Eleições no Brasil, EUA e UE: esquerda identitária e direita antissistema desviam o debate do essencial — soberania e redistribuição de riqueza.

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As eleições brasileiras têm sido férteis na expressão dos estereótipos eleitorais mais comuns que, na sua esmagadora maioria, são responsáveis pelo acentuado resvalamento para uma política superficial, estéril em debate de soluções efectivas para o futuro colectivo, mas profundamente rica em estética carnavaleira, mais liberal ou mais conservadora, em acesa maledicência e numa tendência exacerbada para o insulto fácil ou até para as mais vis ofensas pessoais.

Nada que não se conheça dos EUA e da forma conservadora, tacanha, acanhada e recuada como aí é discutida a política nacional, em que uma e outra barricada evitam debater os assuntos realmente fracturantes, classificados de «radicais»; nem nada que não se conheça da velha Europa, cuja perda de qualidade da classe política em nada difere, hoje, do que se passa no Brasil, na Argentina ou noutras paragens marcadas pela submissão dos principais dirigentes políticos ao imperialismo anglo-sionista, ao poder imenso da oligarquia ou, em última análise, à necessidade de conciliação das políticas caseiras para com a agenda internacional do imperialismo.

Enquanto olhamos para uma esquerda apanhada, não raras vezes, pelo identitarismo individualista e liberal, assim desviada dos locais de trabalho, do chão de fábrica, dos dramas da exploração, que estão na base dos problemas mais profundos com os quais se debate a maioria da população, constatamos também uma direita que funciona como o outro lado da moeda: ao liberalismo nos costumes de parte da esquerda (a liberal), a direita responde com o conservadorismo; às promessas de justiça social da esquerda (a liberal), a direita responde com mais liberalismo e até “ultraliberalismo”. Uma e outra acabam por falar muito pouco do que interessa realmente, centrando-se muitas vezes em assuntos acessórios, mais ligados à estética do que à essência.

Não obstante, com um olhar atento, podemos sempre desenterrar o que se esconde por trás de um e outro panfletarismo. Uma das mais importantes temáticas em confronto hoje nas sociedades ocidentais – ou ocidentalizadas, como é o caso do Brasil, da América Latina e da Europa Latina – consiste na tensão entre soberania e submissão ao imperialismo anglo-sionista. Se, na Europa – nos casos de Portugal, Espanha ou Itália –, essa tensão é mediada por uma UE já submetida, que tende a funcionar como uma camada protectora das tensões nacionais e uma vez levantada a questão da soberania, a tendência é, das duas uma, ou vê-la como uma extensão da soberania europeia, o que esconde o real problema, ou vê-la como uma tentativa de discussão da saída da UE, o que ainda é visto como um tabu em alargados círculos de um campo ou outro; no Brasil, essa tensão fica mais exposta, uma vez que não existe uma União Americana para mediar as relações externas do país para com os EUA e Israel, os grandes representantes do imperialismo anglo-sionista.

E, neste caso, é interessante verificar que, do lado bolsonarista, de onde se poderia esperar a proposta nacionalista, tal não sucede, ou sucede muito residualmente, pois, mesmo quando sucede, a tentativa é desmascarada pelo excessivo apoio que as redes sociais norte-americanas dão à candidatura de Bolsonaro, ou pelas constantes ingerências de Trump e dos seus apaniguados no processo eleitoral brasileiro. Por muito que a direita quisesse mostrar-se como defensora da nação e da sua independência, o efusivo apoio dos EUA à candidatura em causa faria cair a máscara, pois os EUA – e Israel – nunca apoiariam com tanta veemência e de forma tão expressa quem não lhes fosse dócil. A omissão de Lula nos comandos algorítmicos de Silicon Valey acaba por denunciar qual dos dois candidatos é mais dócil aos interesses dos EUA.

Já do lado de Lula da Silva, aí sim, têm surgido as propostas mais demarcadas em matéria de defesa da soberania, mesmo que alguma dessa intensidade possa depois colidir com os ditames pragmáticos da realpolitik, ditados pela necessidade de conciliar com um centrão marcadamente pró-imperialista. De qualquer das formas, esta linha demarcadora existe, e parece-me pouco crível que alguém, no pleno uso das suas faculdades mentais, possa escolher um protegido de Trump para a defesa dos interesses soberanos do Brasil, em vez de um experiente conciliador, mesmo que não revolucionário.

Sabendo da importância que esta questão tem, depois, para a gestão e utilização soberana dos recursos endógenos e a sua afectação a um plano de desenvolvimento independente, parece-me de difícil defesa a escolha de Bolsonaro, no caso de pesar, nessa escolha, a questão soberana. Tal como na UE, também não é na direita que os soberanistas têm encontrado as melhores práticas, talvez com excepção de Viktor Orbán — que governou a Hungria durante dezasseis anos, até às eleições de abril de 2026 —, mas mais por necessidade de alinhamento com a Rússia e a China, em consequência das escolhas da UE em matéria energética e industrial, do que por necessidade de construção de um projecto de nação realmente soberano. Aliás, se mais provas fossem necessárias, tivemos o total alinhamento de Orbán com o sionismo para percebermos que o desencontro para com a UE era apenas tático, e não uma questão de fundo ou de defesa da soberania nacional. Nem por um momento Orbán renunciou à NATO nem se afastou de Israel e do sionismo — factores que usou como plataformas de sustentação contra a burocracia de Bruxelas. A submissão a Trump, essa, também foi explícita e verbalizada com o fulgor de quem via nele “um enviado de deus”!

Já no caso de Meloni, Babis e outros, a questão é a mesma: muita conversa, mas, no final, o mesmo alinhamento, o que deixa antever para onde virão a virar os partidos como a AfD. Perante as questões fundamentais, também estas alinharão, ou pela submissão a Bruxelas, ou pela submissão directa ao sionismo e ao imperialismo dos EUA. Outros, como Meloni, conseguem fazer um meio-caminho que, no final, tem as mesmas consequências sociais. No que conta realmente, os jovens continuam a deparar-se com o desemprego, a não conseguir casa, as infraestruturas a degradar-se, os direitos laborais sob ataque cerrado e os salários em desvalorização acelerada face ao aumento brutal do custo de vida. Não existe um local onde esta «nova direita» esteja implantada e sentada nas cadeiras do poder, onde isto não se passe.

Daí que subsista um outro paralelo importante entre as eleições brasileiras e o que se passa na Europa e no Ocidente em geral: quer no Brasil, quer nos EUA, quer na Europa, esta «nova direita» utiliza também a agenda identitária como linha divisória em relação à esquerda. Supostamente, a «esquerda» – liberal, acrescento eu – seria responsável por uma decadência dos costumes e dos valores culturais e religiosos, pela decadência social e moral dos defensores desta deriva «wokista».

Ora, esta demarcação tem funcionado como justificação para muitos que, tendo-se apresentado como críticos do sionismo, defensores da multipolaridade, anti-imperialistas e defensores das soberanias do Sul Global, vêm agora usar este suposto «wokismo» da esquerda para justificar a eleição de um representante da submissão ao imperialismo como Bolsonaro. Esta demarcação tem um problema: mais «wokista» do que o «wokista» é aquele que faz do wokismo a coisa mais importante da política, seja quando se está a favor, seja quando se está contra.

À esquerda, muitos não são capazes de identificar nas pautas excessivamente identitárias uma agenda individualista, fraccionária e fragmentadora das classes trabalhadoras, com origem nos próprios EUA, cujos serviços de manipulação de massas transformaram o ser «woke» (alerta para as injustiças sociais) numa espécie de panfletarismo identitário que extraiu ao movimento «woke» a dimensão classista e de redistribuição justa da riqueza que possuía e lhe deu uma panóplia de identidades em troca, transformando a preocupação com a igualdade, a justiça social e a liberdade – uma preocupação materialista e universalista – numa preocupação tribalista, individualista e, acima de tudo, desconectada da dimensão material, ou seja, da dimensão da justa redistribuição da riqueza produzida pelo trabalho.

Mas, à direita, quando se utiliza essa deriva tribalista e individualista como linha divisora, nega-se também o que distingue, de facto, a esquerda da direita. É que na matriz histórica que distingue esquerda de direita está a riqueza: quem a domina e como é repartida. De um lado, quem defende que a propriedade e a riqueza não devem ser a medida da liberdade e da iniciativa política e que todos os seres humanos devem ter direito a uma vida digna (universalismo) e, do outro, à direita, a plutocracia fisiocrática, ou seja, a ideia de que a liberdade e a capacidade de intervenção política devem medir-se pela riqueza que se tem. Daí que os sufrágios liberais assentassem numa lógica censo-censitária – ou seja, identitária –, em que o que contava era a riqueza que se tinha, se era homem e se sabia ler e escrever, e não fosse a luta, nomeadamente a das mulheres sufragistas, a conseguir alcançar o que hoje designamos por «sufrágio universal» e ainda estaríamos assim. Julgo que também as terão acusado de «wokistas», nos termos em voga na altura!

Assim, de lá para cá, ou seja, desde o momento fundador da dicotomia «esquerda–direita» da Revolução Francesa, a direita se empenha mais do lado da conservação da propriedade nas mãos de quem a tem, e a esquerda mais do lado da democracia real, da democracia económica, social e cultural, negando a ideia de que os ricos tenham de permanecer ricos e que os pobres tenham de permanecer pobres — em jeito de tradução, o que chamamos de progressismo universalista, por oposição ao progressismo individualista, o qual tende sobretudo para as questões da identidade individual.

