After months of arguments, a state judge in Alaska ruled in late June that retired teacher Dan J. Sullivan could run against incumbent Republican Sen. Dan S. Sullivan, overturning the ruling from the Alaska Division of Elections. A few months later, after the first round of balloting, state election officials finalized the top four candidates for Alaska’s unique system, and both Dan Sullivans advanced to the general election.
That Donald Trump and his political team are worried about the race is obvious, but what the president’s team is doing about it is another matter entirely.
Late Thursday, Trump’s Justice Department filed a preemptive lawsuit that intends to block certification of the Senate race — but only if the Republican incumbent loses while the rival with the similar name remains on the ballot.
As The Associated Press reported, the litigation kicks off “what many have feared could become a lengthy battle between the U.S. government and states over certifying an election where the president’s party is struggling.”
What’s more, it’s entirely possible that former Democratic Rep. Mary Peltola will win this race and the efforts by Trump’s DOJ will determine whether she’s seated — and which party ultimately holds a majority in the Senate.
The lawsuit is a dramatic escalation, but it didn’t come out of nowhere. At a White House event in early September, the president publicly urged Attorney General Todd Blanche to pursue a case in Alaska specifically focused on the competing candidates with nearly identical names.
Last week, Trump went further, claiming that federal authorities were “looking into” the matter and pushing assorted conspiracy theories for which there was no evidence. As recently as Wednesday of this week, the president used his social media platform to publish a statement that read, in part, “Dan S. Sullivan is leading by a lot, but this is CHEATING in an Election, and the Judge that allowed this to happen should be ashamed of himself. We are looking at powerful legal options to remove the fraudulent Daniel J. Sullivan Jr. from the Ballot, and holding the Democrats accountable for their Election Interference, in the pursuit of Justice and Fairness.”
The statement included obvious falsehoods — most recent polling in Alaska shows the Republican incumbent trailing, not “leading by a lot” — and there is nothing to suggest Democratic officials have engaged in “election interference,” other than championing their party’s nominee.
Nevertheless, there have long been concerns that the Trump administration might try to derail election results it doesn’t like, and the DOJ’s new lawsuit regarding Alaska suggests those concerns are well grounded.
This is a developing story. Check back for updates.
The post Trump administration sues to block possible Democratic win in Alaska Senate race appeared first on MS NOW.
Bulgaria will elect a president on Sunday, 25 October, in a contest that has become a test of the country’s relationship with Russia, its commitments to NATO and the European Union, and its response to deteriorating security in the Black Sea.
The Central Election Commission has registered 27 presidential and vice-presidential candidate pairs, although the contest is dominated by incumbent President Iliana Yotova and former caretaker prime minister Andrei Gyurov.
An opinion poll conducted by Market Links between 13 and 19 October placed Yotova ahead with 47.3 per cent support, compared with 30.6 per cent for Gyurov. However, low anticipated turnout makes a second round on 1 November highly likely.
Although Bulgaria’s presidency is primarily ceremonial, the office carries constitutional authority over defence, legislation and government formation. The election also comes six months after former President Rumen Radev secured a parliamentary majority and became prime minister, substantially changing the country’s political landscape.
Yotova, 62, became Bulgaria’s first female president in January 2026 after Radev resigned to enter parliamentary politics. Previously his vice-president, she is now seeking a five-year mandate of her own.
Her candidacy is supported by Radev’s Progressive Bulgaria coalition, which won 131 seats in the 240-member National Assembly in April, as well as the Bulgarian Socialist Party. Her running mate is Kiril Valchev, director-general of the Bulgarian News Agency.
Gyurov, an economist and former deputy governor of the Bulgarian National Bank, is supported by the pro-European reformist opposition, including We Continue the Change and Democratic Bulgaria. His vice-presidential candidate is Georgi Kandev, a former senior Interior Ministry official.
A third significant contender is Kostadin Kostadinov, leader of the nationalist Revival party, whose political platform includes opposition to Western military assistance for Ukraine and closer relations with Moscow. His running mate is European Parliament member Petar Volgin.
The election follows years of political instability, during which Bulgaria held eight parliamentary elections between 2021 and April 2026. Radev’s parliamentary victory ended a prolonged period of fragmented governments, but it has also raised questions about the concentration of political influence.
A Yotova victory would place both the presidency and the parliamentary majority within the same political camp. A Gyurov victory would instead create an institutional counterweight to Radev’s government.
Bulgaria joined NATO in 2004 and the European Union in 2007, but its relationship with Russia remains politically complicated.
Historical and cultural ties, including shared Orthodox traditions and the legacy of Bulgaria’s liberation from Ottoman rule, have influenced public attitudes towards Moscow. During the Cold War, Bulgaria was among the Soviet Union’s closest allies, and Russian influence continued after the collapse of communism, particularly through energy, business and political networks.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 exposed divisions over whether Sofia should provide military assistance to Kyiv or adopt a more cautious position.
Since returning to power as prime minister in May, Radev has advocated maintaining Bulgaria’s European commitments while seeking improved relations with Moscow. His government has halted military deliveries to Ukraine and taken a more restrictive approach to further sanctions against Russia.
Yotova has similarly emphasised negotiations as the means of ending the war and warned against further militarisation of the Black Sea. Her position appeals to voters concerned that escalating confrontation could expose Bulgaria to additional security and economic risks.
Gyurov represents a more explicitly Euro-Atlantic political orientation, arguing for stronger Western alignment and institutional reform.
The contest therefore concerns not whether Bulgaria will formally leave its existing alliances, which would require decisions far beyond presidential authority, but how actively it participates in their policies towards Russia.
The security debate has intensified following a series of drone attacks against merchant vessels operating near Bulgarian and Romanian waters in October.
According to a maritime threat assessment published by Ambrey, three commercial ships were struck on 5–6 October within the exclusive economic zones of the two NATO members. Two sank, marking a substantial escalation in the geographic exposure of commercial shipping.
Ambrey assessed that Russian forces were highly likely responsible and that the vessels had been targeted because of their connections to Ukrainian grain exports.
The attacks have raised concerns about navigation, maritime insurance, food exports and the potential for further incidents involving NATO member states.
Bulgaria’s position on the western Black Sea coast gives these developments particular significance. Its ports, maritime infrastructure and commercial shipping depend on maintaining secure access to international sea routes.
As EU Today previously reported, the expansion of Russian attacks into areas close to NATO territory creates difficult questions for coastal governments seeking to protect commercial interests without becoming direct participants in the conflict.
For Bulgarian voters, maritime security is no longer simply an aspect of the war taking place elsewhere. It has become a question of national security, economic vulnerability and the government’s capacity to respond.
The campaign has also been influenced by inflation and higher energy costs, particularly among lower-income households and residents of rural areas.
Bulgaria’s historical dependence on Russian energy has long complicated its foreign-policy choices. Although the country has pursued diversification, fluctuations in international energy markets continue to affect domestic prices and industrial competitiveness.
Economic concerns have acquired an additional dimension following Bulgaria’s adoption of the euro on 1 January 2026, making it the euro area’s 21st member.
The transition represents a significant stage in Bulgaria’s economic integration with the European Union, but it has occurred during a period of price pressures and uncertainty over household purchasing power.
The presidency does not determine energy policy or monetary decisions. Nevertheless, candidates’ positions on Russia, European integration and economic security form part of the wider political debate.
Under Article 93 of Bulgaria’s Constitution, a candidate must receive more than half the valid votes, with turnout exceeding 50 per cent of eligible voters, to win in the first round.
Neither requirement is expected to be easily satisfied. Turnout in the first round of the 2021 presidential election was approximately 38.6 per cent, reflecting the broader problem of electoral participation after repeated national votes.
If no candidate meets the constitutional requirements on Sunday, the two leading candidates will contest a runoff on 1 November.
Yotova enters the election with a substantial polling advantage, but Gyurov could benefit from opposition voters consolidating around his candidacy in the second round.
The result will determine more than the occupant of the presidential office. It will indicate whether Radev’s parliamentary dominance can be extended to the presidency, or whether voters prefer a political counterweight at a time when Bulgaria faces growing pressure to define its position between Moscow and its Western allies.
Any story about a family dispute is bound to be complex, but the politics surrounding Vivek Ramaswamy’s abhorrent attack ad are relatively straightforward. Amy Acton, the Democratic gubernatorial nominee in Ohio, was allegedly raped by her stepfather when she was a child.
Her Republican opponent, Ramaswamy, is trying to weaponize this in despicable fashion, pushing a campaign commercial that features Acton’s estranged mother, who sided with the stepfather even after his arrest and stayed with him until his death.
But in recent days, it’s become clear that this ad has taken on far greater significance than one commercial in one gubernatorial election. As The New York Times’ Michelle Goldberg summarized in her latest column:
It’s quite a feat, in this numb and debased era, to create a political advertisement so shocking and indecent that people from across the political spectrum feel the need to denounce it. The Ohio gubernatorial candidate Vivek Ramaswamy, who has long fashioned himself as a kind of Donald Trump 2.0 — younger and brainier but just as brash — has managed it.
By releasing what may be the most disgusting ad in American political history, he’s done more than just reveal his own low character. He’s opened a kind of proxy debate on the right about whether a post-Trump conservatism should try to reclaim some base-line morality or continue along its current smashmouth course.
Donald Trump has changed his party and his nation’s politics in a great many ways, but among the most important shifts is the degree to which the president has championed the politics of cruelty and dishonor. There are messages — from attack ads to speeches to social message postings — that Republican officials used to avoid, even when they agreed with the underlying point, in part to avoid backlash and in part to maintain their public reputations and credibility.
In recent years, however, those scruples have been cast aside. GOP officials and candidates no longer hedge on depraved messaging: After having seen Americans twice elevate a malicious television personality to the nation’s highest office, they now routinely echo his amorality and cynicism, seeing it as a way to satisfy the party’s far-right base, to advance their own ambitions or both.
Most decent people can and will agree that Ramaswamy’s attack ad is indefensible, but the ad has also taken on totemic value.
“What the ad represents … is an opening salvo in the post-midterms fight for the Republican Party’s future,” Politico’s Jonathan Martin explained. “It’s a battle that will accelerate next year but may not culminate until the 2030s. Put simply, what sort of party does the GOP want to be — and what will the market bear?”
Trailing in polls and short on options, Ramaswamy made his choice, and the stain on his character is likely to be permanent. What the Ohioan might not have anticipated, however, is just how much his disgusting tactic has divided his own party.
Several prominent Republicans in the state, including outgoing Gov. Mike DeWine, have publicly condemned the ad, and others outside of Ohio have taken similar steps. Former GOP presidential contender Nikki Haley, for example, said via social media that Ramaswamy is “a bad guy.” A day later, Rep. Ashley Hinson, the party’s Senate hopeful in Iowa, called the commercial “absolutely terrible.”
On the other side, there’s the White House, where the politics of cruelty and dishonor still thrive, and where there are Republican leaders who still believe repugnant messaging will dominate for the foreseeable future.
JD Vance, for example, declared this week that he’s “a little bit disgusted,” not by Ramaswamy’s gutter politics, but by members of his own party who are “whining” about civility.
The vice president’s reaction itself drew swift rebukes — The Bulwark published a piece that described Vance as a “sociopath” — but that didn’t stop Trump from picking up where his vice president left off.
On Wednesday, the president told reporters he didn’t “know anything about it,” before shifting gears and talking about how important he considers it to see a mother “hate her daughter that much.”
A day later, Trump went much further and spent much of Thursday defending the ad, urging Ramaswamy to keep running it, demanding the public take the underlying claims “seriously” and at Iowa rally, predicting that the ad would work in the GOP candidate’s favor.
In other words, Trump took care to keep dividing Republicans — with less than two weeks remaining, during the early voting period — in one of the nation’s most important gubernatorial races, by leaning into support for one of the most repulsive campaign ads in recent memory.
Election Day is 11 days away. Watch this space.
The post Ramaswamy’s vile ad is dividing the Republican Party. Trump is leading the wrong side. appeared first on MS NOW.
On Thursday, Brazilian President and reelection candidate Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva called on the country’s young and elderly people to “defeat” opposition Sen. Flavio Bolsonaro to build a society that “distributes books and culture, not weapons and hate.”
RELATED:
Datafolha Poll Shows Lula and Bolsonaro Tied at 50% Ahead of Runoff
“Our army is much bigger, full of enthusiasm and heart, where nobody wants to kill anybody,” said the Workers’ Party (PT) candidate during his first digital event of this kind.
Lula spent an hour and a half participating in a livestream on social media alongside lawmaker Andre Janones, who created a public WhatsApp channel in support of the progressive leader called “Lula’s Army.” The channel has already attracted 8.5 million users ahead of Sunday’s presidential runoff.
