,463 air-to-ground munitions in total, a Sailor explaining the marks said in a video on social media.

George H.W. Bush Leaves Thailand And Returns To The Middle East

The USS George H.W. Bush and her destroyer escort, USS Delbert D. Black, departed Phuket, Thailand, on October 9 after a five-day liberty visit. “Nearly 5,000 Sailors from across the strike group experienced the sights and sounds Thailand has to offer, deepening their understanding of the Thai people and strengthening interpersonal bonds,” according to a press release.

“The Sailors and I had an amazing time in this beautiful country, and I sincerely thank the people of Thailand for their incredible welcome,” Capt. Justin T. Issler, the commanding officer of George H.W. Bush, said about the stop. “This port visit to Phuket was a tremendous opportunity for the crew. We are grateful to our Thai allies for hosting us, and we look forward to continuing our mission here in 7th Fleet, alongside Thailand and our other regional allies and partners.”

Bush dropped anchor approximately two nautical miles south of Ao Makham Deep Sea Port on October 4 after 187 consecutive days at sea. After leaving Phuket, the carrier stopped broadcasting AIS while steaming due south at 10 knots. Imagery on DVIDS confirms that the CSG returned to the Middle East and operating in the U.S. 5th Fleet AOR to “support maritime security and stability,” joining the George Washington CSG once again as the second strike group in the region.

Destroyer USS Mason, which deployed as the integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) commander for the CSG but has disaggregated at times, arrived in Singapore on October 5, likely for a port call. The Arleigh Burke class destroyer departed on October 9 and was last tracked heading northwestbound in the Malacca Strait, likely to rejoin the CSG. The other two destroyers assigned to the CSG, USS Ross and USS Donald Cook, remained in 5th Fleet during the visit.

F-35C Lightning II Operates from A Ford Class Carrier For The First Time

Marking a major milestone, an F-35C Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter made the first arrested landing aboard a Gerald R. Ford class carrier, the Navy’s newest and most advanced class of aircraft carriers that are being built to replace the aging Nimitz fleet. The trap was made by Lt. Cmdr. Robert Mason with the “Salty Dogs” of Air Test and Evaluation Squadron (VX) 23 aboard the future USS John F. Kennedy in the Western Atlantic on October 13. The first catapult launch followed the next day, pictures on DVIDS showed.

VX-23, based out of Naval Air Station Patuxent River in Maryland, is part of the Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division and was putting Kennedy through the ongoing Aircraft Compatibility Testing to assess the “operational capabilities of the ship’s aircraft launch and recovery equipment.” A team from the Patuxent River-based F-35 Integrated Test Force, detached to the ship, conducted the evaluation using a specially instrumented example of the jet. One of the two pictured was externally equipped with an inert Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) bomb.

The Navy took preliminary acceptance of Kennedy, which is still considered a Pre-Commissioning Unit, on September 29. This process allows the service to conduct at-sea testing and build underway proficiency while the shipbuilder, Huntington Ingalls Industries, completes final system checks ahead of expected delivery in spring 2027. Kennedy got underway on October 13 and returned to her homeport of Naval Station Norfolk three days later.

The lead ship of the class, the USS Gerald R. Ford, does not currently embark F-35Cs and will need upgrades to field the Navy’s most advanced jet. Back in 2019, TWZ warned that the stealth jet wouldn’t fly from the troubled class for years. Because of this, Congress required that Kennedy be equipped to embark F-35Cs, which led to additional delays for the Navy’s next carrier.

Big Deck Fleet At A Glance

Overall, three U.S. carriers are deployed, three are working up in various states of readiness, three are in maintenance availabilities, one is post-deployment, one is being used primarily for training before deactivation next year, and another will be delivered in 2027. Two amphibious ready groups are deployed, one is forward-deployed, three are working up or in port, and three are in maintenance.

Note: Positions are general approximations. Non-deployed LHA/LHD amphibious warships are not shown.

Contact the author: ian@twz.com or @ianellisjones

The post Where Are The Aircraft Carriers?: October 17, 2026 appeared first on TWZ.

Army leaders preparing for a potential fight in the Pacific told us that some of the biggest lessons they’ve learned from the war in Ukraine and America’s now-paused fight against Iran are to move around assets that you can and find a better way to camouflage those that you can’t. While seemingly common sense, these lessons come from watching how war is now waged. The ubiquity of drones in Ukraine providing constant overwatch and strike capabilities, and U.S. troops killed and equipment destroyed or damaged by massive Iranian barrages on static installations are informing changes to how the Army trains, equips and operates.

These conversations took place during the recently wrapped Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA) annual convention in Washington, D.C., which TWZ attended.

“A lot of the things that are happening right now in terms of long-range fires, integrated air and missile defense, and the lessons that we’re learning from them, we’re able to bring a lot of that to our potential challenges in the Pacific,” Gen. Ron Clark, commander of U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), told us at a media roundtable. “Specifically, I am thinking through mobility and camouflage. So it’s one of those age-old Army forgotten sciences of how to hide in plain sight and how to camouflage ourselves from observation, because the ability to be able to see surface entities is almost ubiquitous.”

“Our ability to be able to use electronic warfare, to be able to use just good old-fashioned camouflage, and the ability to deceive our adversary is a must,” Clark added. You can read more about the U.S. military’s camouflage and deception efforts in our story here.

As we have frequently reported about the Ukraine war, both sides have been using a variety of “old-fashioned” tactics to duck, dodge and hide. They range from practices like smokescreens to hide from drones to updates on measures from the past like paint schemes designed to obfuscate vehicles and other equipment from AI-enabled targeting systems.

 As tough as things have been for Ukraine and for U.S. forces in the Middle East, the challenges will be even greater in the Pacific, Clark warned.

In Europe and the Middle East, “it’s not a near-peer adversary that we will be working against,” said Clark, referring respectively to Russia and Iran.

“Whereas in our theater, it absolutely is,” the USARPAC commander noted in a reference to China without naming the country. “So our ability to scale that and to think through the problem sets of how do we fight Type One, Type Two UAS? How do we think through ballistic missile defense holistically in the region? We spend a lot of time working with the joint force for solutions associated with that. How do we maneuver inside an archipelagic environment?”

For the Army, any fight in the Pacific will require soldiers to be able to hop islands and move through vast swaths of ocean, constantly hunted and frequently inside the Chinese weapons engagement zone. Clark said that the Army’s organic fleet of ships like landing craft, small tugs, and modular causeway systems operated by the service’s 8th Theater Sustainment Command will be vital for maneuver.

The Army, however, is struggling to keep its aging fleet of 70 of these vessels in the water and it got rid of a number of others over the years. Concerns about this underappreciated force have been something TWZ has raised for years.

“But we also have to be able to conduct tactical maneuver with forces on the ground that can provide long-range precision fires, as an example, and then move so that fires, radars, sensors are not easily targeted,” Clark added. “Because if they can see you, they can hit you. And if you know they have an opportunity to return fire, they will. So our lessons that we’re learning are, in some cases, are very, very relevant. In some cases, we can learn from some of the changing characteristics of war.”

Still, the wide-open plains and dense cities of Ukraine are quite different from the beaches and jungles of the Pacific, Clark reminded us.

“The way we generally fight does not equate specifically in the Ukraine piece to the maneuver that you would see out of U.S. forces if deployed in a conflict like that,” the USARPAC commander explained. “To be able to use operational maneuver and tactical maneuver in a way that it’s not just simply drone on drone or firing long range fires at one another at scale for an extended period of time. We find our way to work through that problem set and maneuver to positions of advantage and to prevail.”

Ukraine’s 115th Mechanized Brigade has released new footage showing a VB-140 Flamingo interceptor drone attacking a Russian Mi-28 attack helicopter in flight.

The drone approaches from above and flies directly into the helicopter’s spinning main rotor. It’s unclear whether… pic.twitter.com/GCb9FodXG3

— Special Kherson Cat (@bayraktar_1love) October 16, 2026

Regardless of the terrain, the ubiquity of drones in the Ukraine war has made maneuver and resupply deadly endeavors, with much of the front lines bogged down with limited territorial advances by either combatant.

