European intelligence agencies have warned that Russia is intensifying efforts to assassinate executives of defence companies supplying Ukraine, extending its campaign of sabotage and intimidation into the European military-industrial sector.
According to intelligence assessments obtained from five European security services, Moscow has ordered an expansion of covert operations targeting senior figures at major arms manufacturers and smaller companies producing drones and military components. Germany’s domestic intelligence agency, the BfV, has reportedly advised executives to strengthen personal security, while some manufacturers have already increased protection for senior personnel.
The warnings emerged alongside reports of an alleged assassination plot against Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and Defence Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz. Polish authorities convened an emergency security meeting and subsequently detained a suspect. No connection between the Polish case and Russian intelligence has been established.
The apparent expansion of Russian covert operations reflects a shift in Moscow’s calculations concerning Western military assistance.
President Vladimir Putin had reason to anticipate that Donald Trump’s return to the White House would weaken American support for Kyiv. Trump repeatedly questioned US military expenditure on Ukraine and advocated a negotiated settlement with Russia. A substantial reduction in American weapons deliveries could have increased pressure on Ukraine to accept Moscow’s territorial demands.
Instead, European governments assumed greater responsibility for sustaining Ukrainian defence capabilities, including financing weapons purchases and expanding domestic production.
The European Union’s €90 billion support programme for 2026–2027 allocates €60 billion to defence procurement and industrial capacity. The EU has also established mechanisms allowing Ukraine to participate in European joint procurement programmes.
Disrupting European manufacturers therefore offers Moscow a means of restricting Ukraine’s military capabilities without directly confronting NATO.
Assassination threats can interfere with procurement even when attacks are never carried out. Large manufacturers can afford extensive security arrangements, but smaller companies producing electronics, drone components and specialised equipment often lack comparable resources.
Intimidation could delay contracts, discourage investment and persuade individual suppliers to withdraw from Ukrainian defence programmes.
Russia’s alleged interest in targeting defence executives is not unprecedented. In 2024, American intelligence reportedly uncovered a Russian plot to assassinate Armin Papperger, chief executive of Rheinmetall, one of Germany’s principal suppliers of ammunition and military equipment to Ukraine.
As EU Today previously reported, Moscow has also publicly identified European factories involved in Ukrainian drone production, increasing concerns that civilian industrial facilities could become targets of Russian operations.
European authorities have investigated suspected Russian involvement in arson, infrastructure attacks and clandestine networks. An earlier cross-border investigation into alleged assassination and sabotage preparations demonstrated how intermediaries could be recruited to conduct operations while obscuring their sponsors.
Such activity also carries political consequences. Attacks against infrastructure and industrial facilities can reinforce public fears about confrontation with Russia, particularly during elections when parties advocating accommodation with Moscow seek to exploit security concerns.
Poland has already experienced mounting Russian hybrid pressure, including threats to critical infrastructure and information operations intended to aggravate domestic political divisions.
Ukraine’s continuing strikes against Russian refineries and military-industrial facilities have added economic and operational pressures to Moscow’s prolonged war effort. Russia retains substantial military production capacity, but the costs of sustaining the conflict remain considerable.
Interfering with European weapons manufacturing could serve two objectives: restricting Ukraine’s access to equipment and obstructing Europe’s longer-term rearmament.
The Kremlin does not necessarily need European governments to abandon Ukraine formally. Production delays, disrupted contracts and reluctant suppliers could reduce the practical effect of military assistance even while political commitments remain unchanged.
European governments have acknowledged the industrial challenge. In its June conclusions on European defence, the European Council called for accelerated manufacturing capacity, stronger supply chains and closer cooperation with Ukraine’s defence industry.
Russia’s apparent strategy seeks to exploit the dependence of these programmes on private companies and skilled civilian personnel.
The warnings from European intelligence agencies suggest that protecting defence executives, engineers and contractors is becoming part of the continent’s wider security responsibilities.
For Moscow, intimidation offers the possibility of weakening Ukrainian military resistance without an open confrontation with NATO. For European governments, preventing covert operations from disrupting weapons production is increasingly inseparable from their commitment to sustain Ukraine’s defence.
Según revela Instituto Alemán de Economía (IW), durante la primera mitad de la década de 2020-2025, la economía germana creció un 0,2% anual y esa tasa se debió mayormente al gasto público, el cual, solamente en el segundo trimestre del 2026, fue superior a la media anual de 2019.
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Escríbenos: info@strategic-culture.su
Lo que significa que se diluye la “Alemania como motor económico europeo” de la que tanto se habló en el último medio siglo.
El empresariado invirtió muy poco en estos años y en el entorno productivo y de realce económico nacional ha caído drásticamente.
El mismo gobierno federal reconoció, a principios de este mes, que la situación de crecimiento es “precaria” y, en los círculos cerrados del empresariado escasean los vaticinios halagueños para el 2027 y 2028.
Creditreform informó que 1 de cada 3 empresas está muy endeudada y que las inversiones retrocedieron a su rango de 2013.
Durante el pasado mes de abril, más de 2 mil empresas quebraron, destacándose entre estas empresas las abocadas al transporte, la logística, la hotelería y la cervecería.
Klaus Wohlrabe, jefe de estudios del Instituto Ifo de Investigación Económica, declaró que todavía no se vislumbra una recuperación real para el mercado laboral y “Los despidos continúan en la industria manufacturera y el comercio”.
Por su parte, Rolf Bürkl, experto en consumo del NIM, dijo que “La mayoría de los hogares prevé que los altos precios de la energía reduzcan su poder adquisitivo” y, en consecuencia, “se muestran más escépticos sobre sus perspectivas de ingresos para los próximos doce meses”.
El agricultor e influencer, Hannes Kuhnwald («Landwirt aus MV»), pronosticó que se avecina una crisis en la agricultura ya que “Cada vez cierran más explotaciones. Y las pequeñas son las primeras en verse afectadas. Ahora, las grandes empresas se benefician de ello. Y muchas corporaciones también”, afirmando que las explotaciones pequeñas y medianas no pueden competir con las compañías grandes y que, por lo tanto, la clase política debería aplicar medidas sensatas para proteger de la pauperización, la quiebra y la exclusión económica a los pequeños y medianos productores agrícolas.
Dentro de la misma Alemania hay quienes se quejan de la forma en que llegan los fondos provenientes de la UE, pidiendo, como una de las soluciones más rápidas, que dichos fondos lleguen hacia abajo de una forma más equitativa.
Simultáneamente, se produce, en esta segunda mitad del 2026, un descenso pronunciado en las ventas del sector minorista, cuyos niveles son, según consignas las estadísticas más fiables, de mayor caída en los últimos cinco años.
Hay negocios de los más consolidados que, debido a la situación, están llegando al límite.
El Grupo Theo Müller -líder de la industria alimentaria- anunció, en esta semana, que cerrará dos de sus plantas más importantes con la consecuencia de cientos de empleados que serán despedidos.
Asimismo, en entorno de Volkswagen seguirá convulso en lo que resta de este año y en 2027.
Publicado originalmente por Geopolítica rugiente
Ukraine has intensified its campaign against Russia’s oil industry with another drone strike on the Samara linear production and dispatch station, a major facility in the pipeline network operated by state-controlled Transneft. The latest attack, during the night of 9–10 October, followed earlier strikes on 2 and 7 October, which Ukrainian military authorities say caused extensive damage to storage tanks and associated infrastructure.
The significance of Samara extends well beyond the destruction of stored oil. Situated near the settlement of Prosvet in Russia’s Samara region, the installation is a junction where crude oil arriving from Western Siberia, Tatarstan and the Volga-Urals producing regions is received, stored, blended and redistributed. Its role makes it an important link between Russian oil production, domestic refining and export markets.
According to the Ukrainian General Staff’s operational report, Samara is responsible for blending crude with different sulphur contents to produce Urals, Russia’s principal export grade. Ukraine’s military says the facility also contributes to supplying the Russian armed forces.
Unlike an oil refinery, where crude is processed into petrol, diesel and other fuels, the Samara installation performs a function earlier in the supply chain. It is one of the points where different grades of Russian crude are brought together to produce a commercially standardised export mixture.
Western Siberian crude generally has different characteristics from oil extracted in the Volga-Urals basin, including variations in sulphur content and density. Blending these streams is essential to maintaining the specifications of Urals crude, which is supplied to refineries and sold on international markets.
Samara’s importance also reflects the sheer scale of the infrastructure concentrated at the site. Ukrainian Special Operations Forces describe a facility where four major oil pipelines converge, supported by 71 storage tanks with a combined capacity exceeding 1.6 million cubic metres.
The site’s central role is not simply a Ukrainian assessment. Transneft-Privoĺga’s management previously described the Samara installation as having Europe’s largest oil storage tank farm and identified its blending station and associated pumping installations as part of a major modernisation programme.
Approximately 140 million tonnes of oil passes through the Samara complex annually. That figure would make the installation an important concentration point within the wider Russian pipeline system.
The consequences of sustained disruption could therefore extend beyond the immediate loss of storage capacity. Damage to blending operations, connecting pipelines or loading equipment could interfere with the movement of crude towards refineries and export routes. The precise effect would depend on the functioning of alternative facilities, available spare capacity and the speed of repairs.
The first strike, on 2 October, reportedly damaged 11 storage tanks with capacities of 20,000 cubic metres each, three larger tanks of 50,000 cubic metres, sections of pipeline and an automated loading station. The Security Service of Ukraine confirmed that its personnel had participated in the operation alongside other branches of the armed forces.
A further strike on 7 October destroyed four large storage tanks and caused a substantial fire, according to Ukraine’s General Staff. Ukrainian Special Operations Forces subsequently confirmed another attack on 10 October, although the damage from that operation remains under assessment. The reported destruction and damage have not been independently verified in full.
The repeated attacks indicate an effort to produce cumulative disruption rather than rely on a single operation to disable an extensive industrial complex.
This approach is consistent with Ukraine’s broader campaign against Russia’s refining industry. As EU Today examined in August, repeated strikes on processing facilities can create difficulties that extend beyond the immediate damage, particularly when specialist equipment requires lengthy repairs.
