The selection of the Borralha tungsten mine, planned for Montalegre, in northern Portugal, as a strategic project of the European Union is “an achievement” and an opportunity of “great importance”
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A giant wind farm risks blinding radar used to track Russian jets and missiles, the Ministry of Defence has warned as it opposes Net Zero plans to build 23 turbines twice the height of Big Ben in Yorkshire.
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Two Latvian nationals have been arrested in Britain on suspicion of entering a restricted military installation for purposes potentially harmful to national security. The men were discovered inside RAF Molesworth, a sensitive military facility in Cambridgeshire that houses American and NATO intelligence operations, during the early hours of Thursday, 8 October.
The suspects, aged 36 and 32, are both Latvian citizens residing in the United Kingdom. According to an official statement issued by the Metropolitan Police, they were initially detained on suspicion of trespassing and criminal damage before being arrested under the National Security Act 2023.
The incident follows a separate investigation into a suspected terrorist plot near RAF Fairford in Gloucestershire, where American strategic bombers had been deployed. British counter-terrorism officers have emphasised that there is currently no evidence connecting the two cases.
The investigation began at approximately 10pm on Wednesday, 7 October, when Ministry of Defence Police officers patrolling RAF Molesworth discovered an abandoned vehicle near the installation’s perimeter.
Officers from Cambridgeshire Constabulary joined the search and subsequently identified a small breach in the security fence. At approximately 2am on Thursday, the two men were located inside the restricted area and taken into custody.
The suspects were initially questioned over alleged trespassing and criminal damage. However, investigators subsequently invoked Section 4 of the National Security Act 2023, which covers entering, approaching or inspecting prohibited locations for purposes prejudicial to Britain’s safety or interests.
The legislation carries a maximum sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment upon conviction. Neither man has been publicly identified, and police have not disclosed evidence establishing their alleged intentions or any connection with a foreign intelligence service.
Officers have also searched two addresses in the Peterborough area. The abandoned vehicle was recovered and examined by specialist explosive ordnance disposal personnel after concerns arose during initial inspections.
As a precaution, police established a cordon affecting roads around Glatton, including part of the A1. Specialists subsequently found nothing of concern, allowing the restrictions to be lifted.
RAF Molesworth is not an ordinary operational airfield. Although designated as a Royal Air Force station, the installation accommodates intelligence facilities supporting American military operations and NATO.
Among the organisations associated with the site is the NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre, which contributes to intelligence collection, assessment and information-sharing between allied military authorities. The installation also supports American military intelligence activities relating to operations in Europe and Africa.
The presence of these facilities makes Molesworth a sensitive location, where unauthorised access raises questions extending beyond conventional trespassing. Investigators will seek to establish how the men entered the compound, why they were there and whether they attempted to approach or examine restricted equipment or infrastructure.
The arrests come less than two weeks after British police detained seven men in connection with a suspected terrorist plot involving RAF Fairford, another British installation used by the United States Air Force.
The Fairford investigation began on 27 September after suspicious activity was reported near the base. Police subsequently investigated possible offences involving explosives and preparations for terrorist acts. Those arrested in connection with that investigation have since been released on bail.
The incident was followed by the withdrawal of American bombers from Fairford. President Donald Trump subsequently referred to security threats affecting the installation, raising further questions about the protection of American military assets stationed in Britain.
Commander Helen Flanagan, head of Counter Terrorism Policing London, which is leading the Molesworth investigation, cautioned against drawing conclusions about the relationship between the two cases.
She said investigators had found nothing so far suggesting a connection with the Fairford incident and were continuing to examine possible motives.
British authorities have not publicly identified a foreign state or organisation as being responsible for the Molesworth breach.
The two Latvian nationals remain in police custody while investigators continue examining the circumstances surrounding their presence at the installation. The inquiry involves Counter Terrorism Policing, the Ministry of Defence Police and Cambridgeshire Constabulary.
The investigation is taking place against a wider background of security concerns involving European military facilities. Latvia itself reported an armed border provocation and sabotage of surveillance infrastructure near Belarus earlier this week, although there is no evidence linking that incident to the arrests in Britain.
For British investigators, the immediate task remains establishing whether the Molesworth intrusion was an isolated security breach or involved an intention to compromise military operations or intelligence infrastructure.
U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio steered a careful path around the issue of whether or not Portugal will be purchasing American made F-35s in the near future during what
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Russian forces attacked Kramatorsk, in Ukraine’s Donetsk region, at approximately 10am local time on 8 October, hitting an area where two scheduled passenger buses were carrying civilians.
The Donetsk Regional Prosecutor’s Office initially reported 12 fatalities and 14 injuries. In a subsequent update, prosecutors raised the death toll to 30 and the number of injured to 18.
The attack was also confirmed by the Kramatorsk City Council and Vadym Filashkin, head of the Donetsk Regional Military Administration.
According to preliminary findings from Ukrainian investigators, Russian forces may have used a UMPB D-30SN guided aerial munition. The precise weapon and circumstances of the attack remain under investigation.
The two buses were operating regular passenger services when the strike occurred. Ukrainian authorities said passengers were on board, although detailed information about the victims, including their ages and identities, has not yet been released.
Photographs published by the regional prosecutor’s office show the aftermath of the attack, including severely damaged passenger vehicles. Emergency personnel and law enforcement officers were dispatched to assist the wounded, recover victims and document evidence.
The strike raises questions about the selection of the target and precautions taken to protect civilians. Under international humanitarian law, civilian vehicles and their passengers are protected from deliberate attack unless a vehicle becomes a military objective under the applicable legal rules.
The circumstances of Thursday’s strike, including whether the buses were directly targeted or struck during an attack on another location, have not yet been independently established.
Kramatorsk remains one of Ukraine’s principal administrative and logistical centres in the part of Donetsk region still controlled by Kyiv. The city has faced repeated Russian bombardments as Moscow continues its military campaign to capture the remaining Ukrainian-held territory in Donetsk.
Its transport infrastructure serves residents who have remained despite years of fighting, including those travelling between neighbouring communities and those attempting to leave the region.
Regional officials have repeatedly urged residents to evacuate to safer areas of Ukraine as Russian bombardments continue. However, civilians remain in Kramatorsk and surrounding settlements, where everyday services, including public transport, continue to operate despite the danger.
Russian forces have used guided aerial bombs against Ukrainian-controlled settlements near the front line. Such weapons can be released from aircraft at distances that reduce Russian pilots’ exposure to Ukrainian air defences.
The UMPB D-30SN, provisionally identified in the Kramatorsk attack, is a guided munition designed to reach targets beyond the immediate position of the launching aircraft. Its suspected use against an area containing occupied passenger buses will form part of the investigation.
Investigators will need to establish the intended target, the weapon used and the information available to those who planned and carried out the strike. These findings are relevant to determining whether the attack violated the laws of war.
The Donetsk Regional Prosecutor’s Office is collecting evidence concerning the bombardment, including the type of munition used and the circumstances in which the buses were struck.
Establishing whether the vehicles were deliberately targeted, or whether the attack resulted from an indiscriminate or disproportionate strike, will be central to any assessment under international humanitarian law.
The identities of the victims and the full extent of the damage have yet to be established publicly. As of the updated figures issued by Ukrainian prosecutors on 8 October, 30 people were reported killed and 18 injured.
A Ukrainian drone attack has reportedly forced the closure of a Yandex data centre in Russia’s Ryazan region, causing a fire and disrupting part of the company’s infrastructure. Shares in the Russian technology group fell by more than three per cent in early Moscow trading on Thursday, 8 October.