When we pushed further on that point, Gen. Xavier T. Brunson, commander of United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command and United States Forces Korea, weighed in.

“To be able to move with sensors everywhere at all times causes us to achieve positions of advantage from distributed locations,” Brunson pointed out. “So the fight is: you look at maneuver. You might maneuver to a position of advantage, knowing that you’re going to change that again. The ability to utilize not only joint sensors but joint effectors, if you will, joint fires, to be able to use those things from different positions changes the shape of the operating environment.”

The bottom line, he added, is that “maneuver is always going to be maneuver. You’re going from A to B, but you might go from A to A1 to A2 to A3 to get to B, and that’s what I think we realize in this distributed fight that’s going on in Ukraine, and so we continue to watch to see what lessons might be coming back into” effect.

In part reacting to lessons learned from Ukraine and the Middle East, the Army is also changing how it trains, Clark stated. In South Korea, he said the service has to get out of the habit of concentrating so heavily on just two annual major training exercises.

“We recognize… that largely the two big exercises every year in Korea focus on large command posts,” Clark proffered. “We’ve got to move away from that. So what we intend to do is take advantage of the knowledge that we have of the threats that exist or that prevail in the Ukraine fight.”

Clark said these discussions are underway with his deputy commander, Republic of Korea Army Gen. Sungmin Kim.

“We talk about how we would operate in a distributed fashion. You know as well as I do, there’s a location that we go to to train every year in Korea, and we stay in that place,” Clark said in response to a question from another reporter. “What would it look like if we train from Jeju all the way up to Gyeonggi Province in the north? What would that look like, just with our headquarters alone?”

“So just imagine,” Clark postulated, “if we train across the entirety of the peninsula, and got ourselves in the shape where we would say [to North Korea], ‘You can’t utilize the things that you’ve learned in the fight and the battlefield in Ukraine on us, because we learned the same lessons and we’ve distributed ourselves in such a way that we don’t make ourselves the target. We won’t be moored in place,’ and that’s what I’m talking about when I talk about positional advantage. It might not be the same place to the continuum. It might not be the same place when you’re in crisis or conflict or competition. We might have to change that, and that’s what we’re learning.”

Another lesson from Ukraine that Army leaders should be paying attention to, said another panelist, is how both sides are using aerial and ground drones to supply frontline forces and evacuate the wounded because human efforts have now become too deadly, thanks to drones.

“I think you also can’t talk about Ukraine without talking about autonomy,” said Tara Murphy Dougherty, CEO of a company called Air, which provides AI-based sustainment solutions to the Army.

“One of the advantages that you get from using simulation and automation, and really using models and compute in order to create convoy plans, as opposed to humans with Excel spreadsheets, is you are able to do many fewer actual convoys because you’re using all of your capabilities so much more effectively and efficiently,” Dougherty posited. “And while it’s an indirect example, I think it does tie to soldier protection because you’re putting fewer soldiers out there in vulnerable settings. I see that not as an end-goal outcome; we need convoys.”

Ultimately, however, the Army will have to advance what Ukraine and Russia are doing with the deployment of aerial drones and uncrewed ground vehicles for logistics by creating “convoys” of autonomous vehicles.

“I see the end goal outcome as having as many autonomous convoys as possible, and we’ve heard today already at this event some of those ideas,” the CEO added. “In the interim, until we get to more autonomy in medevac and more autonomy in convoys when it’s non-soldier material that’s going out to the battlefield, let’s try and put fewer out there while actually getting more material and capability into the force where it needs to be.”

The Iranian missile and drone barrages on fixed U.S. bases across the Middle East have created some very costly lessons for American forces. As we noted earlier in this story, several troops were killed and critical air defense radars, aircraft and other important equipment were destroyed or damaged. U.S. installations across the region have also suffered damage.

In another media session, we pressed Army officials operating in South Korea about what they learned from watching the destruction caused by Iran and what they are doing to address it.

You can see a satellite image of damage to a U.S. radar site in Jordan below:

NEW: The radar for a THAAD system was struck and apparently destroyed in Jordan while two other THAAD radar systems may have been hit in the UAE, satellite images show – w/ @ThomasBordeaux7 https://t.co/qiuWVQgyda

— Gianluca Mezzofiore (@GianlucaMezzo) March 5, 2026

“We certainly are watching what’s happening, and we are learning from what is happening in Operation Epic Fury,” Lt. Gen. Joseph “Joe” Hilbert, commanding general of Eighth Army, stationed in South Korea, told us. “We’re learning what’s happening in Ukraine, and we are working through changes in our own tactics and techniques and procedures to be able to react to those threats and to be able to defend against them.”

For more details, he turned the microphone over to Col. Rosanna “Ro” M. Clemente, commander of the 35th Air Defense Artillery Brigade in South Korea.

“Drawing from those lessons learned, a lot of it is trying to understand how our systems are being hunted by the adversary,” she told us. “So, strictly into all of our training plans, and as we conduct our own internal exercises, all of our air defenders are practicing something as simple as mobility and survivability jumps, which is being able to reposition and displace your systems to different alternative locations based on any type of threat warnings that we receive. They’re very, very well trained. I think all of our soldiers know how to move their systems extremely, extremely well. They move them quickly, and they are able to move them and reposition them into different locations across the peninsula that still maintains that ballistic missile defense coverage.”

In addition, “we also have to rely on the other pillars of integrated air and missile defense, most specifically the passive defensive measures that we also have in place,” she added.

Those measures involve “a little bit more than just hardening – but a couple of other techniques that we’ve learned from the Russia-Ukraine war in terms of deception, how to move things around, create distractions, and make sure that we create different types of dilemmas for the adversary in terms of where our capabilities are and where are they positioned to protect its defended assets.”

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The post What The Army’s Pacific Commanders Are Learning From Ukraine And Iran Conflicts appeared first on TWZ.

By K. J. NOH, POPULAR RESISTANCE

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Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

Over seventy years ago, the US took control of South Korea’s military. To this day, it still controls it.

Why?

This confounds every notion of state sovereignty: a supposedly sovereign country — South Korea — has its own military subjugated under US control.

Opcon (operational control) of one nation’s army by another country is usually temporary, usually during wartime among allies.

In Korea, it has lasted over 76 years.

South Korea has asked for opcon back, repeatedly. It has been three decades since South Korea first made the demand.

The US has always delayed, filibustered, waffled, and moved goal posts.

More recently, the US has signaled more delay on the return of opcon, despite current president Lee Jae Myung’s demand that it be transferred back before the end of his term in 2030.

The allies are currently assessing the “full operational capability” (FOC) after validating the “initial operational capability” (IOC).

Seoul aims to wrap up the FOC certification and announce a target year for the Opcon transition at the upcoming SCM, before moving on to the remaining assessment of the “full mission capability,” which it expects to take about a year or so….[However] Washington remains firm in its position that Seoul is not ready for FOC certification, weighing on Seoul’s push to accelerate the Opcon transition.

This follows on US Forces Korea Commander Xavier Brunson’s repeated declarations of his opposition to Opcon transfer: only conditions matter, not timelines. According to Brunson, there can be no timeline to return control of South Korea’s troops to South Korea. Seventy six years is not enough.

South Korea had originally insisted on deadlines for the return of opcon. The US delayed, and delayed, and denied. It finally agreed–but only if certain conditions were met. These were agreed to in 2014, and reaffirmed them in 2017. Yet another decade has passed since those agreements.

Conditions for the return of opcon:

Cutting through the fog, there are essentially three conditions that the US has predicated as preconditions for South Korea to regain control over its own troops:

1. Can South Korea defend itself? (Can it operate its own military effectively? Does it have capacity, materiel, systems, and institutions?)

2. Are US and South Korea forces interoperable? (Can they coordinate in war?)

3. Are the conditions stable enough for opcon transfer?

The answer to the first is, of course. South Korea has one of the most powerful and well-equipped militaries in the world.

The second is, of course, the US and South Korea have been rehearsing interoperability for over seventy years.

The third is key: it is a catch-22 designed to undermine the entire process.

Conditions-based Opcon Transfer (COPT) sets specific benchmarks and tests for opcon transfer. These are the goalposts that are being constantly shifted.

