Two tankers caught fire within about 12 hours off Sulina, Romania’s port at the mouth of the Danube, Romanian authorities reported. The crew of one said a drone hit it inside Romania’s territorial waters, while Bucharest says it is still checking whether drones were involved. Bulgaria, where drones sank ships in its economic zone this month, says it lacks proof that Russia launched them.
For months, Russia has struck civilian ships on the sea route that carries most of Ukraine’s farm exports, while its drones have repeatedly crossed into Moldova and Romania during attacks on Ukraine. As long as Bucharest and Sofia wait for drone wreckage before naming anyone, Russia, the party Bulgaria’s own prime minister says the logic points to, pays no price for extending its war on Ukraine’s trade routes into NATO members’ waters.
The San Marino-flagged chemical tanker Wine Trader reported a fire in its superstructure around 07:00 on 15 October while anchored in Romanian territorial waters about 13 nautical miles southeast of Sulina, Romania’s Naval Authority said. By midday, five of its 12 crew had been recovered and seven were still missing.
Hours earlier, at 01:34, a drone entered Romanian airspace over the country’s waters southeast of Sulina for about a minute before vanishing from radar, the Defense Ministry said. Authorities have not named a cause for the fire, though unnamed sources
Russia’s expanding campaign against commercial shipping in the Black Sea is creating a security crisis that extends far beyond Ukraine. The latest drone attacks off Bulgaria’s coast have left 11 sailors missing, forced Sofia to seek assistance from NATO and the European Union, and raised concerns that Moscow is attempting to disrupt one of the world’s principal agricultural export routes.
On 13th October, the Guinea-Bissau-flagged HS Dignity sank after being struck by drones approximately 17 nautical miles east of the Bulgarian village of Krapets. Another vessel, the Ukrainian-owned, Maltese-flagged Chelsea 3, was attacked near Byala. All 15 crew members were rescued, although five sustained minor injuries. The incidents followed earlier attacks in Bulgaria’s exclusive economic zone on 6th October, when the ALFA WATAN sank and the grain-carrying ABLE was damaged.
The significance lies not simply in the destruction of merchant vessels but in the geographical expansion of the threat. Commercial routes previously regarded as comparatively safer alternatives to Ukraine’s exposed ports are now becoming operationally dangerous. Bulgaria and Romania, both NATO and EU members, face disruption to trade, maritime insurance and port operations as the conflict spreads across the western Black Sea.
The latest attacks follow months of Russian strikes against Ukrainian ports, export terminals and civilian shipping. As EU Today previously reported, repeated attacks on Odesa have already reduced Ukraine’s grain-export capacity, while alternative routes through the Danube and neighbouring European countries cannot fully replace its major Black Sea terminals.
The extension of attacks towards Bulgaria changes the economic calculation. Ships carrying agricultural products, those approaching Danube ports and vessels operating between Black Sea countries now face greater uncertainty, regardless of whether they enter Ukrainian territorial waters.
Maritime security company Ambrey assessed the earlier October attacks as highly likely to have been conducted by Russian forces. Its assessment identified vessels associated with Ukrainian grain trade as the principal targets, rather than suggesting that every commercial ship was being attacked indiscriminately.
This distinction is important, but it offers little reassurance to international shipping companies. A campaign directed against Ukrainian trade can disrupt the wider maritime economy when insurers, shipowners and exporters cannot establish which routes remain safe.
The economic consequences are already becoming apparent. Shipowners must consider higher insurance premiums, additional security measures and the possibility of losing vessels and crews. Traders may redirect cargoes or withdraw from routes whose commercial returns no longer justify the risks.
The attacks have also placed Bulgarian Prime Minister Rumen Radev in an increasingly difficult political position.
Radev has advocated renewed diplomatic engagement with Moscow and questioned the emphasis placed on military assistance to Ukraine. He has rejected accusations of being pro-Russian, presenting his approach as a pragmatic alternative to prolonged confrontation.
Yet the attacks have demonstrated the limitations of maintaining political distance from a war whose economic and security consequences are reaching Bulgarian waters.
After summoning Russian Ambassador Eleonora Mitrofanova on 13th October, Radev acknowledged that Bulgaria possessed no conclusive evidence establishing responsibility for the latest strikes. Nevertheless, he argued that their consequences benefited Russia and questioned why Ukraine would attack its own commercial vessels.
According to the Bulgarian News Agency’s account of the meeting, the prime minister also warned that higher insurance costs and shipping companies’ reluctance to serve Bulgarian ports were already damaging the national economy.