The installation in Sasovo was affected during overnight strikes on Russian territory. Yandex said it was working to restore affected infrastructure, while its principal consumer services remained operational. The incident has raised questions about the vulnerability of Russia’s digital economy to Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign.
The affected data centre began operating in 2014 in buildings formerly occupied by the Sasta machine-tool manufacturing plant. Yandex subsequently connected the installation to Moscow by fibre-optic communications links as part of its wider computing infrastructure.
Ryazan regional governor Pavel Malkov said Russian air defences intercepted two drones over the region. He reported a fire on the roof of an industrial building in the Sasovo district and damage to windows in nearby private homes. No casualties were reported.
According to a statement on the incident, the situation had been brought under control while work to restore infrastructure continued. Yandex said its main consumer services remained operational.
The company’s cloud division also reported an electricity supply problem affecting an availability zone known as ru-central1-b. Clients were advised to use alternative zones where necessary to maintain service continuity.
Yandex shares dropped by approximately 3.4 per cent to 3,568.5 roubles in early trading on the Moscow Exchange. The decline followed news of the fire, although a single trading session cannot establish the long-term financial cost of the disruption.
Yandex operates search, advertising, navigation, artificial intelligence and cloud computing services. Its infrastructure therefore supports commercial users as well as the company’s own applications. The duration of the interruption, the extent of physical damage and the cost of repairs will determine the wider impact.
Investors can follow the company’s quoted share price as further details emerge.
In a separate development, explosions and a fire were reported on Thursday near the Gazprom Neftekhim Salavat refining and petrochemical complex in Russia’s Republic of Bashkortostan, around 1,400 kilometres from the Ukrainian border. The precise location of the fire and the extent of damage had not been independently established.
The Gazprom-owned complex processes hydrocarbon feedstock and produces petrol, diesel, fuel oil and petrochemicals. It has previously been targeted by Ukrainian drones. The latest reported incident comes amid repeated attacks on Russian refining and fuel infrastructure.
Ukraine’s long-range economic campaign has focused heavily on oil refineries, fuel stores, military production plants and transport infrastructure. A strike affecting a major data centre introduces another category of vulnerability: the computing equipment and supporting utilities used by the digital economy.
Such sites serve businesses, financial institutions and industrial enterprises, and can also support defence-related activities. However, no publicly verified evidence establishes that the Sasovo data centre was directly involved in Russian military operations.
Damage to power supplies, cooling systems and network connections can interrupt services without necessarily destroying servers. Operators with geographically distributed facilities may be able to shift workloads to unaffected locations. The suspension of one centre therefore does not mean that Russia’s internet infrastructure has ceased functioning.
The attacks coincide with Russia’s plans for substantial military expenditure in 2027. The draft federal budget envisages considerable government spending and borrowing as Moscow continues its war against Ukraine.
Ukraine’s strikes on economic infrastructure are intended to increase the cost of maintaining Russia’s invasion. Disruption to energy facilities can affect fuel production and revenue, while attacks on technology and industrial sites may interrupt wider commercial and logistical operations.
The cumulative effect depends on the severity and duration of the damage. Neither the reported temporary closure of the Yandex facility nor preliminary accounts of the Salavat fire establish the scale of lasting losses.
The incidents nonetheless illustrate the exposure of Russian industrial and technology assets far beyond the Ukrainian border, as Kyiv increasingly targets infrastructure that supports the country’s economy.
Germany’s Federal Interior Ministry confirmed on Thursday, 8 October, that it was examining whether confidentiality regulations may have been breached during August Hanning’s tenure as state secretary between 2005 and 2009. The examination follows his arrest on suspicion of espionage and attempted treason, and the discovery of a suspected network supplying sensitive intelligence documents from within Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service (BND).
According to the latest information on the ministry’s examination, officials have ordered an immediate review. The ministry has not disclosed its scope or whether investigators have identified any additional security breaches during Hanning’s government service.
Hanning, 80, headed the BND from 1998 until 2005 before moving to the Interior Ministry, where he remained until 2009. An investigating judge at Germany’s Federal Court of Justice subsequently ordered his continued detention following his arrest on Tuesday.
His former chief of staff, identified under German privacy rules as Manfred D., has also been remanded in custody. Prosecutors suspect that the two men maintained an arrangement through which confidential intelligence documents were obtained in exchange for payment.
Federal prosecutors believe the arrangement began around 2010, several years after Hanning left the BND, and continued until June 2022.
Investigators suspect that approximately 2,000 documents were obtained through Hanning’s former colleague, who remained in senior administrative positions at the intelligence service under successive directors.
The material reportedly included assessments of Russia’s military activities, information concerning Iran’s nuclear programme and intelligence originating from foreign partner services. Some documents were intended for senior German government officials, including the chancellery.
Prosecutors suspect that Hanning used confidential material in his private security consultancy and prepared at least one analysis for a foreign intelligence contact. Whether the analysis was ultimately delivered remains unclear.
The investigation consequently extends beyond the suspected unauthorised removal of German state documents. Intelligence supplied by foreign governments is frequently shared under restrictions governing its subsequent distribution. Any compromise of such material could require Germany to assess whether sensitive foreign sources, methods or assessments were exposed.
BND president Martin Jäger has confirmed that the service initiated extensive internal investigations after suspicions emerged. The affair has also drawn attention from the Bundestag’s parliamentary intelligence oversight body, whose chairman, Marc Henrichmann, has called for a comprehensive investigation.
Hanning’s lawyer, Leon Kruse, has rejected the accusations while acknowledging that his client possessed confidential documents.
In a statement released following the court hearing, Kruse denied that Hanning had passed information to the detriment of Germany or received payment for doing so. He maintained that further investigations would establish that his client was being wrongly prosecuted.
The defence statement establishes an important point in the proceedings: possession of confidential material is acknowledged, but its alleged commercial exploitation and transfer to foreign intelligence services remain disputed.
Investigators must establish how the documents were acquired, whether payments were made and what classified information, if any, reached foreign recipients.
The identity of the foreign intelligence service involved remains another unresolved question.
German reporting has raised the possibility of a connection to Azerbaijan, although federal prosecutors have not publicly identified the foreign service concerned.
Azerbaijan has rejected suggestions that its intelligence authorities were involved. Baku reportedly lodged a diplomatic protest with the German government, challenging the allegations and their potential consequences for bilateral relations.
The possibility of a Russian connection has also attracted attention because of Hanning’s international business contacts and his association with former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. However, no evidence establishing Russian involvement has been publicly presented by German prosecutors.
Hanning’s foreign commercial relationships alone do not establish that classified information was transferred to any particular government.
The circumstances that brought Hanning to investigators’ attention have added another dimension to the affair.
The suspected intelligence breach emerged during an investigation connected to German businesswoman Christina Block, who is facing criminal proceedings over allegations concerning the abduction of her children.
Hanning had reportedly provided advisory services connected to the affair. Searches conducted in September 2025 led investigators to confidential BND material, prompting a separate examination of how the documents had been obtained.
The discovery subsequently developed into an intelligence investigation involving federal prosecutors and Germany’s domestic criminal investigation authorities.
The investigation comes as Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s government seeks to strengthen Germany’s intelligence capabilities in response to mounting security threats.
The BND’s ability to obtain and exchange intelligence depends partly on the confidence of partner organisations. Concerns now centre on whether documents supplied by allied services were included in the material allegedly transferred, and whether Germany must inform partners about potential exposure.
The case is also prompting scrutiny of restrictions placed on former senior intelligence officials who subsequently enter private consultancy work.
