Ukraine has completed its Operation Vivaldi, aimed at protecting its fortress belt cities of Donetsk Oblast, which helped Kyiv preserve the region from Russian occupation for 12 years. Brigadier General Andrii Biletskyi, the commander of the Third Army Corps behind the operation, has reported that the fourth phase secured 101 km² of territory. Among the latest achievements is the liberation of three settlements—Zelena Dolyna, Lypove, and Kolodiazi.

The operation's main objective was to move Ukrainian troops into more advantageous defensive positions, Biletskyi said in the first days after the operation was made public. Vivaldi has now summed up the results of all four phases: Ukraine has established full control over 16 settlements, liberated 277 km² of territory, and inflicted 8,000 casualties on Russian forces.

Ukraine worked against Russia's deadline

During Operation Vivaldi, Ukrainian forces have prevented Russian troops from outflanking the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration and cutting the Kharkiv–Sloviansk highway, a key supply route for Ukraine’s forces in Donbas, Biletskyi says.

“We thwarted the offensive of the Zapad grouping and forced it to redeploy some units of the 1st Tank Army, which eased pressure on Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi,” Biletskyi announces.

Previously, the Institute for the Study of War noted that Russian President Vladimir Putin was confident that Russian forces would be able to seize the entire Donetsk Oblast by the end of 2026 — the Kremlin’s latest deadline for achieving this goal.

Ukraine’s military was on a mission to prevent this.

Season one: clearing russian infiltration groups

On 15 September 2026, Ukraine’s Third Army Corps announced Operation Vivaldi in northern Donetsk Oblast. During the first phase, Ukrainian troops cleared Russian groups from 75 km² of territory and liberated another 10 km².

The Third Army Corps said it had struck Russian supply routes and fuel infrastructure, prompting Russia to relocate its fuel and lubricant reserves to Voronezh Oblast. According to the corps, Russian forces lost around 1,500 troops, more than 12,000 drones, and hundreds of pieces of equipment.

Season two: liberation of Shandryholove and Derylove

On 20 September, the Third Army Corps reported the liberation of Shandryholove and Derylove and the establishment of full control over Drobysheve.

During the second season, Russian forces lost another 800 troops, bringing their total losses across the first two seasons to more than 3,000, according to the corps.

During the first two seasons of the operation, Ukrainian troops and attached units regained control of 125 km² of territory, including 50 km² that had been fully liberated.

The first phase of Vivaldi involved eliminating Russian groups that had infiltrated Ukrainian positions, explained the commander of a battalion in the 125th Brigade, callsign Darwin, per ArmyInform. After clearing those groups, the Defense Forces moved on to the operation’s second phase, using reconnaissance drones to detect Russian forces, he added.

For this, Ukraine used UAVs and ground robotic systems.

“The Third Army Corps was the first in the world to begin deploying ground robotic systems by air. Our heavy bombers deliver kamikaze ground robotic systems more than 10 kilometers behind enemy lines,” Biletskyi noted.

Season three: advances near Novе and Ridkodub

On 28 September, the Third Army Corps reported the liberation of Nove, Ridkodub, and Katerynivka and the restoration of control over Karpivka and Novomykhailivka. Ukrainian forces regained another 51 km² of territory, bringing the total area liberated since the start of the offensive to 176 km². Russian forces lost around 2,000 troops, and more than 250 were taken prisoner, the corps said in its summary of the operation’s third phase.

“The Russians were convinced that the main axis of attack was Shandryholove–Zelena Dolyna. This led it to squander its reserves in counterattacks along that very axis. The Russians slept through the actual strike, which was focused on capturing Nove,” Biletskyi said.

Operation Vivaldi aimed to disrupt Russia’s plans in Donetsk Oblast

The need for Operation Vivaldi arose amid Russian attempts to encircle Ukraine’s fortified belt in Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian forces conducted preparatory efforts aimed at degrading Russia’s offensive capabilities, including strikes on Russian drone operators, the Institute for the Study of War reported on 9 October.

Ukrainian counterattacks in the Lyman direction and east of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk were intended to complicate Russian efforts to seize the fortified belt in Donetsk Oblast, the report noted.

The corps advanced gradually, reclaiming small areas instead of attempting a large-scale breakthrough.

Bennett and Golan allege treason; Urich said to tell police he doesn't remember content of meetings, which were not official government business, or where they took place; PM said to claim he was told nothing about it

Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s unusually direct criticism of Donald Trump marks a turning point in relations between Kyiv and Washington. With American satellite restrictions disrupting Ukrainian military operations, intelligence cooperation under scrutiny and the White House easing pressure on Russian energy exports, Ukraine faces a fundamental question: how can it defend itself when its most powerful partner is increasingly willing to accommodate Moscow?

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has abandoned much of the diplomatic restraint that characterised his dealings with Donald Trump since their confrontation in the Oval Office in February 2025. In an interview on 14 October, the Ukrainian president accused his American counterpart of moving towards Russia and choosing the wrong side of history.

