Al Mayadeen | October 7, 2026
Former CIA analyst Larry Johnson and Professor Mohammad Marandi said that Yemen holds the upper hand in its war with Saudi Arabia, and that neither Turkey nor Pakistan is likely to change that by sending forces to the kingdom’s aid.
Speaking on Al Mayadeen’s The Grand Standoff: Iran and the World on Tuesday, both guests also noted that Tehran is working on the assumption that the US will restart its war on Iran, while Johnson argued that Washington has less capacity to carry one out than its rhetoric suggests.
Yemen advances as Saudi-backed forces falter
Marandi said that the past weeks have shown a one-sided war. He stated that the Saudi camp’s claims that it could retake significant territory proved to be empty talk, as Yemeni forces, led by Ansar Allah and the Yemeni government, kept moving forward. “The liberation of Taiz is near,” he said.
Johnson stressed that Yemen “has every advantage in this war.” He put Saudi Arabia’s dependable fighting strength at about 75,000 soldiers, the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) at another 100,000, and the Yemeni Armed Forces’ at 350,000. He described the Saudi army as “basically a group of mercenaries,” while Yemeni fighters have the motivation of defending their own land.
Johnson highlighted that the PLC’s latest offensive showed a lack of military competence. “Successful military attacks are usually not announced in advance, they usually prefer not to give the opposing side a heads up about what you’re going to do,” he said, noting that this one was announced beforehand. He added that the PLC launched it “even without what’s called close air support.”
Saudi aircraft carried out a number of bombing runs along the front lines, Johnson said, “but they were not coordinated.” He explained that “normally you want somebody on the front lines who can actually be in communication with the pilots or with the air controllers, the combat air controllers, to identify specifically along the front lines where bombs need to be dropped.”
“What we’ve seen is that [the Yemeni Armed Forces] operate at a more sophisticated level,” he said. He rejected the Western line that this is Iran’s doing. “Contrary to Western propaganda that this is all just the work of Iran, this is not the work of Iran,” he said. “Anybody that’s had any dealings at all with the Houthis knows that they are quite independent.” He said the movement sees Iran as a friend, but “they don’t let Iran dictate its choices or what it does.”
Johnson added that he believes Saudi Arabia attacked Sanaa after the funeral of Sayyed Ali Khamenei because the US encouraged it. He explained that Washington wrongly saw Yemen as a paper tiger, and described its approach to West Asia as “a combination of ignorance and arrogance.”
Turkey, Pakistan face a logistical nightmare
Both guests dismissed the idea of a Turkish or Pakistani deployment. Johnson said the announcement that Turkey and Pakistan would effectively declare war on Yemen “was laughable.”
He clarified that air power would not solve the problem either. “Dropping bombs without effective ground controllers is just, it’s a waste of bombs,” Johnson said. “It’s just punching holes in landscape without accomplishing anything.” He called the announcement “more Western hype” that “speaks to the desperation of the Saudis,” adding, “I don’t see Turkey or Pakistan intervening in any significant way.”
Marandi said he does not know whether Riyadh, Ankara and Islamabad have even decided to send forces. “It’s possible,” he said. “But as Larry said, this would be a logistical nightmare, and the cost would be extraordinary. And even troop movements inside Saudi Arabia would not be easy.”
He stated that neither country has the capacity. “Pakistan, of course, its military is on the border with India, and they have very bad relations with the Taliban in Afghanistan,” Marandi said, adding that Turkey has difficult relations with almost all of its neighbors. “The armed forces of Pakistan and Turkey are not designed for such mass movements of troops.”
Marandi asserted that Turkey and Pakistan are also harming themselves by letting the narrative spread that they stand with Saudi Arabia. “Turkey and Pakistan are not doing themselves any favors by pushing or allowing this narrative to be pushed that they are on the side of Saudi Arabia,” he said. He pointed to their stance on Gaza, which he said made them popular across the region. “They’ve become heroes across the region,” he said, and “it’s clear that their sympathies lie with [Ansar Allah].”
Saudi Arabia exposed on oil, infrastructure
“The Saudis are in real trouble,” Johnson said. He said the East-West oil pipeline is down and that reports of oil getting through, including through the Strait of Hormuz, are false. “They have lots of infrastructure that can be targeted and is being targeted by Ansar Allah,” he noted, while “Ansar Allah doesn’t sit there with an abundance of infrastructure that can be targeted by the Saudis or the Western helpers.” His conclusion was that “Yemen holds the upper hand.”
Marandi pointed to the weight of the kingdom’s finances. “The Saudis have nothing but their oil exports and their oil industry to sustain themselves, and it is a country that has very high costs,” he stressed. “The government spends a lot of money, so the economy is doing very poorly.” He warned that “the longer this war lasts, the more Saudi infrastructure will be destroyed.”
Marandi argued that the way out is obvious. “The smart thing to do would be for Saudi Arabia to end this war, to do a deal with the people of Yemen, and to lift the siege, and to recognize the government, and stop interfering in Yemen’s internal affairs,” he said. “But Mohammed bin Salman is not the wisest of leaders, to say the least.” He compared the crown prince to Trump. “I think both are very arrogant, neither are wise, and the people around them are yes-men,” he asserted. “Otherwise the Saudis would have ended this by now.”
Johnson put the responsibility on Riyadh. “This is a fight that the Saudis chose to initiate,” he insisted, adding that Ansar Allah “was content to live side by side with the Saudis” and “abiding by the ceasefire” until the Saudis broke it. For Johnson, the kingdom now has a single option. “The choice is settle, make peace with Yemen, or risk the absolute destruction of the government and the country of Saudi Arabia.”