At the German government’s press briefing on 7 October, a spokesman acknowledged the seriousness of the allegations but declined to discuss the proceedings, referring questions to federal prosecutors and the courts.
The Interior Ministry’s decision on 8 October to examine Hanning’s earlier government service potentially broadens the inquiry beyond the suspected transfer of BND documents between 2010 and 2022.
Investigators must now determine the extent of any unauthorised disclosure, identify any foreign recipients and assess whether information supplied by Germany’s security partners was compromised.
Both men remain presumed innocent unless convicted.
The EU should not accept any cuts to the proposed allocation of funds to defence and security in the next long-term EU budget, German MEP Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann said in Strasbourg on Wednesday.
“Without security, we have no discussion anymore about anything,” the chair of the European Parliament’s committee on defence and security (SEDE) told the European Newsroom (enr) on the sidelines of Parliament’s plenary session.
The European Commission has proposed €131 billion for investment in defence, security and space under the European Competitiveness Fund in the EU’s 2028–2034 budget. This represents a five-fold increase compared with the current budget period.
Asked what compromise she would accept on the size, funding or allocation of defence spending to secure a budget agreement, Strack-Zimmermann said: “We need everything without compromises.”
The next long-term budget requires unanimous agreement among EU member states and the European Parliament’s consent.
Strack-Zimmermann accused Russia of trying to deter European leaders from visiting Kyiv and undermine their support for Ukraine following attacks during German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s visit last Sunday.
Asked about accelerating deliveries to Ukraine to defend itself against Russia’s war of agression, Strack-Zimmermann said funding was available but action required approval from national governments.
Ukraine needed humanitarian, military and economic assistance, including money to produce more weapons to protect its people, she said.
Strack-Zimmermann urged countries to move faster on joint defence procurement, backing the EU’s Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument.
SAFE provides up to €150 billion in competitively priced loans to member states aimed at accelerating large-scale investment in critical capabilities.
“We have more than 150 different weapons systems and to protect Europe we need this SAFE program,” the German politician said.
She said the programme had attracted interest both within and outside the EU. According to the European Commission, 19 EU member states have submitted defence investment plans, such as France, Italy and Poland, but not Germany.
The first non-European country to participate in SAFE was Canada, which concluded an agreement with the EU in June.
Russia fired 70 missiles and 130 drones at Ukraine during one of the largest combined aerial attacks of recent months, striking Kyiv and at least a dozen regions between Tuesday evening and Wednesday morning.
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said at least 11 people had been killed and 34 wounded in the attacks. He said energy infrastructure was among Russia’s principal targets and described ballistic missiles as the most difficult element of the assault for Ukrainian air defences. Reuters reported the remarks and casualty figures.
According to the Ukrainian Air Force’s preliminary assessment, the attack began at about 6pm on 6 October and involved a mixture of ballistic, anti-ship and cruise missiles launched from Russian territory, aircraft and the Caspian Sea. Russia also deployed 130 Shahed-type, Gerbera and decoy drones, including 46 jet-powered attack drones.
By 9am, Ukrainian forces said they had destroyed or electronically suppressed 161 aerial targets: 117 drones, 39 cruise missiles and five ballistic or other high-speed missiles. Six additional cruise missiles were still being assessed. Missile and drone impacts were recorded at 18 locations, while debris from intercepted weapons fell at another five.
The main directions of attack were the Kyiv, Kharkiv, Poltava and Dnipropetrovsk regions.
Some of the heaviest civilian casualties were reported in Pryluky, in Chernihiv region, where a missile struck a multi-storey residential building. Emergency officials initially reported four people killed and 20 injured, including three children. Rescue teams continued searching the damaged structure on Wednesday morning. Associated Press reported on the rescue operation and casualties.
In Kyiv, ballistic missiles reached the capital during the night, with explosions reported shortly after 3am. Two people were killed. A non-residential building in the Podilskyi district was hit and caught fire, while garages burned in Darnytskyi district. The wider Kyiv region was simultaneously attacked by missiles and drones, damaging three production and warehouse facilities in the Obukhiv district.
Two people were also killed and seven wounded in Kremenchuk, in Poltava region, where missiles and drones struck the city and surrounding district. Damage was reported to residential buildings and an industrial facility. Further strikes were recorded in Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia and Oleksandriia.
Zelenskyy said Russia had deliberately sought to inflict serious damage on Ukraine’s energy system. “One of the key targets was our energy infrastructure,” he said, adding that further air-defence supplies had become an immediate requirement.
The attack came only hours after the Ukrainian president said intelligence services had obtained information indicating that Russia was preparing another major aerial operation. In his address on Tuesday evening, he urged Ukrainians to respond to air-raid warnings and said the country’s ability to withstand the expected attack would depend partly on the availability of Western-supplied defensive systems. His latest statements are available through the official presidential website.
The scale and composition of Wednesday’s barrage again exposed the pressure being placed on Ukraine’s layered air-defence network. EU Today has previously examined the shortage of Patriot interceptors capable of engaging ballistic missiles, which travel considerably faster than cruise missiles and drones and leave defence crews much less time to respond.
Russia’s use of different weapons within the same attack also forces Ukraine to employ several types of interception simultaneously. Cheap drones can be engaged by mobile fire groups, electronic warfare and interceptor drones, while ballistic missiles generally require more sophisticated systems such as Patriot.
Moscow’s Defence Ministry said its forces had carried out a “massive strike” using long-range precision weapons and drones against Ukrainian military-industrial facilities. It claimed that missile and drone production and storage sites, as well as port and ship-repair infrastructure, had been targeted. Those claims could not independently establish the nature of individual sites hit. Ukrainian authorities meanwhile documented damage to homes, businesses, energy facilities and other civilian infrastructure.
The overnight assault follows several weeks of intensified strikes as Ukraine approaches another winter under pressure on its power network. During German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s visit to Kyiv at the weekend, Berlin announced a new assistance package of more than €1.3 billion, including military support and funding intended to help protect and repair the country’s energy infrastructure ahead of winter.
Wednesday’s attack demonstrated why those two areas — air defence and the resilience of the electricity system — have become increasingly closely connected. Even with more than 160 incoming weapons intercepted or suppressed, missiles and drones reached targets across several regions, leaving casualties and damage hundreds of kilometres apart.
Two commercial vessels were struck by drones in Bulgaria’s exclusive economic zone early on Tuesday, 6 October, in the first known attack of its kind on merchant shipping in Bulgarian waters.
The Togo-flagged ALFA WATAN suffered severe structural damage and sank, while the Palau-flagged ABLE caught fire. Bulgarian Prime Minister Rumen Radev said the vessels were attacked at around 3am by both aerial and maritime drones about 70 nautical miles east of the coastal town of Byala. The Bulgarian government said a search-and-rescue operation was continuing for the crew of the ALFA WATAN, whose fate remained unknown.
All 18 people aboard the ABLE were rescued after abandoning the burning vessel. The Bulgarian-flagged passenger and freight ferry DIOSCURIA was diverted to the area and initially took the crew on board before Bulgarian Navy and Border Police vessels transferred them towards Varna.
The crew comprised 11 Turkish and seven Indian nationals. Two sailors were taken to hospital, including an Indian crew member suffering from burns and the Turkish captain, who sustained a head injury. Bulgarian public broadcaster BNT reported that the remaining 16 sailors subsequently arrived safely in Varna for medical checks.
The ABLE was reportedly carrying grain towards Istanbul. The cargo aboard the ALFA WATAN, which had been heading north towards Romania, has not been officially established.
