Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s unusually direct criticism of Donald Trump marks a turning point in relations between Kyiv and Washington. With American satellite restrictions disrupting Ukrainian military operations, intelligence cooperation under scrutiny and the White House easing pressure on Russian energy exports, Ukraine faces a fundamental question: how can it defend itself when its most powerful partner is increasingly willing to accommodate Moscow?

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has abandoned much of the diplomatic restraint that characterised his dealings with Donald Trump since their confrontation in the Oval Office in February 2025. In an interview on 14 October, the Ukrainian president accused his American counterpart of moving towards Russia and choosing the wrong side of history.

His intervention followed a series of American decisions that have increased pressure on Kyiv while offering Moscow economic and diplomatic advantages. A controversial agreement involving Russian diesel exports, uncertainty surrounding the provision of American intelligence and sudden restrictions on military satellite communications have brought relations between the two countries to their most difficult point since Trump’s return to the White House.

Zelenskyy’s criticism was unusually personal. Questioned about whether he felt betrayed by Washington’s recent decisions, he acknowledged the sense of betrayal but emphasised that Ukraine’s survival could not be treated as a commercial negotiation. He said Ukraine was not selling its country and argued that an American president claiming to act as an intermediary must not favour one of the belligerents.

The shift reflects the apparent exhaustion of a strategy Kyiv has pursued for more than a year: avoid openly challenging Trump, maintain personal contact with the White House and hope that American support can be preserved through diplomatic accommodation. That calculation is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain as Washington’s demands threaten to constrain Ukraine’s military operations without producing corresponding concessions from Russia.

American leverage becomes a Ukrainian vulnerability

The immediate demonstration of Ukraine’s dependence on American technology came during the night of 13–14 October, when SpaceX imposed restrictions on Starshield, the military-grade version of its Starlink satellite communications service.

According to accounts provided by Ukrainian frontline commanders, the changes disrupted connections to terminals travelling above approximately 160 kilometres per hour, forcing the abandonment of several drone missions. The restrictions affected systems used for reconnaissance, interception and strikes against Russian military targets.

As EU Today reported on 14 October, the disruption exposed a weakness extending beyond individual drone missions. Satellite communications form part of Ukraine’s operational infrastructure, supporting the movement of battlefield information, remote weapons control and communications across areas where conventional networks are vulnerable to Russian electronic warfare.

An interruption imposed remotely by a commercial provider can therefore affect military capabilities without any physical attack on Ukrainian equipment. Decisions taken outside Ukraine’s military command structure can alter the effectiveness of systems already deployed on the battlefield.

Ukraine’s Defence Ministry subsequently opened discussions with American officials, SpaceX and NATO partners while examining alternative communications arrangements.

Later on Wednesday, former Ukrainian defence minister Mykhailo Fedorov announced that Starlink functionality at speeds up to 160 kilometres per hour was being restored. Work was still required to remove the restrictions on Starshield altogether. The partial reversal offered immediate operational relief but did not resolve the underlying dependency.

There is no established evidence that the Trump administration ordered SpaceX to impose the restrictions. Nevertheless, their timing, amid mounting disagreements over Ukraine’s military operations, has reinforced Kyiv’s concerns about relying on communications infrastructure controlled by an American company.

Intelligence warnings and the protection of civilians

The dispute over satellite access coincides with growing uncertainty about American intelligence cooperation.

Following Russian ballistic missile strikes on Kyiv on 12–13 October, Zelenskyy complained that Ukraine had received no advance warning from its international partners. The attacks damaged residential buildings and energy infrastructure, while Ukraine’s authorities raised concerns about the absence of advance intelligence.

Advance information about Russian missile launches is particularly important when ballistic weapons leave civilians only minutes to reach shelters. Intelligence cooperation also supports Ukrainian air-defence units in assessing threats and preparing interceptions.

Trump denied on 13 October that Washington had stopped sharing intelligence with Ukraine. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha likewise confirmed that cooperation continued. The absence of warnings about particular attacks therefore cannot be equated with a complete suspension of American assistance.

Yet the consequences of unreliable warning arrangements remain serious. For Ukraine, the distinction between information withheld, delayed or simply unavailable offers little protection when Russian ballistic missiles reach civilian neighbourhoods without sufficient warning.

The wider concern is that intelligence provision could become another instrument of diplomatic pressure. Accounts of negotiations over Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries have raised the possibility that Washington might use such assistance as leverage. Reports of explicit threats have been disputed, but the controversy has increased uncertainty surrounding a capability central to Ukraine’s defence.

Why the diesel agreement changes the strategic calculation

The confrontation has also exposed a contradiction in Washington’s approach to the war.

Trump’s agreement allowing Russian diesel to return to international markets offers Moscow additional export opportunities at a time when Ukrainian attacks have damaged refining capacity and disrupted domestic fuel supplies.

The American administration has justified the arrangement partly through the need to ease fuel prices. Yet the initially announced quantities are modest in relation to international petroleum markets, raising questions about how much immediate relief the measure can realistically provide.

For Putin, its diplomatic significance may be considerably greater. Russia has secured a relaxation of American economic restrictions while Washington simultaneously presses Kyiv to limit attacks on the infrastructure that generates revenue for Moscow’s war economy.

The commercial implications of Washington’s sanctions reversal extend beyond the initial shipment volumes. The Treasury authorisation permits certain transactions involving Russian-origin diesel until April 2027, creating opportunities for international traders and financial intermediaries while leaving the broader sanctions framework formally intact.

