Wehretat, Wehrdienst und neue Kontrollbefugnisse verändern nicht nur die Bundeswehr, sondern auch die Republik. 

“Wir müssen bis 2029 kriegstüchtig sein.” Der Satz, mit dem Boris Pistorius seine Sicherheitspolitik begründet, ist im Wortlaut so unauffällig, dass sein historischer Defekt regelmäßig übersehen wird: Deutschland sei nicht kriegstüchtig, müsse es aber dringend werden.

Wer das ausspricht, behauptet im selben Atemzug, zwei Jahrzehnte Hindukusch, über 90.000 deutsche Soldatinnen und Soldaten in Afghanistan, 59 Gefallene, die Einsätze in Mali, im Kosovo, am Horn von Afrika und in Litauen sowie das Gefecht von Kundus, in dem die Bundeswehr unter Beschuss kam wie keine deutsche Truppe seit 1945 — all das sei keine Kriegstüchtigkeit gewesen.

Den Hinterbliebenen der Gefallenen ist man eine genauere Antwort schuldig. Sich selbst ist man die Frage schuldig, warum eine Behauptung, die einer historischen Prüfung nicht standhält, zur Voraussetzung einer Politik werden konnte, die das ganze Land verändern soll.

Die Erklärung liegt nicht in einer fehlerhaften Erinnerung des Verteidigungsministers, sondern in der Funktion seiner Sprache. “Kriegstüchtigkeit” ist kein deskriptiver Begriff, sondern eine rhetorische Maschine, die einen Ausnahmezustand erzeugt: Indem das Frühere als militärisch unzureichend disqualifiziert wird, wird das Spätere von demokratischer Rückfrage befreit.

Das Muster lässt sich an drei Indikatoren ablesen, die zusammen ein erstaunlich konsistentes Bild ergeben. Der zwanzigste Rüstungsbericht, der 2025 hätte erscheinen sollen, ist schlicht ausgeblieben.

Die neue Geheimschutzordnung des Bundestages vom 17. Oktober 2025 erklärt zentrale Angaben zu Rüstungsaufträgen zu Verschlusssachen. Und der Wehretat 2026 liegt bei 108,2 Milliarden Euro — gut die Hälfte davon kreditfinanziert über das Sondervermögen und die Schuldenbremsen-Ausnahme, mit einem Aufwuchspfad bis zu rund 153 Milliarden Euro im Jahr 2029.

Ein Staat, der so viel Geld bewegt und so wenig Rechenschaft ablegt, verwaltet nicht Verteidigung, sondern politische Unkenntnis.

Wer trägt die Last der Aufrüstung?

Die ökonomische Last dieser Architektur tragen, wie immer, nicht die Profiteure, sondern die Schwächsten. Am 25. März 2026 erklärte Lars Klingbeil bei der Bertelsmann Stiftung, die Gesellschaft müsse “insgesamt mehr arbeiten”, weniger Teilzeit, später in Rente, das Ehegattensplitting auf den Prüfstand, längere Befristungsmöglichkeiten, schwächere Transferentzugsraten.

Diese Aufforderung fiel in eben jene Woche, in der die Bundesregierung den höchsten Verteidigungshaushalt seit dem Ende des Kalten Krieges beschloss. Die Choreografie war perfekt: Der Vizekanzler bittet die Lohnabhängigen um Opfer, während sein Kabinett dem Rüstungssektor das größte Auftragsvolumen seit Generationen zuteilt.

Rheinmetall meldete 2025 einen Auftragsbestand von 63,8 Milliarden Euro; die US-amerikanische Rüstungsindustrie gab allein 2023 mehr als 139 Millionen Dollar für Lobbyarbeit aus und beschäftigte 904 registrierte Lobbyisten. Friedenspolitik verfügt über keine vergleichbare Infrastruktur — keine Werkshallen, keine Aktienkurse, keine regionalen Arbeitsplätze, keinen Bundesverband.

Friedenspolitik weist nur einige recht allgemein gehaltene Aussagen im deutschen Grundgesetz auf, deren Intention eigentlich das verhindern will, was zur Zeit passiert. Hinzu tritt das stille Interesse derselben Lobby an fossilen Energien, weil sich Diesel, Kerosin und Schweröl im Ernstfall logistisch robuster mobilisieren lassen als dezentrale Erneuerbare — eine Vorliebe, deren Preis die deutsche Handelsbilanz auf der Energieseite weiter verschlechtert.

Was als “Investition in unsere Zukunft” verkauft wird, ist eine Umverteilung im Tarnanzug: von oben investiert, von unten finanziert.

Medial erzeugte Narrationen der Kriegstüchtigkeit

Damit die Bevölkerung diese Differenz zwischen Pathos und Praxis nicht bemerkt, braucht es ein zweites Element: ein Narrativ, das jeden Zweifel in die Rechtfertigungsposition drängt. Das Muster war am 2. März 2026 bei “Hart aber fair” zu besichtigen, als Michael Wolffsohn dem SPD-Außenpolitiker Ralf Stegner mit jener kühlen Höflichkeit, die ein Gespräch ins Insinuierende zieht, mitteilte, seine Argumentation für das Völkerrecht sei “der AfD sehr ähnlich”.

Das ist die saubere Pointe des Kriegs-Hufeisens: Wer auf die UN-Charta verweist, gilt plötzlich als nützlicher Idiot der Autokraten; wer angesichts von 108 Milliarden Euro Wehretat nach Belegen fragt, stört den nationalen Ernst. Der Sicherheitsforscher Johannes Varwick, der von sich sagt, er sei kein Pazifist, beschreibt die Tonlage der Debatte als einen “Kriegstüchtigkeitsrausch”, der nicht auf Verteidigungsfähigkeit ziele; der Spiegel raunt in der Ausgabe 12/2026, die ganze Nation müsse kriegstüchtig gemacht werden.

Selbst Carlo Masala räumt auf Nachfrage ein, sein Russland-Invasions-Szenario stehe nirgendwo geschrieben, erscheine ihm aber wahrscheinlich, weil Putin gerne provoziere — eine empirische Grundlage für Milliardenbeschlüsse, die nüchtern betrachtet ein Offenbarungseid ist.

Dass die Nato Russland konventionell haushoch überlegen ist, dass Moskau seine Ziele in der Ukraine kaum erreicht, dass jede Aufrüstung ein Sicherheitsdilemma auslöst, in dem die unterlegene Seite zu nuklearer Kompensation getrieben wird — und dass Ramstein und Büchel dann zu den ersten Zielen zählen würden — wird in dieser Erzählung nicht erwähnt. Es passt nicht ins Genre.

Das Wehrdienst-Modernisierungsgesetz als Schleuse zur Militarisierung

Wer Wehrdienst-Modernisierungsgesetz, das seit dem 1. Januar 2026 gilt, nüchtern liest, erkennt schnell, dass es militärisch nicht aufgeht. In sechs Monaten Grunddienst werden alle Wehrdienstleistenden ausschließlich zu Wach- und Sicherungssoldaten ausgebildet; erst ab zwölf Monaten ist laut BMVg eine Verwendung “in der gesamten Breite der Streitkräfte” überhaupt möglich.

Für die Laufbahnen, die das einundzwanzigste Jahrhundert wirklich verlangt — IT-Spezialistinnen, Cyber-Analysten, Drohnenoperateure, Nachrichtentechniker — liegt die Mindestverpflichtungszeit bei sechs bis zwölf Jahren. Ein halbjähriger Kurzdienst ist für die moderne Kriegsführung mit unbemannten Systemen, Counter-UAS, elektronischer Kampfführung, Datenfusion und KI-gestützten Funktionen kaum mehr als ein folkloristisches Element.

Er ergibt aber sehr viel Sinn, sobald man fragt, was er nicht-militärisch leistet. Er ist die Einstiegsschleuse, die einen ganzen Jahrgang in Musterung und Uniform zieht und so jenes Reservepotenzial sichert, mit dem Generalinspekteur Breuer rechnerisch auf 460.000 Soldatinnen und Soldaten kommen will.

Was hier als Streitkräfte-Modernisierung firmiert, ist in Wahrheit ein Gesellschaftsprogramm, das Verfügbarkeit mit Fähigkeit verwechselt: Masse ist nicht Kompetenz, und Erfassung ist nicht Verteidigung.

Pistorius selbst beschreibt das Ziel mit einer Klarheit, die seine Apologeten ungern zur Kenntnis nehmen: Der Platz der Bundeswehr sei “in der Mitte der Gesellschaft”, sichtbar, präsent und getragen von ihr (Beförderungsappell zum ersten Veteranentag, 15. Juni 2025).

Der reaktivierte §3 des Wehrpflichtgesetzes verlangt für männliche Personen ab dem siebzehnten Lebensjahr — also vor der Volljährigkeit — eine Genehmigung der Bundeswehr für Auslandsaufenthalte über drei Monate; eingeführt per Generalverweisung im neuen Wehrpflichtgesetz, politisch verkauft als “freiwilliges Modell”, praktisch nur deshalb derzeit nicht angewendet, weil das Ministerium die Norm per Verwaltungsvorschrift “als erteilt geltend” aussetzt — eine Konstruktion, deren rechtsstaatliche Bedenklichkeit selbst wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiter führender Hochschulen offen aussprechen.

Hinzu kommen die verpflichtende Befragung des Geburtsjahrgangs 2008 mit Bußgeldandrohung, der schrittweise Wiederaufbau einer Pflichtmusterung zum 1. Juli 2027 in 24 neuen Musterungszentren, die automatische Einbindung der Wehrdienstleistenden in die Reserve und schließlich, am 16. Januar 2026, die Erweiterung der Befugnisse des Militärischen Abschirmdienstes zu Telekommunikationsüberwachung, V-Personen-Einsatz und Observation auch außerhalb militärischer Liegenschaften — gegen den dokumentierten Einspruch der Bundesrechtsanwaltskammer, die von einer massiven Beschädigung des Mandatsgeheimnisses sprach.

Wer dieses Bündel betrachtet — Datenregister, Verfügbarkeitserfassung, Genehmigungsvorbehalte, soldatisches Ethos als Normalform staatsbürgerlicher Haltung, ausgeweitete militärische Inlandsaufklärung —, erkennt eine Form von Staatlichkeit wieder, die in Deutschland bereits zweimal gescheitert ist.

Einmal im nationalen Heldenepos, das vom Hermannsdenkmal über das Niederwalddenkmal bis Tannenberg reicht und dann in der DDR mit ihrer Wehrerziehung, ihren vormilitärischen Laufbahnen und ihrem Kult um die Nationale Volksarmee.

Der neue Obrigkeitsstaat kommt nicht in Stiefeln. Er kommt im Fragebogen, im Datensatz, im Verschlusssachenstempel.

Militarisierung bereitet autoritären Kräften den Boden

Hier schließt sich die gefährlichste Schleife der ganzen Operation. Die Rechtsradikalen täuschen derzeit Pazifismus vor, weil sie wissen, dass man so schneller an die Macht kommt — kein deutsches Unikat, sondern derselbe Mechanismus, mit dem Donald Trump 2024 antrat, alle Kriege zu beenden, um wenige Monate später unter dem Codenamen “Epic Fury” ohne Kongressmandat, ohne völkerrechtliche Grundlage und nach Auskunft seiner Sprecherin “aus einem Gefühl heraus” einen Krieg gegen den Iran zu führen.

Hitler versprach Autobahnen und Arbeit, Trump versprach Frieden — die Macht wird über Wohlfühlversprechen erworben, der Krieg beginnt danach.

In den aktuellen Werten des Politbarometers (INSA, Stand 12.9.2026) liegt die AfD bei 28,6 Prozent und damit deutlich vor der Union (20,1 Prozent); in Sachsen-Anhalt erreichte sie 43,8 Prozent und ging als stärkste Kraft aus den Landtagswahlen hervor (CDU: 17,2 Prozent). Niemand kann seriös garantieren, dass sicherheitspolitische Schlüsselressorts auf Dauer ausschließlich in den Händen rechtsstaatlich sensibler Akteure verbleiben.

Genau deshalb ist es brandgefährlich, eine weitgespannte Wehrpflicht- und Erfassungsarchitektur zu errichten, ohne sich Rechenschaft darüber zu geben, wer sie eines Tages erbt.