His intervention followed a series of American decisions that have increased pressure on Kyiv while offering Moscow economic and diplomatic advantages. A controversial agreement involving Russian diesel exports, uncertainty surrounding the provision of American intelligence and sudden restrictions on military satellite communications have brought relations between the two countries to their most difficult point since Trump’s return to the White House.

Zelenskyy’s criticism was unusually personal. Questioned about whether he felt betrayed by Washington’s recent decisions, he acknowledged the sense of betrayal but emphasised that Ukraine’s survival could not be treated as a commercial negotiation. He said Ukraine was not selling its country and argued that an American president claiming to act as an intermediary must not favour one of the belligerents.

The shift reflects the apparent exhaustion of a strategy Kyiv has pursued for more than a year: avoid openly challenging Trump, maintain personal contact with the White House and hope that American support can be preserved through diplomatic accommodation. That calculation is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain as Washington’s demands threaten to constrain Ukraine’s military operations without producing corresponding concessions from Russia.

American leverage becomes a Ukrainian vulnerability

The immediate demonstration of Ukraine’s dependence on American technology came during the night of 13–14 October, when SpaceX imposed restrictions on Starshield, the military-grade version of its Starlink satellite communications service.

According to accounts provided by Ukrainian frontline commanders, the changes disrupted connections to terminals travelling above approximately 160 kilometres per hour, forcing the abandonment of several drone missions. The restrictions affected systems used for reconnaissance, interception and strikes against Russian military targets.

As EU Today reported on 14 October, the disruption exposed a weakness extending beyond individual drone missions. Satellite communications form part of Ukraine’s operational infrastructure, supporting the movement of battlefield information, remote weapons control and communications across areas where conventional networks are vulnerable to Russian electronic warfare.

An interruption imposed remotely by a commercial provider can therefore affect military capabilities without any physical attack on Ukrainian equipment. Decisions taken outside Ukraine’s military command structure can alter the effectiveness of systems already deployed on the battlefield.

Ukraine’s Defence Ministry subsequently opened discussions with American officials, SpaceX and NATO partners while examining alternative communications arrangements.

Later on Wednesday, former Ukrainian defence minister Mykhailo Fedorov announced that Starlink functionality at speeds up to 160 kilometres per hour was being restored. Work was still required to remove the restrictions on Starshield altogether. The partial reversal offered immediate operational relief but did not resolve the underlying dependency.

There is no established evidence that the Trump administration ordered SpaceX to impose the restrictions. Nevertheless, their timing, amid mounting disagreements over Ukraine’s military operations, has reinforced Kyiv’s concerns about relying on communications infrastructure controlled by an American company.

Intelligence warnings and the protection of civilians

The dispute over satellite access coincides with growing uncertainty about American intelligence cooperation.

Following Russian ballistic missile strikes on Kyiv on 12–13 October, Zelenskyy complained that Ukraine had received no advance warning from its international partners. The attacks damaged residential buildings and energy infrastructure, while Ukraine’s authorities raised concerns about the absence of advance intelligence.

Advance information about Russian missile launches is particularly important when ballistic weapons leave civilians only minutes to reach shelters. Intelligence cooperation also supports Ukrainian air-defence units in assessing threats and preparing interceptions.

Trump denied on 13 October that Washington had stopped sharing intelligence with Ukraine. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha likewise confirmed that cooperation continued. The absence of warnings about particular attacks therefore cannot be equated with a complete suspension of American assistance.

Yet the consequences of unreliable warning arrangements remain serious. For Ukraine, the distinction between information withheld, delayed or simply unavailable offers little protection when Russian ballistic missiles reach civilian neighbourhoods without sufficient warning.

The wider concern is that intelligence provision could become another instrument of diplomatic pressure. Accounts of negotiations over Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries have raised the possibility that Washington might use such assistance as leverage. Reports of explicit threats have been disputed, but the controversy has increased uncertainty surrounding a capability central to Ukraine’s defence.

Why the diesel agreement changes the strategic calculation

The confrontation has also exposed a contradiction in Washington’s approach to the war.

Trump’s agreement allowing Russian diesel to return to international markets offers Moscow additional export opportunities at a time when Ukrainian attacks have damaged refining capacity and disrupted domestic fuel supplies.

The American administration has justified the arrangement partly through the need to ease fuel prices. Yet the initially announced quantities are modest in relation to international petroleum markets, raising questions about how much immediate relief the measure can realistically provide.

For Putin, its diplomatic significance may be considerably greater. Russia has secured a relaxation of American economic restrictions while Washington simultaneously presses Kyiv to limit attacks on the infrastructure that generates revenue for Moscow’s war economy.

The commercial implications of Washington’s sanctions reversal extend beyond the initial shipment volumes. The Treasury authorisation permits certain transactions involving Russian-origin diesel until April 2027, creating opportunities for international traders and financial intermediaries while leaving the broader sanctions framework formally intact.

Trump’s proposed energy ceasefire has compounded the difficulty. As EU Today examined earlier this week, Kyiv has offered to suspend strikes against Russian energy facilities if Moscow reciprocates. Russian attacks on Ukrainian power infrastructure have nevertheless continued.

