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Europe’s mounting social chaos… chickens coming home to roost for proxy war against Russia

Strategic Culture Foundation | October 9, 2026

The European Union is witnessing a full-blown social revolt. Governing political parties and their economic policies are held in open contempt as public protests and strikes escalate across multiple countries.

Protests, mass marches, and industrial strikes are spreading across the EU in France, Belgium, Spain, Italy, Germany, Ireland, Portugal, and other countries. The grievances are various, from students and teachers over woeful education services, to healthcare professionals and transportation workers denouncing crumby wages and pension cuts.

But at the core is a warmongering, dehumanizing system of capitalist inequality.

Unbearable living costs for basic needs, from food to housing, are driving millions onto the streets in desperation and anger at the lack of adequate political response to their concerns. As one French student said: “Too young to be listened to, old enough to be tear-gassed.”

The entire political system is being brought into disrepute for its dysfunction and indifference towards meeting rudimentary human needs. Then, infuriating all the more, are lies from the elite rulers and their propaganda media about “national defense and threat of war from Russia.”

In Spain this week, an 87-year-old frail woman known as Maricarmen died in hospital after she was evicted from her Madrid home because she could not pay the extortionate rent increase. Her plight has come to galvanize a nationwide protest against Spain’s housing crisis, a crisis that is repeated across every European country. Protesters shouted furiously that the pitiful old woman was “murdered by the state and corporations.”

In France, the brutality of police against student protests has shocked the nation and the world. Nearly 7,000 young people have been arrested, as riot police tear gas and shoot at largely peaceful rallies. Students gathering at the Place de la Bastille in Paris and other cities vow that they will not back down. One student had his hand blown off by a police stun grenade while another teenager lost an eye from a rubber bullet fired at close range.

The Place de la Bastille is where the French Revolution manifested in 1798 against a hated aristocracy amid abject misery. Today, the tensions are boiling towards another momentous rebellion, this time inspiring again similar movements across Europe.

These protests and the inhumane suffering that underlie them are channeling uprisings all over the EU.

There is a palpable sense that populations en masse have had enough of decades of inequality and chronic deprivation inflicted by capitalist policies that enrich a few and are enforced by governments slavishly serving the interests of capital over the needs of the citizen majority.

Western media reports talk about “cash-strapped” governments under pressure from bond markets to reduce record debt levels while workers, students and pensioners demand more public investment and relief from economic hardship.

That is a misleading partial portrayal of the problem. Omitted is the crucial backdrop that European governments are directing vast economic resources towards militarism and the proxy war in Ukraine against Russia. That is what is causing the “cash-strapped governments.” In other words, their declared fiscal straits are a policy choice, not some mysterious dilemma.

The social crisis sweeping across Europe is also seen in the United States and other Western-aligned nations. The background is a failed economic system that no longer provides a modicum of acceptable living conditions. The problem has been decades in the making from growing inequality and diminishing political representation. Today it is even questionable if Western states are democracies, controlled as they are by corporate oligarchies.

Nevertheless, the social crisis that is unfolding across Europe has been intensified and amplified by European political rulers operating in a relentless war mode against Russia.

The European Union has pumped hundreds of billions of euros into Ukraine over the past four years to prop up a NeoNazi regime run by a corrupt dictatorship – all for the objective of defeating Russia. The EU leaders – many of them unelected, like Ursula von der Leyen, Kaja Kallas and António Costa – are driven by an obsessive Russophobia. But that is only part of the explanation.

Other elected leaders and parties like France’s Macron and Germany’s Merz are also despised for their elitism and delusions of grandeur. Merz declares that he wants to make Germany the strongest military in Europe, in total tin-ear deafness to his nation’s economic and social problems and the sinister historical connotations of resurrecting Nazi Germany. Meanwhile, as his government suffers electoral defeat after defeat, European elites deprecate German voters as being blind because they dare to choose parties that are opposed to war with Russia.

There are many grounds for the Europe-wide contempt of ruling parties. Inequality, poverty, unemployment, soaring living costs, declining wages, deteriorating public services. Uncontrolled immigration amid the pressure on inadequate public resources is another cause for grievance. Europe’s complicity in the Israeli genocidal war on Palestinians, and Europe’s complicity in Trump’s aggression towards Iran, Yemen, Cuba, and so on, are other factors.

However, the bogus narrative that governments are “cash-strapped” is a cause for immense public disgust. There are plenty of economic resources to meet public needs. It’s a question of those resources not being permitted to create just and humane societies under the prevailing capitalist system with its priority of enriching a tiny elite class.

The conditions of “tight budgets” and “austerity for the masses” are created by deliberate policies of militarism and fuelling a proxy war in Ukraine.

European “leaders” and their NATO lobbyists like Mark Rutte demand hundreds of billions of euros to boost military industries while at the same time calling for draconian cuts in public spending and social welfare in order to pay for this reckless militarism. The EU is “lending” an additional €90 billion over the next two years alone just to prop up the corrupt regime in Kiev so that it can keep fighting a futile war with Russia. The perverse priority is driven by the military-industrial complex and its corporate investors. It is also driven by an ideological, propagandized mindset that demonizes Russia as an enemy. President Putin and other Russian voices have repeatedly stated that they do not want war with Europe. They say the conflict in Ukraine has root causes that can be resolved through diplomatic engagement. Why are European politicians implacably opposed to peace?

A major factor is covering for internal political and economic failure of the European system. The EU’s economies, as with those in the U.S. and other Western states, are bankrupt dystopias in terms of delivering on social and democratic needs. The failure has been compounded by the costs of war in Ukraine.

That failure is criminal and fatal for the politicians and governments who have overseen the policies. Thus, the political class, including the propaganda news media, cannot admit their criminal policies.

In the face of their own internal contradictions, the European political elites are seeking a solution by externalizing Russia as an enemy. This is the same modus operandi that European rulers have used for the past century and more, unleashing two world wars as a result.

These criminal politicians and their dysfunctional economic system are again pushing war as their escape plan for survival at the expense of millions of lives and at the risk of starting a third world war, one that this time around could involve catastrophic nuclear nemesis.

It is damning of virtually every European government, including primarily the British, that there are no calls for diplomacy and political settlement with Russia. They are committed to waging war on Russia to absolve themselves from the social devastation they are responsible for.

One positive thing, though, is that increasing numbers of people can see through the chicanery and lies. A German student placard summed it up: “We won’t fight your wars… Education not bombs!”

A day of reckoning is imminent. Criminal political leaders and their warmongering system are exposed like never before and in a way that demands total revolt as a proper solution. The consequences are not to be externalized this time. Chickens are coming home to roost, as Malcom X once said.

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Ukranian Defenses Crack in Zaporozhye

File image.

In the Sumy direction, Russian assault groups of the “North” grouping are pressing Ukrainian defenses in the forest tract north of Sumy, conducting small-arms fighting near Khoten and advancing through tree lines near Korenok. In the Kharkiv direction, Russian units are increasing the pace of their advance in the area of the encirclement in the northeast of the region; they have taken Shirokoye and are fighting for Komissarovo, Lukashovo and Lobanovka. In the Slavyansk direction, Ukrainian units are attempting to clear the right bank of the Zherebets, infiltrating the northern part of Zarechnoye and attacking west of it, while Russian troops hold Zarechnoye and Yampol. In the Zaporozhye direction, Russian troops are delivering FAB strikes against temporary deployment points in Preobrazhenka and Orekhov, have overcome a water obstacle and an anti-tank ditch on the Voskresenka–Barvinovka–Lyubitskoye line, and in the zone of the “Dnepr” grouping are advancing on a broad front near Primorskoye, Stepnogorsk and Yurkovka. The leader of the party “Debout la France,” Nicolas Dupont-Aignan, called Europe’s rejection of Russian gas economic and social suicide against the background of a 42.4% price rise since the beginning of 2026.

Sumy direction  

Heavy positional fighting is under way on all sectors of the front. Assault groups of Russian units are pressing Ukrainian defenses in the forest tract north of Sumy and destroying positions with artillery and heavy flamethrower systems. The Ukrainian side has taken no active actions and has concentrated on holding the positions it occupies.

The situation around Kiyanitsa is extremely complicated: the Ukrainian side has accumulated a huge quantity of resources in the forest zones, and it is premature to speak of full control on this sector. Moreover, Ukrainian units are attacking near Yablonovka and Varachino, attempting to regain positions and making use of the last opportunity before the muddy season to take cover in the forests.

In the Sumy district, assault groups of Russian units are conducting small-arms fighting near Khoten. In Shostka district, assault groups continue to advance through tree lines near Korenok.  

Kharkiv direction  

Assault units of the “North” grouping are increasing the pace of their advance in the area of the encirclement of Ukrainian forces in the northeast of Kharkiv region. Ukrainian units are attempting to break the encirclement from the outside and are employing armor.

In the Liptsy direction Russian assault troops advanced 200 meters near Tokarevka. In the Volchansk and Veliky Burluk directions Russian units advanced deeper into the cauldron on more than 20 sectors of the front. Overall progress reached approximately 1,000 meters.

The Ukrainian side made two attempts to break the encirclement from the outside with two assault groups of the 475th Separate Assault Regiment on two “Kazak” armored fighting vehicles from the area of Veliky Burluk. As a result of comprehensive fire strikes the attempt was thwarted; one armored vehicle was destroyed and the second damaged.

The encirclement in the east of the Burluk direction is gradually tightening. Ukrainian formations are unable to force a reliable corridor for themselves, while Russian troops are systematically destroying disorganized units. Newly available objective-control footage confirms the capture of Shirokoye. Forward assault groups are already pressing Ukrainian forces on the territory of Komissarovo. Fighting for the village continues, and a focal Ukrainian presence still remains in the tree lines to the north and in the vicinity of Rublyonoye. Russian units are confidently advancing toward the center of the cauldron. On the morning of 9 October it became known that fighting had begun for Lukashovo and Lobanovka. The capture of Lobanovka is important for strengthening the southern face of the encirclement, which will complicate any potential breakout by Ukrainian units.  

Slavyansk direction  

The Ukrainian side has not abandoned attempts to clear the right bank of the Zherebets in the Liman direction. Ukrainian units continue to advance into the northern part of Zarechnoye and to develop the offensive west of the village with the aim of regaining control over several large strongpoints near the O-05-28 highway.

Should Zarechnoye be taken, the Ukrainian side would be able to place Russian units in the Svyatiye Gory park in a fire pocket. Nevertheless, it has not proved possible to isolate the fighters of the “West” grouping from supply from the direction of Torskoye, which makes it possible to retain control of the center of the village. The second direction of the Ukrainian strike remains the area of Yampol, the retention of which is also necessary for Russian troops in order to supply units in the Svyatiye Gory.