Trump’s proposed energy ceasefire has compounded the difficulty. As EU Today examined earlier this week, Kyiv has offered to suspend strikes against Russian energy facilities if Moscow reciprocates. Russian attacks on Ukrainian power infrastructure have nevertheless continued.

An arrangement in which Ukraine stops targeting Russian refineries while Russia retains the ability to strike Ukrainian electricity generation would remove an important source of pressure on Moscow without protecting Ukrainian civilians.

Such an outcome would change the military and economic conditions of the war in Russia’s favour, regardless of how Washington describes its diplomatic objectives.

The White House, Congress and the limits of presidential power

Zelenskyy’s sharper language also reflects a possible reassessment of where influence over American policy can be exercised.

For much of Trump’s second presidency, Kyiv’s diplomacy has concentrated on preserving a workable relationship with the president himself. That approach assumes that personal engagement can influence White House decisions even when Trump’s broader political instincts favour accommodation with Putin.

The events of October suggest that this strategy has reached its limits.

Ukraine’s alternative is not necessarily an outright confrontation with Washington. Rather, it involves placing greater weight on Congress, the American defence establishment and the institutional relationships that have supported Ukraine since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.

There is a historical precedent. During Trump’s first presidency, Congress supported military assistance to Ukraine despite differences within the administration over relations with Russia. Under Joe Biden, congressional resistance also demonstrated how domestic American politics could determine the timing and scale of weapons deliveries.

The months-long delay in approving the 2024 military assistance package contributed to severe ammunition shortages at a critical stage of Russia’s offensive operations. Ukraine’s loss of Avdiivka illustrated the danger of making battlefield planning dependent on political negotiations in Washington.

The congressional elections on 3 November 2026 could alter the balance of power. A change in control of either chamber would increase opportunities for oversight, investigations and legislative pressure on the administration, although Congress cannot independently direct every aspect of intelligence sharing or presidential diplomacy.

A less compliant Congress could nevertheless make it politically harder for the White House to restrict Ukrainian assistance without explanation.

Europe confronts a more permanent problem

For European governments, the dispute carries implications extending well beyond the immediate confrontation between Trump and Zelenskyy.

The transatlantic security relationship has historically depended on the assumption that American military capabilities, intelligence networks and political commitments would remain available to European allies during a major security crisis.

That assumption is increasingly difficult to reconcile with an American administration prepared to link assistance to Ukraine with wider commercial negotiations and domestic political objectives.

The consequences are particularly acute in areas where European capabilities remain insufficient to replace American systems quickly, including satellite intelligence, strategic reconnaissance, missile defence and specialised communications.

Europe can expand weapons production, finance Ukrainian purchases and develop alternatives to American technology. Replacing the full range of capabilities provided by the United States, however, requires investment measured in years rather than months.

The problem will not necessarily disappear when Trump leaves office. His return to power demonstrated that the American foreign-policy consensus which supported European security for decades can be challenged through the electoral process.

Future American administrations may seek to restore traditional alliances, but European governments must now account for the possibility that another election could reverse those commitments.

For Zelenskyy, the immediate calculation is exceptionally difficult. Public criticism risks provoking further retaliation from a president whose administration still controls capabilities essential to Ukraine’s defence. Continued diplomatic restraint, however, has not prevented Washington from offering concessions to Russia or introducing uncertainty into Ukraine’s military planning.

His latest intervention suggests that Kyiv is no longer convinced that avoiding confrontation will preserve American support. The question is whether greater political scrutiny of Washington’s decisions can prevent a further erosion of assistance before Russia turns the resulting military advantages into territorial gains.

Mercedes-Benz chief executive Ola Källenius has warned that excluding British manufacturers from European industrial preference rules would damage automotive production on both sides of the Channel, increasing pressure on Brussels ahead of negotiations over its proposed Industrial Accelerator Act.

The head of Mercedes-Benz has warned that excluding British manufacturers from the European Union’s proposed industrial preference rules would damage the competitiveness of carmakers across Europe, challenging Brussels over legislation intended to protect European production from growing international competition.

Ola Källenius, chief executive of Mercedes-Benz and president of the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association (ACEA), criticised the prospect of restricting British participation in the forthcoming “Made in Europe” framework during discussions in Brussels on Wednesday, 14 October.

His intervention comes as European governments negotiate the Industrial Accelerator Act, which would introduce European-content requirements affecting public procurement and certain forms of industrial support.

The proposed legislation is intended to strengthen manufacturing within the EU, but its treatment of production in neighbouring countries has become contentious, particularly in an automotive industry whose factories and suppliers operate across national borders.

European production extends beyond the EU

British manufacturing remains closely integrated with continental European automotive production despite the United Kingdom’s departure from the single market.

Components manufactured in Britain are incorporated into vehicles assembled in EU member states, while British factories depend on engines, batteries, electronics and other parts produced in continental Europe.

The value of this integrated manufacturing system depends on companies being able to source components across borders without unnecessary restrictions.

Källenius warned that excluding the UK from the proposed rules would weaken manufacturers operating on both sides of the Channel.

His position reflects industry concerns that a narrowly defined European-content regime could impose additional costs on companies already facing pressure from Chinese competition, slowing demand and substantial investment requirements.

As EU Today reported in September, British Prime Minister Andy Burnham has been pressing Brussels to recognise the UK as a trusted industrial partner under the emerging framework.

Germany has also supported a broader approach that would allow selected trading partners to qualify under European-content rules where reciprocal conditions are met.

France has favoured stronger preferences for production within the EU itself, reflecting differences among member states over how far European industrial policy should extend beyond the Union’s borders.