However, the third condition is critical. It requires the de-escalation of tensions between North and South:

“Conducive Security Environment: The security environment on the Korean Peninsula and in the broader region must be stable and conducive to a safe, uninterrupted transfer.”

This is the catch-22:

If there is de-escalation of tensions, the required “tests” are not conducted and the benchmarks and certifications are not achieved — they are tied to field-condition wargames. Doing these wargames and tests escalates tensions with North Korea.

If there are tensions, then condition 3 is not met, and Opcon cannot be transferred.

It’s a formula for ensuring opcon is never transferred.

The simple fact is, it does not take 20+years to transfer opcon. “Wartime” opcon is transferred very rapidly. Armies coalesce, and opcon is transferred. Syngman Rhee turned over opcon in July of 1950 and the US was immediately in charge. It doesn’t take years and decades to transfer opcon. It takes hours or days. Returning it should be even faster. But that would require political will.

Here are some other important things to understand about opcon:

Opcon transfer conditions are actually classified:

The US keeps these conditions under wraps, and therefore the South Korean public or its representatives cannot challenge them publicly because they are not known. We only know the general outlines. The South Korean side can only hope the US will agree they have been met. This is yet another abrogation of sovereignty and democracy in addition to the original breach: “We will keep your military, unless you meet our secret conditions, which you cannot discuss, debate or challenge, because they are secret”.

Condition 3, “Conducive security environment” has always been a kill switch:

We know that security conditions have always been a tacit condition because, in the past, whenever opcon transfer looked justified and imminent, the security environment would suddenly degrade, scuttling the whole project. For example, just as the deadline for Roh Moo Hyun-negotiated Opcon transfer was approaching in 2012, the sudden sinking of the ROKS military ship Cheonan-Ho derailed wartime opcon transfer to 2015. That deadline has also passed and gone. Recent North-Korea attributed mine explosions near the DMZ fit this pattern, as have other numerous, suspicious incidents.

The concoction of “peacetime opcon” is nonsense:

The US claims it only has “wartime” opcon because it transferred “peacetime” opcon to South Korea in 1994. However, this very concept is nonsense:

1) Opcon means control of operations. Operations mean warfighting. “Wartime opcon”, ie. “wartime warfighting control” is a pleonasm. The only time operational control of a military is important is during fighting, just as the only time steering a car matters is when it’s moving.

The invention and transfer of “peacetime” opcon to Korea was a booby prize created to give the appearance that something had changed. Think of those Fisher-Price toy steering wheels you stick on the dashboard while someone else steers the car–it’s a political toy. It gives the illusion of control but it means nothing. The fact is, the US would never allow its military to be subjugated to a foreign command, even a shared command. The simple fact is, the US never shares control.

2) Immediately after “peacetime” opcon transfer in 1994, the US instituted CODA (Combined Delegated Authority), which continues US control of planning and execution of war. As Clint Work observes correctly, “The ROK JCS was granted the term OPCON for political purposes, and the US CFC was given the term CODA for accomplishing missions”. So much for peacetime “control”.

3) Last but not least, the US gets to unilaterally decide what constitutes peacetime and what constitutes wartime. When the US declares Defcon III, it’s wartime. Korean troops must fall in line under US opcon. If you get to slice the cake and then decide which portion you take, it’s your bloody cake. If you share a car, but only one party decides when it gets to be driven, and they drive, they own the car, you are maintenance. If one party unilaterally decides when it gets control, it has control, regardless of any protestations to the contrary.

But why does the US need to keep Opcon?

The US needs control over ROK troops because it is planning for war with China in the Pacific. It has been doing so since it drew up formal plans, AirSea Battle in 2009. For war, it needs SK as a military proxy: it needs the cannon fodder. South Korea has 3.6 million combat-ready troops: 500,000 regular and 3.1 million reserve. It has one of the most powerful and advanced militaries in the world, as well as the defense industrial base to sustain it. Furthermore, SK troops have always fought in US wars as proxies: more military-aged men in South Korea saw combat in Vietnam than Americans did as a proportion of population — 325,000 were deployed–the largest foreign deployment after the US. It was also the third largest deployment to Iraq. The US can avoid a draft because SK has one.

USFK Commander Xavier Brunson has made this US agenda of weaponizing South Korea for war against China explicit, comparing South Korea to “fixed aircraft carrier”, a dagger pointed at China, and a critical part of US war strategy because it is already inside China’s defense perimeter.

As the Hankyoreh Newspaper points out:

When his “dagger” comment is tied to his previous remarks, it’s evident that Brunson expects Korea to play an offensive role capable of striking the Chinese heartland, and Japan to play a defensive role supporting Korea…Brunson commented last August that he would like F-35 fighters with stealth capabilities and a multi-domain task force (MDTF) capable of wrecking China’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) network to be assigned to USFK. These comments suggest that Brunson means to treat Korea as a forward base equipped with military options for launching direct strikes against China.

Brunson recently announced that the multi-domain task force will be deployed to Korea.  These build on his previous statements on preparing the peninsula for war with China:

…[this] orientation clarifies how forces on the peninsula can impose costs, not only on the CCP’s Northern Theater Army, but also on the [Russian] Northern Fleet, thus demonstrating the significant strategic potential that exists on the peninsula to influence adversary operations in both adjacent seas… existing force positioning, particularly on the Korean Peninsula, may offer greater strategic advantages… advantageously positioned assets already inside the [Chinese] defensive perimeter, capable of immediate cost-imposition [ie. attack] against multiple adversaries.

This simultaneous fiction of pretending it doesn’t control South Korea’s troops became necessary when US-opconned SK troops massacred civilians in Gwangju.  The need to avoid accountability created the legal fiction of “peacetime opcon”, but that doesn’t obviate the US need for control as it prepares for and escalates to war.

The real reason why opcon transfer is taking so long is the US is trying to create a structure that maintains control of the SK army while pretending that it doesn’t.   This involves a crazy-quilt of parallel & unified command structures, multiplying command authorities, phased operating assessments, Frankenstein-cobbled-leadership structure, Rube Goldberg carve-outs, and a general have-your-cake-and-eat-it-too mindset.  This is assisted by extreme factions of the quisling South Korea right, who have lashed themselves to the sinking US Empire and see any reclamation of genuine South Korean sovereignty as abandonment–they fear that a South Korean military–the real nexus of power in Korean politics, accountable only to Koreans, would result in a loss of status and power as US quisling collaborators and subcontractors.

With war with China on the horizon, South Korea needs to reclaim opcon rapidly.  It remains to be seen if president Lee Jae Myung can pull off this hat trick.  However, the consequences of not doing so could be catastrophic.

Original article:  popularresistance.org

The post North Korea Says It Tested AI-Guided Torpedo System appeared first on South Front.

Avançado português garantiu o 2-0 do Chelsea na visita ao Everton. Clube está provisoriamente no quarto lugar da Premier League.

© ADAM VAUGHAN/EPA

By Milda Seputyte and Aaron Eglitis Oct 16, 2026 (Bloomberg) –Europe should block the transit of Russian grain through Baltic ports as that may force Moscow to seek ways to open...

By Konstantin Asmolov – New Eastern Outlook – October 17, 2026

South Korean President Lee Jae-myung is trying to maneuver between pressure from the United States, which demands participation in the conflict with Iran, and risks to national security and reputation, opting for a strategy of stalling and minimizing a direct military presence.

The previous article explained why South Korea refused to join the United States in the “denuclearization of Iran” and how, in response, Donald Trump struck at Lee Jae-myung’s ambitions, nudging him toward the desired choice. And although President Lee’s rhetoric ultimately seems anti-war, in reality there are many loopholes remaining: for example, not a new contingent, but a decisive increase and expansion of the existing contingent’s mandate.

“No!” or “Maybe”

On September 16, Donald Trump said on social media that countries that “provided no assistance” would, after the war with Iran ended, have to “compensate” the United States for damages. Trump did not say whom he meant.

On September 17, First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea Park Yun-ju stated that the ROK’s participation in an international operation in the Strait of Hormuz region depends on a number of factors and is tied not only to relations with the United States but also to the safety of navigation, energy supplies, and the protection of the country’s citizens.