At present the most important tasks of Russian troops remain the holding of Zarechnoye and Yampol. Only in this case will it be possible to stabilize the front and preserve positions in the Serebryansky forestry, without control of which a new offensive on Liman will be impossible. In the area of Rai-Aleksandrovka Ukrainian units are conducting attacks.  

Zaporozhye direction  

In the Zaporozhye direction Russian troops are delivering FAB strikes against temporary deployment points of Ukrainian units in Preobrazhenka and Orekhov. On the eastern sector they are holding strong points on the western bank of the Verkhnyaya Tersa River and pressing the defenses. Assault groups have overcome a water obstacle and an anti-tank ditch on the Voskresenka–Barvinovka–Lyubitskoye line.

Further east, in the zone of the “Dnepr” grouping, the picture is different. Russian units continue to advance on a broad front. Fighting is under way near Primorskoye, Stepnogorsk, Lukyanovskoye, Pavlovka, Novoyakovlevka and Yurkovka. Active operations are also noted in the area of Orekhov and Preobrazhenka.

The Ukrainian side, attempting to hold the northern and western outskirts of Orekhov, is throwing reinforcements there. Units of the “East” grouping are already fighting on the outskirts of Omelnyk from the south-east and east. The aim is to reach the rear of the Orekhov–Preobrazhenka grouping. Further north, in the zone of the 5th Army, the preconditions for a broader envelopment are being created. Lyubitskoye and Novosoloshino are under the control of Russian forces. Further south the situation remains complicated and reciprocal.  

Conclusion  

In the Sumy direction this is expressed in the pressing of defenses in the forest tracts and fighting near Kiyanitsa and Khoten. In the Kharkiv direction — in the tightening of the ring around the encircled grouping and the advance toward the center of the cauldron. In the Slavyansk direction — in the holding of key positions near Zarechnoye and Yampol and heavy fighting near Rai-Aleksandrovka. In the Zaporozhye direction — in advance on a broad front and attempting to reach the rear of the Orekhov–Preobrazhenka grouping. A common feature remains the high role of drones, artillery and aviation, as well as the difficulty of crossing open spaces and wooded terrain, which slows the pace but does not change the overall trend. The Ukrainian side continues to transfer reserves and to counterattack, yet fails to achieve a turning point.

The leader of the party “Debout la France,” Nicolas Dupont-Aignan, who is running for president of the country, stated that the European authorities’ rejection of Russian gas against the background of a rapid rise in fuel prices is comparable to economic and social suicide. “Gas prices continue to rise rapidly. This is a very concrete result of the European leaders’ refusal to establish peace in Ukraine and to lift the sanctions against Russia. This is economic and social suicide,” he wrote on the social network X.

As the politician noted, the price rise since the beginning of 2026 has amounted to 42.4% and continues to this day. “Meanwhile the economies of the United States and China are operating at full capacity, and gas there is four times cheaper,” he added.  

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US-Russia Diesel Deal Becomes Massive Defeat for Ukraine

Sputnik – 10.10.2026

The recent phone conversation between Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump, and the diesel deal they struck, are the most important events in the US-Russia relations since the summit in Anchorage, Dmitry Suslov, deputy director of the Center for European and International Studies at Russia’s Higher School of Economics, tells Sputnik.

The diesel deal marks an important shift in the US’ stance on the Ukrainian conflict. “Until now, the Trump administration maintained that any sanctions removal and any practical cooperation with Russia, including cooperation on energy, is only possible after the Ukrainian conflict is resolved or after a ceasefire is achieved. And now we see that the Trump administration deviated from this stance.”

“The sanctions are waived for a long time, until April 7, and the US will commence mass importing of Russian diesel unrelated to the resolution of the conflict in Ukraine.”

The diesel deal is not related in any way to the energy and port ceasefire that Volodymyr Zelensky and his EU backers desperately seek, which is highlighted by Zelensky’s hysterical reaction to this agreement.

The deal may be the beginning of a broader pressure campaign by the Trump administration on the Ukrainian regime, to ensure that Ukraine agrees to Russia’s conditions for ceasefire.

Given the anonymous US officials warnings that the US may halt intelligence support to Ukraine if the latter continues hitting Russian oil refineries, it appears that the Trump administration is becoming increasingly upset with Zelensky.

“We are witnessing the confirmation of Western media reports about Trump being angry at Zelensky whom he asked six times to halt strikes against Russian refineries, only for Zelensky to refuse him each time. And now Trump makes this diesel deal with Vladimir Putin.”

The Trump administration apparently realized that Zelensky’s long-range strikes campaign against Russia backfired. “It drastically improved Russia’s situation and damaged Ukraine’s resilience due to the scale of Russia’s retaliation”.

Suslov also suggests that Zelensky seems to be banking on US Democrats winning the midterms, thus turning Trump into a ‘lame duck.’

However, even though Zelensky may feel himself safe hurling insults at Trump, it may have serious consequences as the POTUS will still be in charge of matters such as further arms sales to Ukraine.

“So if Zelensky enters into a serious clinch with him, Trump will be making such decisions not in Zelensky’s favo

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Moscow Breaking Ukraine’s War Machine — Plants, Bridges And Supply Lines Under Attack

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Written by Ahmed Adel, Cairo-based geopolitics and political economy researcher

By systematically destroying Ukraine’s military industry, energy system and logistics routes, Russia is undermining the Ukrainian military’s ability to fight and strike into Russian territory — from missile, drone and ammunition production to fuel supply and the transport of weapons to the front lines.

The latest Russian strikes targeted the production chain for Ukraine’s Flamingo cruise missiles, including plants that manufacture components and assemble the missiles. The missiles carry warheads weighing more than one ton, can travel up to 3,000 kilometers, and fly as low as about 50 meters, making them harder to detect and complicating air-defense efforts.

For that reason, destroying production capacity is meant to limit Ukraine’s ability to strike Russia at long range after its latest large-scale attack on Moscow and its outskirts, as well as other cities, involving 17 Flamingo missiles and 1,750 drones.

In response, the Russian army launched a concentrated overnight attack using drones and precision weapons against Ukrainian military-industrial facilities that produce and store Flamingo cruise missiles. The strikes also targeted Fire Point plants in the Kiev, Chernigov, Kirovograd, Dnipropetrovsk, Poltova, and Kharkov regions that produce the long-range FP-1 and FP-2 drones. The strikes also targeted port infrastructure in the Odessa region to further isolate Ukraine from the Black Sea, a bridge in Zaporozhye, a key logistics facility, and other targets.

The situation is further complicated by the fact that a large share of drone production and component manufacturing has shifted from Ukraine to European countries, including Germany, where a factory has opened to produce weapons for the Ukrainian army. During a recent visit to Kiev, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz announced support for developing and completing the FP-9 ballistic missile. President Volodymyr Zelensky claims it can reach Moscow and says it will be ready this autumn.

Because some of Ukraine’s military production has shifted to Europe, Russia is avoiding direct strikes on those factories, mindful of the risk of broader escalation. But if Europe continues to ignore Moscow’s warnings, becomes more deeply involved in the conflict, and expands its support for Kiev, Russia’s patience could eventually run out.

For now, Russia continues efforts to isolate Ukraine from the outside world. Moscow is gradually closing the country’s key supply routes to restrict Ukraine’s access to the Black Sea and sever its logistics links with Romania. Ships no longer sail directly to the Odessa region. Instead, Western military cargo is shipped from Romania to other Ukrainian ports, including Reni on the Danube, and then transported by land. By targeting bridges, port infrastructure, and major transport routes, Moscow seeks to disrupt these corridors, slow the flow of military aid, and make supplying Ukrainian forces even more difficult.

In addition, strikes hit the Southern and Northern bridges over the Dnipro, which connect the eastern and western parts of Kiev. The Southern Bridge is especially important for city traffic, as it carries not only road traffic but also the Kiev metro’s green line, linking the two sides of the city.

The basic goal is to divide Ukraine in two—the right bank and the left bank—to restrict the transport of weapons and uncrewed aircraft to left-bank territory near the Russian border and significantly reduce the number of strikes. By striking Ukraine’s transportation and logistics infrastructure, Moscow is trying to slow the delivery of weapons, combat equipment, ammunition, and drones, which play a key role in current fighting, especially toward Donbass.

Ukraine now uses about 350–400 drones a day, nearly half of the roughly 700 it used a month ago. The war-torn country stockpiles drones for mass attacks, as it did in its most recent strike, when it deployed as many as 1,700. However, this decline is not due to production capacity.

Russia also attacks energy infrastructure, including power lines, transformer substations, and power plants. Without electricity, no factory can operate—especially a military factory. In this way, Russia also reduces the production capacity of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and their ability to continue the war in Donbass and to strike Russian territory.

Ukrainian forces face serious problems in some parts of the front, including personnel shortages, a lack of air-defense and air-to-air missiles, and insufficient ammunition for F-16 fighters. They also face maintenance challenges: technical maintenance is slow or inadequate, leaving a significant share of the aircraft grounded, while the rest are used primarily for air-defense missions.

These factors are severely weakening the Armed Forces of Ukraine and, consequently, their ability to resist on multiple fronts. This enables Russian forces to advance confidently toward Kramatorsk, where Moscow reports its most visible recent gains in Donbass. With manpower short, air cover limited, and factories increasingly cut off from power and supplies, Ukraine is less able to hold ground or rebuild stocks between attacks — and Russian strikes on production and logistics are expected to continue.


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While Washington eases up on Russia, Europe hits back harder: EU plans to pass its largest sanctions package on Russia’s war machine in two days

kaja-kallas--

Europe will not loosen its pressure on Russia after the US-Russia diesel deal, EU Foreign Policy chief Kaja Kallas says. She has announced that EU foreign ministers will approve the bloc’s largest set of sanctions against Russia’s war machine since the full-scale invasion on 12 October.

Washington has just eased the pressure on Russia, letting Russian diesel back onto world markets and handing Moscow more money to wage war. This comes as Russian strikes have killed more than 80 Ukrainian civilians in two days, 22 of them on Russian President Vladimir Putin's birthday on 7 October.

Moreover, Russia has stepped up its hybrid attacks against Europe, both EU Member States and NATO Allies. It is now the time to tighten sanctions, not loosen them, Kallas says.

“Suspending sanctions on Russian diesel provides Moscow with more revenues to wage war. This is not the time to ease pressure on Russia, and Europe won’t,” she claims.