Tehran plans for a renewed US war on Iran
Marandi told the program that Tehran is planning around the assumption that Trump will restart the war. “I’m not saying that war is inevitable, but the working assumption is definitely that we’re going to have war,” he stated. Iran “has been preparing itself for a major confrontation, a very heavy war that would take perhaps weeks,” he noted, and it has warned US-aligned countries that helped Washington that “this time around the Iranian response will be much more devastating for them as well.”
He detailed upgrades to Iran’s missile and drone capabilities, improved air defenses, expanded underground bases and strengthened command and control meant to protect its leaders from targeted strikes. The remaining question, he argued, is timing. “Will there be conflict before Netanyahu’s election, or between the two elections, or after the US midterm elections? That is basically the real question.”
Marandi also pointed to deepening energy shortages. “Trump can pretend that the Strait of Hormuz is open and that more oil is getting through than ever before,” he said. “But the reality is that that’s not the case. The shortages are accumulating.”
Flows reached 11 to 12 million barrels a day for a couple of weeks, when Iran avoided escalation around President Masoud Pezeshkian’s planned US trip, but even then they fell short of demand. Shortages of diesel, gasoline, helium, sulfur and LNG are growing faster than the oil shortage, he explained.
He questioned why Trump keeps threatening to wipe out Iran if, as Trump has claimed for over seven months, the country is already defeated. “I don’t think anyone in Iran takes him seriously anymore,” Marandi added.
Johnson points to limits on US firepower
Johnson argued that Washington’s capacity is thinner than its threats suggest. “I wouldn’t characterize it as a wider escalation, because the United States is limited in what it can do to escalate,” he stated. He noted that the US lacks a robust supply of Tomahawk and JASSM cruise missiles and that its air defense stocks are depleted. “They’ve exhausted their air defense systems. Patriot missiles and THAAD missiles are, I mean, they’re out.”
He cited the evacuation of 12 B-1 bombers from RAF Fairford as evidence. Washington blamed a possible Iranian drone threat, but Johnson countered that “if they still had an adequate number of Patriot missiles, they wouldn’t have evacuated 12 B-1 bombers from the Fairford RAF airfield.” Even against drones, he added, the US does not have enough PAC-3 missiles.
Johnson dismissed press reports of 10,000 US troops being surged to the region, pointing out that 50 to 60 percent of them are the crews of aircraft carriers, escort destroyers and a Marine Expeditionary Unit. The USS Theodore Roosevelt is replacing the USS George H.W. Bush, which is docked in Phuket, Thailand, and due to depart on October 9. “So it doesn’t look like there’s a buildup on that front,” he observed, adding that it is unclear whether the Bush will return to waters off Iran.
Johnson believes the bomber withdrawal followed a secret meeting last Friday at Camp David involving J.D. Vance, Pete Hegseth and John Ratcliffe. In his view, they recognized that “the United States really is in a limited position to carry out any kind of effective or sustained strikes against Iran that are risk-free.” He expects Iran to act preemptively if it judges strikes are imminent, for example against aircraft deployed to al-Udeid.
For Washington, he concluded, “the United States stands to lose much, much more than they’ve already lost if they decide to renew conflict and war with Iran.”
By Salman Rafi Sheikh – New Eastern Outlook – October 7, 2026
On October 5, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan activated the Makkah Pact, taking their new alliance to war for the first time, and potentially revealing the future of American power in the Middle East: Washington provides the security umbrella while regional partners increasingly do the fighting.
From treaty to military alliance
Only two months after Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye signed the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement, the new alliance has been activated. As representatives of the three countries met in Riyadh and Houthi missiles and drones targeted Saudi territory, Saudi-backed Yemeni forces launched a major counteroffensive around the strategically important Bab al-Mandeb Strait. Despite hundreds of strikes, the Saudi offensive has not been enough to push the Houthis back to their original position. In this context, the alliance’s Strategic-Political and Defense Committee agreed to move “immediately” toward implementing its collective-defence commitments and to provide agreed military forces and capabilities for rapid deployment in Saudi Arabia. The meeting also appointed retired Pakistani Lieutenant General Nauman Mahmood as the alliance’s first secretary-general.
The significance goes beyond additional military assistance for Riyadh. The Yemen war is transforming – and that, too, very rapidly – a remarkably young agreement into an operational military alliance. Signed on August 7, the Makkah Pact contains a collective-defence commitment under which an armed attack against one member is regarded as an attack against all three. Pakistan describes the agreement as defensive and grounded in the right to collective self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.
That inevitably invites comparisons with NATO. The analogy should not be exaggerated. NATO possesses 32 members, an integrated command structure and more than seven decades of institutional development. The Makkah Pact possesses none of that depth.
But its institutional development has been unusually rapid. On August 31, the three governments established mechanisms for political and military coordination, agreed to create a permanent secretariat in Saudi Arabia and committed themselves to joint activities, defence-industrial cooperation and joint technology development and production. Now comes the most important stage in the evolution of any military alliance: responding to an actual threat.
Pakistan and Türkiye were already assisting Saudi Arabia before formal activation. Reports show that Pakistan had supplied air-defence systems, drones, anti-drone equipment and light artillery, while Pakistani advisers were working with Saudi counterparts supporting Yemeni forces. Türkiye had supplied drones. The October 5 decision potentially integrates such capabilities into something larger: collective military action undertaken because one alliance member has come under attack.
The distinction between defensive and offensive action consequently becomes blurred. Defending Saudi airspace against Houthi missiles is clearly defensive. Destroying the launchers firing those missiles from Yemen would involve offensive operations undertaken for a defensive purpose. Pakistani Defence Minister Khawaja Asif has deliberately avoided ruling out that possibility, saying Pakistan would make “whatever means are available” at its disposal available to defend Saudi Arabia.