Im Anschluss an die deutlich gewonnene Wahl der AfD in Sachsen-Anhalt im September 2026 äußerte sich deren Spitzenkandidat Ulrich Siegmund zur Frage, wie er zur Aufrüstung stehe, wie folgt: Er verteufele keine Aufrüstung, “weil wir bei (einer) späteren Remigrations- und Abschiebeoffensive natürlich auch entsprechende Hilfsmittel brauchen”.

Siegmunds Begründung für eine weitere militärische Aufrüstung beinhaltet also den Einsatz militärischer Waffengewalt für die Durchsetzung der Remigration. Zu remigrieren sind aber möglicherweise Millionen Menschen in Deutschland, Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund, insbesondere Asylbewerber, und diejenigen, die sie unterstützen.

Auch die SPD-Regierungsmitglieder Pistorius, Klingbeil und Bas verkennen den Charakter dessen, was sie bauen. Sie helfen dabei, die Verwaltungsarchitektur, die Datenregister, die Geheimschutzordnungen, die MAD-Befugnisse und die Kreditermächtigungen umzusetzen— und sie errichten sie in einer politischen Landschaft, in der sie nicht kontrollieren, wer sie eines Tages verwaltet. Die AfD wird möglicherweise dieses Geschenk dankend annehmen.

Militarisierung einer Gesellschaft bedeutet aber auch, dass die Bundeswehr in die Schulen gehen und für den Militärdienst werben kann. Militarisierung bedeutet ebenfalls die mediale Diskreditierung und öffentliche Zerstörung unliebsamer Personen, die hier Zweifel anmelden.

Originalbeitrag Telepolis

By Ricardo Martins – New Eastern Outlook – October 2, 2026

It was common practice during the Cold War to exaggerate the threat from the Soviet Union. Nowadays, Russia has assumed that role. Although the circumstances have changed, some of the political methods employed to create a sense of insecurity are still remarkably similar.

Europe is not formally engaging in preparations for war since it desires one. Instead, the governments of Europe and the institutions of the EU describe their rapidly growing defence policies and war preparedness as being aimed at deterrence, on the basis that Europe has to become strong enough to avoid a bigger conflict.
NATO does likewise, presenting itself as a defensive alliance whose role is to deter aggression. Nevertheless, the extent and the terminology used in Europe’s present military transformation should be examined. If preparedness becomes a top political concern, if huge amounts of public money are channelled into defence industries, and if support for Ukraine becomes more and more tied to Europe’s own security, then a significant question arises: where does deterrence cease and the political preparation for war begin?

The question is especially relevant to the EU, which has throughout its history been based on reconciliation, economic interdependence and a rejection of war.

From a peace project to a defence project

The European Union is experiencing a deep change in the way it views security. This change is no illusion. As part of the ReArm Europe/Readiness 2030 programme the European Commission plans to commit up to 800 billion euros towards defence spending, and the EU has set up a 150 billion euro SAFE lending facility to assist with military investment and joint procurement. The various EU institutions have made it clear that the aim is to eliminate capability gaps, boost the European defence industry and enhance deterrence.

The language that goes with this transformation is just as important. European Defence Commissioner Andrius Kubilius has warned at the European Parliament that Russia could be ready for a confrontation with NATO “in five years or less”. He has also invoked Jean Monnet’s wartime “Victory Programme” analogy, arguing that Europe needs a comparable transformation of its defence industry.

The official view of the Commission is that the issue is one of deterrence and not about starting a war. However, a military system which is intended to deter war needs to have weapons, logistical support, industrial capacity, troops and operational plans. As these capabilities increase, so too does the institutional ability to conduct war.

A paradox arises since Europe claims it is arming itself and preparing its hospitals to receive 2,000 wounds per day – as it is the case in Germany — in order to maintain peace while at the same time setting up a more and more integrated belligerent European defence structure. The EU is considering not just an increase in weapons but also the creation of a European Defence Union, a European Security Council, common procurement, military mobility and a closer relationship between European institutions and NATO.

The fact that this might constitute a necessary adaptation to a new security situation also brings up a more general issue concerning European identity: is the European Union still mainly a peace project which happens to have military capabilities, or is it instead becoming a geopolitical and military actor for which readiness for confrontation is becoming increasingly important?

Is Russia a threat, an adversary, or a permanent enemy?

Here, there is a mixture of perceived threats, old ressentiments and Russophobia in play. The threat perceptions are not the same throughout Europe. Because of historical reasons, such as foreign occupation and Soviet domination, Poland has long viewed Russia differently from countries such as France and Germany, which after the Cold War initially placed greater emphasis on economic engagement and interdependence with Moscow. But that distinction has changed dramatically.

Germany, in particular, has moved from the Ostpolitik-era logic of engagement towards a confrontational security posture. Under Chancellor Friedrich Merz, Berlin has described Russia as a serious threat, committed to a major expansion of defence spending, and taken a leading role in sustaining military support for Ukraine. Germany has also intensified defence cooperation with France, including discussions on nuclear deterrence and European capabilities. Germany has also established a permanent military presence in the Baltic States, with a brigade of around 5,000 soldiers being stationed in Lithuania.

The military buildup that Poland has since carried out has depended largely on the United States and South Korea, highlighting a further weakness: even though the EU has aimed at setting up a European defence industry, European manufacturers have not always been able to provide weapons at the speed and on the scale required by countries that have been rearming since 2022.

A more serious issue is that those who question the military escalation are seen as showing a lack of strength, a state of naivety or a failure to have sufficient solidarity with Europe — what then becomes of democratic debate? French Socialist Ségolène Royal.

The danger of making war readiness a political culture

That is exactly the reason why Europe’s present-day transformation should be subject to democratic scrutiny.

Deterrence becomes a politically dangerous thing when preparedness itself comes to be the main idea of security, when military expenditure starts to compete with other public priorities, and when diplomacy and negotiation are regarded as being of less importance than the building up of military power.

The proper European question therefore isn’t whether Europe is “strong enough” to fight Russia. It is rather what kind of security arrangement the Europeans would like to establish.

The present danger is that, as a result of years of confrontation, rearmament and politics based on the use of threats, Europe might slowly create a political and institutional setting in which war seems ever more certain and peace ever more unrealistic.

Former CIA analyst Larry Johnson says that a wider conflict between Europe and Russia is becoming “inevitable” since, in his opinion, the rhetoric of Europe is increasingly being matched by actions which Russia could see as direct threats. He highlights Germany as especially important, stating that Berlin’s more confrontational rhetoric, its military preparations and its demands on Moscow are leading to a dangerous escalation.

Johnson also sees the capture of Russian ships as a key point of escalation. He maintains that Moscow might view any attempt by Europe to seize its ships as an act of war and could then retaliate against the ships or military assets in question. He also mentions the collapse of diplomatic relations, the rearmament of European forces, preparations for a possible future confrontation, and the increasing pressure surrounding Kaliningrad as factors which reduce the room for de-escalation. In his view, the real danger is not that Russia is seeking war but that European actions are gradually making a direct confrontation inevitable.

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Ricardo Martins – Doctor of Sociology, specialist in European and international politics as well as geopolitics

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36 Jahre nach der Eingliederung der DDR in die BRD stellen sich viele Deutsche die Frage, ob es Deutschland tatsächlich gelungen ist, eine echte Einheit zu erreichen. Die jüngsten Landtagswahlen in Sachsen-Anhalt, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern und Berlin zeigen deutlich, dass Deutschland in politischer Hinsicht nach wie vor gespalten ist.

Aus sozialer Sicht schien die Nation einst geeinter zu sein als heute. 40% der befragten Ostdeutschen sehen heute mehr Unterschiede als Gemeinsamkeiten zwischen den beiden Teilen des Landes. Vor zehn Jahren lag dieser Wert bei nur 23%, wie aus einer im vergangenen Jahr durchgeführten Langzeitstudie der Technischen Universität Dresden hervorgeht.

Was die Politik betrifft, so sind die Folgen des Wahlschocks der letzten Wochen nach wie vor spürbar. Für die Bewohner des Westens ist es schwer zu erklären, dass in den ehemaligen neuen Bundesländern die Parteien der politischen Extreme zusammen die absolute Mehrheit der Stimmen auf sich vereinen. Dort machten die Wahlergebnisse der Parteien AfD, Die Linke und BSW in letzter Zeit zusammen ein Viertel der Stimmen aus.

In der Gesellschaft entstehen Risse. Im politischen System zeichnen sich nicht nur entlang der Achse «Ost–West», sondern auch an verschiedenen anderen Stellen Bruchlinien ab. Die drohende politische Destabilisierung durch den Zerfall der bisherigen Stützen des Staates hebt die Kontraste entlang der ehemaligen Grenze noch deutlicher hervor.

Die Unterschiede zwischen Ost und West werden sich in den kommenden Jahrzehnten wahrscheinlich noch erheblich verschärfen. Der Grund dafür liegt weniger in unterschiedlichen Lebenswegen, der Überheblichkeit der «Wessis», dem «Unverständnis» der Ostdeutschen für demokratische Prinzipien oder der vielbeschworenen «Ostalgie».

Obwohl Ost- und Westdeutsche ihre Lebensbedingungen heute in vielerlei Hinsicht gleich bewerten, sind Ostdeutsche in Führungspositionen der höchsten Bundesbehörden nach wie vor unterrepräsentiert. Seit 2022 ist ihr Anteil zwar von 13,9% auf 16,3% gestiegen.

Besonders deutlich wird der Unterschied im Bereich der Erbschaft und Schenkung: Laut dem Statistischen Bundesamt entfielen im Jahr 2025 95% des Gesamtwerts der bei den Steuerbehörden gemeldeten Vermögensübertragungen auf Westdeutschland.

Einer der Gründe für die bis heute spürbaren Unterschiede sind die Folgen der wirtschaftlichen und demografischen Umbrüche nach der Wiedervereinigung. Nur 17% der ehemaligen DDR-Bürger behielten nach dem Umbruch ihren Beruf, die übrigen mussten ihre Pläne ändern.

In den 1990er Jahren verloren viele Unternehmen in der ehemaligen DDR ihre Absatzmärkte oder wurden geschlossen, während vor allem junge und gut ausgebildete Menschen in den Westen abwanderten. Infolgedessen ist in einigen Regionen bis heute ein Mangel an Einwohnern und Unternehmenszentralen zu beobachten.

Der demografische Abwärtstrend in Ostdeutschland

Ein wesentlicher Grund für die strukturelle Schwäche liegt jedoch in der Demografie. Ostdeutschland hat sich nie ganz von den Folgen des Zweiten Weltkriegs erholt. Dies war auch in der DDR spürbar. Mit der deutschen Wiedervereinigung und der Abwanderung von Millionen Ostdeutschen in den Westen auf der Suche nach Arbeit hat sich diese Situation noch weiter verschärft. So ist die Einwohnerzahl Ostdeutschlands von 1990 bis 2026 um 6 Millionen Menschen zurückgegangen.

Ballungsräume sind jedoch eine Grundvoraussetzung für wirtschaftliche Dynamik. Größe und Bevölkerungsdichte erhöhen die Attraktivität einer Region. Bei günstiger Entwicklung setzt ein sich selbst verstärkender positiver Kreislauf ein: Dort, wo viele qualifizierte Fachkräfte leben, investieren Unternehmen. Das regt den Zuzug neuer mobiler Fachkräfte an, was wiederum weitere Investitionen anzieht – und so weiter.

In Ostdeutschland werden voraussichtlich nur Berlin mit seinen Vororten sowie Leipzig und Dresden einen Bevölkerungszuwachs verzeichnen. In anderen Regionen wird die Bevölkerung weiter schrumpfen. So hat Sachsen-Anhalt beispielsweise seit 1990 bereits rund 25% seiner Bevölkerung verloren und könnte bis zur Mitte des Jahrhunderts weitere 20% einbüßen. Ein solcher Bevölkerungsrückgang zieht fast zwangsläufig einen wirtschaftlichen Niedergang nach sich.

Demografische Prognosen zufolge wird die Bevölkerung im Osten bis zum Jahr 2045 im Szenario ohne Zuwanderung um mehr als ein Fünftel schrumpfen – deutlich stärker als im Westen.

Politik ist der konzentrierte Ausdruck der Wirtschaft

Laut einer Studie des Instituts der deutschen Wirtschaft (IW) erreicht die ostdeutsche Wirtschaft 36 Jahre nach der Wiedervereinigung nur etwas mehr als 79% des westdeutschen Niveaus. Bei einer Reihe von Indikatoren ist sogar ein Rückschritt zu beobachten. Die Forscher sehen das größte Risiko dabei in der demografischen Situation im Osten.