The campaign against Samara represents a significant extension of that strategy. Refineries remain important targets because they produce the fuels required by Russia’s armed forces and domestic economy. Transport and blending facilities, however, determine whether crude reaches those refineries in the required quantities and specifications.
Continuous attacks are essential because much of the damage inflicted by drones is repairable. Individual installations may return to service within days or weeks, meaning the cumulative effect depends heavily on whether further disruption occurs before repairs and production have fully resumed.
Russia’s refining industry remains heavily dependent on specialist equipment and technologies historically supplied by Western manufacturers. Sanctions have restricted access to replacement components, while domestically manufactured equipment and Chinese alternatives are not always technically compatible with existing installations. These constraints complicate repairs, prolong shutdowns and limit Russia’s ability to restore damaged refining capacity.
Samara presents a somewhat different vulnerability. Its importance rests on the concentration of pipeline connections, storage and blending operations at one location. A sustained interruption could affect several parts of the oil supply chain simultaneously, although the available evidence does not yet establish that the wider network has suffered a prolonged shutdown.
Ukraine has already demonstrated its willingness to strike other logistical installations. A recent attack on the Volodarskaya petroleum-products station near Moscow targeted another important part of Russia’s fuel distribution system.
Oil remains central to Russia’s export earnings and federal finances, while the availability of refined petroleum products influences military logistics, transport and industrial activity.
The immediate economic significance of the Samara attacks will depend on how much operational capacity has been lost, whether crude can be redirected through alternative infrastructure and how quickly Transneft can restore the damaged facilities.
There is an important distinction between destroying storage tanks and preventing oil from moving through a network. The former reduces available capacity; the latter can impose broader restrictions on production, refining and exports. Establishing the extent to which the latest strikes have achieved either effect will require further operational evidence.
Nevertheless, the decision to return repeatedly to Samara illustrates a development in Ukraine’s campaign against Russia’s energy sector. Rather than concentrating exclusively on the refineries that convert crude into fuel, Kyiv is also attacking infrastructure that connects oil production to its commercial and military end users.
For Moscow, the vulnerability of Samara is particularly consequential because the installation occupies a central position in the movement and preparation of Urals crude. Any sustained loss of its blending, storage or distribution functions would introduce additional pressure into an oil system already facing repeated attacks on its refineries and export infrastructure.
The latest operation therefore raises a question extending beyond the damage to one industrial site: whether Russia can maintain reliable oil flows when several interconnected stages of its energy supply chain are subjected to recurring disruption.
The story of infrastructure in capitalist vs. socialist systems
By Hua BIN
Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su
A friend visited Germany recently and told a story how a delayed train caused him to miss the flight home.
I was shocked since you could set your watch by the Deutsche Bahn when I was living in Germany back in 1997.
I was doing an internship at Mercedes Benz in Stuttgart in those days. I could time my walk from the apartment to the bus stop, then connect with a train to the office with less than 5 minutes in total waiting time.
The bus and train schedules were synced so perfectly that you could count on a two-minutes’ walk and exactly 2 minutes wait in between. Both buses and trains were on time to a fault.
I had a particular fondness for DB since I traveled around Germany almost every weekend with its 35 Mark Schones-Wochenende Ticket (happy weekend ticket). Unfortunately that service was discontinued in 2019.
In the winter of 1997, I got lost on a hike with several friends in the Black Forest near Baden-Baden.
We were only able to walk out of the cold night after stumbling upon a rail track that led us to a small rural train stop. I can still remember the warm platform light to this day.
I’ve held German rail in high regard ever since.
So you can imagine how incredulous I was about the delay and bad service my friend complained about.
This prompted me to read about what happened to Deutsche Bahn over the last 30 years. In a nutshell, things certainly have changed for the worse.
Deutsche Bahn today defines an on-time train as one arriving less than 6 minutes behind schedule – a long cry from the clock-setting punctuality of the late 90s.
Even by such a low bar, punctuality hovers around 50 to 60%, well below DB’s own target of 70%.
The official explanation is aging infrastructure, heavy construction, and overloaded tracks.
However, as I dig a bit deeper, the decline of the German rail efficiency seems to stem from a deeply flawed privatization in 1994 which led to decades of extreme infrastructure underinvestment.
The 1994 Bahnreform merged the old East and West state railways with a clear mandate: DB was supposed to operate as a profit-seeking private corporation to prepare for an eventual stock market IPO.
To attract investors, DB prioritized extreme cost-cutting over public service.
They aggressively cut staff, outsourced maintenance, and began divesting into global logistics companies (like DB Schenker) rather than focusing on domestic rail.
Under the guise of maximizing efficiency, DB severely downsized its physical network to save money.
Nearly 8,000 kilometers of secondary rail lines were completely dismantled. Thousands of track crossovers, passing loops, and spare sidetracks were removed.
In 1997, if a train broke down or was delayed, a dispatcher could easily reroute it around the problem using these spare tracks.
Today, the network is stripped of its buffers. If one commuter train stalls near Frankfurt, it acts like a broken-down car on a single-lane highway, causing immediate, cascading delays across the entire country.
The problem is compounded by a mixed-rail system where fast Intercity Express (ICE) trains share the same physical tracks with slow regional commuter trains and heavy freight cargo.
In comparison, Chinese high-speed rail or France’s TGV networks mostly operate on dedicated high-speed tracks.
As the DB physical network was drastically thinned out, annual passenger numbers went up from 1.5 billion passengers in 1994 to 2.4 billion today.
Back in the 90s, it was still very common to live near where you worked in Germany. Over the last 30 years, skyrocketing housing costs in major hubs like Frankfurt, Munich, Berlin, and Hamburg forced a massive portion of the workforce to move further out into surrounding suburban regions and smaller towns.
As a result, Germany experienced a commuter explosion, with millions of people traveling significantly longer distances back and forth every single day.
Now, the Deutsche Bahn system runs at 100% capacity nearly constantly. Any small delays can quickly snowball into network chaos.
To make things even harder, Germany’s strict structural debt limits have restricted state spending.
For years, Germany spends only a fraction of what its neighbors do on rail. For example, Switzerland invests over €400 per citizen annually into rail infrastructure. Germany routinely spends around €100.
DB’s disastrous experience with privatization mirrors what happened with other similar projects such as the Thames Water in the UK.
When Margaret Thatcher’s government privatized the UK water sector in 1989, Thames Water was handed to private investors with a clean slate and zero debt.
However, successive private owners treated the utility—which serves 16 million customers across London and southern England—as a corporate cash cow.
Private investors – Wall Street banks and hedge funds – loaded the utility with a mountain of debt and extracted hundreds of millions in management fees and dividends.
Instead of using revenue to upgrade Victorian-era pipes and treatment centers, money was funneled to shareholders and executive bonuses. By 2026, that debt has ballooned to roughly £20 billion.
While the financial engineering generated short-term returns for private equity, the physical infrastructure rotted.
Thames Water has become a national scandal as it has spilled billions of liters of raw sewage directly into the River Thames and local waterways.
Due to aging infrastructure, 25% of all treated water leaks straight out of the pipes before ever reaching customer homes.
Amid severe dry spells and record temperatures, Thames Water repeatedly implements prolonged hosepipe bans because the system lacks structural resilience to manage the region’s water security.
Most privatization projects of public utilities have witnessed a similar pattern of chronic underinvestment, extreme operational cost cutting, and unsustainable debt leverage while enriching financial investors.
Deutsche Bahn and Thames Water are symbols of public goods degradation for private investor gains in rentier capitalist economies.
In stark contrast, Chinese infrastructure remains firmly in the domain of public ownership.
While Europe and the US follow a policy of reactive, austerity-driven, rent-collecting management of their nations’ infrastructure, China has adopted a strategy of anticipatory, supply-led construction – often years ahead of demand.
Back in the 90s, China still was heavily reliant on decades-old, technically backward rail networks that suffered regular breakdowns.
I still remember sitting in rail cars with no air-conditioning in the height of summer for hours when the train from Beijing to Chongqing broke down due to an engine failure during a trip home from college.
The ride used to take 40 hours by scheduled timetable. Today the same trip takes less than 7 hours on highspeed rail.
When China started building its national highspeed rail network in 2004, there was an avalanche of negative press from the West.
Western “experts” eagerly called out how wasteful the project was and how the rail would never generate a positive return on investment.
Despite the nay-sayers, the country has built over 50,000 kilometers of highspeed rail in the last 20 years, over 70% of the world’s total capacity.
Just today, China announced the completion of 4 new highspeed rail lines in 4 provinces, adding another 1,142 kilometers to the network.
One of the lines is the 318-km Harbin–Yichun Line, which is now China’s northernmost highspeed rail traversing alpine permafrost.
The network now covers 97% of all cities with over 500,000 residents. It operates on dedicated rail lines and achieves 98% departure punctuality and 95% arrival punctuality.
Rather than aiming to achieve profitability and high return for every single line, the Chinese highspeed rail system serves as a public good that generate system-level benefits for the entire economy and the public.
Deutsche Bahn and China Rail represent two systems that operate on completely opposite philosophies, leading to radically different outcomes in rail performance and economic impact.
Building ahead of demand vs. Managing declining assets
China’s infrastructure strategy rests on the philosophy that building massive, high-capacity transport networks creates economic growth and future demand, rather than just responding to it.
By constructing the world’s largest highspeed rail network, largely ahead of full demand saturation, China bypassed the bottleneck phase entirely.
On the other hand, Germany operates on a strict “just-in-time” for-profit corporate framework.
Investments are only approved if existing capacity is mathematically proven to be completely exhausted.
This means that by the time a project is planned, funded, and built, the demand has already vastly outpaced the upgrade, leaving the network perpetually lagging behind.
China recognized early on that mixing slow freight and fast passenger trains limits a network’s ultimate capacity. Beijing built an entirely separate, dedicated network for the high-speed Fuxing and Hexie trains.
On the other side, because Germany tried to save money by avoiding the construction of entirely new corridors, they forced ultra-fast commuter trains to share the exact same physical tracks with heavy cargo trains.
When one slow freight train breaks down, the entire national express system grinds to a halt.
Economic Multiplier vs. Direct Profit
The Chinese state views high-speed rail as a public utility and an economic multiplier.