On September 18, Lee Jae-myung stated that South Korea would not deploy troops or military equipment in a way that would draw the country into the war between the United States and Iran. However, he allowed for minimal measures to protect South Korean vessels, oil delivery routes, and citizens, pointing to disruptions in crude oil supplies as one of the risks.

Apparently, eyebrows were raised in Washington, after which on September 19 the Blue House indicated that President Lee Jae-myung’s remarks did not amount to a rejection of Trump’s call for military cooperation. An administration official said that the government is considering practical ways to assist in close contact with the international community, including the United States.

The Specifics of the Future Conflict

Because the war with Iran follows a sine curve, and Donald Trump’s promises to “flatten Iran” alternate with talk of peace, it is possible that, once Trump enters a peace phase, Seoul’s need to rush to help the United States will temporarily disappear. Therefore, let us consider the scenario in which Seoul is actively pressed to help Washington—at least as proof of the Republic of Korea’s allied status.

Compared with previous deployments of South Korean troops as U.S. allies—whether in Vietnam or Iraq—they find themselves in a far more difficult situation. In both cases, this was a ground war in which South Koreans performed auxiliary tasks and mainly carried out clearing operations and fought poorly armed guerrillas, or guarded South Korean specialists while stationed in territory controlled by the Kurds.

However, although Iran does not have nuclear weapons, it has ballistic missiles and kamikaze drones in abundance. This means that wherever South Korean troops are located, they could become targets, especially since South Koreans have no experience countering such a threat, and any serious losses would both damage the country’s domestic political standing and hurt the president’s reputation. As the saying goes, victory has many fathers, but defeat always has one—and he is often the scapegoat.

If anything goes wrong, President Lee will be symbolically held responsible as the person who initiated South Korean participation in the war. At the same time, he may also be criticized for the fact that, in seeking to neutralize the threat of a military coup, he carried out a whole set of measures that could be seen as a certain decline in military readiness—which, alas, performed poorly when confronted with Iranian drones.

Lee Jae-myung’s Two Strategies

Lee Jae-myung understands this situation perfectly and will therefore adhere to two strategies.

The first is to stall for as much time as possible, especially since, under the country’s constitution, sending troops abroad must go through parliament. Because the conflict is escalating and there is domestic opposition, the timing of any troop deployment remains in question.

The situation is interesting: parliament is generally under President Lee’s control, and if he says “yes,” the National Assembly will vote according to his will. But if Lee throws up his hands and says, “I’m in favor, but the Korean people are against it, and we have a democracy, which I cannot go against,” then, on the one hand, outside observers may perceive this as a mutiny on board; on the other, the United States may find another painful way to push Seoul in the right direction. The hope here is rather that the geopolitical situation or Trump’s mood will change and assistance will not be needed.

The second strategy is to send assistance but minimize Korean participation in direct combat: patrol operations, intelligence and surveillance, demining assistance, medical or other humanitarian aid. As a government source told Yonhap, “we are discussing how to contribute safely, without direct participation in combat,” and according to the Dong-A Ilbo, South Korea is considering sending a P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft designed for long-range maritime surveillance, a supply ship, and explosive ordnance disposal specialists.

Another option is the Cheonghae Unit (the newest destroyer with a special forces team aboard), which has long been in the Middle East and is engaged in protecting shipping and responding to threats, including piracy. Increasing its size is not the same as deploying a new contingent, and when, on July 24, 2019, during one of the previous rounds of escalation, the United States demanded not only an increase in South Korea’s share of the costs of maintaining American troops but also the deployment of South Korean naval forces to the Strait of Hormuz, the Cheonghae contingent, which was supposed to fight Somali pirates, “expanded its area of operations” from the Gulf of Aden to the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Gulf. In 2021, Cheonghae was also in the strait, but it was withdrawn to leave a window of opportunity for negotiations after Iran seized a South Korean tanker.

Iran’s Response: What Matters to Tehran Is the Fact Per Se, Not the Scale

It seems that the Iranian side responds in this respect much as North Korea does: what matters is the very fact of Seoul’s participation on the side of the United States, not the scale of such measures. Diplomats and officials have already issued a series of warnings, voicing fairly specific and inconvenient response options for Seoul.

On September 7, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei published a warning in Korean, stating that Tehran would regard the military presence or participation of any third country in operations in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz as direct support for the aggressor, which could entail “serious consequences.” At the same time, the diplomat stressed the importance of friendly relations with Seoul.

Earlier, Iranian expert Mohammad Marandi said that South Korea’s participation in the war could make it an enemy of Iran, and retaliatory strikes could affect not only military but also economic assets of South Korean companies in the Persian Gulf countries. South Korea gets most of its energy resources from the Near and Middle East, and a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and attacks on vessels delivering petroleum products to South Korea would force it to urgently rethink its supply chains.

At the same time, the most convenient and safe backup supply-chain option is also uncertain, because it involves obtaining petroleum products from Russia. Talks on this issue have already begun, and South Korea is trying to prepare its European partners for the possibility of obtaining Russian petroleum products. But, first, the EU still has to be persuaded; second, it is not at all clear that Moscow would welcome this with open arms, knowing that this is not a conceptual turn toward Russia but a desire to solve a problem now that is de facto completely irrelevant to Moscow.

In Lieu of a Conclusion

Lee Jae-myung remains trapped. Refusing to send troops could lead to a further deterioration in relations with Trump, who could take actions against South Korea, such as imposing new tariffs. Sending troops carries certain reputational and domestic political risks. This is harder than a “test of strategic thinking” and a choice between two great evils.

Therefore, we will follow with great interest whether a parliamentary discussion finally takes place and what its verdict will be. It is interesting to see how ready South Korean military personnel and South Korean weapons are to take part in a modern war.

 

Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, leading research fellow at the Center for Korean Studies of the Institute of China and Modern Asia at the Russian Academy of Sciences

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Dal 2020 le padelle antiaderenti non possono essere prodotte con PFOA, ovvero l’acido perfluoroottanoico. Si tratta di una sostanza della famiglia dei PFAS, le sostanze considerate cancerogene per la salute umana dall’Agenzia Internazionale per la Ricerca sul Cancro. Da allora molti prodotti presentano la scritta “senza PFAS”. Non tutti i produttori mantengono la promessa allo stesso modo: in diversi test di laboratorio sono state trovate tracce di queste sostanze.

Ci sono poi produttori che vengono accusati apertamente di fare ancora uso di tali sostanze, in un contesto nel quale l’Europa si sta impegnando attivamente per vietare i PFAS nei prodotti di consumo di uso quotidiano. Ci sono delle deroghe per alcuni settori considerati critici, come la difesa e la sanità; la proposta ufficiale è attesa per l’inizio del 2027, dopo la relazione finale dell’Agenzia Europea per le Sostanze Chimiche che arriverà a dicembre.

L’Europa vieta le sostanze PFAS?

La direzione dell’Europa sembra essere quella del divieto delle sostanze PFAS. Anche i lobbisti, come cita Euronews, sono per la riduzione di queste sostanze in maniera sensata, ma anche misurata e proporzionata.

La proposta di legge è attesa per l’inizio del 2027, dopo l’arrivo della relazione finale dell’Agenzia Europea per le Sostanze Chimiche, prevista per dicembre 2026. Già nel marzo 2026 però l’agenzia aveva affermato che le sostanze PFAS “rappresentano rischi crescenti per le persone e per l’ambiente”, chiedendo un divieto generalizzato del loro utilizzo, con eccezioni in assenza di alternative.

Alternative che esistono in cucina, e per questo uno dei settori che dovrebbe veder sparire i PFAS è proprio questo.

Il caso delle pentole SEB

Un produttore di pentole francese, Groupe SEB, è stato raggiunto da un ultimatum di tre organizzazioni ambientaliste. Secondo queste, il gruppo continua a utilizzare PFAS in alcune sue pentole antiaderenti. Scrivono che l’azienda utilizza un approccio “obsoleto e inadeguato”, ma soprattutto non conforme ai requisiti di legge previsti tanto dalla normativa europea quanto da quella francese in materia di responsabilità sociale d’impresa.