Assim, quando esta direita embarca na lógica antiwokista, fazendo desta agenda o aspecto mais importante da discussão política, como se o que importasse realmente não fossem as coisas que nos permitem viver, sustentar, alimentar e fruir o nosso corpo e espírito, esta direita fá-lo apenas com uma intenção: desviar a atenção para uma questão superficial, para que nas propostas em discussão não entre o que lhe é mais caro: a redistribuição justa da riqueza e a democracia económica, social e cultural. Assim, o que mais lhe importa permanece indiscutível e as eleições transformam-se num carnaval de bandeirinhas do contra e a favor. Quem escolhe onde vota por causa do wokismo de outro é tão wokista quanto ele.

Mas não se ficam por aqui as semelhanças. Outra é a questão da segurança e do combate ao crime: à direita, propaga-se a ideia de que o crime se combate com violência brutal; à esquerda, defende-se que, enquanto houver pobreza, não será possível erradicar o crime. Ora, não é preciso ser muito inteligente para perceber que a primeira proposta falha nos locais onde mais se dela fala: nos EUA. Nenhum país tem mais prisioneiros comuns — também poucos terão mais prisioneiros políticos —, nenhum país gasta tanto em suposto combate ao crime, nenhum país desenvolvido tem tanto crime. Porque, nos EUA, os viveiros do crime comum, os guetos negros e latinos, onde vivem populações desesperadas, desprovidas de condições básicas de emprego, de educação e de serviços públicos essenciais, continuam sobrelotados e cada vez mais empobrecidos. Ora, esse é apenas o crime do desesperado, o que surge na televisão.

Outra forma de crime e que também constitui um paralelo na agenda direita/esquerda, é a questão da corrupção. Se esta «nova direita» faz bandeira da corrupção e a esquerda pouco fala dela, também é verdade que, quando eleita, esta «nova direita» faz tudo menos acabar com a corrupção. Não é preciso ir mais longe do que Trump para constatarmos um caso de corrupção empedernida. E quem do bolsonarismo esperava o fim da corrupção também ficou a praguejar no deserto: o governo Bolsonaro foi, ele próprio, um antro de corrupção. Talvez se devesse começar por discutir que, para acabar com a corrupção, é preciso acabar com o que a origina: a imensa disparidade na distribuição da riqueza, que faz com que uns possam usar o seu imenso poder económico para obter do poder político o que lhes falta em legitimidade eleitoral. Este crime, o de colarinho branco, sendo até mais insidioso e originando as causas profundas do outro, não surge tão amiúde nas televisões.

Na imigração temos, talvez, a única das grandes diferenças entre as eleições na América Latina, no Brasil e nos países do capitalismo avançado. Mas a imigração surge também como uma forma de identitarismo superficial da direita. Quanto mais a «nova direita» fala de «excesso de imigração», mais esquece que quem emprega esses imigrantes são os mesmos que a financiam e apoiam, que os imigrantes vêm trabalhar nos sectores económicos com os salários mais baixos, explorados pelos patrões mais retrógrados e conservadores — base social da direita radical —, e que o patronato só recorre à imigração como último recurso, porque a sua agenda antilaboral fez com que os trabalhadores não tenham hoje condições para projectar um futuro com estabilidade, porque os jovens, vítimas da transformação da habitação em especulação imobiliária, deixaram de poder programar um futuro em família e porque os pais e as mães, vítimas dos horários desregulados impostos pelo patronato e consagrados em lei pela direita, não têm tempo para a sua família.

O mais grave é que, quanto mais negam as condições materiais necessárias, mais dizem defender a família e os respectivos valores. Uma clara mostra de hipocrisia e cinismo, que nega as causas profundas do problema — um problema que afecta todo o Ocidente. É mais fácil, como têm feito, negar que a crise da natalidade está intrinsecamente ligada ao sistema vigente. Sabem onde não havia crise da natalidade? Nos países socialistas do leste. Países industrializados, letrados e bem alimentados, que duplicaram as suas populações em 70 anos. Hoje, tomados pelo capitalismo, encontram-se na lenga-lenga dos países do capitalismo avançado. Daí não sairão até que mudem as características fundamentais de um sistema económico que não apenas não dá tempo à mulher para ter filhos, como destrói a coesão familiar com a desregulação do trabalho e, consequentemente, da vida.

Ora, o que é mais interessante deste debate político é que os que há uns anos, os que diziam não haver direita e esquerda, que os políticos eram todos iguais, são agora os que vêm dizer que a salvação está nesta «nova direita» e são os que se acirram quando lhes dizemos que esta «nova direita» nada tem de «nova» e que, ao invés, tresanda a fascismo clássico.

Nunca são fascistas, mas submetem-se ao sionismo e ao império anglo-sionista; não são fascistas, mas usam da demagogia e do discurso fácil usados pelo fascismo clássico; não são fascistas, mas usam das bandeiras de massas como o fez o fascismo clássico; não são fascistas, mas usam a religião e a suposta degradação dos costumes para desviar as atenções do essencial, como o fez o fascismo clássico; não são fascistas, mas chegados ao poder privatizam, atacam direitos laborais e fecham serviços públicos essenciais, como fez o fascismo clássico; não são fascistas, mas atacam o conhecimento, desvalorizam o estudo e o empenho individual, como fazia o fascismo clássico; não são fascistas, mas desconsideram a experiência política, o percurso individual e colectivo, como fazia o fascismo clássico, para desconsiderar as instituições; não são fascistas, mas assumem um discurso racialista, xenófobo, supremacista e ultra-individualista, como fazia o fascismo clássico; não são fascistas, mas são todos anticomunistas, antissocialistas e contrários ao progresso social, como era o fascismo clássico; não são fascistas, mas são apoiados pela oligarquia e pelo patronato mais retrógrado, bem como pelo imperialismo, como era o fascismo clássico.

Não são fascistas, mas cheiram, voam, cantam e vociferam como os fascistas…

Chamem-lhe o que quiserem, mas uns «anos 30» do século XXI, armados de IA e de redes sociais? Não, obrigado! Não podemos esperar diferente de quem tem os mesmos patrões e quer mandar nos mesmos empregados…

Espero que, depois, me poupem ao adágio repetitivo do «fomos enganados».

FONTES E NOTAS DE VERIFICAÇÃO

Encarceramento nos EUA — os EUA têm a maior população prisional do mundo (cerca de 2 milhões de pessoas) e a maior taxa de encarceramento de qualquer democracia; em taxa por habitante, apenas El Salvador, Cuba e Turquemenistão a superam (World Prison Brief / Prison Policy Initiative, 2026). https://eji.org/news/u-s-remains-world-leader-in-number-of-people-incarcerated/

Jair Bolsonaro — condenado pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal a 27 anos e 3 meses de prisão (11 de setembro de 2025) por tentativa de golpe de Estado, organização criminosa armada e abolição violenta do Estado democrático de direito; cumpre pena desde 25 de novembro de 2025. https://apublica.org/especial/o-julgamento-de-jair-bolsonaro/ ; https://checamos.afp.com/doc.afp.com.A2V88ZQ

Donald Trump — condenado em maio de 2024 por 34 crimes de falsificação de registos comerciais; em janeiro de 2025 foi-lhe aplicada uma liberdade incondicional (sem pena de prisão nem multa), com recursos ainda pendentes em 2026. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c4g3m95ykzko ; https://www.axios.com/2026/08/28/trump-hush-money-conviction-appeal

Viktor Orbán — a Hungria é membro da NATO e Orbán foi aliado próximo de Netanyahu e de Israel; nas eleições de abril de 2026, Péter Magyar pôs fim a 16 anos de governo de Orbán. https://apnews.com/article/hungary-israel-euro-2024-soccer-1514e137b54b18a1fed8be8b6cd89b19 ; https://www.ynetnews.com/article/hjef3yqnbx

Sufrágio — em Portugal, o voto censitário só foi extinto em 1968; as mulheres obtiveram um direito de voto limitado em 1931 e a igualdade plena apenas com a Constituição de 1976. https://www.europeana.eu/pt/stories/votes-for-women ; https://arquivomunicipal.lisboa.pt/fileadmin/arquivo_municipal/difusao/publicacoes/cadernos/Cad04.pdf

Origem do termo «woke» — inglês afro-americano, com registos desde os anos 1920–1940, popularizado a partir de 2014 pelo movimento Black Lives Matter. https://www.merriam-webster.com/wordplay/woke-meaning-origin ; https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2025-09-30/how-woke-went-from-an-expression-in-black-culture-to-a-conservative-criticism

Origem dos termos «esquerda» e «direita» — disposição dos deputados na Assembleia Nacional Constituinte francesa, em 1789. https://observador.pt/opiniao/a-grande-dicotomia-o-que-ainda-separa-a-esquerda-da-direita/

Criminalidade — a taxa de homicídios dos EUA (≈6,4 por 100 mil habitantes) é muito superior à dos restantes países desenvolvidos, mas inferior à do Brasil (≈22–23) ou do México (≈25); por essa razão, o texto original «nenhum país tem tanto crime» foi ajustado para «nenhum país desenvolvido tem tanto crime». https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/gsh/2023/GSH_2023_LAC_web.pdf

 

Acting President Delcy Rodríguez announced Wednesday that Venezuela will hold its Youth Popular Consultation in February 2027, a vote she framed as a platform for young people to convert their talent, creativity and ingenuity into a driving force for national development.

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Venezuelan Acting President Delcy Rodríguez delivered the announcement during a visit to the Nueve Raíces de Simón communal circuit, where she urged the country’s youth to prepare actively for what she described as a democratic appointment that will mark the direction of the coming year.

Rodríguez said the process aims to vindicate the talent, creativity and ingenuity of the new generations and to propel Venezuela toward fresh development opportunities. The call places younger Venezuelans at the center of a participatory model that has gathered strength since 2024.

