Ukraine has completed its Operation Vivaldi, aimed at protecting its fortress belt cities of Donetsk Oblast, which helped Kyiv preserve the region from Russian occupation for 12 years. Brigadier General Andrii Biletskyi, the commander of the Third Army Corps behind the operation, has reported that the fourth phase secured 101 km² of territory. Among the latest achievements is the liberation of three settlements—Zelena Dolyna, Lypove, and Kolodiazi.

The operation's main objective was to move Ukrainian troops into more advantageous defensive positions, Biletskyi said in the first days after the operation was made public. Vivaldi has now summed up the results of all four phases: Ukraine has established full control over 16 settlements, liberated 277 km² of territory, and inflicted 8,000 casualties on Russian forces.

Ukraine worked against Russia's deadline

During Operation Vivaldi, Ukrainian forces have prevented Russian troops from outflanking the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration and cutting the Kharkiv–Sloviansk highway, a key supply route for Ukraine’s forces in Donbas, Biletskyi says.

“We thwarted the offensive of the Zapad grouping and forced it to redeploy some units of the 1st Tank Army, which eased pressure on Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi,” Biletskyi announces.

Previously, the Institute for the Study of War noted that Russian President Vladimir Putin was confident that Russian forces would be able to seize the entire Donetsk Oblast by the end of 2026 — the Kremlin’s latest deadline for achieving this goal.

Ukraine’s military was on a mission to prevent this.

Season one: clearing russian infiltration groups

On 15 September 2026, Ukraine’s Third Army Corps announced Operation Vivaldi in northern Donetsk Oblast. During the first phase, Ukrainian troops cleared Russian groups from 75 km² of territory and liberated another 10 km².

The Third Army Corps said it had struck Russian supply routes and fuel infrastructure, prompting Russia to relocate its fuel and lubricant reserves to Voronezh Oblast. According to the corps, Russian forces lost around 1,500 troops, more than 12,000 drones, and hundreds of pieces of equipment.

Season two: liberation of Shandryholove and Derylove

On 20 September, the Third Army Corps reported the liberation of Shandryholove and Derylove and the establishment of full control over Drobysheve.

During the second season, Russian forces lost another 800 troops, bringing their total losses across the first two seasons to more than 3,000, according to the corps.

During the first two seasons of the operation, Ukrainian troops and attached units regained control of 125 km² of territory, including 50 km² that had been fully liberated.

The first phase of Vivaldi involved eliminating Russian groups that had infiltrated Ukrainian positions, explained the commander of a battalion in the 125th Brigade, callsign Darwin, per ArmyInform. After clearing those groups, the Defense Forces moved on to the operation’s second phase, using reconnaissance drones to detect Russian forces, he added.

For this, Ukraine used UAVs and ground robotic systems.

“The Third Army Corps was the first in the world to begin deploying ground robotic systems by air. Our heavy bombers deliver kamikaze ground robotic systems more than 10 kilometers behind enemy lines,” Biletskyi noted.

Season three: advances near Novе and Ridkodub

On 28 September, the Third Army Corps reported the liberation of Nove, Ridkodub, and Katerynivka and the restoration of control over Karpivka and Novomykhailivka. Ukrainian forces regained another 51 km² of territory, bringing the total area liberated since the start of the offensive to 176 km². Russian forces lost around 2,000 troops, and more than 250 were taken prisoner, the corps said in its summary of the operation’s third phase.

“The Russians were convinced that the main axis of attack was Shandryholove–Zelena Dolyna. This led it to squander its reserves in counterattacks along that very axis. The Russians slept through the actual strike, which was focused on capturing Nove,” Biletskyi said.

Operation Vivaldi aimed to disrupt Russia’s plans in Donetsk Oblast

The need for Operation Vivaldi arose amid Russian attempts to encircle Ukraine’s fortified belt in Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian forces conducted preparatory efforts aimed at degrading Russia’s offensive capabilities, including strikes on Russian drone operators, the Institute for the Study of War reported on 9 October.

Ukrainian counterattacks in the Lyman direction and east of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk were intended to complicate Russian efforts to seize the fortified belt in Donetsk Oblast, the report noted.

The corps advanced gradually, reclaiming small areas instead of attempting a large-scale breakthrough.

UK agency says Singaporean-flagged ship hit by projectile and sank; unclear if two statements refer to same vessel

U.S. forces destroyed an Iranian-affiliated dhow in the Gulf of Oman on October 6 after determining that the vessel was conducting surveillance and helping target American warships, U.S. Central Command...

A deadly Houthi attack on Riyadh’s international airport has highlighted how the Yemeni group is reframing its perceived “Iran proxy” role and shifting its regional focus to its ongoing battle against Saudi Arabia. The October 10 strike, in which 13 people were killed and hundreds injured, was the most violent episode on Saudi Arabian soil […]

The post Houthis reframing the narrative casting them as an Iranian proxy appeared first on Asia Times.

EU ministers have reviewed reforms introduced by Prime Minister Péter Magyar’s administration but left the Article 7 proceedings against Hungary unresolved. The European Commission has acknowledged significant progress while warning that further changes are required to restore the rule of law.