America stays, but its role changes
It would be tempting to interpret this development as evidence that Saudi Arabia is preparing for a post-American Middle East. That conclusion would be premature. The more interesting possibility is almost the opposite: the Makkah Pact may fit remarkably well into the kind of Middle Eastern security order the Trump administration itself wants to create. Trump welcomed the agreement shortly after it was signed. He called it’s a “big, bold and important first step” and argued that it demonstrated how regional countries could “defend themselves in a more meaningful way.” That language closely matches the administration’s formal defence strategy.
The 2026 National Defense Strategy says Washington wants regional allies and partners to assume “primary responsibility” for deterring and defending against Iran and its proxies, while the United States supports them and deepens cooperation with Gulf partners. The administration’s arms-transfer strategy similarly argues that allies should assume more responsibility for regional security while Washington equips them with advanced American military capabilities. Yemen now offers an unusually clear illustration of what this division of labour can look like.
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman sought direct American military intervention against the Houthis in September. Trump declined to order US strikes. But Washington did not withdraw from the conflict. Instead, it offered intelligence and targeting assistance, while CENTCOM commander Admiral Brad Cooper travelled to Saudi Arabia for consultations. As the Saudi-backed offensive subsequently began, the same pattern continued. Saudi aircraft provided extensive air support to Yemeni government forces, while the United States supplied intelligence and targeting support. America therefore remains deeply involved. What has declined, at least for now, is direct participation in the fighting. This distinction matters.
The choice facing Washington is not simply between dominating Middle Eastern security and abandoning it. There is a third possibility: remaining the indispensable strategic enabler while shifting more of the immediate military burden onto regional states. That is precisely where the Makkah Pact becomes useful.
Saudi Arabia brings financial resources, geography and enormous investments in advanced weaponry. Türkiye contributes a large, NATO-trained military and a rapidly expanding defence industry. Pakistan brings substantial conventional forces, longstanding military relations with Saudi Arabia and extensive operational experience. Together, they can potentially perform missions that previously might have generated demands for more direct American intervention. The United States can remain above this architecture rather than outside it: supplying intelligence, weapons, logistical assistance, strategic deterrence and diplomatic backing while allies provide more of the personnel and firepower required to confront regional threats. Seen this way, the pact is not necessarily a rebellion against American primacy. It could become one mechanism through which that primacy is made less militarily expensive for the US.
A different kind of American order
This model also helps explain why describing the emerging Middle East as “post-American” can be misleading. American power has traditionally been measured partly through deployments, bases and direct military intervention. But primacy does not require Washington to fight every regional war itself. The Makkah Pact could push this transformation considerably further.
Its future significance will depend less on what its three members call the alliance than on what they build after Yemen, and whether their first experiment in collective defence proves sufficiently successful to encourage deeper cooperation. Regular military planning, interoperable forces, integrated air and missile defence, intelligence-sharing arrangements and joint weapons production would gradually give the agreement institutional substance.
Yet therein lies a paradox for Washington. The same burden-sharing that reduces America’s military responsibilities could eventually reduce its leverage. More capable allies are not necessarily more dependent allies. As regional powers acquire the institutions, experience and capabilities to conduct military operations with diminishing direct American involvement, they may also acquire greater freedom to pursue threats and strategic objectives that do not fully correspond with Washington’s preferences. An arrangement that initially reinforces the US security architecture could therefore gradually produce greater regional strategic autonomy.
The consequences could extend to military technology. Saudi Arabia’s armed forces remain heavily equipped with American weapons, but neither Pakistan nor Türkiye operates exclusively within a US defence ecosystem. Pakistan, for example, operates the JF-17 fighter aircraft jointly developed with China. In fact, Islamabad has deployed this jet in Saudi Arabia as part of the pact. While Türkiye has built an increasingly indigenous defence industry. A more deeply integrated Makkah alliance could therefore eventually combine American, Turkish, Pakistani and Chinese-origin military technologies rather than reproduce an exclusively US-centred weapons architecture.
That may prove more consequential for American primacy than the pact itself. If the Makkah alliance fades once the immediate Houthi threat recedes, it will remain another temporary regional alignment. But if Yemen produces permanent military integration, Washington could confront an unexpected consequence of its own burden-sharing strategy: the more successfully regional allies learn to defend the American-led order themselves, the less dependent that order may eventually become on America.
Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of international relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs
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A Caixa Geral de Aposentações (CGA) anunciou que vai corrigir 2.937 pensões atribuídas entre maio e agosto, devido a um “lapso” que levou esses pensionistas a receberem mais do que estava previsto na lei.
A notícia foi avançada pelo Público, segundo o Notícias ao Minuto, dando conta de que estes reformados vão receber, em média, menos 93 euros por mês do que lhes tinha sido comunicado inicialmente.
Foi também veiculada na mídia a informação de que os funcionários públicos reformados nesta situação terão sido já contactados pela Caixa, ao longo das últimas semanas, sendo que, foi confirmado um “lapso” no cálculo global da reforma.
Nessa mesma comunicação, a CGA deu 10 dias aos visados para efetuarem contestação e consultarem o processo.
Segundo veiculou o mesmo jornal, terá existido “um lapso na parametrização do sistema de informação” da CGA, o que levou a que fossem atribuídas, “entre maio e agosto de 2026, um total de 2.937 pensões de aposentação num valor superior ao que resulta da legislação em vigor“.
Importa referir, entretanto, que as pensões até 1.074 euros deverão ter um aumento acima da taxa de inflação em 2027, devido ao desempenho da economia portuguesa no segundo trimestre do ano, o que influencia a fórmula de atualização das reformas.
Isto porque o crescimento médio do produto interno bruto (PIB) nos dois últimos anos deverá ficar acima de 2%, garantindo que, pela fórmula de atualização automática em vigor, cerca de 90% das pensões terão aumento acima da inflação.