Shortly before the digital event, polling firm Datafolha released a survey showing both candidates tied at 50% of the valid vote, three days before voters head to the polls.
🚨 PESSOAL, URGENTE!!!
— Lula (@LulaOficial) October 22, 2026
Preparados pra ver a história acontecendo AO VIVO diante dos olhos?!
Vamos encerrar a campanha mais importante da história do Brasil!
Um ato que ficará para sempre marcado na memória das lutas do povo brasileiro! 🇧🇷
É sábado, dia 24, às 14h, na Av.… pic.twitter.com/aslsI3WZPw
The text reads, “Folks, urgent!!! Are you ready to watch history unfold live before your very eyes?! We are bringing the most important campaign in the history of Brazil to a close! It will be an event that remains forever etched in the memory of the Brazilian people’s struggles! Join us this Saturday, the 24th, at 2:00 pm, on Avenida Paulista, in Sao Paulo!”
In the first round of the election, the eldest son of far-right former President Jair Bolsonaro won 47% of the vote, two percentage points more than Lula, who appears to have drawn even in the final days of the campaign.
Part of the Brazilian president’s strategy has involved mobilizing his supporters in the streets and on social media, with an emphasis on young people and those over 70. The latter are exempt from voting in a country where voting is mandatory.
Introduced as “Marshal Lula,” the Workers’ Party leader acknowledged feeling “like a fish out of water” during his first livestream, where he listened to accounts from young and elderly people.
“I have to talk with my army; we have a great battle ahead of us,” Lula said, adding that his candidacy represents “democracy,” “the fight against femicide” and a “life focused on health, culture” and education.
Estas eleições serão um divisor de águas para o Brasil. É hora de transformar essa esperança e mobilização das ruas em mais participação e compromissos.
— Lula (@LulaOficial) October 23, 2026
Seguiremos firmes na luta por um país mais justo, com oportunidades para todos e políticas voltadas às necessidades da… pic.twitter.com/TzOkr47RH8
Lula da SIlva’s text reads, “These elections will be a watershed moment for Brazil. It is time to transform this hope and the mobilization seen in the streets into greater participation and concrete commitments. We will remain steadfast in the fight for a fairer country—one with opportunities for all and policies geared toward the needs of the population. Our ‘army’ consists of more than just soldiers; it is driven by reason, motivation, and a cause. And our cause is the best in the world, because it is the Brazilian people. Let us work together to secure another victory!”
“Our army fights to build a harmonious, loving society that builds rather than destroys, that distributes books and culture, not weapons and hate,” said the Workers’ Party leader, who also referred to Sunday’s runoff election as a “war.”
“Brazil cannot fall into the hands of a militiaman,” Lula said, alluding to the Bolsonaro family’s ties to relatives of members of paramilitary groups in Rio de Janeiro.
Lula also recalled that Flavio Bolsonaro had served as the lawyer for a police officer accused of killing a 5-year-old girl during an operation against suspected drug traffickers.
The Workers’ Party also urged those who abstained from voting — who accounted for 21% of voters in the first round, or about 33.5 million Brazilians — to vote for Lula on Sunday.
“You who did not go to vote because you didn’t like the candidates or because you are over 70, that is your right; but not now. Now you have to think about Brazil, about your homeland,” he said.
teleSUR/ JF
Source: EFE
Even if Israelis vote out the current government, an ideological shift will endure, says Beth Oppenheim, a policy fellow in the Middle East and North Africa programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations.
The London-based analyst explains how once-fringe ideas have crept into the political mainstream and the limitations of liberalism.
In this interview:
You say Israel’s illiberal and ethnonationalist turn represents a transformation beyond Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu; these ideologies would not disappear even with him gone. In your analysis of Israeli politics, you avoid the traditional left–right political spectrum – why?
Beth Oppenheim: In the Ideas of Israel project for ECFR, I wanted to unpack this binary we often see on the question of Netanyahu’s leadership. He dominates Israeli politics, but the debate about the prime minister often obscures more interesting trends like the rightward shift of Israeli politics. Often, the opposition is referred to as the liberal bloc, whom the right wing label as leftists – but this is inaccurate.
The pro-Netanyahus form a government coalition, while the opposition bloc is actually rather ideologically diverse. So in my research I wanted to go beyond the reductive question of Netanyahu to understand how parties behave in elections; I wanted to see where all these different parties’ ideologies and visions fit in.
And this led you to categorise Israeli parties into four groups: the liberal Zionists, the nationalists, the ultra-Orthodox camp, and the religious nationalists. Could you describe each group? Let’s start with the liberal Zionists, who are considered the most left-wing of the Jewish Israeli camps…
Of course. The liberal Zionists include figures such as Yair Golan, Yair Lapid and Gadi Eisenkot.
Eisenkot (Yashar party) is a former general in the military. Despite this, many on the right brand him as a leftist.
Lapid (Yesh Atid party) comes from a liberal centrist tradition in the mould of his father. Like Eisenkot, he is very secular. A secular vision for Israel and an emphasis on liberal democratic institutions unite the camp of liberal Zionists.
Golan (The Democrats party) is the left flank of this camp. In Europe, he wouldn’t be seen as far left, but within the Israeli spectrum, he is seen as radical. He has security credentials, too, but he’s the only liberal Zionist who talks about a political settlement with the Palestinians.
The two-state solution is not really on the menu in the Jewish Israeli political mainstream – that’s now the preserve of the far-left fringe; it’s not a mainstream discussion anymore.
“The two-state solution is not really on the menu in the Jewish Israeli political mainstream”
The liberal Zionists are united around their secularism and their commitment to the liberal democratic institutions, but there’s one big caveat: when it comes to the Palestinian issue, their liberalism is more circumscribed.
They are not talking about the ongoing occupation and the effect that that has on Israel’s democratic standing. But of course, they’re very united in their opposition to Netanyahu.
The liberal Zionist camp lacks a coherent platform other than this; they basically advocate for good governance, but don’t offer a robust vision.
And that cannot be said about the nationalists, whose vision is quite clear, right?
Traditionally, the nationalist camp was the mainstream right wing. Today’s main contenders are prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud and Avigdor Lieberman’s Yisrael Beiteinu.
Meanwhile, former prime minister Naftali Bennett is running on a joint list with Lapid’s Yesh Atid, called Beyachad (‘Together’). Bennett and Lapid joined forces despite coming from different ideological traditions. They have very different ideas about the country, but they’re coming together to present a more technocratic agenda, get Netanyahu out and normalise Israeli politics.
The nationalist camp descends from the Revisionist Zionist tradition based on Ze’ev Jabotinsky’s vision: a liberal democratic outlook fused with ultra-nationalist convictions. So to take a Revisionist Zionist view is to take a hawkish and hardline approach towards Arabs, while keeping a commitment to liberal democratic values. But affinity for liberalism and democratic values has really withered away over recent decades, not only under Netanyahu.
And then there is the ultra-Orthodox camp, without which the current government would never have completed a full term.
The ultra-Orthodox group does not fit easily on the left-to-right political spectrum, which in the Israeli understanding is defined by hawkishness on Palestinians and security.
They are made up of two Ashkenazi parties – Degel HaTorah and Agudat Yisrael – and Sephardic party Shas. What unites them is strict religious observance of Jewish law and their commitment to separation from secular society or modernity.
“The ultra-Orthodox camp is predominantly non-Zionist, but not necessarily anti-Zionist”
Interestingly, the ultra-Orthodox camp is predominantly non-Zionist, but not necessarily anti-Zionist since they didn’t endorse the creation of Israel in its secular form. They engage with the state, but in a limited way – they’re very transactional and pragmatic.
And the ultra-orthodox camp work within state apparatus to advance sectoral interests, yeshiva education, the military service exemption, and subsidies to maintain a somewhat introverted separation from the rest of society.
They are mostly passive when it comes to issues of foreign policy and security policy, but they do not support loss of Jewish life for nationalist ends – they don’t believe that the state in its current form is sacred. And so they don’t, for instance, endorse the loss of Jewish life for territorial expansion.
That leaves us with the last category: the religious nationalist camp.
Religious nationalists draw together ultra-orthodox religious observance, but with ultra-nationalism.
This article continues, but the full version is available only to EUobserver.com subscribers. Visit account.euobserver.com/membership
Segurança pública, rejeição à pauta woke e valorização dos costumes ajudam a explicar a força eleitoral da direita brasileira.
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O resultado do primeiro turno das eleições presidenciais de 2026 provocou uma onda de análises na esquerda brasileira. Com Flávio Bolsonaro à frente de Lula na votação, muitos comentaristas voltaram a procurar explicações no comportamento dos evangélicos, no conservadorismo moral e na influência das lideranças religiosas. Esses fatores têm importância, mas não explicam tudo. Uma parcela significativa do eleitorado demonstra insatisfação com prioridades culturais da esquerda e, sobretudo, com a percepção de que o Estado perdeu capacidade de garantir segurança à população.
A segurança pública ocupa posição central nesse debate. Segundo levantamento Nexus/BTG divulgado em julho de 2026, 30% dos entrevistados identificaram violência, criminalidade ou segurança pública como o principal problema do país. A preocupação é especialmente relevante entre eleitores que apoiam Flávio Bolsonaro, para os quais o combate ao crime constitui uma das principais expectativas em relação ao próximo governo.
A situação do Rio de Janeiro ilustra a dimensão concreta desse problema. Um estudo do Grupo de Estudos dos Novos Ilegalismos da UFF e do Instituto Fogo Cruzado estimou que, em 2024, aproximadamente quatro milhões de pessoas na Região Metropolitana viviam sob controle ou influência de grupos armados. Isso correspondia a 34,9% da população da região. Facções criminosas e milícias exercem formas de poder territorial que afetam a circulação, as atividades econômicas e a vida cotidiana dos moradores. Algumas estimativas apontam que entre 60% e 70% do território do Rio de Janeiro é atualmente controlado pelo crime organizado.
Nesse contexto, discursos que enfatizam direitos sociais, soberania nacional e política externa podem perder força eleitoral quando não oferecem respostas convincentes à insegurança cotidiana. Lula tem defendido o enfrentamento do crime organizado por meio da integração das forças de segurança, da investigação financeira e da retomada de territórios. E isso só está acontecendo agora, após quatro anos de absoluta negligência na questão de segurança, com o crime organizado alcançando recordes históricos de expansão territorial.
Flávio, por sua vez, aposta em uma abordagem mais punitiva, incluindo o enquadramento de facções como organizações narcoterroristas. A disputa envolve diferentes concepções de segurança, mas também a capacidade de cada candidato de transmitir determinação diante do problema. Se considerar estes grupos terroristas ajuda ou não no combate ao crime é uma longa discussão, mas sem dúvidas a mera classificação com terroristas já agrada uma parcela substancial da população que vive sob o (verdadeiro) terror desses criminosos.
Existe ainda uma dimensão cultural que a esquerda frequentemente subestima. Parte do eleitorado rejeita o vocabulário político associado à agenda woke e interpreta determinadas iniciativas progressistas como tentativas de impor novas normas de comportamento. A decisão draconiana do Supremo Tribunal Federal reconhecendo “transfobia” como “crime equiparável ao racismo” tem gerado, naturalmente, reações extremamente negativas. Afinal, parece absolutamente normal que milhões de brasileiros rejeitem uma decisão que literalmente pode colocar na cadeia (e já está colocando) por até cinco anos pessoas que erram pronome de tratamento durante comunicação com indivíduos trans.
O descontentamento cultural é muitas vezes irresponsavelmente ignorado nas análises políticas. Muitos analises insistem em ver os eleitores como máquinas em busca do benefício material constante, dispostas a sacrificar seus valores imateriais em troca de migalhas assistencialistas – que é tudo que até agora o governo PT conseguiu dar ao povo brasileiro. Mas essa análise é equivocada. Para muitos brasileiros, questões relacionadas à educação dos filhos, à religião e aos limites da intervenção estatal fazem parte de suas prioridades políticas. Esses eleitores obviamente tendem a votar na oposição num cenário nacional onde hospitais estatais universitários – com apoio do establishment esquerdista – promovem bloqueio hormonal e outras formas de “intervenções não-cirúrgicas” em “crianças trans”.
Para desespero dos analistas acadêmicos desconectados da realidade nacional, a política externa ocupa um espaço limitado na experiência diária da maioria da população. As relações com os Estados Unidos, a atuação brasileira nos BRICS e a posição diplomática sobre a Palestina são temas relevantes, mas dificilmente substituem preocupações imediatas como violência urbana e pautas culturais.
A votação de Flávio Bolsonaro deve ser compreendida a partir dessa combinação de fatores, sem atribuir a milhões de eleitores uma motivação única. Segurança pública, valores tradicionais, insatisfação com o governo e rejeição a determinadas pautas progressistas podem convergir em um mesmo voto. Se a esquerda quiser melhorar sua popularidade, o caminho correto é através da revisão de seus erros, não da invenção de falsos motivos para o crescimento da direita.