The European Union has maintained its Article 7 proceedings against Hungary despite acknowledging significant improvements in the country’s rule-of-law situation since Prime Minister Péter Magyar’s government took office earlier this year.

Ministers meeting at the General Affairs Council in Luxembourg on Tuesday, 13 October, reviewed reforms introduced by the Hungarian administration and received an updated assessment from the European Commission.

The proceedings, initiated by the European Parliament in September 2018, remain open eight years after concerns over judicial independence, corruption, media freedom and democratic accountability first prompted action under the EU treaties.

No decision was announced to terminate the procedure following the latest meeting.

Brussels acknowledges progress

European Commissioner Michael McGrath said ahead of the discussions that Hungary had made substantial progress towards addressing the institutional problems inherited from the administration of former prime minister Viktor Orbán.

Speaking in Luxembourg, McGrath acknowledged improved cooperation between the Hungarian government and European institutions.

However, he also indicated that the reform process remained incomplete, noting that the new administration had been in office for only several months.

The Commission’s assessment reflects the changing relationship between Budapest and Brussels following Magyar’s election victory and the subsequent introduction of reforms intended to restore judicial and institutional independence.

As EU Today reported in June, the change of government created an opportunity to resolve long-standing disputes over the condition of Hungary’s democratic institutions and the suspension of European funding.

The latest Council discussions indicate that the EU is prepared to recognise reforms already undertaken without automatically treating them as sufficient to close the Article 7 procedure.

An eight-year institutional dispute

The European Parliament initiated the proceedings in 2018 after raising concerns over developments affecting Hungary’s constitutional system, judicial independence, corruption safeguards and civil society.

Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union provides mechanisms for responding when a member state is considered at risk of seriously breaching the Union’s fundamental values.

Under its preventive provisions, the Council can determine whether there is a clear risk of such a breach.

More severe measures, including the possible suspension of certain membership rights, require additional procedures and higher institutional thresholds.

Hungary’s case has remained within the preventive stage, with successive Council meetings examining the country’s legal and political developments.

The Council’s account of the 13 October meeting confirms that Hungarian representatives presented measures intended to address concerns raised by the European Parliament and member states during earlier proceedings.

The Commission also briefed ministers on its latest assessment.

The meeting did not produce a formal finding that the outstanding concerns had been fully resolved.

Magyar faces the consequences of Orbán’s legacy

Since assuming office, Magyar has sought to reverse elements of the institutional structure established during Orbán’s lengthy premiership.

The reforms have included measures concerning public administration, judicial accountability and the relationship between national institutions and European law.

The new government has also attempted to improve relations with Brussels after years of disputes that affected EU budget decisions, sanctions policy and cooperation over Ukraine.

EU Today has previously examined Magyar’s programme of institutional renewal and the political difficulties involved in changing institutions shaped by the previous administration.

Reforming legislation does not necessarily transform the institutions responsible for applying it.

Judicial appointments, regulatory structures, public procurement procedures and anti-corruption enforcement may all require additional measures before the effects of reform can be fully assessed.

The European Commission must therefore consider not only the laws adopted by the new government but also whether the institutions concerned operate independently and effectively.

EU funding remains a separate question

The Article 7 proceedings are closely associated with wider disputes over Hungary’s access to European funding, although the relevant legal mechanisms are different.

During Orbán’s administration, the Commission and Council used financial conditionality procedures to restrict access to certain EU resources because of concerns affecting the protection of the Union’s budget.

Magyar’s reforms have opened the possibility of reversing some of those restrictions.

As EU Today reported in September, the Commission moved towards releasing €4.2 billion following changes intended to address rule-of-law concerns.

The financial decisions involve compliance with conditions attached to EU funding and can proceed independently of the Article 7 mechanism.

Consequently, the release of money does not automatically establish that all the institutional problems identified in the original parliamentary proceedings have been resolved.

Likewise, the continuation of Article 7 does not necessarily prevent the Commission from recognising progress under separate funding arrangements.

Who can end the proceedings?

McGrath addressed the possibility of terminating the procedure during remarks before Tuesday’s meeting.

He explained that the Commission could provide its assessment but did not have unilateral authority to bring the Article 7 process to an end.

In his recorded statement in Luxembourg, the Commissioner pointed to the responsibilities of the European Parliament, which initiated the case, and the Council, which has conducted the subsequent examination.

The institutional arrangements mean that improved relations between the Commission and the Hungarian government cannot by themselves dispose of the proceedings.

The Council must consider the reforms and the remaining concerns within the framework established by the treaties.

Political agreement among member states will consequently be required to determine how the process develops.

A changed relationship with Brussels

The latest discussions take place against a substantially different political background from previous years.

Budapest has recently withdrawn objections to further steps in Ukraine’s EU accession negotiations following Ukrainian legislation addressing educational rights for Hungarian speakers and other national minorities.

The change has removed one obstacle to enlargement negotiations and reflects the government’s more cooperative approach towards other EU institutions.

Nevertheless, Hungary’s position on foreign policy and enlargement is distinct from the assessment of its domestic rule-of-law arrangements.

The Council’s examination remains focused on the institutional concerns that led to the procedure being initiated.

The Irish presidency’s summary of the October Council meeting confirms that ministers received an update rather than reaching a new formal determination.