Vejamos: no caso das pensões até dois IAS, o aumento será superior à inflação se o crescimento médio da economia se situar entre 2% e 3%. Caso essa média fique abaixo dos 2%, as pensões terão apenas uma atualização equivalente à inflação.
Em causa está o aumento por via do mecanismo previsto na lei. Este prevê que as pensões são atualizadas em janeiro com base em dois indicadores: a média do crescimento do PIB dos últimos dois anos e a variação média dos últimos 12 meses do Índice de Preços no Consumidor (IPC) sem habitação disponível a 30 de novembro.
Conforme noticiado anteriormente, o Presidente da República, António José Seguro, promulgou na terça-feira (06) o diploma do Governo que prevê a atribuição de um suplemento extraordinário para as pensões até 1.611,39 euros. Em causa está o bónus das pensões, que foi anunciado pelo Executivo de Luís Montenegro, decidido no Conselho de Ministros da passada semana.
Esse suplemento será pago aos pensionistas em dezembro, em conjunto com a pensão desse mês, e terá o valor de 200 euros para as pensões até 537,13 euros, de 150 euros para as pensões entre 537,13 euros e 1.074,26 euros e de 100 euros para todas as pensões entre 1.074,26 euros e 1.611,39 euros, conforme anunciado pelo Governo.
O Município de Vila Real de Santo António (VRSA) acaba de anunciar através de nota de imprensa que estão abertas candidaturas para atribuição de 30 Bolsas de Estudo do Ensino Superior.
O período de candidaturas para estas Bolsas de Estudo, anuais, destinadas a estudantes do Ensino Superior residentes no concelho de VRSA, são referentes ao ano letivo 2026/2027.
As candidaturas podem ser apresentadas até 16 de novembro de 2026, inclusive.
Cada bolsa tem o valor de 1.000 euros, sendo que 5 das bolsas destinam-se a premiar o mérito escolar, valorizando o desempenho académico dos estudantes.
Podem candidatar-se os jovens que residam no concelho há, pelo menos, três anos e que frequentem ou ingressem em instituições públicas de Ensino Superior em Portugal, no âmbito de uma licenciatura ou mestrado integrado.
O processo de candidatura decorre nos termos do Regulamento Municipal de Bolsas de Estudo, disponível no portal institucional do Município através do seguinte endereço: https://tinyurl.com/bolsasestudoVRSA.
A autarquia vilarealense informa também que as candidaturas devem ser apresentadas, preferencialmente, por correio eletrónico, através do endereço geral@cm-vrsa.pt, ou presencialmente, nos Paços do Concelho da Câmara Municipal de Vila Real de Santo António, na Divisão de Cultura e Educação.
Esclarece também a edilidade pombalina que o período de candidaturas às Bolsas de Estudo decorre habitualmente entre 1 e 15 de outubro. Excecionalmente, este ano, o Município alargou o prazo até 16 de novembro, tendo em consideração as alterações verificadas no calendário de acesso ao Ensino Superior, nomeadamente o prolongamento dos prazos associados à realização de exames e à apresentação de candidaturas, permitindo assim adequar o processo de atribuição das bolsas ao calendário de ingresso no Ensino Superior.
Russia is spending more on the war than at any point since it began. Russia's military funding is on track to hit a record this year after President Vladimir Putin added almost $60 billion to the outlays set in the budget, Bloomberg reports, citing people close to the government.
Defense spending is expected to approach about $199 billion by the end of 2026, roughly 40% above the plan Moscow announced in late 2025. That reverses the course of a year ago, when the Kremlin meant to slow military growth, narrow its deficit, and rebuild reserves drained by the war.
Putin ordered the shift late last year, after concluding that talks with the US in Alaska would not produce an acceptable deal to end the fighting, the report says.
By January, the Kremlin judged an agreement with Ukraine to be out of reach, and the government began accelerating advance payments to defense firms and raising other war-related spending.
"The government is finally budgeting for a prolonged war in Ukraine, but still understates its cost," Bloomberg Economics economist Ekaterina Vlasova said.
Paying for the war has blown out the budget. The projected 2026 deficit has climbed to more than $81 billion, up from about $44 billion as first planned, and the government covered the extra spending through increased domestic borrowing and gold sales.
The spending is not set to fall soon. Under the budget plans, Russia's military outlays reach about $200 billion in 2027, then ease to $194 billion in 2028 and about $191 billion in 2029, a signal that Moscow is planning for a long war.
Earlier, Euromaidan Press reported that Russia was raising 2027 defense spending by 27% to a record, even as its deficit widens and oil and gas revenues fall.
This story originally appeared in Panamerican Dispatch on Oct. 07, 2026, and is shared here with permission.
The CIA is allegedly working behind the scenes in Brazil’s election, planting stories to favor Flávio Bolsonaro and build a positive narrative about the senator.
The claims come from John Kiriakou, a former CIA agent who has become something of a celebrity in recent years. Earlier this week, he took to social media to flag what he called “credible” evidence of the spy agency’s involvement in Brazil’s election.
On Tuesday, Kiriakou gave more details on his podcast.
“I heard a rumor from a former CIA colleague of mine this past weekend that the agency is actively working behind the scenes to support Bolsonaro,” he said.
“And the way they’re doing it is by planting pro-Bolsonaro stories in both the Brazilian press and the international press,” he claimed.
He offered no evidence and was careful to say he doesn’t know whether this account is true. But he argued that it fits the agency’s pattern of behavior over the years.
“There’s a long history of CIA involvement in elections abroad, controlling the media narrative,” he said.
He noted that much of the Brazilian press has swung behind Bolsonaro.
“This is despite the fact that Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency was one mistake after another,” he said.
The former agent pointed to the former president’s 27 year prison sentence, calling his conduct “incredibly corrupt.”