Der einheitliche IW-Index spiegelt den Prozess des Aufholens des Rückstands seit 1990 wider. Neben dem Wirtschaftsindikator pro Kopf werden die Entwicklung der Arbeitsproduktivität, der Kapitalstock in der Wirtschaft, der Anteil hochqualifizierter Fachkräfte im Bereich Forschung und Entwicklung, die Erwerbsquote sowie der Anteil der Arbeitslosen und Selbstständigen berücksichtigt.

Laut dem IW hinkt Ostdeutschland bei einer ganzen Reihe von Indikatoren hinterher oder verzeichnet keine Fortschritte. So sinkt beispielsweise die Erwerbsquote. Bezogen auf die Gesamtbevölkerung erreichte der Osten im Jahr 2010 noch knapp 89% des Westniveaus, im Jahr 2025 hingegen nur noch etwas mehr als 85%.

Auch die Investitionen sind ins Stocken geraten. Gemessen am Wert aller Maschinen, Fabriken, Straßen und Gebäude pro Kopf – also am Kapitalstock – holt der Osten seinen Rückstand seit 15 Jahren praktisch nicht mehr auf. Im Jahr 2010 lag dieser Wert bei knapp 77% des Westniveaus, im Jahr 2025 bei etwas mehr als 79%.

Was die Zahl der Beschäftigten im Bereich Forschung und Entwicklung betrifft, erreicht der Osten nur etwas mehr als 46% des Westniveaus.

Natürlich können die neuen Bundesländer auch einige bemerkenswerte Erfolge vorweisen: die Ansiedlung des Tesla-Werks in Grünheide (Brandenburg), den in Europa führenden Cluster für die Halbleiterfertigung in Dresden und den Ausbau erneuerbarer Energien.

Doch diese seltenen Ausnahmen bestätigen leider die traurige Regel: Ostdeutschland bleibt in Bezug auf seinen wirtschaftlichen Entwicklungsstand hinter dem Westen zurück. Und dieser ungünstige Trend wird offenbar noch lange anhalten.

Germany is moving ahead with plans to give its unusually large F125 frigates a medium-range air-defense capability, helping address one of the most conspicuous weaknesses of a four-ship class that has long attracted attention for having relatively little combat power for its size.

Diehl Defense and Germany’s Federal Office of Bundeswehr Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support (BAAINBw) have signed a contract to adapt and develop the IRIS-T SLM surface-to-air missile system for operational use aboard the German Navy’s F125 frigates. Under the agreement, Diehl will build prototypes and conduct comprehensive test firings intended to validate the system’s integration and performance within the existing F125 architecture. Each frigate will be fitted with two new launchers, each capable of holding 16 missiles, for a total of 32.

“The aim is to make the system mission-capable on the German Navy’s F125 frigates,” Diehl said in today’s announcement. The company described the prototype construction and test-firing phase as necessary to ensure “the seamless integration and maximum performance” of IRIS-T SLM within the frigate’s existing architecture.

The program has moved notably quickly, reflecting the urgency of the requirement.

Germany began examining the feasibility of integrating IRIS-T SLM with the F125 in 2024, with BAAINBw and Diehl studying the technical risks and requirements of adapting the normally land-based system for shipboard use. That effort led to the development of a navalized demonstrator in 2025. In October of that year, the F125 frigate Baden-Württemberg took part in a German Navy Maritime Firing Exercise off Andøya, Norway, carrying an experimental anti-air warfare module based on IRIS-T SLM. Diehl says the module went from concept to firing in less than 10 months and met all established test and evaluation objectives.

The Bundeswehr subsequently reported that Baden-Württemberg fired three live IRIS-T SLM missiles during the exercise. The ship’s radar supplied target data to the missile system, demonstrating the basic integration between the F125’s sensors and the navalized air defense architecture.

The exercise established that the concept could work at sea; the contract signed now is intended to turn that demonstration into a qualified fleet capability.

The German parliament’s Budget Committee approved the adaptation effort on September 23, with the German Defense Ministry describing it as a means of expanding the F125’s self-defense capabilities in response to the current air threat. The ministry also pointed to IRIS-T SLM’s combat experience in Ukraine.

The effort needs to be seen in the context of why the F125 has been such a controversial warship in the first place.

As TWZ examined in 2017, the F125 is a roughly 7,200-ton, 490-foot warship with an unusually small core crew and a concept of operations centered on long-duration deployments, stabilization missions, crisis management, conflict prevention, and international intervention rather than high-end fleet combat. The class was designed to spend long periods away from Germany and operate with relatively modest manpower requirements.

But its armament does not remotely match the size and sophistication of the hull. As completed, the ships were equipped with eight RGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship missiles, a 127mm gun, remotely operated guns and, for close-quarters air defense, two RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile launchers. The F125 has no medium- or long-range surface-to-air missile capability and no organic sonar or dedicated anti-submarine warfare weapon system.

At the same time, the TRS-4D/NR radar and other sensors can see far beyond the engagement envelope of the close-in air-defense weapons, but there is little the ship itself can do with that information against an aircraft or incoming missile at medium range.

Nearly a decade later, IRIS-T SLM is emerging as an answer to at least part of that problem.

Even with IRIS-T SLM, the F125 is well short of being an air warfare destroyer. It also still lacks an organic anti-submarine warfare capability or the kind of large vertical-launch missile battery found on Germany’s F124 frigates.

However, it does fill a gap between the F125’s original short-range defenses and the capabilities of other ships or aircraft operating around it.

IRIS-T SLM is designed as a medium-range surface-to-air system, with an engagement range of around 25 miles and an altitude envelope of approximately 65,000 feet. As shown in the 2025 demonstration, the F125’s radar can feed information directly into the missile system, exploiting the ship’s existing sensor capabilities.

Rather than rely heavily on escorts for protection against airborne threats outside the short range of RAM, an IRIS-T-equipped F125 could at least contribute to its own medium-range air defense. Recent operations in the Middle East have underscored the importance of this in contested maritime environments.

It also gives the ships a more useful role in a task group. The threat environment has changed substantially since the F125’s original concept was drafted. Cruise missiles, drones, loitering munitions, and increasingly sophisticated aircraft mean that even ships operating away from a major naval war can face threats well beyond the range of their existing close-in defenses.

In November 2024, Germany confirmed that the F125 frigate Baden-Württemberg, returning from an Indo-Pacific deployment, would avoid the Red Sea and sail around Africa because of the Houthi missile and drone threat. The German Defense Ministry explicitly cited the ship’s limited air defense capability and its inability to provide an effective air-defense umbrella for itself or its accompanying replenishment ship.

Ironically, the F125’s large hull, extensive electrical power, sophisticated radar, substantial aviation facilities, long endurance and relatively spacious mission areas were always supposed to provide room for a flexible approach to future missions. Yet the class’s original weight and integration constraints made adding major weapons difficult, a concern TWZ also highlighted in 2017.

IRIS-T SLM offers Germany a way to add a meaningful capability without undertaking the much more invasive redesign associated with installing a conventional vertical-launch system. The 2025 demonstration used an AAW module mounted on the ship’s deck rather than a conventional VLS installation, and today’s program is focused on adapting the system to the F125 architecture.

Once IRIS-T SLM is installed, the F125 will still be an unusual frigate. It is enormous by the standards of its mission, optimized for endurance, and lacks some of the weapons traditionally associated with a high-end surface combatant. But it will bring more to a contested fight.

The program should give the class a credible medium-range air-defense role, and provide Germany with a way to get considerably more utility out of four ships whose original design philosophy was always somewhat controversial.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Germany Is Finally Giving Its F125 Frigates Some More Teeth With IRIS-T SLM Surface-To-Air Missiles appeared first on TWZ.

 Al Mayadeen | October 2, 2026

The European Union has begun assessing contingency scenarios in case German Chancellor Friedrich Merz leaves office or becomes increasingly focused on domestic political difficulties, Politico Europe reported Friday, citing diplomats and European officials.

According to the report, governments in two European countries have held internal discussions on how a possible end to Merz’s chancellorship could affect EU policymaking.

The discussions reportedly reflect growing concern in Brussels over political instability in Germany following major electoral setbacks for Merz’s governing conservatives and renewed tensions within the coalition.

Recent regional elections have weakened Merz politically. Reuters reported that the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) suffered its worst-ever result in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania in September, failing to clear the threshold to enter the state parliament, while the Alternative for Germany (AfD) made further gains.

Berlin’s Political Turmoil Raises EU Concerns

Politico Europe reported that officials consider two scenarios particularly disruptive: Germany being left without an effective leader or a right-wing government emerging in Berlin. However, the report said both scenarios are viewed as unlikely in the short term.

Under Germany’s constitutional system, a chancellor cannot simply be replaced by a successor appointed by the governing party. The Bundestag elects the chancellor, meaning any leadership change would require the necessary parliamentary majority.

For Brussels, the political uncertainty matters because Germany remains the EU’s largest economy and a central actor in negotiations over major bloc-wide policies.

Reuters reported Thursday that Merz is facing growing domestic pressure, while speculation about possible successors has emerged within the CDU. Merz has nevertheless rejected calls to step aside and continues to pursue his government’s policy agenda.

EU Budget Dispute Adds Pressure

Merz’s domestic political position could also affect negotiations over the EU’s next seven-year budget.

According to Politico Europe, Germany is part of a group of member states, including the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, and Finland, seeking substantial reductions to the proposed long-term EU budget. The report said officials believe domestic political pressure could encourage Berlin to take a tougher negotiating position in Brussels.

The budget dispute comes as EU governments debate competing priorities, including defense, industrial investment, infrastructure, and support for Ukraine.

Military Buildup Remains Central to Merz’s Agenda

Despite the political pressure, Merz’s government continues to prioritize strengthening Germany’s armed forces. Reuters reported that Berlin’s debt-financed investment drive is supporting both infrastructure and military expansion, while the government has committed hundreds of billions of euros to rebuilding the armed forces.

Merz has also reaffirmed Germany’s support for Ukraine and called for stronger European military capabilities, while accusing Russia of conducting hybrid attacks against Europe. Moscow has rejected such accusations.

Any change in Berlin’s political leadership would therefore carry implications beyond Germany, potentially affecting EU budget negotiations, defense policy, relations with Russia, and the bloc’s wider strategic direction.

Zack Polanski has repeatedly said that his family "fled the Nazis", but it's now emerged that all four of his grandparents were born in Britain, long before the war.

The post Zack Polanski Said his Family “Fled the Nazis”. But All Four of His Grandparents Were Born in Britain – Long Before the War appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.

A few inches below the forest floor in the eastern Taunus hills lies a stretch of the Roman frontier that has barely been examined. The Kapersburg fort, near Rosbach vor der Höhe in Hesse, is one of the best preserved on the German limes, the chain of Roman border defences. Research has long concentrated on […]

France and Germany are moving towards a possible compromise over the future of Europe’s automotive industry, linking negotiations over EU vehicle-emission rules with a separate dispute over how strongly European-made products should be favoured in subsidies and public procurement.

The negotiations bring together two issues that have divided Paris and Berlin: Germany’s demand for greater flexibility in rules governing combustion-engine vehicles and France’s campaign for stronger “Made in Europe” requirements in EU industrial policy.

Officials involved in the discussions believe a broader Franco-German agreement may now be possible, although differences remain over how European content should be defined and whether products made in countries with EU free-trade agreements should receive similar treatment.

The automotive dispute follows the Commission’s decision in December 2025 to propose significant changes to rules that had originally required a 100 per cent reduction in tailpipe CO₂ emissions from new cars from 2035.

Under the revised automotive package, manufacturers would instead face a 90 per cent tailpipe-emissions reduction requirement from 2035.

The remaining 10 per cent could be compensated through mechanisms linked to low-carbon steel produced in the EU and the use of e-fuels and biofuels.

EU Today reported before the Commission presented the package that pressure from Germany, Italy and European manufacturers was forcing Brussels to reconsider the original 2035 framework.

The subsequent proposal confirmed the shift.

In March, EU Today also examined the Commission’s decision to link low-carbon European steel directly to vehicle-emissions compliance, creating a connection between automotive climate rules and support for Europe’s heavy industry.

Germany has continued to argue for a technology-neutral approach.

Berlin wants legislation to leave scope for combustion engines operating on renewable or low-carbon fuels rather than treating battery-electric vehicles as the only route towards lower emissions.

That position is particularly important for Germany because of the scale of its automotive sector and the large industrial supply chain built around combustion-engine technology.