Even if individual rail lines operate at a financial loss or carry high debt, the investment is justified by the massive economic productivity, regional integration, and urban development it unlocks.
As part of the 1994 privatization, the German government treated Deutsche Bahn like a standard commercial enterprise.
Success was measured by cutting operational costs and generating a direct financial profit, which directly starved the physical tracks of preventative maintenance.
One would probably think the German model at least achieved higher ROI for investors even though China achieves higher total societal benefits.
Yet, reality has an ironic twist – the German model ultimately failed the investors, too.
Deutsche Bahn ended up in a financial worst-of-both-worlds scenario.
In a standard capitalist system, starving an asset of maintenance to boost short-term balance sheets usually generates high dividends for investors or pushes stock prices up.
But because DB’s privatization was half-baked, it achieved neither. The only investor in Deutsche Bahn is still the German Federal Government as its IPO plan was abandoned 2 decades ago.
Because the network was run into the ground to cut short-term corporate costs, the long-term liabilities eventually caught up.
Rather than paying rich dividends, DB has cost taxpayers billions in bailouts. The company recently reported a €2.3 billion net loss.
To manage its staggering debts, DB was forced to sell off its highly profitable global logistics subsidiary, DB Schenker, just to artificially steady its balance sheet.
By treating a core public monopoly like a private business, Germany didn’t create a highly profitable enterprise; they created an operational bottleneck that costs the broader German economy billions in lost corporate productivity every year.
China’s model operates on the opposite financial wavelength.
In a socialist market economy, critical infrastructure is heavily state directed through State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs).
While China Rail carries a massive debt load from building its expansive high-speed network, the losses are directly absorbed by the state.
From Beijing’s perspective, the direct financial return on investment of the railway itself is secondary. The real payoff is the societal and macroeconomic ROI.
By connecting far-flung cities, the state slashes shipping friction, drives real estate value, unlocks regional labor markets, and creates economic mobility.
The state effectively subsidizes the train ticket to capture a massive tax and economic growth harvest across the rest of society.
A prime example is the Greater Bay Area in Guangdong, where 7 metropolises, including Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong, are connected into an integrated web via highspeed rail, metro subways, and a network of highways.
The region enjoys unprecedented supply chain density and is ranked as the No. 1 most innovative cluster of cities in the world by the UN’s World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), ahead of Silicon Valley.
The same formula is repeated in nearly every natural monopoly domain – telecom, electric and water utilities, national highway network, and banking.
Rather than allowing private capital to derive rentier-income from such assets, as what happens in capitalist societies, Beijing firmly controls these commanding-heights of the economy in the public hands.
The German capitalist model tries to draw a neat box around Deutsche Bahn and demand that the box itself be profitable. China’s state-led model views the railway as just one cog in a larger national engine.
Ultimately, Deutsche Bahn’s 30-year experiment has proved that for critical public monopolies like rail, trying to squeeze out the last penny of corporate micro-profits usually breaks the system entirely.
Original article: huabinoliver.substack.com
Europe’s “strategic autonomy” is a project through which Europe is rebuilding its own imperial and militarist capabilities.
Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su
We remember Nokia as the company behind some of the most popular mobile phones of the past, as well as its famous slogan, “Connecting people.”
Founded in Finland in 1865 and now operating as a multinational company in telecommunications and information technology, Nokia continues to work in the field of communications – that is, to “connect people.” But with its latest project, it appears that the company is now preparing to connect people in uniform.
Nokia has teamed up with ICEYE, another Finnish company specializing in the production of microsatellites that provide high-resolution Earth observation data day and night and in all weather conditions.
The two companies have partnered to develop secure and sovereign satellite communications systems for governments and defense customers, with the first communications satellites planned for launch in 2028.
Defense, border security, emergency response…
Announced on October 1, the project envisages satellite systems operating in low Earth orbit (LEO) for use in areas including defense, border security, emergency services and disaster response.
Under the project, governments will be able to own and control not only the satellites themselves, but also the ground infrastructure and user terminals.
Rafal Modrzewski, co-founder and CEO of ICEYE, said countries should not leave control over their communications infrastructure in the hands of foreign commercial satellite operators, emphasizing that the project is ultimately aimed at reducing external dependence.
As part of the partnership, Nokia will contribute its expertise in secure networking technologies and network management, while ICEYE will provide its experience in satellite platforms, satellite constellation operations and ground infrastructure.
The cooperation between Nokia and ICEYE is not entirely new. Nokia was among the companies that participated in an investment round announced by ICEYE in June 2026, through which the company secured more than €1 billion in financing.
First satellites planned for 2028
The first satellites are scheduled to be launched in 2028. If the project is implemented, ICEYE will expand its activities in government-controlled satellite intelligence into the communications sector, while Nokia will strengthen its presence in Europe’s rapidly growing defense and space communications market.
Europe’s “strategic autonomy”: the militarization of civilian technology
The new partnership between Nokia and ICEYE is a striking example of where the concepts of “strategic autonomy” and “technological sovereignty,” which Europe has increasingly embraced in recent years, are actually heading.
The satellite communications systems being developed by the two Finnish companies may initially appear to be nothing more than a technological investment. Yet the companies themselves explicitly list defense, border security and government operations among the project’s intended areas of use. With the first satellites planned for launch in 2028, the system is also designed to remain under government control, including its satellites, ground stations and terminals.
What is significant here is not simply that two companies are entering the defense sector. The boundary between civilian and military technology is increasingly disappearing in Europe.
Companies operating in telecommunications, artificial intelligence, satellite technology, data analysis and digital infrastructure are being turned into direct components of European states’ rearmament and security policies.
This transformation is being marketed under the rhetoric of “European independence.” Yet what is emerging is not a Europe moving away from militarism. On the contrary, Europe is building its own militarized infrastructure.
Reducing dependence on the U.S. does not eliminate militarism
Europe’s basic argument is that it should not remain dependent on U.S.-based companies for its security and communications infrastructure. That is why European states are seeking to develop their own satellite systems, defense technologies and secure communications networks.
But there is a serious contradiction here.
The infrastructure being developed to reduce dependence on U.S. companies is being used to expand the military capabilities of European states. In other words, the question of “militarism or peace?” is being reduced to a choice between “American militarism or European militarism.”
The EU’s IRIS² program is a larger-scale example of this transformation. Although the system was initially presented as a secure communications and digital infrastructure project, the program was expanded in August 2026 to include 66 additional LEO satellites for defense, security and emergency services, bringing the total planned core constellation to 348 satellites. The European Commission has also explicitly identified defense and security applications as among the main drivers behind the changes.
What we are therefore witnessing is not simply a European space program designed to “improve internet access.” Space infrastructure is being transformed into a component of Europe’s security and defense architecture.
Companies are becoming part of the war economy
More importantly, this transformation is not taking place solely through state institutions.
The European model places private companies at the center of this process. As in the case of Nokia and ICEYE, private technology companies are developing infrastructure designed to meet the defense and security needs of governments. Public-private partnerships are also at the heart of the IRIS² model.
The program’s total cost over 12 years has been set at €10.6 billion, with €6 billion expected to be provided by the EU and more than €4 billion by the private sector.
Thus, the expansion of Europe’s “defense capacity” does not simply mean larger state budgets. Private capital is becoming a direct partner in Europe’s emerging security economy.
This transformation is also changing the fields in which technology companies operate. Technologies once associated primarily with consumer communications, the internet, software or civilian infrastructure are now becoming integrated into border surveillance, military communications, intelligence and crisis-management systems.
This is not the neutralization of Europe’s technology sector. It is its militarization.
The technological infrastructure of “Fortress Europe”
All of these developments cannot be considered separately from the increasingly powerful concept of “Fortress Europe.”
Tighter border controls, the treatment of migration as a security issue, increased military spending and the expansion of Europe’s own defense industry are different components of the same political direction.
Satellite technology is no exception. Indeed, border surveillance is explicitly listed among the intended uses of IRIS² in EU documents.
In this way, seemingly positive concepts such as “digital sovereignty,” “technological independence” and “strategic autonomy” are, in practice, becoming technological instruments for building a stronger European security apparatus.
The fundamental issue here is not that Europe is reducing its dependence on the United States. There is nothing inherently wrong with any country developing its own technological capabilities. The question is what those capabilities are being developed for.
If the result of technological independence is more military satellites, more sophisticated border surveillance systems, stronger military communications networks and larger defense budgets, then what is being created is not simply independence. It is the expansion of the militarist capacity of European states and European capital.
From this perspective, the Nokia-ICEYE agreement represents more than a technological partnership.
As Europe seeks to create an alternative to the United States’ military and technological dominance, it is simultaneously building its own military-technological complex.
And perhaps the most important feature of this process is that the war economy is no longer built solely in arms factories.
Telecommunications companies, satellite companies, artificial intelligence firms and other high-tech corporations are becoming increasingly important actors in this economy.
Europe’s “strategic autonomy” therefore cannot be understood merely as a project to become independent from Washington. It is also a project through which Europe is rebuilding its own imperial and militarist capabilities.
by Fabio Giuseppe Carlo Carisio
“Our Earth is dying. Even NOAA admits that the super El Niño — a product of geoengineering — can alter the global climate and that the planet’s life-support system has reached a catastrophic tipping point. Global climate terrorists within the US military are intensifying their warfare operations.”
So begins a brief investigation by American Dr. Ana Maria Mihalcea (Source 1)—work that has been suppressed by mainstream media, even though the articles she publishes on her Substack are consistently based on official papers. It was she who published a confidential US Air Force dossier titled “Weather as a Force Multiplier” (link at the bottom of the article).
This document confirms, beyond any reasonable doubt, the military use of weather—a history traced back to Operation Popeye in Vietnam by our geopolitics and intelligence contributor at Gospa News International, Dr. Darini Rajasingham-Senanayake, an academic at the University of Colombo (Sri Lanka)…
It is worth recalling that the US Air Force also distinguished itself by publishing a study on laboratory-created recombinant chimeric viruses—the very nature of SARS-CoV-2, which was found to be spiked with HIV…
Mihalcea adds: “Not only does ball-sized hail constitute an act of terrorism against civilians, but the toxic substances being sprayed—toxic metals, graphene, and polymers—are killing humans, plants, and animals. For years, I have maintained that it is pointless to stop biological weapons linked to COVID-19 if we do not put an end to geoengineering.“
Today, we were supposed to focus specifically on the potential correlation between the HAARP station in Alaska and the alarming intensification of El Niño; however, we will cover this in the next episode because, while searching for documentation on the subject, we uncovered other detailed “scientific scoops”!