Kiriakou said the runoff projections don’t favor Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and suggested the right has already secured one of its biggest wins in Brazilian history.
“Lula is likely to lose the election, and I think the younger Bolsonaro will end up pardoning his father,” he predicted.
He also noted that Donald Trump has already endorsed Flávio Bolsonaro’s candidacy, acknowledging that doing so could be a “violation of international rules.”
Earlier in the week, Kiriakou wrote on social media that he met with Lula three years ago. On Tuesday, he explained that a Lula aide had reached out so the two could discuss government transparency.
According to the former agent, one topic in that conversation was police violence under Jair Bolsonaro’s government. He said he suggested that Lula confront that issue directly, and that doing so had led police to turn against Lula.
In 2013, Kiriakou pleaded guilty to revealing the identity of an undercover agent, the first case of its kind in 27 years. He had worked for the CIA from 1990 to 2004 and was sentenced to 30 months in federal prison as part of a plea deal.
He admitted to disclosing to a reporter the identity of an undercover officer who had taken part in harsh interrogations of alleged Al Qaeda members held at secret CIA detention sites.
Kiriakou first drew national attention in 2007, during the George W. Bush administration, when he told ABC News in an interview that waterboarding, a technique that simulates drowning, had been used on a Guantánamo detainee named Abu Zubaydah.
Then CIA Director David Petraeus issued a statement praising the plea deal with Kiriakou, even though four other charges against him were dropped. The case “represents an important victory for our agency, for our intelligence community and for our country,” Petraeus said.
It was the first time in 27 years that someone had been found guilty of revealing the identity of an undercover agent.
This article first ran in ICL Notícias, was translated by Panamerican Dispatch, and can be read in its original Portuguese here.
Quis o destino que eu estivesse na Cisjordânia neste 07 de outubro, e que essa coluna fosse publicada no exato dia em que, 3 anos atrás, o ataque terrorista do Hamas que resultou na morte de cerca 1000 pessoas entre civis e militares, deu início a um massacre cometido pelo Estado de Israel que, até agora, somente na Faixa de Gaza, já matou mais de 75 mil e feriu mais de 170 mil palestinos.
Eu sei que o Brasil pega fogo neste momento e é difícil falar em outra coisa ou pensar em um povo que está tão longe geograficamente. Mas talvez nós possamos aprender uma coisa ou duas sobre resistência e resiliência com um povo que vem sendo oprimido, colonizado e sofre tentativas reiteradas de apagamento há mais de 100 anos.
Meus avós são sobreviventes do Holocausto. Minha avó polonesa e meu avô romeno passaram por campos de concentração e tinham números tatuados neles. Ainda jovens migraram para o Brasil, onde se conheceram e formaram família. E é também por respeito a essa história que não posso me calar diante de um genocídio étnico que acontece live stream nos celulares na palma de nossas mãos.
Nos últimos dias estive rodando pela Cisjordânia, visitando comunidades palestinas que estão sendo despejadas, torturadas, roubadas e dizimadas por milícias israelenses formadas por colonos e por militares. A Cisjordânia é um território palestino que fica no Oriente Médio, situado na margem ocidental do rio Jordão, entre Israel e a Jordânia. É dividida em três zonas administrativas – zonas A, B e C – segundo os Acordos de Oslo, assinados na década de 1990, que previam transferir gradualmente o controle do território para a Autoridade Palestina. A área teoricamente estaria sob controle total da Palestina. A área B teria um controle misto entre Israel e Palestina e a área C, cerca de 60% da Cisjordânia, está sob controle israelense total, tanto para administração civil quanto para segurança.
Mas atualmente esses contornos estão cada vez mais borrados, com colonos israelenses tomando cada vez mais áreas.
Tudo isso ainda vai virar reportagem e indico o Pauta Pública desta sexta-feira (09/10) com o diretor geral do Centro de Assistência Jurídica e Direitos Humanos de Jerusalém (JLAC) e membro do Conselho de Comissários da Comissão Independente de Direitos Humanos da Palestina (ICHR), Issam Aruri, que traz uma verdadeira aula sobre o conflito na região.
Mas queria contar aqui na coluna uma das histórias que mais me marcou até agora: A de uma mulher de 67 anos, moradora de um vilarejo em Masafer Yatta, que fica nas colinas ao sul da cidade de Hebrom, cerca de 70km ao sul de Ramallah – capital administrativa da Cisjordânia. Não vou revelar seu nome por motivos óbvios. Mas sua vila está totalmente cercada por assentamentos israelenses, que tentam a custo de barbárie expulsar os palestinos que estão ali há dezenas de gerações, vivendo da colheita de azeitonas e do pastoreio de ovelhas e cabras.
Sua vila não tem água encanada nem luz. Se vê apenas pedras, areia, pequenas casas e barracões. Os cabos de energia passam por cima da comunidade, de um lado a outro, para os assentamentos israelenses, mas os palestinos não podem usar. Foi instalado um portão na estrada, que pode ser fechado pelos soldados a qualquer momento e por tempo indeterminado, impedindo os moradores de entrar ou sair, mesmo que em emergência médica. Essa é uma prática bastante comum na região. Até mesmo ruas dentro de comunidades são fechadas indiscriminadamente pelas forças israelenses.
“Foi aqui que um colono israelense matou meu filho”. A senhora aponta para um ponto do centro de convivência, que já foi destruído e reconstruído várias vezes e que abriga o único banheiro disponível para a comunidade. As casas tinham banheiro. Mas eles foram destruídos ou absurdamente declarados como zonas militares, tornando-se inacessíveis aos moradores. Sua filha mora em uma casa há poucos metros dali e não pode usar o próprio banheiro nem construir outro sem permissão. Mais: o celeiro, que fica no quintal da casa, foi declarado “zona militar” e trancado, então a família não pode levar os animais para o pasto ou mesmo chegar perto do pequeno barracão. O exército israelense passa por lá uma vez na semana (quando muito) para alimentar as ovelhas e cabras, que estão obviamente morrendo paulatinamente.