The proceedings therefore remain open while the Commission and member states continue examining the measures introduced by Magyar’s administration.

The coming decisions will establish how European institutions respond when a new government undertakes reforms intended to reverse the conduct that originally led to action under Article 7.

For Hungary, the outcome will influence its relationship with Brussels well beyond the immediate debate over EU funding. For the Union, it will demonstrate how its rule-of-law procedures operate when political circumstances change and the member state concerned begins addressing previously identified institutional problems.

A new dress-code dispute in Azerbaijan’s public schools has sparked protests by parents and students after reports that girls wearing hijabs, or Islamic headscarf, were turned away from classes. The protests come after a new ban on clothing deemed incompatible with the secular nature of education.

José Niño Unfiltered | October 11, 2026

In September 2026, Ansar Allah, derisively labeled as the Houthis in Western foreign policy circles, redrew the map of western Yemen in a matter of days. Its fighters swept down the Red Sea coast, seized Mocha on September 10, then pushed through Dhubab and took Mayyun Island at the heart of the Bab el-Mandeb strait the following day, consolidating control over Yemen’s entire Red Sea coastline and roughly 5,400 square kilometers of newly gained territory. Yemen’s Saudi-backed government answered on October 4 when Presidential Leadership Council head Rashad al-Alimi announced Operation Dawn of Yemen, vowing to keep fighting until the country was “liberated from the grip of the terrorist militia,” with 100 Saudi coalition fighter jets providing air cover and Ansar Allah firing missiles at targets inside the kingdom in response.

Washington reached for a familiar script. Secretary of State Marco Rubio branded Ansarh an Iranian proxy, and Tehran fired back on September 9. Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei wrote on X, “Marco Rubio’s lies cannot replace facts. Ansarallah is an independent Yemeni actor that makes its own decisions; it takes orders from no one and acts as nobody’s proxy.”

On the question of Ansar Allah’s relationship to Iran, the record sides with those who emphasize the movement’s homegrown roots. In the 1980s, Zaydi religious networks in the northern province of Saada organized study groups and summer camps to resist the Wahhabi and Salafi outreach that Saudi money spread across the region. Around 1992, those networks crystallized as the Believing Youth, an educational and social revival movement dedicated to Zaydi theology and the preservation of a tradition stretching back a millennium. Saada’s poverty and its chronic neglect by Sanaa fueled the grievances that eventually became a military force.

Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi sharpened that network into a political cause after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. He accused President Ali Abdullah Saleh of running a corrupt government that neglected Saada, sidelined Zaydis, and surrendered Yemeni sovereignty to Saudi and American interests. His followers adopted a chant that read in full: “God is Great, Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse the Jews, Victory to Islam.” The chant named foreign powers, but its domestic meaning was clear: Yemeni authorities understood that a movement chanting “death to America” today could be chanting “death to the president” tomorrow. Palestine and the Second Intifada also featured prominently in Hussein’s sermons, which cast Israel as an occupying power and the United States as its enabler. The antisemitism in the Yemeni resistance’s messaging reflected a long-held hostility to Jewry’s machinations among the Yemeni population.

Saleh went to war against the movement in 2004, and his forces killed Hussein on September 10. Leadership passed to his younger brother Abdul-Malik al-Houthi. During the 2011 uprising the movement took the name Ansar Allah and pitched itself as a national force against corruption and inequality.

The episode that best exposes the proxy myth unfolded in September 2014. Iranian representatives reportedly urged Ansar Allah not to seize the capital, and Ansar Allah marched in anyway. HuffPost broke the story in April 2015, citing American officials familiar with the intelligence. One official told the outlet “It is wrong to think of the Houthis as a proxy force for Iran.” National Security Council spokeswoman Bernadette Meehan added: “It remains our assessment that Iran does not exert command and control over the Houthis in Yemen.” The Wilson Center also called attention to the aforementioned restraint Iran advocated for: “In 2014, Iran reportedly advised the Houthis against taking over Sanaa, but they pressed on.”

Thomas Juneau of the University of Ottawa built the academic foundation for this view. His 2016 study in International Affairs argued that “the Houthis are not Iranian proxies; Tehran’s influence in Yemen is marginal.” In a Washington Post op-ed that same year, he wrote: “It is simply inaccurate to claim that the Houthis are Iranian proxies.” Juneau has since acknowledged deeper cooperation, yet he told The Iran Primer : “The Houthis are fiercely nationalist, and do not take orders from Iran. Instead, they work together, closely, on the basis of their common interests.”

Helen Lackner, among the most respected Western scholars of Yemen, put it plainly on Democracy Now: “The Houthis are not Iranian proxies. They are not Iranian servants. They don’t do what the Iranians tell them to do. They make their own decisions.” She described how the alliance functions: “If their decisions and their policies coincide with those of Iran, then there’s no issue. But if they don’t, they don’t do it.”

Allison Minor challenged the proxy narrative directly in a Brookings essay: “Rigorous definitions of the term ‘proxy’ require that the sponsor has some means of controlling the proxy, as this is what differentiates a proxy from a partner/ally. In truth, the Houthis are not an Iranian proxy, even though they benefit from Iranian support.” Minor pointed to the unilateral ceasefire Ansar Allah declared with Saudi Arabia in 2019, even as Iran sought escalation, and stressed their possession of independent revenue, local arms production, and diverse supply lines as other indicators of autonomous production and decision-making.