An arrangement in which Ukraine stops targeting Russian refineries while Russia retains the ability to strike Ukrainian electricity generation would remove an important source of pressure on Moscow without protecting Ukrainian civilians.

Such an outcome would change the military and economic conditions of the war in Russia’s favour, regardless of how Washington describes its diplomatic objectives.

The White House, Congress and the limits of presidential power

Zelenskyy’s sharper language also reflects a possible reassessment of where influence over American policy can be exercised.

For much of Trump’s second presidency, Kyiv’s diplomacy has concentrated on preserving a workable relationship with the president himself. That approach assumes that personal engagement can influence White House decisions even when Trump’s broader political instincts favour accommodation with Putin.

The events of October suggest that this strategy has reached its limits.

Ukraine’s alternative is not necessarily an outright confrontation with Washington. Rather, it involves placing greater weight on Congress, the American defence establishment and the institutional relationships that have supported Ukraine since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.

There is a historical precedent. During Trump’s first presidency, Congress supported military assistance to Ukraine despite differences within the administration over relations with Russia. Under Joe Biden, congressional resistance also demonstrated how domestic American politics could determine the timing and scale of weapons deliveries.

The months-long delay in approving the 2024 military assistance package contributed to severe ammunition shortages at a critical stage of Russia’s offensive operations. Ukraine’s loss of Avdiivka illustrated the danger of making battlefield planning dependent on political negotiations in Washington.

The congressional elections on 3 November 2026 could alter the balance of power. A change in control of either chamber would increase opportunities for oversight, investigations and legislative pressure on the administration, although Congress cannot independently direct every aspect of intelligence sharing or presidential diplomacy.

A less compliant Congress could nevertheless make it politically harder for the White House to restrict Ukrainian assistance without explanation.

Europe confronts a more permanent problem

For European governments, the dispute carries implications extending well beyond the immediate confrontation between Trump and Zelenskyy.

The transatlantic security relationship has historically depended on the assumption that American military capabilities, intelligence networks and political commitments would remain available to European allies during a major security crisis.

That assumption is increasingly difficult to reconcile with an American administration prepared to link assistance to Ukraine with wider commercial negotiations and domestic political objectives.

The consequences are particularly acute in areas where European capabilities remain insufficient to replace American systems quickly, including satellite intelligence, strategic reconnaissance, missile defence and specialised communications.

Europe can expand weapons production, finance Ukrainian purchases and develop alternatives to American technology. Replacing the full range of capabilities provided by the United States, however, requires investment measured in years rather than months.

The problem will not necessarily disappear when Trump leaves office. His return to power demonstrated that the American foreign-policy consensus which supported European security for decades can be challenged through the electoral process.

Future American administrations may seek to restore traditional alliances, but European governments must now account for the possibility that another election could reverse those commitments.

For Zelenskyy, the immediate calculation is exceptionally difficult. Public criticism risks provoking further retaliation from a president whose administration still controls capabilities essential to Ukraine’s defence. Continued diplomatic restraint, however, has not prevented Washington from offering concessions to Russia or introducing uncertainty into Ukraine’s military planning.

His latest intervention suggests that Kyiv is no longer convinced that avoiding confrontation will preserve American support. The question is whether greater political scrutiny of Washington’s decisions can prevent a further erosion of assistance before Russia turns the resulting military advantages into territorial gains.

VTM

A VTM esteve num dos locais onde a campanha decorreu, em Vila Real, e conversou com Alice Gonçalves, voluntária da CVP. A voluntária fez um balanço positivo da campanha de recolha de alimentos, destacando a generosidade da população e a importância da iniciativa para apoiar quem mais precisa. “Tem corrido muito bem. As pessoas já doaram bastante e isso, para nós, é uma satisfação, pois há sempre pessoas com muitas necessidades”.

Apesar das dificuldades financeiras enfrentadas por muitas famílias devido ao aumento do custo de vida, Alice Gonçalves considera que a população continua solidária, contribuindo de acordo com as suas possibilidades. “Cada um tem consciência do que pode fazer e dar”, afirma.

A voluntária salientou também que os portugueses são um povo que se ajuda mutuamente. “Mesmo que seja com pouco, tentam sempre ajudar”.

The post Campanha procurou reforçar apoio alimentar às famílias carenciadas appeared first on A Voz de Trás-os-Montes.

No âmbito do Dia Mundial da Coluna, que se assinala a 16 de outubro, a campanha “Olhe pelas Suas Costas” associa-se ao tema definido este ano pelo World Spine Day, “Saúde da Coluna ao Longo da Vida”. A iniciativa pretende reforçar a importância de cuidar da saúde da coluna de forma contínua e de adotar, […]

EU ministers have reviewed reforms introduced by Prime Minister Péter Magyar’s administration but left the Article 7 proceedings against Hungary unresolved. The European Commission has acknowledged significant progress while warning that further changes are required to restore the rule of law.

The European Union has maintained its Article 7 proceedings against Hungary despite acknowledging significant improvements in the country’s rule-of-law situation since Prime Minister Péter Magyar’s government took office earlier this year.