Chicago voters can cast ballots in 12 different languages this election, an expansion that Illinois Republican Party Chairman Bob Grogan warns is making an already complicated election system harder to independently monitor.
Grogan told Fox News Digital the proliferation of versions in languages such as Tagalog, Gujarati and Urdu creates additional challenges for election judges and party observers tasked with ensuring voters receive accurate ballots. He also questioned how many voters need some of the translations, arguing that many immigrants who speak those languages also speak English.
"It's a solution in search of a problem," Grogan told Fox News Digital. "It's big city virtue signaling."
TRUMP ADMIN SUED OVER ALLEGED ILLEGAL COLLECTION OF SENSITIVE VOTER DATA FROM 47 STATES
Chicago voters can cast ballots in 12 different languages: English, Spanish, Chinese, Hindi, Korean, Tagalog, Polish, Gujarati, Urdu, Ukrainian, Arabic and Russian.
Section 203 of the U.S. Voting Rights Act requires the Chicago Board of Elections to make materials and ballots available in certain precincts for Spanish, Chinese and Hindi speakers, a spokesperson for the elections agency told Fox News Digital. The Board includes the other non-English languages to "maintain uniformity with the languages used by the Cook County Clerk's office under a county ordinance, so that all voters throughout Cook County are afforded equal voting opportunities," the spokesperson added.
But Grogan, a former DuPage County auditor for 12 years, said he has "a fair number of Gujarati friends ... and everyone in their family speaks English."
"Gujarati — it's from India, and English is an official language in India," Grogan added.
TRUMP ADMIN'S PROPOSED 'ENGLISH-ONLY' HEAD START RULE DRAWS FIRE FROM LOS ANGELES MAYORAL CANDIDATE
Data provided to Fox News Digital by the Chicago Board of Elections shows that some of the less commonly used language options accounted for only a handful of ballots cast during the March primary. Just nine ballots were cast using the English-Gujarati option, while 15 used English-Urdu, 10 used English-Arabic and 25 each used English-Russian and English-Ukrainian, according to the Board's figures.
Other translations were used more frequently, including 4,474 English-Polish ballots, 2,183 English-Chinese ballots, 664 English-Hindi ballots, 352 English-Korean ballots and 100 English-Tagalog ballots.
Grogan also questioned why language requirements can change substantially across county lines, noting that Chicago offers touchscreen ballots in 12 languages while nearby DuPage County offers fewer language options.
"You can have a Gujarati population in Peoria," Grogan said. "You would think that there would be some more uniformity to all of that as well."
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Beyond questioning the need for some of the translations, Grogan raised a broader concern about oversight, arguing that election judges and party observers cannot independently scrutinize ballots written in languages they do not understand.
However, the Chicago Board of Elections pushed back, telling Fox News Digital that it has in-house staff who help translate ballots and signs and assist multilingual media ahead of elections. It also said voters are allowed to bring "interpreter[s] to assist them in understanding and casting their ballot" under certain conditions.
When asked about multilingual judges, the Board noted that of the 7,218 election judges assigned for November's general election as of Thursday, 810 are multilingual candidates. Those multilingual judges include speakers of Spanish, Chinese, Hindi, Urdu, Gujarati, Polish, Korean and Tagalog, according to the Board.
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Pressed on whether he believes the additional languages create an election security vulnerability, Grogan said the risk depends in part on how widely the translated ballots are used.
Overall, the Board's figures show 7,857 multilingual ballots were cast during the March primary, representing about 1.85% of the 424,564 ballots cast citywide.
"I think it certainly makes it harder to monitor," Grogan said. "If there is one ballot cast in that language, that's a very small vulnerability you have. If all of a sudden we have 10,000 in some very small, poorly understood language, then that increases the risk."
Fox News Digital asked the Chicago Board of Elections how many languages are available for mail-in ballots but did not receive a response in time for publication.
Supreme Court Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson was the lone public dissenter in a Thursday decision allowing New Hampshire to block the use of student ID cards in the upcoming midterm elections.
Other justices on the court cited the longstanding precedent "that lower federal courts should ordinarily not alter the election rules on the eve of an election," and said that lower courts failed to argue that the specific case in New Hampshire warranted an exception to the tradition. Jackson, however, argued the proximity to an election should not get in the way of properly applying the law.
"I respectfully dissent because — even, and perhaps especially, when an election is looming — I would not disturb a clearly justifiable federal-court order issued to ensure that the public receives accurate information about a State’s electoral processes," she wrote.
FEDERAL JUDGE BLOCKS INDIANA BAN ON STUDENT ID FOR VOTING
The underlying dispute stems from a law signed in April that went into effect in June, striking student ID cards from the list of forms of identification that election officials can accept when an individual requests a ballot. A voting rights group sued New Hampshire on the grounds that the law illegally discriminated against young voters by making it more difficult for them to vote.
New Hampshire Secretary of State David Scanlan then issued guidance saying that student IDs could not be used to establish voter identity, even as supporting evidence under the state's alternative verification procedures. A district judge blocked that portion of the guidance, arguing that it went beyond the scope of the law itself, which only removed student IDs from the list of expressly accepted forms of identification.
Among the supporters of the guidance was the Republican National Committee.
DEMS HAND GOP FRESH MIDTERM WEAPON BY OPPOSING WIDELY USED VOTER ID
While Jackson was the lone public dissenter, it is possible that other justices dissented as well, but opted not to be named on the court order. During her roughly four years on the Supreme Court, Jackson has broken from the rest of her colleagues in areas such as campaign finance, immigration and congressional map litigation.
In 2023, she was the lone dissenter in an 8-1 ruling allowing a concrete company to sue striking union workers. She also stood alone in a May 2026 decision involving federal prisoners seeking to challenge their convictions through compassionate release.
TRUMP SCORES SUPREME COURT WIN IN ELECTION INTEGRITY FIGHT AS STATES GAIN NEW VOTER ROLL TOOL
New Hampshire is holding a handful of close races on Election Day, putting some weight behind the court’s decision. Fox News’ power rankings rate the state’s Senate race as leans Democratic, meaning that liberals have a slight advantage in a race that could decide control of Congress. The state’s governor’s race, meanwhile, is rated as likely going to the GOP.
College students typically favor the Democratic Party, though it is unclear how many voters will be affected by the court ruling, as students who previously relied on their student IDs will now need another accepted form of identification.
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Some Democrats, however, believe allowing voters to use student IDs would be a good thing. Texas Democratic Senate nominee James Talarico, for instance, has pushed for such a thing in his state.
Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic resigned from the presidency in September and is running for prime minister in parliamentary elections considered to be one of the most competitive elections for Serbia in recent memory.
"I think this is certainly the biggest challenge for the former President in his 14-year rule," Helena Ivanov, associate fellow at the Henry Jackson Society, told Fox News Digital.
"The student protesters have been able to capture the hearts and minds of people and keep the momentum going in a way that the established opposition was never able to do," Ivanov added.
ANTI‑CORRUPTION PROTESTS HIT EUROPEAN NATION AS CALLS FOR NEW ELECTIONS GROW
Serbian Foreign Minister Marko Djuric told Fox News Digital that he believes the student opposition is highly unlikely to win.
"The people of Serbia have seen through them: years of criticism have not persuaded the public that they have a credible program or a serious plan for the country’s future," the foreign minister said.
Djuric touted Serbia’s economy under Vucic and the Strategic Dialogue with the U.S., which he said will foster greater cooperation and new opportunities for Serbs.
In an exclusive interview with Fox News Digital in June when he was still president, Vucic pointed to the country's economic growth as evidence of its transformation. "Our GDP was 32 billion (euros) when I became the prime minister," Vucic said. "This year it's going to be over 100 billion euros, which is $120 billion." Vucic first became prime minister in 2014 and president in 2017.
In that same interview, he said the improving relationship between Washington and Belgrade was increasingly centered on economics, investment and technological cooperation and mutual conservative values.
A bipartisan group of senators led by Sen. Chuck Grassley, R-Iowa., and Sen. Richard Blumenthal, D-Conn., introduced the Supporting the Rule of Law, Building Institutional Justice, and Accountability Act (SRBIJA) to address democratic backsliding in Serbia, promote the rule of law and accountability and improve the treatment of student-led civic protests.
Most importantly, the legislation would condition future aid on a presidential certification that Serbia made "significant and sustained" efforts toward judicial accountability, press freedom and alignment with the EU and NATO.
The bipartisan group of lawmakers, which also included Rep. Joe Wilson, R-S.C., and Rep. William Keating, D-Mass., took aim at President Vucic and his time in power.
There are growing concerns from Congress and observers that the election will take place in a hostile environment and efforts to discredit and undermine the election are already underway.
Others fear the current government might not respect the outcome of the election if the Student List were to win.
Vucic had served as president of Serbia since 2017 and previously as prime minister from 2014 to 2017, but was term limited under the constitution. His exit from the presidency created the opportunity for him to remain in power by returning as prime minister.
Vucic resigned from the presidency and dissolved parliament in September, setting the stage for the snap election on Oct. 25.
As president, analysts say he has always straddled the geopolitical line between East and West, seeking European legitimacy and launching EU accession talks in 2014 while also maintaining close ties with Russian President Vladimir Putin even after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Unlike previous elections, the student-led opposition garnered significant attention to their cause and mobilized popular support, becoming a legitimate political contender out of a spontaneous protest movement.
Serbia has been roiled by student-led anti-corruption protests since November 2024, demanding justice and accountability after the deaths of 16 people following the collapse of a railway station in the town of Novi Sad. One of the largest protests in Serbia’s history took place on March 15, 2025, with nearly 350,000 people gathered in Slavija Square in central Belgrade.
ZELENSKYY WARNS RUSSIA WANTS TO CAUSE 'EXPLOSION' IN THE BALKANS
The protesters criticized the Vucic government for failing to hold anyone accountable for the canopy disaster as the government continued its heavy-handed crackdown on demonstrators. None of the original demands of the protesters were met, so the students turned to electoral politics to enact change the Serbian political opposition was never able to achieve.
The Student List, as the opposition is known, consists of a wide swath of civil society actors, many of whom come from the ranks of academia, but does not include anyone from Serbia’s traditional opposition parties that struggled to challenge Vucic and his ruling Serbian Progressive Party in the past.
The group operates in a decentralized manner and does not have an official leader. Their main priorities are to tackle corruption and promote transparency and the rule of law.
Filip Ubović, a student from the University of Belgrade and protest participant on the ground in Belgrade, has spoken with Fox News Digital over the course of the year-long protests.
Ubović said he joined the protests because he was fed up with the current state of his country. This was the first opportunity, Ubovic said, to do something tangible, instead of just complaining.
"People had enough for quite some time but decided to fully embrace us because we are ‘their kids’, we are young, we are not professional politicians, we do not have a single face representing us, and we are very professional and principled," Ubovic said.
Ivana Stradner of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies told Fox News Digital that corruption has held back democracy in the Balkans and progress for its people for a while.
"Corruption doesn’t just steal public money; it steals an entire generation’s future. Young people in Serbia and Albania are taking to the streets demanding accountability and a better future. The U.S. should pay attention, not out of charity, but strategic self-interest," Stradner said.
The test will be whether the Student List can transition their popular mobilization in the streets into a viable political option that can win an election and govern a country that hasn’t undergone a political transition in over a decade.
It’s also unclear, if the Student List were to win, how they might reorient Serbia’s foreign policy and its relations with the U.S.
"So far, the students have been remarkably reluctant to define foreign policy goals that would depart from the current government’s course. For now, the most realistic expectation is continuity," Sinisa Vukovic, director of the Global Policy Program at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, told Fox News Digital.
Vuković said that Serbia’s foreign policy has remained mostly consistent dating back to Slobodan Milosevic, the former leader of Yugoslavia, and the Vucic government has left hot-button issues including the crisis over Kosovo and EU membership mostly unresolved.
While much might change in Serbia domestically, any resolution to the conflict with Kosovo or any substantial reorientation of foreign policy that shifts Serbia away from Russia and moves it much closer to the U.S. and EU remains unclear.
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"Another period of pseudo-hedging is likely, with Russia keeping a deep presence in the most vital sectors and dominating most of them," Vukovic added.
© Joe Raedle/Getty Images
Tout suggère que M. Jair Bolsonaro sera chassé du pouvoir par les urnes à la fin de son mandat, en 2022. Celui qui promettait d'en finir avec la corruption se trouve désormais empêtré dans les affaires et ses frasques irritent le secteur privé. L'ancien capitaine explore donc d'autres voies, moins démocratiques, pour se maintenir au pouvoir. Au risque de se laisser dépasser par une base radicalisée.