A split with Washington

On 9 October, Trump claimed he had agreed with Putin to put more than 300,000 tons of Russian diesel on world markets immediately.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy called the deal a weak decision by strong partners, arguing that Russia turns oil-product revenue into weapons against Ukraine's civilians, according to the BBC.

The package aims at the missile chain

On 7 October, EU ambassadors approved the 22nd package of sanctions, with about 1,700 listings, Ukrainian President’s Commissioner for Sanctions Policy Vladyslav Vlasiuk notes. It is expected to be formally approved on 12 October.

This package contains the largest number of sanctions targeting Russia’s defence industry. Of these, 60% were drawn from Ukrainian decrees and proposals. The package includes measures targeting machine tools, Lancet drones, ballistic weapons, and related technologies.

“The core of the package is Russia’s missile programme and electronic components: electronics, capacitors, resistors, and semiconductors. It also covers electronic warfare, shipbuilding, and explosives,” Vlasiuk says.

It took just a few weeks from Ukraine's decision to the European one.

"But we are already working on further measures, including sectoral sanctions targeting energy, the defense industry, finance, and trade,” he stated.

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Greece “Indispensable” To US. What About Turkey? Turkish Question Strikes Again

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Written by Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio this week hailed Greece as an “indispensable” NATO partner – and a pillar of stability in a region marked by “geopolitical uncertainty”. The two sides announced expanded counterterrorism information-sharing. A defense agreement has been reached – worth up to $4 billion. Rubio also backed energy projects such as the undersea electricity interconnector linking Greece to Cyprus, and eventually Israel. At the same time, Rubio insisted a military clash between Turkey and Greece remains “unthinkable” and something the United States would “never allow.” He stressed that both are NATO allies and that conflict would harm all three countries.

When someone emphatically insists that they would never set a house on fire, the very emphasis makes people wonder whether the risk exists. Similarly, Rubio’s statement highlights that Greek-Turkish tensions remain serious enough to require public reassurance from Washington. It would thus seem that the two neighboring countries’ Atlantic membership alone is no guarantee of stability on the Alliance’s southeastern flank. NATO itself has in fact long been split over the “Turkish Question”.

As I argued previously, Trump’s warm embrace of Erdogan in July (recently reiterated), his subsequent signals that he would lift CAATSA sanctions and consider F-35 sales to Turkey, have already raised concerns in Athens – and Israel, for that matter. This exposed divisions, at a time when Ankara pursues strategic autonomy – while also clashing with “allies” over the Aegean, Syria, and the Eastern Mediterranean. Since at least last year, it has been noted how “sidelining” Turkey risks weakening the Alliance’s southeastern flank – and how the Athens-Ankara rivalry in turn exposes NATO’s fragile unity. These tensions predate the current US-Greece deepening of ties.

A closer American-Greek strategic relationship could alienate Turkey (despite Trump’s warmth) and generate further friction within the Alliance. Ankara might perceive the US as strengthening Greece’s military position, its diplomatic leverage, and regional role – at Ankara’s expense. Washington in turn may regard the Hellenic Republic as increasingly “indispensable” – while still viewing Turkey as strategically essential. Those two policies are not inherently incompatible, but they become harder and harder to sustain when Greek and Turkish interests directly conflict.

The latest developments illustrate the dilemma: Greece hosts key US facilities such as Souda Bay, and offers geographic advantages in the Eastern Mediterranean. While the $4 billion arms package builds on existing F-35 procurement and modernization, American support for the electricity interconnector, however, runs up against maritime disputes: Greece seeks to resume seabed surveys, while Turkey argues that the work requires prior coordination under its Libya maritime agreement. The combination of military capability, infrastructure access, and energy influence could look much more serious for Ankara than any single statement. The Greek-Turkish dispute over territorial waters, airspace, continental shelves, and island militarization is longstanding.

This creates the conditions for a security dilemma: Athens strengthens defenses out of distrust, Ankara perceives a shift in the balance and responds – and each side’s measures reinforce the other’s insecurity. Moreover, perception matters in foreign relations. Calling Greece “indispensable” does carry symbolic weight. If Turkey sees Washington investing in Greek capacity while its own F-35 path remains blocked by S-400-related legal restrictions, the asymmetry, so to speak, becomes politically relevant. Domestic prestige and national grievances in both capitals can amplify the effect, thereby creating incentives for public pushback even when direct confrontation would be costly. How can the US and NATO “balance” this?

Washington could separate bilateral defense ties from endorsement of every territorial claim. “Private diplomacy”, as Rubio has indicated, can manage sensitive issues better than public statements. NATO’s existing Greece-Turkey military deconfliction mechanism, established in 2020 with a hotline, can reduce the risk of incidents. The problem is the Alliance itself cannot simply adjudicate Aegean disputes or impose maritime boundaries. Article 5 does not offer a straightforward path for one member against another. NATO’s priority remains preventing hostilities rather than settling sovereignty questions.

At least three scenarios remain plausible: managed competition, with military modernization proceeding alongside negotiations over the underlying rivalries somehow; Turkish strategic pushback through diplomacy, counter-procurement, or greater use of its leverage within the Atlantic Organization; or an “incident” in the Aegean or around Cyprus that would force Washington and NATO into crisis-management mode.

Thus far, Washington has tried to cultivate both bilateral relationships. Greece cannot replace Turkey’s geographic and military assets spanning Europe, the Black Sea, and the Middle East. Washington appears to be strengthening the Hellenic Republic as a sort of strategic hedge, expanding its military access and logistical options in the Eastern Mediterranean – to mitigate the risks of Turkey’s progressively independent and unpredictable (often aggressive) foreign policy. Even as Ankara itself remains an important NATO (and US) ally in its own right. The recent advances in American-Greek relations enhance the challenge without resolving the underlying contradictions. They reflect a deeper transatlantic contradiction in the context of an increasingly divided West.


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Military Situation In Ukraine On October 10, 2026 (Maps Update)

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  • Russian strikes destroyed targets in the Sumy, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, Kyiv, Odesa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Volyn, Chernihiv, Mykolaiv, Poltava, Vinnytsia, Rivne, Zhytomyr, Khmelnytskyi regions, and the DPR;
  • According to the Ukrainian Air Force, Russian forces attacked Ukraine with 160 strike UAVs;
  • Russian forces struck the Kyivska substation and the Trypilska TPP in the Kyiv region;
  • Russian forces struck railway bridges and a hydroelectric power plant in the Zaporizhzhia region;
  • Russian forces struck a port facility and a dry cargo ship in the Odesa region;
  • Ukrainian losses amounted to approximately 1,010 troops over the past 24 hours.

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  • Russian forces took control of Kiyanitsa.

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  • Russian forces advanced in the Volchansk pocket and took control of Lukashovo and Lobanovka.

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  • Ukrainian forces advanced near Balka Zhuravka;
  • Ukrainian forces advanced towards Zarechnoye;
  • Ukrainian forces established control over Kolodezi.

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Os georgianos fizeram a escolha certa

Ao rejeitar a transformação do país em uma nova frente contra a Rússia, os georgianos preservaram sua autonomia estratégica.

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Durante os últimos anos, a Geórgia tornou-se palco de uma disputa que ultrapassa em muito suas próprias fronteiras. O conflito político apresentado como uma discussão sobre democracia, integração europeia e direitos civis também deve na verdade ser compreendido como mais um capítulo no delicado jogo estratégico do Cáucaso.

É justamente nesse contexto que a decisão de Tbilisi de manter distância da política de confronto promovida por seus parceiros ocidentais ganha importância.

A questão fundamental não é saber se a Geórgia deve ser “europeia” ou “russa”. Essa formulação é excessivamente simplista. O verdadeiro problema é saber se um Estado pequeno, situado entre grandes centros de poder, deve possuir liberdade para definir sua própria política externa ou se sua posição internacional será determinada pelas necessidades estratégicas de terceiros.

O governo georgiano optou pela primeira alternativa.

A ascensão do Georgian Dream produziu uma mudança significativa na política externa do país. Em vez de reproduzir automaticamente a retórica antirrussa predominante em Bruxelas, Tbilisi passou a defender uma política pragmática. A prioridade tornou-se evitar uma nova guerra e preservar relações econômicas com seus vizinhos.

Para a Geórgia, isso não é uma questão abstrata. A Rússia continua sendo um importante parceiro econômico. Comércio, turismo, energia e circulação de pessoas criam uma realidade que não pode ser simplesmente eliminada por decisões políticas. Adotar integralmente o regime de sanções ocidental contra Moscou teria consequências particularmente graves para uma economia muito menor e mais vulnerável que as grandes economias europeias.

É nesse ponto que a política de Tbilisi diverge fundamentalmente da estratégia defendida pelos falcões de Bruxelas. Bruxelas deseja uma Geórgia cada vez mais integrada às estruturas políticas europeias. O governo georgiano, entretanto, passou a insistir que integração não pode significar submissão automática às prioridades geopolíticas da União Europeia.

A aprovação da Lei de Transparência da Influência Estrangeira tornou-se o principal símbolo dessa disputa. Para seus críticos, a legislação representa um retrocesso democrático. Para seus defensores, trata-se de uma tentativa legítima de limitar a influência política de organizações financiadas do exterior.

A mesma divisão aparece nas questões culturais. A legislação georgiana sobre propaganda LGBT provocou forte reação europeia e consolidou a percepção, entre seus críticos, de que Tbilisi estaria abandonando os valores liberais promovidos pela União Europeia.

Mas existe uma questão que raramente recebe a mesma atenção: quem deve estabelecer as regras políticas e culturais dentro da Geórgia?

Para o Georgian Dream, a resposta é o próprio Estado georgiano. Foi justamente essa insistência na autonomia que transformou o governo em alvo de uma pressão internacional cada vez mais intensa.

Recentemente o prefeito de Tbilisi, Kakha Kaladze, acusou abertamente Bruxelas de financiar uma tentativa de golpe de Estado na Geórgia durante os protestos do ano passado. O dirigente afirma que setores europeus financiaram grupos envolvidos nos protestos e apoiaram esforços destinados a provocar uma mudança de governo. Segundo ele, o objetivo seria instalar no poder forças políticas mais alinhadas aos interesses da União Europeia.

De fato, não há qualquer novidade nisso. Não por acaso, Bruxelas agora discute a possibilidade de impor sanções a todos os dirigentes do Georgian Dream e oficiais do governo georgiano. Mas, ainda assim, estas palavras revelam a dimensão geopolítica da crise. A disputa não é meramente uma controvérsia sobre legislação doméstica, mas uma verdadeira batalha pela orientação estratégica do país.