Ministers meeting at the General Affairs Council in Luxembourg on Tuesday, 13 October, reviewed reforms introduced by the Hungarian administration and received an updated assessment from the European Commission.

The proceedings, initiated by the European Parliament in September 2018, remain open eight years after concerns over judicial independence, corruption, media freedom and democratic accountability first prompted action under the EU treaties.

No decision was announced to terminate the procedure following the latest meeting.

Brussels acknowledges progress

European Commissioner Michael McGrath said ahead of the discussions that Hungary had made substantial progress towards addressing the institutional problems inherited from the administration of former prime minister Viktor Orbán.

Speaking in Luxembourg, McGrath acknowledged improved cooperation between the Hungarian government and European institutions.

However, he also indicated that the reform process remained incomplete, noting that the new administration had been in office for only several months.

The Commission’s assessment reflects the changing relationship between Budapest and Brussels following Magyar’s election victory and the subsequent introduction of reforms intended to restore judicial and institutional independence.

As EU Today reported in June, the change of government created an opportunity to resolve long-standing disputes over the condition of Hungary’s democratic institutions and the suspension of European funding.

The latest Council discussions indicate that the EU is prepared to recognise reforms already undertaken without automatically treating them as sufficient to close the Article 7 procedure.

An eight-year institutional dispute

The European Parliament initiated the proceedings in 2018 after raising concerns over developments affecting Hungary’s constitutional system, judicial independence, corruption safeguards and civil society.

Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union provides mechanisms for responding when a member state is considered at risk of seriously breaching the Union’s fundamental values.

Under its preventive provisions, the Council can determine whether there is a clear risk of such a breach.

More severe measures, including the possible suspension of certain membership rights, require additional procedures and higher institutional thresholds.

Hungary’s case has remained within the preventive stage, with successive Council meetings examining the country’s legal and political developments.

The Council’s account of the 13 October meeting confirms that Hungarian representatives presented measures intended to address concerns raised by the European Parliament and member states during earlier proceedings.

The Commission also briefed ministers on its latest assessment.

The meeting did not produce a formal finding that the outstanding concerns had been fully resolved.

Magyar faces the consequences of Orbán’s legacy

Since assuming office, Magyar has sought to reverse elements of the institutional structure established during Orbán’s lengthy premiership.

The reforms have included measures concerning public administration, judicial accountability and the relationship between national institutions and European law.

The new government has also attempted to improve relations with Brussels after years of disputes that affected EU budget decisions, sanctions policy and cooperation over Ukraine.

EU Today has previously examined Magyar’s programme of institutional renewal and the political difficulties involved in changing institutions shaped by the previous administration.

Reforming legislation does not necessarily transform the institutions responsible for applying it.

Judicial appointments, regulatory structures, public procurement procedures and anti-corruption enforcement may all require additional measures before the effects of reform can be fully assessed.

The European Commission must therefore consider not only the laws adopted by the new government but also whether the institutions concerned operate independently and effectively.

EU funding remains a separate question

The Article 7 proceedings are closely associated with wider disputes over Hungary’s access to European funding, although the relevant legal mechanisms are different.

During Orbán’s administration, the Commission and Council used financial conditionality procedures to restrict access to certain EU resources because of concerns affecting the protection of the Union’s budget.

Magyar’s reforms have opened the possibility of reversing some of those restrictions.

As EU Today reported in September, the Commission moved towards releasing €4.2 billion following changes intended to address rule-of-law concerns.

The financial decisions involve compliance with conditions attached to EU funding and can proceed independently of the Article 7 mechanism.

Consequently, the release of money does not automatically establish that all the institutional problems identified in the original parliamentary proceedings have been resolved.

Likewise, the continuation of Article 7 does not necessarily prevent the Commission from recognising progress under separate funding arrangements.

Who can end the proceedings?

McGrath addressed the possibility of terminating the procedure during remarks before Tuesday’s meeting.

He explained that the Commission could provide its assessment but did not have unilateral authority to bring the Article 7 process to an end.

In his recorded statement in Luxembourg, the Commissioner pointed to the responsibilities of the European Parliament, which initiated the case, and the Council, which has conducted the subsequent examination.

The institutional arrangements mean that improved relations between the Commission and the Hungarian government cannot by themselves dispose of the proceedings.

The Council must consider the reforms and the remaining concerns within the framework established by the treaties.

Political agreement among member states will consequently be required to determine how the process develops.

A changed relationship with Brussels

The latest discussions take place against a substantially different political background from previous years.

Budapest has recently withdrawn objections to further steps in Ukraine’s EU accession negotiations following Ukrainian legislation addressing educational rights for Hungarian speakers and other national minorities.

The change has removed one obstacle to enlargement negotiations and reflects the government’s more cooperative approach towards other EU institutions.

Nevertheless, Hungary’s position on foreign policy and enlargement is distinct from the assessment of its domestic rule-of-law arrangements.

The Council’s examination remains focused on the institutional concerns that led to the procedure being initiated.

The Irish presidency’s summary of the October Council meeting confirms that ministers received an update rather than reaching a new formal determination.