El Niño is a periodic warming phenomenon occurring between March and February at intervals of two to seven years; it stands in contrast to La Niña, which causes cooling. This year, the phenomenon is being intensified by equatorial Pacific Ocean temperatures that are already above average.
More details in the descripyion of the VIDEO
Hurricane Isaias leaves hundreds of thousands of people without power in Alabama, Georgia and Florida, with all three states declaring emergencies Flooding is a continuing risk, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis says as he warns of a “very hazardous situation”, according to BBC.
Winds peaked at 120mph (193km/h) before Isaias made landfall in Florida late on Friday – images show houses battered by winds and felled trees.
Two people are dead in Alabama, according to the governor, while two more have been killed in separate incidents in Florida. Isaias peaked as a category three hurricane, bringing heavy rain and powerful wind, but has since been downgraded
Video of the recent floods in Chile
While researching geoengineering, we uncovered scientific studies that—when viewed together—suggest a potential link between the activity of the High-frequency Active Auroral Research Program (HAARP) and alterations to the ionosphere, space weather, and the Earth’s climate…
By synthesizing the astrophysical data gathered, we can state that artificial electromagnetic bombardment generated by the Alaska station can produce dangeorous effects similar to geomagnetic storms originating from the Sun or other planets.
If you missed any of the nine previous reports in the HAARP Dossier, you can revisit one of the early ones—“TOO MANY FLOODS AFTER DAZZLING AURORAS MADE BY HAARP. Dangerous Tests Funded by US NSF. As Solar project in EU“—as well as the most recent entry: “HAARP Dossier – 9: Cloudbursts, Tornadoes, and Lightning Across Italy, the EU, the USA, and Nepal (Video) Following PARS Tests in Alaska for the Third Consecutive Year—No Correlation? (at the moment in Italian only but avoidable in English with machine stranslation)“
Recent videos regarding the floods in Spain
In short, the immensely powerful HAARP antennas—located at a military base in Gakona, Alaska, and managed by the University of Alaska Fairbanks (UAF) on behalf of the US Air Force (which nonetheless continues to fund experiments alongside the US government’s National Science Foundation, or NSF)—conduct multiple experiments each year involving the geomagnetic bombardment of the ionosphere.
“The ionosphere stretches roughly 50 to 400 miles above Earth’s surface, right at the edge of space. Along with the neutral upper atmosphere, the ionosphere forms the boundary between Earth’s lower atmosphere — where we live and breathe — and the vacuum of space.” (NASA)
As this is a program funded and utilized by the US Pentagon, we are unaware of any scientist ever publishing research on the risks associated with these activities.
With each of our investigations, however, we uncover new, unsettling secrets hidden within the many communications—ostensibly about safety—regarding geoengineering activities; activities described by them as mere study and research, but which we—along with certain European scientists who urged caution—interpret as manipulation.
Indeed, those scientists’ calls for prudence were significant enough to prompt the Pentagon (the US Department of Defense) to relinquish control of the controversial facility in 2015.
«The HAARP facility can generate artificial heating in the atmosphere to enable the study of the variability of the atmosphere, the energetic electron distribution, and how the HF radio wave propagation would be affected. The HAARP HF heater is currently the only available source of controlled ELF/VLF waves available to scientists for magnetospheric wave injection» reads on the official website as we reported in a previous investigation.
The HAARP station’s Ionospheric Research Instrument (IRI) is a massive array of 180 radio antennas spread across a 33-acre site; last August, it conducted PARS (Polar Aeronomy and Radio Science) tests for the third consecutive year prior to the onset of the flood season in Europe and across the globe, a topic we covered in our previous article, *HAARP DOSSIER – 9*.
That is not all. It conducted other tests that were not publicized as part of the official research campaigns and can only be tracked on the website by experts; this is because the UAF is required to issue a “transmission notice” to amateur radio operators, given that electromagnetic tests alter radio frequencies—and much else besides…
Today, we reveal two highly technical yet fundamental points regarding the dangerous HAARP activity—though we hope to present them in a more accessible way, even at the risk of minor scientific inaccuracies:
«The High-frequency Active Auroral Research Program (HAARP) will be conducting a research campaign August 25-27 UTC, with operating times specified in the table below. Operating frequencies will vary, but all HAARP transmissions will be between 2.8 MHz and 10 MHz».
This is what was stated in a “transmission notice” dated August 24, 2026 (following our Investigation No. 9) a notice that is effectively hidden from anyone unfamiliar with the website (Source 2).
Not only is this experiment unmentioned on the homepage—which still displays the previous PARS test from August 4–13, 2026, that we had reported on Italian 9 DOSSIER.
But the “Research Campaigns” section has not been updated since the PARS campaign of August 2024. How can such secrecy be explained?
This is because, as revealed in a world exclusive by Gospa News, the geomagnetic bombardment experiments of May 2024 coincided with the appearance of dazzling, anomalous aurorae borealis visible across much of the Northern Hemisphere.
However, UAF management blamed an ongoing solar storm and denied that their tests had triggered or intensified the auroras or that, by interfering with the solar storm, they might be linked to subsequent atmospheric disasters. Since then, transparency regarding the HAARP station has become optional…
DAZZLING AURORAS DEBUNKED! Artificially Caused by HAARP & US NSF. Not by a Solar Storm as CNN Told
I reiterate—for the umpteenth time—that the danger inherent in these electromagnetic bombardments of the ionosphere lies in the fact that no scientific study has ever been conducted on potential short-, medium-, or long-term adverse effects.
At present, Gospa News’ investigations represent the only source of scientific analysis regarding the temporal coincidences between HAARP experiments and anomalous—sometimes even catastrophic—atmospheric events occurring in the weeks and months immediately following them.
This was the case with another test in January 2026—also kept “hidden” and detectable only via the “transmission notice”—which preceded floods and landslides in Europe and the USA.
Now, however, we have identified a study highlighting the critical nature of the foF2 factor as altered by tests conducted at the Alaska station.
“Operating frequencies will vary, but all HAARP transmissions will be between 2.8 MHz and 10 MHz. Actual transmit days and times are highly variable based on real-time ionospheric and/or geomagnetic conditions. All information is subject to change.” reads the official notice dated August 24, 2026 (screenshot above).
“Note that due to the number of experiments and the need to make real-time schedule adjustments based on ionospheric conditions, no frequencies are specified in the table below. The included transmission notice supplement contains information on the frequencies HAARP is authorized to transmit. HAARP transmissions will only occur on our authorized frequencies”.
The communication appears quite generic, yet the notes below specify that “The emission bandwidth may be up to 46 kHz; the actual value depends on the frequency, modulation and experiment requirements”
So far, so good — given that this electromagnetic emission is well below that of a 5G installation (700 MHz, or 700,000 kHz) — but that is not the alarming indicator…
At the point 3 we read: “The authorized Effective Radiated Power (ERP) varies from 457 MW at the lower frequencies up to 3.6 GW at the higher frequencies; the actual power depends on the experiment requirements but will be ≤ authorized limit”
“3.6 GW—or 3,600 megawatts (MW)—represents an enormous amount of power, potentially very dangerous if not managed correctly through industrial infrastructure and specific safety systems.”
Google Gemini’s AI issues this warning, reminding us that this is equivalent to 36 million watts (or 36,000 kilowatts) “the power generated by a medium-sized power plant (such as a large wind or solar farm), capable of powering approximately 12,000 homes simultaneously.”
Let us look at the explanation provided in the caption of the image from the University of Alaska Fairbanks regarding the August experiment (Source 2):
In short, this means interference with satellites and all forms of satellite communication.
It is essentially a “Star Wars”-style tool, given that without Elon Musk’s Starlink satellite network, Ukraine—which lacks its own space-based spy stations—would be left blind…
However, the issue of alterations to this foF2 factor is clearly explained in an older study published by the scientific journal *AGU Advancing Earth and Space Science* in its “Space Weather” section.
The study—authored by J. S. Shim of The Catholic University of America and NASA GSFC (Greenbelt, MD, USA), along with other NASA scientists—is titled “Validation of Ionospheric Specifications During Geomagnetic Storms: TEC and foF2 During the March 2013 Storm Event” (Source 3).
That study, published in 2018, makes no reference whatsoever to the HAARP activity in Alaska—given that operations had only just resumed at the time following the transfer from the US Air Force to the University of Alaska Fairbanks—yet it helps mere mortals like us (laypeople when it comes to physics) to at least grasp the importance, and therefore the potential danger, of the foF2 factor.
Let us look at the research abstract:
«To address challenges of assessing space weather modeling capabilities, the Community Coordinated Modeling Center is leading a newly established International Forum for Space Weather Modeling Capabilities Assessment» and this in itself is a curious news item containing alarming words that smack of geoengineering a thousand light-years away…
But it continues:
«This paper presents preliminary results of validation of modeled foF2 (F2 layer critical frequency) and TEC (total electron content) during the first selected 2013 March storm event (17 March 2013)». In this study, we used eight ionospheric models ranging from empirical to physics-based, coupled ionosphere-thermosphere and data assimilation models. The quantities we considered are TEC and foF2 changes and percentage changes compared to quiet time background, and the maximum and minimum percentage changes. In addition, we considered normalized percentage changes of TEC».
Therefore, if foF2 levels rise during a geomagnetic storm, then—by a simple, self-evident philosophical syllogism—artificially exceeding that threshold (as HAARP admitted in the notes regarding its latest test on August 24, 2026) should or could trigger a similarly dangerous space weather event!
To better understand the study’s findings, let us consult the Space Weather website of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)—the U.S. Department of Commerce agency that studies and attempts to forecast weather events.
«The Total Electron Content (TEC) is the total number of electrons present along a path between a radio transmitter and receiver. Radio waves are affected by the presence of electrons. The more electrons in the path of the radio wave, the more the radio signal will be affected. For ground to satellite communication and satellite navigation, TEC is a good parameter to monitor for possible space weather impacts» states NOAA’s Space Weather service (Source 4).