L’azienda continuerebbe a utilizzare il PTFE, che è un tipo di PFAS impiegato da molti altri produttori, nello specifico da chi produce pentole e padelle, per via della resistenza all’acqua, alle macchie e al grasso. Rispetto ad altri PFAS tossici, il PTFE non è stato collegato al cancro. Secondo le organizzazioni ambientaliste, però, l’azienda ha utilizzato pratiche commerciali ingannevoli legate alla campagna pubblicitaria di questo prodotto, raccontandolo come totalmente sicuro.

Perché, anche se il PTFE non è tossico, come spiegano gli esperti è il modo in cui viene prodotto e smaltito che può rilasciare PFAS tossici. Uno dei metodi di smaltimento errati è quello tramite incenerimento. Quindi questi prodotti, se utilizzati quotidianamente, non causano problemi di salute, ma la maniera nella quale sono stati prodotti e il modo in cui saranno smaltiti in futuro potrebbero aver contaminato o contaminare l’ambiente.

Le accuse arrivano in un momento di acceso dibattito in attesa della legge del 2027. A questa diffida l’azienda ha risposto che “esaminerà i contenuti e risponderà in conformità con la legge”.

Inquinamento da PFAS in Europa

Non c’è quindi in gioco soltanto la salute singola di chi acquista una padella antiaderente con PFAS, ma anche un più ampio fenomeno di inquinamento. I PFAS sono diventati un simbolo della crisi ambientale. Il Belgio, per esempio, è stato denunciato per violazione dei diritti umani per la sua incapacità di affrontare la contaminazione da PFAS.

Hélène Duguy, ambientalista di ClientEarth:

I PFAS sono piuttosto emblematici di una realtà sociale diffusa, che accetta danni collaterali in nome di profitti a breve termine.

Sono sostanze difficili da rimuovere dall’ambiente e possono avere effetti dannosi sulla salute umana. L’inquinamento da PFAS, inoltre, è particolarmente diffuso in Europa. Secondo le indagini del 2023, in tutto il continente ci sono circa 23.000 siti contaminati da PFAS. In Italia 300 famiglie saranno risarcite proprio a causa della diffusione di PFAS.

All’inizio del 2026 è entrata in vigore una normativa che impone ai singoli Stati di monitorare i livelli di PFAS nell’acqua potabile. Nel caso i risultati siano superiori ai limiti, dovranno adottare misure per ridurre i livelli e tutelare la salute pubblica. Il problema, secondo le organizzazioni, è che in questo modo si agisce sul sintomo ma non sulla prevenzione, ovvero andando alla fonte per fermare la produzione, la commercializzazione o il rilascio stesso dei PFAS.

South Korean President Lee Jae-myung is trying to maneuver between pressure from the United States, which demands participation in the conflict with Iran, and risks to national security and reputation, opting for a strategy of stalling and minimizing a direct military presence. The previous article explained why South Korea refused to join the United States […]

Italia e Commissione europea hanno raggiunto un’intesa preliminare sulle misure del decreto Bollette per contenere il costo dell’elettricità per famiglie e imprese. L’accordo, maturato il 16 ottobre dopo un confronto tecnico tra Roma e Bruxelles, apre la strada a un intervento sul prezzo dell’energia senza modificare le regole europee sulle emissioni.

Il risultato rappresenta un passaggio importante per il governo guidato da Giorgia Meloni, che da tempo chiede maggiore flessibilità per affrontare il caro energia. Il punto centrale riguarda la possibilità di ridurre l’impatto del prezzo del gas sulla formazione del prezzo dell’elettricità, attraverso un meccanismo di compensazione dei costi sostenuti dalle centrali elettriche.

L’intesa, tuttavia, non equivale ancora all’approvazione definitiva del provvedimento. L’Italia dovrà notificare formalmente alla Commissione europea il testo aggiornato del piano, che sarà esaminato alla luce delle norme comunitarie sugli aiuti di Stato e sulla concorrenza. Bruxelles ha annunciato l’intenzione di procedere rapidamente con la valutazione una volta ricevuta la documentazione.

Come funziona il meccanismo per abbassare le bollette

Per capire la portata dell’accordo bisogna partire dal funzionamento del mercato elettrico. In Italia l’elettricità viene prodotta attraverso diverse fonti, tra cui solare, eolico, idroelettrico e gas naturale. Il prezzo all’ingrosso, però, è generalmente determinato dall’impianto più costoso necessario a soddisfare la domanda in un determinato momento.

Spesso si tratta di una centrale a gas, soprattutto quando le fonti rinnovabili non sono sufficienti a coprire il fabbisogno. Di conseguenza, un aumento del costo del combustibile può far salire il prezzo dell’elettricità sul mercato, influenzando anche l’energia prodotta da impianti solari ed eolici, che non devono acquistare gas per funzionare. È questo il meccanismo sul quale il governo vuole intervenire. L’ipotesi è introdurre un tetto convenzionale al costo del gas utilizzato per produrre elettricità, così da ridurre il peso dei rincari nella determinazione del prezzo finale dell’energia.

In concreto, il sistema dovrebbe prevedere un livello di riferimento per il costo del combustibile. Se il prezzo effettivo del gas supera tale soglia, la differenza verrebbe compensata attraverso un apposito meccanismo. Il costo riconosciuto per la produzione elettrica risulterebbe così più contenuto e potrebbe contribuire a ridurre il prezzo dell’elettricità sul mercato all’ingrosso. La misura non consiste quindi nell’imporre un tetto generalizzato al prezzo del gas per tutti gli utilizzi, ma nell’intervenire sul costo del combustibile impiegato dalle centrali elettriche. Le modalità operative, la soglia di riferimento e il sistema di finanziamento dovranno essere precisati nel testo definitivo del decreto.

Chi pagherà la differenza tra il prezzo reale e il tetto

Uno degli aspetti centrali del piano riguarda il finanziamento delle compensazioni. Secondo il meccanismo descritto dal governo, lo Stato dovrebbe coprire la differenza tra il costo effettivo del gas e quello convenzionale riconosciuto ai fini della produzione elettrica.

L’obiettivo è evitare che il prezzo elevato del combustibile continui a trasferirsi integralmente sul mercato dell’elettricità. In questo modo, il sistema dovrebbe contribuire a contenere i costi sostenuti dagli operatori e, attraverso la riduzione dei prezzi all’ingrosso, favorire un alleggerimento delle bollette. La Commissione europea ha fissato però alcuni paletti: l’intervento dovrà essere temporaneo, non dovrà alterare in modo significativo la concorrenza e dovrà garantire che i benefici arrivino integralmente ai consumatori.

Il precedente del modello iberico

Il riferimento è l’esperienza di Spagna e Portogallo, che nel 2022 ottennero dalla Commissione europea l’autorizzazione a introdurre un meccanismo straordinario per contenere l’impatto del gas sui prezzi elettrici. Il cosiddetto modello iberico interveniva sui costi di approvvigionamento delle centrali alimentate da combustibili fossili, con l’obiettivo di ridurre il prezzo all’ingrosso dell’elettricità durante la crisi energetica.

La soluzione italiana si ispira a quella esperienza, ma dovrà rispettare le condizioni concordate con Bruxelles e le caratteristiche del mercato nazionale. Il precedente dimostra che è possibile introdurre misure temporanee sul funzionamento del mercato elettrico, purché siano compatibili con le regole europee e non compromettano la concorrenza.

Quando arriverà il via libera definitivo

Dopo l’intesa preliminare, il prossimo passaggio spetta al governo italiano, che dovrà presentare formalmente il piano alla Commissione europea. L’esecutivo comunitario procederà quindi a verificare la compatibilità del provvedimento con il diritto europeo e con il quadro temporaneo sugli aiuti di Stato predisposto per affrontare le conseguenze della crisi in Medio Oriente.

Il ministro dell’Ambiente e della sicurezza energetica, Gilberto Pichetto Fratin, ha annunciato che la notifica del nuovo testo dovrebbe arrivare a breve. Anche la presidente del Consiglio Giorgia Meloni ha accolto positivamente il risultato della trattativa, considerandolo un passo avanti nella strategia del governo contro il caro energia.