France’s priority is different.

Paris wants EU industrial policy to ensure that public subsidies and procurement increasingly support products manufactured inside Europe.

The argument centres on the Commission’s Industrial Accelerator Act, proposed in March as part of a wider strategy to strengthen European manufacturing.

The legislation introduces “Made in EU” and low-carbon requirements for public procurement and public support schemes covering strategic sectors including automotive manufacturing, steel, cement and aluminium.

The dispute is over what “European” should mean.

France favours a relatively strict definition focused principally on production inside the EU’s 27 member states.

Germany has advocated what Economy Minister Katherina Reiche has described as a “Made with Europe” approach, under which some products from close trading partners could qualify if those countries provide equivalent market access to European companies.

That could potentially include states such as Norway and Switzerland and partners including Canada.

Spain has been among countries seeking a middle position between the French and German approaches.

The issue matters because modern automotive supply chains do not stop at the EU’s external border.

Battery materials, semiconductors, electric motors and other components can pass through several countries before final assembly, while Britain and Turkey remain deeply integrated into European vehicle production.

The EU-UK relationship is particularly sensitive because stricter rules of origin for electric vehicles are due to apply from 2027.

EU Today previously reported that European and British manufacturers were seeking another delay to those rules because the regional battery supply chain had not developed as quickly as originally expected.

At the same time, the EU is attempting to reduce dependence on Chinese electric vehicles, batteries and critical inputs.

The Commission has committed €1.8 billion to a Battery Booster strategy intended to strengthen the European battery value chain.

European electric-vehicle demand is continuing to grow. A 16-market European survey examined by EU Today showed battery-electric cars taking more than a quarter of new registrations in July, although large differences remain between national markets.

Manufacturers must therefore make investment decisions while several important elements of the regulatory framework remain under negotiation.

Factory conversion, battery plants and new vehicle platforms require investments planned years in advance. The conditions applying after 2030 will directly affect where those investments are made.

A Franco-German understanding would not determine the final EU rules. The European Parliament, Commission and other member states remain part of both legislative negotiations.

It could, however, bridge two of the most important disputes: Germany’s demand for greater technological flexibility in the 2035 vehicle regime and France’s demand that public money be used more directly to support European production.

The negotiations now underway suggest Paris and Berlin are increasingly treating those questions as parts of the same industrial bargain.

First published in Respekt.

In Germany’s recent state elections, voters as young as 16 could cast ballots. The results confirmed a global trend of political division between young women and men.

“On 1 January, we both deleted Instagram, TikTok and Snapchat. And whichever of us would be the first to start watching Reels again or download Instagram would have to eat a slice of rotten cheese,” Greta and Lena told Germany’s Deutschlandfunk radio station.

The 16-year-old girls live in a village in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and chose to delete social media because they had been spending far too much time on it. They often scrolled on TikTok or Instagram late into the night, affecting their performance at school. This summer, however, both reinstalled TikTok for a month. This time without the punishment of a slice of rotten cheese.

They did so for an experiment with journalists from Deutschlandfunk. The journalists wanted to find out what political content the girls would consume through TikTok, the popular Chinese social network, during the peak of the election campaign. Mecklenburg-Vorpommern went to the polls on the third weekend of September. And, as is well known, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) swept the state, just as it had two weeks prior in Saxony-Anhalt.

Greta and Lena, however, were in a markedly different position from their peers in Saxony-Anhalt. For the first time, the north-eastern federal state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern had allowed 16- and 17-year-olds to vote in state elections. Since young people consume much of their news on social media, Greta and Lena immersed themselves in TikTok, one of the networks now most popular among young Europeans.

For the first few minutes, the girls watched a range of non-political videos — recipes, tomato growing and “silly” AI videos. Then, at around the third minute of scrolling, the first political content appeared. First came a video about Erich Honecker, the former East German communist politician. “Why am I seeing so much stuff about the GDR here?” Greta wondered. As she continued scrolling, she came across AfD co-leader Alice Weidel herself.

It was the first moment when the girls began to notice how quickly their initially apolitical feed was changing. “I feel as if it is constantly just AfD,” Greta said later. She added that she had not searched for any such content in advance. Over the following month, the girls kept a diary of their feed and observed how, after political videos, more and more similar content began appearing — not only from the parties themselves, but also from a range of accounts that picked up and further spread their messages.

The experiment confirmed what has been known for some time: TikTok and other networks alongside it can quickly form the political world a young person sees and the views they come to adopt. At the same time, algorithms are accelerating a trend of a political divide between young women and men, which was also reflected in the results of the state elections mentioned above in Germany.

Algorithms exacerbate polarisation

This article continues, but the full version is available only to EUobserver.com subscribers. Visit account.euobserver.com/membership

European governments and the United States are negotiating over emergency diesel reserves as a global shortage of refined fuel places increasing pressure on transport, agriculture and industry.

The Trump administration has urged France and Germany to release diesel from their strategic stocks, while raising the possibility of restricting American diesel exports if European governments fail to put additional supplies on the market.

Washington has asked Europe to release about 120 million barrels over six months, according to people familiar with the talks.

The demand puts European governments in a difficult position. Releasing reserves could help reduce prices in the short term, but it would also reduce the emergency buffer available if disruption to Russian or Middle Eastern supplies becomes more severe.

The European Commission, France, Italy, Ireland and Britain held discussions on 1 October over possible diesel stock releases. Germany has been involved separately in discussions with Washington.

France and Germany hold a substantial share of Europe’s emergency diesel reserves.

Under the EU’s Oil Stocks Directive, member states must maintain emergency crude oil or petroleum-product stocks equivalent to at least 90 days of net imports or 61 days of domestic consumption, whichever is higher.

The requirement exists to provide a buffer against major supply interruptions rather than normal market fluctuations.

Europe’s dependence on imported oil remains substantial. Oil accounted for around 38 per cent of the EU energy mix in 2024, while approximately 95 per cent of crude oil consumed in the bloc was imported.

The latest dispute follows months of mounting pressure in the diesel market.

EU Today reported in September that President Donald Trump had urged Ukraine to reduce attacks on Russian refining infrastructure as global diesel supplies tightened.

Moscow has since extended restrictions on diesel exports. At the same time, disruption to Middle Eastern refining and shipping has constrained another major source of supply, while China moved on 1 October to suspend most fuel-product exports outside Hong Kong and Macau.

The result has been a particularly sharp problem for Europe because its refining capacity has declined over the past two decades and it has become increasingly dependent on imported middle distillates.

European dependence on outside energy supplies was already becoming more expensive before the latest diesel shortage. Recent Eurostat figures showed that the value of EU petroleum-oil imports increased by 55.8 per cent in the second quarter of 2026, even though the physical volume imported rose by only 1.2 per cent.

The United States has become an increasingly important diesel supplier since Europe sharply reduced imports of Russian refined products following Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

That means a US export restriction would have an immediate impact on the European market.

EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič said after discussions with US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer that Brussels wanted a coordinated transatlantic approach to lowering diesel prices.

He said restrictions on US diesel exports would damage Europe’s economic performance and that both sides had agreed to remain in close contact.

Šefčovič also noted that the EU had exceeded its commitment to purchase US energy under the trade agreement reached at Turnberry in 2025.

US Energy Secretary Chris Wright, meanwhile, said he was “highly confident” European governments would release additional stocks.

Wright argued that coordinated action was particularly important as the northern hemisphere moved into the harvest season and towards winter, when demand for diesel and heating fuels normally increases.

Emergency releases have already been used on an exceptional scale this year.

In March, the 32 members of the International Energy Agency agreed to make 400 million barrels of oil from emergency reserves available to the market after disruption caused by the Middle East conflict.

It was the largest coordinated stock release in the organisation’s history.

A further European release would therefore come only months after governments had already drawn on strategic reserves to stabilise markets.

The pressure is increasing as oil prices again move higher. Brent crude settled above $102 a barrel on 1 October amid concerns over Chinese fuel exports and further US military deployments to the Middle East.

EU energy officials are now considering whether the immediate risk of high diesel prices outweighs the value of keeping fuel in reserve against a potentially more serious supply disruption later in the year.

Was steckt hinter dem ungewöhnlichen Protest von sechs EU-Ländern, die sich gegen die Haushaltspläne von Ursula von der Leyen und ihrer EU-Kommission gestellt haben?

Zunächst zum Kern des Skandals: Vor kurzem wurde bekannt, dass Brüssel den eigenen Haushalt, der größtenteils aus den Beiträgen der EU-Mitgliedstaaten in den gesamteuropäischen Finanztopf gespeist wird, deutlich aufstocken möchte.

Doch die Regierungschefs von Deutschland, Österreich, Schweden, Finnland, den Niederlanden und Dänemark sprachen sich gegen eine Erhöhung des EU-Budgets aus und forderten eine Kürzung der Finanzierung um „mehrere hundert Milliarden Euro“. Bundeskanzler Friedrich Merz und seine fünf Kollegen erklärten im Rahmen der Finanzverhandlungen mit der EU, dass der Haushaltsvorschlag der Europäischen Kommission inakzeptabel sei.

Warum aber? Was ist passiert? Man könnte meinen, es mache keinen Unterschied, wie hoch der EU-Haushalt ist, da die Gelder, die die EU-Länder in die Kasse einzahlen, an dieselben Länder zurückfließen. Sie werden lediglich von Brüssel verteilt und nicht von Berlin, Kopenhagen oder Wien. Das Geld verschwindet also nicht und fließt nicht in dunkle Kanäle; es bleibt innerhalb der EU.

Doch so einfach ist es nicht. Der Protest wurde von den Nettozahler-Ländern geäußert. Das sind jene Staaten, die mehr in die EU-Kasse einzahlen, als sie zurückerhalten. Und wenn diese nun protestieren, dann deshalb, weil – wie «Die Zeit» schrieb: Die Nettozahler-Länder lehnen eine Erhöhung des EU-Haushalts ab, weil sie Probleme mit ihren eigenen Budgets haben.

«Die von der EU-Kommission vorgeschlagene nominale Aufstockung um rund 60 Prozent sei «schlichtweg nicht realistisch, weder wirtschaftlich noch politisch. Zudem verwiesen die sechs Länder darauf, dass es in ​vielen EU-Ländern bereits jetzt ernsthafte Sorgen wegen der hohen Schulden ‌in den nationalen Haushalten ‌gebe». – schrieb «Die Zeit».

Der Streit hat also einen triftigen Grund. Als Geld im Überfluss vorhanden war und die Zeiten wohlhabend waren, reichte es für alles und jeden. Doch jetzt reicht es nicht mehr.
Dies ist eine direkte Folge von zwei Faktoren: dem Krieg in der Ukraine gegen Russland und der verlorenen wirtschaftlichen Konkurrenz gegenüber China.
Der Skandal selbst zeigt, dass die reichsten EU-Länder bereits „überfordert“ sind.

Ihre Volkswirtschaften sind überlastet. Deshalb hat diese Gruppe von sechs EU-Ländern Brüssel nun faktisch ein Ultimatum gestellt und gefordert, für den EU-Gipfel im Oktober neue, gekürzte Haushaltspläne zur Diskussion vorzulegen.

Merz strebt eine Einigung mit Brüssel noch vor Ende dieses Jahres an. Deutschland ist der größte Nettozahler der EU. Es gibt unterschiedliche Berechnungen, aber aktuellen Daten zufolge wird erwartet, dass Deutschland jährlich zwischen 13,1 Milliarden und fast 14,8 Milliarden Euro in den EU-Haushalt einzahlt. Diese Beiträge werden ausschließlich aus deutschen Steuergeldern finanziert.

Multipliziert man diese Summe mit sieben (da der Finanzplan der EU auf sieben Jahre ausgelegt ist), kommt ein beachtlicher Betrag zusammen. Dies erklärt, warum Merz den Vorschlag der Europäischen Kommission ablehnt, die Ausgaben für den Zeitraum 2028–2034 auf 2 Billionen Euro zu erhöhen – im Vergleich zu den 1,3 Billionen Euro des aktuellen EU-Haushalts für 2021–2027.

Entschuldigen Sie die vielen trockenen Zahlen. Doch unterm Strich lässt sich sagen, dass die EU-Staaten begonnen haben, auf das Geld zu achten und zu sparen. Dies ist – nach der Einführung teilweiser Kontrollen an den EU-Binnengrenzen – der zweite Schritt in Richtung Abschottung und ein Zeichen für das Wanken des gesamten EU-Konstrukts. Denn wenn der nächste Siebenjahresplan bestenfalls auf dem bisherigen Niveau bleibt, während die Inflation in der Eurozone steigt, bedeutet das real einen Rückgang der Mittel.