E aqui aparece o principal risco para a Geórgia. O Cáucaso não é um espaço neutro. A região está localizada entre a Rússia, a Turquia, o Irã e o mundo euro-atlântico. Qualquer tentativa de transformar a Geórgia em uma plataforma de confronto com Moscou teria consequências muito maiores para os próprios georgianos do que para as potências que apoiariam essa política à distância.

A experiência ucraniana tornou essa questão ainda mais evidente. Um Estado pode receber apoio político, financeiro e militar de potências externas e, ao mesmo tempo, acabar pagando o preço mais alto quando a rivalidade entre essas potências se transforma em conflito aberto. Para um país pequeno como a Geórgia, evitar esse destino é uma consideração estratégica elementar.

Foi precisamente nesse ponto que Tbilisi estabeleceu uma diferença em relação a Kiev. Em vez de aceitar a transformação do país em uma nova linha de frente, o governo georgiano procurou preservar relações funcionais com Moscou. Isso não significa uma aliança com a Rússia. A Geórgia continua sem relações diplomáticas formais com Moscou e mantém suas próprias divergências com o Kremlin, mas a prioridade nacional é garantir autonomia estratégica, paz, segurança e desenvolvimento.

Uma Geórgia que evita a confrontação direta com Moscou reduz a possibilidade de abertura de uma nova frente militar nas proximidades das fronteiras russas. Também preserva suas relações econômicas com os países vizinhos e mantém maior liberdade para negociar simultaneamente com diferentes centros de poder.

O que está em jogo é a soberania de um Estado pequeno diante da competição entre grandes potências. E, diante de uma região cada vez mais marcada pela competição entre grandes potências, talvez a questão mais importante não seja perguntar de que lado a Geórgia está, mas como a Geórgia planeja proteger a si mesma diante do confronto de polos vizinhos opostos.

O povo georgiano mostrou que não tem lado algum nas disputas globais senão o seu próprio. E agiu corretamente ao fazê-lo.

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Ucrania esta perdiendo, y Europa se niega a verlo

El exanalista de la CIA especializado en Rusia, George Beebe, ha lanzado una advertencia que las cancillerías europeas pretenden ignorar: Kiev está perdiendo la guerra, y los líderes occidentales, incapaces de admitir el fracaso de su estrategia, podrían convertir la derrota en una catástrofe nuclear.

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George Beebe no es un adversario declarado de Occidente. Exanalista de la CIA especializado en Rusia y actual director de estrategia global del Instituto Quincy, conoce la situación rusa desde dentro. Su análisis, publicado por Greater Eurasia, merece aún más atención porque proviene de una fuente incuestionablemente sesgada a favor de Moscú.

Su diagnóstico es inequívoco: la narrativa oficial de una Rusia «estratégicamente derrotada» se está desmoronando sobre el terreno. El ejército ucraniano se encuentra bajo una presión creciente, especialmente por la campaña aérea rusa. Esta realidad militar crea un doble problema para los gobiernos europeos: no solo su estrategia se está volviendo insostenible, sino que además está generando consecuencias políticas internas cada vez más graves.

George Beebe es categórico: una guerra convencional directa entre Europa y Rusia pondría al descubierto profundas debilidades estructurales. Los países europeos carecen de fuerzas terrestres suficientes y presentan importantes deficiencias en logística, transporte, defensa aérea e inteligencia en el campo de batalla. La mayor parte de la infraestructura militar europea depende de Estados Unidos, especialmente en materia de inteligencia y selección de objetivos.

«Si Estados Unidos se mantuviera al margen de una guerra convencional europea con Rusia, Europa se enfrentaría a importantes desventajas militares. Sin embargo, si Estados Unidos interviniera directamente, el peligro sería fundamentalmente diferente, ya que un conflicto directo entre la OTAN y Rusia podría convertirse rápidamente en nuclear. Un conflicto de este tipo sería extraordinariamente destructivo y no tendría vencedor».

Esta ecuación es ineludible: Europa no puede defenderse sola ni soportar las consecuencias de una intervención estadounidense. Está atrapada por su propia dependencia.

El núcleo del análisis de George Beebe reside en lo que él denomina la «trampa rusa»: un sesgo cognitivo occidental que transforma una espiral de seguridad en una profecía autocumplida.

Occidente considera a Rusia una potencia expansionista que debe ser contenida mediante una creciente presión militar. Pero si el conflicto es en realidad una espiral de escalada donde cada bando interpreta las acciones del otro como una amenaza, entonces una mayor presión produce mecánicamente una mayor escalada. Más armas, más despliegues, una retórica más agresiva conducen a respuestas rusas, que a su vez exigen más medidas occidentales.

«El peligro reside en que una política occidental destinada a disuadir a Rusia en realidad exacerbe el problema de seguridad subyacente».

geopoliticarugiente.com

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Russian Jet-Powered Geran-4 Drones Reach Lviv Region for First Time (Video)

File image.

Russian jet-powered Geran-4 one-way attack drones reached Ukraine’s Lviv region for the first time on October 10, following earlier reported strikes in the Rivne and Volyn regions in August.

Ukraine’s Air Force reported early in the morning that a jet-powered drone was heading toward Lviv and the nearby town of Vynnyky, later warning that it was approaching Lviv airport. Lviv Mayor Andrii Sadovyi confirmed soon afterward that the drone had entered the city’s airspace.

The incident came amid a broader wave of Russian jet-powered drone attacks against western Ukraine. Geran-4 drones targeted not just Lviv, but also Volyn, Rivne, Khmelnytskyi and Ivano-Frankivsk regions from late October 9 overnight into October 10.

Russia disclosed the Geran-4’s range publicly on October 2, when a representative briefed President Vladimir Putin on the drone during a visit to the Chebarkulsky training ground in the Chelyabinsk region. The representative said the drone travels at 350 kilometers per hour, carries a 50-kilogram warhead and has a range of 750 to 800 kilometers.

Those figures place western Ukrainian targets within its declared operational reach. Yet there have been reports of strikes even beyond this range.

In August, an unidentified Russian jet-powered drone reportedly traveled about 900 kilometers from Crimea before reaching Dubno in the Rivne region.

Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence revealed earlier this week that Russia has begun to produce an updated version of the Geran-4.

The updated version replaces the Chinese Telefly turbojet engine with a Russian-produced equivalent and adds the Susanin electro-optical system, which compares onboard camera images with stored reference imagery to guide the drone along a designated route. It is also armed with a new shaped-charge warhead designed to cut through bridge structures and supports for overhead power lines.

The continued development of the Geran drone represents a growing threat to Ukrainian air defenses, which are struggling to cope with existing versions.

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Putin Conveys to Trump Iran’s Vision on Possible Conflict Resolution – Kremlin

Sputnik – 10.10.2026

MOSCOW – Russian President Vladimir Putin conveyed to US President Donald Trump, in coordination with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Iran’s vision on a possible resolution of the conflict, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on Saturday.

Putin, during communication on the sidelines of the summit in Turkmenistan, held two meetings with Pezeshkian, at one of which he informed the Iranian president about the upcoming telephone conversation with the US president, the Kremlin spokesman noted.

“And then, in coordination with the Iranian president, Putin conveyed to Trump Iran’s vision on a possible resolution of the conflict,” Peskov said.

During a conversation with Trump, Putin showed understanding regarding some proposals of the US leader aimed at de-escalating the conflict in Ukraine, Peskov said.

At the initiative of Trump, most of the time in the telephone conversation between the leaders, which took place the previous evening, was devoted specifically to the Ukrainian settlement, Peskov added.

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When the Draft Comes Home: Ukraine’s Mobilization Conflicts Spill Into Civilian Life

Click to see the full-size image

The recruitment van leaves. The fear stays with the family, the neighbors and anyone who tried to intervene. These mobilization videos show more than men being taken away. They show what happens to everyone left behind.

Self-defense. A missing deferment. A notification team carrying out its duties. The official explanations vary. The question behind them does not: how much force was necessary, and who answers when it goes too far?

The Courtyard Becomes a Scene

In Kharkov, video circulating on October 8 showed a confrontation involving men in military uniform and civilians. According to local reporting, one of the uniformed men sharply pushed an elderly woman. She fell onto the pavement and did not immediately get up. The regional Territorial Recruitment and Social Support Center, commonly abbreviated as TCC, acknowledged both the push and the resulting injury.

Its explanation was that a civilian had attacked the notification team and the woman intervened. The serviceman, the office said, pushed her while defending himself.


An elderly woman lies on the pavement. No one even tries to help her. The TCC calls the shove “self-defense.” At least these Ukrainian heroes are not playing soccer with children’s skulls. Not in this video


The woman was not the person being mobilized. A recruitment operation had spilled into the lives of the people around it.

“Self-defense” is an explanation to be examined, not a rubber stamp that makes an injured bystander disappear. Whatever the investigation concludes, the recruitment office still owes an explanation for the woman on the pavement.

Through the Window

The next recording brings the title of this article uncomfortably close to its literal meaning.

Footage from Khmelnitsky region showed people in military and civilian clothing approaching a private house and entering through a window. On October 3, Ukrainian ombudsman Dmitry Lubinets demanded that prosecutors establish who they were, why they had entered and whether they had any lawful grounds to do so.

Men climbing through your window. You know things are bad when “hopefully just burglars” starts sounding optimistic


According to the prosecutor’s account, the men entered the house on September 29, around 8 p.m. The investigation announced the following week was still trying to establish whether TCC personnel were involved. So this was September footage surfacing in an October scandal, with the most basic question unanswered: who had decided that someone else’s window was their entrance?

The uncertainty offers the homeowner little comfort. “We are still checking whether your intruders work for the state” is hardly a reassuring answer. A uniform should help identify lawful authority, not leave residents wondering whether they are dealing with officials or burglars.

If these were private criminals, their identities belong in a case file. If they were recruitment personnel, their job titles belong there too. Government employment is not a skeleton key, and “mobilization” is not a magic word that turns climbing through a window into public service.

Customers Who Take the Clerk

In Novovolynsk, the boundary crossed was a shop counter.

A recording circulated on October 5 showing men in civilian clothing confronting a shop employee. Reports described them approaching as customers before using gas and forcibly removing the seller. A man in military clothing was also present. Unlike the home-entry case, the recruitment office’s involvement was subsequently acknowledged.

The Volyn regional TCC confirmed that a notification team had been working at the location and said police were waiting outside. Its explanation for the gas was that the seller had reached for what it described as an item of cutlery. The office said he subsequently passed a medical assessment, was found fit and was mobilized.