L’accordo segna quindi un avanzamento nel confronto tra Italia e Unione europea. Il governo ottiene la possibilità di intervenire sul costo del gas utilizzato per produrre elettricità, mentre Bruxelles mantiene i vincoli sulla concorrenza e sulla politica climatica. La riduzione delle bollette resta l’obiettivo del piano, ma la sua portata concreta dipenderà dalle condizioni definitive del provvedimento e dalla sua applicazione.

Italy has extended checks on travellers from Spain for another week, but talks between Giorgia Meloni and Pedro Sánchez have opened the way for an end to reciprocal restrictions imposed after the migration crisis in Ceuta.

Italy and Spain have agreed to work towards ending their reciprocal Schengen border controls following discussions between Prime Ministers Giorgia Meloni and Pedro Sánchez at the European Council summit in Brussels. Rome nevertheless extended its restrictions for another seven days on Friday, 16 October, as the two governments consider how to bring their respective measures to an end.

The decision marks a possible turning point in a dispute that has disrupted travel between two of the European Union’s largest countries since the summer. According to the notifications recorded by the European Commission, the restrictions concern air and sea connections between Italy and Spain, which do not share a land border.

The two governments have instructed their interior ministers to consider alternative arrangements over the coming week. Although neither side has formally withdrawn its measures, the agreement to coordinate their removal suggests that both capitals are seeking a way out of an increasingly uncomfortable confrontation over migration and internal European security.

How the Ceuta crisis reached Schengen

The dispute began after an extraordinary influx of migrants from Morocco into Spain’s North African enclave of Ceuta in late July. More than 72,000 people crossed the border, prompting serious questions about the management of the EU’s external borders and the possibility of onward movements into other member states.

Italy responded by introducing checks on passengers arriving from Spain, arguing that the situation created risks for public order and internal security. Rome also raised concerns about the possible movement of individuals presenting security threats, although the extent of any such movement remained disputed.

Madrid rejected the justification and introduced reciprocal measures. What began as an emergency response to events on an external border consequently developed into a disagreement about whether one Schengen member could impose restrictions on another on the basis of anticipated migration movements.

EU Today examined the original Spanish retaliation in August, when the dispute first threatened to turn temporary border controls into an instrument of political pressure.

The wider consequences of the Ceuta incident have raised questions about the vulnerabilities exposed at the EU’s external border and the effectiveness of common European migration and crisis-response policy.

The limits of temporary border controls

Schengen is built on the principle that people can travel between participating countries without routine internal border checks. Member states nevertheless retain the right to reintroduce temporary controls in response to serious threats to public policy or internal security, subject to the requirements of EU law.

The difficulty lies in determining when those exceptional powers are justified. Italy has maintained that the Ceuta crisis warranted precautionary action. Spain has argued that controls imposed specifically on travellers from its territory were unjustified and discriminatory.

These opposing positions matter beyond the two countries. If concerns over irregular arrivals in one member state become sufficient grounds for another to introduce sustained checks, the distinction between Europe’s external borders and its internal travel area becomes increasingly difficult to maintain.

The operational results have also entered the political argument. Italian figures cited during the dispute indicate that nearly half a million passengers were checked during the first month, with 31 refused entry. Those numbers demonstrate that the measures were substantial, but do not by themselves establish whether the original security concerns were proportionate to the restrictions imposed.

Madrid, meanwhile, has maintained that migrants involved in the Ceuta influx had not moved onwards to mainland Spain in the manner suggested by Italian concerns.

Meloni and Sánchez seek a practical compromise

The latest discussions offer both governments a route towards de-escalation without formally conceding their underlying positions. Meloni can present the additional week of controls as a continuation of Italy’s security precautions, while Sánchez can point to an agreement to prepare their coordinated removal.

The two prime ministers remain politically divided on migration. Meloni has consistently argued for stronger border enforcement and deterrence, while Sánchez has defended an approach incorporating legalisation and labour-market integration for migrants already living in Spain.

Those disagreements were also visible during the Brussels summit, where European leaders returned to the question of migration management and the consequences of national decisions for the wider Union.

For Brussels, the immediate concern is whether the two governments can replace competing national restrictions with arrangements that address security concerns without unnecessarily interrupting movement between Schengen countries.

A coordinated end to the controls would not resolve the underlying problems exposed by Ceuta. It would, however, remove one of the more unusual internal consequences of that crisis and demonstrate that political negotiations can still prevent emergency border measures from becoming semi-permanent.

The decisive period is now the coming week. Whether the controls expire as planned will depend on the discussions between the Italian and Spanish interior ministries and their ability to agree practical alternatives.

Nel precedente articolo “Prezzo del gas al TTF e il dogma europeo: perché Giorgia Meloni difende il disastro energetico di Bruxelles ” abbiamo ridimensionato e specificato ciò che la Meloni ...

Leggi tutto

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A cura di Margherita Furlan
Con la collaborazione di Gionata Chatillard, Ivan Bodyan e Jeff Hoffman
Editing di Mario Ferdinandi

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The balancing act of Bulgaria's Moscow-friendly leader stands on shaky ground.

Since taking office in May, Bulgarian Prime Minister Rumen Radev has taken a harsh line on Ukraine while adopting steps his critics say are accommodating to Moscow.

Radev's course has now come under scrutiny as

The International Energy Agency (IEA) has agreed to accelerate the release of approximately 100 million barrels of emergency oil stocks, including more than 20 million barrels of diesel, as the...

Agriculture Minister Taras Vysotskyi raised the issue during a meeting with Turkish Ambassador to Ukraine Fatma Ceren Yazgan earlier this week.

The attacks in the two countries' exclusive economic zones threaten a global shipping route and have left two people dead, with at least 25 still missing. They also run the risk of drawing other countries directly into the war for Ukraine.

Romania has proposed a joint NATO military command for the Black Sea, as drones hit four merchant ships in 24 hours, three of them off its coast, and its foreign minister said Russia "bears full responsibility." NATO ambassadors will discuss the attacks next week.

Russia’s strikes on merchant ships in the Black Sea have escalated this autumn and reached NATO shores. Drones have attacked at least eight merchant vessels near Romania and Bulgaria since 5 October, two of them inside Romania’s territorial waters. Until now, neither country had named the attacker, and Bulgaria still says it cannot prove who it was. Romania’s patience appears to have run out, and next week’s NATO meeting will show whether the alliance is ready to go further as Russia’s war spills beyond Ukraine’s borders.

Acting Defense Minister Radu Miruță wrote on Facebook on 14 October that "the Black Sea needs a joint military command of the NATO riparian states." "The Black Sea incidents, involving drones, sunk ships, and naval mines, oblige us to act, not wait," he wrote, after a call with his Bulgarian counterpart. Leadership and location would rotate among the member states. Romania is ready to host the command on its coast from 2028 and would accept a start on Türkiye's coast until then, he said. He proposed that Romania and Bulgaria send NATO a joint letter backing the idea.

The next day, Foreign Minister Oana Țoiu wrote on X that four commercial ships had been attacked over the previous day, including in Romania's territorial waters and exclusive economic zone, and that eight people had died. "Russia is turning the Black Sea into a dangerous area for civilian ships," she wrote. "Killing sailors from commercial ships, both in this region and anywhere in the world, is a crime. Russia bears full responsibility for these developments."

Earlier that day, as two tankers burned off Romania's coast, Bucharest had said it was still checking whether drones were involved.

Țoiu said NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte had agreed to convene the allies within days, after he met Romanian President Nicușor Dan and Bulgarian Prime Minister Rumen Radev in Brussels. NATO ambassadors will meet next week, France 24 reported. No date has been announced.

An escalating drone strike campaign

Drones have been hitting merchant ships for weeks on the route from Ukraine's Danube and Odesa ports to the Bosporus. Besides the latest strikes off Romania, Reuters counts at least five cargo ships hit near Romania and Bulgaria in the past 10 days, with 23 sailors dead or missing, most of them outside any NATO member's territorial waters. This week the strikes reached Romania's own waters.