Frappé par une pandémie qui a pris des allures de cauchemar, le Brésil semble vivre l'agonie de sa plus récente période démocratique. Depuis plusieurs mois, une coalition de forces emmenée par le président Jair Bolsonaro, élu en 2018, s'en prend au Parlement et au système judiciaire. Un travail de sape des institutions brésiliennes dont chaque succès galvanise les partisans du chef de l'État, que diverses études estiment à environ 12 % de la population (1), soit près de vingt-cinq millions de personnes. Comment la plus grande démocratie d'Amérique latine en est-elle arrivée là ?
Au milieu des années 2010, la perspective que le Parti des travailleurs (PT, gauche) se maintienne au pouvoir, après quatre victoires consécutives à la présidentielle (de 2002 à 2014), convainc les élites de déchirer la Constitution de 1988. Avec le soutien des États-Unis, elles optent pour la voie du coup d'État parlementaire et la destitution de la présidente Dilma Rousseff, en 2016, au prétexte d'une corruption qui n'eut jamais lieu. « Les politiques sociales ne rentrent pas dans le cadre du budget fédéral », justifie alors leur mentor, M. Antônio Delfim Netto (2), l'un des ministres de l'économie de la dictature (1964-1984). Aux yeux des putschistes, aucune différence, donc, entre le fait de piocher dans les ressources de l'État pour s'enrichir et la mise en place de programmes sociaux destinés à sortir la population de la misère (3).
« Nous allons nous débarrasser de cette engeance et nous en libérer pour au moins trente ans », avait déclaré en 2006 le sénateur du Parti du front libéral (PFL, devenu Les Démocrates en 2007) Jorge Bornhausen, suggérant que l'idée d'un coup d'État séduisait déjà certains. Dix ans plus tard, le projet devient réalité, soutenu par une alliance du secteur privé, des différentes formations conservatrices, des militaires, des Églises évangéliques et des médias privés (contrôlés par cinq des familles les plus riches du pays). Washington apporte également son concours, à travers l'Agence nationale de sécurité (NSA), dont on sait désormais qu'elle a inspiré la grande opération « anticorruption » surnommée « Lava Jato », destinée à discréditer le PT puis à empêcher la candidature de M. Luiz Inácio « Lula » da Silva à la présidentielle de 2018, qu'il était sur le point de remporter (4).
Dès la destitution de Mme Rousseff, les nouveaux maîtres du pays orchestrent le virage qu'ils attendaient depuis si longtemps. Ils s'appuient sur « Le pont vers le futur (5) », un document stratégique publié en 2015 par la formation du nouveau président Michel Temer, qui détaille l'ensemble des mesures à prendre pour « moderniser » le Brésil et doper la rentabilité des entreprises : réforme du code du travail, refonte du système des retraites, privatisations, suppression de droits sociaux… On peut faire bien des reproches aux néolibéraux, pas celui de manquer d'ambition. Dès le mois de décembre 2016, M. Temer fait passer l'amendement constitutionnel 95, qui limite l'accroissement des dépenses publiques au niveau de l'inflation de l'année précédente : la mesure condamne le pays à un recul programmé de la protection sociale, à mesure que la population grandit.
Le peuple regimbe, et les perspectives de la droite traditionnelle s'assombrissent à l'approche de la présidentielle de 2018. Inspirée par son passé colonial et guidée par une morale conservatrice, elle retrouve ses vieux réflexes autoritaires et s'en remet à un ancien capitaine, pourtant chassé de l'armée pour « complot » et « terrorisme »… Les réseaux évangéliques, puissants au Brésil (6), bénissent cette union de circonstance, rendue possible par la promesse de la nomination au ministère de l'économie de M. Paulo Guedes, un monétariste militant. Depuis son arrivée aux affaires, celui-ci épouse scrupuleusement le programme du « Pont vers le futur ». Non sans un certain succès pour le secteur privé : les chiffres du deuxième trimestre 2021 indiquent que les profits de dix des plus grandes entreprises cotées à la Bourse brésilienne ont été multipliés par dix en un an (7).
Une récente déclaration du colonel Marcelo Pimentel suggère une autre analyse — pas nécessairement incompatible — de l'arrivée au pouvoir de M. Bolsonaro. Critique de l'actuel président, le haut gradé pointe le rôle de ce qu'il nomme le « Parti militaire » : « Un groupe soudé, hiérarchique, discipliné, avec des caractéristiques autoritaires et des prétentions claires au pouvoir politique, dirigé par une poignée de généraux formés dans les années 1970 à l'Académie militaire d'Agulhas Negras, qui faisaient ou font partie du haut commandement de l'armée. Leur défense d'une idéologie, leur mode de pensée les dotent de caractéristiques associées aux partis politiques formels. Ses dirigeants et le capitaine [Bolsonaro] sont des amis proches et des collègues depuis 1973 (8). » Selon lui, la candidature de M. Bolsonaro surgit au sein de ce groupe.
La question de l'existence formelle de ce « Parti militaire » reste ouverte, mais celle de l'implication croissante des hommes en uniforme dans la vie politique brésilienne ne souffre aucun doute (9). Et rien n'indique que tous souhaitent retourner dans leurs casernes et abandonner les postes qu'ils occupent aujourd'hui.
La manipulation de l'opinion publique par l'équipe de M. Bolsonaro lors de la campagne électorale de 2018, à grand renfort de fake news, est désormais largement prouvée. Le Tribunal électoral supérieur (TSE) a ouvert une enquête qui pourrait conduire à la révocation du chef de l'État et de son vice-président, M. Hamilton Mourão. Le rapport du TSE sur la diffusion de fausses informations et l'existence de milices numériques d'extrême droite a été transmis à la Cour suprême, où l'enquête est pilotée par le juge Alexandre de Moraes, devenu l'une des principales cibles des partisans du président.
C'est que le « clan Bolsonaro » — presque autant détesté des médias que le PT — dispose d'une puissante structure de communication basée sur les réseaux sociaux. Elle repose sur ce que la population connaît désormais sous le nom de « cabinet de la haine », installé au cœur du palais présidentiel et piloté par M. Carlos Bolsonaro, l'un des fils du président. La mission du cabinet ? Débiter des fake news qu'une centaine de sites disséminent à leur tour sur la Toile, alimentant la fournaise des colères bolsonaristes.
Un exemple : l'idée que le système de vote électronique, utilisé sans anicroche depuis 1996, va permettre aux adversaires du président de le priver d'une victoire qu'il juge assurée lors de la présidentielle de 2022, alors même que tous les sondages le prédisent perdant. Raison pour laquelle M. Bolsonaro a exigé un retour au bulletin de vote en papier. Naturellement, il a interprété le refus du Congrès comme la preuve qu'une fraude électorale était en marche. Cette théorie lui vaut une deuxième poursuite pénale.
Plus de cent trente procédures de destitution ont été engagées. Des partisans de M. Bolsonaro qui occupent des postes-clés empêchent toutefois que les dossiers n'avancent : le procureur général de la République, M. Antônio Aras, par exemple ; mais également le président de l'Assemblée nationale, M. Arthur Lira. Sans compter que l'ancien capitaine coopte — par le biais d'amendements parlementaires qui garantissent l'attribution de ressources (détournables) à leurs fiefs électoraux — des députés et des sénateurs de ce qu'on appelle le centrão (le « centre »), un ensemble de partis qui se vendent au plus offrant. La démarche assure au chef de l'État un socle parlementaire suffisant pour bloquer les procédures.
Pendant longtemps, la popularité de M. Bolsonaro n'a pas semblé souffrir de ces obstructions. Mais la pandémie de Covid-19 a marqué un premier point d'inflexion pour le chef d'État, tenu pour responsable de plus de 585 000 décès liés au SRAS-CoV-2. La seconde aiguille enfoncée dans le matelas d'approbation qui soutenait le clan au pouvoir a été la fin du programme d'aide d'urgence que M. Bolsonaro était parvenu à imposer à son ministre de l'économie (avant que le Congrès n'en double le montant). Un tiers de la population en bénéficiait pendant les neuf premiers mois de la pandémie (10). En 2021, plus de 125 millions de Brésiliens, soit 58 % de la population, se trouvent en situation d'insécurité alimentaire et 20 millions connaissent la faim. Peu de ceux-là envisagent de voter Bolsonaro.
Au-delà des rangs, toujours fournis, des partisans de l'ancien capitaine, la colère grandit au fil des révélations d'une commission d'enquête parlementaire du Sénat, contrôlé par l'opposition. Elles documentent la négligence du gouvernement fédéral face à la pandémie ainsi que l'étendue de la corruption dont profitent le président et sa famille, ainsi que les six mille militaires retraités ou d'active qui occupent des postes-clés : une économie du pillage mise en œuvre depuis les ministères, qui facilite l'accaparement des terres, l'exploitation minière clandestine, la contrebande de bois, la déforestation, etc.
Certains secteurs militaires, opposés par principe à l'implication de l'armée dans le gouvernement, se sont éloignés du président, à l'image d'une fraction des classes moyennes, initialement séduite par la promesse de M. Bolsonaro d'en finir avec la corruption. Alors que le rétrécissement de sa base sociale amène ce dernier à radicaliser son discours et que, de toute évidence, sa barque prend l'eau, certains représentants du pouvoir judiciaire et du Parlement, hier proches, découvrent qu'il menace l'État de droit, et se tournent vers l'opposition. De leur côté, les grands patrons sourcillent aux menaces de coup d'État : l'instabilité politique n'est jamais bonne pour les affaires. Inutile, dans ces conditions, de continuer à afficher leur soutien à un dirigeant qui a désormais perdu toute capacité d'approfondir la « réforme » du pays.
Pour l'heure, les sondages accordent 56 % des suffrages au premier tour à Lula, contre 31 % pour M. Bolsonaro. Une partie des classes supérieures semble considérer que la solution d'hier s'est transformée en problème et que les conditions ne sont pas réunies pour dégager une troisième voie entre l'ancien militaire et l'ancien syndicaliste. Lula représente à leurs yeux la meilleure option pour pacifier le pays, à condition qu'il accepte de gouverner sans chercher à reconstruire ce qui a été détruit depuis le coup d'État de 2016… D'autres estiment qu'il est urgent de destituer M. Bolsonaro afin de créer l'espace pour une candidature de droite « respectable ». Seul problème : aucun nom ne s'impose avec évidence et la clameur du « tout sauf Bolsonaro » monte.
Le contexte politique et judiciaire pousse l'actuel président à la radicalisation : seul le pouvoir lui permettrait d'éviter la prison où il risque de se retrouver avec une probabilité croissante à mesure que s'accumulent les accusations et les poursuites. S'il décidait de décréter l'état de siège pour renverser la table, il pourrait compter sur le soutien des forces de police, de certains secteurs militaires, mais aussi de milices lourdement armées.
Le 7 septembre dernier, le jour de l'indépendance, M. Bolsonaro a tenté une démonstration de force : une « méga-mobilisation » sur l'esplanade des ministères à Brasília, pour dénoncer le rôle « antidémocratique » du TSE, du Congrès et du système judiciaire. Mais l'événement n'a pas été à la hauteur des espérances du chef de l'État. D'importantes foules se sont réunies dans plusieurs grandes villes du pays, sans toutefois conduire au basculement que semblait espérer M. Bolsonaro.
Dès le lendemain, le président promet de respecter le résultat du scrutin de 2022 ainsi que les institutions du pays… mais ses équipes de choc tentent au même moment d'envahir le ministère de la santé et la Cour suprême fédérale. Des conducteurs de camion bloquent les routes dans seize États, exigeant la destitution des membres du TSE. Un galop d'essai ? Il n'est pas impossible que le président se trouve dépassé par les bases qu'il a chauffées à blanc : pressé par la crainte de perdre ses alliés au Congrès, M. Bolsonaro demande rapidement la démobilisation des chauffeurs routiers, ce qui lui vaut d'être surnommé « le lâche » parmi ses soutiens. Émerge ainsi la possibilité d'un « bolsonarisme sans Bolsonaro », avec lequel devra compter le prochain président, quel qu'il soit.
(1) Datafolha, São Paulo, enquête des 29 et 30 août 2021.
(2) Antônio Delfim Netto, « Entre a causa e seu efeito », Valor Econômico, São Paulo, 15 septembre 2015.
(3) Lire Renaud Lambert, « Le Brésil est-il fasciste ? », Le Monde diplomatique, novembre 2018.
(4) Lire Perry Anderson, « Au Brésil, les arcanes d'un coup d'État judiciaire », Le Monde diplomatique, septembre 2019.
(5) « Uma ponte para o futuro » (PDF), Fundação Ulysses Guimarães — Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB), Brasília, 29 octobre 2015.