They posed as customers, then sprayed the clerk and dragged him out. The shelves stayed stocked. The man became the merchandise


The office also said it had received no complaint from the man. That is not a finding that the force was justified. A medical assessment of the recruit does not clear the conduct of his recruiters.

When Bystanders Step In

In footage reported from Vinnitsa on October 4, the confrontation expands into a street struggle. Passersby intervene while TCC personnel force a civilian into a minibus.

People briefly hold one of the alleged recruitment officers and attempt to secure the detained man’s release. Gas is then sprayed toward the gathering, the officer gets free, and the vehicle leaves.

Vinnitsa. A street kidnapping hits a wall, so the press gang breaks out the tear gas. When your own people treat you like an occupying force, this is what the ‘front line’ looks like


Bystanders stop watching and step in. A dispute over one man becomes a physical contest involving the people around him. Neither a crowd nor a uniform settles legality by winning a struggle. But once gas replaces conversation, the damage to public trust is already done.

A Community at the Gates

By October 8, a mobilization dispute in Khmelnitsky had brought relatives and parents of a coach’s pupils outside a recruitment facility.

Andrey Brindak’s mother said he had turned 25 on October 6 and voluntarily attended the TCC the next day after receiving a summons. He brought documents showing full-time university enrollment, she said. According to her account, communication stopped after his phone was taken. Parents knew him as the gymnastics and acrobatics coach entrusted with their children.

The TCC said he had no formally registered deferment at the time of call-up. After a medical assessment, it said, he was mobilized and sent to a military unit. His family contested the legality of that decision.

Khmelnitsky. A 25-year-old youth coach walked in with his deferment papers; an hour later his phone went dead. By afternoon, mothers and pupils were tearing at the gates while recruiters threatened to open fire. This isn’t recruitment. It’s a fortress holding hostages


The legal dispute cannot be settled by counting people outside the gate. Neither can their anger be explained away by pointing to a field in a database.

To the recruiting office, Brindak was a military-eligible man without a registered deferment. To the people gathered outside, he was a son and a coach. Both descriptions concerned the same person. The confrontation exposed the distance between them.

The Tourist Exception, or a Better Class of Human

Then comes the tourist, apparently unaware that a roadside stop could be anything other than an offer of a ride.

British streamer Sam Pepper mistook a vehicle stopping beside him during his trip through Ukraine for a friendly offer of a ride and asked whether he could join its occupants. Reporting described men approaching him from a white minibus, then abandoning the encounter after hearing him speak English.

He asked for a lift. They heard a British accent. Suddenly, the van had somewhere else to be. Draft dodgers, take notes


The clip does not establish who the men were or what they intended. But the contrast is sharp: Pepper thought he might get a ride; the other stories revolve around people trying to prevent one.

For him, an awkward roadside encounter became travel content. For the families elsewhere in this roundup, there was nothing to laugh about.

Visit Ukraine. Bring a camera. Apparently, the British accent is the premium package.


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Russian Air Strikes Kill 20 in Zaporizhzhia, Including Three Children, as Rescuers Search Rubble

At least 30 people have been injured after Russian guided aerial bombs struck residential buildings in the Ukrainian city of Zaporizhzhia. The fate of several residents remains unknown as emergency workers continue searching collapsed apartment blocks.

At least 20 civilians, including three children, have been killed in Russian air strikes on the southern Ukrainian city of Zaporizhzhia on Saturday morning, 10 October, according to regional authorities. Rescue workers are continuing to search the ruins of residential buildings, with several people still unaccounted for.

The death toll rose from eight to 30 as emergency crews recovered more victims. The Zaporizhzhia regional military administration confirmed that three children were among those killed, while earlier reports recorded 16 injured, including three children. Two of the wounded were in a serious condition.

Authorities had previously reported that 12 people remained missing, although they did not provide a revised figure after the death toll increased. Rescue operations continued amid concerns that further victims could be trapped beneath collapsed concrete and other debris.

Apartment Buildings Destroyed by Guided Bombs

Russian forces launched the attack shortly before dawn, using guided aerial bombs against residential areas of Zaporizhzhia. According to the regional administration’s preliminary assessment, one five-storey apartment building suffered a direct hit and was destroyed, while part of another residential block collapsed.

The attack damaged at least 26 residential buildings in the Shevchenkivskyi and Voznesenivskyi districts, comprising 23 apartment blocks and three private houses. Three buildings sustained particularly extensive damage, while non-residential properties were also affected.

Firefighters, police officers and medical personnel were deployed to the affected neighbourhoods, supported by municipal workers and local residents. Emergency crews continued removing debris and examining unstable structures while officials assessed the extent of the destruction.

The Ukrainian National Police said that officers were documenting the consequences of the attack, including damage to civilian infrastructure. Investigators were also recording evidence for possible war crimes proceedings.

Search Continues as Casualty Figures Rise

The scale of the destruction has complicated efforts to establish the number of victims. The initial casualty figures increased repeatedly as rescuers gained access to damaged buildings and recovered bodies.

Earlier in the morning, authorities reported four deaths. The figure subsequently rose to seven, then eight, before reaching 11 shortly after midday. The number of injured also increased as information emerged from hospitals and emergency services.

At 10.15am local time, 16 people were confirmed wounded. Three were children, while two patients were described as seriously injured. The regional administration said most of the remaining casualties were in a condition of moderate severity.

Officials warned that the casualty figures could change as operations continued. The authorities had not established how many of those initially reported missing might still be trapped in the wreckage, and the recovery of additional bodies had not been accompanied by a revised missing-person count.

Zaporizhzhia Faces Continued Russian Air Attacks

Zaporizhzhia, an industrial city in south-eastern Ukraine, has remained exposed to Russian aerial attacks throughout the full-scale invasion. Its proximity to Russian-held territory in the surrounding region leaves residential districts vulnerable to aircraft-launched weapons.

Guided aerial bombs present a particular challenge for Ukrainian air defences. Unlike conventional unguided bombs, they can be fitted with glide and guidance systems allowing Russian aircraft to release them from considerable distances. Their substantial explosive payloads can cause extensive structural damage when they strike apartment buildings.

Saturday’s attack comes only three days after Russia launched another large-scale assault across Ukraine, targeting energy infrastructure and residential areas. As EU Today reported on 7 October, that operation killed at least 11 people and caused damage in several Ukrainian cities, including Zaporizhzhia.

The latest fatalities also follow earlier attacks on civilian facilities in the city. In February, Russian drones struck a maternity hospital in Zaporizhzhia, causing a fire and injuring patients.

The repeated strikes have placed continuing pressure on the city’s emergency services, which must respond to new attacks while repairing damage to residential buildings and public infrastructure.

Day of Mourning Declared

The Zaporizhzhia authorities have declared Sunday, 11 October, a day of mourning for those killed in Saturday’s bombardment. The announcement followed confirmation that the death toll had reached 11, including three children.

The Russian attack has also renewed attention to the vulnerability of densely populated urban areas to guided aerial bombs. Under international humanitarian law, deliberate attacks against civilians and indiscriminate attacks are prohibited, while all parties must distinguish between military objectives and civilian objects.

Ukrainian investigators are continuing to document the damage and civilian casualties. The precise circumstances of each impact, including the intended targets, have not yet been independently established.

For the families awaiting news of missing relatives, the immediate priority remains the search beneath the destroyed buildings. As of the latest available information on Saturday, rescue workers were still operating at the sites, and the authorities had warned that the number of dead could rise further.

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Washington and Moscow Target the ICC: Different Motives, a Common Beneficiary

Russia’s demands for the extradition of International Criminal Court judges and Washington’s sweeping sanctions against the institution have converged within days. The two governments have different grievances, but the consequences of their actions increasingly overlap, raising questions about the political relationship between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin and the future of international criminal justice.

Russia and the United States have intensified their campaigns against the International Criminal Court (ICC) almost simultaneously, exposing an increasingly consequential convergence between the policies of Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump.

On 8 October, Moscow demanded the extradition of ICC President Tomoko Akane and eight other current and former officials. The following day, Washington announced sanctions against the court as an institution, extending earlier measures against individual judges and prosecutors.

The timing raises an obvious question: are these independent campaigns arising from different disputes with international justice, or do they reflect a broader political understanding between Washington and Moscow?

There is no publicly established evidence of a coordinated operation or an agreement between Trump and Putin to undermine the ICC. Nevertheless, the strategic consequences of their respective actions are remarkably similar. Both weaken an institution pursuing criminal proceedings against political leaders whom the two governments seek to protect.

Different grievances, overlapping interests

Russia’s hostility towards the ICC is directly connected to the arrest warrant issued against Putin in March 2023 over the alleged unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children from occupied territories.

The court subsequently issued warrants against senior Russian military commanders, including Sergei Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov, over alleged crimes involving attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure.

Moscow’s response has been to pursue ICC personnel through its own criminal justice system. The latest extradition demands follow convictions handed down in absentia by a Russian court in December 2025.

Washington’s confrontation with the ICC has a different immediate origin. The Trump administration objects to the court’s jurisdiction over American nationals and Israeli officials, particularly following the arrest warrants issued against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former defence minister Yoav Gallant.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio has presented the American campaign as a defence of US sovereignty. Yet the sanctions announced on 9 October are not confined to the Israeli proceedings or any investigation involving American personnel.

They target the institution itself, potentially disrupting financial transactions and commercial relationships essential to its operation. This distinction matters because a court-wide restriction necessarily affects investigations beyond those cited by Washington. That includes Ukraine.

The Anchorage question

The political context cannot be separated from the relationship between Trump and Putin, including their meeting in Anchorage, Alaska, in August 2025.

The summit formed part of Trump’s efforts to negotiate directly with Moscow over the war in Ukraine. The American president has repeatedly treated relations with Putin as a question of diplomatic bargaining, seeking arrangements that might produce an agreement where conventional Western pressure has failed.

Against this background, suggestions that pressure on the ICC might form part of a wider accommodation with Moscow warrant scrutiny. However, the proposition that Trump specifically offered Putin assistance in neutralising the court during their Anchorage discussions remains unsubstantiated. There is no verified public account establishing such a commitment.

A more defensible conclusion is that Washington’s independently declared campaign against the ICC also advances an important Russian interest. For Putin, the benefit is clear. Measures designed to restrict the court’s financial and administrative capacity could complicate investigations into Russian conduct, irrespective of the American administration’s stated intentions.

The relationship therefore need not involve explicit coordination to produce politically significant results.

Why sanctions against the institution matter

The escalation from targeting individual prosecutors to sanctioning the entire ICC represents a substantial change. Previous American measures imposed personal and financial restrictions on selected officials. The latest approach threatens the broader infrastructure upon which international criminal proceedings depend.