A dispute over industrial sovereignty

The Industrial Accelerator Act proposed by the European Commission is intended to strengthen Europe’s manufacturing base and support production in strategically important sectors.

Its provisions address public procurement and industrial incentives affecting products including vehicles, steel, aluminium and clean technologies.

The Commission wants European public spending to support local industrial capacity rather than reinforce dependence on imports from major international competitors.

China has become the principal focus of those concerns because of its expanding manufacturing capacity, particularly in electric vehicles and batteries.

However, measures designed to counter Chinese industrial competition could also affect established trading partners whose manufacturers form part of European supply chains.

The United Kingdom, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey occupy different legal positions in their economic relations with the EU, but all maintain important industrial connections with member states.

An approach that treats their production as equivalent to imports from countries with substantially different market conditions could require European companies to reorganise existing supplier relationships.

For manufacturers, replacing a supplier may involve more than simply ordering components from another factory. Production standards, technical certification, logistics and long-term investment arrangements can make changes expensive and difficult.

Industry demands regulatory certainty

Following an ACEA board meeting on Wednesday, European manufacturers called for faster progress on the wider automotive legislative package.

In its 14 October statement, ACEA urged EU institutions to advance negotiations so that the package could be finalised early next year.

The association argues that manufacturers require a predictable regulatory framework to plan investments in electric vehicles, production facilities and new technologies.

Källenius linked the industry’s transition towards zero-emission mobility with the need to preserve employment and strengthen economic security.

European manufacturers are simultaneously investing heavily in electrification while competing against Chinese companies with established battery supply chains and significant production capacity.

The resulting financial pressures are particularly serious for manufacturers that must develop new vehicle platforms while maintaining existing factories and dealer networks.

Additional restrictions on component sourcing could complicate those decisions at a time when companies are seeking to reduce costs.

Britain refuses to follow EU tariffs automatically

The dispute has acquired a further dimension following remarks by British Business Secretary Jonathan Reynolds.

Speaking on Wednesday, Reynolds indicated that Britain would not automatically follow the European Union in imposing tariffs on Chinese vehicles.

The UK government maintains that trade measures must be determined according to British economic interests rather than adopted simply to align with Brussels.

That position complicates London’s attempt to secure favourable treatment under European industrial rules.

EU policymakers have argued that closer alignment on trade defences could support Britain’s claim to be treated as a trusted partner.

British ministers, however, must consider whether restrictions on Chinese imports would benefit domestic manufacturers and consumers.

The disagreement will form part of the broader economic relationship being discussed ahead of the next UK–EU summit, scheduled for 20 November.

The wider implications for EU–UK relations

The automotive dispute follows earlier negotiations over British participation in European defence procurement and other industrial programmes.

In both cases, London wants access to initiatives designed to strengthen European production while remaining outside the EU’s institutional framework.

Brussels must determine how far preferential treatment can extend to non-member countries without undermining the objectives of its industrial policy.

The Commission’s proposals have already revealed disagreements between governments favouring a tightly defined European manufacturing base and those seeking to preserve wider commercial partnerships.

Källenius’s intervention strengthens the argument that industrial protection cannot be considered separately from the supply chains on which European manufacturers depend.

The final legislation will influence investment decisions, procurement arrangements and the position of British suppliers within the continental automotive industry.

The outcome will also provide an indication of how far the EU is prepared to accommodate its closest trading partners as it attempts to strengthen European manufacturing against growing competition from China.

VTM

Em comunicado, assinado pela atual presidente da Comunidade Intermunicipal do Alto Tâmega e Barroso (CIMAT), Fátima Fernandes, é explicado que a reunião “foi formalmente convocada pela senhora ministra da Saúde, tendo os presidentes de câmara municipal assegurado a sua presença”, no entanto, a reunião não se concretizou, uma vez que “não foram recebidos pela senhora ministra, tendo sido proposto, em alternativa, um encontro com o senhor secretário de Estado da Saúde, Francisco Pinheiro Catalão”.

Perante esta situação, os autarcas entenderam que “não estavam reunidas as condições para um diálogo profícuo, ao nível da responsabilidade política e institucional que o tema exige”, nunca colocando em “causa a consideração institucional devida ao senhor secretário de Estado.

Na mesma nota, é referido que a saúde “é uma preocupação central das populações do Alto Tâmega e Barroso e exige respostas concretas, diálogo institucional e compromisso político”, explicando que o encontro “tinha como objetivo abordar matérias de elevada relevância para o futuro dos cuidados de saúde na região, pelo que os autarcas consideram fundamental que este diálogo deve ocorrer com a devida atenção à importância do assunto para os cidadãos”.

Os seis municípios (Chaves, Boticas, Montalegre, Ribeira de Pena, Valpaços e Vila Pouca de Aguiar) reafirmam a sua “união na defesa dos interesses das populações e o compromisso de continuar a trabalhar, de forma concertada, para que as necessidades da região em matéria de saúde sejam ouvidas” e mereçam a resposta que legitimamente lhes é devida.

 

 

The post Autarcas lamentam ausência da ministra da Saúde de reunião que convocou appeared first on A Voz de Trás-os-Montes.

EU ministers have reviewed reforms introduced by Prime Minister Péter Magyar’s administration but left the Article 7 proceedings against Hungary unresolved. The European Commission has acknowledged significant progress while warning that further changes are required to restore the rule of law.

The European Union has maintained its Article 7 proceedings against Hungary despite acknowledging significant improvements in the country’s rule-of-law situation since Prime Minister Péter Magyar’s government took office earlier this year.