RELATED: Venezuela to Begin Funding Projects Selected in Popular Consultation Next Week

The announcement lands days after the Second National Popular Consultation of 2026, held on October 18. It was the eighth nationwide vote of its kind since 2024, and officials described the turnout as massive and successful. That result has now been translated into a fresh appeal aimed specifically at young people, signaling the government’s intention to widen the base of participants in community decision-making.

🗳️🔥 ¡LA JUVENTUD SE PREPARA: NUEVA CONSULTA EN FEBRERO 2027!🇻🇪✨

Tras una participación histórica en la pasada Consulta Nacional Popular, la ruta continúa: ¡Jóvenes de toda Venezuela a prepararse desde ya! 💪🌱

El compromiso no se detiene: es momento de seguir adelante,… pic.twitter.com/YyOteBQqLT

— Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Juventud (@Minjuventud__ve) October 21, 2026

Text reads: “Youth is preparing: new consultation in February 2027! After a historic participation in the last National Popular Consultation, the route continues: Young people from all over Venezuela to prepare now! The commitment does not stop: it’s time to move forward, organize and execute projects that will transform our territories.”

A Record October Turnout

Millions of residents from communities across the country turned out on October 18, prompting the National Electoral Council (CNE) to extend voting by one hour.

The scale of the exercise was measured in large numbers. More than 5,418 communes and communal circuits coordinated the work of over 48,000 communal councils, and voters selected among 37,205 priority community projects eligible for public financing.

Rodríguez has championed the consultation model as a vehicle for what officials call popular power. In separate remarks, she described participation in the October exercise as extraordinary, linking the strong turnout to a broader effort to place public decision-making directly in the hands of organized communities rather than distant institutions.

A Broader Community Voice

One of the most notable features of the October consultation was the first-time inclusion of condominium boards, which put forward 428 projects. Acting President Rodríguez celebrated that milestone on social media, underscoring the importance of keeping decisions about everyday matters firmly in the hands of communities themselves.

The proposals reflected local priorities. Acting President Rodríguez had previously detailed that 14% of the projects corresponded to the water sector, followed by initiatives in road infrastructure, lighting, electricity, public services and productive activities, showing residents directing public resources toward their most pressing daily needs.

With the youth consultation now scheduled for February 2027, the Acting President called young Venezuelans to assume what she called absolute protagonism in the process. Organizers expect the new consultation to build on the machinery tested in October and to channel the energy of younger generations into decisions that will shape the country’s near-term path.

At least 10,561 gang members have been convicted by Salvadoran courts over the past four years since the start of the crackdown on gangs began in 2022, Attorney General Rodolfo Delgado detailed on Tuesday.

The post El Salvador Logs over 10,500 Gang Member Convictions Since 2022 appeared first on Breitbart.

Venezuela needs a competent supreme court, truly independent political parties, the freedom of its political prisoners, and the restored trust of its people for a democratic transition to successfully take place, Dinorah Figuera, the leader of the opposition delegation negotiating that transition, told Breitbart News.

The post Exclusive — Dinorah Figuera, the Woman Leading Venezuela’s Road to Elections: ‘The Interests of the Country Come First’ appeared first on Breitbart.

Digital models modified Flávio Bolsonaro’s event photography to artificially expand audiences and simulate support from female voters.

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The Brazilian presidential election has become an arena for modern, dirty digital tactics. Senator Flávio Bolsonaro, representing the Liberal Party (PL), has centered his campaign strategy around coordinated digital reach and automated content production.

RELATED: UN Experts Raise Concerns Over Meta’s Handling of Political Expression During Brazil Elections

Rather than working as a traditional political campaign of physical rallies, the operation relies heavily on digital distribution infrastructure across social media platforms.

Flávio’s strategy operates through two main mechanisms. First, the campaign uses synthetic consensus tools, automated social media accounts, AI image generation, and digital avatars to simulate organic public backing.

Second, the campaign benefits from algorithmic distribution asymmetries on digital platforms, which amplify far-right material while placing system restrictions on competing political content.

Collected evidence by independent researchers, journalism networks, and electoral authorities indicates that systemic digital manipulation and platform-level infrastructure played a decisive role in shaping voter perception and electoral engagement in Brazil.

Industrial Bot Networks

A core component of Flávio Bolsonaro’s digital strategy involves the commercial purchase of automated networks designed to manufacture artificial public support.

An investigation by The Intercept Brazil revealed that Flávio Bolsonaro paid Elytron, a cybersecurity firm, to carry out data collection and voter identification to spread rumors and create fake accounts.

These automated tools operate primarily across WhatsApp, Instagram, and X, generating synchronized posts and artificial engagement to bypass standard organic distribution patterns.

This infrastructure uses astroturfing techniques to alter online public discourse. By deploying thousands of automated accounts programmed to post identical messaging scripts, the campaign artificially inflates engagement metrics, pushes specific political hashtags into regional trending lists, and floods comment sections on public news pages.

This creates a false impression of widespread popular momentum, designed to sway undecided voters through perceived consensus.

Technical evaluations submitted during electoral court proceedings reveal the scope of these automated operations. Data presented to electoral monitors shows coordinated account clusters posting at frequencies humanly impossible without software automation.

🚨 BREAKING: Flávio Bolsonaro paid R$600,000 to a company that offered AI to manipulate elections, according to Intercept Brasil. pic.twitter.com/eFcRp74vNw

— Pop Core (@TheePopCore) October 16, 2026

Deepfakes, AI Avatars, Demographic Manipulation

Various social organizations and media outlets have denounced the deployment of AI image and video generation tools as another facet of Flávio Bolsonaro’s digital strategy.

A prominent example occurred during campaign launch events, where the campaign broadcast an AI-generated digital avatar of former president Jair Bolsonaro endorsing his son’s candidacy. This technique allowed the campaign to maintain the political presence of the former president Bolsonaro in public events despite judicial rulings restricting his direct participation in political activities.

In addition, the campaign used AI tools to manipulate visual documentation of campaign gatherings. Documented instances show event photography processed through image generation models to alter crowd compositions.

These AI modifications included scaling up crowd sizes to exaggerate physical attendance and digitally swapping male attendees with female faces. The primary objective of this demographic engineering was to simulate broader support among female voters, a demographic group where polling data consistently showed lower support for the candidate.

An investigation by a Brazilian media outlet identified more than 50 TikTok videos altered using AI, specifically on-the-street interviews in which subjects claimed they would vote for Flávio Bolsonaro. These videos garnered over 7 million views, yet in only 18% of them did the platform indicate that the individuals featured were AI-generated.

While Brazilian law prohibits the use of AI-generated videos in political campaigns, it is difficult to determine when such content is created by third parties with no direct affiliation to the campaigns.

Due to a lack of female supporters, Brazilian presidential candidate Flávio Bolsonaro has resorted to using AI to transform middle-aged men into attractive young women.

This AI-generated creation has been dubbed the "Bolsonaro Bombshell." pic.twitter.com/ap1ecKou9K

— Vatnik Soup (@vatniksoup) October 20, 2026

Disinformation and Aggressive Public Discourse

Flávio Bolsonaro’s public communications strategy relies heavily on coordinated attack campaigns directed against President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and the Workers’ Party (PT).

The Flávio campaign’s public messaging routinely utilizes sensationalist allegations and targeted attacks. Online networks affiliated with the campaign circulate manufactured claims regarding public safety, economic stability, and social values, framing the current administration in terms of moral crisis.

On Sunday the 18th, the public debate between the two candidates took place, and Flávio Bolsonaro spent most of his time attacking Lula during his turns to speak.

Throughout the debate, Flávio was sarcastic and mocking toward President Lula; he attempted to intimidate him physically, to which Lula responded by moving away, stating that he did not want to be near either Flávio or the Bolsonaro family.

Furthermore, when the discussion turned to public safety, Flávio claimed that Lula is the preferred candidate of organized crime, pointing out that Lula received a large number of votes from within the country’s prisons. Lula replied, “I want 100% of them to vote for me -even your father,” a reference to the fact that Jair Bolsonaro is currently incarcerated.

This aggressive messaging strategy directly impacts the broader political environment. By flooding public discourse with inflammatory claims, the campaign creates heightened polarization, distracts from substantive legislative evaluations, and systematically delegitimizes established democratic processes and electoral monitoring bodies.

Hundreds of Brazilians protested outside Meta’s São Paulo offices, accusing the technology giant of limiting President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s campaign reach while boosting far-right candidate Flávio Bolsonaro, just six days before the presidential runoff. The demonstration… pic.twitter.com/KRAxExFjMO

— teleSUR English (@telesurenglish) October 20, 2026

Meta’s Structural Bias in the Campaign

The Brazilian presidential race was shaped by asymmetries within Meta’s platforms, including Instagram, WhatsApp, and Facebook.

Filings submitted to the Superior Electoral Court (TSE, in Spanish) by President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s legal team documented clear disparities in how content from both campaigns was handled by the different platforms.

A primary issue involved Meta’s generative AI features. When users requested campaign materials incorporating Lula’s official ballot number, 13, the system repeatedly rejected the prompts, citing political content restrictions. Conversely, identical requests containing Flávio Bolsonaro’s candidate number, 22, were routinely processed, generating promotional material for the far-right campaign.

In other instances, the AI tool inserted Bolsonaro’s electoral number into completely unrelated image requests. Following formal complaints, the Superior Electoral Court ordered Meta to ensure equal treatment. Meta attributed these outcomes to technical errors and implemented broad restrictions on political image generation.

Internal Meta communications revealed that technical errors caused Lula’s official Instagram profile to be excluded from platform search results and recommendation engines, while Flávio Bolsonaro’s profile remained fully discoverable and actively recommended to users. Furthermore, internal technical escalations confirmed that temporary account restrictions had hindered the reach of Lula’s messaging assets.