Others well-versed in Yemeni affairs reached the same conclusion years earlier. Saudi journalist and filmmaker Safa al-Ahmad, who reported from inside Ansar Allah territory, told PBS Frontline that Iran’s ties to the group were “vastly overblown” and that “the Iranians can’t just pick up the phone and tell the Houthis what to do.”

Even the hawkish Institute for the Study of War agrees. Its September 18 update stated, “The Houthis are not an Iranian proxy, although their objectives often overlap with Iran’s strategic interests.” It added, “The Houthis are an independent partner of Iran and may resist potential Iranian pressure to halt their campaigns, however.”

None of this means Iran sits on the sidelines. The Associated Press reported in late September that officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps helped Ansar Allah with planning during the coastal offensive. Yet researcher Nicholas Brumfield told Al Jazeera that the campaign reportedly involved 76,000 Yemeni fighters, raised “using their own governance apparatuses,” and that mounting evidence points to Ansar Allah boasting a burgeoning domestic arms industry.

Ansar Allah ultimately behaves as a national liberation movement that shares many of Iran’s enemies and welcomes Iranian assistance, yet it charts its own course whenever its interests diverge. It does not need Tehran to steer it any more than any serious and credible resistance movement needs a foreign master. It grew from Yemeni grievances, and it will naturally seek allies such as Iran that oppose the same aggressive powers—Israel and the United States—that work tirelessly to destabilize West Asia. Movements like it already shake the foundations of the regional order. If the current momentum holds, Ansar Allah could reshape not only Yemen but also the Saudi provinces of Asir, Jizan and Najran, lands that many Yemenis still regard as their own and that Saudi Arabia locked down after the 1934 war between the two countries.

What started as a revolt against a corrupt president in a neglected mountain province has become a war that stretches from Taiz to Riyadh. With Ansar Allah astride the Bab el-Mandeb and Iran pressing on the Strait of Hormuz, two of the world’s most vital chokepoints now sit within reach of forces Washington cannot push back. If Asir, Jizan and Najran ever slip from Riyadh’s grip, historians will trace the new map back to Saada, not to Tehran.

The post A New U.S.-Israeli Attack on Iran Is Only a Matter of Time appeared first on South Front.

Graham Linehan, the Father Ted creator, may have been unfairly arrested by the Metropolitan Police because of his gender-critical views, the police watchdog has said.

The post Metropolitan Police May Have Unfairly Arrested Linehan Over Gender Critical Views, Says Watchdog appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.

Dozens have been crushed to death while Israel prevents reconstruction, leaving families with an impossible choice: to live in war-torn structures at risk of caving in, or flimsy tents exposed to the elements.

President Donald Trump says he has struck a deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin to import large amounts of diesel fuel into the United States—apparently hoping to lower fuel prices in the weeks before the midterm elections.

The exact terms of that agreement remain somewhat unclear. The White House has not said when the purchases will be made, what prices will be paid, or who will be paying (private companies or taxpayers), though the Treasury announced that it would be issuing a "temporary general license to allow the supply of Russian diesel to the global market." Reporting by The New York Times suggests that investors with ties to the administration are most likely to profit. Because diesel prices are determined by a global market, it's also far from certain that the Russian gas would make much of a dent in American prices.

However, this much is clear: If Trump follows through with this "deal," he will have violated two federal laws recently passed by Congress—one of which he signed just weeks ago.

The more significant of those two laws is the Ending Importation of Russian Oil Act, which passed the House with a 413–9 vote and was unanimously approved by the Senate. President Joe Biden signed that bill into law on April 8, 2022. The law is an outright ban on Russian energy products, including diesel fuel.

The law also lays out the process for lifting the ban on imports. The president must tell Congress that Russia has "reached an agreement to withdraw Russian forces and cease military hostilities in Ukraine" and has recognized "the right of the Ukrainian people to independently and freely choose their own government."

There is also a clear timeline for lifting the ban. Any termination of the ban requires a 90-day waiting period, during which time Congress has the opportunity to block the change.

Obviously, Russia has not withdrawn from Ukraine. Even if it had, the White House has not gone through the necessary process to notify Congress, nor waited the necessary 90 days.

The law does not allow a president to ignore it if fuel prices are high and an election is approaching. It does not allow a president to ignore it if he starts an illegal war in another part of the world that causes fuel prices to spike.

Trump's attempt to disregard that law has drawn a bipartisan rebuke from members of Congress. A group of seven senators—three Democrats and four Republicans—issued a joint statement this week saying that Trump's deal "runs directly counter to" the 2022 law.

Sen. Thom Tillis (R–N.C.), one of the senators who joined that statement, said on Sunday that there is "a legitimate case for saying the president's not following the law."

The second law at play is the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act, named for the late senator and passed earlier this year. Among other things, it authorizes the president to levy tariffs of up to 100 percent against countries that buy Russian crude oil and natural gas. The intent is clear: to prevent Russia from being able to finance its war against Ukraine by selling energy commodities onto the global market. Trump signed it into law last month.