The proceedings therefore remain open while the Commission and member states continue examining the measures introduced by Magyar’s administration.

The coming decisions will establish how European institutions respond when a new government undertakes reforms intended to reverse the conduct that originally led to action under Article 7.

For Hungary, the outcome will influence its relationship with Brussels well beyond the immediate debate over EU funding. For the Union, it will demonstrate how its rule-of-law procedures operate when political circumstances change and the member state concerned begins addressing previously identified institutional problems.

VTM

A iniciativa pretende aproveitar os recursos florestais locais para produzir energia renovável e assegurar o aquecimento de habitações e edifícios públicos, promovendo soluções energéticas sustentáveis em zonas rurais. A reunião permitiu também discutir alternativas para a localização da central, depois de os habitantes terem manifestado oposição à instalação prevista ao lado da junta de freguesia.

Em declarações à VTM, a presidente da Câmara Municipal de Vila Pouca de Aguiar, Ana Rita Dias, referiu que a reunião teve como finalidade esclarecer a forma de execução do projeto e procurar alternativas para a instalação da caldeira, procurando responder às preocupações dos residentes sem comprometer a concretização da candidatura. “A população não querendo que fique aqui a caldeira, está a tentar perceber qual é outra solução dentro do projeto que está em execução”.

A autarca revelou também que o projeto foi lançado em 2023 e pretende assegurar, numa primeira fase, o aquecimento de oito habitações e de dois edifícios públicos, entre eles a junta de freguesia e o Centro Interpretativo de Tresminas.

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Medellín city hall has begun demolishing a house that once belonged to drug lord Pablo Escobar in the Diamante 2 neighborhood of the El Poblado district in the capital of Antioquia. The property, one of the many owned by the head of the Medellín Cartel, who was killed in 1993, had been abandoned, although authorities say it was being used to hold satanic rituals, for sexual activity, and for drug use. It had also become a security problem in one of the city’s most tourist-heavy neighborhoods. On Tuesday, the local administration began intervening on the site.

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© Alcaldía de Medellín

Despite admitting mass immigration is damaging the country, the ruling classes fail to secure the border while clamping down on dissent. It's accelerating Britain towards crisis, say David Betz and Michael Rainsborough.

The post Britain is Accelerating Towards Crisis appeared first on The Daily Sceptic.

The Ukrainian government on Tuesday night said that its access to the SpaceX-owned Starlink satellite internet service was throttled, prompting critics to question the wisdom of depending on any company owned by far-right billionaire Elon Musk. According to a Wednesday report in The New York Times, Ukrainian officials suspect that orders to restrict their access […]

The post Throttling Ukraine’s Starlink access heightens concerns over Musk appeared first on Asia Times.

Ronen Bar says Netanyahu disregarded an 'extraordinary series of warnings of impending disaster'; lawsuit comes in response to PM's claim of 'criminal' acts by Bar for failing to wake him before Hamas attack

Six months into a war that sowed upheaval in the Persian Gulf, Qatar found itself stuck. By late August, even limited shipments from the gas heavyweight had all but stopped following a projectile attack on one of its tankers outside the Strait of Hormuz. Pressure was growing, not only from energy-starved clients but also from inside an economy built on regular deliveries.

Esta é uma das mais importantes freguesias turísticas do Algarve e do País.

O conteúdo Foto do dia: freguesia algarvia de pescadores e turistas onde já se cultivou a cana-de-açúcar aparece primeiro em Algarve Marafado.

O encontro juntou as famílias de acolhimento da associação para assinalar o marco e partilhar experiências

A AIPAR, Associação de Proteção à Rapariga e à Família, promoveu no passado domingo, 11 de outubro, um Encontro de Famílias de Acolhimento na Quinta do Meloal, espaço da associação na freguesia da Conceição de Faro. 

A manhã teve dois objetivos: celebrar a certificação da vigésima família de acolhimento da AIPAR e dar às famílias a oportunidade de partilharem experiências entre si. Há outras famílias atualmente em processo de certificação.

“Sentimos uma enorme gratidão pelas vinte maravilhosas famílias que se juntaram à AIPAR e abraçaram a missão de ser famílias de acolhimento. Quero que saibam que nunca estarão sozinhas. A nossa equipa acompanha-as em cada passo e, a partir de agora, têm também umas às outras“, afirmou Filomena Rosa, Presidente da Direção da AIPAR.

A manhã começou com uma sessão de ioga do riso e continuou à volta de um brunch preparado pelo serviço de catering da associação. Enquanto os adultos conversavam, as crianças participaram em atividades ao ar livre acompanhadas por uma equipa da AIPAR. No final, cada família recebeu um certificado e um saquinho de lufas, esponjas vegetais cultivadas e secas na própria quinta.

“Cada família tem o acompanhamento da nossa equipa, mas há coisas que só outra família de acolhimento compreende. É necessário criar momentos como este“, acrescentou a Presidente da Associação.