Das heißt, die ärmeren EU-Länder werden weniger erhalten, was ihren Unmut und ihre Kritik verstärken wird. Zumal jeder genau sieht, dass die Ukraine und die korrupte Clique um Selenskyj jede gewünschte Summe erhalten. Alle Forderungen aus Kiew werden erfüllt; Milliarden an europäischen Geldern fließen dorthin.

Daraus ergibt sich die Frage: Wird sich eine solche Situation und die finanzielle Ungerechtigkeit nicht auf die europäische Solidarität auswirken?

Für mich ist die Antwort offensichtlich: Das wird sie. Wirtschaftlicher Neid und das Gefühl finanzieller Benachteiligung werden die ärmeren EU-Länder um ihren ruhigen Schlaf bringen.

Die ärmeren EU-Staaten werden keine zusätzliche Unterstützung für die Stärkung ihrer Grenzen und ihrer nationalen Sicherheit erhalten können. Polen und die baltischen Staaten beispielsweise sehen sich an vorderster Front, um das „aggressive Russland“ in Schach zu halten. Sie versichern Brüssel, dass sie quasi ihr Blut vergießen und sich für die Sicherheit der EU opfern.
Doch werden sie sich nicht gekränkt fühlen, wenn man ihnen ihre Russophobie und ihre Kriegslust nicht stärker vergütet?

Oder werden sie freudig in die Hände klatschen und rufen: „Natürlich ist die Ukraine wichtiger, schickt das Geld nach Kiew zu Selenskyj, wir kommen hier schon irgendwie zurecht“?
Natürlich werden die Balten, Polen und Rumänen beleidigt sein. Sie sind nicht der EU beigetreten, um Europäer zweiter Klasse zu bleiben.

Darüber hinaus sehen diese Länder, wie Deutschland immer mehr Geld für seine eigene Armee bereitstellt. Dies wird die längst vergessenen historischen Ängste vor einem bis an die Zähne bewaffneten Deutschland wiederbeleben – und tut es bereits. Diese Phobien sind im Grunde nie wirklich verschwunden.

In Polen hat man den 1. September 1939 nicht vergessen. Wenn man zudem bedenkt, dass Polen heute die ehemals deutschen Städte Danzig, Stettin, Breslau usw. besitzt, könnte es den Westpolen durchaus ungemütlich werden, und ein kalter Schauer könnte ihnen über den Rücken laufen. Natürlich erheben die Deutschen derzeit keinerlei Ansprüche auf ihre alten Gebiete. Es gilt als ausgemacht, dass diese Frage für immer abgeschlossen ist.

Doch falls die rechte AfD an die Macht käme, könnte es dann zu unangenehmen Überraschungen für Polen und viele andere EU-Länder kommen? Niemand kann diese Frage derzeit beantworten. Aber ich verstehe, warum Donald Tusk nach dem Erfolg der AfD bei den jüngsten Landtagswahlen in Deutschland so unzufrieden war. Er bezeichnete diejenigen Polen, die sich über die Wahlerfolge der AfD freuen, als Idioten.

Und ich stimme Tusk zu. Er sieht sehr genau, wohin sich Deutschland bewegt. Deutschland will „wieder kriegstüchtig“ werden. Dieser Begriff von Verteidigungsminister Boris Pistorius und Friedrich Merz stammt genau aus den dreißiger Jahren. Und auch das Wort „wieder“ weckt äußerst beunruhigende Assoziationen.

Übrigens möchte ich im Zusammenhang mit der fortschreitenden Militarisierung Deutschlands noch eine weitere Nachricht erwähnen: Deutschland plant den Bau eines zweiten Marinestützpunktes an der Nordseeküste. Bisher gibt es nur einen einzigen deutschen Marinehafen an der Nordsee, und zwar in Wilhelmshaven. Doch laut der Nachrichtenagentur DPA soll bald ein zweites militärisches Objekt der Marine in Emden entstehen. Der neue Marinehafen mit einer Fläche von 40 Hektar soll Liegeplätze für sieben Fregatten, zehn Minenjäger und zehn Schlepper bieten.

Man kann also verstehen, dass Deutschland, wenn es gegen die großen finanziellen Appetitlichkeiten Brüssels protestiert, dieses Geld keineswegs für deutsche Rentner oder Ärzte sparen will. Nein. Dieses Geld wird mit Sicherheit in militärische Zwecke, in die Militarisierung und in die verstärkte Hilfe für Kiew fließen. Merz interessieren die Bedürfnisse deutscher Senioren oder sozialer Wohnungsbau für Studenten in Berlin nicht. Für ihn ist der Krieg gegen Russland das Wichtigste.

Daher ist der Protest gegen die Aufstockung des EU-Haushalts nur eine weitere Etappe der Spannungen in Europa. Brüssel wird weniger Geld für Programme zur Unterstützung von LGBTQ-Gemeinschaften in Afrika und Zentralasien haben, ebenso wie für Programme zum Ausheben von Panzergräben im Baltikum an der Grenze zu Russland. Dafür wird Deutschland aber mehr Geld für Kiew sowie für den Bau neuer Kasernen und Militärhäfen haben.

By Leonid Ragozin | The American Conservative | September 30, 2026

Britain’s Labour Party is not traditionally thought of as a bastion of militarism or authoritarianism. Yet listening to some of what its top figures have been saying recently might cause one to doubt the conventional wisdom on that.

Consider what Labour Party strategist Paul Richards said in a GB News interview earlier this month. Asked how the UK might respond to an increased Russian threat, Richards—who has worked for two Labour governments—gave a disturbing answer. “We’d have to lock some people up,” he said, “some of the pro-Russian voices, people who say there isn’t a threat, [and say] ‘Don’t fight for your country, don’t go to war for Burnham.’”

His comments are not a one-off. They reflect a worrying trend among Britain’s political mainstream—the old parties, media, and think tanks—which has increasingly adopted a siege mentality informed by the far-fetched expectation of imminent war with Russia.

Nor is the trend restricted to Britain. It spans the entire Western world. And it helps explain why the centrist political forces previously seen as “reasonable” are losing ground to the supposed “fringe.” Apocalyptic millenarianism is no longer the domain of radical obscurantists, but of people like NATO’s secretary-general Mark Rutte, who in 2025 seemed to foretell with relish a conflict between Europe and Russia on the scale of  the Second World War. “Imagine it,” he said, “a conflict reaching every home, every workplace, destruction, mass mobilisation, millions displaced, widespread suffering and extreme losses.”

It is politicians branded as far right or far left radicals who, surprisingly, have emerged as the main opposition to this unhinged bellicosity.

What’s largely prompting this trend is the very logic of the liberals competing with the populists. Western societies display a demand for performative “toughness,” which caters both to the infantilism of their political classes and the gamification of war in far off countries.

Things seem to have begun in earnest in 2016, when the prospect of liberals losing to rivals like Donald Trump led the former to embrace conspiracy theories like Russiagate and double down on foreign policy hawkishness as a way of evading responsibility for their own failures. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine served a similar function, providing a theater for “toughness” even as the West has gotten bogged down in what has increasingly turned into a proxy conflict.

Trying to outdo the populists along a different axis, rather than doing the hard work of opposing them with value-based positions, has led the centrists into a trap. It left a vacuum in the center, into which the populists—ever alert to political opportunities—have deftly stepped.

Here is how it plays out in Germany. When the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) suffered an embarrassing defeat in Saxony-Anhalt earlier this month, the party’s leader and premier in North Rhine-Westphalia, Hendrik Wüst, said the government should consider banning the AfD (which won the election by a landslide). Wüst is eyed as a potential replacement for the unpopular chancellor Friedrich Merz.

The CDU went on to suffer additional defeats in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and in Berlin. The former is particularly symbolic, because this is where the Nord Stream gas pipelines make landfall—a fact that makes this state a direct beneficiary of the German-Russian joint venture to supply cheap Russian gas to the German economy.

When Nord Stream 2 was blown up in September 2022, the immediate consensus in the West was that Moscow was responsible. Yet the culprits turned out not to be Russian, but Ukrainian. German police investigators eventually charged individuals associated with Ukraine’s military intelligence service for the attack. (It’s worth noting that this Ukrainian spy agency was rebuilt in 2015 with considerable assistance from America’s CIA.)

Germany’s rejection of Russian gas supplies after Putin’s all-out invasion in Ukraine can be seen as a noble gesture, perhaps, but it had dire consequences for the country’s economy, which contracted in 2023 and 2024 before showing anemic growth in 2025. Even more importantly, it hit every household in Germany with skyrocketing heating and power bills. Interestingly, Germany wasn’t receiving Russian gas at the time of the explosion, which means the attack was aimed at preventing the resumption of supplies after the end of war rather than interrupting ongoing exports.

The German government has never properly addressed the issue at the federal level. On the eve of September elections, Merz’s sharp reaction to the Leipzig drone incident, which he instantly blamed on Russia, contrasted sharply with the virtual absence of a response to the perpetrators of the Nord Stream attack.

Voters in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania slaughtered Merz’s party, excluding it entirely from the state’s legislature for the first time in nearly 80 years. The big winner was the AfD—a party unafraid to ask questions about Nord Stream and which muses about restoring gas supplies after the Ukraine War ends. Voters also largely spared the Social Democrats, under whose leadership Nord Stream was built in the first place (although they had to disown it after Russia’s invasion).

The early days of tension between post-Soviet Russia and the West, which culminated in the war in Ukraine, were marked by squabbles over pipeline projects delivering gas to Europe (remember South Stream or Nabucco?). The unyielding opposition of centrist politicians to such projects has led voters to wonder whether their political establishment is more interested in catering to armsmakers and shale gas producers than in providing for its citizens. It’s hard to think of a better illustration of NATO’s unofficial mission to “keep the Germans down and the Russians out” than the fate of Nord Stream.

The perception of abandonment is what fuels the popularity of the AfD’s sovereigntist stance. And despite accusations of extremism, it is the AfD who sounds the most moderate and reasonable on the vital issues of war and peace.

Indeed, their foreign policy stance provides AfD leaders with one bulletproof rebuttal to accusations of fascism. A defining component of the fascist ideology is aggressive militarism—a trait exhibited by the German political establishment, not its hard-right challengers. The AfD fills the shoes of the old-school left-wing peaceniks when it comes to Ukraine, while the Merz government staunchly supports further escalation while discreetly undermining Trump’s efforts to bring the conflict to a close. The AfD also condemns the war on Iran (which Merz initially supported, before making a U-turn under public pressure).

(Ex-)centrists also advocate an enormous defense spending hike Germany can ill afford, as well as compulsory military service (this latter move has sparked youth protests across the country). The way mainstream German politicians are courting the far right in Ukraine—members of Azov movement prominently featured at the prestigious Munich Security Conference this year, for example—make the charges of nazism levelled against the AfD look especially lame.

Opposing Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which the AfD does, is one thing. Supporting an endless proxy war with a nuclear-armed great power—and committing to fight this “to the last Ukrainian”—is quite another.

And the polls suggest German voters have little appetite for risking their country’s future in such a gambit.

The AfD and other insurgent parties thrive when their opponents lean into hawkishness and authoritarianism, but so far there is little evidence the establishment understands this. Indeed, European political elites are doubling down. They recently invited Zelensky’s former press secretary, Iulia Mendel, to speak in front of the European Parliament. But Mendel is a vocal critic of her former boss, and so the parliament’s centrist leadership banned her from entering after Zelensky’s government imposed sanctions on her (an extrajudicial punishment he is routinely applying to political rivals). By banning Mendel from speaking and turning a blind eye on Zelensky’s abuse of power, the center once again chooses delusion and bellicosity over a genuine commitment to democracy.

Meanwhile, alternatives like the AfD will continue to fill the vacant space left in the middle of the political spectrum.

A regional German court sentenced a 29-year-old Syrian man to four years and 10 months in prison for attempted manslaughter after he stabbed a man in the neck during a dispute at a Cologne drug hotspot, slightly reducing an earlier five-year term after Germany’s highest criminal court ordered a resentencing.

The Cologne Regional Court imposed the penalty Friday following a brief retrial, the Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger reported. The Federal Court of Justice had largely upheld the original findings but ruled that the first chamber had improperly double-counted an aggravating factor.