(6) Lire Lamia Oualalou, « Les évangélistes à la conquête du Brésil », Le Monde diplomatique, octobre 2014.
(7) « Dez das maiores empresas da Bolsa veem lucro dobrar no 2º trimestre », Agência Estado, São Paulo, 8 août 2021.
(8) René Ruschel, « O Brasil é refém do Partido Militar, diz coronel », Carta Capital, São Paulo, 30 mai 2021.
(9) Lire Anne Vigna, « Le Brésil, une démocratie militarisée », Le Monde diplomatique, juin 2021.
(10) Lire André Singer, « La cavalcade autoritaire de Jair Bolsonaro », Le Monde diplomatique, juillet 2020.
Dépourvus du soutien des médias, d'une grande partie du patronat et des élites politiques, les réseaux de l'ancien président brésilien Jair Bolsonaro ont tenté un putsch le 8 janvier dernier. Sans doute espéraient-ils un ralliement des militaires. En dépit de son échec, le courant politique incarné par l'ancien président vient de démontrer qu'il n'avait plus besoin de son meneur d'hier pour exister.
Sur le parvis du Tribunal suprême fédéral (STF) à Brasília, un long drapeau brésilien de plus de cinquante mètres de long a été abandonné, au milieu des bris de verre et des douilles de gaz lacrymogènes. Alors que, ce mardi 10 janvier, la police scientifique était à l'œuvre dans le bâtiment pour relever les empreintes digitales, d'autres enquêteurs interrogeaient le personnel de sécurité afin de reconstituer le déroulé des événements du dimanche 8 janvier, lorsque des milliers de partisans de l'ancien président brésilien Jair Bolsonaro ont pris d'assaut les plus importantes institutions de la démocratie brésilienne.
Des trois édifices de la place des Trois-Pouvoirs, le STF a été le bâtiment vandalisé avec le plus de furie, selon les inspecteurs de police qui s'expriment en off. Cette haine contre la plus haute cour de justice du pays, en charge également des élections, épouse celle manifestée par M. Bolsonaro. « Le président sortant devrait faire l'objet de poursuites pour incitation au coup d'État et crimes contre la démocratie, deux crimes qui figurent dans le code pénal », estime la professeure de droit María Fernández. Avant d'ajouter que le même sort devrait attendre « tous les responsables politiques qui ont reproduit ses discours et ses menaces depuis quatre ans ». Vendredi 13 janvier, le juge du STF Alexandre de Moraes a autorisé le bureau du procureur général (PGR) à enquêter sur l'implication de l'ancien président dans l'insurrection survenue cinq jours plus tôt.
Depuis le début de l'année 2020, M. Bolsonaro menace les autres pouvoirs — ne pas respecter leurs décisions, lancer ses partisans contre eux… — en moyenne une fois tous les vingt-trois jours, selon une estimation du journal O Globo (1), conservateur mais hostile à M. Bolsonaro. Avant que la justice n'atteigne éventuellement les auteurs intellectuels de cette tentative de putsch, 1 159 militants d'extrême droite ont déjà été écroués le 11 janvier dans deux prisons de la capitale ; 209 l'avaient été dès le 8 janvier au soir, arrêtés au sein même du palais présidentiel. Beaucoup sont cependant parvenus à éviter la prison, pour l'heure.
L'ABIN, les services de renseignement brésiliens, avait pourtant informé les forces de sécurité de Brasília que 3 900 personnes étaient arrivées dans 156 bus le samedi 7 janvier, et qu'elles avaient rejoint le plus grand campement bolsonariste du pays : installé juste en face du quartier général de l'armée depuis le 30 octobre, il visait à obtenir des militaires qu'ils prennent le pouvoir de façon à empêcher le retour de la gauche aux affaires. L'investiture de M. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, le 1er janvier dernier, avait douché leurs espoirs ; une grande majorité était rentrée chez elle.
Six jours plus tard, toutefois, un nouvel appel était lancé pour que tous « les patriotes se rendent à Brasília ». Un texte largement partagé sur les réseaux sociaux et les applications de messagerie de la galaxie bolsonariste appelait à une mobilisation nationale le 8 janvier « pour empêcher qu'on établisse le communisme au Brésil et pour éradiquer la corruption. Nous revendiquons une intervention immédiate des forces armées et, pour cela, nous allons occuper la place et les bâtiments des Trois-Pouvoirs, bloquer toutes les raffineries, paralyser les transports routiers, les activités industrielles, commerciales et agricoles, et suspendre tout paiement d'impôts ». Brasília devait être le centre névralgique de la révolte à partir duquel le reste du pays allait suivre.
Ce n'était pas la première fois que des actions violentes étaient fomentées à partir du campement principal des bolsonaristes. Le 12 décembre, lors de la cérémonie de certification de l'élection de M. Lula da Silva au STF, des bus et des voitures étaient incendiés dans la capitale par des militants. Le 22 décembre, la police découvrait une bombe artisanale, placée dans un camion-citerne près de l'aéroport de la capitale. Le suspect, M. George Washington de Oliveira Sousa (54 ans), a confessé à la police que l'attentat, conçu au sein du campement, visait à provoquer une tragédie de façon à attiser le chaos et contraindre les forces armées à intervenir pour rétablir l'ordre.
Beaucoup de Brésiliens peinent à comprendre la mansuétude dont a fait preuve le gouvernement « Lula » envers cette mobilisation, installée face à des dizaines de bâtiments militaires dans tout le pays depuis la fin du second tour des élections. Le nouveau ministre de la justice Flavio Dino, par exemple, voulait démanteler le site dès la prise de fonctions du président Lula da Silva, le qualifiant d'« incubateurs de terroristes (2) ». Mais, proche des militaires, le ministre de la défense, M. José Mucio Monteiro, dépeignait le campement comme une « manifestation de la démocratie (3) ». Il s'appuyait sur des informations émanant de l'armée, qui notait que les protestations avaient perdu en puissance : un rapport présenté fin décembre au président élu faisait état d'une diminution du nombre de « campeurs-militants » de 43 000 à 5 000 depuis le second tour de la présidentielle, fin octobre. « Lula » a choisi de ne rien faire, jusqu'au jour de l'invasion. Le lendemain, les campements bolsonaristes qui émaillaient le pays étaient tous démantelés.
De loin le plus grand, le campement de Brasília occupait une immense esplanade. Il était également le mieux organisé, avec des toilettes chimiques, des douches, un espace pour les « influenceurs », une scène pour les orateurs et des structures équipées pour préparer gratuitement les repas de milliers de « patriotes ». Mme Viviane M., venue de la ville de Londrina dans l'État du Paraná, nous avait fait visiter ces installations en décembre dernier.
Même si l'entrée du campement est alors libre, les médias ne sont pas les bienvenus. « Journaliste française » figure au rang des pires cartes de visite que l'on puisse exhiber, du fait de propos du président Emmanuel Macron, qui avait suggéré de conférer « un statut international à la forêt amazonienne » alors que les politiques de M. Bolsonaro avaient favorisé les incendies (4). La ruse consiste donc à se présenter comme une simple touriste, désireuse de comprendre ce mouvement de protestation.
Petite femme dynamique et souriante, Viviane cuisine pour le campement. « J'étais sans emploi, on m'a proposé de venir ici pour aider le mouvement », nous explique cette partisane de M. Bolsonaro, sans préciser qui se cache derrière ce « on » un peu flou. « Pas du tout », répond-elle lorsqu'on lui demande si elle perçoit un salaire. Elle trime pourtant douze heures par jour depuis deux mois… et elle envoie de l'argent à sa mère pour s'occuper de ses deux jeunes enfants restés à Londrina. Derrière de grandes bâches, elle organise les réserves dans une dizaine de frigos qui fonctionnent grâce à des groupes électrogènes, tout en nous présentant les fake news les plus connues du bolsonarisme : « Si “Lula” gouverne ce pays, nous allons devenir un nouveau Venezuela. Le communisme va s'installer, et tout notre argent ira à Cuba », rapporte-t-elle tout en réservant une poignée de saucisses. Les provisions sont livrées par camions, sans que Viviane sache d'où elles viennent. Ni ce que contiennent les colis : « Je dois improviser, je ne sais jamais à l'avance ce qu'on nous apporte », confie-t-elle en riant. Toujours ce mystérieux « on », dont Viviane ne peut rien nous dire…
Un mois plus tard, à la mi-janvier, l'enquête de la police fédérale a déjà identifié une centaine d'entreprises ayant financé ce campement ainsi que les transports par bus de bolsonaristes à l'occasion du 8 janvier (ou avant) pour rejoindre la capitale. Sans rendre publics leurs noms, la police a confirmé que ces entreprises appartenaient au secteur de l'agrobusiness, du transport et de la construction civile, et qu'elles étaient en majorité originaires du Paraná, du Mato Grosso do Sul et de São Paulo, trois États qui ont élu des alliés de M. Bolsonaro aux postes de gouverneur. Certains de leurs dirigeants étaient d'ailleurs présents le 8 janvier, à l'image de M. Albert Alisson Gomes Mascarenhas, propriétaire de l'entreprise Construtora Meirelles Mascarenhas, qui a gagné des dizaines de contrats publics lors de la présidence de M. Bolsonaro. L'ingénieur, qui se filmait en direct en train d'inciter la foule à entrer au Congrès, ne fait pour l'instant pas partie des personnes emprisonnées. De même, le mouvement Brasil Verde e Amarelo (« Brésil vert et jaune »), dirigé par le producteur de soja Antônio Galvan, qui regroupe plus de trois cents entités liées à l'agrobusiness, a aussi encouragé ses adhérents à se rendre à Brasília le week-end du 8 janvier.
De la fin du mois d'octobre au 9 janvier, à l'avant du campement, devant les barrières des bâtiments militaires, des « patriotes » se relaient pour lancer des « SOS forces armées » en agitant des drapeaux. Pour eux, l'élection présidentielle d'octobre 2022 a été partiale et inéquitable. Les arguments prêtent parfois à sourire : la gauche aurait diffusé des informations trompeuses, acheté des votes… La recette des campagnes de mobilisation du bolsonarisme.
Régulièrement, de rutilantes voitures klaxonnent leur soutien en passant aux abords du camp. La capitale, où l'administration publique est de très loin le premier employeur (40 % des emplois), a largement voté pour celui qui avait si souvent menacé de balayer la démocratie brésilienne : 58,81 %, contre 41,19 % pour M. Lula da Silva au second tour de l'élection présidentielle. Le 30 octobre dernier, les partisans du président sortant viennent fièrement déposer leur bulletin avec les attributs du bolsonarisme : drapeaux brésiliens sur les toits des voitures, maillots vert et jaune de la seleção (l'équipe nationale de football) sur le dos. La plupart acceptent de répondre aux questions de la presse, et fustigent la « corruption du Parti des travailleurs [PT] », qu'ils ne voulaient surtout pas voir revenir aux affaires après les mandats de M. Lula da Silva (2003-2010) et de Mme Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016). Systématiquement, ils balaient les questions concernant la gestion (désastreuse) de la pandémie de Covid-19 par leur favori ou ses attaques contre la démocratie : « La véritable menace, c'est le retour du PT », nous assure M. Sergio Davila, fonctionnaire au ministère de l'économie. « Les menaces de Bolsonaro, ce ne sont que des paroles en l'air. Alors que “Lula”, lui, va de nouveau financer des pays comme Cuba. Nous n'avons rien à gagner avec cette politique. » Des propos qui n'étonnent guère la députée du PT pour le District fédéral, Mme Erika Kokay : « Cela peut paraître incroyable mais, en effet, Jair Bolsonaro jouit d'un soutien solide parmi les fonctionnaires de Brasília, qui gagnent des salaires très confortables. Même lorsqu'il menaçait de détruire la démocratie, cet appui n'a jamais flanché. » À de très rares exceptions, ces fonctionnaires n'ont toutefois pas campé au milieu des « patriotes ».
En revanche, les familles de militaires étaient très présentes. Lors de ses visites régulières, l'épouse du général Eduardo Villas Bôas était fêtée comme une invitée de marque. Son mari, ancien commandant de l'armée, est un proche de M. Bolsonaro et l'auteur, en avril 2018, d'un tweet menaçant le STF d'une intervention militaire si les juges votaient contre l'emprisonnement de « Lula », alors accusé de corruption sans preuve (5). Bien que non officielle, la présence de proches des militaires au sein du campement était un secret de polichinelle. Elle explique peut-être en partie leur refus initial de démanteler le campement, le 8 janvier au soir, après l'invasion de la place des Trois-Pouvoirs. Ils s'y résoudront le 9 janvier au matin, après avoir laissé le temps aux putschistes de s'enfuir…
Depuis, le président Lula a limogé, le 21 janvier, le président Lula da Silva limoge M. Julio César de Arruda, le chef de l'armée de terre. Des fuites dans la presse suggèrent que sa décision a été motivée par le refus du militaire de démettre de ses fonctions un jeune gradé proche de M. Bolsonaro toujours en fonction au sein de l'administration. À cette occasion, le ministre de la défense reconnaît que « la confiance a été rompue » et réitère que « les enquêtes iront jusqu'au bout. “Lula” ne va rien pardonner aux insurgés, y compris s'ils sont militaires » (6).