The court requires banking facilities, secure communications, technology services and commercial suppliers. American sanctions can reach beyond US territory because of the international financial system’s dependence on dollar transactions and American service providers.

The ICC had already anticipated this vulnerability. According to details disclosed in September, the institution has pursued alternatives to American software and financial services to reduce its exposure.

Nevertheless, operational continuity and investigative effectiveness are not necessarily the same thing. The court may remain formally functional while facing additional costs, delays and restrictions affecting prosecutors, investigators and international cooperation.

For Ukraine, this is particularly significant. The ICC holds and evaluates evidence connected to alleged Russian war crimes, including the deportation of children and attacks on civilian infrastructure. Its proceedings preserve a judicial process independent of whatever diplomatic settlement Washington and Moscow might eventually negotiate.

Weakening that capacity would not invalidate existing warrants or automatically destroy evidence, but it could make the pursuit of accountability more difficult.

Europe’s response and its limitations

The European Union now faces a dispute with Washington over an institution that European governments have spent decades supporting.

On 9 October, eight governments issued a joint statement, reaffirming their support for the ICC and rejecting the American sanctions. The signatories included Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Britain, Japan and Canada.

The European Commission also indicated that the EU was prepared to take measures necessary to preserve the court’s operations. Such assurances are politically important, but they do not automatically resolve the practical consequences of American restrictions.

European financial institutions and technology suppliers must consider their own exposure to US sanctions. Sustaining the court may require alternative payment arrangements, commercial protections and potentially further European regulatory intervention.

The EU has discussed extending its blocking statute to shield European operators from the effects of American sanctions. Whether that mechanism can provide sufficient protection remains uncertain.

The dispute also extends beyond the ICC’s current investigations. Ukraine and the Council of Europe are developing a separate Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression, designed to address jurisdictional limitations preventing the ICC from prosecuting Russia’s leadership for the decision to launch the invasion.

The two institutions have distinct legal mandates, although cooperation between them is envisaged. Undermining the ICC would not automatically prevent the special tribunal from operating, but it would weaken an important part of the wider international accountability framework.

A convergence with consequences for Ukraine

Washington and Moscow have not adopted identical positions towards the ICC. Russia seeks to discredit and punish the officials responsible for pursuing Putin. The Trump administration is attempting to restrict the court’s authority and operational capacity, principally in response to proceedings involving Americans and Israelis.

Yet their actions converge at precisely the point where the ICC’s independence becomes politically inconvenient. The distinction between motive and consequence is essential. It would be premature to describe the American sanctions as evidence of a secret bargain struck in Anchorage. It would be equally mistaken to overlook the assistance these measures could provide to Moscow.

The broader concern is that the United States, traditionally central to Western efforts to hold Russia accountable for its invasion of Ukraine, is now applying pressure to one of the principal institutions carrying out that work.

For European governments, the immediate question is no longer simply whether they support the International Criminal Court. It is whether they are prepared to protect its practical independence when the political and financial pressure comes not only from Russia, but also from Washington.

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The Warmongering fiction: Europe’s elite and the politics of self-destruction

When an elite loses the capacity to imagine, create, and persuade, it may be a harbinger that an era is coming to an end.

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In a burst of posturing during the recent European Arctic Summit in Rovaniemi, Finland, European leaders donned military attire to convey a message of readiness for a confrontation with Russia, while the political and media apparatus repeats, almost in unison, warnings about the “Russian threat.” The Summit’s official declaration places security at the heart of discussions and insists on the need to strengthen the European presence and capabilities in the region, which is deemed strategic for continental security.

There is something deeply unsettling about this staging. These leaders present themselves as representatives of societies mobilized for war, even as they govern deeply divided countries and face a growing erosion of public trust. This gap alone – between leadership rhetoric and the actual disposition of their societies – should counsel prudence. Instead, we are witnessing the creation of a psychological atmosphere of confrontation. And that is precisely where the danger lies.

The real risk of self-destruction

First, there is an element of pretense, as Europe lacks the industrial capacity required to autonomously sustain a prolonged military mobilization on the scale suggested by such warmongering rhetoric. The very effort to rebuild stockpiles, ramp up ammunition production, and restore industrial capacity demonstrates just how much that infrastructure has been scaled back in recent decades. Yet, the most serious issue is not industrial, but strategic.

The Russian Federation possesses a massive nuclear arsenal and advanced strike systems, including hypersonic missiles. This does not mean Russia holds technological superiority in every field, but it points to something far more significant for this discussion: any direct war between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Russia would involve forces capable of inflicting destruction on a civilizational scale. Russia and the US continue to hold the overwhelming majority of existing nuclear warheads, even as major nuclear states modernize their arsenals and arms control mechanisms weaken. Therefore, treating a direct confrontation with Russia as merely another foreign policy option is not an act of courage; it is courting the possibility of self-destruction.

Once a certain threshold is crossed, there is no longer any guarantee that events will remain under the control of those who initiated them. This is the crucial point missing from the current warmongering theatricalization.

And there is something even more disturbing. The language of destruction is once again being openly voiced by Western leaders themselves. At the United Nations General Assembly, President Donald Trump proclaimed that the US could “annihilate” Iran if an agreement were not reached. If a threat of this nature – a “final solution” – can be uttered at the UN without triggering a political rupture commensurate with the enormity of the statement, then something extremely serious is happening to the Western perception of the limits of war. For the normalization of the language of annihilation does not necessarily remain confined to the adversary against whom it was originally directed.

Today it might be Iran. Tomorrow, in a spiral of escalation beyond anyone’s control, it could be European cities. It is in this sense that current warmongering fantasies cease to be mere political posturing and begin to represent a concrete danger of self-destruction for European civilization. Europe, which for centuries was a fundamental center of Western civilization, has lived through two world wars and knows firsthand what it means to turn political rivalries into wars of annihilation. Precisely for this reason, one would expect its leaders to be the first to understand that a war between nuclear powers offers no second chance to correct miscalculations. Yet we see them toying with military symbols, mobilizing rhetoric, existential enemies, and the prospect of confrontation, as if we were still living in the world that existed before Hiroshima and Nagasaki. That is precisely the nature of the fiction: portraying war as a readily available political tool without fully confronting what it could actually entail. And if the confrontation spirals out of control, the price will be paid not merely by governments, parties, or military alliances, but by the very civilization these leaders claim to be defending.

Who needs the threat?

So, let us ask: who is behind all this falsehood? Who funds this play? Who needs this constant atmosphere of threats? And why does a political order facing an evident crisis of legitimacy seem to find, in the prospect of war, one of the last narratives capable of justifying its own survival?

The simplest answer would be to explain this attitude as an attempt to prop up unpopular regimes by invoking an imaginary external threat, while simultaneously condemning or suppressing emerging political forces, portrayed as foreign agents or tools of an enemy power – in this case, linked to the Russian “beast”.

Undoubtedly, there is some truth to this. History offers numerous examples of governments resorting to external threats to restore crumbling internal cohesion, discredit opponents, and justify measures that would face greater resistance under normal circumstances. Yet, this explanation is insufficient. The crisis is not merely about the legitimacy of a group of European leaders; it affects the very system that placed them in power – and it is that system which is in crisis.

The crisis of the liberal-financial order

The so-called “rules-based world,” the financial globalization, the free trade elevated to the status of dogma, and the progressive displacement of the productive economy by financialization are being challenged by the resurgence of the sovereign nation-state, industrial policies, energy security, strategic supply chains, and the defense of national economic interests. Paradoxically, this return of the nation-state could also offer a path for the West to reclaim some of its own civilizational roots (that are essentially Christian), in which political power was not conceived as absolute, but rather subject to a higher moral order. At a deeper level, however, what lies behind these chimeras is an even greater crisis: the crisis of the liberal-financial system organized around “independent” central banks, the growing autonomy of financial power from national communities, and an economic conception that, over decades, has progressively shifted the center of wealth from production to financial returns. This system has historical roots in the formation of the Anglo-Dutch commercial and financial order of the 17th and 18th centuries – an order that was subsequently projected across much of the world through British and, later, American imperial and financial structures.

Over time, this model has taken on new forms but retained an essential characteristic: the ability of financial power to present itself as a reality standing almost outside politics, as if its decisions were technical, neutral, and independent of the sovereign choices of societies. It is precisely this architecture that is now being called into question.

A secular religion without the promise of redemption

The underlying system of Western oligarchies has lost the capacity to generate ideas and projects capable of mobilizing societies around a vision of the future. This sterility is also reflected in the mediocrity of much of the current leaders, who act more as administrators of an order in crisis than as creators of a new political reality. Liberal politics has thus transformed into a kind of secular religion devoid of any promise of redemption. And this is perhaps one of its most unsettling characteristics.

The great political movements of the 19th and 20th centuries, even when they led entire societies to catastrophe, still promised some form of historical redemption: the classless society, national greatness, empire, revolution, the “new man,” or a supposedly definitive future order.

The secular religion of the decaying liberal order no longer offers even that. It demands sacrifices without holding out the prospect of a future paradise. It demands impoverishment in the name of stability, a loss of sovereignty in the name of rules, deindustrialization in the name of efficiency and environmental “protection,” and censorship in the name of democracy; ultimately, it even accepts the risk of war to preserve an order whose purpose it can no longer explain. There is no longer a genuine promise of redemption. There is only the promise that the system will continue to exist. In the words of former EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell, “We are the Garden of Eden; the rest is the jungle.”

At this point, politics ceases to defend society and instead demands that society sacrifice itself to defend the system. This is precisely where a secular religion can become self-destructive: when preserving the existing order comes to matter more than preserving the people living under that order.

From creative minority to dominant minority

This is, perhaps, one of the deepest signs of civilizational exhaustion. An elite ceases to be creative when it can no longer imagine a future distinct from the mere continuation of itself. The English historian Arnold Toynbee grasped this phenomenon with profound insight when he distinguished the creative minority from the dominant minority. A creative minority exercises leadership because it offers responses capable of inspiring allegiance. Its authority stems from its ability to respond to historical challenges and to generate new forms of organization, culture, and meaning. When this capacity vanishes, the former creative minority may transform into a dominant minority – one that no longer leads by inspiring, but sustains itself through control. Persuasion is progressively replaced by discipline; imagination by administration; vision by propaganda; and trust by fear.

It is at this juncture that the system risks turning the crisis itself into a justification for its continued existence. The more it fails, the more power it demands. The more legitimacy it loses, the more it requires enemies. The less it is able to imagine a future, the more dramatically it must portray the present as an existential battle.