“Um colono entrou na comunidade e atirou na cabeça do meu filho. Meu neto, aquele ali – aponta para um gurizinho de uns 3 anos – estava no colo dele. Entrou e atirou. Assim. Na frente de todo mundo. Chamamos a polícia que veio, levou o corpo e não puniu o colono. Alguns dias depois ele estava caminhando por aqui normalmente e eu perguntei: ‘Por que você matou o meu filho’? Ele me empurrou ali, eu caí de cabeça em uma pedra e desmaiei. O portão estava fechado e só pude ser levada ao hospital dias depois. Sofri uma concussão e perdi a visão. Quebrei ossos do corpo. Mas nenhuma dor foi igual a de não poder enterrar meu filho. A polícia levou o corpo e não nos deixou velar ou enterrar”, contou. Ela enxugava os olhos no hijab preto, que contornava seu rosto e se fundia ao vestido também preto. Uma mãe em luto há três anos.
Não faltam provas. Todas as comunidades que visitei me mostraram dezenas de vídeos de colonos invadindo, cortando as oliveiras centenárias, subindo à noite nos telhados das casas batendo os pés e cantando músicas, ameaçando botar fogo, e todo o tipo de humilhações e torturas inimagináveis. Em todas as vilas, ouvi que os moradores fazem turnos durante a noite, para que não morram queimados enquanto dormem.
As violações também são amplamente registradas por organizações de direitos humanos na região. Eu vi as árvores cortadas. Eu vi os animais mortos. Eu fiquei do lado de fora dos portões e levei 4 horas para atravessar poucos quilômetros, porque no caminho havia pontos de checagem com soldados pesadamente armados que me fizeram descer do carro, mostrar meus documentos e passar minha bolsa em detectores. Eu visitei uma escola de crianças palestinas que era proibida de pôr o lixo pra fora e tinha que manter todo ele dentro das classes – não no pátio, dentro das salas – por semanas.
Enquanto caminhava por um mercado árabe a céu aberto em Hebrom e ouvia histórias de porque os corredores estreitos haviam sido cobertos por grades – para evitar que pedras fossem jogadas do alto, fui cercada, junto a colegas jornalistas e guias palestinos, por um grupo de soldados israelenses usando roupas camufladas e rosto coberto, mais novos que meu filho. Um deles apontou sua metralhadora para nós.
Ouvi de moradores que a Cisjordânia está virando Gaza. Mas também ouvi que eles não pretendem ir a lugar nenhum, que ali é sua terra há dezenas de gerações, que eles têm resistido. Que uma hora esse massacre vai ter que acabar. “O que eles vão fazer? Matar 7 milhões de nós? Nós não temos para onde ir, aqui é nossa casa”, me disse um senhor, diante das suas oliveiras centenárias queimadas por colonos israelenses.
Há três anos a Palestina é punida pelo 7 de outubro. Todos os dias. Mas teve uma frase que ouvi de uma mulher que conheci pelo caminho que acho que serve pra nós também, nesse momento da nossa história:
“O mais difícil é não se tornar um monstro. Não desejar a morte deles como eles desejam as nossas. Enquanto eles passam com tanques sobre bebês em Gaza, eu quero o bem das crianças deles. Esse é um desafio e um exercício diário. Que a indignação nos fortaleça em nossa resistência, mas que não nos torne monstros”.
O Tribunal Regional Eleitoral de Goiás (TRE-GO) manteve a decisão que determina a perda do mandato da vereadora Aava Santiago (PSB) por infidelidade partidária. O julgamento dos recursos apresentados pela parlamentar e pelo partido ocorreu nesta terça-feira (6) e terminou com a rejeição dos argumentos da defesa.
A decisão preserva o entendimento adotado pelo tribunal em julho, quando Aava foi condenada por ter deixado o PSDB, partido pelo qual foi eleita para a Câmara de Goiânia, e se filiado ao PSB durante o exercício do mandato. Na ocasião, o placar foi de 6 votos a 1 pela perda da cadeira.
Ao analisar os novos recursos, o TRE-GO entendeu que não havia pontos capazes de modificar o julgamento anterior. Entre as questões apresentadas pela defesa estavam alegações relacionadas a conflitos internos no PSDB, mudanças na estrutura partidária, redução de recursos destinados à atuação política da vereadora, discriminação e violência política de gênero.
A defesa também sustentou que havia motivos legítimos para a saída do PSDB e questionou a análise das provas feita no julgamento original. O tribunal, porém, manteve o entendimento de que as circunstâncias apresentadas não comprovaram uma justificativa legal suficiente para a desfiliação.
Com a manutenção da decisão, o relator do processo, desembargador eleitoral Adenir Teixeira Peres Júnior, determinou que a Câmara Municipal de Goiânia seja comunicada sobre o resultado. A decisão também faz referência à posse do suplente do PSDB, Michel Magul.
A mudança, contudo, não significa que Aava tenha de deixar imediatamente a cadeira no Legislativo. A vereadora anunciou que pretende recorrer ao Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) e afirma que continuará no cargo enquanto os recursos forem analisados.
Em manifestação divulgada após o julgamento, Aava afirmou que considera haver questões jurídicas que ainda precisam ser examinadas pelas instâncias superiores. A defesa também destacou o voto divergente apresentado no julgamento que resultou na cassação em julho.
O caso agora segue para a Justiça Eleitoral em Brasília. Se a perda do mandato for mantida ao fim da tramitação, Michel Magul, primeiro suplente do PSDB, será o responsável por ocupar a cadeira deixada pela vereadora.