This is the fundamental change confronting Sofia. The conflict is no longer solely a question of Bulgaria’s position towards Ukraine or its diplomatic relationship with Russia. It is affecting the country’s commercial interests, energy supplies and responsibilities as a NATO member.
Radev’s response does not necessarily indicate a wholesale reversal of his previous political position. It demonstrates that the practical obligations of government can leave considerably less room for accommodation with Moscow than the arguments advanced from outside direct responsibility for national security.
The broader consequences may be felt most severely outside Europe.
Ukraine remains an important supplier of wheat, maize and vegetable oils to international markets, including countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. Interruptions to these exports affect more than Ukraine’s agricultural revenues. They can increase transport costs, delay deliveries and reduce the availability of competitively priced food in import-dependent countries.
Speaking at the Warsaw Security Forum on 12th October, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy warned of a possible agricultural crisis, arguing that Russian interference with Black Sea shipping could leave countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East facing serious supply difficulties within months.
The warning reflects a mechanism already familiar from the earlier stages of Russia’s invasion. Following Moscow’s withdrawal from the UN-brokered grain agreement in July 2023, Ukrainian agricultural exporters faced renewed attacks on port infrastructure and substantial uncertainty over maritime access.
The danger is not necessarily an immediate worldwide shortage of grain. Wheat prices remained relatively steady following the 13th October incidents. Rather, sustained disruption could progressively reduce available export capacity, increase costs and place vulnerable importing countries under greater pressure.
For Moscow, such disruption could serve several purposes simultaneously: weakening Ukraine’s economy, raising the costs of international support for Kyiv and creating additional pressures on governments concerned about food inflation and social stability.
The immediate challenge for Brussels and NATO is how to protect commercial navigation without allowing the conflict to expand into a direct military confrontation.
Bulgaria has requested stronger air and maritime surveillance and is seeking closer coordination with Romania and Turkey. Defence Minister Dimitar Stoyanov said on 14th October that Sofia expected to join a NATO counter-drone initiative by the end of the month.
The EU has already developed a framework for addressing precisely such threats. Its Black Sea strategy, announced in May 2025, proposed a maritime security hub integrating surveillance, intelligence-sharing, infrastructure protection and regional cooperation.
The attacks now expose the difference between developing a security framework and providing effective protection to merchant vessels. Better intelligence can identify threats, but preventing further sinkings requires detection systems, coordinated responses and sufficient defensive capabilities.
Turkey’s involvement is particularly important because of its control over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles and its established role in Black Sea maritime security. Any workable regional arrangement must therefore extend beyond cooperation between Bulgaria and Romania.
The incidents occurred outside Bulgaria’s 12-nautical-mile territorial sea, meaning they do not automatically constitute an armed attack on NATO territory under Article 5. Nevertheless, repeated strikes within the economic zones of alliance members pose a substantial challenge to maritime security.
Russia’s campaign against Ukrainian exports is increasingly imposing costs on neighbouring European states and international trading partners. The question facing the EU is whether it can secure the commercial routes on which both Ukraine’s economy and the food supplies of millions beyond Europe depend.
European regions and cities demand clear rules and solid financial backing to help Europe’s ailing car industry through the shift to electric vehicles (EVs). The European Committee of the Regions (CoR) on Wednesday adopted an opinion on the European Commission’s Automotive Package, arguing that the transition will only succeed if regions are adequately equipped to carry it.
Regions said electrification is crucial to achieving climate-neutral road transport, but that success depends on affordability and access. They called for charging infrastructure across regions, funded by European, national and regional budgets, as well as targeted demand support in lower-income regions.
“Europe’s regions and cities have spoken with one voice: competitiveness and electrification by 2035 go hand in hand,” said María Chivite, President of the Navarre region in Spain, who drafted the opinion. Europe can only lead the transition, she argued, if regions receive “real financing”.
The Commission proposed the Automotive Package in December. It suggests a 90-percent-cut in tailpipe emissions from 2035, with the remaining 10 percent offset through low-carbon steel or e-fuels and biofuels. The CoR welcomed these temporary flexibilities but warned that they must not delay zero-emission mobility.
Brigitte Torloting, Chair of the Automotive Regions Alliance (ARA) and Vice-President of France’s Grand Est region, warned that time is short and “global competition will not wait for us”. She called for a strategy that protects automotive production in the regions, backed by strong European instruments such as “European preference.” Without a clear framework and targeted investment, she said, Europe risks losing its industrial base, from small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to major suppliers.