Cette connivence entre forces de sécurité et militants bolsonaristes s'est illustrée dans de très nombreuses vidéos. Elle explique la facilité avec laquelle les militants d'extrême droite se sont introduits dans les bâtiments, avant de les mettre à sac pendant plus de deux heures. Certaines images suggèrent une ambiance bon enfant entre policiers, militaires et insurgés à l'extérieur du Congrès, tandis que la foule a déjà envahi le toit de la coupole. Une autre vidéo montre l'intérieur du bâtiment : la police est alignée et laisse passer les casseurs, alors que le cortège se rend au Salon vert, qui mène à l'Hémicycle. Les scènes les plus dérangeantes ont été tournées au sein du Planalto, le palais présidentiel. On y voit un commandant militaire tentant d'empêcher que la police militaire (PM, chargée de l'ordre) n'arrête les insurgés. D'autres vidéos du circuit interne de la vidéosurveillance du palais, qui n'ont pas été rendues publiques pour l'instant, seraient encore plus problématiques. « Je veux voir toutes les vidéos, a annoncé le président Lula da Silva, lors d'une conférence de presse le 11 janvier. Celles que j'ai déjà visionnées montrent une connivence des insurgés avec la police militaire, avec les forces armées. Je suis convaincu qu'on les a laissés entrer au Planalto, car il n'y a pas de porte cassée. »
Pour M. Renato Sérgio de Lima, directeur du Forum brésilien de sécurité publique (FBSP), une organisation non gouvernementale (ONG) spécialisée dans les questions de sécurité, cette collusion ne doit pas surprendre. « Nos études concluent à une très forte adhésion des forces de sécurité au bolsonarisme. Elles montrent par ailleurs que la radicalisation des troupes est allée crescendo, et de façon bien plus importante que dans le reste de la population. » L'ONG a par exemple établi qu'entre 2020 et 2021 le nombre de policiers qui participaient aux réseaux sociaux bolsonaristes a augmenté de 27 % (7). Plus d'un tiers des forces de l'ordre serait abonné à ces réseaux, dont 21 % aux pages les plus radicales. Dans le cas de la PM, qui comprend un contingent de plus de 400 000 policiers, 51 % des troupes suivraient les groupes bolsonaristes, dont 30 % les comptes plus radicaux. La police fédérale des routes (PRF), qui compte près de 13 000 membres, constituerait un autre foyer du bolsonarisme. « En quatre ans, ce corps de police a été mis complètement au service du président sortant et de son idéologie, complète Sérgio de Lima. On a vu la PRF réaliser des blocus le jour de l'élection dans le Nord-Est pour empêcher des électeurs de “Lula” d'aller voter. Elle a participé à des massacres dans les favelas aux côtés de la PM en 2022, alors que ce n'est absolument pas son rôle ni son terrain d'action. »
Lors d'un entretien sur la chaîne Globonews, le 12 janvier 2023, le ministre de la justice Flavio Dino a proclamé que le phénomène de radicalisation des forces de l'ordre allait faire l'objet de toute son attention. Quelques jours après l'invasion de la place des Trois-Pouvoirs, il invite d'ailleurs les spécialistes à lui remettre des propositions sur cette question. Cette invitation offre l'occasion d'une énième fake news de l'extrême droite : le ministre doit démentir sur Twitter qu'il aurait embauché le philosophe Michel Foucault pour l'épauler. « Je n'ai pas le pouvoir de ressusciter une personne décédée en 1984 », écrit le ministre le 14 janvier 2023.
Au cours des derniers mois, le complotisme débridé de la sphère bolsonariste atteint son apogée. Leurs groupes de discussion, en particulier sur l'application Telegram, diffusent les théories les plus farfelues, vues et reproduites des millions de fois dans tout le pays. Florilège.
Le 30 décembre, alors que M. Bolsonaro s'est envolé pour les États-Unis afin de ne pas avoir à remettre l'écharpe présidentielle à son successeur, les bolsonaristes sont persuadés qu'il suit en réalité un autre plan. « Il vient de remettre le pouvoir au vice-président. C'est lui, le général Mourão, qui va décréter l'intervention militaire, ce soir dans son allocution à la nation », nous explique très sérieusement M. Marcelo P., un retraité vivant à Brasília qui se rend tous les soirs au campement. Le lendemain pourtant, le vice-président ne décrète aucune intervention : il critique au contraire les campements devant les casernes dans son message télévisé. Les réseaux sociaux l'accablent : « un traître de plus » qui a abandonné le président et son armée.
Autre exemple. Une vidéo de M. Bolsonaro dans un supermarché en Floride est décortiquée par des militants qui interprètent le moindre mouvement de leur leader. Mme Ana Priscila Silva de Azevedo, dont la chaîne Telegram « La chute de Babylone » est suivie par près de 55 000 abonnés, publie immédiatement une vidéo pour annoncer « le début de la guerre. Vous avez vu qu'il [M. Bolsonaro] s'est arrêté devant les piles ? ». Dans la vidéo, M. Bolsonaro jette en effet machinalement un regard vers la gondole devant la caisse. « Il veut nous dire qu'il nous faut des piles pour les lampes et les radios, car la guerre va commencer ! », assure sur Telegram Mme Silva de Azevedo le 27 décembre 2022. Son arrestation, le 10 janvier, fera couler beaucoup d'encre. La militante aurait été protégée, puis exfiltrée, par les militaires, alors qu'elle avait été interpellée au sein du palais présidentiel. Elle a été arrêtée deux jours après les événements, à soixante kilomètres de Brasília. Elle croupit désormais en prison.
Mais on aurait sans doute tort de résumer le bolsonarisme à ses franges complotistes faciles à ridiculiser. M. Amaro Martins, par exemple, enrage. Il craint « la mort de notre mouvement conservateur. Pourquoi demander une intervention militaire ? Je n'ai jamais été d'accord avec cela ».
À une heure en voiture du centre de Rio de Janeiro, dans une de ces banlieues tristes de la périphérie, M. Martins a accepté de nous recevoir chez lui en octobre dernier. Seul luxe au milieu d'une maison modeste, une télévision qui trône au centre du salon. Ce dimanche d'octobre, il rentre tout juste du culte évangélique avec son épouse. À 42 ans, cheveux coupés ras et corps athlétique, M. Martins possède deux commerces modestes dans la ville de Campo Grande. Son épouse propose des soins d'esthéticienne, chez elle. Tout en préparant le repas, M. Martins évoque « [son] président », qu'il espère alors voir gagner l'élection : « Bolsonaro, je l'ai rencontré ici, dans un marché en 2014. Il était en campagne pour les législatives. Je l'ai tout de suite aimé. C'est un homme simple, un homme bon. » Cette année-là, M. Martins commence à s'intéresser à la politique, comme beaucoup de Brésiliens. En juin 2013, le Brésil connaît ses premiers soubresauts sociaux et politiques après dix ans de gouvernements du PT. Des manifestations géantes éclatent, initialement pour exiger plus de services publics. Mais elles sont vite récupérées par les franges les plus extrêmes de la droite. Les revendications mutent. La cible est désormais la présidente Dilma Rousseff, et la corruption qu'elle incarnerait. Le 20 juin 2013, déjà, des manifestants tentent d'envahir le Congrès et le ministère des affaires étrangères à Brasília, au cri de « PT dehors ».
« Je me suis formé en politique sur Internet, en suivant des cours sur YouTube », nous explique M. Martins, chrétien évangélique de l'Église baptiste depuis quinze ans, en nous montrant sur son téléphone la chaîne Terça Livre, créée en 2014 et animée par le blogueur Allan dos Santos. Condamné en 2021 à une peine de prison par le juge de Moraes pour avoir « incité à des actes antidémocratiques, diffusé des fake news et attaqué les autorités », dos Santos a fui aux États-Unis avec l'aide de la famille Bolsonaro et de ses réseaux. L'académie Terça Livre, dont les comptes YouTube et Twitter ont été suspendus par la justice, propose toujours sur son site des cours payants pour « se former » sur de vastes sujets tels que le communisme, le nazisme, la guerre de l'information, l'infiltration de la gauche dans l'Église catholique, etc. « C'est là que j'ai découvert ce qu'était le socialisme et que j'ai compris que j'étais un conservateur sans le savoir. Je suis contre l'érotisation des enfants, l'idéologie du genre que l'école enseigne et que la gauche a toujours promue », poursuit M. Martins.
M. Martins développe. « Plus je m'informe sur Internet et plus je comprends que le communisme est néfaste. Le PT nous fait détester les riches alors que ce sont eux qui créent l'emploi et améliorent la vie des pauvres. La gauche décrète des impôts qui compliquent la vie des plus modestes. Elle n'a jamais aidé les pauvres, elle les a utilisés », assène-t-il avec une soudaine véhémence. Pour l'historien Odilon Caldeira Neto, qui coordonne l'observatoire de l'extrême droite à l'université fédérale de Juiz de Fora (UFJF), « ce mélange de libéralisme assumé et de valeurs conservatrices religieuses est depuis toujours l'idéologie principale de l'extrême droite brésilienne. Elle continue de convaincre des millions de Brésiliens ».
Monsieur Renato O. préfère ne pas donner son nom complet à la presse. Ce représentant de commerce pour une marque de glaces depuis plus de vingt ans a aussi accepté de nous rencontrer pour expliquer son soutien à l'ancien président, en ce début décembre. Il se dirige comme tous les week-ends vers le campement des bolsonaristes à Belo Horizonte, capitale de l'État du Minas Gerais, au nord de Rio de Janeiro. Il a revêtu son maillot de la seleção et s'installe là, sur le trottoir, à côté d'autres « patriotes ». Près de cinq cents personnes sont présentes ce dimanche ensoleillé. Ce qu'il aime en particulier dans ce mouvement, c'est le patriotisme : « Bolsonaro nous a fait comprendre que le Brésil était un grand pays ; il a réveillé le patriotisme en nous. Avant, je disais que le Brésil était corrompu, qu'on ne changerait jamais, mais j'ai évolué avec ce mouvement et je sais maintenant que j'appartiens à une grande nation. » Renato reprend le discours victimaire sur lequel joue volontiers M. Bolsonaro : « Le STF, le Congrès, personne ne l'a laissé gouverner. Et puis même les militaires, auxquels il a donné des milliers de postes, l'ont abandonné. Il est seul contre tous. » Les « patriotes » sont les derniers à le soutenir…
Renato n'est pas armé mais ne cache pas qu'il est prêt à prendre les armes. « Nous n'allons pas avoir le choix, il va falloir qu'on s'engage à un moment si l'on veut défendre notre pays », nous explique très froidement ce représentant de commerce à deux semaines de Noël. Le 10 janvier, nous l'appelons au téléphone : lui ne s'est pas rendu à Brasília. Mais il est en colère, « inquiet pour Bolsonaro », persuadé que « des infiltrés de gauche ont provoqué ce chaos pour détruire le mouvement » et désemparé « face à la lourdeur des peines qui vont être requises contre les patriotes ».
Ce même jour, M. Ricardo Cappelli — désigné par le ministre de la justice pour diriger l'intervention fédérale et reprendre en main la sécurité de Brasília — explique à la presse que « les policiers ont fait face à de véritables professionnels, des gens qui ont été formés et préparés, qui avaient une notion des tactiques de confrontation, qui avaient des gants pour récupérer et lancer des grenades et des objets. Là aussi, nous devons découvrir qui a financé, préparé et organisé cet assaut ».
Le président Lula da Siva se dit désormais décidé à mettre au jour le bras financier et armé du bolsonarisme. En dépit de son échec, ce mouvement ultraconservateur vient de faire la démonstration de sa détermination à survivre au dirigeant politique qui a présidé à son émergence sur la scène politique brésilienne. Il n'est pas impossible que « Lula » soit de nouveau confronté à cette force.
(1) Bernardo Mello et Marlen Couto, « Investigado por incitar atos golpistas, Bolsonaro fez um ataque grave à democracia a cada 23 dias », O Globo, São Paulo, 15 janvier 2023.
(2) Entretien sur Globonews, 26 décembre 2022.
(3) Déclaration lors de sa prise de fonctions, le 2 janvier 2023.
(4) Lire Renaud Lambert, « Main basse sur l'Amazonie », Le Monde diplomatique, octobre 2019.