WHO'S THE REAL THIEF? LULA CHALLENGES BOLSONARO TO SHOW RECORDS

Ahead of Brazil’s presidential election, Brazilian President Lula da Silva publicly challenged rival Flávio Bolsonaro to open his bank accounts, release his phone records, and let the Brazilian people decide who… pic.twitter.com/U6Ge0yOV6A

— Sovereign Media (@sov_media) October 21, 2026

Regulatory Imperatives and Popular Sovereignty

The execution of Flávio Bolsonaro’s digital presidential campaign illustrates the evolving mechanics of far-right electoral operations.

By combining commercial bot procurement, generative AI deepfakes, coordinated public attacks, and platform-level algorithmic advantages, the campaign constructed a heavily synthetic media environment designed to influence voter perception.

These developments underscore the limitations of existing legal and regulatory frameworks in addressing digital campaign manipulation. While judicial interventions by the Superior Electoral Court forced technical corrections, reactive oversight remains insufficient to counteract real-time automated suppression and algorithmic imbalance.

Protecting democratic processes requires structural regulatory reform, including mandatory algorithmic transparency, strict auditing of generative AI systems, and clear accountability standards for global technology corporations operating within national borders.

Exposing the mechanics of digital manipulation through independent research and data-driven journalism remains essential to safeguarding electoral integrity against automated distortion and platform bias.

Sources: Brasil de Fato – Agência Brasil – Gov.br – O Globo – Folha de S.Paulo – O Estado de S.Paulo – El País – CNN Brasil – EFE – Instituto Tricontinental – La Base América Latina – Diario Red – The Intercept – El Salto

Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva presented a constitutional amendment on Wednesday that would reserve budget funds for free public transport on weekends and holidays, tying the move to workers’ newly expanded right to rest.

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The initiative would redirect 26.8% of parliamentary budget amendments to fund the program, which the government says would strengthen working-class access to leisure and urban mobility.

It envisions reallocating 11.2 billion reais (more than 2.2 billion dollars) from the budget controlled by Congress, whose concentration of resources has historically limited the federal government’s ability to carry out social policies. The proposal still needs to pass Congress.

RELATED: Lula Signs Constitutional Amendment Reducing Brazil’s Workweek to 40 Hours

The Brazilian government argues that this concentration of resources in parliamentary hands has historically limited the federal government’s capacity to carry out social programs. Reassigning the money, officials contend, restores room for initiatives aimed at urban mobility and access to leisure for the working class.

PESSOAL URGENTE 🚨

Lula anuncia tarifa zero para ônibus aos fins de semana em todo o país. PEC foi enviada ao Congresso e prevê que parte do orçamento das emendas parlamentares financie a medida. #FandomsComLula pic.twitter.com/cYNB8bGf9q

— Fandoms Com Lula ⭐️ (@fandomscomlula) October 21, 2026

During the same ceremony at Planalto Palace Lula signed a separate law forgiving 16 billion reais (about $3.1 billion) in tax debts accumulated by individual microentrepreneurs, a category that covers millions of small producers and self-employed workers.

Administration officials portrayed the debt pardon as a lifeline for families whose tax obligations had outpaced their ability to pay. The two measures, they said, respond to the same pressure weighing on popular households across Brazil.

The Brazilian President described the weekend transport plan as a pilot program. Its purpose is to measure the social and operational impact of the zero fare model before any decision to extend it nationwide.

Lula’s administration said the project complements the recent reduction of the working week, helping workers make effective use of their right to rest. Days before Wednesday’s event, Lula attended the Senate promulgation of a separate constitutional amendment that abolishes the six-days-on, one-day-off schedule. The change secures two paid days of rest each week, preferably Saturday and Sunday, and shortens the maximum work week without cutting pay.

🚍 MAIS TEMPO PARA VIVER!

Hoje enviamos ao Congresso a PEC da Tarifa Zero, que propõe transporte público gratuito aos fins de semana e feriados em todo o Brasil e em cidades que possuem transporte público.

Essa proposta se conecta a uma conquista fundamental: o fim da escala… pic.twitter.com/yOcfXFuZ05

— Lula (@LulaOficial) October 21, 2026

Despite criticism from far-right sectors backing Senator Flávio Bolsonaro, the executive said it will deepen its commitment to restoring rights and defending popular gains. The announcements come days before the October 25 presidential runoff in which Lula faces Bolsonaro.

The weekend fare initiative arrives as Lula’s administration pushes a broader agenda of recovering social and labor protections. The Brazilian President has linked the transit measure and the shorter work week as parts of a single effort to lift the weight of daily costs from working families.

President Lula of Brazil said that Flavio Bolsonaro must disclose his financial records if he wants to debate him again before the runoff.

The post Brazil’s Lula Seeks Way Out After Debate Disaster: Won’t Face ‘Thief’ Flávio Bolsonaro Again Without Bank Records appeared first on Breitbart.

A senior Ukrainian diplomat joined a U.S.-hosted panel at the United Nations on Monday condemning human rights abuses by the communist government of Cuba, describing Cuban citizens as among the largest groups of foreign recruits aiding the Russian invasion of his country.

The post Ukraine Denounces Cubans Used as ‘Cannon Fodder’ in Russian Invasion at U.N. appeared first on Breitbart.

Alberta’s referendum to begin the process of seceding from Canada failed by a wide margin on Monday, keeping Canada’s oil wealth intact and delivering a major political win to Prime Minister Mark Carney.

The post Alberta Secession Referendum Fails appeared first on Breitbart.

Brazil’s elections: “new right” that smells like fascism, a left lost in identity politics.

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The Brazilian elections have proved fertile ground for the expression of the most common electoral stereotypes, which, by and large, are responsible for the sharp slide toward a superficial politics, barren of debate over effective solutions for our collective future, yet rich, deep down, in carnival aesthetics, more liberal or more conservative, in bitter invective, and in an exacerbated tendency toward the easy insult or even the basest personal offenses.

None of this is unfamiliar from the US, where national politics is discussed in a conservative, parochial, cramped, and backward fashion, with barricades on both sides avoiding debate on the truly divisive issues, labeled “radical”; nor is it unfamiliar from Old Europe, whose political class has lost quality to a degree that differs nothing, today, from what goes on in Brazil, Argentina, or other places marked by the submission of their leading political figures to Anglo-Zionist imperialism, to the immense power of the oligarchy, or, in the final analysis, to the need to reconcile domestic policies with the international agenda of imperialism.

As we look at a left wing caught, all too often, in individualistic, liberal identity politics — thereby diverted from the workplaces, from the factory floor, from the dramas of exploitation that underlie the deepest problems with which the majority of the population grapples — we also find a right wing that works as the other side of the coin: to the liberalism of part of the left (the liberal left) on matters of customs, the right answers with conservatism; to the left’s promises of social justice (the liberal left), the right answers with more liberalism and even “ultraliberalism.” Both end up saying very little about what really matters, focusing much of the time on side issues more closely bound to aesthetics than to essence.

Nevertheless, with a keen eye, we can always unearth what lies behind one or another piece of pamphleteering. One of the most important themes in contention today in Western societies — or Westernized ones, as is the case of Brazil, Latin America, and Latin Europe — is the tension between sovereignty and submission to Anglo-Zionist imperialism. If in Europe — in the cases of Portugal, Spain, or Italy — that tension is mediated by an already submissive EU, which tends to act as a protective layer over national tensions, then once the question of sovereignty is raised, the tendency is, one of two things: either to see it as an extension of European sovereignty, which hides the real problem, or to see it as an attempt to discuss leaving the EU, which is still regarded as taboo in broad circles of one camp or another. In Brazil, that tension lies more exposed, since there is no American Union to mediate the country’s foreign relations with the US and Israel, the great representatives of Anglo-Zionist imperialism.

And in this case, it is interesting to note that on the Bolsonaro side — from which one might expect the nationalist proposal — this does not happen, or happens only residually, because even when it does, the attempt is unmasked by the excessive support that American social networks give to Bolsonaro’s candidacy, or by the constant interference of Trump and his cronies in the Brazilian electoral process. However much the right wished to present itself as the defender of the nation and its independence, the effusive support of the US for the candidacy in question would bring the mask down, for the US — and Israel — would never support so vehemently and so openly anyone who was not subservient to them. Lula’s absence from Silicon Valley’s algorithmic command posts ends up giving away which of the two candidates is more subservient to US interests.

On Lula da Silva’s side, by contrast, the more clearly drawn proposals on the defense of sovereignty have in fact emerged — even if some of that intensity may later collide with the pragmatic dictates of realpolitik, imposed by the need to strike deals with a notoriously pro-imperialist “centrão.” Either way, this dividing line exists, and it seems scarcely credible to me that anyone in full possession of their mental faculties could choose a protégé of Trump to defend Brazil’s sovereign interests, rather than an experienced conciliator, even if not a revolutionary one.

Knowing how important this question is, afterward, for the sovereign management and use of endogenous resources and for their allocation to an independent development plan, the choice of Bolsonaro seems to me hard to defend, should the sovereign question weigh in that choice. As in the EU, the sovereignists have not found the best practices on the right either — perhaps with the exception of Viktor Orbán, who governed Hungary for sixteen years, until the April 2026 elections — but more out of a need to align with Russia and China, as a consequence of the EU’s energy and industrial choices, than out of any need to build a genuinely sovereign national project. Moreover, if further proof were needed, Orbán’s total alignment with Zionism allowed us to see that his disagreement with the EU was merely tactical, not a matter of principle or of defending national sovereignty. Orbán never for a moment renounced NATO or distanced himself from Israel and Zionism — factors he used as platforms of support against the Brussels bureaucracy. His submission to Trump, for that matter, was also explicit, and voiced with the fervor of one who saw in him “an envoy of God”!