Ministers meeting at the General Affairs Council in Luxembourg on Tuesday, 13 October, reviewed reforms introduced by the Hungarian administration and received an updated assessment from the European Commission.

The proceedings, initiated by the European Parliament in September 2018, remain open eight years after concerns over judicial independence, corruption, media freedom and democratic accountability first prompted action under the EU treaties.

No decision was announced to terminate the procedure following the latest meeting.

Brussels acknowledges progress

European Commissioner Michael McGrath said ahead of the discussions that Hungary had made substantial progress towards addressing the institutional problems inherited from the administration of former prime minister Viktor Orbán.

Speaking in Luxembourg, McGrath acknowledged improved cooperation between the Hungarian government and European institutions.

However, he also indicated that the reform process remained incomplete, noting that the new administration had been in office for only several months.

The Commission’s assessment reflects the changing relationship between Budapest and Brussels following Magyar’s election victory and the subsequent introduction of reforms intended to restore judicial and institutional independence.

As EU Today reported in June, the change of government created an opportunity to resolve long-standing disputes over the condition of Hungary’s democratic institutions and the suspension of European funding.

The latest Council discussions indicate that the EU is prepared to recognise reforms already undertaken without automatically treating them as sufficient to close the Article 7 procedure.

An eight-year institutional dispute

The European Parliament initiated the proceedings in 2018 after raising concerns over developments affecting Hungary’s constitutional system, judicial independence, corruption safeguards and civil society.

Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union provides mechanisms for responding when a member state is considered at risk of seriously breaching the Union’s fundamental values.

Under its preventive provisions, the Council can determine whether there is a clear risk of such a breach.

More severe measures, including the possible suspension of certain membership rights, require additional procedures and higher institutional thresholds.

Hungary’s case has remained within the preventive stage, with successive Council meetings examining the country’s legal and political developments.

The Council’s account of the 13 October meeting confirms that Hungarian representatives presented measures intended to address concerns raised by the European Parliament and member states during earlier proceedings.

The Commission also briefed ministers on its latest assessment.

The meeting did not produce a formal finding that the outstanding concerns had been fully resolved.

Magyar faces the consequences of Orbán’s legacy

Since assuming office, Magyar has sought to reverse elements of the institutional structure established during Orbán’s lengthy premiership.

The reforms have included measures concerning public administration, judicial accountability and the relationship between national institutions and European law.

The new government has also attempted to improve relations with Brussels after years of disputes that affected EU budget decisions, sanctions policy and cooperation over Ukraine.

EU Today has previously examined Magyar’s programme of institutional renewal and the political difficulties involved in changing institutions shaped by the previous administration.

Reforming legislation does not necessarily transform the institutions responsible for applying it.

Judicial appointments, regulatory structures, public procurement procedures and anti-corruption enforcement may all require additional measures before the effects of reform can be fully assessed.

The European Commission must therefore consider not only the laws adopted by the new government but also whether the institutions concerned operate independently and effectively.

EU funding remains a separate question

The Article 7 proceedings are closely associated with wider disputes over Hungary’s access to European funding, although the relevant legal mechanisms are different.

During Orbán’s administration, the Commission and Council used financial conditionality procedures to restrict access to certain EU resources because of concerns affecting the protection of the Union’s budget.

Magyar’s reforms have opened the possibility of reversing some of those restrictions.

As EU Today reported in September, the Commission moved towards releasing €4.2 billion following changes intended to address rule-of-law concerns.

The financial decisions involve compliance with conditions attached to EU funding and can proceed independently of the Article 7 mechanism.

Consequently, the release of money does not automatically establish that all the institutional problems identified in the original parliamentary proceedings have been resolved.

Likewise, the continuation of Article 7 does not necessarily prevent the Commission from recognising progress under separate funding arrangements.

Who can end the proceedings?

McGrath addressed the possibility of terminating the procedure during remarks before Tuesday’s meeting.

He explained that the Commission could provide its assessment but did not have unilateral authority to bring the Article 7 process to an end.

In his recorded statement in Luxembourg, the Commissioner pointed to the responsibilities of the European Parliament, which initiated the case, and the Council, which has conducted the subsequent examination.

The institutional arrangements mean that improved relations between the Commission and the Hungarian government cannot by themselves dispose of the proceedings.

The Council must consider the reforms and the remaining concerns within the framework established by the treaties.

Political agreement among member states will consequently be required to determine how the process develops.

A changed relationship with Brussels

The latest discussions take place against a substantially different political background from previous years.

Budapest has recently withdrawn objections to further steps in Ukraine’s EU accession negotiations following Ukrainian legislation addressing educational rights for Hungarian speakers and other national minorities.

The change has removed one obstacle to enlargement negotiations and reflects the government’s more cooperative approach towards other EU institutions.

Nevertheless, Hungary’s position on foreign policy and enlargement is distinct from the assessment of its domestic rule-of-law arrangements.

The Council’s examination remains focused on the institutional concerns that led to the procedure being initiated.

The Irish presidency’s summary of the October Council meeting confirms that ministers received an update rather than reaching a new formal determination.

The proceedings therefore remain open while the Commission and member states continue examining the measures introduced by Magyar’s administration.

The coming decisions will establish how European institutions respond when a new government undertakes reforms intended to reverse the conduct that originally led to action under Article 7.

For Hungary, the outcome will influence its relationship with Brussels well beyond the immediate debate over EU funding. For the Union, it will demonstrate how its rule-of-law procedures operate when political circumstances change and the member state concerned begins addressing previously identified institutional problems.