“The TEC in the ionosphere is modified by changing solar Extreme Ultra-Violet radiation, geomagnetic storms, and the atmospheric waves that propagate up from the lower atmosphere. The TEC will therefore depend on local time, latitude, longitude, season, geomagnetic conditions, solar cycle and activity, and troposphere conditions. The propagation of radio waves is affected by the ionosphere. (..) The change in the path and velocity of radio waves in the ionosphere has a big impact on the accuracy of satellite navigation systems such as GPS/GNSS”. states the US government website.
From these few lines, two definitive concepts emerge:
Here is what the AI Gemini writes on the subject:
Space weather—driven primarily by solar activity (flares, solar wind, and coronal mass ejections, or CMEs)—directly affects the geospace environment and terrestrial technologies.
The interaction of solar plasma with Earth’s magnetic field generates spectacular auroras—both the *borealis* and *australis*—which are sometimes visible even at mid-latitudes during peak storm activity.
We return to the subject of auroras, the “core mission” of HAARP, which states that “high-frequency transmissions often rely on the critical plasma frequency for the F2 region (foF2), as measured by the Gakona ionosonde.”
For someone like me—having written 96 investigative reports on the lab-engineered SARS-CoV-2—reading these statements about the interaction between immense electromagnetic power (3.6 megawatts) and solar activity is truly terrifying.
Google AI Gemini also warns that geomagnetic storms can cause many damages to out planet:
But I am not the only one pointing out the danger of space weather impacts on Earth…
In recent days, we debunked a sensational piece of fake news regarding the explosion of an American spy satellite—a story hastily published by the website *Sorvegliati Spaziali (Space Checks)* after it was misled by Gemini AI. We feel somewhat indebted to them, given the exceptional work they usually do as partners of the National Institute for Astrophysics (INAF) of Rome (Italy); today, we cite them to provide a detailed scientific explanation of the phenomena that the AI had previously reported in a crude and inaccurate manner.
“Space weather refers to the physical state of the space occupied by Earth and the planets of the Solar System—a region permeated by the solar wind, a continuous stream of electrically charged particles (in a state known as plasma) confined by the analogous ‘interstellar wind’ within a massive bubble called the heliosphere,” reads the entry on Space Meteorology (Source 5).
For the sake of brevity, we will skip the lengthy section explaining magnetic field activity linked to the Sun’s rotation and sunspots, which “can release magnetic energy during chromospheric eruptions (so-called flares), resulting in particle acceleration and the emission of electromagnetic radiation.”
“Enormous ‘plasma bubbles’—known as CMEs or Coronal Mass Ejections—can be accelerated toward the planets. When a planet possesses a magnetic field that acts as a genuine shield against incoming space particles, this field becomes compressed, triggering magnetic storms.“
Finally, we turn to the shimmering skies: their varying color shades depend on radio-frequency intensity—as we highlighted in our analysis of a table regarding HAARP investigations, and as is evident from the table published earlier in this article.
“On Earth, polar auroras appear as delicate, multicolored curtains; their luminosity is generated in the ionosphere by atoms and molecules excited by solar particles that manage to penetrate the magnetic shield. (…) A disturbed ionosphere affects the quality of radio communications—for instance, by making GPS-based positioning problematic. Furthermore, intense ionospheric electric currents can induce significant additional currents in power lines, thereby triggering blackouts.”
Rosanna Rispoli, a researcher at the National Institute for Astrophysics (INAF) of Rome, explains space weather and the solar geomagnetic storms that give rise to the aurora borealis and aurora australis in a video released on YouTube.
In the video, she highlights the intensity of these phenomena between 2024 and 2025; it is worth noting that these are precisely the years during which HAARP conducted the highest number of experiments.
The video also refers to the intense aurora borealis—”visible at an unusual latitude”—of May 2024; this occurred at the peak of a solar storm but also during one of the most controversial tests conducted by the Alaska station, forcing UAF management to deny a correlation that seemed obvious even to laypeople…
It is baffling that experts fail to even hypothesize a possible link between these exceptional space events and HAARP experiments; yet, this can only be explained by the fear of challenging a Pentagon project.
However, there is a striking new development regarding the impact of space weather on our planet.
“According to a new statistical study published today in *Nature* (July 15, 2026 – Ed.),we are underestimating the potential consequences of severe geomagnetic storms on Earth. The cause appears to be a combination of measurement errors regarding the solar wind—which drives these storms—physical inferences, and a statistical phenomenon known as ‘regression to the mean,'” summarizes Valentina Guglielmo in an article published by INAF’s online news outlet (Source 6).
«Several processes occur between the point where we measure solar wind intensity—the Lagrange L1 point—and the magnetopause, the point where the solar wind strikes Earth’s outer atmosphere,» explains Nithin Sivadas, a researcher in the Department of Physics at the Catholic University of America in Washington, D.C., and the paper’s lead author, speaking to *Media INAF* (Gospa News translation from Italian).
«Some of these processes can have a systematic effect on reducing intensity, while others—such as turbulence—can have a random effect, causing stochastic variations in solar wind intensity. We focus exclusively on the processes that cause random variations. Phenomena driving random fluctuations in solar wind intensity measured between L1 and Earth’s vicinity include, for example, the solar wind’s direction, its variable structure, and turbulence closer to Earth.»
«Since these factors introduce random variations, scientists previously hypothesized that, on average, underestimations would cancel out overestimations, allowing us to relate the measured average solar wind intensity to its effects on Earth without worrying about random fluctuations. However, our paper argues that this is not entirely true.»
In the study’s abstract, astrophysicist Sivadas—who also works at the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland—and his colleagues write an even more unsettling sentence regarding “statistical bias”:
“Our results reveal that the data analysis underpinning saturation theories is affected by a non-linear bias, thereby calling the validity of such theories into question. When uncertainties are corrected, it emerges that Earth’s response to solar wind forcing is consistently linear and that the impact of extreme geomagnetic storms can be double what was previously believed (Source 7).”
We refer astrophysics enthusiasts and professionals to the complex scientific paper itself; we cite it here solely to refute the mainstream “mantra” claiming that extreme climate changes are driven exclusively by human behavior (certainly a contributing factor) rather than by solar activity—and, by extension, the military geoengineering that mimics it...
Just as with mRNA Covid vaccines, when science truly gets serious and rigorously tests every hypothesis, “politically convenient” certainties begin to crumble…
This “scientific scoop” emerges at a time when HAARP is altering space weather by toying with solar storms—much like “sorcerer’s apprentices” enhancing lethal viruses in a lab—and bombarding the ionosphere, whose primary function is to reflect long-distance radio waves and protect Earth by shielding it from a portion of solar radiation.
Confirming our suspicions and the many unknowns inherent in space weather, here is a final key insight from another study published on the European Commission’s CORDIS website. For the sake of brevity, we cite only the conclusions, which refer to a solar eruption and “Coronal Mass Ejections” (CMEs).
«Light associated with an eruption takes eight minutes to reach Earth’s magnetosphere. However, CMEs can take up to five days to cover the distance to our planet. The solar wind acts on these clouds of superheated plasma like a current opposing a boat’s motion, slowing down the faster ones. STEREO scientists have discovered that the impacts occurring around these clouds must be taken into account to “predict” arrival times with greater accuracy (Source 8)».
«From the constant stream of electrically charged particles known as solar wind to unpredictable CMEs, Earth feels the impact of our stellar companion—an influence that extends far beyond mere light and heat».
This is what scientists from the European Commission-funded STEREO (Solar Terrestrial Relations Observatory) mission report (Source 8), implicitly confirming that solar electromagnetic emissions impact Earth’s atmosphere; an effect that, however, can also be artificially replicated by HAARP during Pentagon-funded tests through the alteration of the ionosphere’s “foF2 critical frequency” (as seen in the 2018 Shim et al. study cited above).
The defense strategy of the Alaska station’s proponents has consistently been the same: solar geomagnetic storms are far more powerful—measured in terawatts—and thus vastly exceed the 3.6-gigawatt limit imposed on the UAF.
Yet this remains merely a hypothesis—just like our own—given that until recently (prior to the STEREO and Sivada studies), the prevailing view was that solar flares could not dangerously impact Earth’s atmosphere and clouds…
True science ought to analyze both possibilities; however, were an astrophysicist to discuss the safety of the Pentagon’s projects in Alaska, they would—at the very least—lose their job.
They would also risk premature death, much like the scientists who identified SARS-CoV-2 as a lab-engineered pathogen—foremost among them Luc Montagnier—linking the COVID-19 pandemic to decades-long experiments conducted by DARPA, the US Department of Defense’s military agency.
WUHAN.GATES – 34. COVID IS A SCIENTIST’s KILLER… Who Discovered SARS Viruses Died!
And finally…the kicker: Amarus in Fundo!
A group of researchers from a Japanese university has proposed a theoretical model exploring a possible link between solar storms and earthquakes. They suggest that, under specific conditions, ionospheric disturbances could help trigger seismic events that are already “on the brink” of occurring.
We are not providing details on this study here, as it will be the main topic of the next Gospa News investigation (subscribe to the newsletter), especially in light of the now-alarming seismic activity along the Pacific Ring of Fire…
In this specific context, we move from HAARP to HARP—the Alaska Earthquake Center—which is based right inside the UAF station in Gakona that we discussed in our previous investigation.
Could it be that the “crazy conspiracy theorists”—who blamed earthquakes on those dangerous, mysterious antennas on the American Arctic peninsula—actually had a scientifically valid point?
If that turns out to be the case, Gospa News will aim to prove it—relying, as always, on credible international scientific studies, just as we did for all the “Wuhan-Gates” investigations into lab-engineered SARS-CoV-2 and the harms associated with mRNA vaccines.
Fabio Giuseppe Carlo Carisio – Gospa News founder and director
VITAL RELATED POSTS – ITALIAN LINKS CAN BE READ IN ENGLISH WITH MACHINE TRANSLATION
Brussels, 10 October, (Brussels Morning Newspaper) – The European Union is facing renewed pressure over EU-China trade restrictions as European industry groups demand stronger protection against Chinese imports, despite a preliminary trade understanding reached between Brussels and Beijing … Read more
By Philip PILKINGTON
Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su
The Trump administration is missing the bigger picture.