Radev convened an emergency meeting involving the ministries of defence, interior, transport and environment, alongside the presidency and Bulgaria’s security services. He described the attack as an unacceptable violation of international and maritime law and warned of its effect on commercial navigation in the Black Sea.
Bulgarian authorities have not publicly identified who launched the drones. Investigations are examining both the weapons used and the circumstances surrounding the attack. One rescued Turkish sailor told Bulgarian television that he believed the ABLE had been hit by a Russian underwater drone, but that account has not been independently established and Sofia has made no formal attribution.
Foreign Minister Velislava Petrova said Bulgaria was in contact with its European and NATO partners and described Black Sea security as inseparable from wider European security. She said civilian crews and freedom of navigation must be protected and that Bulgaria would work with its allies to assess the wider consequences for maritime security.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen also condemned attacks against civilian shipping, saying the situation in the Black Sea was becoming increasingly concerning. She said commercial vessels and their crews were being targeted as investigations continued into the latest incidents.
Tuesday’s attack came less than 24 hours after another commercial vessel caught fire and sank in Romania’s exclusive economic zone. The Turkish-owned Royad Mammadov, sailing under the flag of Saint Kitts and Nevis, had left the Ukrainian Danube port of Izmail carrying corn for Ravenna in Italy.
Romanian authorities confirmed that two people died and 11 crew members were rescued. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said the vessel had been struck by two Russian drones, although Romanian authorities did not themselves publicly attribute the incident to Russia.
The two incidents in consecutive days mark a further geographical expansion of the risks facing commercial shipping in the western Black Sea. EU Today has previously reported how strikes near Romania have moved maritime war risks closer to NATO territory, while a separate maritime drone explosion at Constanța raised questions over the ability of coastal states to detect and respond to unmanned systems approaching commercial infrastructure.
The distinction between territorial waters and an exclusive economic zone remains important. The attacks occurred outside Bulgaria’s territorial sea and therefore do not amount simply to an attack on Bulgarian territory. They nevertheless took place in an area where Bulgaria has internationally recognised economic rights and responsibilities, including search-and-rescue and environmental obligations.
The immediate concern for Sofia is the search for the missing crew of the ALFA WATAN and the possibility of pollution from the wreck. The wider concern for the EU is the increasingly exposed position of civilian shipping routes linking Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey.
Ukraine’s maritime export routes remain particularly important for agricultural trade. Repeated attacks on merchant vessels can increase insurance premiums, discourage shipowners from entering the region and raise transport costs even when ports themselves remain operational. Russian attacks on Odesa and its export infrastructure have already placed Ukraine’s Black Sea grain corridor under sustained pressure.
With merchant ships now struck in the economic zones of both Romania and Bulgaria on consecutive days, Black Sea maritime security has moved further onto the agenda of EU and NATO governments along the western coast.
A major fire was reported at the Volodarskaya linear production and dispatch station in Moscow region early on Tuesday, bringing Ukraine’s campaign against Russian fuel infrastructure to another important point in the capital’s supply network.
Footage published from the area around Konstantinovo showed a substantial blaze at the facility, with reports from local residents that storage tanks were burning. The material identified the site as the Volodarskaya station, operated by Transneft-Upper Volga and connected to the petroleum-products network serving the Moscow region.
The extent of the damage was not immediately clear. There had been no detailed assessment from Transneft by Tuesday morning establishing whether pumping equipment, pipelines or only storage facilities had been affected. This distinction will determine whether the attack produces a temporary disruption or a more significant problem for Moscow’s fuel distribution system.
The strike formed part of a large overnight drone attack on Moscow and surrounding districts. Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin reported repeated interceptions of drones approaching the capital, while air-defence activity continued across Moscow region. Russian aviation authorities temporarily restricted operations at Vnukovo, Domodedovo, Sheremetyevo and Zhukovsky airports for flight-safety reasons.
There is no evidence at this stage that the airport restrictions resulted from fuel shortages. They were imposed during the drone attack itself. The longer-term significance of Volodarskaya lies instead in the station’s role within the pipeline and storage infrastructure serving the Russian capital.
Volodarskaya is connected to Moscow’s ring petroleum-products pipeline, through which petrol, diesel and aviation kerosene can be moved between refineries, storage facilities and major consumers.
Its importance is documented by Transneft itself. In 2024, the company said it had returned a 32-kilometre petroleum-products pipeline between the Moscow refinery and Volodarskaya to operation as part of a project to increase fuel deliveries across Moscow region.
According to the company’s figures, the project allowed aviation-fuel deliveries to Moscow’s airports to rise almost twofold, to as much as three million tonnes a year. Potential diesel deliveries to Moscow region consumers increased to 2.8 million tonnes annually, while petrol volumes reached 1.6 million tonnes. Transneft specifically identified Vnukovo, Domodedovo and Sheremetyevo as airports supplied through the expanded system.
Transneft has also expanded storage at Volodarskaya. The company previously said it had commissioned additional petroleum-product tanks at the station to support fuel supplies to Moscow and aviation-fuel transportation to the capital’s airports.
Those figures do not mean that every litre of fuel consumed by Moscow depends on Volodarskaya. Russia can move petroleum products by rail and road, and the Moscow region has other storage and distribution facilities. But replacing pipeline volumes on the scale handled by the Moscow system would place additional demands on those alternatives, particularly if disruption were prolonged.
The attack also follows repeated Ukrainian strikes against refining infrastructure supplying European Russia. On 20 September, EU Today reported that a mass drone attack had hit the Moscow Oil Refinery at Kapotnya, one of the main fuel-processing plants serving the capital. The strike reportedly affected its ELOU-AVT-6 primary processing unit, increasing pressure on a refinery that had already been targeted earlier in the year.
The broader campaign has moved beyond individual refineries. Ukraine has increasingly targeted different stages of Russia’s energy system, including storage depots, pumping infrastructure, ports and export terminals. Earlier attacks on the Omsk refinery and Baltic export infrastructure illustrated Kyiv’s effort to put pressure on both domestic fuel processing and the logistics through which Russian oil reaches international markets.
That approach is intended to force Russia to repair several parts of the system simultaneously rather than simply compensate for the temporary loss of production at one refinery. EU Today has previously examined how sustained strikes can put physical pressure on Russia’s oil economy where sanctions alone have limits.
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on 3 October that Ukraine intended to intensify attacks on Russian oil refineries in response to Moscow’s continuing strikes against Ukrainian cities, while maintaining that Ukrainian operations would not deliberately target civilians.
Volodarskaya adds another element to that campaign. A refinery converts crude oil into usable fuels; a pumping and storage station determines how those products reach consumers. Damaging one without the other may create disruption that can be bypassed. Sustained damage to both processing and distribution infrastructure is more difficult to compensate for.
Much therefore depends on what happened inside Volodarskaya overnight. If the damage is confined to several storage tanks, the Moscow fuel network may be able to absorb the loss. Damage to pumping installations or pipeline connections would have wider consequences, particularly if the facility is attacked repeatedly.
The strike nevertheless demonstrates that a fuel installation closely connected to Moscow’s aviation and transport system can be reached despite the dense air-defence network surrounding the capital. The scale of its effect will become clearer once satellite imagery and operational information show which parts of the Volodarskaya complex were actually damaged.
Her intervention adds pressure for a more coordinated European response to hostile activity below the threshold of conventional warfare.
Russia is putting lives at risk across Europe through an expanding campaign of hybrid activity, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said on Monday, after another series of Russian drones and missiles entered Moldovan airspace.