In the case of Meloni, Babiš, and others, the question is the same: much talk, but in the end, the same alignment — which foreshadows where parties like the AfD will later turn. Faced with the fundamental questions, they too will fall in line, either with submission to Brussels or with direct submission to Zionism and US imperialism. Others, like Meloni, manage a middle path that, in the end, has the same social consequences. Where it really counts, young people keep running into unemployment, cannot find a home, watch infrastructure decay, see labor rights under relentless attack, and see their wages rapidly losing value against the brutal rise in the cost of living. There is no place where this “new right” is entrenched and seated in the halls of power where this does not happen.

Hence another important parallel persists between the Brazilian elections and what goes on in Europe and the West in general: whether in Brazil, the US, or Europe, this “new right” also uses the identity agenda as its dividing line against the left. Supposedly, the “left” — liberal, I would add — would be responsible for a decadence of customs and of cultural and religious values, for the social and moral decay of the defenders of this “woke” drift.

Now, this demarcation has served as a justification for many who once presented themselves as critics of Zionism, defenders of multipolarity, anti-imperialists, and defenders of Global South sovereignties, and who now use this supposed “wokeness” of the left to justify electing a representative of submission to imperialism like Bolsonaro. This demarcation has one problem: the only thing more “woke” than the “woke” is the one who makes wokeness the most important thing in politics, whether one is for it or against it.

On the left, many are unable to identify, in the excessively identitarian agendas, an individualistic, divisive agenda that fragments the working classes — one originating in the US itself, whose mass-manipulation services turned being “woke” (alert to social injustices) into a kind of identitarian pamphleteering. They stripped the “woke” movement of the class-based dimension and the just redistribution of wealth it once had, and gave it a panoply of identities in exchange — turning the concern with equality, social justice, and freedom, a materialist and universalist concern, into a tribalistic, individualistic concern, and, above all, one disconnected from the material dimension, that is, from the dimension of the just redistribution of the wealth produced by labor.

But on the right, when this tribalistic and individualistic drift is used as a dividing line, what genuinely distinguishes left from right is also denied. For in the historical matrix that separates left from right lies wealth: who dominates it, and how it is shared. On one side, those who hold that property and wealth must not be the measure of freedom and political initiative, and that all human beings are entitled to a life of dignity (universalism); on the other — on the right — plutocratic physiocracy: the idea that freedom and the capacity for political intervention should be measured by the wealth one has. Hence the liberal suffrages rested on a census-based — that is, identitarian — logic, in which what counted was the wealth one had, being a man, and knowing how to read and write; and were it not for the struggle, notably that of the suffragettes, to achieve what we today call “universal suffrage,” we would still be there. I suspect they, too, were accused of being “woke,” in the terms in vogue at the time!

Thus, from then on — that is, since the founding moment of the “left–right” dichotomy of the French Revolution — the right has committed itself more to the preservation of property in the hands of those who hold it, and the left more to real democracy, to economic, social, and cultural democracy, rejecting the idea that the rich must remain rich and the poor must remain poor. In a manner of speaking, this is what we call universalist progressivism, as opposed to individualist progressivism, which leans above all toward questions of individual identity.

So when this right embarks on the anti-woke logic, making this agenda the most important aspect of the political discussion — as if what really mattered were not the things that allow us to live, to sustain, feed, and enjoy our body and spirit — it does so with only one intention: to divert attention to a superficial issue, so that what is most precious to it does not enter the proposals under discussion: the just redistribution of wealth and economic, social, and cultural democracy. Thus, what matters most to it remains beyond debate, and elections turn into a carnival of little flags for and against. Whoever chooses where to vote because of someone else’s wokeness is every bit as woke as they are.

But the similarities do not end here. Another is the question of security and fighting crime: on the right, the idea is spread that crime is fought with brutal violence; on the left, it is argued that as long as there is poverty, crime cannot be eradicated. Now, it does not take much intelligence to see that the first proposal fails precisely where it is most talked about: the US. No country has more common prisoners — and few will have more political prisoners; no country spends so much on supposed crime-fighting; no developed country has so much crime. Because in the US, the breeding grounds of common crime — the Black and Latino ghettos, where desperate populations live, deprived of basic conditions of employment, education, and essential public services — remain overcrowded and ever more impoverished. But that is only the crime of the desperate, the kind that shows up on television.

Another form of crime — which also features in the right/left agenda — is the question of corruption. If this “new right” waves the banner of corruption and the left barely speaks of it, it is equally true that, once elected, this “new right” does everything except end corruption. One need look no further than Trump to find a case of incorrigible corruption. And those who remembered Bolsonarismo and expected the end of corruption were also left cursing in the desert: the Bolsonaro government was, itself, a den of corruption. Perhaps the discussion should start with the point that, to end corruption, one must end what originates it: the immense disparity in the distribution of wealth, which allows some to use their immense economic power to obtain from political power what they lack in electoral legitimacy. This crime — white-collar crime — being even more insidious and giving rise to the deep causes of the other, does not show up as often on television.

On immigration, we have perhaps the only one of the great differences between the elections in Latin America, in Brazil, and in the countries of advanced capitalism. But immigration also shows up as a form of shallow identitarianism of the right. The more the “new right” talks about “excessive immigration,” the more it forgets that those who employ these immigrants are the very same who finance and support it; that immigrants come to work in the economic sectors with the lowest wages, exploited by the most backward and conservative bosses — the social base of the radical right; and that employers only turn to immigration as a last resort, because their anti-labor agenda has left workers today unable to project a future with stability; because the young, victims of the transformation of housing into real-estate speculation, can no longer plan a future as a family; and because mothers and fathers, victims of the deregulated work schedules imposed by employers and enshrined in law by the right, have no time for their families.

Worst of all, the more they deny the necessary material conditions, the more they claim to defend the family and its values. A clear display of hypocrisy and cynicism, which denies the deep causes of the problem — a problem that affects the entire West. As they have done, it is easier to deny that the fertility crisis is intrinsically bound up with the prevailing system. Know where there was no fertility crisis? In the socialist countries of the East. Industrialized, literate, and well-fed countries, which doubled their populations in 70 years. Today, taken over by capitalism, they find themselves caught up in the same old tune of the advanced-capitalist countries. They will not get out of it until the fundamental features of an economic system change — one that not only leaves women no time to have children but also destroys family cohesion through the deregulation of work and, consequently, of life.

Now, what is most interesting about this political debate is that those who, a few years ago — those who said there was no left or right, that politicians were all the same — are now the ones telling us that salvation lies in this “new right,” and they are the ones who bristle when we tell them that this “new right” has nothing “new” about it and that, on the contrary, it reeks of classic fascism.

They are never fascists, but they submit to Zionism and the Anglo-Zionist empire; they are not fascists, but they resort to the demagogy and easy rhetoric used by classic fascism; they are not fascists, but they wave mass banners as classic fascism did; they are not fascists, but they use religion and the supposed degradation of customs to divert attention from what is essential, as classic fascism did; they are not fascists, but once in power they privatize, attack labor rights, and shut down essential public services, as classic fascism did; they are not fascists, but they attack knowledge and devalue study and individual effort, as classic fascism did; they are not fascists, but they dismiss political experience, individual and collective track records, as classic fascism did, in order to dismiss institutions; they are not fascists, but they adopt a racialist, xenophobic, supremacist, and ultra-individualist discourse, as classic fascism did; they are not fascists, but they are all anti-communist, anti-socialist, and opposed to social progress, as classic fascism was; they are not fascists, but they are backed by the oligarchy and the most backward employers, as well as by imperialism, as classic fascism was.

They are not fascists, but they smell, fly, sing, and bellow like fascists…

Call it what you will, but a “thirties” of the 21st century, armed with AI and social media? No, thank you! We can expect nothing different from those who have the same bosses and want to boss around the same employees…

Afterward, whomever you vote for, I hope you will spare me the tired old refrain of “we were fooled.”

SOURCES

Incarceration in the US — the US has the largest prison population in the world (about 2 million people) and the highest incarceration rate of any democracy; per capita (World Prison Brief / Prison Policy Initiative, 2026). https://eji.org/news/u-s-remains-world-leader-in-number-of-people-incarcerated/

Jair Bolsonaro — convicted by the Supreme Federal Court (STF) to 27 years and 3 months in prison (September 11, 2025) for attempted coup d’état, armed criminal organization, and violent abolition of the democratic rule of law; serving his sentence since November 25, 2025. https://apublica.org/especial/o-julgamento-de-jair-bolsonaro/ ; https://checamos.afp.com/doc.afp.com.A2V88ZQ

Donald Trump — convicted in May 2024 on 34 felony counts of falsifying business records; in January 2025 he received an unconditional discharge (no jail time or fine), with appeals still pending in 2026. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c4g3m95ykzko ; https://www.axios.com/2026/08/28/trump-hush-money-conviction-appeal

Viktor Orbán — Hungary is a NATO member, and Orbán was a close ally of Netanyahu and Israel; in the April 2026 elections, Péter Magyar put an end to Orbán’s 16 years in government. https://apnews.com/article/hungary-israel-euro-2024-soccer-1514e137b54b18a1fed8be8b6cd89b19 ; https://www.ynetnews.com/article/hjef3yqnbx

Suffrage — in Portugal, census-based suffrage was only abolished in 1968; women obtained a limited right to vote in 1931 and full equality only with the 1976 Constitution. https://www.europeana.eu/pt/stories/votes-for-women ; https://arquivomunicipal.lisboa.pt/fileadmin/arquivo_municipal/difusao/publicacoes/cadernos/Cad04.pdf

Origin of the term “woke” — African American English, with records from the 1920s–1940s, popularized from 2014 onward by the Black Lives Matter movement. https://www.merriam-webster.com/wordplay/woke-meaning-origin ; https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2025-09-30/how-woke-went-from-an-expression-in-black-culture-to-a-conservative-criticism

Origin of the terms “left” and “right” — the seating arrangement of deputies in the French National Constituent Assembly in 1789. https://observador.pt/opiniao/a-grande-dicotomia-o-que-ainda-separa-a-esquerda-da-direita/

Crime — the US homicide rate (≈6.4 per 100,000 inhabitants) https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/gsh/2023/GSH_2023_LAC_web.pdf

Honduras’ conservative-majority Congress approved a motion to seek funding for a new maximum-security prison modeled on El Salvador’s Cecot, aiming to confront a surge of violence that has left more than 1,000 people dead in just over ten months.