In the classic martial arts film Enter the Dragon, Bruce Lee’s character is instructing a young, aspiring fighter. Irritated at the lack of progress his student is making, he points to the sky. “It’s like a finger pointing away to the moon,” he says as the student tries to focus on what his teacher is saying. “Don’t concentrate on the finger,” Lee says, slapping him on the head, “or you will miss all that heavenly glory.” The quote is derived from an old Buddhist text called the Śūraṅgama Sūtra, and the point is clear: Sometimes if you focus on what is immediately in front of you, you can miss the point entirely.
Something like this is happening in Washington, DC, right now. For almost two weeks, the debate around the progress or lack thereof in the Iran War has been focused on activity in the Strait of Hormuz. A whole host of maritime experts have emerged suddenly to inform us that the Trump administration has succeeded in reopening the crucial waterway to shipping. Maximalists are claiming that this means the United States has effectively won the war in the Middle East. Others are making the more modest claim that this reopening of the Strait will solve the looming energy crisis.
These were the two perspectives that most people who were not deeply involved in the debate heard. There was, however, a small but vocal minority who questioned whether the Strait had been opened at all. If Iran had effective fire control over the Strait in spring and summer, they asked, then why would they suddenly lose it now? Almost immediately after this question was raised, Iran settled the debate by striking an enormous number of ships: 12 and counting in less than a week.
To those of us who were paying attention, the whole exercise felt like looking at Lee’s finger as he points to the moon. As these debates unfolded, the market for U.S. Treasury debt continued an epic sell-off. Bloomberg quoted an investment banker who stated that Treasuries were “trading like a meme stock.” U.S. Treasury bonds have now experienced their worst long-run returns in history.
Treasury bonds are not just any old asset. For one, they are the debt of the U.S. government. If they become uninvestable, the capacity for Washington to live beyond its means through debt issuance is open to question. Treasuries are also the benchmark asset for the entire global dollar system that has allowed the U.S. to run enormous deficits for decades. If this asset starts “trading like a meme stock” and generating awful returns, foreigners will opt for something else. This week, the president of the German central bank stated that “the case for further diversification into gold remains significant.” People are talking.
In mid-September, the speaker of the Iranian parliament, Mohammed Bagher Ghalibaf, posted an equation on X. Unusually for an obscure piece of algebra, the post garnered nearly 7 million views. The equation was a modified version of what economists call the “Taylor Rule,” a method that economists and central bankers use when setting central bank interest rates. In normal times, the equation factors in expected future inflation and how much slack is in the economy. But Ghalibaf’s equation—which he called the “Straits Taylor Rule” —included two new variables: the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb, the two waterways currently under fire from Iran and the Houthis in Yemen, respectively.
The equation is a stripped-down representation of Iran’s strategy. By controlling these waterways, Iran and its allied groups have gained control over the global energy market. By squeezing these chokepoints, Iran can assert de facto control over America’s financial markets by pushing up expected inflation. Central banks like the Federal Reserve realize that this is no mere bluff and have already started raising interest rates. Ghalibaf’s equation explains, to a very large extent, why American government debt is currently trading like a meme stock.
Meanwhile, at the same time as these pressures are felt in American financial markets, the real economy is undergoing a squeeze too. Recent reports from the Energy Information Agency suggest that American heating-oil bills are expected to rise by 21 percent this winter. Diesel markets are entering into a genuine crisis, with President Donald Trump floating the prospect of banning diesel exports to ensure that there are no shortages. Diesel is the lifeblood of the American logistics chain. If there are shortages, trains and trucks will not run and goods will not be delivered to shelves. Trump has walked back the diesel export ban for now, after strong-arming the Europeans to dump their oil and diesel reserves, but there is every chance that this option appears back on the table as the crisis worsens. Food prices are rising too, with sugar prices looking particularly worrisome.
Once again, Ghalibaf outlined how this is part of Iran’s overall strategy. In an X post this week, the speaker published a rudimentary graph—coupled with a haunting image of a ghost—showing rising commodity prices and interest rates on one side, and falling consumer confidence, foreign interest in U.S. Treasuries, hyperscaler investment, and housing affordability on the other. The Iranians are not just trying to squeeze the American financial system—they are aiming to put extreme stress on the entire economy—and it looks increasingly like they intend on making this pressure felt before American voters go to the polls on November 3.
The Trump administration has become fixated on the Strait of Hormuz, seeing it as a decisive battlefield on which the U.S. can win the war. But the Strait is merely a means to an end. For Iran, that end is to slowly demolish the American economy and financial system until the pressure becomes too much and the U.S. backs off. The idea that you can “win” such a battle is delusional.
The Strait is merely the finger in Lee’s analogy. It is Iran’s overall economic strategy—the moon—that we should focus on. And when we do, we come to the worrying conclusion that by the time the Trump administration cries uncle, the damage done to the American economy and financial system will be so severe that it could take many, many years to recover.
Original article: www.theamericanconservative.com
Britain’s biggest employers set bold diversity targets – but has anyone checked the maths? Actuary Peter Crowley runs the numbers and finds the arithmetic rather less accommodating than the slogans.
The post Diversity Targets: Has Anyone Done the Maths? appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.
Il controllo iraniano sui passaggi strategici di Hormuz e Bab el-Mandeb si trasforma in un’arma economica capace di influenzare i prezzi dell’energia, alimentare l’inflazione e condizionare le decisioni della Federal Reserve. Teheran dimostra così che la pressione militare e il controllo delle rotte petrolifere possono mettere in difficoltà Washington ben oltre il campo di battaglia.
Nei giorni scorsi, Kpler ha quantificato in almeno 16,5 milioni di barili al giorno l’ammontare medio raggiunto nel mese di settembre dalle esportazioni di petrolio dalla regione del Golfo, nell’ambito di graduale ritorno dei flussi sui livelli prebellici. Una quota significativa dell’output è transitata attraverso lo Stretto di Hormuz, che la scorsa settimana ha registrato volumi medi di greggio in uscita superiori ai 14 milioni di barili al giorno segando un incremento di oltre il 210% rispetto al minimo di circa 4,5 milioni di barili giornalieri di media toccato nel mese di marzo.
Un risultato strabiliante, ascritto generalmente al danneggiamento e/o distruzione dei radar e dei sistemi di comunicazione iraniani situati nelle zone costiere ad opera delle forze statunitensi. Le operazioni di “bonifica” hanno posto le basi per l’instaurazione di un corridoio di navigazione a doppio senso a ridosso delle coste dell’Oman, di cui i mercantili si sono serviti per entrare nel Golfo Persico, imbarcare petrolio, riattraversare lo Stretto e trasferire il carico su navi in attesa al di fuori del passaggio marittimo, sotto la supervisione della Us Navy.
Di questa “rotta sicura” si è avvalsa anche l’Arabia Saudita, specialmente in seguito al danneggiamento in più punti dell’oleodotto East-West ad opera delle milizie irachene. La conduttura aveva assicurato a Riyadh la possibilità di convogliare parte rilevante (4-5 milioni di barili al giorno) della produzione petrolifera verso il porto di Yanbu, sul Mar Rosso, così da aggirare lo Stretto di Hormuz.
L’Iran, di contro, è stato tagliato fuori dal mercato petrolifero globale dal blocco navale statunitense, che accentua le pressioni economiche sulla Repubblica Islamica esercitate dalle sanzioni annunciate lo scorso agosto dal segretario al Tesoro Bessent.
La Repubblica Islamica, hanno concluso gran parte degli analisti, stava rapidamente perdendo il controllo sullo Stretto di Hormuz.
Lo scenario è cambiato radicalmente a partire dal 28 settembre, quando gli iraniani hanno ripreso le operazioni offensive contro le petroliere che si accingevano ad attraversare lo Stretto di Hormuz senza autorizzazione di Teheran. Kpler ha documentato almeno sette attacchi contro navi mercantili, di cui quattro avevano effettuato due o più viaggi di andata e ritorno attraverso lo Stretto di Hormuz a partire da giugno. Nel novero degli obiettivi figurano due Very Large Crude Carrier (Vlcc) gestite dalla Kuwait Oil Tanker Company, in grado di trasportare fino a due milioni di barili di petrolio.
Il 3 ottobre, la divisione navale dei Pasdaran ha lanciato un chiaro avvertimento alle navi intenzionate a percorrere il corridoio allestito dagli Stati Uniti, minacciando di prenderle di mira e distruggerle. «Non fidatevi della Marina statunitense, non utilizzate assolutamente il corridoio meridionale e non mettete a rischio la vostra vita», recitava il messaggio radio trasmesso dalle Guardie Rivoluzionarie su un canale pubblico comunemente impiegato per la navigazione commerciale. Secondo gli specialisti, gli attacchi iraniani starebbero già producendo un impatto negativo, con i primi segnali di un rallentamento dei flussi petroliferi.
La passività con cui Teheran ha assistito alla ripresa dei flussi petroliferi in uscita dal Golfo Persico era quindi frutto di una preciso calcolo politico. Una strozzatura prolungata dell’offerta petrolifera danneggia non soltanto i nemici della Repubblica Islamica, ma anche un grande importatore di idrocarburi alleato come la Cina e la vasta platea di Paesi neutrali che gli iraniani non hanno alcun interesse a inimicarsi.
La riattivazione del traffico attraverso quel cruciale braccio di mare non è per di più coinciso con un crollo delle quotazioni internazionali di petrolio, gas e derivati, i cui prezzi sono rimasti mediamente del 50% più alti rispetto ai livelli pre-bellici. Costi di trasporto elevati (i broker navali stimano che i produttori di petrolio del Golfo Persico sborsino tra i 30 e i 40 milioni di dollari per un viaggio di andata e ritorno attraverso lo Stretto di Hormuz), rincaro delle polizze assicurative, prolungamento dei tempi di riparazione e/o ricostruzione degli impianti energetici del Golfo Persico danneggiati e/o distrutti nell’ambito del conflitto e insufficiente capacità di raffinazione all’interno del sistema globale hanno mantenuto i valori dell’energia sufficientemente alta da imporre conseguenze molto pesanti all’economia globale nel suo complesso e in particolare agli Stati Uniti. Paese in cui i riscaldamenti domestici, i mezzi agricoli, i treni e i camion che percorrono oltre 400 miliardi di miglia ogni anno per trasportare il 73% circa di tutte le merci sono alimentati a diesel. Nella settimana compresa tra il 21 e il 28 settembre, il prezzo del diesel è salito a 6,53 dollari, a fronte dei 3,76 registrati nei giorni antecedenti all’attacco israelo-statunitense contro l’Iran.