(5) Lire Perry Anderson, « Au Brésil, les arcanes d'un coup d'État judiciaire », Le Monde diplomatique, septembre 2019.
(6) Cézar Feitoza et Catia Seabra, « Lula não vai perdoar ataques golpistas e investigações vão até o fim, diz Múcio », Folha de S. Paulo, 22 janvier 2023.
(7) « Política entre os policias militares, civis et federais do Brasil », Fórum Brasilieiro da Segurança Pública, août 2021.
Supporters of Proposition 39, the statewide ballot initiative that would implement additional Voter ID requirements for California elections, pitch the measure as a "common-sense reform to increase trust and participation in our elections." Its sponsor, Assembly member Carl DeMaio (R–San Diego), touts widespread support for such measures by Democratic, Republican, and independent voters.
Yet the latest polls show the measure tanking, with a Public Policy Institute of California survey last month showing it losing 55 percent to 43 percent—dismal numbers this late in the election season. The official ballot arguments provide some insight into the reasons. While supporters stick with their "nonpartisan" shtick, opponents tie the measure to President Donald Trump's election denialism.
"Stop Trump from rigging our elections. Don't believe the lies. Prop. 39 MAKES VOTING HARDER, MORE EXPENSIVE, AND LESS SAFE for Californians," per the "no" argument. It refers to the measure's funding from "MAGA rightwing billionaires." That point was reinforced by a recent CalMatters report showing large donations from "deep-pocketed Republican donors." The publication says it's a "signal that conservatives view Prop. 39 as a test of support for future battleground states in the broader push by…Trump to tighten voter restrictions."
That's a fair assessment. In a Democratic state where the president's approval ratings are 24 percent in one poll, it's hard to imagine that most voters will spend much time thinking about the ins and outs of election policy and analyze the measure based on its specifics. They'll no doubt see it for what it largely is: a Republican Party effort to aid and abet Trump's unfounded election conspiracies. That said, its requirements aren't overly obtrusive, only unnecessary.
Currently, Californians must show a state identification or provide the last four digits of their Social Security Number when registering. No identification is needed to vote in person, but election officials use signature verification for vote-by-mail envelopes. Around 90 percent of Californians vote that way, so the main issue involves the requirement that voters add the last four digits from their government IDs on the outside of the envelope—thus adding an additional checkpoint (and sadly an additional opportunity for identity theft).
There's no need to worry about compliance costs for election agencies, as it's their job to administer elections. The measure likely will marginally reduce voter participation (by increasing disqualified ballots, even from legal voters if they forgot the ID they used when they registered), while marginally increasing security. It would force many Californians to re-register, which is a hassle. It would no doubt burden our excruciatingly slow ballot counting.
I don't have any theoretical problem with requiring an identification before voting, but California's elections are remarkably secure. There's no evidence of widespread fraud. Basically no one risks prison time by pretending to be someone else on a ballot. It's not about fixing a problem.
Since his defeat in 2020, Trump has traded in election conspiracy theories. The new GOP game is to trot out evidence-free election-fraud claims whenever they lose. We shouldn't play along. Despite the nonpartisan rhetoric, Proposition 39 is the state GOP's way of leaning into Trump's priorities and, as that CalMatters article noted, build momentum for less-defensible nationwide restrictions—apparently the only way Republicans think they can build a lasting majority. The measure won't do much damage in California as it's fairly modest, but it energizes the party's worst instincts.
Consider what DeMaio wrote in 2024 about his seven-point plan to overhaul the state GOP: "Do you remember a time when Republicans controlled a majority of statewide offices in California and were competitive in the state Legislature and congressional delegations?" He rightly blames the party itself, then offers his first item on a platform to revive it: "Make election integrity CAGOP's top ballot priority." I, too, would prefer more competitive California elections, but my first point would be for the GOP to make a better case for fixing California's messes.
Others see the measure as a means to gin up Republican turnout for a November election that's going to be a referendum on Trump by giving them some high-excitement issue to rally around. But some savvy political observers think that it might backfire. We'll see, but it reminds me that the California GOP has too long relied on cute strategies rather than good candidates.
What about supporters' main claim that Voter ID is necessary because it will restore voters' flagging trust in election integrity? Well, Republicans are the ones who don't trust our elections—and that's precisely because Trump spent the last six years poisoning the well. Do you really believe the people who think MAGA Republican Spencer Pratt could have only lost a Los Angeles mayoral primary (where only 15.9 percent of voters are Republicans) because of fraud will have their faith restored if Proposition 39 becomes law? Doubtful.
Republicans can restore their fortunes by acting normal again. The rest of us needn't enable them by backing a measure based on an election-integrity fantasy.
This column was first published in The Orange County Register.
The post California Republicans Pushing New Voter ID Law Are Motivated by Trump's 'Stolen Election' Fantasies appeared first on Reason Magazine.
On his last morning as a professor, Vladimir Mihić taught both an ordinary and quite unique class.
It was early June, the final day of the academic year at the Faculty of Philosophy in Novi Sad, Serbia's second biggest city, and Mihić had recently celebrated his 24th year in its classrooms.
The day before, the University Senate had voted — in a secret ballot he and his lawyers say was unlawful — not to reappoint him.
A student asked him to give one more lecture, in public, in front of the Rectorate.
Hundreds attended. There were tears, hugs and gifts.
But it was the quiet morning class with his students, Mihić says, that nearly broke him.
“If you went to the same local tavern for 24 years and it closed down, that would be hard,” he says. “Now imagine walking into a faculty with thousands of students you have taught behind you, and someone tells you: ‘You can't do this anymore’.”
Mihić is one of hundreds of Serbian citizens who have paid for supporting the country's student-led protest movement with their livelihoods.
The movement started on November 1, 2024, when the concrete canopy of the recently renovated railway station in Novi Sad collapsed, killing 16 people — a disaster protesters blamed on corruption, and which ignited the largest demonstrations in Serbia's history.
Nearly two years on, the movement has firmly reshaped Serbian politics. Prime Minister Miloš Vučević resigned all the way back in January 2025. After originally just reshuffling the government, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić called for snap parliamentary elections — the protesters’ main demand for more than a year at this point — which are finally taking place on Sunday, October 25.
A month before the election, on September 27, Vučić stepped down from the presidency to lead his Serbian Progressive Party’s election campaign and run for prime minister, a job he held between 2014 and 2017. Vučić, who has been President since 2017, resigned eight months before his term was due to end in May 2027. He would have been barred from running for a third term, while no such Constitutional barrier exists for prime ministerial terms. Critics argue Vučić, by looking to remain in power, is behaving in the manner of other Eastern European strongmen.
But, for the first time in his reign, Vučić’s grip on power might slip. His main rival is the so-called Student List, a leaderless movement born out of the protests, and the polls constantly disagree on whether it or Vučić is ahead in the race.
Opposition to Vučić has not been confined to just students, however – and nor has the crackdown against it.
In the wake of the student protests, supportive teachers, professors, civil servants, doctors and workers at state-owned companies have been dismissed, demoted, transferred or pushed out. Officially, trade union and civil society groups say, the reasons for dismissal are almost never stated to be support for the students.
But more than 100 school employees alone lost their jobs or had their contracts not renewed in the 2024/2025 school year, according to the Independent Trade Union of Education Workers. The number now far exceeds that, says Civic Initiatives, a prominent local civil rights organization.
Serbia's Commissioner for Protection of Equality keeps no separate tally for “political discrimination,” but on the two grounds that fit — union or political membership, and political convictions — complaints more than doubled in a year, from 31 and 25 in 2024 to 70 and 76 in 2025.
These complaints about discrimination rarely yield redress: of eight formal recommendations made in last year's 85 employment-related cases, only two employers complied, the office said in an email response to Coda’s questions.
Dismissals are only one of the tools of repression the government has used. Since the start of 2026, at least 14 students, activists and opposition politicians have been targeted with advanced spyware, says digital rights group SHARE Foundation. And some of that spyware was installed while they were in police custody, says Amnesty International. Additionally, Serbia recorded 209 press freedom violations in 2025, compared to 84 in the year before. Protesters have been charged with attacking the constitutional order, civil society groups have been branded foreign mercenaries, and university teachers have had their pay cut over the blockades.
Ana Brnabić, currently the acting president of Serbia, was leader of the National Assembly at the time of the student protests and claimed that state institutions had no information that spyware was used against students. Vučić, for his part, has claimed, without evidence, that the Student List is being financed by foreign agents, its political ascent part of a plot to undermine Serbia.
Student List — whose lead candidate (not quite the same thing, the group insists, as a figurehead or party leader) is cardiologist Ilija Srdanović – claims to represent voters fatigued by traditional politics and politicians. It is a posture acknowledged by several opposition parties which have chosen to sit out the elections and endorse Student List instead.
On Sunday, as in so many recent elections around the world, a deeply divided electorate will go to the polls, with watchdogs already warning about intimidation and alleging surveillance and possible electoral manipulation.
But back to June, and Vladimir Mihić’s last day as a professor in Novi Sad. The purge at the Faculty of Philosophy was already underway before Mihić became a national topic.
The first to go was Jelena Kleut, a media studies professor and one of the most visible academic supporters of the protests: in January 2026, the University Senate refused, by secret ballot, to promote her to full professor, thus ending her employment even though expert bodies had approved her promotion and more than 1,200 professors signed a letter of support.
“Sadly, we have indication that this is just the beginning,” Kleut warned, referring to a colleague whose reappointment was also in question.
That colleague was Mihić.
The social psychologist, a tall man with a few grey hairs in his beard and a calm voice, had been, like Kleut, an active supporter of the student protests.
“I could not watch it on television while just sitting around,” he says.
On paper, his reappointment was beyond dispute, his file reviewed by a committee that included two of the most cited psychologists in the world.
"It was not just that my file was not disputable,” Mihić says, “it exceeded the standards several times over.”
What his unimpeachable file could not survive, though, was an objection lodged twice by Patrik Drid, the dean of the Faculty of Sport and Physical Education and a vocal opponent of the protests.
Drid claims his complaint concerned what he described as Mihić's active political organizing. The chief example of which, Drid said, was a social media call for students to gather in front of Drid's own faculty, “blocking access to those who wished to work and study.” Mihić maintains he organized nothing of the kind, and that Drid’s objections were personal.
On June 4, the University Senate voted, again in secret, which Mihić said the university’s own legal department warned was against the rules. Eight members voted for his reappointment, four against and six abstained. Under the current rules, the abstentions counted against him.
Trade unions from ten faculties called the outcome a brutal attack on university autonomy, but no explanation was given for why Mihić had lost his job.
He appealed, but the expanded Senate confirmed its decision. Now he plans to take his case to the Administrative Court, a legal battle he says could take years.
The unjust dismissals extended beyond university campuses.
Biljana Hrnčić spent 21 years working for the government of Vojvodina, Serbia's northern autonomous province, most recently as head of its press department. She says she had never once faced a disciplinary measure.
That changed after the protests.
Every Friday at exactly 11:52 a.m., the exact time the roof caved in at the Novi Sad station in 2024, Serbians would leave their desks and head out to the streets to honor the dead in silence. Managers walked the halls, watching.
“They went around the offices to see who took part and who didn’t,” Hrnčić said. “At one point they were so malicious that they simply locked people out of the building.”
For Hrnčić, joining in the protests was unavoidable. Both her children are students. “My children are in the streets,” she said. “It is more than natural that I would walk out onto that same street.”
In September 2025, with street demonstrations still ongoing, Hrnčić and six colleagues were moved into a new department at work. Two months later, the government abolished the department and its entire staff became “unassigned.”
The provincial government of Vojvodina did not respond to Coda’s questions for this story.
“It is a horrifying feeling,” says Hrnčić, who still looks harrowed by her ordeal. “20 years of daily work, never a single disciplinary problem, and you find yourself on the street asking what just happened.”
She and her colleagues are living off their severance pay and their savings while they wait for their cases to be heard in the Administrative Court.
Many of those dismissed have taken their case to Administrative Court, but even winning there guarantees little.
Dragoslav Ljubičić was chief steward of the Nezavisnost union at the Serbian state’s largest thermal power plant. Five years short of retirement, he was a marked man even before the student protests as a rare insider willing, in his words, to call out the mismanagement of the utility.
When the roof fell, he joined the protests immediately, holding 16-minute silences at the plant — one minute for each victim — and organized the first joint rally of students and workers in front of the state-owned electricity company EPS’s Belgrade headquarters.
In January 2025, he received a formal warning citing his Facebook posts. On February 12, managers tried to hand him a dismissal letter at work. He refused to sign it. Six days later, he signed and then sued.
EPS has publicly denied he was dismissed over the protests or his union activity. It said Ljubičić broke its code of conduct, without specifying how. EPS did not respond to questions for this story.