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According to reports from the National Penitentiary Institute, the plan is to concentrate all inmates belonging to the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Barrio 18 gangs in a single module, as El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele has done.

The proposal would rely on borrowing to finance the construction, and it follows a visit by a congressional delegation to El Salvador’s Terrorism Confinement Center (Cecot), which has been criticized for human rights violations, masss incarceration and the detention of thousands of people who were jailed without proven links to gangs.

RELATED: Honduras Approves Sweeping Anti-Gang, Prison Security Law

“The approval of the motion to build a new maximum-security prison is part of the measures to strengthen prison security and confront crime firmly,” Congress President Tomás Zambrano said on social media. He added that the aim is not to carry out an identical replica but to “identify those successful models” and build a system adapted to local reality.

The motion will allow the government to identify resources for building a new maximum security prison, while the Ministry of Finance announced that it will begin studies to quantify the work, but it does not mean that the construction budget has already been set or that work has begun. For now, the process focuses on quantifying investment, identifying potential sources of financing, and determining the terrain where the establishment will be built.

🏦🇭🇳FONDOS PARA CÁRCEL EN HONDURAS

El Congreso Nacional aprobó gestionar recursos para planificar una nueva cárcel de máxima seguridad. Instituciones evaluarán costos, terrenos y opciones de financiamiento como bonos o préstamos internacionales.#Honduras #Internacional pic.twitter.com/DSWXl5jczY

— Pulso Digital SV (@SVPulsoDigital) October 20, 2026

Text reads: “Prision funds in Honduras: The National Congress approved managing resources to plan a new maximum security prison. Institutions will assess costs, land and financing options such as international bonds or loans.”

The project is considered in the context of measures approved in September to tighten detention conditions for individuals identified by the Honduran state as members of terrorist groups. The reforms include a special regime of maximum security, restrictions on communication and visits, enhanced surveillance and other prison control measures.

Debt and Doubts Loom

The proposal relies on public debt to finance the infrastructure. That choice has drawn concern, as has the logistical question of transplanting a model from El Salvador, a country whose territory is comparable to a single Honduran department, into a nation of more than 10 million people with far more complex territorial dynamics.

The motion had the support of the Freedom and Refoundation party (LIBRE), whose lawmakers nevertheless accused the National Party of applying a double standard. They recalled that Congress rejected a similar proposal from former President Xiomara Castro (2022-2026) to build a maximum-security prison far from urban areas, citing environmental impact and possible human rights violations.

Honduras reduced its homicide rate between 2024 and 2025, but extortion, drug trafficking, assaults and territorial control by organized bands persist. More than 25 massacres, roughly 240 femicides and over 1,000 violent deaths were recorded during the current administration of the right-wing President Nasry Asfura.

¡Antes rechazaban la cárcel de máxima seguridad y ahora la venden como solución! El diputado @SergioC11938796 señaló la contradicción del Partido Nacional: se opuso al penal en Islas del Cisne y ahora impulsa otro en Santa Bárbara, además advirtió que construir más cárceles no… pic.twitter.com/4I0a4GScHL

— Bancada Libre (@BancadaLibre) October 20, 2026

Text reads: “They used to reject the maximum security prison and now sell it as a solution! The deputy
@SergioC11938796 pointed out the contradiction of the National Party: it opposed the penal in Cisne Islands and now promotes another one in Santa Bárbara, also warned that building more prisons does not guarantee to solve the insecurity in Honduras.”

The final location will depend on the technical judgment of the National Penitentiary Institute and defense institutions. To define the technical and financial route, the legislature’s leadership convened a working group bringing together party heads, legislative commissions, the Security and Finance secretariats, the National Police, the Armed Forces and the National Agency against Organized Crime.

Now, with the motion passed, the next steps consist of quantifying the investment, defining the terrain, establishing the sources of financing and specifying the technical conditions for building and operating the prison.

Fifty years ago today, on October 20, 1976, a 15-year-old Diego Armando Maradona played his first professional match for Argentinos Juniors, coming on at halftime against Talleres de Córdoba and beginning a career that would reshape world football.

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The date is described in the report as a milestone in the history of international sport. The young talent from a popular neighborhood like Villa Fiorito stepped onto the pitch to play the second half of the match, which Argentinos lost 1-0 at its stadium in La Paternal, Buenos Aires.

Diego Maradona was 15 years, 11 months and 20 days old, ten days short of his 16th birthday, which made him the youngest player to debut in Argentine football.

RELATED: Lionel Messi’s Emotional Farewell: “This Jersey Was My Dream, My Pride and My Life”

Other accounts of the day, including a longer retrospective published in Argentina, put the crowd at between 7,000 and 8,000 people and say Maradona nutmegged defender Juan Domingo Patricio Cabrera on his first touch of the ball, a detail that comes from Maradona’s own memoirs.

Ver esta publicación en Instagram

Una publicación compartida de teleSUR English (@telesurenglish)

A Debut Full of Promise

Although the result went against his team, Maradona’s arrival offered immediate signs of his technical quality. His control of the ball stood out, as did his nerve in running at defenders despite his age. Nobody in the stadium that afternoon could have measured the scale of what they were witnessing, but the signs were already visible.

Coach Juan Carlos Montes brought on the teenager in place of midfielder Rubén Giacobetti at the start of the second half. Diego Maradona wore the number 16 shirt. Montes told him to play as he knew how and to nutmeg the first opponent he faced. Maradona later wrote that he did exactly that, passing the ball between the legs of defender Juan Domingo Patricio Cabrera. The crowd responded with “olés,” according to his memoirs.

Un día como hoy debutaba Diego Armando Maradona en primera pic.twitter.com/3PJUMDi7ME

— Expe (@Expefutbol) October 20, 2026

Text reads: “On a day like today, Diego Armando Maradona made his debut at First Division.”

From Cebollitas to Legend

Diego Maradona came through the club’s youth ranks, including the famous children’s side known as “Los Cebollitas”, and had been building great expectations through his performances at junior level. His entry into the top category was the start of a professional career that would later bring him numerous domestic and international titles and turn him into an emblematic figure and a popular reference point in global sport.

His career would later shine brightest on the world stage, particularly in the 1986 World Cup triumph in Mexico, where his talent and control of the ball defined an entire tournament.

Maradona’s first match ended in defeat, and by his own later account he knew he was beginning something important. In the following weeks he moved from the bench to a regular place in the starting lineup, according to the longer retrospective, and went on to become the league’s top scorer in several consecutive tournaments.

But the first page had been written. A 15-year-old walked onto the pitch in the red of Argentinos Juniors, replaced a teammate at the break, and began a story that still commands attention five decades on.

On this day, 20 October 1976

Exactly 50 years ago, a 15 year old Diego Armando Maradona made his professional debut for Argentinos Juniors against Talleres.

He came on at half-time wearing the No. 16 shirt.

He was still 10 days away from his 16th birthday.

And with the first… pic.twitter.com/HNUXh24OqP

— Common Man Files (@CommonManFiles) October 20, 2026

The date is recalled not for the result, but for what it announced. It was the moment a career began that would reshape the dynamics of football and reaffirm the importance of youth development in the sport across the region.

The work done in the club’s academy, the patience of those who formed him, and the talent that needed no introduction all converged on October 20, 1976. A modest afternoon in La Paternal, in a game lost, became the first step in one of the most celebrated careers in the history of the football around the world.

Colombia’s Congress approved the 2027 national budget of 200 billion dollars on October 20, igniting a backlash from opposition lawmakers who say the plan favors debt payments and financial interests over education, peace and regional development.

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The approval of the General Budget of Colombia for 2027 capped a tense legislative session.

President Abelardo de la Espriella’s government secured passage of the law, worth 634.9 trillion Colombian pesos (about $200 billion), over the objections of the opposition, which was led mainly by the Historic Pact party.

RELATED: Colombia’s First National Strike Against De la Espriella Met With Police Crackdown

Representative María Fernanda Carrascal described the debate as a “disaster” and faulted the national government for refusing to accept any of the 700 proposals submitted by her party. The initiatives sought to channel more resources into public education, support for victims of violence and the regions, she detailed. Faced with the lack of agreement, the opposition walked out of the debate, stating it would not back a measure it considers harmful to the country.

The Historic Pact also questioned the law’s orientation, arguing that the government chose to protect financial entities, oligopolies and the most favored sectors. They further denounced that the project promotes over-indebtedness, which they say will end up shifting heavier tax burdens onto Colombian citizens.

🇨🇴 ¡Colombia tiene Presupuesto para 2027!
El Congreso de la República aprobó por $634,9 billones el Presupuesto de la Verdad, el primer paso para volver a encaminar la economía del país hacia el crecimiento, la responsabilidad fiscal y la atención de las necesidades del país. pic.twitter.com/pHiLhYzVTU

— MinHacienda (@MinHacienda) October 20, 2026

Text reads: “Colombia has budget for 2027! The Congress of the Republic approved the Truth Budget for $634.9 trillion, the first step to reorient the country’s economy toward growth, fiscal responsibility, and meeting the country’s needs.”