The stabbing occurred on April 27, 2025, at the Josef-Haubrich-Hof near Neumarkt, an area known for heroin and cocaine dealing. The defendant intervened in an argument within the drug scene and was struck during the altercation between the two men, possibly with brass knuckles. In anger, he then drew a folding knife and stabbed one of the men in the neck, severing his jugular vein, the court findings stated.

Berlin bus passenger in critical condition after Syrian suspect stabbed him in the neck for refusing cigarette

Blood sprayed from the stab wound immediately. The 47-year-old victim dragged himself to a stairwell in the Neumarkt passage and collapsed.

Prosecutors said in the first trial that the attacker recognized the victim would die without help but was indifferent to whether he survived.

The victim lost about 1.5 liters of blood, spent three days in a medically induced coma after emergency surgery at the university clinic, later suffered a pulmonary embolism, and continues to experience pain, shortness of breath, anxiety and sleep problems, the Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger reported. A scar also remains on his neck.

Germany: Indian migrant stabs supermarket employee to death in Hamburg in front of shocked customers

The victim told the court he has been living on the street.

Defense lawyer Mario Geuenich described the convicted man as “peace-loving” but said that day he was “surely not in control of his senses” and that the act stemmed “from affective agitation.”

The defendant said, “I really regret it,” and told the court he had stopped using alcohol, drugs and methadone while in custody. He also told the court he wants to bring his wife and children from Syria to Germany and lead a normal life.

‘We have imported knife violence’ – Wave of knife attacks shakes Germany once again

The victim addressed the defendant directly: “I forgive you. But my life is fucked up and shitty.” He added, “God bless you. I ask for a mild sentence,” and said, “God is his judge, not me.”

Presiding Judge Achim Hengstenberg replied, “But we still exist.”

Mitigating factors included the apology, expressed remorse and the victim’s forgiveness. Aggravating factors were the dangerous knife wound and the defendant’s prior convictions. The new sentence is two months shorter than the original. The victim’s lawyer, Eva Kuhn, said she was satisfied with the sentence and plans to seek compensation from the convicted Syrian.

The verdict is final.

Germany: Knife crime reaches 10-year high in Berlin as immigration soars

The post Germany: ‘Peace-loving’ Syrian migrant sentenced for stabbing man in the neck, now wants to bring his wife and child to Germany appeared first on Remix News.

On 30.09.1965, the Indonesian army and its militias, backed by West Germany and the United States, used a failed coup as a pretext to murder up to three million suspected communists. This documentary uses the West German government’s own files to expose Bonn’s role in the genocide.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

The files show that Bonn knew of the massacres from the first week. Its ambassador called the slaughter “a cleansing entirely in our interest” and called the killers “our friends in the army”. West Germany spread the army’s propaganda, held out money to the army’s side and cleared weapons for it, to keep Inadonesia out of communist hands and away from recognising the GDR. Six of the first seven West German ambassadors in Jakarta had been Nazi party members or Nazi propagandists. To this day, Berlin rejects what it calls “the hypothesis of support”.

Original article:  braveneweurope.com

Merz is a dead man walking. Fear and warmongering don’t win votes.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

Having found out the hard way what it means to get slapped in the face at election time in Saxony-Anhalt, the CDU really got pulled backwards through the hedge on the 20th of September in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania (Meck/Pomm) and Berlin.

Looking at Meck/Pomm first, voter turnout was 78.1% – about the same as in Saxony-Anhalt with 77.8%.

The official, though still provisional, final result can be classed as a mini-bombshell compared to Saxony-Anhalt, but eye-opening nonetheless. There will be four parties taking seats in the state parliament.

AfD 38.2% = 32 seats
SPD 35.5%, with the incumbent state minister-president looking to stay in office = 29 seats
Die Linke (Left) 6.5% = 5 seats
Die Grüne (Greens) 5.7% = 5 seats

The state parliament has a total of 71 seats.

Now the interesting part: CDU 4.9%, zero seats thanks to the 5% hurdle; as also the FDP 1.0%, also zero seats.

Now let’s bring in a bit of perspective.

The AfD have won the next election, though not with such a large margin as in Saxony-Anhalt, but still a victory.

The incumbent minister-president since 2017, Manuela Schwesig, belongs to the top echelon of the SPD. She previously held the post of Minister for Education, Family, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth on a federal level from 2013–2017, and had held a similar post in the state parliament of Meck/Pomm from 2008–2013. She had a difficult time when the SPD moved away from being a working-man’s party and followed the so-called social reforms that drastically cut into the social security system, Schwesig trying to cushion the hard cuts as far as possible. Her role in politics has always come across as sincere and caring, giving the impression of being honest.

She belongs to the few SPD politicians expected to bring the ailing SPD back into a brighter future, but appears to want to stay in her position in Meck/Pomm, at least for the time being.

The Greens and the Left achieved what was expected of them: the Greens struggling, and the Left still trying to gain strength again after a period of internal turmoil after Sahra Wagenknecht walked out and started her own movement, BSW, taking some left-wing voters with her.

The Greens started out as a pacifist party, against military build-up and environmental degradation. Since 2022, they have become one of the foremost supporters of the regime in Ukraine and of a German and European rearmament, sometimes outdoing the established conservatives. This has cost them a lot of support from the environmental wing, mainly young voters. The anti-war supporters have turned to the AfD, and to some extent to the Left, the only parties propagating a more peaceful and diplomatic solution.

The big bang here in this election is not the FDP. They are of no real significance at the moment, having been in many coalition governments since 1949, always helping the two main parties to necessary majorities. They seem to have lost their own profile, trying to be partner to their campaign opponents and losing their way.

The big thing is the CDU, the governing party nationally, getting a measly 4.9% and thus being kicked out of the state parliament. This is massive. Mr. Merz is basically a dead man walking, and the writing is on the wall for all to see.

The once East German states still feel left behind and cheated after reunification. The programs set up to modernise and repair the old GDR benefited mostly Western German companies and institutions. Tenders were fixed and hundreds of enterprises went into receivership, only to be sold for a song to Western investors.

This is one of the underlying issues still in the minds of ex-GDR citizens and is trotted out as an explanation for just such election results. This is, however, valid only as an excuse to paste over the shortcomings of the established parties, ignoring the real issues such as de-population of the villages with missing infrastructure to care for an ageing population, low employment opportunities, migrant issues, and mistrust of the established parties. The driving power at the time of reunification was the CDU, whose promises did not come to pass. So a socialistic and an alternatively conservative platform were the choices of the day.

The elections in Berlin did not, at first glance, hit the CDU as badly as in the other two German states. Being Berlin, the capital city does, however, put another emphasis on the results. And here too the governing parties lost significantly to the parties on the wings, AfD and Linke. The results are as follows, with gains and losses added for clarification:

Die Linke        25.7%             47 seats          +13.5%
CDU                18.8%             34 seats          −9.4%
AfD                 16.3%             29 seats          +0.1%
Grüne             14.3%             26 seats          −4.1%
SPD                 12.1%             22 seats          −10.1%
BSW                4.7%               under 5% hurdle, no seats
FDP                2.5%               under 5% hurdle, no seats

The participation was 74.2%.

The state parliament has 158 seats and the majority starts at 80 seats. This means there will definitely be a coalition government. All the signs at the moment point to a coalition between the Linke (Left), SPD and Greens.

The AfD have not been able to gain on the same scale as in the other elections. This is due mainly to two factors.

Berlin has an urban environment, and as such a more concentrated electorate with a younger population, and one that has many newcomers from other German states.

The second being massive problems unique to such environments. Affordable accommodation being one of the central issues. The AfD has no track record of city management and no real new concepts on offer that are different enough to entice voters to take the plunge in the direction of the AfD.

It still is surprising that parties with such losses as the SPD can still come into power. Putting the CDU aside, the biggest losers in this election come to power regardless. That is the beauty of a coalition.

The Linke, the Left Party, are not really trusted by the established parties and conservative voters, as there is still an aura of communism surrounding them. Regardless of this, the election results are clear, and it will be interesting to see how the Linke will be able to carry through their campaign themes, mainly focusing on the housing problem, into reality. The other coalition partners will do their best, so no too-radical changes are to be expected.

Here again one can see the ruling parties on the federal level have been given a clear message, and the losses paint a grim picture. It will be an uphill task to change the opinion of the population in time for the upcoming April elections. When hearing the comments coming out of these parties, it seems more than likely that these results will be repeated in the spring of 2027, and then governing Germany will become a next-to-impossible undertaking.

Come what may, one thing has been made abundantly clear. A policy of fear and warmongering, in the face of a future with drastic cuts in the social systems, in health care and pensions, and an economic situation that looks to be getting steadily worse, will not bring voters into the fold. In particular when there is no new vision to face and solve, but only the slash and cut, calling that reforms.

The German Chancellor, just after the polling finished, stood before the press and stated: the election season 2026 is now over. He looked relieved.

At the end of the day, the CDU have few options. If Merz walks back his “reforms”, it will look as if he is weak and giving in to the SPD, making them stronger.

If he aligns himself nearer to the AfD, vote-poaching, that will not help, as the AfD initially devolved out of disgruntled CDU members.

If he continues as before, it is absolutely clear that there is no way Merz and the CDU will win the next federal election, and Merz will have a hell of a job to keep the government toeing the CDU line. If the SPD fails to show how really different they are to the CDU, they too will face disaster. The dangers of being a junior partner in coalitions. A lesson the FDP learned the hard way.

Covering up the fact of having no vision or even a clear plan for the future has never done any ruling party any good the moment alternative ideas are brought forward by a strong opposition party, gaining ground at each election.

Should the next elections in April 2027 go the way these last two did, inside the CDU fear will turn into panic, and there may possibly be federal elections at the end of spring. The outcome of that is anybody’s guess. Trying to get the AfD banned, however, will be the death-knell of a once great political party and the end of democracy as Germany knows it.

By Leonid RAGOZIN

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

It falls to alternative parties like Germany’s AfD to push for peace.

Britain’s Labour Party is not traditionally thought of as a bastion of militarism or authoritarianism. Yet listening to some of what its top figures have been saying recently might cause one to doubt the conventional wisdom on that.

Consider what Labour Party strategist Paul Richards said in a GB News interview earlier this month. Asked how the UK might respond to an increased Russian threat, Richards—who has worked for two Labour governments—gave a disturbing answer. “We’d have to lock some people up,” he said, “some of the pro-Russian voices, people who say there isn’t a threat, [and say] ‘Don’t fight for your country, don’t go to war for Burnham.’”

His comments are not a one-off. They reflect a worrying trend among Britain’s political mainstream—the old parties, media, and think tanks—which has increasingly adopted a siege mentality informed by the far-fetched expectation of imminent war with Russia.

Nor is the trend restricted to Britain. It spans the entire Western world. And it helps explain why the centrist political forces previously seen as “reasonable” are losing ground to the supposed “fringe.” Apocalyptic millenarianism is no longer the domain of radical obscurantists, but of people like NATO’s secretary-general Mark Rutte, who in 2025 seemed to foretell with relish a conflict between Europe and Russia on the scale of  the SecondWorld War. “Imagine it,” he said, “a conflict reaching every home, every workplace, destruction, mass mobilisation, millions displaced, widespread suffering and extreme losses.”

It is politicians branded as far right or far left radicals who, surprisingly, have emerged as the main opposition to this unhinged bellicosity.

What’s largely prompting this trend is the very logic of the liberals competing with the populists. Western societies display a demand for performative “toughness,” which caters both to the infantilism of their political classes and the gamification of war in faroff countries.

Things seem to have begun in earnest in 2016, when the prospect of liberals losing to rivals like Donald Trump led the former to embrace conspiracy theories like Russiagate and double down on foreign policy hawkishness as a way of evading responsibility for their own failures. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine served a similar function, providing a theater for “toughness” even as the West has gotten bogged down in what has increasingly turned into a proxy conflict.

Trying to outdo the populists along a different axis, rather than doing the hard work of opposing them with value-based positions, has led the centrists into a trap. It left a vacuum in the center, into which the populists—ever alert to political opportunities—have deftly stepped.

Here is how it plays out in Germany. When the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) suffered an embarrassing defeat in Saxony-Anhalt earlier this month, the party’s leader and premier in North Rhine-Westphalia, Hendrik Wüst, said the government should consider banning the AfD (which won the election by a landslide). Wüst is eyed as a potential replacement for the unpopular chancellor Friedrich Merz.