A judge ordered EPS to reinstate Ljubičić until his case could be heard, a decision it could not appeal. But, he said, “they did not give me back my job. They gave me a fixed-term contract and a post that did not match my qualifications at nearly half my previous pay.”
For continuing to complain about his treatment, EPS transferred him to a job that included an exhausting commute from his home.
Ljubičić’s lawyer, Ivan Ninić, who represents a string of dismissed workers, says this is the EPS playbook. Every ruling against the company is automatically appealed, at the expense of the public budget. “We took you back because the law says so,” Ninić said, describing EPS’s attitude. “Now we will make your life hell until you quit on your own.”
Serbian law, he says, is largely on the side of workers; the problem, though, is that the process takes years.
Still, Ljubičić has little patience for the slogan his supporters chant.
“The message ‘Justice for Ljubičić’ misses the point,” he says. “The real message is: stop the dismissals. Mine was the first. And then there came a wave of dismissals across Serbia, most of which the public never heard about.”
Despite the professional and financial hardship, neither Ljubičić, Mihić or Hrnčić expressed any regret. “There has not been a fraction of a second in which I have thought, ‘why did I need to do this.’I could never forgive myself if I hadn't done what I did,” says Mihić.
On Sunday, Serbians will have a long-awaited chance to exorcise their feelings of injustice. The answer to the question of whether it will be enough for a student movement to unseat the populist, autocratic Vučić will reverberate around an embattled Europe.
Phineas Rueckert
Natalia Antelava
The post Can Serbia’s students defeat its strongman? appeared first on Coda Story.
By Ted SNIDER
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The Ukrainian leader faces escalating crises.
Like the man in Monty Python and the Holy Grail, Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky may be crying, “I’m not dead.” It is too early to perform a postmortem on Zelensky’s political career. But it may not be premature to attempt an analysis of his deteriorating condition and struggle to survive.
Zelensky’s strength is being undermined on four fronts: overall domestic support, support from his party, financial support from Europe, and a collapsing relationship with President Donald Trump.
Polls show that Ukrainians, who wanted Zelensky to lead them through the war, no longer want him to lead them after the war. Indeed, having fed Ukrainians with fantastical promises of pushing Russia out of all Ukrainian lands and being welcomed into NATO, and having depended on a cooperative relationship with Ukrainian ultranationalists who oppose a compromise peace with Moscow, Zelensky may have put himself into a position where his presidency cannot survive the war. Polling shows a collapse of domestic support for Zelensky, suggesting that he would lose by a wide margin in the next election.
But, while the foreign media has been entirely focused on the war, domestic attention in Ukraine has also turned to corruption. Zelensky was elected on the twin platform of making peace with Russia and ending Ukraine’s self-destructive corruption. He has delivered on neither.
A key metric is Zelensky’s trust rating. Asked recently which political figures they trust, Ukrainians ranked their president a damning sixth, with only 18 percent of respondents fully trusting him. His main potential political rivals, Valeriy Zaluzhny, Kyrylo Budanov, and Mykhailo Fedorov are all more trusted. A fifth of those who say they do not trust Zelensky cite corruption as the main reason, and 72 percent of Ukrainians say he is personally responsible for corruption in his government. Amid his latest spat with Trump, one recent poll found Zelensky’s trust rating had risen, but the overall trend is still bad, and the rally-around-the-flag effect may prove fleeting. Zelensky has hurt himself with his handling of a snowballing corruption scandal that is reaching deeper and deeper into his inner circle.
And Ukraine’s president is not only losing ground with voters—he’s also losing the support of his party, which once was solidly behind him. He is being confronted by unfamiliar resistance, with dozens of MPs in his Servant of the People party boycotting or rebelling. His legislative supermajority is reportedly at risk as a result of defections.
The lack of support at home also puts in jeopardy EU funding on which the Ukrainian government relies. Ukraine is facing a massive budgetary shortfall totaling tens of billions of dollars. Kiev wants money promised by the EU for 2027 to be provided sooner. But the release of badly needed funds from the EU is contingent on the Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine’s parliament, enacting corruption reforms—and Zelensky’s party has refused to pass such measures. Even a package of tax bills that was passed last week and that could unlock $4.3 billion dealt only with less controversial items, and avoided addressing many of the more serious demands being made by the EU.
Earlier this month, the EU rejected Zelensky’s appeals and refused to accelerate payments to cover the shortfall, again tying funding to corruption reform. According to Slovakia’s Prime Minister Robert Fico, neither Slovakia nor Hungary will participate in another EU loan to Ukraine. Other, more pro-Ukraine EU nations would have trouble filling the gaps. France, for example, is convulsed by riots motivated in part by the rising cost of living, and populist critics of the establishment are quick to remind voters of the vast sums that have already been sent to Ukraine. The right-wing leader Marine Le Pen, currently the favorite to win France’s next presidential election, recently said that, if she wins, Paris will cut financial aid to Ukraine.
But Zelensky’s biggest challenge comes from Ukraine’s most crucial supporter. Shaky relations with U.S. presidents are nothing new for Zelensky. In the first year of the war, when Joe Biden authorized further military assistance for Ukraine, Zelensky complained about what he wasn’t getting. Biden reportedly “lost his temper” during a call with the Ukrainian leader. “Raising his voice,” he told Zelensky to “show a little more gratitude.” The next year, Thomas Friedman of the New York Times reported, “There is deep mistrust between the White House and President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine—considerably more than has been reported.”
But Zelensky managed those challenges. Even following last year’s public debacle that saw Trump throw him out of the Oval Office, Zelensky was able to repair his relationship with Trump. That work has now exploded.
Earlier this month, Trump made three decisions that seemed to collectively amount to a breaking point for a reluctantly conciliatory Zelensky. He made a deal with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin that would allow Russia to sell diesel fuel, he announced a surprise energy ceasefire that demanded Ukrainian armed forces stop all strikes on Russian refineries, and he waived new sanctions on Russia.
This trio of announcements apparently led Zelensky to conclude that his conciliatory approach was no longer working. According to a person close to Zelensky, he let it be known that “plain speaking” was now needed, and he made the decision to publicly criticize Trump.
Zelensky said Trump’s behavior “is certainly not how partners should treat each other.” When Ukraine struck another Russian refinery, Trump said Zelensky “better damn well stop.” Zelensky said Trump was not being fair or honest. He called Trump weak, and juxtaposed his leadership to the “real leaders” in Europe. Trump fired back, declaring, “I think it’s time for Ukraine to get a new president…. I suggest they get a new leader who can make a deal.” Trump later expanded: “I think if they are going to end up with a settlement of some kind, they are not going to do it with him.” On Monday, Trump added, “To be honest, I think it’s time for somebody else to negotiate on behalf of Ukraine.”
The gloves were off, and Zelensky was in danger of losing Trump. The military-grade version of Starlink, which Ukrainians use for battlefield communications, as well as U.S. early warnings of incoming Russian missiles went silent. “He is not a good guy for us to deal with,” Trump said of Zelensky Friday, adding that he is “more difficult to deal with than Putin.” Zelensky, he said, had “destroyed that country.”
When Russia kept pounding Ukraine’s electricity grid with drones, ballistic and hypersonic missiles, and with access to U.S. intelligence was restricted, Zelensky defied Trump’s orders, letting it be known that the block on attacking Russian refineries was off.
Zelensky is a political survivor, but the latest constellation of crises is the most difficult challenge to his leadership yet.
Original article: www.theamericanconservative.com
By Philip GIRALDI
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How many more innocent people will die?
If one were seeking to create something like a modern-day folk tale based on current realities and having the theme of “good versus evil” there are any number of real-life narratives available that could be exploited to invite speculation on actual environments that might have served as models for the fiction. I have found much of the bizarre and blood-soaked evil relationship between the United States and Israel, which serves no US interest at all, to be one such arrangement in which two countries have through their own behavior become the most hated in the world. They have successfully established an odd partnership based largely on a common view of which other nations they hate and would like to destroy.
One must consider the monstrous joined-at-the-hip relationship between Washington and Tel Aviv, which is likely soon to become a true military and policy partnership by act of Congress. It will leverage the already existing ability of tiny Israel to manipulate and dominate the large and powerful United States. And there is also something else that should be reckoned with in the arrangement, and that is melding of the desire of the two countries to dominate not only their neighbors but also far beyond that. One can cite the aberrations in behavior that reveal how neither government wants to get along with other nations except in those rare cases where America and the Jewish state are accepted and even honored in spite of not being bound by any rules, decency or even democratic norms.
A prime example of how the completely murderous pathology that guides both President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that has come to dominate the relationship surfaced last week when Trump endorsed Netanyahu in the upcoming Israeli election. It was a case of two completely evil men finding common ground to congratulate themselves and advance their respective careers, which nearly all of the rest of the world would like to terminate!
Both men are in trouble with their respective electorates in large part because their obsession with endlessly killing anyone annoying be it in the Caribbean or Gaza, has become suspect, largely because the killing is without any actual objective and no real good comes out of the process. This is particularly true for voters in the US who have suffered the bullying by Israel and its domestic Lobby and also bear the tax burden and shortages that are the only fruit that falls from the trees of the conflicts. In Israel the equation is somewhat different as 90% of the Jewish voters want to eradicate even more Muslims and Christians and fully support a new Prime Minister who will kill even more of the vermin.
Observe what a brain dead Trump has to say about his good buddy Netanyahu in a shared phone call in which they first exchanged pledges that they would soon “finish the job,” the “job” in question being the “extermination” of Iran and most particularly its government. Bibi told Trump “Donald, we have a job to finish. You said it, and we’ll finish it together. We’ll finish it, and no one else will do it.” Bibi explained later how “I have spoken about this with President Trump more than once, including the day before yesterday… Finishing the job means bringing down the terrorist regime in Iran. It is the head of this poisonous octopus. You cut it off, and it will fall. We will also have peace with Lebanon. We must complete the elimination of the Iranian regime — that is the primary objective.”
Trump then responded in kind, telling Netanyahu that “You’re a warrior, and you’ve been treated unfairly by your country and from some others … but you’re a great warrior, and we will prove that. We will prove that very soon. I think you’re terrific, Bibi … You’re the man I want by my side, Bibi.” On Truth Social Trump later elaborated how “Bibi Netanyahu has been a Great Warrior Prime Minister and an even greater Partner for Peace in combatting the Islamic Republic of Iran.” He is “Strong, Brave, and Brilliant, the kind of Partner that the United States of America is demanding of Israel, a Country for which it has done so much.”
Clearly Netanyahu wants to get reelected to stay out of jail for corruption, apart from anything else, and he knows that unconditional support from the United States is essential to achieve that end and keep the wars in Lebanon, Syria and Iran going. What the two monsters were pledging was the total destruction of a nation of 90 million people that prior to the war initiated by Israel and the US had not threatened in any way either nation. That means it was per the Geneva Convention a war crime and besides which it is a violation of the War Powers Act and the US Constitution that Trump had sworn to support. Israel was admittedly the driving force behind the war against Iran, which has done huge damage to the world economy, because it saw the country as a political-military competitor in the Middle East region and Netanyahu was able to convince a stupid and willfully ignorant Trump that the war would be over in a week or two, a walk-over.
In a move that is being interpreted as an additional American support for Netanyahu in the upcoming election, US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth made an unannounced visit to Israel on Monday and met with the Prime Minister. The talks reportedly took place at the Ovda Air Base in southern Israel, where US refueling planes and fighter jets are deployed. Hegseth also met with some US troops. As Netanyahu and President Trump have discussed the possibility of restarting the full-scale bombing campaign against Iran the appearance and timing of the Hegseth visit, as he is the strongest supporter of resuming strikes on Iran within the administration, suggests that the war will soon be resuming.
Beyond the depressing likelihood that the war against Iran will soon start up again, there is the language employed by Trump, which as usual is inane. So Bibi is a “great warrior”? That comes from a draft dodger who avoided US military service in 1968 not for any moral reason but because it was inconvenient for him so his father arranged for a Jewish doctor to fake the records for a medical deferment. Trump had “bone spurs,” a condition largely unheard of in the real world before Trump came up with it on paper. And now the draft dodger is praising a “great warrior” who sends his men and women out to shoot three year olds as part of a regime that has been killing children systematically and without any consequences since the conflict with Gaza began.
And, unfortunately, the bad news is still coming. There is no doubt Trump has been the most servile president in US history when it comes to his constant supporting Israel even when it carries out genocide and kills American citizens. Trump has never failed to obey Netanyahu, but, it must be observed, he has only done slightly more so than Biden and the Democrats did when they preceded him in office. So one should have doubts that a possible change-over in the US Congress and Senate, where Israeli flags can be seen flying in some of the offices, is going to make much difference when it comes to the United States “standing with our best friend and closest ally Israel.”
Original article: www.unz.com
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