Si tratta di un aumento di circa il 74%, che pesa soprattutto sugli agricoltori, chiamati proprio in questo periodo di raccolto a fare maggiore impiego di trattori e mietitrebbie. Devono anche prepararsi alla stagione della semina, accumulando fertilizzanti che provengono in larga parte proprio dalla regione del Golfo Persico. A partire dall’urea, derivato petrolifero il cui prezzo è aumentato dell’80% soltanto tra marzo e aprile.
Anche le compagnie aeree risentono pesantemente dell’instabilità nel quadrante del Golfo, perché le loro flotte consumano carburante speciale derivato dal petrolio. Dopo lo scoppio della guerra, i prezzi del carburante per aerei sono pressoché raddoppiati.
L’inflazione è conseguentemente aumentata, anche a causa del concomitante, frenetico attivismo di Ansarallah. Nell’arco di pochi giorni, la compagine yemenita alleata di Teheran ha strappato al governo internazionalmente riconosciuto di Sana’a il controllo delle aree costiere che si affacciano sullo Stretto di Bab el-Mandeb, imposto il blocco dei porti sauditi, preso di mira petroliere riconducibili al regno e colpito, di concerto con le milizie sciite irachene, il cruciale oleodotto East-West in più punti rendendolo inutilizzabile per quasi due settimane.
L’azzeramento provvisorio dell’export petrolifero saudita si è istantaneamente riverberato sui prezzi internazionali del greggio.
Segno che, controllando i due cruciali punti di strozzatura di Hormuz e Bab el-Mandeb, l’Iran e i suoi alleati regionali esercitano una notevole capacità di influenza sulla quotazione del petrolio e, a ricasco, sulle politiche monetarie di gran parte dei Paesi del mondo. A partire proprio dagli Stati Uniti.
Lo ha sottolineato di recente il presidente del Parlamento iraniano Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, attraverso un sottilissimo post sul suo profilo X in cui presentava versione opportunamente ritoccata dell’equazione elaborata nel 1993 dall’economista di Stanford John Taylor e affermatasi rapidamente come una delle formule di riferimento per le Banche Centrali in materia di determinazione dei tassi di interesse.
Nello specifico, l’equazione mette in relazione il tasso di interesse sui titoli di Stato a dieci anni con l’andamento dell’inflazione e l’output gap, raccomandando di innalzare i tassi di interesse quando l’inflazione supera l’obiettivo del 2% e/o la produzione economica eccede il suo potenziale.
La logica è elementare: tassi di interesse più alti rendono più costoso indebitarsi. Quando il costo del credito aumenta, privati e aziende riducono la propria propensione all’indebitamento e riducono la spesa, raffreddando così la dinamica dei prezzi. Ghalibaf ha integrato a questi dati già ricompresi nell’equazione di Taylor due nuove variabili, rappresentate dallo Stretto di Hormuz (denominato “SOH”) e da quello di Bab el-Mandeb (denominato “BM”) .
Nella “Stratis Taylor Rule” – i = r* + π* + 1.5(π−π*) + 0.5(y−y*) + α(SOH−SOH*) + β(BEM−BEM*), α,β > 0 – coniata da Ghalibaf, i tassi di interesse statunitensi crescono proporzionalmente alla gravità dell’interruzione dei traffici di idrocarburi in questi due nevralgici punti di strozzatura. Alla formula, il presidente del Parlamento iraniano ha accluso un commento: «vediamo se un rialzo dei tassi contribuirà a riaprire lo Stretto di Hormuz o a produrre una singolo barile di petrolio in più. Non si possono risolvere i problemi di un punto di strozzatura con 25 punti base aggiuntivi».
Tradotto: un innalzamento dei tassi di interesse ad opera della Federal Reserve non garantisce la riapertura dei due stretti, né l’aumento dell’offerta di petrolio. In compenso, chi controlla Hormuz e Bab el-Mandeb influisce indirettamente sulla determinazione dei tassi di interesse negli Stati Uniti in quanto titolare della prerogativa di dettare tempi e modi del traffico marittimo. E, quindi, di aumentare discrezionalmente i prezzi petroliferi. Ovvero di far lievitare l’inflazione.
Le dinamiche belliche che di recente hanno interessato la regione del Golfo Persico avvalorano la tesi di Ghalibaf. Nei dieci giorni antecedenti al 16 settembre, data in cui il direttivo della Federal Reserve si sarebbe pronunciato in materia di tassi, gli iraniani hanno preso di mira alcune petroliere nei pressi dello Stretto di Hormuz, mentre Ansarallah ha bersagliato la raffineria saudita di Jizan e assunto il controllo della costa prospiciente lo stretto di Bab el-Mandeb. Parallelamente, uno sciame di droni lanciato dalle milizie sciite irachene ha colpito l’oleodotto East-West, sospingendo il prezzo del petrolio al di sopra della soglia critica dei 100 dollari per barile. Un copione sostanzialmente analogo era andato in scena poche ore prima della riunione del board della Federal Reserve di fine luglio, quando alcuni missili lanciati da Ansarallah avevano centrato due petroliere saudite facendo anche in quel caso salire il prezzo petrolio sopra i 100 dollari.
Il prossimo vertice del direttivo della Federal Reserve è previsto per il 28 ottobre. Si tratta di una data da tenere d’occhio, visti i precedenti.
Diplomatie et monde
L’Allemagne réarme, elle renoue le fil coupe par la défaite c’est le fait le plus important de la période. Le reste n’est que distraction.
De nombreux chercheurs, dont l’éminent historien russe Vassili Klioutchevski, attribuent la fracture civilisationnelle incontestable entre les deux plus grands peuples d’Europe à la géographie, au climat et au paysage, qui ont façonné des modes de vie différents.
Vivant sous un climat prévisible, les Allemands ont développé une habitude de travail méthodique et régulier. Ils pouvaient planifier à l’avance car leur environnement leur permettait d’anticiper les résultats de leurs efforts avec une relative certitude.
Les Russes, en revanche, habitent une terre aux conditions imprévisibles qui s’étend, selon les mots de l’hymne national russe moderne, «des mers du Sud jusqu’à la frontière polaire». Ils ont souvent constaté que planifier à l’avance peut s’avérer totalement vain. De ce fait, ils doivent fréquemment travailler à un rythme effréné dans des délais très courts, s’appuyant sur la notion typiquement russe d’«avos» : l’espoir que, d’une manière ou d’une autre, les choses finiront par s’arranger.
Ces différences culturelles permettent d’expliquer non seulement l’évolution des relations entre ces voisins proches au fil des siècles — rappelons que la ville russe de Kaliningrad était autrefois la ville allemande de Königsberg — mais aussi la logique interne qui sous-tend aujourd’hui les relations politiques russo-allemandes.
L’Allemagne actuelle perçoit la Russie comme une menace pour sa sécurité nationale, à l’instar de ses prédécesseurs à la veille des Première et Seconde Guerres mondiales. Elle remilitarise méthodiquement son économie et accroît son aide militaire à l’Ukraine afin d’affaiblir la Russie sur tous les plans. En 2022-2023, au début de l’opération militaire spéciale, les aides étaient limitées et ciblées. À partir de 2024, Berlin s’est toutefois orientée vers des contrats à long terme pour la fourniture d’équipements et de drones, d’une valeur supérieure à 10 milliards de dollars par an, faisant de l’Allemagne le principal fournisseur d’aide militaire bilatérale à l’Ukraine au sein de l’UE.
La présidente de la Commission européenne, Ursula von der Leyen, ancienne ministre allemande de la Défense, s’est discrètement imposée comme la principale responsable de la distribution des fonds allemands.
Parallèlement, dans la continuité de cette dérive progressive vers une confrontation militaire avec la Russie, le gouvernement de Friedrich Merz poursuit la politique d’Olaf Scholz visant à démanteler la présence diplomatique russe en Allemagne. Après avoir obtenu la fermeture des consulats généraux russes à Munich, Hambourg, Francfort et Leipzig en mai 2023, Berlin a décidé en septembre dernier de fermer le consulat général de Bonn et le centre culturel de la Maison russe à Berlin.
Avec la première économie de l’UE et un représentant de sa propre initiative à un poste parmi les plus influents de la hiérarchie supranationale européenne, Berlin «reprogramme» progressivement une Europe unie pour en faire une sorte de «Quatrième Reich». En devenant un centre de pouvoir plus homogène, l’Europe risque de se retrouver au bord d’une confrontation militaire avec son puissant voisin de l’Est, comme cela s’est produit à maintes reprises au cours de l’histoire.
Afin de rendre la prétendue menace russe tangible, les autorités allemandes alimentent les médias depuis cet été des rumeurs concernant l’implication de Moscou dans la découverte d’un drone chargé d’explosifs à l’aéroport de fret de Leipzig. Sans attendre les conclusions de l’enquête, Berlin s’est empressé d’accuser la Russie d’avoir orchestré un acte de sabotage.
Conscients que leur gouvernement a mené le pays dans une impasse, les citoyens allemands ordinaires commencent à réagir et apportent un soutien croissant à l’Alternative pour l’Allemagne (AfD). Ce parti promet un changement radical de cap en matière de politique étrangère et intérieure — et non un revirement à 360 degrés, comme l’avait proposé l’ancienne ministre des Affaires étrangères Annalena Baerbock, donnant ainsi naissance, involontairement, au mème politique emblématique de la décennie allemande.