Speaking in Brussels alongside Moldovan Prime Minister Vasile Tofan and Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos, Kallas said Europe had experienced an increase in sabotage attempts and airspace violations during recent weeks.
“Russian missiles and drones violated Moldovan airspace again over the weekend,” she said, describing the incidents as unacceptable.
According to the official EU record of the press conference, Kallas said the Kremlin was seeking to create fear and interfere with European decision-making, and argued that the response should include greater resilience and continued support for Ukraine.
Her remarks follow Russia’s renewed large-scale attacks against Ukraine’s energy system and continued reports of drones crossing borders beyond Ukrainian territory.
Moldova’s defence authorities reported that three drones entered Moldovan airspace during Russia’s 30 September attack on Ukraine. Moldova, which shares a long border with Ukraine and is seeking EU membership, has repeatedly accused Moscow of attempting to destabilise the country.
The latest incidents broaden a European debate that has been developing for months: how governments should respond to hostile operations that are deliberate and potentially dangerous but fall short of an overt military attack.
EU Today reported on 28 September that European governments were discussing an emergency security protocol intended to improve coordination when member states face sabotage and other hybrid threats.
That followed earlier warnings concerning suspected attacks on infrastructure, cyber operations, interference campaigns and airspace violations across several European countries.
The problem is partly one of attribution and partly one of thresholds.
A conventional armed attack on a NATO member may trigger consultation under Article 4 or, in sufficiently serious circumstances, collective defence provisions under Article 5. The European Union also has its own mutual assistance provision under Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union.
Hybrid activity is frequently designed to remain below those thresholds.
Cyberattacks, covert sabotage, GPS interference, disinformation, drones and operations conducted through intermediaries can impose costs without giving governments an obvious basis for a military response.
Kallas’s warning comes as Germany has also reported an increase in activity it attributes to Russia.
Chancellor Friedrich Merz has warned that Germany faces growing hybrid pressure involving drones and cyber operations. European security services have separately investigated suspected Russian involvement in sabotage and attacks on infrastructure in several countries.
Moscow has denied Western accusations that it is directing such operations.
The EU has already used sanctions against individuals and entities accused of Russian hybrid activity, while governments are considering faster systems for sharing intelligence and attributing incidents.
EU Today examined the debate in September as the European Parliament considered proposals for quicker attribution, stronger intelligence-sharing and improved protection of critical infrastructure.
Moldova occupies a particularly exposed position.
The EU has provided €317 million through the European Peace Facility for Moldovan defence modernisation, according to Kallas, including €120 million allocated in 2026 for air defence. Brussels is also supporting Moldova through its EU Partnership Mission, which provides assistance against hybrid and cyber threats.
Unlike Ukraine, Moldova is not a NATO member and has constitutional neutrality. Its ability to counter Russian missiles or drones entering its airspace is therefore closely connected to the development of its own detection and air-defence capabilities.
For the EU, repeated incidents involving Moldova, NATO airspace and European infrastructure are increasingly being considered as parts of the same security problem rather than isolated events.
Ron DeSantis and the Florida Cabinet, on September 29th, designated the Muslim Brotherhood and the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), along with another organisation, as domestic terrorist groups.
More than 90 foreign terrorist organisations, federally designated as such, were also included on the same list.
According to the website (floridaphoenix), CAIR describes itself as the foremost civil rights organisation serving the Muslim community in the United States since its founding in 1994, and it has more than 25 chapters across the country, including in the cities of Tampa and Sunrise (in Broward County), while documented reports link it to being one of the branches of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Under this decision, the council and the remaining organisations will be barred from receiving financial support from local governments and the state government, and scholarships for schools designated for them, from which they benefit financially, will be cancelled.
All those affiliated with it will face severe penalties, and all its activities in the state of Florida will be shut down.
Since January, the United States has designated three branches of the Muslim Brotherhood, in Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon, as terrorist groups, and two months later it also designated the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan as a terrorist organisation.
Florida Governor Ron DeSantis commented, in statements carried by the American website (wfla), on his state cabinet’s decision, saying: “If you look at some of these entities.. you will find that the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) was a co-conspirator without being formally charged in the largest terrorism financing trial in American history. And there are many financial channels that fuel these movements.”
He added: “We want to make sure that we are doing everything we can in Florida to put an end to that; and this has now become official.”
For his part, James Uthmeier, senior adviser to DeSantis, said: “Supporting these groups is a crime, and taxpayer money will not fund them.”
He continued: “Likewise, there will be no contracts and no foothold for them in our universities, and students who promote them will be expelled. The ‘Free State of Florida’ will not allow terrorism to be laundered through our educational institutions.. We will call these groups by their names, cut off their funding, and hold accountable those who support them financially.”
For its part, the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in Florida rejected the government’s measures, considering them a violation of the constitutionally guaranteed rights of Florida residents, and said the terrorism allegations are completely unfounded.
If the council fails to obtain a ruling from the federal courts, the decision will take effect on November 5th.
DeSantis’s moves against CAIR were not new, as he had previously issued an executive order in December 2025 designating it as a terrorist organisation, but in response, CAIR’s Florida chapter challenged the decision and turned to the federal court, which issued a ruling suspending the implementation of the state’s decision.
Florida later returned to the issue through a different legislative path with the enforcement of the law (HB 1471) on July 1st, 2026, which created a statewide legal framework for designating organisations.
On September 29th, the Florida Cabinet approved the new designations, placing the council on the domestic terrorism lists, at a time when other moves against the decision have begun from human rights groups.
Florida authorities based their placement of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) on terrorism lists on a set of historical documents and records used to justify the administration’s position on the organisation and its alleged ties to networks linked to the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas.
Among the most prominent elements raised was the listing of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) as an “unindicted co-conspirator” in the Holy Land Foundation case, which was heard in U.S. courts beginning in 2007, in addition to allegations of historical links between some of the organisation’s founders and figures associated with Hamas.
According to the website (floridaphoenix), the state of Texas had designated the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) as a terrorist group on its state lists in 2025.
Globally, the United Arab Emirates has designated CAIR as a terrorist organisation since 2014, due to its direct link to the Muslim Brotherhood, which it also designates as a terrorist group.
Merz visited the Ukrainian capital on Sunday while Russian drone attacks continued against Kyiv.
According to the Ukrainian presidency’s account of the meeting, the package includes more than €1 billion for defence and additional financing for the energy sector ahead of winter. Separate reporting put the energy component at approximately €350 million.
The visit also produced an extensive group of bilateral agreements involving governments and companies.
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Ukraine and Germany had concluded 15 agreements and documents, most concerning security co-operation, production, procurement, orders for German industry and joint projects in Ukraine. He put the total value of the agreements reached during the visit at more than €8.5 billion.
A narrower set of industrial agreements reported during the visit was valued at about €6.6 billion and included air-defence, radar and drone projects.
The visit went beyond another transfer of military aid.
Germany and Ukraine are increasingly constructing a defence relationship based on procurement, industrial production and the transfer of Ukrainian battlefield experience to European manufacturers.
At the Ukrainian-German Business Forum, Zelenskyy said the new security package would strengthen Ukraine’s armed forces immediately while industrial agreements were intended to build longer-term production capacity.
The direction corresponds with a wider shift in European support for Ukraine.
Military assistance is increasingly moving away from transfers of existing national stocks towards contracts financing new weapons production. In July, the EU released €3.47 billion for Ukrainian defence procurement, including financing intended for drones, missiles, air defence and combat aircraft requirements.