When the temporal takes the place of the transcendent

Here, the reflections of German-American philosopher Eric Voegelin on totalitarian ideologies as “political religions” converge with Toynbee’s ideas regarding the disintegration of civilizations. When a society loses its reference to a transcendent order, the human need for the absolute does not necessarily disappear; it may simply be transferred elsewhere. The nation, race, class, party, revolution, the market, “the rules,” or democracy (understood not merely as a political system but as an absolute moral category)  –  any temporal reality can be sacralized and elevated to a status beyond questioning.

In this process, the temporal takes the place of the transcendent. Yet there is a decisive difference between the political movements of the past and this potential secular religion of an exhausted order. The former promised a future redemption. The latter seems to demand present sacrifice solely to prevent the system from vanishing. It is a secular religion devoid of eschatology, paradise, a “new man,” or a truly new horizon. Its only future is the indefinite continuation of the present.

When fear replaces imagination

This absence of a future may well explain the growing prominence of fear: fear of the external enemy, of rupture, of dissent, of losing control. It is the fear that what was presented for decades as inevitable might suddenly cease to be so. When an order can no longer generate hope, it must generate fear. And when fear replaces imagination, conflict can transform into a form of legitimation. War, then, ceases to be merely an external instrument of policy and can become an internal necessity for the system. It is precisely here that contemporary warmongering fantasies take on a dimension far deeper than the day-to-day debates regarding Russia, Ukraine, NATO, or military spending.

The issue becomes civilizational. An order that has lost the capacity to envision its own future may begin to accept risks that, under normal circumstances, would seem unthinkable. It may end up conflating the survival of its own structures with the survival of civilization itself. And this confusion is among the most dangerous errors an elite can make. For institutions, economic regimes, and political systems are historical constructs; civilizations are far greater than they are. When a system begins to demand that civilization risk itself so that the system may survive, the relationship between means and ends has been completely inverted.

Signs of the end of an era

It is at this point that one can truly speak of self-destruction.

A civilization may begin to self-destruct not because it has ceased to believe, but because it has turned its own historical order into an object of absolute belief. And when leaders can no longer envision a future different from the one they administer; when war begins to replace politics; when fear supplants vision; when the preservation of institutions is deemed more important than the people for whom those institutions ought to exist – then we are facing not merely a political or economic crisis, but a profound crisis of civilization itself.

When an elite loses the capacity to imagine, create, and persuade, it may be a harbinger that an era is coming to an end. Yet, this does not necessarily mean the civilization is doomed. It may signify the exact opposite: that structures no longer capable of meeting present challenges are making way for other forms of organization, new ideas, and the recovery of principles that seemed forgotten. For the loss of a specific vision of order does not spell the end of human imagination. And when those in power can conceive of nothing beyond their own perpetuation, that may well be the very first sign that something new is drawing near.

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Who really owns Czech Vanadium? Investigators trace possible sanctions-evasion links to Russian oligarch Abramovich

First published in Deník N.

Until Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Czech Vanadium was among the European companies which clearly had Russian owners.

Since 2007, the company has been controlled through the Evraz group by Russian businessman Roman Abramovich, who is close to Russian leader Vladimir Putin.

The ferrovanadium producer was part of a chain through which vanadium ore mined in Russia reached Europe before being sent on to Abramovich’s factories in the US. Ferrovanadium is an alloy added to steel to help improve its properties. And Czech Republic accounts for six percent of global production.

But sanctions following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 forced the oligarch to sell up.

Evraz, the holding company in which Abramovich is the largest shareholder, supplied the Russian army, according to media reports. But Evraz denied this.

In 2024, the Abu Dhabi-based company Metco (now ‘Metco Holding’) became the sole shareholder in the Czech factory, but it is not clear who controls it.

Czech authorities and police suspect the transfer of the vanadium factory to a new parent company in the UAE may conceal the true owner. They are seeking to establish who is really behind the opaque company in the Persian Gulf, and whether it is still Roman Abramovich.

According to Deník N sources familiar with the investigation, specialists from Czech police bodies for organised crime (NCOZ) and the financial intelligence unit (FAÚ) are involved.

“Yes, we are investigating who is behind the company. There are many leads and the suspicion is clear that the company may still be backed by its former owners from Russia,” a source close to the investigation confirmed.

NCOZ spokesperson Jaroslav Ibehej declined to comment in more detail on the search for Czech Vanadium’s beneficial owner. “As a rule, we neither confirm nor deny what we are working on,” he said.

According to documents in the Czech judicial database, the company is formally controlled by one owner — a Dubai-based lawyer of Indian origin who provides nominee services for beneficial owners. The lawyer has been linked to money-laundering investigations in Ukraine and Moldova.

Apparent fake owner scheme

The officially declared owner of Czech Vanadium is Nikhil Skariah Kolekunnel. According to the ADGM free zone business register in the UAE, he is both the sole shareholder and director of Metco Holding.

However, the Gulf state’s database does not disclose so-called beneficiaries, who are entitled to the company’s profits and may also secretly control it.

Although the Czech judicial register lists Skariah as Czech Vanadium’s beneficial owner, this does not necessarily indicate the person exercising control in the background. For example, trustees of trust funds are also listed in the registers as beneficial owners.

The nature of Skariah Kolekunnel’s business suggests that he performs the specific role of an administrator, a so-called fiduciary — someone who accepts an ownership mandate and effectively manages another person’s assets.

He is a lawyer originally from India who founded two law firms in the UAE years ago. His companies represent large corporations and businesspeople who do not wish to publicly acknowledge ownership of a business.

“South Bridge Legal is an advisory firm for comprehensive business establishment in Dubai, Abu Dhabi and the UAE. Our highly experienced team has been active in the sector for more than 10 years, providing services tailored to the unique needs of every ambitious entrepreneur setting up companies in Dubai,” the company wrote on its website.

“We have all activities, which is tax management, tax consulting, accounting, corporate services, offshore company formation, free zone company formation…everything,” Skariah said in a recently published video on YouTube.

Metco Holding’s address in Abu Dhabi suggests it may be a shell company. And it is headquartered from a WeWork.

Moldova and Ukraine links

‘Skariah’, the name of the Indian administrator, had already emerged eight years ago in connection with the concealment of ownership structures during an investigation into the privatisation of Moldova’s national airline. At the time, Skariah appeared as the owner of the opaque company Gold Craft FZE, established in Dubai in 2015.

“On Monday 1 October 2018, one day before the privatisation agreement for Air Moldova was signed, a plane from Istanbul landed at Chișinău International Airport. One of the passengers, a 39-year-old man, was carrying nearly €2.6m in cash in his luggage. He declared the money to customs officers, which, according to the Office for the Prevention and Fight against Money Laundering, he had borrowed four days earlier from Gold Craft FZE in the United Arab Emirates,” the investigative outlet RISE Moldova reported.

It finds that Andrei Ianovici brought cash from Dubai, equivalent to tens of millions of Czech crowns. Later that day, he deposited the money in a bank, and it ended up in the accounts of Civil Aviation Group SRL. That company privatised Air Moldova, and Ianovici was one of its partners.

The true origin of the money was never established, leading local investigators to suspect that the money had not been earned legally. No charges were brought, however.

According to court records, Skariah was also involved in disputes in Ukraine, where Gold Craft FZE claimed ownership of an Ilyushin aircraft which the company allegedly purchased in 2017.

Skariah’s Russian-linked empire

However, the UAE-based lawyer was not the only individual to have emerged as an administrator of Czech Vanadium. Another is Sergei Gushchin.

A man of this name was formerly a prominent Russian businessman in rail freight transport and, although he withdrew from Russia three years ago, he appears on Ukrainian sanctions lists for supporting the Russian army.

Gushchin became a senior manager at PJSC TransContainer, a Russian rail freight carrier, after Evraz sold its stake. In the past, a quarter of the company was owned by the holding company of Abramovich.

Meanwhile another of Gushchin’s companies, Rail Service, formed a joint venture with Evraz in 2019 focused on the production of railway wheels.

According to a UAE register, Gushchin was a director and shareholder of Metco, which became Czech Vanadium’s parent company from 2022-23.

US credit-rating agency Moody’s shared data with Deník N that listed Gushchin as a recent beneficiary of Metco Holding and as the company’s director.

Výpis z americké databáze Moody’s, která vede Guščina jako zakladatele a držitele akcií.
Moody’s data shows Sergei Gushchin as Metco Holding’s director.

Russia’s ferrovanadium monopoly

Czech Vanadium’s revenues regularly exceed €81m, and in 2024 the company reported profits of more than €8m. This summer, the company sent over €0.6m of that sum to the Dubai company, the remaining funds staying in its retained earnings account.

Last year, the company recorded a modest €0.2m loss. Its accounts retained more than €12m in undistributed profits in total.

Czech Vanadium’s business remains closely tied to Russia. Last year alone, vanadium oxides or hydroxides worth nearly €82m were imported into the Czech Republic from the Russian Federation. Russia is effectively the sole supplier of the raw materials needed to produce ferrovanadium. According to the statistical office database, exports mainly go to the United States, as well as Germany and Taiwan.

Czech Vanadium did not reply to requests for comment or an explanation of its ownership structure.

It also did not answer the question of how a Dubai lawyer had bought the Czech company, which, according to some estimates, is worth more than €40m.

Company representatives have not responded to questions about its owners since 2024, when the company left the Evraz group structure.

Fake owner model in US

Jiří Skuhrovec, an analyst at Datlab, specialises in the global vetting of business partners. He says Abramovich uses a similar model for concealing ownership in the United States.

Sanctions also forced the Russian oligarch, who became better known through his former ownership of the British football club Chelsea, to withdraw from US companies. But Skuhrovec concluded that they were probably still controlled by people linked to Abramovich just like the factory in Czech Republic.

“We mapped the entire chain, from the Russian ore supplier through the Czech smelter to the final recipient: the US company Strategic Alloys LLC. Until recently, all three companies officially belonged to Abramovich, and all three are now controlled by people with links to his Evraz group. Abramovich may therefore still secretly control the entire supply chain for this strategic raw material. This would be a textbook case of sanctions circumvention, as well as an obvious security risk,” Skuhrovec said.

Findings led Datlab and Transparency International to submit a complaint to police. “We believe that the 16m Czech crowns (around €655,000) in distributed profit may have gone to Abramovich, who is on a sanctions list. That would constitute a criminal offence,” the analyst explained.