Lawmakers on both sides of the aisle have also pointed to that law in the days since Trump announced his deal to buy Russian diesel.

"Now is the time to use those sanctions to squeeze Putin's war machine, not reward a dictator by putting more money in his hands while he continues targeting and killing Ukrainian civilians," Rep. Don Bacon (R–Neb.) posted on X this week. Rep. Steny Hoyer (D–Md.) said it was "outrageous" for Trump to be buying energy from Russia after signing a bill that could be used to punish other countries for doing the same.

The White House could argue that, in this case, Trump is merely violating the spirit of the law rather than the letter of it. Even so, this is blatantly hypocritical.

The hypocrisy runs deep. The Trump administration has spent much of its second term trying to restrict trade and downplay the advice of economists who have warned that doing so would raise prices. Now, Trump is once again seeking imports as a means to ease high prices—as he has done with beef and other products. Perhaps the White House should apply this general principle more broadly, and in circumstances where doing so would not violate federal laws.

Some of the president's allies are now trying to downplay these violations of federal law. Conservative pundit Mollie Hemingway says Trump is merely trying to "put the American people first" by addressing rising gas prices.

Sorry, but no. The president is not allowed to disregard federal laws because he believes it will lower gas prices in swing states.

You can, of course, criticize those laws for being misguided. Trade is generally good, and erecting barriers to the flow of goods tends to be costly. Trump could ask Congress to repeal these laws. He cannot deliberately ignore them.

If the "deal" with Russia comes to fruition, it will further erode what little power Congress retains within America's democratic system. If a president is not bound by the laws Congress has passed, then the legislature might as well not exist at all.

The post Trump's Plan To Buy Russian Diesel Would Violate Federal Law appeared first on Reason Magazine.

A Receita Federal deve ser vista sobretudo como ferramenta estratégica do Estado brasileiro, e não só como órgão de arrecadação e fiscalização. De acordo com o ministro da Fazenda, Dario Durigan, o grande volume de informações reunidas pelo Fisco pode orientar políticas públicas, aperfeiçoar mecanismos de controle e aumentar a eficiência da atuação estatal.

Durigan participou, nesta quarta-feira (14), da abertura do 4º Congresso de Direito Tributário e Aduaneiro.

Notícias relacionadas:

• Durigan prevê envio de MP do Imposto Seletivo após eleições.
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• Durigan: financiadora do Dark Horse recebeu verba do crime organizado.

“Vejo a Receita como plataforma de inteligência do Estado brasileiro, mais do que um mero órgão que tem que coletar tributo.”

A avaliação do ministro tem por base quatro frentes relacionadas à Receita, destacadas em seu discurso: 

• atuação como infraestrutura crítica do Estado; 
• uso de dados para subsidiar políticas públicas; 
• modernização da fiscalização por meio da análise de informações agregadas; 
• incorporação de inteligência artificial.

"A Receita precisa contribuir mais para o desenho de políticas públicas", acrescentou.

Segundo ele, as informações produzidas pelo órgão podem auxiliar Executivo, Legislativo, Judiciário e órgãos de controle em tomadas de decisão.

Fiscalização

O ministro defendeu mudança de paradigma, com maior uso de dados para identificar padrões e anomalias. Como exemplo, citou o trabalho conjunto da Receita com a Agência Nacional do Petróleo, Gás Natural e Biocombustíveis (ANP), ao monitorar os efeitos da desoneração de combustíveis.

"A fiscalização que nós estamos pedindo é uma fiscalização que olha para o dado agregado", afirmou, ao destacar, nesse contexto, o potencial da inteligência artificial.

De acordo com ele, o volume de dados que passará a ser compartilhado entre União, estados e municípios, com a implementação da reforma tributária, ampliará significativamente a capacidade analítica da Receita.

Carbono Oculto

Como exemplo das possibilidades abertas por esse modelo, o ministro citou a Operação Carbono Oculto, investigação que apura estruturas de lavagem de dinheiro usadas para ocultar os reais controladores de empresas ligadas ao setor de combustíveis, incluindo a aquisição de uma das maiores distribuidoras do país. 

Em uma das fases da operação, foram identificadas movimentações de cerca de R$ 11 bilhões por diferentes camadas da estrutura investigada.

A investigação revelou o uso de fintechs e de pelo menos 40 fundos de investimento para ocultação patrimonial e blindagem de recursos, dificultando a identificação dos reais controladores dos ativos e da origem do dinheiro utilizado nas operações.

Metodologia

Mais do que os resultados da operação, Durigan destacou o método empregado. Para ele, a análise de grandes bases de dados permite identificar estruturas que fogem aos padrões comuns do mercado e direcionar investigações de forma mais eficiente.

Durigan mencionou também, com base em uma apresentação feita pela equipe da Receita, estruturas associadas à Reag e ao Banco Master como exemplos de casos que chamaram a atenção por apresentarem características atípicas.

Para o ministro, a combinação entre análise de dados, integração de informações e inteligência artificial pode ampliar a capacidade do Estado de formular políticas públicas e aperfeiçoar a fiscalização.

"A Receita Federal pode mudar o patamar de funcionamento do Estado brasileiro para um patamar de um Estado eficiente e inteligente."