The post TRE-GO mantém cassação de Aava Santiago e determina comunicação à Câmara de Goiânia appeared first on Diário da Manhã - O Jornal do leitor Inteligente.
Russell Hardy, amministratore delegato di Vitol, il più grande distributore indipendente di petrolio al mondo, ha parlato chiaro all'Energy Intelligence Forum di Londra. Le scorte disponibili nei paesi occidentali per compensare le interruzioni di approvvigionamento causate dalla guerra tra Stati Uniti, Israele e Iran si sono esaurite. Il mercato è ora sempre più esposto a ulteriori shock. Quella che era iniziata come una crisi del petrolio greggio si è trasformata in una carenza di prodotti raffinati e ora si è evoluta in una crisi delle spedizioni marittime.
I numeri raccontano la portata del problema. Negli ultimi sette-dieci giorni, circa 12 milioni di barili al giorno di greggio e altri 2 milioni di barili di prodotti raffinati hanno lasciato il Medio Oriente a bordo di petroliere. "Senza di essi, si avrebbe quello scenario da 200 dollari al barile, quindi è piuttosto importante che continui", ha dichiarato Hardy. Le scorte occidentali sono state prosciugate. "Non ci sono più scorte da drenare in Occidente", ha aggiunto.
La situazione si è aggravata progressivamente. I prezzi delle spedizioni marittime hanno registrato incrementi parabolici. L'incertezza è diventata così estrema che i commercianti non riescono a stimare le spese di trasporto con una precisione superiore a 2-4 dollari per barile. Hardy ha anche avvertito che le carenze di carburante raffinato probabilmente persisteranno durante l'inverno perché la capacità di raffinazione globale rimane limitata. Questo è lo scenario da incubo in cui è piombato il mondo a causa delle azioni scellerate di Trump, Zelensky, Netanyahu e altri vassalli assortiti come gli europei.
I paesi del G7 hanno concordato la scorsa settimana di rilasciare 100 milioni di barili di greggio e prodotti raffinati dalle scorte di emergenza, iniziando con il diesel, dopo che l'amministrazione del presidente Donald Trump ha fatto pressione sull'Europa affinché facesse di più per frenare i prezzi in aumento. Hardy ha però notato che i dettagli del piano non sono completamente trasparenti, incluso quanto greggio e diesel verrebbero rilasciati e da dove proverrebbero.
Questo intervento segue mesi di pesanti prelievi dalle scorte utilizzati per compensare le interruzioni di approvvigionamento dall'inizio della guerra con l'Iran alla fine di febbraio. L'Agenzia Internazionale per l'Energia ha affermato che circa 325 milioni di barili erano già stati rilasciati entro l'inizio di ottobre da un'azione di emergenza da 400 milioni di barili annunciata a marzo.
Il petrolio rimane nei depositi occidentali, ma gran parte quello che resta è detenuto nelle riserve strategiche, necessario per mantenere in funzione le infrastrutture, o non può essere portato prontamente sul mercato. Questo lascia meno approvvigionamento immediatamente disponibile per assorbire un'altra interruzione.
I flussi di greggio dal Medio Oriente si sono ripresi in modo significativo, ma le spedizioni di carburanti raffinati sono rimaste indietro. Le petroliere impiegano anche più tempo per completare i viaggi poiché le interruzioni intorno allo Stretto di Hormuz complicano le normali spedizioni, riducendo la disponibilità di navi anche quando più greggio torna sul mercato.
Amin Nasser, amministratore delegato di Saudi Aramco, ha avvertito che meno del 10 percento dei circa 6 miliardi di barili rimanenti nelle scorte commerciali globali di petrolio è praticamente disponibile per il mercato. Ha affermato che la ricostruzione delle scorte esaurite potrebbe richiedere fino a due anni anche dopo che i flussi attraverso lo Stretto di Hormuz torneranno alla normalità.
La crisi energetica non è più solo una questione di prezzi alla pompa. È una questione di disponibilità fisica di carburante, di capacità di raffinazione, di navi che possano trasportare il greggio. È un problema che tocca ogni aspetto della vita quotidiana, dal riscaldamento invernale ai costi di trasporto delle merci. E all'orizzonte non si intravedono misure capaci di riportare il settore quantomeno vicino alla normalità.
The Alfa Watan, a ship sailing under the flag of Togo, and the Able, a vessel flying the flag of Palau, were targeted by naval and aerial drones on Tuesday (6 October) morning in the Black Sea near the Bulgarian coast.
The Alfa Watan sank, and rescuers at the scene found only an overturned boat, life jackets, and fragments of the ship’s equipment, according to Bulgarian prime minister Rumen Radev.
The 18-member crew of the Able caught fire, but was successfully evacuated to the port of Varna.
“This is an unacceptable attack in Bulgaria’s exclusive economic zone,” Radev said after an emergency government meeting on Tuesday.
Bulgaria had discussed the drone attack inside the EU and Nato, he added.
It came after a drone also sank a Turkish-owned grain ship, the Royad Mammadov, killing two sailors, on Monday.
But even though Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelensky was quick to blame Russia, the perpetrators have not been formally identified yet, in a grey-zone conflict in which deniability is a tactic.
Russia and Ukraine have been escalating attacks on ships for several months in an effort to disrupt each other’s export economies.
And Moscow’s attacks have largely halted Ukraine’s maritime exports of agricultural products, while Kyiv’s attacks have forced Russia to seek alternative routes for exports.
“The situation in the Black Sea is increasingly concerning,” said EU Commission’s president Ursula von der Leyen on X on Tuesday.
Ukraine has “proposed concrete steps to de-escalate the situation”, also said Zelensky.