O objetivo da AIPAR é certificar o maior número possível de famílias, porque cada uma tem uma disponibilidade própria. Muitas famílias com filhos preferem acolher uma criança de determinada idade ou género, para facilitar a convivência em casa, enquanto outras estão preparadas para receber grupos de irmãos ou crianças mais velhas. Quanto mais famílias houver, mais situações a AIPAR consegue acompanhar e mais fácil se torna encontrar a família certa para cada criança.

O acolhimento familiar é uma medida de proteção temporária que permite que crianças e jovens retirados à família de origem cresçam num ambiente familiar, e não numa instituição.

Segundo o relatório CASA 2024, das 6.349 crianças e jovens em acolhimento em Portugal, 361 viviam com famílias de acolhimento, cerca de 6% do total. A maioria continua em casas de acolhimento residencial.

A AIPAR é uma instituição de enquadramento do acolhimento familiar, ao abrigo de um acordo de cooperação com o Instituto da Segurança Social celebrado em novembro de 2022. Qualquer pessoa ou casal com mais de 25 anos e residência em Portugal pode candidatar-se. As famílias recebem formação, acompanhamento técnico permanente e apoio financeiro mensal.

Sobre a AIPAR

Fundada em 1932 e Instituição Particular de Solidariedade Social desde 1988, a AIPAR tem sede em Faro. Trabalha na proteção de crianças, jovens e famílias através do Acolhimento Familiar, da Casa de Acolhimento, do CAFAP, do Apartamento de Autonomização, do CACI e da Cantina Social.

A Comissão de Constituição e Justiça (CCJ) do Senado concluiu nesta quarta-feira (14) a votação da Proposta de Emenda à Constituição (PEC) da Segurança Pública. O texto segue para análise do plenário, onde precisará ser aprovado em dois turnos antes de avançar na tramitação constitucional.

A conclusão ocorreu após o presidente da comissão, senador Otto Alencar (PSD-BA), considerar prejudicados três destaques que propunham mudanças na proposta. Os autores das emendas não estavam presentes para encaminhar a votação, e os trechos não chegaram a ser analisados separadamente.

O texto-base havia sido aprovado pela CCJ em setembro. Com o encerramento dessa etapa, a decisão sobre o conteúdo da PEC passa ao plenário do Senado, que poderá iniciar a discussão após a votação da proposta que prevê o fim da escala de trabalho 6×1.

Destaques tratavam de agentes de trânsito e polícias municipais

Entre as alterações que deixaram de ser analisadas estava a proposta do senador Eduardo Gomes (PL-TO) para incluir os agentes de trânsito entre os integrantes da segurança pública previstos na Constituição.

Outro destaque, apresentado pelo senador Carlos Portinho (PL-RJ), tratava da possibilidade de utilização de recursos do Fundo Nacional de Segurança Pública em determinadas operações das Forças Armadas relacionadas à defesa civil, ao combate a delitos transfronteiriços e ambientais e à garantia da lei e da ordem.

A terceira emenda, de autoria do senador Alessandro Vieira (MDB-SE), buscava retirar a exigência de autorização periódica dos conselhos estaduais de segurança pública para o funcionamento das polícias municipais. O objetivo era evitar que órgãos estaduais tivessem poder de interferência sobre estruturas de segurança organizadas pelos municípios.

PEC amplia integração entre forças de segurança

A PEC 18/2025 tem como um de seus principais objetivos incluir o Sistema Único de Segurança Pública (Susp) na Constituição Federal. A proposta busca fortalecer a cooperação entre União, estados, Distrito Federal e municípios, com compartilhamento de informações e atuação conjunta no enfrentamento à criminalidade.

O texto também amplia as atribuições da Polícia Rodoviária Federal (PRF), que poderá atuar nos modais rodoviário, ferroviário e hidroviário federais. A proposta prevê ainda o fortalecimento da atuação da Polícia Federal contra organizações criminosas e milícias com alcance interestadual ou internacional.

Outro ponto é a criação de regras constitucionais para o Sistema de Políticas Penais, com medidas relacionadas à atuação das polícias penais e à administração dos estabelecimentos prisionais.

A proposta estabelece, ainda, mecanismos de proteção dos recursos destinados à segurança pública e ao sistema penitenciário, restringindo o bloqueio e o uso dessas verbas para finalidades diferentes das previstas.

Recursos das apostas esportivas ficaram fora do texto

Durante a análise na CCJ, o relator, senador Rogério Carvalho (PT-SE), retirou da proposta o dispositivo que destinava 30% da arrecadação das apostas esportivas aos fundos nacionais de Segurança Pública e Penitenciário.

A mudança foi justificada pela ausência de discussão aprofundada sobre a regra durante a tramitação na Câmara dos Deputados. O relator também argumentou que não seria adequado incluir na Constituição uma vinculação de receitas das apostas sem uma avaliação mais ampla de seus efeitos.

Por outro lado, foi mantida a previsão de destinação de parte do superávit financeiro do Fundo Social do pré-sal para o financiamento da segurança pública.

Texto precisa passar por dois turnos

Por se tratar de uma proposta de emenda à Constituição, a PEC precisa receber pelo menos 49 votos favoráveis em cada um dos dois turnos de votação no Senado. O regimento prevê sessões de discussão e intervalo mínimo entre as etapas.