In brief:

  • Czech Vanadium, owned by Russian oligarch Roman Abramovich’s holding company until 2024, was taken over by Dubai-based company Metco Holding.
  • The company is opaque, and Czech authorities are investigating who actually owns the Czech factory. It is suspected it is still linked with former owner.
  • This would amount to circumventing sanctions imposed by the European Union.
  • Deník N and Datlab analyst Jiří Skuhrovec found that the company is backed by lawyer Nikhil Skariah Kolekunnel and Sergei Gushchin, who conduct business with Abramovich’s Evraz group.
  • Skariah has been linked to money laundering in Moldova and Ukraine. He has long covered for companies that are in fact owned by someone else.

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Gerhard Schröder: Putin’s Shameless Apologist Returns to Moscow to Celebrate His Master’s Birthday

As Russian missiles continue to devastate Ukraine, Germany’s disgraced former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder finds time to celebrate Vladimir Putin’s birthday. His latest Moscow pilgrimage is another reminder of the scandalous relationship between German political power and Russian energy money.

There are few spectacles quite so nauseating as a former democratic leader enthusiastically embracing the dictator whose aggression has brought death and destruction to Europe.

Yet there was Gerhard Schröder, Germany’s former Chancellor, grinning alongside Vladimir Putin at the Russian president’s 74th birthday celebrations, apparently oblivious to the moral obscenity of the occasion.

According to Reuters, Schröder visited Putin’s home in Moscow, where the two old friends were photographed smiling and shaking hands against a suitably cosy backdrop of traditional Russian furnishings.

How touching. While Ukrainians endure another year of Russian bombardment, Schröder enjoys the hospitality of the man responsible.

The photographs could scarcely provide a more damning illustration of how completely one of Germany’s former leaders has lost his moral compass.

From German Chancellor to Kremlin’s Favourite German

Schröder’s relationship with Putin has long since ceased to be merely an embarrassing personal friendship. It represents one of the most troubling examples of the revolving door between European political office and Russian commercial interests.

Having served as German Chancellor between 1998 and 2005, Schröder promptly embarked upon a remarkably lucrative second career in the Russian energy industry.

His involvement with Nord Stream was particularly scandalous.

While still Chancellor, Schröder championed the Baltic Sea gas pipeline linking Russia directly to Germany. Shortly after leaving office, he accepted a senior position with the consortium responsible for the project.

The arrangement raised an obvious and deeply uncomfortable question: had German energy policy been shaped exclusively by national interests, or had the groundwork also been laid for an exceptionally rewarding retirement?

There is no need to allege criminal wrongdoing to recognise the appalling appearance of a conflict of interest.

Schröder subsequently became chairman of the supervisory board of Rosneft, Russia’s state-controlled oil giant, in 2017.

This was three years after Putin’s illegal annexation of Crimea, when any responsible European statesman should already have understood the dangers of strengthening Moscow’s financial and strategic position.

Instead, Schröder continued to prosper within the Russian energy establishment.

Nord Stream: The Pipeline That Helped Putin

The Nord Stream controversy was never simply about natural gas.

It was about geopolitical leverage, European security and the extraordinary willingness of successive German governments to disregard warnings from Poland, Ukraine and the Baltic states.

Those countries understood precisely what Berlin preferred not to acknowledge: energy dependence on an authoritarian Russia was a strategic vulnerability.

Schröder became one of the most prominent advocates of precisely that dependence.

The Nord Stream 2 project subsequently became entangled in further controversy surrounding a foundation established in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, ostensibly for environmental purposes, which helped companies involved in completing the pipeline navigate American sanctions.

The foundation received €20 million from Nord Stream 2 AG. The affair prompted parliamentary scrutiny and questions about Russian corporate influence over German political decision-making.

Schröder’s involvement in the wider Nord Stream enterprise remains a central feature of that controversy.

No Shame, No Apology

Even Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 failed to produce the moral reckoning that Schröder’s conduct demanded.

He eventually relinquished his Rosneft position and declined a proposed Gazprom board appointment. His political reputation, however, was already in ruins.

The Bundestag stripped him of his parliamentary office and staff privileges. His own Social Democratic Party faced demands to expel him, although attempts to remove him ultimately failed.

Yet Schröder apparently remains incapable of recognising why his behaviour disgusts so many Germans.

His latest Moscow appearance has provoked outrage from Chancellor Friedrich Merz, whose government described the birthday visit as profoundly immoral. SPD co-leader Lars Klingbeil condemned it as completely unacceptable.

A Useful Friend for the Kremlin

There is another dimension to this disgrace.

Putin has previously suggested that Schröder could serve as an intermediary in negotiations concerning European security. European governments understandably rejected the proposal.

Why would Europe entrust its security to a man whose professional judgement has been so closely associated with Russian commercial interests?

Schröder’s latest Russian appointment, on the supervisory board of supermarket operator Hyperglobus, merely reinforces the impression that Moscow remains an irresistible attraction.

Perhaps he regards himself as a bridge between Russia and Germany. If so, it is a bridge built upon extraordinary political misjudgement.

Schröder is entitled to choose his friends. Europeans are equally entitled to judge him by those choices.

History will remember that, while Ukraine fought for its survival, a former German Chancellor travelled to Moscow to celebrate the birthday of Vladimir Putin, the man directing its destruction.

It is difficult to imagine a more humiliating epitaph for a once-powerful European statesman.

Main Image: Kremlin.ru
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Trump’s Diesel Deal with Putin Undermines US Sanctions Pressure as Ukraine Peace Talks Stall

President Donald Trump announced an agreement with Vladimir Putin on Friday, 9th October, under which Russia will resume substantial diesel exports to American and international markets, despite Washington’s existing sanctions against Moscow over its invasion of Ukraine.

According to Trump’s announcement following the telephone conversation, Russia will immediately release more than 300,000 tonnes of diesel, followed by 500,000 tonnes in November and another million tonnes shortly afterwards. A further three million tonnes could become available once Russian refining capacity permits.

The announcement was accompanied by a temporary authorisation from the US Treasury allowing transactions involving Russian diesel until 7 April 2027. It represents a substantial departure from the administration’s recent sanctions policy, which had sought to restrict Russian energy revenues and strengthen Washington’s negotiating position over Ukraine.

The timing is politically significant. Trump faces congressional midterm elections on 3 November, while diesel prices have become a growing economic concern for American businesses and consumers. The agreement gives the White House an opportunity to present itself as addressing fuel costs, although its practical effect on prices remains uncertain.

Russian diesel cannot resolve the global supply shortage

Trump has linked the proposed Russian deliveries to his administration’s efforts to restore energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz, arguing that the combined measures will produce a rapid reduction in diesel prices.

The disruption of maritime energy supplies following the confrontation with Iran has, however, created a problem considerably larger than the quantities Russia has initially promised.

The first two deliveries amount to approximately 800,000 tonnes. Even including the subsequent million tonnes, the announced volumes are modest relative to global consumption. Their arrival may provide temporary relief in individual markets, but there is little evidence that they could independently reverse the wider shortage.

Russia’s capacity to maintain larger exports is also uncertain.

Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries have disrupted production and contributed to restrictions on petroleum exports. Moscow has periodically imposed limits to protect domestic supplies, while damaged facilities require repairs before returning to normal operations.

The condition of those refineries is explicitly acknowledged in Trump’s announcement, which makes the proposed additional three million tonnes dependent on their recovery.

This introduces a further contradiction. Washington is seeking Russian diesel at precisely the moment Ukraine is attempting to reduce Moscow’s capacity to refine and export petroleum products.

The economic benefits of the agreement may consequently depend partly on developments in a military campaign that the United States has previously supported through intelligence cooperation with Kyiv.

Zelenskyy rejects sanctions relief without Russian concessions

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy responded critically to the agreement, describing the relaxation of economic pressure as a concession to Putin that had not been accompanied by any meaningful Russian commitment to de-escalation.

In his response to the American decision, Zelenskyy argued that Moscow would exploit renewed export revenues to prolong its war rather than make concessions towards a settlement.

Ukraine has indicated that it remains prepared to consider reciprocal measures concerning attacks on energy infrastructure. Such arrangements would require Russia to stop striking Ukrainian facilities in exchange for restrictions on Ukrainian operations against Russian energy targets.

No comparable undertaking was announced as part of Friday’s diesel agreement.

This distinction is central to Kyiv’s objections. Sanctions relief has traditionally been regarded as leverage to obtain changes in Russian behaviour. In the present arrangement, Moscow stands to receive additional commercial opportunities without publicly agreeing to alter its military campaign.

Lukoil negotiations raise further questions

The agreement also comes amid separate discussions concerning the international assets of Lukoil, Russia’s second-largest oil producer.

A recent account of negotiations involving American investors and Russian officials described proposals involving Lukoil’s overseas oilfields, refineries and distribution businesses.

The discussions have reportedly involved figures connected to Trump’s diplomatic efforts, including Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, alongside Russian representatives.

On Friday, another development complicated the proposed transaction when Carlyle withdrew from the competition to acquire Lukoil’s international assets, previously valued at approximately $22 billion.

The negotiations illustrate the extent to which potential commercial cooperation has entered the broader American-Russian relationship.

There is no verified evidence, however, that the diesel agreement was concluded to facilitate a particular acquisition or benefit individuals connected to Trump’s administration. The commercial negotiations and Friday’s sanctions decision remain separate developments unless further evidence establishes a direct connection.

Washington and Europe move in different directions

The American decision creates an additional complication for European sanctions policy.

On 7th October, EU ambassadors agreed to expand sanctions against Russia’s military-industrial network, approving 1,646 additional designations, many directed at the production of ballistic missiles used against Ukraine.

Britain has also introduced further restrictions on Russian oil-related businesses, tankers and financial intermediaries, reinforcing its stated objective of limiting Moscow’s ability to finance the war.

The contrast with Washington’s diesel authorisation is substantial. While European governments are attempting to restrict Russian petroleum revenues, the United States is providing a temporary legal route for renewed sales.

The development also recalls the difficulties already examined by EU Today in its reporting on sanctions enforcement against Russia’s shadow fleet, where differences in national restrictions and their application have complicated efforts to control petroleum exports.

For Moscow, the significance of Friday’s agreement extends beyond the immediate revenue generated by diesel sales. It establishes that the United States is prepared to relax particular economic restrictions before securing a settlement over Ukraine.

Whether the arrangement ultimately lowers American fuel prices will depend on production, shipping and international market conditions. The diplomatic consequence is already apparent: Russia has obtained an opportunity to restore part of its international energy trade without accepting publicly announced conditions concerning its war against Ukraine.

For Kyiv and European governments, the question is whether this remains a narrowly defined response to an energy shortage or marks the beginning of a broader American policy of separating commercial relations with Moscow from negotiations over Ukraine.

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