Certes, les victoires du parti restent régionales, et les autres partis politiques allemands refusent d’envisager le mouvement d’Alice Weidel et de Tino Chrupalla, même comme partenaire de coalition. Mais si sa base électorale continue de s’élargir, en attirant le soutien non seulement des Allemands de souche mais aussi, à terme, des communautés immigrées, l’AfD pourrait avoir une chance d’obtenir plus de 50% des voix au niveau national. Cela lui permettrait de former un gouvernement à elle seule.
Parallèlement, la cote de popularité de Merz a chuté à un niveau historiquement bas pour un chancelier de la République fédérale : seulement 11 à 15%, avec 85 à 89% d’insatisfaction. Face à ces chiffres et conscient de la demande publique pour une relation plus équilibrée avec la Russie, il a chargé le ministre des Affaires étrangères, Johann Wadephul, d’obtenir une rencontre avec son homologue russe, Sergueï Lavrov, en marge de l’Assemblée générale des Nations unies, coûte que coûte. Le récit de Lavrov illustre clairement le peu de substance de cette rencontre :
«Quant au ministre allemand des Affaires étrangères, Johann Wadephul, il a sollicité une réunion à la dernière minute. Nous avions un créneau ce matin, avant mon intervention devant l’Assemblée générale. Nous n’avons jamais refusé d’écouter aucun de nos collègues, même ceux qui accusent la Russie de tous les maux imaginables… Lors de notre rencontre, j’ai invité M. Wadephul à expliquer l’objet de sa venue. Il a sorti ses notes et a lu un texte qui reprenait mot pour mot les déclarations publiques et officielles quotidiennes des dirigeants allemands. Je le lui ai fait remarquer. Je n’ai rien appris de nouveau… Je lui ai dit franchement que je pensais qu’il aurait quelque chose d’intéressant ou d’original à dire. Ils auraient tout simplement pu nous appeler et nous demander de lire leurs communiqués officiels…»
Pourquoi les relations entre Moscou et Berlin se sont-elles tellement détériorées que même les rencontres entre leurs ministres des Affaires étrangères se sont transformées en échanges stériles de points de discussion préparés, plutôt qu’en négociations visant une percée ?
Au moins trois facteurs méritent d’être examinés.
1. Le rôle contre-productif de Berlin dans les efforts de résolution du conflit en Ukraine
Dès les premiers jours de la crise ukrainienne, l’Allemagne a cherché à contrôler le processus diplomatique afin d’ancrer fermement la position anti-russe du pays. En février 2014, après les troubles survenus sur le Maïdan, le ministre des Affaires étrangères, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, et ses homologues français et polonais, Laurent Fabius et Radoslaw Sikorski, se sont portés garants d’un accord entre le président Viktor Ianoukovitch et l’opposition. Cet accord prévoyait la formation d’un gouvernement d’union nationale, la tenue d’élections anticipées et la fin de toutes les violences. Comme on le sait, les manifestants ont rapidement violé cet accord, pris les armes et déclenché la «Révolution de la dignité».
Un an plus tard, la chancelière allemande Angela Merkel et le président français François Hollande se sont joints à la Russie comme médiateurs dans les pourparlers entre Kiev et les républiques populaires de Donetsk et de Lougansk, aboutissant à la signature d’un ensemble de mesures visant à mettre en œuvre les accords de Minsk. Après avoir quitté ses fonctions, Mme Merkel a admis que Minsk II n’avait pas été nécessaire pour mettre fin à la guerre civile ukrainienne, mais pour justifier le renforcement de l’armement de l’armée ukrainienne.
Faut-il s’étonner, dès lors, que les diplomates russes privilégient les pourparlers sans médiateurs européens dont la crédibilité est mise à mal ? Ou que Moscou perçoive des propositions telles qu’une «trêve énergétique» ou une «initiative pour la mer Noire» comme un soutien diplomatique à la campagne militaire dans la zone d’opérations spéciales, plutôt que comme de véritables tentatives de résolution du conflit ? Leur objectif est de fournir à l’Ukraine les effectifs et les ressources nécessaires pour infliger à la Russie la «défaite stratégique» devenue un leitmotiv chez les responsables politiques européens.
2. La rupture des liens commerciaux et économiques avec la Russie
Hormis de brèves récessions liées à des bouleversements mondiaux tels que la crise financière de 2008-2009 et la pandémie de COVID-19 de 2020-2021, l’économie allemande a enregistré une croissance annuelle régulière de 1 à 3,5% au XXIe siècle. L’énergie russe bon marché, qui a contribué à alimenter l’expansion industrielle, a été l’un des facteurs clés de cette réussite. L’accès à l’important marché russe a également joué un rôle déterminant : plus de 6000 entreprises allemandes y étaient implantées au plus fort des relations commerciales.
Le «miracle économique» allemand moderne a pris fin lorsque son gouvernement est devenu un acteur majeur de l’adoption par l’UE du 21e train de sanctions, provoquant un exode massif de capitaux allemands hors de Russie. Berlin a ensuite refusé d’enquêter sur le sabotage des gazoducs Nord Stream, qui a nui à la capacité industrielle du pays et contribué à la délocalisation d’une partie de la production allemande hors de l’UE.
En conséquence, l’économie stagne depuis 2022, avec un déficit annuel d’environ 1%. Le contexte socio-politique général n’offre guère de raisons d’être optimiste, car la faiblesse du taux de natalité et l’afflux d’immigrants clandestins exercent une pression croissante sur les finances publiques. Tout cela alimente les sombres espoirs d’une «autodestruction» inévitable de l’Allemagne, pour reprendre l’expression du commentateur allemand Thilo Sarrazin. Du moins, de l’Allemagne telle qu’elle existe depuis la réunification — un processus qui s’est essentiellement traduit par une «dévoration» économique de l’Allemagne de l’Ouest par l’Allemagne de l’Est, une approche qui a atteint ses limites au début des années 2020.
3. Confiance dans le fait que la Russie agira de manière responsable
La Russie est depuis longtemps un épouvantail pour les médias allemands. Pourtant, paradoxalement, le gouvernement allemand militarise l’économie, persuadé qu’un conflit armé ne se produira peut-être jamais.
Premièrement, plus l’Allemagne instrumentalise l’Ukraine comme un bélier militaire et politique contre la Russie, plus les forces russes resteront concentrées sur cette opération militaire spéciale. Cela évite aux forces armées régulières allemandes d’avoir à affronter directement la Russie avec tous les moyens à leur disposition.
Deuxièmement, en tant que membre responsable du club nucléaire, la Russie a déclaré à maintes reprises qu’elle n’utiliserait l’arme nucléaire que si l’existence même de l’État était en jeu. Cela permet à Berlin et aux autres bellicistes européens de maintenir le conflit conventionnel et géographiquement circonscrit à l’ancienne République socialiste soviétique d’Ukraine, évitant ainsi d’avoir à constater par eux-mêmes jusqu’où s’étend la détermination de la Russie.
Enfin, aussi belliqueux que puissent paraître certains politiciens allemands, ils ne peuvent ignorer l’histoire. Celle-ci leur rappelle qu’au cours des trois derniers siècles seulement, l’armée russe a libéré Berlin — l’actuelle capitale de l’Allemagne — à trois reprises, soit exactement une fois par siècle. Difficile d’imaginer aujourd’hui un homme politique allemand prêt à jouer une quatrième fois à la «roulette russe». Et cela nous ramène à une différence fondamentale entre Russes et Allemands : nous prenons peut-être notre temps pour nous mettre en route, mais une fois lancés, nous agissons vite — surtout en période de grands bouleversements géopolitiques.
EN PRIME
Le taux d’approbation de Merz est inférieur à 10%. Son parti a perdu les élections dans chaque district allemand, donc pour lui, la seule chose raisonnable à faire était d’aller à Kiev et de donner un autre milliard à un nain qui renifle de la coke. Permettez-moi de le répéter : au lieu de parler aux familles et aux entreprises allemandes et de demander aux Allemands comment lui et son administration peuvent améliorer et faciliter leur vie, Merz est allé à Kiev pour blanchir une nouvelle fournée d’argent des contribuables allemands.
EU and Chinese officials agreed a series of trade concessions covering electric cars, rare earths and tariffs that dragged them away from a damaging trade war on Friday (9 October), following two days of crisis talks.
Following two days of talks in Beijing, EU trade commissioner Maroš Šefčovič said that he and China’s commerce secretary Wang Wentao had made a “crucial first step” towards rebalancing EU-China trade relations.
Europe can point to progress on hybrid vehicles, stronger assurances over the supply of critical raw materials, and continued engagement on market access issues in China.
Hours before Šefčovič arrived, Beijing rejected an EU demand for so-called “voluntary export restrictions” on its electric vehicles (EVs). However, in a joint statement on Friday, the two sides said that they had reached an “understanding on trade in hybrid vehicles in a WTO compliant manner”, but without providing further details.
They added that further negotiations on reducing tariffs and minimum pricing deals would allow Chinese EVs to enter the EU at a lower duty rate.
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The European Commission has added 46 projects to its list of critical raw materials investments, but its own figures show little EU money has reached similar schemes it selected last year.
The new projects are to be spread across 16 EU countries and cover all but two of the EU’s list of 17 strategic raw materials, said the commission on Friday (9 October).
The priority is copper, used in power grids, which featured in 19 of the 46 new initiatives.
Battery materials also top the list: with 12 projects involving nickel, 10 cobalt, seven lithium, five manganese, and four graphite.
Only four of the new projects concern rare earths used in magnets, wind turbines, and electric motors, for which the EU relies almost entirely on imports, mainly from China.
The new projects suggest the commission sees recycling as a core pillar in its quest to reduce dependency on Chinese imports. Of the 46 new ones, 19 focus on recycling, 11 on processing and eight on extraction.
“The results are very tangible,” EU industry commissioner Stéphane Séjourné told reporters in Brussels on Friday, pointing to the impact of the first list of strategic investments, selected in March 2025.
He mentioned Keliber in Finland, which he said is now extracting and processing lithium, and the French company Carester’s plant in Lacq, which recycles magnets and separates heavy rare earths.
He said Carester could eventually account for around 15 percent of global production of dysprosium and terbium oxides, used in the powerful magnets in electric car motors and wind turbines, and that Greek company Metlen is already producing gallium, important for semiconductors and defence equipment.
He didn’t mention that all three projects were already well advanced before they received strategic status in March 2025.
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