But for all his good will, the attacks were just part of a broader deterioration in Europe’s security environment, covering also Nato’s eastern and southern borders.
‘Shadow war’
For Czech president Peter Pavel, speaking to Czech daily Deník N on 22 September, the most imminent danger came from a false-flag attack in Estonia or Latvia, to test Nato’s resolve.
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More than 50 Russian companies could default on their bonds this year, the most since 2009, a rating-agency analyst told Russian newspaper Izvestia, which reported it on 6 October.
Russia's wartime economy is straining under high interest rates, and the budget is too: the 2026 deficit has nearly doubled from the earlier forecast to a record $88 billion, with more deficits planned for the next three years as Moscow raises taxes to fund the war and plans its biggest defense budget since the full-scale invasion began.
A default is a situation in which a company cannot make promised interest payments to investors on time or repay borrowed money. If a payment is not made by the agreed deadline, the company becomes delinquent, which under certain conditions is recognized as a default.
So far this year, 20 companies have defaulted for the first time, compared with 24 in all of 2025, said Mikhail Nikonov of the Expert RA rating agency. Most of the companies that missed payments are small issuers of high-yield bonds, Izvestia reported.
In 2026, Russian companies have missed payments totaling 41 billion rubles (about $490 million), compared with 34 billion rubles (about $410 million) the previous year, according to investment bank Sinara.
By the end of 2026, the number of Russian companies unable to service their ruble-denominated debt on time could reach 40–50, the highest level since 2010, said Pavel Zholobov, junior managing director at the NRA rating agency.
The number of bond defaults in 2026 has already reached its highest level in a decade, Zholobov said. Similar figures were recorded in the mid-2010s: in 2014, 35 companies missed payments; in 2015, 52 did so; and in 2016, there were 44 issuers. This occurred in part after Western sanctions were imposed on Russia over its annexation of Crimea and its war in Donbas, as well as amid a halving of oil prices and a sharp weakening of the ruble.
There were more defaults only in 2009. At the time, amid the fallout from the global financial crisis, more than 100 issuers faced payment problems, while the volume of distressed debt reached nearly 200 billion rubles, Zholobov noted.
This time, the main reason for companies' difficulties in making bond payments has been the prolonged period of high interest rates, which has continued since 2023. Companies are raising financing at high interest rates but are unable to refinance their debt on more favorable terms, explained Ekaterina Sidorova, head of the Foreign Exchange, Commodities and Debt Markets Department at SberCIB Investment Research.
At the same time, the situation does not yet resemble a systemic debt crisis: defaults are primarily being recorded among companies with low credit ratings and high debt burdens, Sidorova said.
If a company fails to repay bond debt, it is given 10 business days to meet its obligations. If it fails to do so, the company may offer investors a restructuring—for example, by postponing payments in exchange for a higher interest rate.
The number of defaults will remain high in 2027, Sidorova believes.
High interest rates were a response to accelerating inflation in Russia. Domestic demand was outpacing production, Russia's Central Bank said in October 2023. Sanctions over the war and rising defense spending had also hit the economy and the ruble, which had lost about 25% against the dollar that year. The bank raised its key rate from 7.5% in the first half of 2023 to 15% by the fall.
Ukraine is also seeking to weaken Russia's economy as part of efforts to reduce its ability to finance the war. In particular, Defense Minister Yevhenii Khmara said strikes on oil refineries are aimed at "bleeding the Russian war machine" and destroying its military and economic potential. According to the ministry, the attacks have knocked out more than 51% of Russia's oil refining capacity.
In the first half of July, Russian oil refineries processed about 3.9 million barrels of oil per day—the lowest level since March 2005. Due to the production cuts, Moscow was also forced to restrict fuel exports.
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Ukraine's 413th Separate Raid Regiment of the Unmanned Systems Forces struck the Snizhne Machine-Building Plant in occupied Donetsk Oblast in September, working with other Defense Forces units, the regiment posted on 6 October, sharing a video of the strike. The General Staff reported the strike on the plant on 11 September, saying that the extent of the damage was being clarified.
The strike adds to Ukraine's campaign of long-range attacks on Russian military targets as Russia has begun its winter campaign of strikes against Ukraine's energy infrastructure. Hitting the suppliers of aircraft parts goes after Russia's ability to keep its attack jets and helicopters flying.
The regiment said the plant works for Russia's military industry, producing engine components for attack aircraft and combat helicopters.
The Snizhne plant was a separate division of Motor Sich, a Ukrainian aircraft-engine maker based in Zaporizhzhia, a city that remains under Ukrainian control. Snizhne has been under Russian occupation since 2014. The plant specializes in producing parts for gas-turbine engines, including compressor and turbine discs and blades, the General Staff said. It never built whole engines. In September 2014, months into the occupation, it was machining blanks from Motor Sich's Zaporizhzhia plant into turbine blades and was one of only two plants in the former Soviet Union making such blades for helicopters, a plant worker said.
Motor Sich said in December 2017 that it had lost control of the plant. Weeks later, Viacheslav Bohuslaiev, then Motor Sich's honorary president and a member of parliament, told RFE/RL's Donbas.Realii that Motor Sich still owned the plant and had handed its management to a foreign company, while keeping it under the company's "full control."
In February 2023, Ukraine's Prosecutor General's Office served Bohuslaiev a notice of suspicion of aiding a terrorist organization, alleging that Motor Sich shipped blanks to the Snizhne plant and received finished engine parts through foreign-registered companies. The case went to court in October 2023, and Bohuslaiev, who denies the charges, has been in pretrial detention since October 2022 as the trial continues.
Snizhne, which Russia uses as a rear base, has been hit before. In May, Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces and the Security Service of Ukraine struck a Russian training center for drone pilots in the city, and in September, a strike on energy infrastructure cut power across Snizhne.
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