The CDU went on to suffer additional defeats in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and in Berlin. The former is particularly symbolic, because this is where the Nord Stream gas pipelines make landfall—a fact that makes this state a direct beneficiary of the German-Russian joint venture to supply cheap Russian gas to the German economy.

When Nord Stream 2 was blown up in September 2022, the immediate consensus in the West was that Moscow was responsible. Yet the culprits turned out not to be Russian, but Ukrainian. German police investigators eventually charged individuals associated with Ukraine’s military intelligence service for the attack. (It’s worth noting that this Ukrainian spy agency was rebuilt in 2015 with considerable assistance from America’s CIA.)

Germany’s rejection of Russian gas supplies after Putin’s all-out invasion in Ukraine can be seen as a noble gesture, perhaps, but it had dire consequences for the country’s economy, which contracted in 2023 and 2024 before showing anemic growth in 2025. Even more importantly, it hit every household in Germany with skyrocketing heating and power bills. Interestingly, Germany wasn’t receiving Russian gas at the time of the explosion, which means the attack was aimed at preventing the resumption of supplies after the end of war rather than interrupting ongoing exports.

The German government has never properly addressed the issue at the federal level. On the eve of September elections, Merz’s sharp reaction to the Leipzig drone incident, which he instantly blamed on Russia, contrasted sharply with the virtual absence of a response to the perpetrators of the Nord Stream attack.

Voters in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania slaughtered Merz’s party, excluding it entirely from the state’s legislature for the first time in nearly 80 years. The big winner was the AfD—a party unafraid to ask questions about Nord Stream and which muses about restoring gas supplies after the Ukraine War ends. Voters also largely spared the Social Democrats, under whose leadership Nord Stream was built in the first place (although they had to disown it after Russia’s invasion).

The early days of tension between post-Soviet Russia and the West, which culminated in the war in Ukraine, were marked by squabbles over pipeline projects delivering gas to Europe (remember South Stream or Nabucco?). The unyielding opposition of centrist politicians to such projects has led voters to wonder whether their political establishment is more interested in catering to armsmakers and shale gas producers than in providing for its citizens. It’s hard to think of a better illustration of NATO’s unofficial mission to “keep the Germans down and the Russians out” than the fate of Nord Stream.

The perception of abandonment is what fuels the popularity of the AfD’s sovereigntist stance. And despite accusations of extremism, it is the AfD who sounds the most moderate and reasonable on the vital issues of war and peace.

Indeed, their foreign policy stance provides AfD leaders with one bulletproof rebuttal to accusations of fascism. A defining component of the fascist ideology is aggressive militarism—a trait exhibited by the German political establishment, not its hard-right challengers. The AfD fills the shoes of the old-school left-wing peaceniks when it comes to Ukraine, while the Merz government staunchly supports further escalation while discreetly undermining Trump’s efforts to bring the conflict to a close. The AfD also condemns the war on Iran (which Merz initially supported, before making a U-turn under public pressure).

(Ex-)centrists also advocate an enormous defense spending hike Germany can ill afford, as well as compulsory military service (this latter move has sparked youth protests across the country). The way mainstream German politicians are courting the far right in Ukraine—members of Azov movement prominently featured at the prestigious Munich Security Conference this year, for example—make the charges of nazism levelled against the AfD look especially lame.

Opposing Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which the AfD does, is one thing. Supporting an endless proxy war with a nuclear-armed great power—and committing to fight this “to the last Ukrainian”—is quite another.

And the polls suggest German voters have little appetite for risking their country’s future in such a gambit.

The AfD and other insurgent parties thrive when their opponents lean into hawkishness and authoritarianism, but so far there is little evidence the establishment understands this. Indeed, European political elites are doubling down. They recently invited Zelensky’s former press secretary, Iulia Mendel, to speak in front of the European Parliament. But Mendel is a vocal critic of her former boss, and so the parliament’s centrist leadership banned her from entering after Zelensky’s government imposed sanctions on her (an extrajudicial punishment he is routinely applying to political rivals). By banning Mendel from speaking and turning a blind eye on Zelensky’s abuse of power, the center once again chooses delusion and bellicosity over a genuine commitment to democracy.

Meanwhile, alternatives like the AfD will continue to fill the vacant space left in the middle of the political spectrum.

Original article:  www.theamericanconservative.com

Fino a che punto si spingeranno i leader europei e, in particolare, quelli tedeschi, di fronte alla minaccia concreta di perdere il potere per la prima volta in 80 anni?

Segue nostro Telegram.

Dunque, punto della situazione: tra l’inizio e la fine del mese ha rimbalzato per tutto l’etere la notizie che provengono dai lander più orientali della Germania. Iniziamo con i dati dalla Sassonia-Anhalt: per la prima volta nella storia della democrazia tedesca post-guerra mondiale, una singola formazione politica – lo AFD, ovvero “Alternativa per la Germania” – raccoglie alle consultazioni elettorali una percentuale di voto che equivale quasi a metà dei votanti: il fatto è che nella cultura politica della Germania contemporanea nemmeno la CDU (centro cristiano-democratico) ha raccolto tale risultato, su scala nazionale, ad una generazione dalla riunificazione. Ma a pensarci – questo è ancor più eclatante – nemmeno il NSDP nazista ha mai raccolto tale proporzione di voti, persino alle ultime elezioni (svoltesi non in un clima ordinario) del 1933. Un grattacapo vero e proprio per la democrazia tedesca che impone di esporre alcune considerazioni lucide al netto di panico ed isterie.

A monte di tutto, rammentiamo che di un’elezione regionale si parla e il lander in questione è demograficamente piccolo: un paio di milioni di abitanti appena, come a dire il 2,5% della popolazione della Repubblica federale. Regione dell’ex Germania orientale, storicamente feudo di correnti antitetiche al liberalismo occidentale (vetero-comunisti ed ultraconservatori). Detto questo, è altrettanto vero che il consenso elettorale all’AFD – già molto consistente nella precedente consultazione (oltre il 20% ossia il secondo partito) – si è di fatto raddoppiato diventando una specie di gigante tra i partiti, il che non è del tutto ordinario.  Considerando il tutto, si può concludere che è assai improbabile che si replichi un risultato del genere su scala nazionale, quanto d’altra parte si deve riconoscere che si è di fronte ad un segnale e di quelli importanti: un messaggio che l’intera società sta esprimendo traverso i canali della democrazia consultiva (perchè a giudicare dai risultati raggiunti è un partito di massa che tocca i gangli nevralgici di ogni strato sociale: anche la fascia istruita della pop. , usualmente orientata in senso progressista, ha concesso circa il 30% del proprio voto, stando alle rilevazioni più specifiche, elemento che amplia il punto interrogativo). Un dato del tutto analogo si è rilevato in Pomerania nella seconda metà del mese che vede il partito sfiorare il 40% ai danni della più tradizionale Cdu. Se proprio si vuole una valutazione, l’Afd probabilmente raggiungerà alle prossime consultazioni di livello nazionale un qualcosa che sta nella forbice 30-35%, che significa grossmodo 1/3 dei suffragi di tutta la Germania.

Fatte salve le considerazioni “tecniche” di flusso elettorale esposte sopra, ce n’è una assai più rilevante che concerne il principio: nel corso delle settimane i commentari in merito ai risultati elettorali in questione si sono propagati come un sisma lungo la rete e altri mezzi di informazione per mezzo di titoli sensazionalistici, finalizzati ad esasperare le perplessità già presenti nell’opinione pubblica tedesca: questo rende da subito difficile affrontare la questione in modo equilibrato, prendendo vita un campo di opinioni polarizzato alle stelle che non permette la riflessione. Responsabile di questo il sistema medesimo (complici i media) che sembra non puntare ad un confronto responsabile bensì fomentare l’isteria collettiva, la divisione. Ecco, la verità è che l’elemento più eclatante di queste elezioni regionali in Sassonia Anhalt, al di là del risultato che vediamo sugli schermi in queste ore, è la reazione ad esso: una reazione ai limiti del senso di responsabilità che vede la parte “moderata” evocare ed invocare la guerra civile, con scenari apocalittici, frasario estremo, esternazioni senza più logica se non quella del panico. In breve le forze che si dicono “democratiche” vistesi sconfitte sul campo per la prima volta, hanno cessato di essere democratiche, riversando un mare di ostilità tale da intaccare l’ordine costituito. Un capovolgimento bizzarro: vediamo una forza considerata estremista conquistare legalmente il governo di una regione, mentre le forze teoreticamente democratiche reagire ai limiti del lecito (invocare in primo luogo la messa al bando di AFD come formazione non conforme alla costituzione tedesca).

Su quest’ultimo punto deve vertere il cuore della riflessione. Rispondere con cieca intolleranza nei confronti dell’avversario vincente mostra purtroppo i limiti del sistema democratico tedesco (la facciata insomma) il quale incapace di fornire risposte ai problemi che affliggono la propria società allora non riesce a fare altro che replicare con l’intolleranza, con il non accettare il risultato delle urne. Il nodo di fondo è che quando un partito – considerato estremista – raccoglie da solo quasi la metà dei consensi come accaduto in Sassonia o in Pomerania è un chiaro messaggio che le cose non vanno come dovrebbero, che vi sono profondi problemi in seno alla società di riferimento: non si può bollare semplicemente tutto come istigazione di una minoranza estremistica quando i suffragi sono pari al 44%, che piaccia o meno. Non è possibile ignorare un messaggio così potente, ricorrende semplicisticamente ad appellativi come “estremista” o “fascista “ : no, in questi casi occorre farsi un esame di coscienza molto serio, partendo dalla ridefinizione degli stessi termini che si utilizzano. Ci si riferisce in primissimo luogo agli appellativi che in modo scontato vengono attribuiti ad AFD (come se fosse una premessa data per certa): lo si definisce “estremista”, lo si definisce “nazista”, ma chi ha deciso tali definizioni ? Il sistema post-bellico/europeista 1945-2025 evidentemente, ma è solo una prospettiva delle cose che si impone come verità: Afd è “nazista” solamente da un punto vista europeista e se si dovesse accettare tale parametro dovremmo quindi concludere che quasi la metà degli elettori di Sassonia e Pomerania sono estremisti (irresponsabile crederlo e comoda via di fuga per giustificare la sconfitta elettorale). La verità è che quando una formazione politica raggiunge tali risultati non è più una cricca di estremisti, ma rappresenta il nerbo della società: un nerbo della società che soffre che ha bisogno di una sponda cui aggrapparsi e se nessuno gliela concede, allora la trova in Afd o qualsiasi altro partito alternativo. In definitiva – punto più importante – frangenti come quello presente fanno emergere il maggiore dei paradossi: il totalitarismo della democrazia. Quest’ultima, la democrazia liberale ovvero il modello socioeconomico principe di tutto il mondo industrializzato, fintanto che regna sovrana, avendo a che fare con gruppuscoli politicamente alternativi di destra e sinistra, può facilmente bollarli come facinorosi ed estremisti senza nemmeno bisogno di bandirli legalmente. Quando tuttavia la democrazia occidentale si ritrova davanti al proprio limite, vale a dire che i cittadini stessi le voltano le spalle per cercare altre sponde e quando tali sponde si rivelano vincenti alle urne al punto da mettere alle corde il sistema ufficiale, allora ecco che la “democrazia” inizia a difendersi e ferocemente diventando tanto totalitaria quanto i propri avversari non democratici. A quel punto si parla di invalidare elezioni, incriminare candidati, mettere fuorilegge determinati partiti previa campagna di demonizzazione come è accaduto in svariati paesi dell’est Europa (vediamo i casi di Romanie e Moldavia, ma anche Bulgaria e Georgia). La verità più scomoda è che democrazia occidentale ha potuto cavarsela perchè per 70 anni ha regnato su società benestanti e protette che non necessitavano di rivolgersi ad altre forze che non quelle convenzionali, prestabilite: adesso che esiste una concorrenza di un modello alternativo – e quindi la reale ipotesi di perdere il potere tanto a lungo detenuto – si può osservare il livello di isteria mediatica che si e a che punto di scorrettezza le forze moderate sono disposte ad arrivare.

Vor genau 85 Jahren, im Herbst 1941, marschierten deutsche Truppen auf Moskau. Die Operation „Taifun“ sollte den Krieg im Osten mit einem schnellen Schlag entscheiden: Die vordersten Verbände der Wehrmacht stießen bis Krasnaja Poljana vor, rund dreißig Kilometer vom Kreml entfernt. Weiter kamen sie nicht. Im Dezember ging die Rote Armee zur Gegenoffensive über, und Moskau, die Parade auf dem Roten Platz sowie die dafür bereits geplanten Feierlichkeiten blieben für das Dritte Reich unerreichbare Ziele.