Jerry Seinfeld mocked protesters highlighting Palestinian children’s deaths, dancing onstage and saying he would send a demonstrator’s ticket money to Israel.

VTM

Durante a visita que fez ao Museu de Arte Contemporânea Nadir Afonso (MACNA), Paula Chaves, deputada municipal em Chaves eleita por uma lista independente, abordou o presidente da República para lhe pedir que ouvisse a população de Covas do Barroso que está contra a exploração de lítio na sua aldeia.

Paula Chaves disse ao presidente que em Covas do Barroso há um grupo de pessoas que “está em defesa daquilo que é o nosso maior património e a nossa maior riqueza, que é a biodiversidade”, lamentando que “já se esgotaram todas as formas de luta”, mas que os ativistas “não se resignam naquilo que é a salvaguarda do património da região”.

Em nome do movimento de cidadãos em defesa de Covas do Barroso, a porta-voz aproveitou a oportunidade para endereçar um convite ao presidente para visitar Covas do Barroso ou até para os receber e poder ouvi-los”.

The post Presidente da República disponível para ouvir opositores à mina do Barroso appeared first on A Voz de Trás-os-Montes.

O Município de Alcoutim, a Federação de Caçadores do Algarve e 28 associações e clubes de caça e pesca assinaram, a 10 de outubro, um protocolo de colaboração para reforçar a prevenção de incêndios rurais, melhorar os acessos no território e promover a recuperação dos habitats naturais do concelho.

O acordo foi formalizado durante a Feira da Perdiz, em Martim Longo, numa cerimónia que contou com a presença do presidente da Federação de Caçadores do Algarve, Vítor Palmilha, do presidente da Câmara Municipal de Alcoutim, Paulo Paulino, e de representantes das entidades aderentes.

A parceria prevê a instalação e manutenção de pastagens anuais em faixas de gestão de combustível, bem como a beneficiação de caminhos agrícolas e da rede viária complementar. Estas intervenções pretendem reduzir a continuidade da vegetação, dificultando a propagação dos incêndios, e melhorar as condições de acesso das equipas de vigilância e combate aos fogos rurais.

A sementeira de cereais e leguminosas deverá também contribuir para aumentar a disponibilidade de alimento para a fauna selvagem, sobretudo nas zonas com menor abundância de recursos, favorecendo a biodiversidade e o equilíbrio dos ecossistemas locais.

No âmbito do protocolo, a Federação de Caçadores do Algarve ficará responsável pela coordenação técnica dos trabalhos e pela representação das associações aderentes junto da autarquia.

A iniciativa enquadra-se numa estratégia de prevenção estrutural dos incêndios rurais, que procura envolver diferentes setores na gestão do território e na redução da vulnerabilidade das áreas florestais.

Esta parceria dá continuidade a outras iniciativas promovidas pela Federação de Caçadores do Algarve, que mantém acordos semelhantes com os municípios de Tavira, Castro Marim e São Brás de Alportel, visando articular a atividade cinegética com a gestão territorial e a proteção ambiental.

VTM

Em declarações à VTM, Felicidade Morais, membro da comissão organizadora do evento, destacou a sua importância no panorama académico, considerando-o “um dos mais antigos, senão o mais antigo, da UTAD”.

A primeira edição realizou-se em 1996 no Departamento de Letras, tendo o evento vindo a crescer progressivamente ao longo dos anos, com a participação de investigadores de universidades nacionais e estrangeiras. A edição deste ano foi organizada pelo Departamento de Letras, Artes e Comunicação da UTAD, em parceria com o Centro de Estudos Sociais da Universidade de Coimbra e o Centro de Estudos em Letras da UTAD.

A edição deste ano contou com a presença de cerca de 70 investigadores de mais de dez países, num formato híbrido que combinou participações presenciais e online. Felicidade Morais explicou que a possibilidade de apresentar comunicações à distância contribuiu para atrair mais participantes e afirmou que os investigadores “se sentiram motivados pela temática do encontro a participar”.

The post UTAD acolheu encontro dedicado aos desafios das sociedades contemporâneas appeared first on A Voz de Trás-os-Montes.

VTM

Segundo o comandante dos bombeiros da Cruz Verde, José Salcedas, a colisão foi com uma “ambulância de transporte de doentes não urgentes, tendo-se registado dois feridos ligeiros, os condutores das viaturas. A ambulância era conduzida por uma bombeira, de 47 anos”.

Acrescentou ainda que os dois feridos foram transportados pelos bombeiros da Cruz Verde para o hospital de Vila Real.

O comandante disse ainda que na origem da colisão poderá ter estado uma ultrapassagem mal calculada.

O alerta foi dado por volta das 17h00 e para o local foram mobilizados 12 operacionais apoiados por cinco veículos, entre os quais os bombeiros da Cruz Verde e a GNR, que tomou conta da ocorrência.

The post Dois feridos em colisão que envolveu ambulância appeared first on A Voz de Trás-os-Montes.

VTM

Em declarações à VTM, o presidente da associação, José Gonçalves, destacou a importância de reunir pessoas que contribuíram para o crescimento do clube ao longo de cinco décadas e que partilharam experiências marcantes. “Este jantar tem como objetivo reunir muitas pessoas que representaram o Flaviense ao longo destes anos e celebrar os momentos bonitos que todos viveram neste clube”.