• The Comoros-flagged tanker Yara J was hit inside Romanian territorial waters late on 14 October, off Sulina, the port at the mouth of the Danube. Its crew was unharmed, and it was towed to the Romanian port of Constanța.
• Early on 15 October drones struck the San Marino-flagged chemical tanker Wine Trader about a mile outside Romanian waters, also southeast of Sulina. Five of its 12 crew were rescued. Seven were still missing on 16 October, when rescuers returned to search the ship.
• Two more ships were also targeted, Reuters reported: the Marshall Islands-flagged Sea Destiny, inside Romanian waters according to NATO, and the Tanzania-flagged Dania J, moored at the Ukrainian Danube port of Izmail.

Țoiu did not say which ships her eight dead were from, and Reuters still lists the Wine Trader's seven as missing. A NATO military source told Reuters the drones that hit both tankers came from Russia.

Romania's president says too early to say

Romania's president has not gone as far as his foreign minister. Dan told reporters in Brussels it was "obvious" that the attacks were Russian attempts to destabilize Romania and Bulgaria and reduce support for Ukraine. But he also said it was too early to say definitively that Russia had launched the drones, according to Politico.

Bulgaria, Romania's partner on the command proposal, says it suspects Russia but cannot prove it. Two ships were hit off its coast on 13 October, and one, the HS Dignity, sank. The other, the Chelsea 3, is Ukrainian-owned.

Radev told parliament on 14 October that the attacks worked in Russia's favor and that "logic leads there." "The problem is that we cannot prove it," he told MPs. Sofia summoned the Russian ambassador. Radev also said EU leaders would discuss a moratorium on attacks on civilian ships in the Black Sea.

Bucharest has blamed Russia for drones before, though over its airspace, not its shipping. On 27 July it expelled a Russian diplomat after prosecutors confirmed that fragments of drones downed on Romanian territory were Russian. Russia, Romania's Foreign Ministry said then, "bears exclusive responsibility."

Ukraine ships most of its farm exports across the Black Sea. Euromaidan Press's David Axe has written on how the fight over shipping there has escalated.

“Yemen did not want this war, but we are bringing the fire back to Saudi Arabia.”

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The Saudi kingdom is facing the danger of collapse from soaring war costs as Yemeni air strikes ramp up, hitting its northern neighbor’s capital and industrial centers with impunity.

Yemeni journalist Hussein al-Bukhaiti says the corruption and arrogance of the “House of Evil” is culminating in historic defeat. Its U.S. patron seems unable to avert the coming collapse.

Despite decades of the U.S. selling weapons worth hundreds of billions of dollars to the Saudi rulers, the regime seems shockingly exposed, with no viable defenses. Yemen’s missiles are striking Saudi Arabia at will. The panicky rulers are pleading with the United States and Europe for help.

Yemen’s armed forces are taking the war to Saudi Arabia, striking its airports, imposing a no-fly zone over the entire state and shutting down its vital oil industry.

“The Saudis cannot stop our drones and hypersonic missiles… we are taking the war to them,” says Sanaa-based Hussain al-Bukhaiti.

With no oil exports, Al-Bukhaiti reckons the Saudi rulers are facing an existential nemesis. Many observers have long predicted that the autocratic Saudi kingdom, created by the British Empire, is awaiting downfall from its ossified and family-run power structure.

Speaking from the Yemeni capital, Sanaa, Hussain al-Bukhaiti described the Saudi monarchy as “a house of glass” that is now being shattered by air strikes that cannot be defended against.

“Yemen did not want this war, but we are bringing the fire back to Saudi Arabia.”

Western politicians and media are portraying the conflict between the two Arab Peninsula countries as being caused by recent aggression from the Ansar Allah-led Yemeni government.

Saudi Arabia’s King Khalid international airport was attacked on October 10 with ballistic missiles that killed several people. Other Saudi airports have also been hit. This has led international airlines to suspend flights.

The state-owned Aramco oil industry has also been blasted with missiles. Fires are raging at major facilities, including at the main base of operations in Dammam on the Persian Gulf coast.

Following the missile strike on Riyadh airport at the weekend, U.S. President Donald Trump and all European leaders condemned an “act of terrorism” by Yemen.

Hussain al-Bukhaiti pointed out the gross hypocrisy of European governments not condemning the thousands of Saudi air strikes on Yemen that have occurred since 2015. These governments still remain silent about the ongoing Saudi atrocities against Yemeni civilians. The European Union even declares “solidarity” with Saudi Arabia.

The Saudi monarchy, led by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, started the war with unprovoked attacks in March 2015. The aggression was enabled by the United States, Britain, and France supplying warplanes, bombs, and intelligence.

These Western powers continue to arm and direct the Saudi regime in its war against Yemen.

Since 2015, there have been thousands of Western-backed air strikes on Yemen, resulting in more than 20,000 mainly civilian deaths.

“They hit everything, schools, hospitals, water-treatment plants, farms, homes, wedding and funeral halls,” says Al-Bukhaiti.

In addition, over 400,000 Yemenis have died from starvation and diseases caused by a blockade on the country imposed by Saudi Arabia and its Western backers for over 10 years.

He says the war reignited in July 2026 after the Saudis broke a four-year truce signed in 2022 by bombing Sanaa international airport. There was no condemnation by Europe of the Saudi violation then.

What Yemen is doing to Saudi Arabia now is but a taste of what the House of Saud inflicted on Yemenis since 2015 with Western support.

The Yemenis this week rejected a reported Saudi proposal for a short-term truce because they see it as just a ploy by the Saudis for rearming and regrouping in a losing situation.

For the war to end, Saudi Arabia must respect Yemen’s sovereignty and stop interfering in its internal affairs.

However, Hussain al-Bukhaiti thinks that the United States will double down and escalate its military involvement in Yemen with a full-blown war. This is not primarily to support the Saudi monarchy, he believes, but rather to prop up the Israeli regime.

Yemen has inflicted huge damage on the Israeli state since it intensified the genocide against Palestinians in October 2023. Yemeni air strikes have repeatedly struck Tel Aviv despite American air defenses.

An expanded U.S. war in Yemen might seem surprising given that Trump has made such a mess of his reckless aggression against Iran and may not have the military forces at his disposal.

But Al-Bukhaiti believes the issue is beyond Trump’s choice. Washington is locked in with the Zionist regime and will do whatever it takes to salvage Israel from defeat. Yemen represents the biggest threat to Israel from the cutting off of its shipping in the Red Sea.

“We are ready for the war that is coming,” he warns.

Per molto tempo il benessere animale è stato raccontato come una questione di sensibilità: si è a favore, difficile essere contrari. Oggi è diventato qualcosa di più preciso. È un parametro di sostenibilità che si misura, si certifica e finisce nelle valutazioni ESG, nei capitolati della grande distribuzione e nelle analisi di rischio di chi finanzia le imprese agroalimentari.

A spostare le cose è stata l’Europa. Dal Trattato di Lisbona del 2009 gli animali sono riconosciuti come esseri senzienti (art. 13): in grado quindi di provare dolore, piacere, emozioni. Da quel principio discendono una responsabilità condivisa fra Commissione e Stati membri e una strategia, Farm to Fork, che al centro del Green Deal ha trasformato la transizione verso sistemi alimentari sostenibili in un obiettivo industriale. E l’Italia è stata la prima in Europa a mettere risorse della Politica Agricola Comune sul benessere degli animali allevati.

Su questo terreno lavora AECIS, Associazione Europea Cultura Innovazione Sostenibilità, nata dall’esperienza di Alti Formaggi (2011) e costituita dai Consorzi di tutela di Provolone Valpadana DOP, Casciotta d’Urbino DOP e Piave DOP. Ed è il terreno del convegno “Sostenibilità in scena”, che l’Associazione dedica alle tre dimensioni in cui la sostenibilità si gioca davvero: ambientale, sociale ed economica. Sono anche le tre chiavi di questa lettura, perché un impegno conta qualcosa solo quando diventa verificabile. E lo strumento che lo rende tale ha un nome: SQNBA.