Suella Braverman says her Asian ancestry means she is British but not English. Clive Pinder argues that Englishness can be ethnic, cultural or both. If we demand assimilation, we should recognise the belonging it creates.

The post You Can Become English appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.

Escrito por Mehmet Perinçek en United World International. Traducción por el Dr. Enrique Refoyo.

El enfrentamiento entre la OTAN y Rusia desde la perspectiva de Turquía

Únete a nosotros en Telegram , X y VK .

Escríbenos: info@strategic-culture.su

El profesor asociado Mehmet Perinçek, autor de la UWI, historiador y politólogo, participó como invitado en directo en el canal turco Ulusal Kanal para analizar el aumento de las tensiones entre Europa y Rusia y las razones que las subyacen.

Compartimos el programa con nuestros lectores.

La «amenaza rusa» como pretexto para la agresión

La «amenaza rusa» se está convirtiendo cada vez más en un tema de debate político en Europa. ¿Qué está ocurriendo y qué hay detrás de ello?

El discurso en Europa sobre una «amenaza rusa» no se ajusta a la realidad. Europa está inventando una supuesta amenaza rusa con el fin de ocultar su propia agresión hacia Eurasia y Rusia. Si echamos la vista atrás a Hitler y a la Segunda Guerra Mundial, ¿qué dijo Hitler cuando actuó contra Checoslovaquia? Las vidas de los alemanes en Checoslovaquia estaban en peligro, y Alemania tuvo que enviar tropas y ocupar Checoslovaquia para protegerlos. Afirmó que el comunismo se estaba extendiendo y que Alemania tenía que eliminar esa amenaza de raíz. Así pues, incluso la Alemania de Hitler intentó disimular sus ambiciones imperialistas y agresivas y fabricar un pretexto para justificarlas.

Observamos cómo resurgen tendencias similares en la Europa actual, con Merz, Macron y otras figuras destacadas del panorama europeo. Cuando analizamos los hechos, lo que realmente vemos no es a Rusia avanzando hacia Europa, sino a Europa y al bloque atlántico avanzando hacia Rusia.

La expansión de la OTAN: hacia Rusia y los demás

A principios de la década de 1990, cuando la Unión Soviética se desmoronaba, los dirigentes soviéticos, bajo el liderazgo de Gorbachov, afirmaron en esencia: disolveremos el Pacto de Varsovia, pero la OTAN no debe expandirse hacia el este. Los dirigentes occidentales dieron garantías verbales en ese sentido. Sin embargo, no cumplieron esas promesas. Por el contrario, la OTAN se expandió hacia el este, en dirección a Rusia, en seis ocasiones y, finalmente, llegó a las fronteras rusas.

Este intento de rodear a Rusia tiene paralelismos en otros lugares: en el Mediterráneo oriental y la cuestión de Chipre, en la cuestión de Taiwán, en el estrecho de Ormuz y en Yemen. En todas estas regiones, observamos intentos por parte de las mismas fuerzas de rodear, contener y asfixiar a Irán, China y Turquía.

«No se puede descartar la posibilidad de una guerra a gran escala»

Así pues, lo que usted está diciendo es que no hay fundamento alguno en esa afirmación de que Rusia no está preparando realmente un ataque. Por el contrario, usted sostiene que el bloque atlántico está tratando de traspasar las líneas rojas de Rusia y expandirse hacia el este, en dirección a Rusia. Entonces, permítame plantear la pregunta de otra manera. ¿Dispone Rusia actualmente de la capacidad militar y los recursos necesarios para abrir un segundo frente contra la OTAN?

No se puede descartar la posibilidad de tal guerra o enfrentamiento. Es necesario subrayar esto.

Alemania, Gran Bretaña, Francia y Polonia también deberían incluirse aquí, ya que vemos que se están preparando para una posible guerra con Rusia. Se están rearmando rápidamente. Están aumentando sus presupuestos militares y de defensa. Al mismo tiempo, están llevando a cabo campañas de propaganda y otras actividades destinadas a preparar a la sociedad para la guerra. Están diciendo a los jóvenes europeos que deben estar preparados para la guerra. La industria europea también se está orientando cada vez más en esa dirección.

Los principales fabricantes de automóviles y otras grandes empresas occidentales están empezando a invertir en la industria de la defensa. Volkswagen, por ejemplo, se ha puesto en contacto con el ejército alemán con propuestas para fabricar equipamiento militar. La francesa Renault se ha lanzado a la producción de drones. Añadimos a esta lista a Rheinmetall y otras grandes empresas. Esto demuestra claramente que Europa y las potencias atlantistas se están preparando para la guerra. Por lo tanto, la posibilidad de una guerra de este tipo sí existe.

Simulaciones de guerra por parte de EE. UU.

Si se produjera un conflicto de este tipo, también habría que señalar que la fuerza militar de Europa y su capacidad militar general son bastante débiles. Europa no está preparada para una guerra de este tipo. Y esta no es meramente nuestra valoración. Los propios expertos militares occidentales, los funcionarios occidentales e incluso algunas de las fuerzas que abogan por la confrontación reconocen que Europa no está realmente en condiciones de hacer frente a Rusia en el ámbito militar.