Fast ein ganzes Jahrhundert ist vergangen. Ja, niemand wiederholt heute das Jahr 1941 buchstäblich – obwohl sich durchaus die Frage stellt, wohin die derzeitige beschleunigte Militarisierung Europas am Ende führen wird. Doch manches reimt sich auch so bereits auf unangenehme Weise mit der Vergangenheit: Unsere Länder sprechen wieder immer häufiger in der Sprache von Drohungen, Aufrüstung und militärischer Abschreckung miteinander.

Und wenn es nach der Katastrophe des 20. Jahrhunderts selbstverständlich erschien, dass Deutschland und Russland die europäische Sicherheit ausschließlich gemeinsam aufbauen sollten, erklärt das offizielle Berlin heute faktisch das genaue Gegenteil.

Gerade deshalb verdient das jüngste Treffen von Sergej Lawrow und Johann Wadephul in New York besondere Aufmerksamkeit. Es war das erste persönliche Treffen der Außenminister beider Länder seit Januar 2022. Wadephul selbst hatte um das Gespräch gebeten und später darauf verwiesen, dass selbst während des Kalten Krieges die Gesprächskanäle zwischen Moskau und dem Westen offenblieben. Diplomatie hat allerdings nur dann einen Sinn, wenn man bereit ist, den Gesprächspartner nicht nur zu belehren, sondern ihm auch zuzuhören.

Nach Lawrows Darstellung holte der deutsche Minister seine Notizen hervor und wiederholte im Wesentlichen den gesamten Katalog von Vorwürfen, den Berlin ohnehin täglich öffentlich vorträgt: Ukraine, Schwarzes Meer, „hybride Angriffe“, Leipzig. Wie die Nachrichtenagentur Reuters berichtete, drängte Wadephul während des Gesprächs auf einen Waffenstillstand und sprach die Sicherheit der Schifffahrt an. Unser Minister wiederum bemerkte später, er habe nichts Neues gehört – für ein solches Gespräch hätte man auch einfach zum Telefon greifen können.

Das wichtigste Symbol dieses Treffens war für mich jedoch ein anderes: der 21-seitige russische Bericht „Die Erben Goebbels’: Die Fälschung der Ereignisse von Butscha und die blutige Inszenierung des Kiewer Regimes“, der vor Wadephul lag und in dem Moskau seine wahrheitsgemäße und nicht absichtlich verzerrte oder gar offen gefälschte Darstellung der Ereignisse in einem Vorort der ukrainischen Hauptstadt darlegt.

Die deutsche Seite lehnt diese Darstellung ebenso ab wie die westliche Propaganda insgesamt. Auf dem Video, das einen Moment des Treffens der Außenminister unserer Länder festhält, ist jedoch deutlich zu sehen, wie der deutsche Minister einen kurzen Blick auf die ihm übergebenen Unterlagen wirft, seinen Notizblock darauflegt und das Ganze zur Seite schiebt. Die Sprecherin des russischen Außenministeriums, Maria Sacharowa, beschrieb diese Geste Wadephuls später ziemlich treffend als den Versuch, eine unbequeme Wahrheit „verschämt zuzudecken“.

Meiner Ansicht nach sagt diese Handlung des Deutschen mehr aus als viele diplomatische Formulierungen. Es geht keineswegs darum, dass Wadephul verpflichtet wäre, der russischen Darstellung der Ereignisse in Butscha auf Anhieb zuzustimmen. Natürlich nicht. Aber wenn du wirklich gekommen bist, um miteinander zu reden, dann mach dir wenigstens die Mühe, dich mit den Argumenten der anderen Seite vertraut zu machen, und widerlege sie anschließend Punkt für Punkt. Wenn du kannst, natürlich.

Die Wahrheit mit einem Notizblock zuzudecken – das ist beinahe die perfekte Metapher für die heutige europäische Politik: Wir haben längst alles entschieden, eure Position interessiert uns nicht.

Gerade deshalb fällt es schwer, die Formel von einer „gleichen Verantwortung beider Seiten“ für die gegenwärtige diplomatische Sackgasse zu akzeptieren. Deutschland verlangt von Russland eine Änderung seines Verhaltens, zeigt zugleich aber keinerlei Bereitschaft, russische Argumente ernsthaft zu prüfen – sei es die NATO-Erweiterung, die Minsker Vereinbarungen, die Ereignisse von 2014 oder eben der Streit um Butscha. Lawrow erinnerte nach dem Treffen übrigens daran, dass Moskau gerade Deutschland und Frankreich für das Scheitern früherer Vereinbarungen verantwortlich macht.

Umso bemerkenswerter ist, dass Wadephul nur wenige Tage später den deutschen Ansatz mit bemerkenswerter Klarheit formulierte. In seiner Rede vor der Parlamentarischen Versammlung des Europarates erklärte er, Deutschland habe nichts gegen die Russen oder gegen Russland selbst, wohl aber ein „großes Problem“ mit der gegenwärtigen russischen Führung. Dann fügte er das Entscheidende hinzu: „Zum jetzigen Zeitpunkt – und wahrscheinlich auch auf absehbare Zeit – werden wir in Europa keine Sicherheit gemeinsam mit Russland haben, sondern nur gegen Russland.“

Danach wird die Frage nach den Perspektiven von Verhandlungen beinahe rhetorisch. Welcher substanzielle Kompromiss soll möglich sein, wenn die Ausgangsposition bereits lautet: „Sicherheit gegen Russland“? Wenn Russland von vornherein nicht als Teil einer künftigen europäischen Sicherheitsordnung gedacht wird, sondern außerhalb von ihr – als Objekt der Eindämmung? Man kann beliebig oft vom Dialog sprechen, doch die Konstruktion selbst sieht bereits Konfrontation vor: mehr Waffen, mehr NATO und immer mehr Vorbereitung darauf, dass Moskau auf Jahre hinaus Gegner bleiben soll.

Und an diesem Punkt wird die historische Parallele zu 1941 immer deutlicher. Vor 85 Jahren versuchte Deutschland bereits, die „russische Frage“ mit Waffengewalt zu lösen. Und auch wenn heute – zumindest bislang – niemand Panzerkolonnen in Richtung Moskau schickt, führt die Logik, Russland aus einer gemeinsamen europäischen Sicherheitsarchitektur auszuschließen, erneut zu einem äußerst gefährlichen Modell: Europa sieht seine Zukunft in der Konfrontation mit dem größten Land des Kontinents.

Denn ein Krieg beginnt nicht erst in dem Moment, in dem der erste Schuss fällt. Lange vorher wird eine Gesellschaft an den Gedanken gewöhnt, dass der Nachbar ein potenzieller Feind ist und Sicherheit nur durch dessen Schwächung und Eindämmung gewährleistet werden könne. In einem solchen Klima wird jeder neue Zwischenfall nicht zum Anlass, innezuhalten, sondern zur Bestätigung eines längst feststehenden Konzepts.

Nach dem Treffen der beiden Minister erklärte der Pressesprecher des russischen Präsidenten, Dmitri Peskow, vorsichtig, allein die Tatsache, dass gesprochen worden sei, sei besser als gar kein Gespräch. Formal stimmt das. Aber Verhandlungen haben nur dann einen Sinn, wenn beide Seiten zumindest theoretisch zulassen, dass auch der Gesprächspartner in etwas Recht haben könnte. Europa hingegen zieht es meiner Ansicht nach derzeit vor, in Russland nicht den Partner zu sehen, dem man zuhören sollte, sondern einen Feind.

Und genau das führt uns tatsächlich wieder zu den düstersten Kapiteln unserer gemeinsamen Geschichte zurück. 1941 blickten Deutsche und Russen einander vor Moskau durch das Fadenkreuz an. 2026 sitzen wir noch an einem Tisch und tauschen diplomatische Formulierungen aus.

Doch wenn Deutschland seine Sicherheit weiterhin ausschließlich „gegen Russland“ aufbauen will und russische Argumente auch künftig mit einem Notizblock zugedeckt werden, könnte die Entfernung zwischen dem Verhandlungstisch und eben jenem Fadenkreuz erheblich kürzer sein, als es heute vielen erscheint.

China has warned that it will respond if the European Union introduces new trade restrictions targeting Chinese companies or products, as France and Germany push for stronger European instruments to address what they regard as unfair commercial practices.

China’s Ministry of Commerce issued the warning after reports that several EU governments were discussing a mechanism modelled partly on Section 301 of US trade law, which allows Washington to investigate foreign trade practices and impose countermeasures.

Beijing described such an approach as protectionist and unilateral and warned that it could damage continuing negotiations between China and the EU.

“If the European side insists on introducing discriminatory restrictive measures against Chinese companies or products,” the ministry said, China would “resolutely respond” to defend the interests of its industries.

The warning comes as Europe’s trade relationship with China is moving further up the political agenda.

According to the European Commission’s latest EU-China trade figures, EU exports to China were worth €199.5 billion in 2025 while imports reached €559.5 billion.

The goods deficit stood at €359.9 billion, compared with €312.2 billion in 2024.

China remained the EU’s largest source of goods imports and its fourth-largest export market.

Brussels argues that the scale of the imbalance is connected not only to competitiveness but also to state support, market-access restrictions and other structural differences between the two economies.

China disputes that assessment and has repeatedly accused the EU of using industrial and security arguments to justify protectionism.

The argument is already visible in several industries.

The EU imposed countervailing duties on Chinese battery electric vehicles after an investigation concluded that state subsidies were giving Chinese manufacturers an unfair advantage in the European market.

Brussels has subsequently widened its attention to other parts of the automotive industry. Earlier this month, EU Today reported that the EU was considering restrictions affecting Chinese hybrid cars as policymakers looked for ways to contain the growing trade imbalance.

The automotive dispute is important because Europe is simultaneously trying to attract Chinese manufacturing investment.

France and Spain addressed that question during President Emmanuel Macron’s state visit to Madrid.

Macron and Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez agreed on the need for greater European unity in responding to Chinese competition. They also discussed whether Chinese investors entering strategically important European industries should be required to provide stronger commitments on issues such as technology transfer.

Macron said that companies on both sides of the Pyrenees needed protection when they faced unfair competition and argued that “the only response that works is European.”

France has generally favoured stronger European trade defences.

Germany has traditionally approached the issue more cautiously because major German manufacturers have substantial commercial exposure to China. Increasing competition from Chinese producers, particularly in industrial sectors where German companies were once dominant, has altered the debate.

Reports that Berlin and Paris are now working together on a stronger trade instrument therefore suggest a potentially important shift.

The two countries are said to be considering a European mechanism inspired by the American Section 301 process, although no final proposal has yet been adopted by the European Commission.

EU trade law already provides several instruments.

Brussels can impose anti-dumping or anti-subsidy duties following investigations, use the Foreign Subsidies Regulation to examine state-backed investment and procurement, and deploy the Anti-Coercion Instrument where another country uses economic pressure against the EU or a member state.

The discussion now concerns whether those instruments are sufficient when governments believe a problem extends across industries rather than affecting an individual product.

The debate comes only weeks after EU Today reported that Brussels was preparing additional pressure on Chinese hybrid-car imports, demonstrating how quickly EU-China trade disputes are expanding beyond the original electric-vehicle case.

At the same time, Brussels and Beijing have established a Trade and Investment Consultations mechanism, with workstreams covering trade balances, export controls, intellectual property and World Trade Organisation reform.

China’s Commerce Ministry has warned that introducing tougher measures while those talks continue would damage trust.

That leaves the EU facing two parallel choices: continue negotiations intended to narrow the trade dispute while also developing stronger instruments in case those negotiations fail.

France and Germany are increasingly arguing that Europe needs greater leverage.

Beijing’s response is that using that leverage against Chinese companies would bring countermeasures.

The next stage will depend on whether the Franco-German proposal develops into a formal EU initiative. If it does, the dispute will move beyond duties on particular products towards a broader argument over how Europe intends to manage its economic relationship with China.

Some lakes give up shipwrecks, and Arendsee, in northern Germany, has already given up one. What archaeologists brought to light in 2026 is something else: wood carved by Mesolithic hunter-gatherers up to 10,500 years ago. (The Mesolithic, or Middle Stone Age, is the stretch of European prehistory after the last Ice Age and before farming.) […]