Che cos’è il SQNBA, in parole semplici

Il Sistema di Qualità Nazionale per il Benessere Animale è uno schema di certificazione nazionale ad adesione volontaria: nessuno è obbligato a entrarci, chi lo fa è perché ci crede. Fissa le regole e i criteri tecnici con cui va condotto l’allevamento, li misura su indicatori costruiti dalla ricerca scientifica e ne affida la verifica a organismi accreditati. Chi aderisce si impegna a tenere livelli di salute e di benessere più alti di quanto già chiedano le norme europee e italiane, a contenere il ricorso agli antibiotici e a rendere l’allevamento più sostenibile nel suo insieme.

Il vantaggio più immediato è l’ordine. Fino a oggi sullo stesso tema convivevano protocolli di certificazione diversi: faticosi da confrontare per un buyer, praticamente illeggibili per chi fa la spesa. Il SQNBA mette ordine e potrebbe diventare l’unico riferimento.

Per ora il Sistema si applica agli allevamenti bovini, da latte e da carne, e suini: sono le specie per cui il Comitato Tecnico Scientifico sul Benessere Animale ha già rilasciato le relative norme tecniche. I requisiti vivono dentro Disciplinari diversi a seconda della specie, dell’indirizzo produttivo e del modo in cui si alleva, ed è previsto che il perimetro si allarghi a tutte le specie di interesse zootecnico.

L’ingresso passa da ClassyFarm, la piattaforma informatica con cui il Ministero della Salute tiene sotto osservazione gli allevamenti e li classifica per livello di rischio. Il veterinario aziendale, o un collega incaricato e in possesso della qualifica, compila la check list dei prerequisiti e il portale risponde con un semaforo: verde se ci sono tutti, rosso se ne manca anche uno. Sul colore incidono anche le verifiche ufficiali già effettuate in stalla.

Ambiente: un animale che sta bene ha bisogno di meno farmaci

La prima ricaduta è insieme ambientale e sanitaria, e parte dal fatto che un animale che vive bene si ammala meno, e un animale che si ammala meno richiede meno trattamenti. Condizioni di allevamento e ricorso ai farmaci sono ormai due variabili che si muovono insieme, e il SQNBA nasce dentro una strategia che punta a ridurre l’antimicrobico resistenza (AMR), uno dei dossier più delicati della sanità pubblica europea.

Non è un principio astratto. Il consumo di antimicrobici e la suscettibilità sono fra le aree che monitora ClassyFarm, insieme al benessere degli animali, alla biosicurezza aziendale e alla fase di macellazione: i dati non restano in un cassetto, entrano in un sistema di classificazione del rischio che viene consultata dall’autorità sanitaria.

La direzione è quella di un modo di allevare più sostenibile, con ricadute positive sull’ambiente e sul tessuto sociale, con risvolti ambientali e sociali positivi e produzioni di qualità più alta. E vale la pena guardare dove sta andando l’Europa: dal 2020 la Commissione sta aggiornando la legislazione sul benessere animale – allevamento, trasporto, abbattimento, fino all’uscita progressiva dalle gabbie – e nella Visione 2025 per l’agricoltura e l’alimentazione ha confermato l’impegno di avvicinare gli standard richiesti anche a ciò che arriva da fuori Unione. Per un’impresa, certificarsi oggi vuol dire farsi trovare pronta.

Sociale: una filiera che si lascia leggere

La definizione più citata ha quasi mezzo secolo. Nel 1976 l’etologo B.O. Hughes descrisse il benessere animale come una condizione di piena salute, tanto fisica quanto psichica, in cui l’animale si trova in equilibrio con l’ambiente che lo circonda. Tre anni dopo il Farm Animal Welfare Council britannico tradusse quel principio nelle Cinque Libertà: niente fame né sete, niente disagio, niente dolore né malattia, la possibilità di comportarsi secondo la propria natura, nessuna paura e nessuno stress. Restano la griglia a cui le norme europee continuano a ispirarsi.

Il passaggio che riguarda da vicino chi compra è che tutto questo diventa visibile. Gli operatori certificati possono portare in chiaro i dati previsti dallo schema per distinguere i propri animali e i propri prodotti: il modo in cui si alleva, lo stabilimento da cui la partita arriva e logo SQNBA in etichetta, con una tracciabilità completa dall’allevamento alla tavola. Non è l’ennesimo bollino da decifrare ma è la possibilità di scegliere sapendo che cosa c’è dietro, nei pochi secondi che si passano davanti al banco frigo.

Ma le stalle gestite secondo standard più alti sono anche posti di lavoro migliori per chi ci passa le giornate. E i formaggi DOP restano parte integrante delle comunità in cui nascono, restano un pezzo delle comunità in cui nascono, perché il valore che producono non si ferma a monte ma si spalma su tutti gli anelli della catena.

Economia: dove si vede il ritorno

Per un’impresa zootecnica il benessere animale non è un costo a fondo perduto. Animali tenuti bene e in salute lasciano il segno su più voci di bilancio: rese più alte, lavoro meno pesante in stalla, una posizione più forte sui mercati, meno esposizione al rischio nella gestione quotidiana, una reputazione che cresce.

Per le filiere a Indicazione Geografica c’è un effetto in più. Affiancare al marchio europeo di qualità certificata, DOP o IGP, il logo SQNBA produce un ritorno di immagine e di valore che supera la semplice addizione di due marchi verificati da terzi perché consolida la credibilità dell’azienda e alzano l’asticella della qualità lungo la stessa linea che le Indicazioni Geografiche battono da decenni, e ridistribuiscono il valore in modo più equo fra tutti gli anelli della catena certificata.

Ci sono poi i costi organizzativi, perché aderire a uno schema di certificazione serio significa scrivere e applicare procedure in ogni angolo della gestione aziendale e in ogni passaggio di mano lungo la filiera – fra allevatore e caseificio, per esempio – per tenere i processi sotto controllo e correggere la rotta appena si devia. È lavoro in più ma non è una duplicazione di adempimenti: è un insieme di azioni coordinate che rafforza gli standard qualitativi di produzione, nel solco di quanto le Indicazioni Geografiche già fanno, e che porta a una distribuzione più equa del valore lungo tutta la filiera certificata.

Tre DOP diverse, un impegno comune

Provolone Valpadana, Casciotta d’Urbino e Piave sono tre mondi distanti: zone di produzione diverse, formaggi diversi e storie diverse. I rispettivi Consorzi condividono però la stessa scelta di fondo, cioè affrontare con serietà il miglioramento della filiera per rispondere alle esigenze di oggi senza scaricarne il conto su chi verrà dopo.

È una posizione coerente con la natura stessa delle denominazioni di origine, che portano la sostenibilità scritta nel proprio codice genetico: standard di sicurezza alti, prodotti con un buon profilo nutrizionale, una ripartizione del guadagno meno sbilanciata, pratiche produttive che rispettano i valori del luogo in cui sono nate.

Quello che mancava era un modo riconoscibile di dimostrarlo. Il SQNBA prende un patrimonio di pratiche spesso già in atto e lo rende certificabile, confrontabile e comunicabile. A un buyer, a un istituto di credito e, soprattutto, a chi legge un’etichetta avendo cinque secondi di attenzione a disposizione.

Ed è il percorso che “Sostenibilità in scena” porta sul palco: ambiente, persone ed economia non come tre capitoli separati di una relazione, ma come tre facce dello stesso lavoro quotidiano di chi produce un formaggio a denominazione di origine.

Le date degli incontri di approfondimento:

10 novembre 2026 – Cadeo (Pc) ore 15-17
La Scottina Relais & Bistrot
Strada del Riglio snc
Loc. Scottina – 29010 Cadeo (PC)

11 novembre 2026 – Invorio (No) ore 15-17
Sala Curioni del Municipio di Invorio
Via G. Curioni 2
28045 Invorio (No)

12 Novembre 2026 – Lodi ore 15-17
Ristorante Isola Caprera
Via Isola Caprera 14 – Lodi

16 Novembre 2026 – Treviso ore 15-17
Ristorante Albronsèr
Via di Sant’Angelo, 162
31100 Treviso (TV)

1° dicembre 2026 – Saronno (Va) ore 15-17
Istituto Prealpi di Saronno
Va San Francesco 13 – Saronno (Va)

In collaborazione con AECIS