“European preference” is an approach first introduced in the Commission’s proposal for an Industrial Accelerator Act in March and is designed to prioritise EU-based manufacturing. The Commission suggests public procurement contracts and state-subsidised industrial projects to source a minimum percentage of materials or components from European producers. For EV production, the Commission proposed that 70% of components for new cars – excluding the battery – must originate within the EU.
CoR members also welcomed the “Made in the EU” approach to strenghten European production but insisted it must be proportionate, so that SMEs and regional supply chains are not buried in red tape.
With automotive production concentrated in specific territories, the opinion also calls for targeted cohesion funding, skills and quality jobs.
According to EU figures for 2024, the automotive industry contributed 7 percent of EU gross domestic product (GDP), about EUR 170 billion in exports and supported around 13.8 million jobs, 3.5 million of them in manufacturing. According to CoR figures, the 41 regions organised in the Automotive Regions Alliance (ARA) generate more than 40 percent of EU GDP.
This story was produced by the European Newsroom (enr) in cooperation with the European Committee of the Regions (CoR). The editorial responsibility lies with the enr.
Press contact:
Theresa Sostmann
Tel. +32475999415
Sofía Andrujóvich (Ivano-Frankivsk, Ucrania, 1982) escribió en 2020 quizá la novela más importante sobre el Holocausto que han dado las letras ucranias. Amadoca es una obra de tres volúmenes que ha recibido múltiples premios literarios en Europa. Ahora llegan al público en español sus dos primeras partes, con el título La historia de Romana y Uliana.
On the night of March 20, 2024, unusually humid and mild in London, three people in their twenties pulled up at an industrial estate in the east of the city in a cherry-red Kia Picanto. They went inside, set fire to a warehouse, and filmed the blaze on a cellphone. The video of the flames consuming the premises ended up in the hands of another 20-year-old, Dylan Earl, who was reached via the Telegram messaging app by the Russian paramilitary organization Wagner, linked to the Kremlin, which had in turn recruited others to do the dirty work. One of the burned units contained humanitarian aid and Starlink satellite equipment destined for Ukraine. According to the British investigation, the three young men who lit the fuse did not know they were actually working for Russia.
© Jens Schlueter (Getty Images)
The German Bundestag has made a historic decision, officially recognizing Germany’s special responsibility to Ukraine for the crimes of Nazism. On 9 October, it adopted two resolutions ahead of the 85th anniversary of the Babyn Yar massacre and linked that responsibility to Germany’s current help for Ukraine amid Russian aggression, Oleksii Makeiev, Ukraine’s ambassador to Berlin, says.
Babyn Yar in Kyiv became one of Europe’s largest sites of the mass murder of Jews during the Holocaust, where more than 100,000 people were killed over two years of Nazi occupation. Germany now casts a debt from that war as a moral duty to help defend Kyiv against Russia today.
Both motions stress the importance of researching Nazi crimes in Ukraine and preserving the memory of their victims. One came from the governing CDU/CSU and SPD parties, the other from the opposition Greens, a rare alignment of coalition and opposition on a single theme.
“The situation is unique: two motions on this subject were approved at once, from the coalition and the opposition. By the usual parliamentary logic, that should not happen,” Makeiev says.
The coalition motion backs research and documentation of Nazi crimes in Ukraine and closer work among German, Ukrainian, and other European archives and memorial institutions. It also calls for countering antisemitism, racism, and historical revisionism, and for continued political, economic, financial, humanitarian, and military support for Ukraine.
Makeiev says he felt a sense of deja vu watching the debate from the visitors’ gallery.
“I was in that same gallery in the fall of 2022. I saw how German democratic parliamentary groups can demonstrate unity on what matters most. At that time, the Bundestag recognized the Holodomor of 1932–1933 as genocide,” he adds.
A separate point of the resolution concerns Ukrainian children and teenagers who Russia has illegally taken from Ukraine. The document calls for efforts to return about 20,000 of them to their parents or relatives, folding the issue into Germany’s wider policy toward Ukraine.
The director of the Babyn Yar National Historical and Memorial Preserve, Rosa Tapanova, considers the Bundestag’s decision an important step toward re-examining the shared history of Ukraine and Germany and overcoming distortions of historical memory propagated for decades by the Soviet authorities and now being exploited by Russia.