O presidente da CCJ, Otto Alencar, afirmou que conversou com o presidente do Senado, Davi Alcolumbre (União Brasil-AP), sobre a possibilidade de acelerar a análise da matéria. A intenção manifestada por lideranças é votar a proposta antes do segundo turno das eleições, marcado para 25 de outubro.

A aprovação na CCJ, entretanto, não altera imediatamente a Constituição. A proposta ainda depende da votação em plenário e da conclusão das etapas constitucionais necessárias para entrar em vigor.

The post CCJ conclui votação da PEC da Segurança Pública, bandeira eleitoral de Lula appeared first on Diário da Manhã - O Jornal do leitor Inteligente.

Ukrainian drones lost some of their fighting capacity after restrictions were suddenly imposed on the battlefield use of the country's U.S.-made Starlink communication terminals, officials said Wednesday as the capital endured another night of missile attacks.

President Donald Trump says he has struck a deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin to import large amounts of diesel fuel into the United States—apparently hoping to lower fuel prices in the weeks before the midterm elections.

The exact terms of that agreement remain somewhat unclear. The White House has not said when the purchases will be made, what prices will be paid, or who will be paying (private companies or taxpayers), though the Treasury announced that it would be issuing a "temporary general license to allow the supply of Russian diesel to the global market." Reporting by The New York Times suggests that investors with ties to the administration are most likely to profit. Because diesel prices are determined by a global market, it's also far from certain that the Russian gas would make much of a dent in American prices.

However, this much is clear: If Trump follows through with this "deal," he will have violated two federal laws recently passed by Congress—one of which he signed just weeks ago.

The more significant of those two laws is the Ending Importation of Russian Oil Act, which passed the House with a 413–9 vote and was unanimously approved by the Senate. President Joe Biden signed that bill into law on April 8, 2022. The law is an outright ban on Russian energy products, including diesel fuel.

The law also lays out the process for lifting the ban on imports. The president must tell Congress that Russia has "reached an agreement to withdraw Russian forces and cease military hostilities in Ukraine" and has recognized "the right of the Ukrainian people to independently and freely choose their own government."

There is also a clear timeline for lifting the ban. Any termination of the ban requires a 90-day waiting period, during which time Congress has the opportunity to block the change.

Obviously, Russia has not withdrawn from Ukraine. Even if it had, the White House has not gone through the necessary process to notify Congress, nor waited the necessary 90 days.

The law does not allow a president to ignore it if fuel prices are high and an election is approaching. It does not allow a president to ignore it if he starts an illegal war in another part of the world that causes fuel prices to spike.

Trump's attempt to disregard that law has drawn a bipartisan rebuke from members of Congress. A group of seven senators—three Democrats and four Republicans—issued a joint statement this week saying that Trump's deal "runs directly counter to" the 2022 law.

Sen. Thom Tillis (R–N.C.), one of the senators who joined that statement, said on Sunday that there is "a legitimate case for saying the president's not following the law."

The second law at play is the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act, named for the late senator and passed earlier this year. Among other things, it authorizes the president to levy tariffs of up to 100 percent against countries that buy Russian crude oil and natural gas. The intent is clear: to prevent Russia from being able to finance its war against Ukraine by selling energy commodities onto the global market. Trump signed it into law last month.

Lawmakers on both sides of the aisle have also pointed to that law in the days since Trump announced his deal to buy Russian diesel.

"Now is the time to use those sanctions to squeeze Putin's war machine, not reward a dictator by putting more money in his hands while he continues targeting and killing Ukrainian civilians," Rep. Don Bacon (R–Neb.) posted on X this week. Rep. Steny Hoyer (D–Md.) said it was "outrageous" for Trump to be buying energy from Russia after signing a bill that could be used to punish other countries for doing the same.

The White House could argue that, in this case, Trump is merely violating the spirit of the law rather than the letter of it. Even so, this is blatantly hypocritical.

The hypocrisy runs deep. The Trump administration has spent much of its second term trying to restrict trade and downplay the advice of economists who have warned that doing so would raise prices. Now, Trump is once again seeking imports as a means to ease high prices—as he has done with beef and other products. Perhaps the White House should apply this general principle more broadly, and in circumstances where doing so would not violate federal laws.

Some of the president's allies are now trying to downplay these violations of federal law. Conservative pundit Mollie Hemingway says Trump is merely trying to "put the American people first" by addressing rising gas prices.

Sorry, but no. The president is not allowed to disregard federal laws because he believes it will lower gas prices in swing states.

You can, of course, criticize those laws for being misguided. Trade is generally good, and erecting barriers to the flow of goods tends to be costly. Trump could ask Congress to repeal these laws. He cannot deliberately ignore them.

If the "deal" with Russia comes to fruition, it will further erode what little power Congress retains within America's democratic system. If a president is not bound by the laws Congress has passed, then the legislature might as well not exist at all.

The post Trump's Plan To Buy Russian Diesel Would Violate Federal Law appeared first on Reason Magazine.