Other voices in the legislature added their objections. Senator Jennifer Pedraza of the Dignity and Commitment party (Dignidad y Compromiso, in Spanish) criticized the absence of a fixed allocation to address the consequences of the earthquake that struck on August 10. She questioned the fact that assistance to hard-hit departments such as Risaralda, Chocó and Valle del Cauca depends solely on leftover budget balances.

Senator Ariel Ávila, in turn, lamented the underfunding of resources earmarked for electric infrastructure and energization in non-interconnected zones such as Vichada, Guainía, Arauca, Putumayo and Vaupés. He also pointed to a lack of concern for victims of the armed conflict and what he called a budgetary strangling of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP).

After the law’s validation, Congress gave the Executive 90 days to draft a fiscal adjustment plan, which the national administration has called the Rescue Law. The Ministry of Finance and the cabinet are already holding talks with the International Monetary Fund, a signal that new credit instruments and the conditions attached to them may be on the negotiating table.

Mobilization Set for November

The Historic Pact called on citizens to join a national mobilization on November 24 to reject the budget. The party maintains that the project raises debt service by 46% while cutting investment in the Special Jurisdiction for Peace by 82% and stripping 500 billion Colombian pesos (about $157 million) from the National Learning Service (SENA).

Lawmakers also warned that 14 departments will see their real investment shrink. They denounced that the norm prioritizes debt repayment over the financing of peace, education and regional development. “The complaint is clear: more resources for debt and less for peace, education and the regions,” the party stated on social media.

The mobilization announced for late November now stands as the opposition’s next test of strength. In the meantime, the government’s 90-day clock to deliver its fiscal adjustment plan is running, and the talks with the International Monetary Fund could define the conditions under which Colombia finances its 2027 spending. The opposition has vowed to keep the pressure on, both in the streets and in the legislature.

📢 ¡24 DE NOVIEMBRE: MOVILIZACIÓN NACIONAL!

La bancada del Pacto Histórico llama a la movilización frente al Presupuesto 2027 del Gobierno de Abelardo de la Espriella, por $634,9 billones.

Según la bancada, el servicio de la deuda aumenta un 46%, la inversión de la JEP cae un… pic.twitter.com/F5IYf2YDVb

— Pacto Histórico Oficial (@PactoCol) October 20, 2026

Text reads: “November 24: National Mobilization! The Historic Pact bench calls for mobilization against the 2027 budget of the government of Abelardo de la Espriella, for $634.9 billion. According to the bank, debt service increases by 46%, Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) investment falls by 82%, National Learning Service (SENA) loses $500 billion, and 14 departments will receive less real investment. The denunciation is clear: more resources for debt and less for peace, education, and regions.”

Deadly Haitian gangs over the weekend ambushed members of an international security force deployed in Haiti, kidnapping four Salvadoran Air Force members, authorities confirmed Monday.

The post Haiti Gangs Ambush Foreign Troops, Kidnap Four Salvadoran Air Force Members appeared first on Breitbart.

Florida Attorney General James Uthmeier revealed on Monday that a judge in the state had issued an arrest warrant for Raúl Castro, the 95-year-old dictator of Cuba, on conspiracy to commit murder charges.

The post Florida Judge Issues Arrest Warrant for 95-Year-Old Cuban Dictator Raúl Castro appeared first on Breitbart.

By Tings Chak

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On Oct. 25, Brazilians will return to the polls to choose between President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Flávio Bolsonaro, son of former president Jair Bolsonaro, who was sentenced to 27 years in prison for his role in an attempted coup.

The first round gave Flávio 47.03 percent of valid votes against Lula’s 45.16 percent, revealing the enduring strength of the far right four years after its electoral defeat.

The runoff takes place as President Donald Trump seeks to restore U.S. domination over Latin America, with Brazil emerging as a consequential battleground in Washington’s campaign to contain China’s growing relations with the region.

Over the past two decades, Brazil and China have built a political partnership that has expanded the space for independent action among countries of the Global South. Under Lula and China’s President Xi Jinping, this relationship has deepened through cooperation in industrial development, infrastructure, science and technology.

The election will determine whether this project advances or Brazil’s international orientation is subordinated to Washington’s renewed Monroe Doctrine as part of the continent’s rightward shift.

Since Lula’s return to the presidency in 2023, the two governments have connected Chinese cooperation with Brazil’s development programmes, including Nova Indústria Brasil, the Growth Acceleration Programme (PAC) and the Ecological Transformation Plan. Lula’s May 2025 visit to Beijing produced 36 agreements covering infrastructure, finance, artificial intelligence, public health and industrial cooperation.

Behind these agreements is a long-standing challenge: overcoming Brazil’s dependent position in the international division of labour, where commodity exports continue to outweigh advanced industrial and technological development.

This cooperation has also reached Brazilian popular movements. Through the International Association for Popular Cooperation (Baobab), Brazil’s Landless Rural Workers’ Movement (MST) and other organisations have worked with Chinese institutions on agricultural mechanisation, bioinputs and digital technologies for family farming.

These initiatives include the Digital Family Farming and Agroecology Laboratoryand IARAA, an artificial intelligence project for agroecology and agrarian reform developed by Brazilian popular movements using Chinese open-source models.

In a countryside marked by extreme concentrations of land, machinery and capital, such cooperation offers new tools to peasant organisations fighting for agrarian reform and the production of healthy food.

Brazil’s relationship with China also reveals the different class interests at work in the country, with contradictions particularly visible in the countryside.

Massive exports of soybeans, meat and minerals have continued under both Bolsonaro and Lula, but their governments have pursued very different political relationships with Beijing.

While Jair Bolsonaro attacked China and aligned himself with Washington, Lula has sought to deepen strategic cooperation, including in industrial development, technology and agrarian reform.

Flávio Bolsonaro now promises an “economically pragmatic” relationship with China while cultivating close ties with Trump. For sectors of Brazil’s ruling classes that profit from commodity exports, continuing to sell to China while embracing Washington’s political agenda presents little contradiction. For Brazil’s efforts to rebuild its industry and develop technological sovereignty, the consequences are far greater.

Return of the Monroe Doctrine

Washington’s ambitions were made explicit in its December 2025 National Security Strategy, which announced a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, seeking to restore U.S. pre-eminence in the Western Hemisphere and deny outside powers control over strategic resources and infrastructure.

Five days later, China published its third Latin America policy paper, reaffirming sovereignty, non-interference, regional integration, technological cooperation and support for the region as a Zone of Peace. The two documents reveal fundamentally different approaches to the political future of the continent.

Brazil’s position is decisive. As Latin America’s largest economy, a founding BRICS member and a leading participant in Mercosur, it possesses industrial, scientific and political capacities that could strengthen independent development across Latin America and beyond.

The emergence of a new technological era makes this struggle particularly consequential. Brazil is among the few countries of the Global South capable of pursuing digital and technological sovereignty that could benefit its neighbours and parts of Africa.

Its roughly 23 percent share of global rare earth reserves is an important starting point, but control over minerals alone is insufficient. The greater challenge is developing the capacity to process them, manufacture advanced components and build the digital infrastructure, artificial intelligence systems and technologies that will shape future production.

Flávio has made his orientation clear. Speaking at the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in the United States in March, he offered Brazil as the “solution” to Washington’s dependence on China for critical minerals, explicitly linking rare earths to artificial intelligence and U.S. military superiority.

Chinese economic reporting has also described proposals from his team to exclude China from rare-earth supply chains. Rather than using Brazil’s resources to develop its own industrial and technological capacities, this agenda would place them at the service of U.S. technological and military power.

The same political orientation extends to digital sovereignty. In July, Flávio’s campaign submitted proposals to U.S. trade authorities that included preventing Brazil’s Pix payment system from connecting to non-Western international payment networks and loosening commitments within Mercosur.

These proposals converge with a wider U.S. campaign involving tariffs, digital regulation, strategic minerals and attempts to influence Brazil’s electoral process.

Meanwhile, Washington’s January bombing on Venezuela and kidnapping of President Nicolás Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores demonstrated how far it is prepared to go to impose its will on the continent.

BRICS & the Struggle for Independent Foreign Policy

Brazil, particularly under Lula, has helped build institutions through which countries of the Global South can reduce their dependence on Western-dominated structures.

At the July 2025 BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro, the group advanced cooperation on development finance, local-currency transactions, and international institutional reform.

The New Development Bank, headed by former Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff, is an important expression of this effort.

The BRICS cannot automatically overcome economic dependency or guarantee sovereignty for working people. Yet its expansion offers greater room for independent development, provided that participating governments have the political commitment to use these possibilities.

Brazil’s history reveals how difficult that independence has been to defend. In 1961, Vice President João Goulart became the first high-ranking representative of a Latin American government to visit the People’s Republic of China, meeting Mao Zedong when revolutionary China remained diplomatically isolated and subjected to U.S. sanctions. Three years later, Goulart was overthrown in a U.S.-backed civil-military coup that inaugurated a 21-year dictatorship.

The early history of China–Brazil friendship was inseparable from struggles over national sovereignty, agrarian reform and the forces determined to suppress them.

The international material conditions for South–South cooperation are considerably more favourable today, but political direction remains decisive.

Former President Jair Bolsonaro hosted the 2019 BRICS summit in Brasília while pursuing close alignment with Washington. A government can weaken institutions from within by abandoning the commitments that give them political substance.

The far right’s resurgence also reflects the enduring power of Brazil’s own ruling classes. Bolsonarismo has a domestic base among sections of agribusiness, finance, the security apparatus, militias, conservative religious networks and major media.

These forces, whose electoral and institutional advances have continued, were strengthened by the 2016 parliamentary coup against Dilma Rousseff and the judicial persecution of Lula. They possess their own organisations, material interests and sources of power, which do not disappear when an election is lost. Their economic dependence on Chinese markets has not prevented their support for Washington’s political agenda.