“The Bundestag’s decision marked an important step toward Germany’s recognition of its historical responsibility toward Ukraine," she says.
The Bundestag’s decision and the participation of German representatives in commemorative events underscore the importance of continued Ukrainian-German dialogue. For the Babyn Yar National Historical and Memorial Preserve, this work encompasses historical research, the documentation of testimonies, educational and memorial projects, and international cooperation.
Ukraine’s prosecution service has dismissed eight people named in connection with an anti-corruption probe into the alleged protection of scam call centers, acting Prosecutor General Anton Kovalskyi reported. His office is also running internal checks on several officials linked to the case. A separate probe covers the trip abroad of his predecessor, who left Ukraine in September.
Ukraine’s main prosecution service is auditing itself while the country’s anti-corruption agencies investigate an alleged scheme run from inside it. The National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) allege that a PGO official set up a criminal organization in mid-2025. They say it drew in serving prosecution employees and unofficial associates, took bribes for leaving scam call centers alone, and laundered the proceeds. The investigation is called Operation Carthage.
Ukraine’s main prosecution service is auditing itself while the country’s anti-corruption agencies investigate an alleged scheme run from inside it. The National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) allege that an official of the Prosecutor General’s Office (PGO) set up a criminal organization in mid-2025. They say it drew in serving prosecution employees and unofficial associates. The group allegedly took bribes for leaving scam call centers alone and then laundered the proceeds. The case is known as Operation Carthage, Espreso reported.
Seven of the eight dismissed people worked at the PGO, Kovalskyi said. Separately, four people were removed from administrative posts, including the heads of the IT department and the cybercrime directorate. Kovalskyi said 24 prosecutors took polygraph tests. The results went to a commission running an internal investigation. He wrote that trust in the prosecution service would be restored not through announcements of change but through consistent, balanced decisions and concrete results.
The internal probe concerning former Prosecutor General Ruslan Kravchenko covers his trip abroad. Investigators are checking whether he followed established procedure and how the business trip was organized. Kravchenko left Ukraine in an official car on the night of 13–14 September, Ukrainska Pravda reported, citing law enforcement sources. He explained his departure as an official trip to Lithuania.
On 14 September, Kravchenko announced he had signed a notice of suspicion against NABU director Semen Kryvonos. That evening, his own office said Kryvonos had never been properly served and that the register entries were cancelled.
On 15 September, lawmakers backed Kravchenko’s resignation 317–0. Two days later, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy assigned Kovalskyi the duties of prosecutor general by decree. Before that, Kovalskyi headed the Khmelnytskyi Oblast Prosecutor’s Office.
The PGO completed an internal investigation into Aidyn Khudiiev, a former deputy department head, Kovalskyi said. Its findings will go to the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors, and the PGO abolished his post. SAPO prosecutor Mykola Karas told a court hearing that detectives seized $50,000 at Khudiiev’s workplace during the Carthage searches.
The PGO is also investigating Serhii Kropyva, former deputy head of its international cooperation department. NABU detained him on 4 September, the first day of the operation. The internal probe looks at whether he used his powers for private interests and interfered in other prosecutors’ work. The PGO’s General Inspectorate has filed a disciplinary complaint against him with the same commission, and his post was also abolished.
Ukraine's 413th Separate Raid Regiment of the Unmanned Systems Forces struck the Snizhne Machine-Building Plant in occupied Donetsk Oblast in September, working with other Defense Forces units, the regiment posted on 6 October, sharing a video of the strike. The General Staff reported the strike on the plant on 11 September, saying that the extent of the damage was being clarified.
The strike adds to Ukraine's campaign of long-range attacks on Russian military targets as Russia has begun its winter campaign of strikes against Ukraine's energy infrastructure. Hitting the suppliers of aircraft parts goes after Russia's ability to keep its attack jets and helicopters flying.
The regiment said the plant works for Russia's military industry, producing engine components for attack aircraft and combat helicopters.
The Snizhne plant was a separate division of Motor Sich, a Ukrainian aircraft-engine maker based in Zaporizhzhia, a city that remains under Ukrainian control. Snizhne has been under Russian occupation since 2014. The plant specializes in producing parts for gas-turbine engines, including compressor and turbine discs and blades, the General Staff said. It never built whole engines. In September 2014, months into the occupation, it was machining blanks from Motor Sich's Zaporizhzhia plant into turbine blades and was one of only two plants in the former Soviet Union making such blades for helicopters, a plant worker said.