José Gonçalves, que assumiu a presidência há cerca de dois anos, recordou também a sua ligação pessoal à instituição, na qual foi atleta. O dirigente considera que o clube teve um papel importante na sua formação pessoal, ensinando-lhe valores que o acompanharam ao longo da vida. “Sinto uma enorme alegria neste momento, aqui a celebrar 50 anos de um clube no qual também fui atleta e que me ensinou a ser homem”.

Atualmente, a Associação Desportiva Flaviense conta com cerca de 300 atletas, distribuídos pelas modalidades de futebol, futsal e basquetebol, fazendo uma aposta forte na formação. Só no futebol, o clube conta com cerca de 200 atletas, desde os quatro anos até aos sub-16. Quanto ao basquetebol, esta modalidade encontra-se ainda numa fase de desenvolvimento, com a realização de captações para a formação de equipas, referiu José Gonçalves.

The post Associação Desportiva Flaviense celebrou meio século de história appeared first on A Voz de Trás-os-Montes.

As the US turned 251, a familiar ritual repeated this year as American politicians lined up to toast the Navy with patriotic messages and, interestingly, images of Indian and Russian warships.

The US Navy celebrates its birthday every year on October 13, marking the day the Second Continental Congress authorized the outfitting of two armed vessels to intercept British supply ships during the American Revolution—the decision that created the Continental Navy, a force that eventually grew into the United States Navy.

As US Navy birthday wishes poured in on October 13, several US lawmakers joined the rush to pay their homage, resulting in a series of social media misfires.

For instance, Georgia Governor Brian P. Kemp posted a message with an image of three sleek gray warships steaming in formation.

At first glance, the post seems routine, but a closer look reveals the warships are Indian Navy vessels, as Dave Brown, the Deputy Washington Bureau Chief at The Wall Street Journal, and military observers pointed out.

The ships have since been identified as INS Godavari, INS Brahmaputra, and INS Beas, although a community note on Kemp’s post flags them as Kolkata-class guided-missile destroyers.

Despite criticism, Kemp has not taken down the post.

Another lawmaker, Ohio State Representative Mike Dovilla, paid his respects on X, saying: “Happy Birthday, U.S. Navy. I am proud of my service in naval intelligence and grateful to all who serve our nation with honor, courage, and commitment. To our sailors, veterans, and their families, thank you.”

Interestingly, though, Dovilla used an image of a Russian warship instead of a US one, a move that drew scrutiny, given that the lawmaker is a Navy Reserve commander and has previously served as a lieutenant commander in the Navy.

Dovilla deleted the post after observers pointed out the error.

Meanwhile, San Diego Mayor Todd Gloria posted images of what has been identified as the Soviet-era cruiser Mikhail Kutuzov, now a museum ship based in Novorossiysk, Russia.

To make matters worse, Gloria wrote: “San Diego is a proud military town. Sailors and their families are a part of the fabric of our community. For 251 years, sailors have answered our nation’s call with courage,” further emphasizing his ignorance.

In another goof-up, the Republican-aligned think tank Freedom Caucus Foundation jumped on the bandwagon of errors by using a picture of the Indian Navy ship INS Trikand. 

A Mistake That Keeps Repeating 

In 2025, the US Navy’s SEAL Museum posted an image of a Russian missile cruiser to mark the US Navy’s 250th birthday. Meanwhile, several elected representatives and public accounts used images of Indian and Russian Navy warships to mark the service’s birthday.

Representative Kyle Donahue, Representative Arvind Venkat, and Representative Andy Harris used images of Indian warships in their posts, while Senator Jim Boyd used an image of a Russian battleship cruiser to pay tribute to the US Navy for its birthday.

These are just a few of the many social media faux pas that were flagged last year.

Similarly, in 2023, Representative Cory Mills and Representative David Trone’s birthday greetings featured images of a Russian warship. On the other hand, the SEAL Legacy Foundation, which supports families of wounded and fallen United States Navy SEALs, used a Russian ship to mark the occasion, whereas the official X page of Homeland Security used the image depicting a Canadian frigate. 

Things weren’t much different in 2021, when Senator Jim Risch published a heartfelt wish for the USN’s birthday, but used a photo of what was later identified as a Pattani-class offshore patrol vessel belonging to the Royal Thai Navy, potentially built by China.

While ship identification may not be a strong suit for many in the United States, it is not much different for combat aircraft.

In a major embarrassment last year, the Pentagon’s Joint Program Office  (JPO) posted an image of the Chinese J-35A stealth fighter instead of the US F-35 Joint Strike Fighter in a Veterans Day homage post. “Today, and every day, we thank all Veterans and those currently serving for their service and sacrifice,” the Pentagon official’s post stated. However, the office took the post down as criticism mounted over the bizarre mistake.

In 2023, Rep. Anna Paulina Luna—an Air Force (USAF) veteran herself—posted birthday graphics for the US Air Force (USAF) on X and Instagram that used silhouettes of Russian MiG-29 fighters. Air Force historians and defense analysts immediately flagged the image, after which the politician took it down and blamed a junior staffer for the error.

In 2021, Sen. Cindy Hyde-Smith of Mississippi made a similar error when she congratulated the US Air Force Reserve Command on its birthday with a graphic showing Russian Su-34 Fullback strike aircraft. “Happy 73rd Birthday to the @USAFReserve! Thankful for all the reservists who are constantly on the ready to serve our nation,” Hyde-Smith said on X, along with a graphic showing four Su-34 jets in flight. 

Needless to say, she deleted the post after netizens mocked her for the error.