The U.S. Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) is proposing $200,000 fees on Spanish-flagged vessels entering American ports, along with restrictions on billions of dollars in Spanish imports, after concluding that Spain’s...

Netanyahu is being sued for shifting responsibility for Oct 7th, as he demands witch hunt against NAZA whistleblowers, and calls for permanent displacement of West Bankers.

Sem condições materiais para disputar a supremacia industrial chinesa, a União Europeia insiste em transformar suas dificuldades econômicas em justificativa para uma nova escalada de hostilidades.

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A liderança europeia parece ter encontrado uma nova missão estratégica: reconstruir a capacidade industrial do continente e, simultaneamente, reduzir sua dependência da China. A iniciativa foi recentemente trazida por França e Alemanha conjuntamente e é apresentada como uma resposta à crescente participação chinesa no mercado europeu. O problema é que os dirigentes responsáveis por esse projeto continuam ignorando uma questão elementar: nenhuma reindustrialização de grande escala pode prosperar sem uma base energética estável, abundante e economicamente acessível.

A Europa possui universidades de excelência, mão de obra qualificada, centros tecnológicos avançados e uma tradição industrial que ainda lhe confere vantagens consideráveis. Entretanto, essas capacidades não funcionam isoladamente. Fábricas de produtos químicos, siderúrgicas, instalações metalúrgicas e numerosas outras atividades dependem de fornecimento energético contínuo e competitivo. A existência de capital, conhecimento científico e trabalhadores especializados não compensa indefinidamente os custos elevados de produção. É justamente nesse ponto que a estratégia europeia entra em contradição com seus próprios objetivos.

Durante décadas, a integração econômica entre a Europa Ocidental e a Rússia proporcionou condições favoráveis ao desenvolvimento de importantes segmentos industriais. O fornecimento de gás natural russo, em particular, contribuiu para sustentar atividades que exigem grandes quantidades de energia. Essa relação atendia a interesses econômicos concretos de ambas as partes: Moscou encontrava um mercado importante para suas exportações, enquanto as economias europeias obtinham um insumo fundamental para sua competitividade.

O começo do regime de sanções em 2022 alterou profundamente esse cenário. As medidas coercitivas ilegais cortaram a parceria russo-europeia de longa data, tornando o lado ocidental do continente economicamente fraco e dependente de energia externa mais cara e menos segura. A Europa, que já vinha progressivamente se desindustrializando antes disso, entrou então no total caos energético, com todas as suas consequências, desde contas de energia mais altas até empresas falindo por incapacidade produtiva.

Seria razoável esperar que uma estratégia de recuperação industrial começasse pela revisão dessas vulnerabilidades. O que se observa, porém, é a tentativa de construir uma nova base produtiva sem resolver adequadamente o problema energético. Os responsáveis pela política europeia parecem acreditar que subsídios, incentivos fiscais e programas de investimento serão suficientes para restaurar a competitividade. Tais instrumentos podem contribuir para o desenvolvimento industrial, mas seus resultados serão limitados enquanto persistirem desvantagens estruturais nos custos de energia.

É nesse contexto que a China passa a ocupar uma posição cada vez mais importante na lista de preocupações de Bruxelas. A capacidade chinesa de produzir em grande escala, abastecer cadeias industriais complexas e oferecer equipamentos a preços competitivos representa um desafio para uma Europa que procura recuperar sua autonomia produtiva. Em vez de reconhecer a dimensão do atraso acumulado e elaborar uma estratégia coerente para superá-lo, setores da liderança europeia preferem recorrer a barreiras comerciais, investigações punitivas e mecanismos de contenção econômica.

Essa orientação revela uma compreensão bastante superficial da competição industrial. Restringir as importações chinesas não cria automaticamente fábricas europeias, tampouco reduz o custo da eletricidade ou garante o fornecimento de gás às instalações industriais. Pelo contrário, empresas que dependem de equipamentos, componentes e matérias-primas chinesas poderão enfrentar despesas maiores justamente quando precisam investir para recuperar sua posição no mercado internacional.

A questão russa torna esse quadro ainda mais delicado. Recuperar a cooperação energética com Moscou seria o passo inicial de qualquer plano de recuperação industrial. Com energia russo e parcerias comerciais amplas com a China, a Europa reencontraria o caminho do desenvolvimento – da mesma maneira que países africanos e asiáticos, em parceria com Rússia e China, estão agora encontrando pela primeira vez.

Mas Bruxelas, Paris e Berlim fazem o contrário. Os estrategistas europeus parecem determinados a enfrentar simultaneamente dois dos maiores polos industriais e energéticos do mundo, sem demonstrar que possuem os recursos necessários para sustentar essa ambição. Primeiro, comprometeram uma relação energética fundamental com a Rússia. Agora, arriscam transformar a China em um adversário comercial permanente.

No fim, o que os falcões europeus querem não é o desenvolvimento da própria Europa, mas a instrumentalização de pautas como indústria e comércio para avançar seus próprios planos autodestrutivos – nos quais os cidadãos europeus, já sem energia russa e possivelmente sem produtos chineses em breve, são sempre as primeiras vítimas.