Motor Sich said in December 2017 that it had lost control of the plant. Weeks later, Viacheslav Bohuslaiev, then Motor Sich's honorary president and a member of parliament, told RFE/RL's Donbas.Realii that Motor Sich still owned the plant and had handed its management to a foreign company, while keeping it under the company's "full control."
In February 2023, Ukraine's Prosecutor General's Office served Bohuslaiev a notice of suspicion of aiding a terrorist organization, alleging that Motor Sich shipped blanks to the Snizhne plant and received finished engine parts through foreign-registered companies. The case went to court in October 2023, and Bohuslaiev, who denies the charges, has been in pretrial detention since October 2022 as the trial continues.
Snizhne, which Russia uses as a rear base, has been hit before. In May, Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces and the Security Service of Ukraine struck a Russian training center for drone pilots in the city, and in September, a strike on energy infrastructure cut power across Snizhne.
“Thanks to our beloved soldiers. We await you in our unbreakable city,” reads a handwritten note beside cans and other foodstuffs received to stave off hunger in Oleshky, a city occupied by Russia. “Thank you,” echoes another note next to a shipment of coffee, herbal teas, and chocolate bars. Photos of these messages and others showing various tokens of gratitude have reached the phone of Roman Chuhalov, 44, one of the Ukrainian servicemen who, by sending aid with drones, are trying to break the blockade in this town in the southern Kherson region, where about 2,000 people are holding out.
At least 280,000 people are missing due to the war between Russia and Ukraine, according to the vast list maintained by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). It includes Ukrainians and Russians, without distinction, and the true figure is likely higher because the list contains only requests registered with the organization. The vast majority are soldiers. Although many have probably died, some parents and wives still set a meal at an empty chair and leave their rooms unchanged in case the person suddenly returns home. They carry a pain psychologists call ambiguous loss.
© Stringer (REUTERS)
Russia is stepping up its hybrid war against Europe. From sabotage, drone incursions, and arson to plots (mostly foiled) to assassinate pro‑Ukraine activists and Russian dissidents on European soil, the Kremlin is testing the allied response, and incidents against NATO’s European partners are becoming more serious, such as the explosive‑laden drones found this summer at Leipzig Airport in Germany. That gray line between a hybrid attack and a conventional one is blurring, and several European intelligence sources warn of the risk that one of those incidents could escalate — either by a deliberate Kremlin decision or a miscalculation.
© Kateryna Klochko (AP/LaPresse)
One way Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy confronts Russian attacks and seeks to show resolve is by appearing in the most dangerous places. He has done so since his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, launched the full-scale invasion in February 2022. At that time, Kyiv was the Kremlin’s primary target, but the attempt was beaten back. In recent weeks, Moscow has increased its aerial attacks and bombs the city day and night, hitting numerous civilian targets. “They want Ukrainians — especially those in the capital — to leave. In fact, that’s what they were aiming for when the full-scale invasion began,” Zelenskiy said during a conversation with EL PAÍS while visiting a school that had been attacked on Thursday morning in Kyiv.
© Presidencia de Ucrania
Vladimir Putin is in trouble. The war in Ukraine is not going well for him; casualties are mounting at an alarming rate; discontent in Russian society is growing amid serious economic hardships; and the Kremlin’s inner circle is becoming increasingly perplexed by their leader’s ineffectiveness. His response, for now, is the same as always: escalation. Against Ukraine, with more missiles; against his own citizens, with more repression; and against the EU, with attacks, threats, and provocations of various kinds — sabotage, cyberattacks, incursions — that are becoming increasingly bold and dangerous.
© Kevin Lamarque (REUTERS)
Donald Trump returned to power in Washington with two major foreign policy promises: to end the war in Ukraine “in 24 hours” and to keep his country out of more “forever wars.” Almost two years after his decisive electoral victory, the Russian invasion continues with no sign of a quick end, and the United States has plunged itself into yet another hornet’s nest in the Middle East. Two conflicts of unpredictable outcome have pushed fossil fuel costs to historic highs worldwide and are increasing doubts about whether — with price signals distorted — supply chains will withstand the pressure.
© Amit Dave (REUTERS)
The alarms raised by the relationship between a Spanish NATO commander and a woman of Russian origin he met on Tinder, the dating app, are the latest chapter in a new espionage battleground: web applications. Sharing content on social media, posting your morning run, or looking for love online has become a latent risk for militaries around the world.
© NurPhoto (NurPhoto via Getty Images)
Login