Kyiv has since asked European partners to accelerate further financing as the demands of the war outpace scheduled disbursements. EU Today reported in September that Ukraine was seeking early access to part of its 2027 EU funding to close a military budget gap.
The German agreements add a bilateral industrial track to that European system.
They also reflect changes on the battlefield.
Russia has continued to expand large-scale drone and missile attacks, increasing the importance of interceptor production, radar coverage and lower-cost methods of destroying unmanned aircraft. Ukraine’s air-defence problem is increasingly an industrial one: inexpensive attack drones cannot sustainably be countered only with scarce and costly surface-to-air missiles.
EU Today has previously examined how Ukraine’s air-defence battle has become an industrial equation, determined as much by production rates and cost ratios as by the technical performance of individual systems.
German-Ukrainian co-operation is increasingly being shaped by that requirement.
Merz has presented continuing support for Ukraine as a direct German and European security interest, rather than assistance based solely on solidarity with Kyiv.
The argument has acquired greater force as German authorities investigate Russian-linked sabotage and hybrid operations on German territory.
In September, investigators reportedly traced the attempted bombing of a Ukrainian cargo aircraft at Leipzig/Halle Airport to a suspected Russian military-intelligence organiser, with EU Today reporting details of the alleged GRU-linked logistics network.
For Berlin, support for Ukraine is now increasingly seen as part of Germany’s own security.
Merz’s visit also carries a domestic political dimension. His government is committing Germany to considerably higher defence expenditure at a time when the CDU has suffered severe electoral setbacks in eastern Germany and voters remain concerned over public finances and economic performance.
Yet Germany’s military and industrial engagement with Ukraine is continuing to expand.
The new package announced in Kyiv is important in itself, particularly as Ukraine prepares for another winter of Russian attacks on its energy infrastructure. The wider development, however, lies in the growing number of defence-production agreements accompanying it.
European governments have spent much of the war debating how to replenish their own weapons stocks while sustaining Ukraine.
The German approach increasingly points towards a different model: Ukrainian operational experience, Ukrainian procurement requirements and European industrial capacity being brought into the same defence-production system.
Rahman Salehi, of Salford, and Salam Ahmadyan, 36, of Liverpool, were charged on Friday, 2 October, with engaging in conduct in preparation for terrorist acts, contrary to Section 5 of the Terrorism Act 2006.
According to the Metropolitan Police announcement detailing the charges, both men are Iranian nationals and were arrested in Manchester on Sunday, 20 September.
They have been remanded in custody and are due to appear at Westminster Magistrates’ Court on Saturday, 3 October.
The arrests followed what police described as a long-running counter-terrorism investigation into a suspected plot directed against the Jewish community in the Manchester area.
Police allege that the two men were communicating with a third person overseas who may have been in Iran. No allegation has been made in the charges released so far that the Iranian government directed the suspected plot.
The particulars published by Counter Terrorism Policing allege that Salehi and Ahmadyan used encrypted communications and obtained material containing instructions for manufacturing an explosive device.
Investigators say the men acquired instructions relating to a device using powdered chlorine and vehicle brake fluid, along with video material concerning the manufacture or assembly of an improvised explosive device.
They are further accused of acquiring liquids, components and equipment, researching potential targets, obtaining images, maps and plans, and carrying out reconnaissance at locations considered as possible targets.
The Crown Prosecution Service confirmed that prosecutors had authorised charges after reviewing evidence gathered during the investigation.
Frank Ferguson, Chief Crown Prosecutor for the CPS Special Crime and Counter Terrorism Division, said prosecutors had concluded that there was sufficient evidence for the case to be put before a court.
The CPS stressed that the proceedings are now active and that both men have the right to a fair trial. The charges are allegations and no finding of guilt has been made.
The arrests took place shortly before Yom Kippur, the holiest day in the Jewish calendar, and came amid heightened security surrounding Jewish institutions in Britain.
Deputy Assistant Commissioner Vicki Evans, Senior National Coordinator for Counter Terrorism Policing, said the investigation had disrupted what police believed to be a plot targeting Manchester’s Jewish community.
The timing is particularly sensitive because it comes one year after the terrorist attack at the Heaton Park Hebrew Congregation synagogue in Manchester on 2 October 2025.
Two worshippers were killed in that attack, which took place on Yom Kippur. EU Today reported at the time on the Manchester synagogue attack and the security concerns facing Britain’s Jewish population.
The latest case also comes against the background of a series of alleged Iranian-linked threats and attacks involving Jewish and Israeli targets in Britain.
British security agencies have repeatedly warned about Iranian activity on UK territory. The government said earlier this year that more than 20 potentially lethal Iran-backed plots had been tracked by British security agencies over the preceding year.
Concerns intensified following attacks on Jewish-linked premises during 2026. In July, the government imposed sanctions on an Iran-linked organisation that had claimed responsibility for attacks on Jewish and Israeli-linked locations.
The group, the Islamic Movement of Companions of the Right, was subsequently designated under Britain’s new state-threat legislation alongside Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
EU Today has previously examined Iran-linked security threats in Britain following counter-terrorism arrests involving Iranian nationals, as well as alleged Iranian-linked plots targeting Jewish institutions elsewhere in Europe and North America.
The Manchester case comes as the British government increases security around synagogues, Jewish schools and community centres.
In July, ministers announced more than £250 million in additional funding over three years to strengthen protection for Jewish communities.
The package includes funding for more than 500 additional police officers across England and Wales, including around 80 officers in Greater Manchester, as well as additional resources for Counter Terrorism Policing.
The UK’s national terrorism threat level was raised to severe in April, meaning that an attack is considered highly likely. The government said the decision reflected both an increased threat from Islamist and extreme-right terrorism and a wider background of state-linked physical threats against the Jewish community.
EU Today has also reported on the government’s £250 million programme to strengthen Jewish community security and the broader increase in antisemitic incidents and violence affecting Jewish communities across Britain.
The allegations against Salehi and Ahmadyan will now be considered by the courts. Prosecutors have warned against publishing material that could prejudice the proceedings.
Latvians went to the polls on Saturday, 3 October, to elect the country’s 100-seat Saeima in an election taking place against an unusually tense security backdrop on NATO’s eastern frontier.
Fourteen parties and electoral alliances are contesting the election, with 1,428 candidates seeking seats in parliament, according to Latvia’s Central Election Commission. Voting takes place across five constituencies — Riga, Vidzeme, Latgale, Kurzeme and Zemgale — with polling stations open until 20:00 local time.
Security has occupied a prominent place in the campaign after a series of drone incidents brought the consequences of Russia’s war against Ukraine directly into Latvian airspace.
Prime Minister Andris Kulbergs, who took office in May after the previous coalition collapsed during a political crisis over the handling of drone incursions, is seeking a new mandate for his centrist United List. EU Today reported at the time that Prime Minister Evika Siliņa resigned after her coalition fractured amid criticism of Latvia’s response to repeated unmanned aircraft incidents along the Russian border. The collapse followed a succession of drone-related security incidents.
Kulbergs has campaigned on continued support for Ukraine and stronger Latvian defences, including additional counter-drone capabilities. His party entered election day ahead in the opinion polls, although the fragmented political landscape means coalition negotiations are likely to determine the eventual composition of the government.
An SKDS poll conducted between 4 and 16 September put United List on 14.4 per cent. Sovereign Power/Alliance of Young Latvians followed on 9.4 per cent, while Latvia First stood on 9.2 per cent. The Progressives recorded 6.2 per cent and the National Alliance 5.6 per cent. When only voters who had decided how they intended to vote were counted, seven political forces were projected to cross the 5 per cent threshold for representation in parliament.