However, Dr. Rob Lee of King’s College in London, who specializes in war studies, joked at the time that Hyde-Smith’s post was part of the “national pastime of mistaking Russian weapons for our own” among Americans.

In an even more ridiculous mistake in 2021, the official Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) account posted a birthday graphic for the US Air Force that featured silhouettes of Russian Sukhoi Su-27 fighter jets.

Meanwhile, one of the accounts connected to “Operation Inherent Resolve” posted a picture of two US Navy Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornets with best wishes to the air force, creating another embarrassing situation.

Similarly, Donald Trump’s 2020 reelection campaign released a “Support Our Troops”  advertisement accompanied by a photo of Russian MiG-29 fighter jets flying over troops with Kalashnikov-pattern rifles. Unsurprisingly, aviation experts widely mocked it, saying it clearly wasn’t American.

Defense analysts have long noted the mechanics behind these recurring errors. For example, modern warships and fighters share enough visual DNA- gray paint, angular superstructures, and similar radar masts- that non-specialists struggle to tell them apart at a glance.

Staffers working under deadline pressure rarely pause to verify hull numbers or distinctive features, making it a low-stakes but revealing ritual.

• Contact the author at sakshi.tiwari13 (at) outlook.com
• Follow EurAsian Times on Google News

The post Russian & Indian Warships Hog Online Limelight as U.S. Navy Turns 251. Social Media Gaffe Continues appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

VTM

Os dois antigos autarcas, eleitos pelo Partido Socialista (PS), começaram a ser julgados a 17 de abril, perante um coletivo de juízes da comarca de Vila Real. Ambos foram detidos pela Polícia Judiciária (PJ), em outubro de 2022, no âmbito da operação Alquimia, tendo posteriormente renunciado aos cargos que exerciam na autarquia.

O processo envolve 59 arguidos, dos quais 40 são pessoas singulares e 19 empresas, e abrange um conjunto de alegados crimes, entre os quais prevaricação, participação económica em negócio, falsificação de documentos, corrupção ativa e passiva, recebimento ou oferta indevida de vantagem, branqueamento de capitais e fraude na obtenção de subsídio ou subvenção.

Uma das testemunhas de acusação ouvida foi José Carvalho de Moura, antigo presidente da Câmara de Montalegre e ex-vereador eleito pelo PSD, que confirmou ter estado entre os denunciantes do processo. Durante o seu depoimento, apontou alegadas irregularidades na contratação pública, nomeadamente o fracionamento de obras para evitar concursos públicos e a existência de procedimentos que considerou viciados.

The post Julgamento de ex-autarcas prossegue com audição de testemunhas appeared first on A Voz de Trás-os-Montes.

Nove das 29 pessoas que ficaram desalojadas devido ao incêndio de ontem, no bairro da Horta da Areia, em Faro, regressaram a casa, enquanto 20 continuam em alojamentos temporários.

“Queremos uma solução rápida para alojar definitivamente as pessoas”, afirmou à Lusa Davide Fernandes, diretor técnico do Centro Comunitário Horta da Areia, acrescentando que a Câmara de Faro não dispõe de habitação social para as colocar.

Nove das 29 pessoas “puderam regressar às suas habitações”, que não foram afetadas pelas chamas, sendo que os elementos do centro comunitário prestaram apoio às famílias desalojadas através de “medicamentos e refeições”.

As 20 pessoas restantes, entre as quais quatro crianças e dois bebés, de três meses e um ano, ficaram desalojadas e foram instaladas temporariamente nas piscinas municipais e pelo Centro de Alojamento de Emergência Social do Movimento de Apoio à Problemática da Sida (MAPS).

O incêndio deflagrou ao início da tarde de terça-feira e foi dominado cerca de duas horas depois, destruindo duas casas, mas sem ferir a população.

One person has died as stormy weather with high volumes of water is sweeping across Greece, affecting mostly Greek islands. Rhodes is one of the Greek islands severely hit by the bad weather front, while Evia and the Sporades islands (Skiathos, Skopelos and Alonissos) are also at the mercy of the intense weather phenomena. RHODES […]

The post One dead as stormy weather sweeps across Greek islands appeared first on Keep Talking Greece.

VTM

A posição surge após a publicação, em Diário da República, do Decreto-Lei n.º 199/2026, que atribui apoios a diferentes setores afetados pelo aumento dos custos dos combustíveis. O diploma prevê uma dotação máxima de três milhões de euros para empresas de transportes de táxis, entidades do setor social e associações humanitárias de bombeiros.

No caso das corporações, o apoio incide sobre o gasóleo rodoviário e a gasolina utilizados em veículos de socorro, combate a incêndios e transporte de doentes. O valor definido é de 10 cêntimos por litro, considerando um consumo de referência de 1200 litros mensais por viatura nos veículos de classe S (Super) das associações humanitárias e de 400 litros nos restantes veículos.

Para a federação distrital, a medida é positiva, mas deve ser acompanhada por uma resposta célere aos problemas que continuam pendentes na aplicação do anterior regime de apoio aos combustíveis. A estrutura distrital manifesta “profundo descontentamento” relativamente ao Decreto-Lei n.º 80-A/2026, de 31 de março, alegando que várias associações do distrito ainda não receberam qualquer verba, apesar de terem cumprido os procedimentos de candidatura. Nas corporações que já receberam pagamentos, a federação afirma que estes foram feitos “de forma tardia” e que os valores ficaram abaixo do que era expectável.

The post Bombeiros pedem rapidez no pagamento de apoio extraordinário aos combustíveis appeared first on A Voz de Trás-os-Montes.