Tampoco, desde el punto de vista social, está la población europea preparada para la guerra. Además, por supuesto, está el hecho de que Rusia es una potencia nuclear. Asimismo, se han llevado a cabo numerosas simulaciones de guerra en EE. UU., incluidas aquellas realizadas o encargadas por el propio Gobierno estadounidense. Estas simulaciones han concluido que, en una guerra convencional no nuclear, EE. UU. sería derrotado por Rusia y China.

Hay otro factor que debemos tener en cuenta. En cualquier enfrentamiento armado con Rusia, especialmente en caso de una intervención militar dirigida contra Rusia, también existe la posibilidad de que se vean implicados los aliados y países amigos de Rusia.

Una posible guerra que se extienda desde Rusia y la OTAN

¿Qué quiere decir exactamente con eso? ¿Podría explicarlo con más detalle?

Una guerra entre Rusia y la OTAN significaría, en efecto, el inicio de una guerra mundial. No se limitaría a Rusia y la OTAN, sino que daría lugar a un conflicto mucho más amplio que abarcaría el mundo entero. En un enfrentamiento de tal magnitud, los países del lado euroasiático también se verían involucrados. Al igual que existe solidaridad económica entre ellos, países como Irán y otros no permanecerían indiferentes ante una guerra de esta magnitud. Inevitablemente surgirían otros frentes.

Como he dicho antes, la guerra en Ucrania y la cuestión de Taiwán no pueden separarse realmente entre sí. Tampoco pueden separarse la cuestión de Taiwán y el estrecho de Ormuz o el Mediterráneo oriental.

Por eso podemos afirmar que Europa, con su actual potencia y capacidades militares, no está preparada para hacer frente a Rusia. Una vez más, son los propios responsables occidentales quienes lo afirman.

Guerra justa e injusta

Existe otro factor: la distinción entre una guerra justa y una guerra injusta. No creo que un joven europeo, o por ejemplo un trabajador turco que viva en Europa, esté especialmente dispuesto a ir a morir al frente ruso en defensa de los intereses imperiales de Alemania. Los jóvenes rusos, por su parte, lucharían con una motivación mucho mayor si creyeran que están defendiendo su propia patria.

Así pues, el principal problema al que se enfrenta Europa hoy en día no es la afirmación de que Rusia esté a punto de atacar. Más bien, Europa carece de un enfoque político común y de un mecanismo de seguridad común capaz de gestionar tal confrontación o de librar una guerra contra Rusia u otro país. ¿Es eso lo que está diciendo?

Sí. Y están intentando crear ese mecanismo y la legitimación necesaria para ello. Pero se enfrentan a una fuerte oposición dentro de sus propios países. Lo hemos visto reflejado en las recientes elecciones en Alemania. En Suiza se están celebrando referéndums sobre la cuestión de la neutralidad. Macron se acerca al final de su carrera política, mientras que Le Pen y Mélenchon están ganando terreno.

El enfrentamiento entre la OTAN y Rusia desde la perspectiva de Turquía

Usted argumentó que, si estallara una guerra entre la OTAN y Rusia, esta no se limitaría a esas dos partes, sino que se extendería. Y mencionó algunos países. Esto nos lleva a la perspectiva de Turquía.

Cuando las potencias atlánticas intentan rodear a Rusia a través de Ucrania y el Mar Negro, también están rodeando a Turquía. Sus planes en el Mar Negro no pueden separarse de sus planes en el Mediterráneo Oriental ni de aquellos destinados a socavar la soberanía de la República Turca del Norte de Chipre (RTNC).

Del mismo modo, el sistema de dominación basado en el dólar que pretenden imponer a Turquía es similar al que pretenden imponer a Rusia. Por lo tanto, los intereses objetivos de Turquía la sitúan claramente en el bando opuesto al bloque atlántico. Si el bloque atlántico se fortaleciera y lograra llevar a cabo sus planes, ello también perjudicaría la soberanía de la TRNC. Debilitaría a Turquía en el equilibrio de fuerzas del Mediterráneo Oriental y fortalecería al bando contrario.

Un bloque atlántico más fuerte también implica un mayor apoyo a Israel. Significaría un aumento de la presión y las amenazas dirigidas por Israel contra Turquía, Siria, Palestina, el mundo árabe, el mundo islámico e Irán. Esto nos lleva de vuelta a lo que dije al principio: el Mar Negro y el Mediterráneo Oriental forman parte del mismo frente estratégico. La cuestión de Taiwán y el estrecho de Ormuz también forman parte de ese mismo frente más amplio. Desde ese punto de vista, los intereses objetivos de Turquía residen en oponerse al bloque atlántico.

La posición y la alineación adecuadas para Turquía

Pero hay algo que añadir aquí: existe una forma de evitar esta escalada. El mundo no tiene por qué encaminarse hacia una gran guerra. Si Turquía adopta la posición adecuada y se establece una alineación estratégica entre Turquía, Rusia, China e Irán, el poder económico creado por dicha agrupación, la disuasión militar que podría generar y la red más amplia de alianzas internacionales que podría atraer contribuirían a evitar tal guerra.