The survey also showed a substantial pool of undecided or disengaged voters shortly before polling day, leaving considerable uncertainty around the final distribution of seats.
Russia and the war in neighbouring Ukraine have also produced sharper divisions between the competing parties.
Kulbergs has maintained Latvia’s strong support for Kyiv, while Sovereign Power has opposed military assistance to Ukraine and called for greater emphasis on negotiations. Latvia First has also sought votes among parts of the country’s Russian-speaking population, particularly in eastern Latvia, where questions surrounding language policy, relations with Moscow and the economic consequences of the war remain politically sensitive.
Latvia’s geographical position gives those arguments a significance extending beyond domestic politics. The country shares a border with Russia and Belarus and hosts allied troops as part of NATO’s reinforced eastern presence.
Earlier this year, drones crossed into Latvia from Russian territory, including incidents that exposed weaknesses in detecting and intercepting relatively small unmanned aircraft. EU Today reported in March that Latvia’s defence minister cut short a visit to Kyiv after another drone crossed the border from Russia. Further incidents followed in May.
Latvian intelligence has meanwhile warned about the changing nature of Moscow’s approach towards the country. In January, the Constitution Protection Bureau said Russia’s perception of Latvia was becoming increasingly similar to its view of Ukraine before the full-scale invasion, while stressing that it did not assess Russia as posing an immediate direct military threat at that stage. The warning was examined by EU Today earlier this year.
Riga has responded with one of NATO’s highest levels of defence expenditure.
Latvia’s Ministry of Defence says the country will spend about €2.16 billion on defence in 2026, equivalent to approximately 4.7 per cent of GDP under its updated calculation, as it moves towards a target of 5 per cent. Priorities include strengthening the armed forces, developing military infrastructure and improving defences along the eastern border. The Latvian defence ministry’s budget programme places additional emphasis on domestic defence production and military innovation.
Security is not the only issue facing voters. The cost of living, pensions, public services and regional economic disparities have also featured heavily during the campaign, particularly outside Riga.
The security debate, however, has given this election a wider European dimension. Latvia’s next government will take office while Russia’s war against Ukraine continues immediately beyond NATO’s eastern frontier and while the Baltic states are investing heavily in air defence, border protection and military readiness.
The official result will determine the composition of the 15th Saeima for the next four years. With several parties competing around the parliamentary threshold and no single force close to a majority, the subsequent coalition negotiations are likely to be almost as consequential as Saturday’s vote itself.
China’s Ministry of Commerce issued the warning after reports that several EU governments were discussing a mechanism modelled partly on Section 301 of US trade law, which allows Washington to investigate foreign trade practices and impose countermeasures.
Beijing described such an approach as protectionist and unilateral and warned that it could damage continuing negotiations between China and the EU.
“If the European side insists on introducing discriminatory restrictive measures against Chinese companies or products,” the ministry said, China would “resolutely respond” to defend the interests of its industries.
The warning comes as Europe’s trade relationship with China is moving further up the political agenda.
According to the European Commission’s latest EU-China trade figures, EU exports to China were worth €199.5 billion in 2025 while imports reached €559.5 billion.
The goods deficit stood at €359.9 billion, compared with €312.2 billion in 2024.
China remained the EU’s largest source of goods imports and its fourth-largest export market.
Brussels argues that the scale of the imbalance is connected not only to competitiveness but also to state support, market-access restrictions and other structural differences between the two economies.
China disputes that assessment and has repeatedly accused the EU of using industrial and security arguments to justify protectionism.
The argument is already visible in several industries.
The EU imposed countervailing duties on Chinese battery electric vehicles after an investigation concluded that state subsidies were giving Chinese manufacturers an unfair advantage in the European market.
Brussels has subsequently widened its attention to other parts of the automotive industry. Earlier this month, EU Today reported that the EU was considering restrictions affecting Chinese hybrid cars as policymakers looked for ways to contain the growing trade imbalance.
The automotive dispute is important because Europe is simultaneously trying to attract Chinese manufacturing investment.
France and Spain addressed that question during President Emmanuel Macron’s state visit to Madrid.
Macron and Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez agreed on the need for greater European unity in responding to Chinese competition. They also discussed whether Chinese investors entering strategically important European industries should be required to provide stronger commitments on issues such as technology transfer.
Macron said that companies on both sides of the Pyrenees needed protection when they faced unfair competition and argued that “the only response that works is European.”
France has generally favoured stronger European trade defences.
Germany has traditionally approached the issue more cautiously because major German manufacturers have substantial commercial exposure to China. Increasing competition from Chinese producers, particularly in industrial sectors where German companies were once dominant, has altered the debate.
Reports that Berlin and Paris are now working together on a stronger trade instrument therefore suggest a potentially important shift.
The two countries are said to be considering a European mechanism inspired by the American Section 301 process, although no final proposal has yet been adopted by the European Commission.
EU trade law already provides several instruments.
Brussels can impose anti-dumping or anti-subsidy duties following investigations, use the Foreign Subsidies Regulation to examine state-backed investment and procurement, and deploy the Anti-Coercion Instrument where another country uses economic pressure against the EU or a member state.
The discussion now concerns whether those instruments are sufficient when governments believe a problem extends across industries rather than affecting an individual product.
The debate comes only weeks after EU Today reported that Brussels was preparing additional pressure on Chinese hybrid-car imports, demonstrating how quickly EU-China trade disputes are expanding beyond the original electric-vehicle case.
At the same time, Brussels and Beijing have established a Trade and Investment Consultations mechanism, with workstreams covering trade balances, export controls, intellectual property and World Trade Organisation reform.
China’s Commerce Ministry has warned that introducing tougher measures while those talks continue would damage trust.
That leaves the EU facing two parallel choices: continue negotiations intended to narrow the trade dispute while also developing stronger instruments in case those negotiations fail.
France and Germany are increasingly arguing that Europe needs greater leverage.
Beijing’s response is that using that leverage against Chinese companies would bring countermeasures.
The next stage will depend on whether the Franco-German proposal develops into a formal EU initiative. If it does, the dispute will move beyond duties on particular products towards a broader argument over how Europe intends to manage its economic relationship with China.
Europe is facing more immediate cyber threats, but whether its member states are prepared to deal with it collectively is becoming a question harder to answer.
Even as drone threats, such as Russia’s bomb plot at the Leipzig-Halle airport in Germany in August, dominated European headlines in September, other, less visible hybrid attacks are also being waged against the EU every day, whose sheer weight of numbers should also cause grave concern.
Poland, for instance, recorded 4,200 cyber-security incidents in military networks and systems in 2024 and 7,100 in 2025, Polish cyber command spokesperson, Przemek Lipczyński, told EUobserver.
In 2025, Polish security systems blocked four million phishing emails targeted at soldiers and defence personnel.
And Poland aside, evolving technology meant Russian cyber-attacks “do not know any border”, said Jamila Boutemeur, the EU’s head of cybersecurity body, in what amounted to a single market for hacking.
For its part, the European Union has built its cybersecurity architecture around the Boutemeur’s European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, ENISA, in Athens, as well as the 27 national cybersecurity agencies.
But as Russia’s threat levels up, the European structure is seeing familiar problems: information is not always shared, responsibilities remain divided between national governments and EU institutions, while ENISA itself is being asked to do more with limited resources.
And the European Court of Auditors (ECA) confirmed it on 21 September in its ENISA study.