Beyond the Election

Beijing has followed the Brazilian election closely, reflecting the importance of the political relationship built between Lula and Xi over years of cooperation.

In July, Xi reaffirmed China’s support for Brazil against external interference during a conversation with Lula, which also covered cooperation in artificial intelligence, satellites, mineral processing and relations between China and Mercosur.

In September, Foreign Minister Wang Yi received Lula’s adviser and former foreign minister Celso Amorim in Beijing, reaffirming the bilateral strategic partnership.

China’s principle of non-interference means that the choice of Brazil’s government belongs to the Brazilian people, but Beijing’s diplomatic restraint should not be confused with an absence of political interests or an assumption that all governments would pursue the same relationship. Chinese analysts have described the possible outlook under Flávio as one of “cold politics, hot economics”: commodity trade would likely continue, but the political relationship and cooperation in strategic sectors could deteriorate. The experience of Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency has already shown the limits of commercial interests in sustaining a broader political partnership.

For the Brazilian people, the consequences extend well beyond foreign policy. The election will also shape the struggles over labour rights, public services, agrarian reform and the defence of democratic space.

Brazil’s renewed role in South–South cooperation under Lula has opened possibilities for a development project that responds to the needs of its working people, but realising those possibilities depends on the political and social forces capable of carrying it forward.

The Brazilian people have fought through dictatorship, neoliberal restructuring, parliamentary coups and the rise of the far right to defend their political and social gains.

This election is another moment in that longer struggle, now unfolding amid renewed U.S. imperial intervention and a transformation of the world’s technological foundations. The future of China–Brazil cooperation will depend on the capacity of organised popular forces to build a sovereign national project and turn international cooperation into lasting changes in people’s lives.

Original article: consortiumnews.com

Sputnik – 20.10.2026

“It’s quite possible that these facts could serve as a tool to exert pressure on the Kiev regime,” but the US government “will never publicly acknowledge that they have leveraged drug cartels to further their own interests,” RAS Institute of Latin America senior researcher Alexander Stepanov told Sputnik.

Commenting on the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service’s report that the US is looking into the deployment of 80+ cartel members to Ukraine for drone training, Stepanov said he suspects Washington won’t take any substantive measures “because the criminal networks and cartels operating in the Western Hemisphere are affiliated with the US intelligence community.”

“These groups serve as proxy instruments for the US, deployed when necessary to pressure opposing governments and act as a key destabilizing factor – thus creating opportunities for the US to exert influence over the region.”

US intelligence even “oversees the recruitment of individuals from these cartels, categorizing them based on technical proficiency, equipment, and intended use,” Stepanov pointed out, highlighting the historical use of American prisons for this purpose, and the fact that “virtually the entire leadership of Mexico’s cartels comes from security or military backgrounds, including the special forces.”

Possessing “the necessary skills, training and discipline,” gang members are “ideal mercenaries,” and deployment in Ukraine for drone training will allow them to transfer their skills back home as instructors at specialized paramilitary training centers affiliated with US intel agencies.

The drone link is also “only part of the picture,” Stepanov said, pointing to “deeper and more pervasive” links involving the transfer of arms sent to Ukraine by NATO to Latin America’s cartels, and to terror groups like those active in the Sahel region today – complete with Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate training assistance.

Ukraine is also “leveraging its capabilities, intelligence structures and affiliated networks of organized criminal groups that have taken root in Europe to facilitate the distribution of narcotics, with Mexican drug cartels serving as their primary suppliers,” Stepanov believes.

Wildfires in Brazil’s Amazon region have driven air pollution to dangerous levels in cities such as Santarém and Manaus, prompting the federal government to deploy a joint armed forces command, more water-bombing aircraft and emergency funds.

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A wave of forest fires is consuming the western zone of Brazil’s Pará state, where authorities have counted 922 active outbreaks. The dense smoke has left the city of Santarém under air pollution levels described as very unhealthy for the local population.

Figures released by the Queimadas platform, which operates under the National Institute for Space Research, place Pará at the top of the national registry of environmental disasters.

RELATED: Brazil Faces Increased Wildfires Due to Super El Niño Phenomenon

The neighboring state of Amazonas reports 90 active fire points after having surpassed one thousand outbreaks in recent weeks.

Conditions grew especially dire in Santarém, where the air quality index climbed to 260 points, according to measurements from the international monitoring platform IQAir. Scientific stations detected concentrations of fine particles reaching 185 micrograms per cubic meter.

That reading exceeds the limit allowed by Brazilian environmental law by an enormous margin. The permitted daily average stands at 32 micrograms per cubic meter. Experts note that these microscopic particles penetrate deep into the respiratory tract and pose a severe threat to public health.

In Manaus, the capital of Amazonas state, the picture remains critical as well. The persistent dispersion of toxic gases pushed the air quality index to 153 units during the early hours of the day, consolidating a harmful atmosphere across the urban centers of the rainforest.

The fires arrive during the dry season, when large stretches of forest are cleared by intentional burns. The flames spread through drought-stricken vegetation, and the resulting smoke drifts over populated areas with no immediate relief in sight.

Manaus respira 12 vezes mais veneno que o limite da OMS — e o pior horário ainda está por virhttps://t.co/9Gd6YlfkL3

Instagram: https://t.co/5ljysPP0H9 pic.twitter.com/OxWcgJCI4Y

— Portal do Holanda (@portaldoholanda) October 18, 2026

Text reads: “Manaus breathes 12 times more poison than the W.H.O. limit – and worst time is yet to com.”

Military Response Activated

Faced with the environmental collapse, Brazil’s federal government ordered an extraordinary operational deployment. Defense Minister José Múcio Monteiro confirmed the activation of a Joint General Staff of the Armed Forces based in Manaus to coordinate ground and air containment efforts.

The response added five aircraft, raising the military fleet fighting the flames in the northern region to 16 water-bombing planes. The Ministry of Integration and Regional Development transferred 14 million reais, about 2.8 million dollars, to the Amazonas state government to mitigate the emergency.

Health authorities announced the installation of a base of the National Force of the Unified Health System. Its main task will be to provide direct medical care to the thousands of residents affected by respiratory illnesses caused by the pollution.

Environmental organizations warn that the scale of the fires exposes the structural vulnerability of the world’s largest tropical rainforest. The combination of prolonged drought, deforestation and insufficient fire control threatens the ecological stability of the Amazonia and the integrity of native communities.

The local government has declared a state of emergency in Autazes as suspected arson fires, aggravated by El Niño, rip through the Brazilian Amazon and trigger health alerts in Manaus🇧🇷🔥 #Amazonas #BrazilFires pic.twitter.com/u9I1i0Ocpd

— SG News (@SGNews123) October 14, 2026

The crisis reflects the devastating consequences of climate change and agricultural pressure on the biome. During the dry season, extensive areas of jungle are razed by intentional burns meant to open land for cattle ranching and large-scale farming.

With 922 active outbreaks in Pará and the fires still spreading, the emergency response faces a race against deteriorating air quality. The health base and the expanded air fleet mark the government’s immediate answer to a crisis that shows no sign of easing.

Acting President Delcy Rodríguez led a meeting on Monday with Venezuela’s main business federations and national union confederations to consolidate agreements on wage restoration, salary scales and worker’s protections.

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The meeting brought together the Federation of Chambers and Associations of Commerce and Production of Venezuela (Fedecámaras), the Federation of Chambers and Companies of Venezuela (Fedeindustria) and the country’s various union confederations.

The dialogue table evaluated the progress made in the days of debate focused on restoring workers’ purchasing power.

RELATED: Venezuela Promotes Venezuela Feeds Plan and Local Economy Law to Achieve “Hunger 0”

Three core areas shaped the agenda. The first was the progressive conversion of workers’ income into formal salary, a shift the government describes as progressive salary restructuring.

The second involved adjusting salary scales and tables. The third centered on designing guarantees of stability for Venezuelan workers. In this sense, the working group also reviewed draft laws and regulatory instruments meant to shield the framework of social and economic protection for workers.

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Una publicación compartida de teleSUR English (@telesurenglish)

Dialogue for Sovereign Growth

Venezuelan Acting President Rodríguez reiterated the government’s unwavering commitment to protecting the inalienable rights conquered by the people. She insisted on preserving the workday, end of year bonuses, additional bonuses, vacations, seniority premiums and social benefits in the face of external economic aggression. Following this, the authorities said the three-way dialogue strengthens the model of social justice and lays the groundwork for sovereign economic growth.

The government’s participants included Economy Minister and sector Vice-president Anabel Pereira, Sectoral Vice President for Social and Territorial Socialism Héctor Rodríguez, Planning Minister Ricardo Menéndez and Economy Sectoral Vice-President Calixto Ortega. Labor Minister Carlos Alexis Castillo, University Education Minister Ana María San Juan and Presidential Commissioner for the Constituent Assembly and Labor Consensus Eduardo Piñate also attended.

The labor meeting follows Rodríguez’s announcement days earlier before the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) that the executive will submit a draft Law for the Local Economy to the National Assembly.

Rodríguez explained that the legal text has as its strategic objective the dynamization of the domestic productive apparatus through the effective linkage of the different economic sectors of the country. Before the multilateral delegations, the Venezuelan Acting President detailed the guiding principles of the norm, designed to strengthen the food sovereignty and security of the Venezuelan people against the blockade of foreign powers.

An Ecuadorian Catholic priest died over the weekend while giving a sermon about the fleeting nature of life during a livestreamed Mass.

The post Ecuadorian Priest Dies After Cross Falls on Him During Livestreamed Homily: ‘One Day, All of Us Here Will Die’ appeared first on Breitbart.