El bloque atlántico ya se encuentra en declive económico. Cada día que pasa pierde legitimidad a nivel internacional. Además, está cada vez más dividido internamente. Acontecimientos como el auge de la AfD en Alemania, el creciente apoyo a Le Pen y Melenchon en Francia, y las contradicciones entre Europa y EE. UU. lo demuestran. Todo el mundo es testigo de su fracaso en Irán y Palestina.

En ese sentido, la cuestión principal para Turquía, tanto para resolver sus propios problemas económicos y de seguridad como para ayudar a evitar que el mundo se vea arrastrado a otra gran guerra, es construir esta alianza. Dicha alianza también permitiría a Turquía establecer relaciones con Occidente sobre una base más equilibrada y sólida.

Ataques ucranianos contra buques y oleoductos turcos

Y me gustaría plantearle una última pregunta. ¿Cómo afectarán las tensiones entre Europa y Rusia al campo de batalla en Ucrania? Se acerca el invierno. ¿Seguirán los países occidentales y europeos prestando apoyo militar a Ucrania? A corto plazo, ¿hacia dónde cree que se dirige la guerra?

El apoyo occidental va a continuar. Sin embargo, el ejército ucraniano no ha podido avanzar y, de hecho, se ha visto obligado a retroceder. Por eso estamos asistiendo a un aumento de los ataques con drones y de los atentados terroristas en el interior de Rusia, dirigidos contra objetivos civiles. Estos ataques están ejerciendo presión sobre Rusia para que responda con mayor dureza, tal vez incluso hasta el punto de plantearse el uso de armas nucleares a escala limitada y táctica. La intensificación de los ataques tras las líneas del frente se debe a que fracasan en el campo de batalla.

Creo que cabe esperar que la intensidad de la guerra aumente en el próximo período, si tenemos en cuenta los preparativos que está llevando a cabo Occidente.

Debo señalar un aspecto relativo a Turquía. Los buques turcos y algunos de los proyectos energéticos más importantes de Turquía, entre ellos TurkStream y Blue Stream, también han sido objeto de ataques por parte de Ucrania. Debemos reconocerlo. Rusia no es el único objetivo en este contexto. Fíjese en el mar Negro hoy en día: el comercio se ha paralizado prácticamente por completo. Los barcos ya no navegan de un lado a otro de la costa opuesta como solían hacerlo. Los tomates cultivados por los agricultores turcos y la maquinaria fabricada por los fabricantes turcos ya no pueden llegar a Rusia como antes. Del mismo modo, las materias primas y otros bienes que Turquía necesita ya no llegan desde la otra orilla del mar Negro como antes.

Por lo tanto, no podemos considerar esta guerra como algo que no tenga una repercusión directa en Turquía. Y el coste del conflicto para Turquía aumenta con cada día que pasa.

Publicado originalmente por  Geopolítica rugiente

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Viktor Yushchenko, Ukraine’s president from 2005 to 2010, has written an open letter to US President Donald Trump and posted it on Facebook on 14 October. Without naming it, the letter takes aim at the green light Washington gave Russian diesel trade five days earlier, after a call between Trump and Kremlin leader Vladimir Putin.

Russia banned its diesel exports in July amid a fuel crisis at home, after Ukrainian strikes on refineries had already cut those exports, and last week’s US waiver and the supply deal Trump announced with Moscow would put that fuel back on world markets while Russian strikes still kill Ukrainian civilians.

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Yushchenko wrote that Russian ballistic missiles, Iranian Shahed drones, and aerial bombs strike homes every day and night in Kyiv, Zaporizhzhia, Odesa, Dnipro, and Kharkiv. Whenever there is talk of “concessions” or deals with Putin, he wrote, the Kremlin answers with more missiles, more drones, and more bloodshed.

Yushchenko rejected calls for Ukraine to “restrain its strikes against the infrastructure that finances and sustains Russia’s war.”

“Money paid for Russian fuel is not an abstraction called ‘commerce.’ It finances an economy geared toward total war,” he wrote.

Nuclear arms, Pearl Harbor, and Iwo Jima

Yushchenko wrote that Ukraine inherited “one of the largest nuclear arsenals in the world” and agreed to give it up, trusting the words and signatures of great powers. In his view, by signing the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, America took on a moral responsibility toward Ukraine.

He compared trade in Russian energy to America’s trade with Imperial Japan, which included strategically important materials, before the US entered World War II. Washington hoped for years to avoid a wider war in the Pacific, he wrote, but economic pressure and diplomacy could not prevent catastrophe.

Japan attacked Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. America knows how dangerous it is to believe that trade can tame an aggressor, Yushchenko wrote, adding: “History taught us that lesson at a terrible price.”

He also named two men he called Ukrainian. One was Sergeant Michael Strank, whose family, Yushchenko wrote, came from Lemkivshchyna. The son of immigrants from Czechoslovakia, Strank took part in the famous raising of the US flag on Iwo Jima, according to the Marine Corps. The other was Oleksandr Silvashko, “a Ukrainian boy from the Cherkasy region,” who, Yushchenko wrote, was the first to embrace US Lieutenant William Robertson when American and Soviet forces met at the Elbe in April 1945.

“One does not negotiate with tyrants—one stops them,” Yushchenko concluded.

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