“The architecture is there, the structure is there. Now it’s a matter of willingness and trust,” to effectively fight back, said George-Marius Hyzler, the ECA’s main auditor.
“It always boils down to the same thing, lack of information sharing,” he said, identifying the EU’s key weakness.
And for Czech Greens MEP Markéta Gregorová, who is also the lead rapporteur on the EU’s incoming Cybersecurity Act 2 (CSA2), duplication of work also bedevilled the EU’s response.
“The [ECA] auditors describe a system that does not work” and was “wasteful”, she told EUobserver.
“Six European legal acts force the same company to report the same incident to different authorities. Two EU bodies monitor the same threats,” Gregorová said.
She also advocated a stronger operational role for ENISA.
But the EU fault lines have underlying political as well as legal tensions.
Cybersecurity remains largely within the competence of the member states, and governments differ in how much new power they are willing to delegate to European institutions.
And for Dimitar Lilkov, from the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, there were three main sources of friction: national security, trust, and money.
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Over the past few weeks, a new wave of fear has engulfed Europe. A number of intelligence and government officials have spoken out, saying Russia could possibly attack a Nato country within months, not years.
On 18 September, Polish prime minister Donald Tusk warned that Russia is planning hybrid strikes with drones or rockets on European countries that support Ukraine, such as Poland.
Two days later, Czech intelligence chief Michal Koudelka told the Guardian that, as well as increased drone activity, a small-scale invasion of Nato territory bordering Russia could be part of the Kremlin’s plans.
Then, last Thursday, Denmark’s defence intelligence service said that Russia is likely to intensify its hybrid war against the West in the coming months, with more frequent attacks against Nato countries.
On the same day, speaking at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, Poland’s foreign minister Radosław Sikorski said, according to TVP World: “We are receiving information … that Russia is preparing something big this year.”
This is not the first time a wave of comments like this has appeared. A similar situation arose last year, when various officials in Europe took turns escalating their rhetoric about the Russian threat.
It is possible that they are speaking out again because new information has surfaced within the intelligence community. The communication goal could be letting Russia know that they know. Much like CIA director John Ratcliffe’s visit to Moscow last month, this could be an effort to make sure Russia doesn’t miscalculate.
The warnings also come in a different context from last year, when the Baltic countries were sounding the alarm. Russia has noticeably been turning up the temperature of its activity around Europe.
Back in July, a cruise missile crashed in Poland. According to experts, it was not a misguided missile, but one deliberately aimed at Poland. Then, in early August, a drone carrying an explosive device was discovered at Leipzig/Halle Airport in eastern Germany, close to Ukrainian cargo planes.
Germany’s interior minister Alexander Dobrindt said the Leipzig airport attack followed the “well-established pattern of Russian hybrid operations in Europe,” the BBC reported.
According to German investigators, who spoke to Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, the incident was also connected to other events, such as an attempted arson attack on a drone manufacturer in eastern Slovakia, and an arson attack in Munich on September 3, when several incendiary devices were thrown from a passing car onto a construction site near the headquarters of defence firms Rohde & Schwarz and Helsing.
In fact, there have been so many different incidents recently that the semi-regular drone incursions into Romania and the Baltics have become almost normalised and struggle to make headlines anymore.
Scenarios of where Russia could take its hybrid attacks next are as abundant as onlookers’ creativity allows. They range from small attacks on factories, through the seizure of a small piece of land by an elite drone unit, all the way to the capture of the Suwałki corridor – a strategic piece of land between the Baltic states and mainland Europe.
Most recently, the CIA warned that while all eyes had so far been on the Baltics, Russia may be preparing a drone strike against Spain, France, and Italy.
According to Marko Mihkelson, chairman of the Estonian parliament’s foreign affairs committee, the snowball of speculation about an imminent Russian attack on Europe is gathering pace.
But as he sees it, isolated facts are being mixed with wishful thinking, worst-case scenarios and, at times, little more than the need to grab attention.
As he wrote in an opinion piece for the Estonian news agency ERR: “Russia understands that it can confuse and paralyse us through information operations alone. Constant speculation about the Baltic states and Poland risks creating the impression that this is primarily a problem for two or three countries on Russia’s doorstep, while the rest of Europe can somehow remain untouched.”
According to Mihkelson, Russia’s campaign against the West would not necessarily begin with a conventional attack.
It could start by undermining Nato from within: interfering in elections, amplifying polarising narratives, exploiting political divisions, and spreading fear. It could seek to isolate Ukraine by limiting Western support, and then test Nato’s willingness to stand together.
As for worries that Russia will attempt to grab land from the Baltics or Poland, there are no significant material or military changes to note along the borders.
Belarus did hold a four-day military exercise near its border with the Suwałki corridor in mid-September, but that is nothing close to the signals we were getting from Russia just before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Back then, physical military infrastructure was being constructed ahead of the attack.
There are also no significant changes in the Russian military’s posture to launch a land attack against the Baltics.
Estonian government officials confirm this. According to Estonia’s minister of defence, Martin Herem, its assessment of the Russian threat remains unchanged.
That means Russia’s main effort remains focused on its war in Ukraine, and neither Estonia, Denmark, nor other Nato allies currently see a threat requiring raised military readiness.
Military experts in Lithuania also see no signs of new escalation. This doesn’t mean Russia won’t continue to be dangerous. It means that Russia has been engaged in provocations against Nato countries for years already, and similar behaviour will continue.
“No one is currently planning to conquer us – not at this moment, nor this year. In this case, specific, very precise attacks or provocations are more likely, designed not so much to cause physical damage as to sow serious panic in people’s minds,” Deividas Šlekys, a professor at Vilnius University’s Institute of Political Science and International Relations, told the Lithuanian wire LRT on Monday (28 September).
And so, while last autumn it was the Baltic states sounding the alarm about a potential Russian attack, now their officials are looking to calm the panic about their aggressive neighbour.
On Tuesday (22 September), the Lithuanian parliament backed a proposal to lift the constitutional ban on the deployment of nuclear weapons and foreign military bases on the country’s territory.
Lithuanian radio LRT reported on the development, which paves the way for nuclear weapons in the country.
Lawmakers overwhelmingly approved the constitutional amendment to lift the ban, with 99 votes in favour, 13 against and five abstentions. The proposal must pass two further parliamentary votes, three months apart, before it comes into effect.
This comes as Europe as a whole debates nuclear deterrence.
In March, French president Emmanuel Macron announced a new French nuclear doctrine. He also raised the possibility of extending France’s nuclear umbrella over countries that could temporarily host French strategic aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons.
However, the final decision on their use would remain in the hands of the French president.
France is the only EU member state with its own nuclear weapons and has a similar number of nuclear warheads to the United Kingdom, which sources them from the US.
However, France has long advocated greater autonomy from the US. Macron has justified this due to the inflammatory rhetoric of US president Donald Trump, who puts into question US commitments to European allies.
Ten European countries have joined France’s forward deterrence programme: the United Kingdom, Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland, which joined this month ending military neutrality after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
It was in the context of the new European nuclear architecture that MP Remigijus Motuzas, chair of the Lithuanian parliament’s foreign affairs committee, plus another 50 Lithuanian MPs tabled a proposal to lift the constitutional ban on deploying nuclear weapons on the Baltic country’s territory.
Lithuania borders Russia’s heavily-militarised Kaliningrad exclave and Belarus, Moscow’s closest ally in its war against Ukraine.
“Given the situation we are in, the geopolitical situation and what is happening, I think it is certainly worth it,” parliamentary speaker Juozas Olekas said in May, referring to nuclear deterrence.
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