Amid growing anxieties in Europe over “the Russian threat”, the US Air Force General Alexus Grynkewich, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), has unveiled what he called the alliance’s “Theory of Victory”. 

Though his Polish hosts did not seem fully satisfied, General Grynkewich assured, on October 12, at the “Warsaw Security Forum,” an annual international conference in the Polish capital, that the alliance is ready to defend itself.

Reassuring America’s reliability as an ally and Washington’s firm commitment to NATO’s Article 5, which envisages collective defense, he said that if an adversary is “foolish enough” to strike, the alliance is fully prepared to “fight tonight”.

During a panel discussion titled “Theory of Victory: How Do We Achieve Military Success Against Russia in Deterrence and Defense?” Grynkewich stated that NATO would destroy “anything and everything” that supports an attack on allied territory.

He asserted, “Should the adversary choose to press the attack or commit his reserves, we will break the warfighting system engaged against us.”

In what the experts describe as an unprecedented move to project an absolute ironclad assurance of security to the one billion citizens living under the NATO umbrella, and to send an unmistakable warning of devastating consequences to adversaries, particularly Moscow ( though he did not mention it explicitly), General Grynkewich then went on to clearly articulate key elements of what was hitherto classified as NATO’s “Theory of Victory”.

NATO had developed a well-known “Theory of Victory,” but its elements were not well understood. General Grynkewich revealed them as part of a rigorous three-phase strategic framework: “Block, Blunt, and Break”.

This triad dictates the sequential escalation and synchronization of Allied multi-domain power from the very first moments of aggression.

While Grynkewich did not explicitly mention Russia during his address, his comments clearly targeted Moscow, especially in light of NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept, which identifies Russia as the most significant and direct threat to allied security.

“My theory of victory is simple: we will block the initial attack. If the attack persists, we will blunt it and prevent enemy advance,” he expla ned. “And if required, we will break the enemy’s forces and the operational warfighting system that is arrayed against us.”

Based on his elaboration, Phase One of Block is the first line of defense. It focuses on an immediate, unyielding denial of territory. If an adversary breaches an allied border, NATO’s forward land forces are trained to deploy instantaneously to halt the invading army directly at the point of contact.

Rather than letting an adversary establish a foothold or capture territory for political leverage, the “Block” phase aims to isolate the initial push. This relies on integrated multi-domain operations, using localized ground units heavily supported by air superiority, naval assets, space surveillance, and active cyber capabilities to immediately close the operational window on the attacker.

If an offensive survives the initial blocking force and persists, NATO transitions to the “Blunt” phase.

The goal shifts from containment to actively stripping the enemy of operational momentum and initiative. To achieve this, the alliance leverages highly advanced technological systems. Grynkewich highlighted the deployment of massive sensor networks, autonomous combat systems, and AI-driven multi-domain targeting to completely suppress the enemy’s ability to coordinate large-scale maneuvers or advance deeper into allied territory.

The final, most severe component of the strategy is the mandate to “Break” the adversary. If an aggressor refuses to cease hostilities or attempts to mobilize its strategic reserves, NATO will launch massive, far-reaching retaliatory actions. Grynkewich explicitly stated that this phase extends far beyond the physical front lines of the immediate conflict. NATO will target and destroy the entire overarching warfighting framework arrayed against it.

This means systematically dismantling command-and-control centers; physical supply and logistics networks; replenishment warehouses; communications arrays; and anything else sustaining the offensive force.

However, Grynkewich carefully balanced aggressive deterrence with diplomatic clarity, noting that NATO did not view a direct military conflict with Russia as imminent or inevitable. Instead, he stressed that the most effective tool for preserving peace is maintaining absolute readiness for war while keeping communication channels open to prevent miscalculations.

This updated strategy appears to draw directly on critical lessons from contemporary battlefields in Ukraine and the Middle East. It explicitly moves away from relying solely on hyper-expensive, exquisite military hardware. Instead, NATO is prioritizing a hybrid mix of technological enablers that pairs high-end precision weapons with large numbers of cheaper, scalable systems like attritable drones and counter-UAS platforms to overwhelm an adversary’s defenses effectively.

General Grynkewich reportedly emphasized three things in this regard: 

First is the “Eastern Flank Deterrence Initiative (EFD),” which serves as the deployment vehicle for a vast network of low-cost, expendable drones and minimally crewed or fully autonomous reconnaissance and strike systems.

Second is “AI-Powered Targeting,” which uses artificial intelligence to sift through vast data streams generated by advanced sensors, satellite arrays, and cyber intelligence. By shortening the sensor-to-shooter loop, AI-enabled networks identify, categorize, and assign targets to artillery, missile systems, or loitering munitions in real time, long before human staff could process the raw coordinates.

Third is the “System Layering” strategy, which does not replace heavy conventional hardware such as main battle tanks or fifth-generation fighter jets but rather insulates them. Cheap, modular drone walls absorb the weight of initial saturation attacks, counter enemy mass, and clear pathways, preserving high-end kinetic platforms for decisive operations against hardened infrastructure.

Overall, the emphasis on sensors, autonomous systems, precision weapons, and integrated land, air, sea, space, and cyber capabilities recognizes that contemporary combat depends as much on information, networks, and logistics as on troop numbers.

The idea is that NATO must exploit technological advantages while producing affordable systems in sufficient quantities.

NATO has periodically revised its strategies, keeping technological developments and threat environments in mind.

During the Cold War, the alliance relied primarily on what it called “forward defense” and “flexible response.”  The forward defense strategy supposedly committed NATO to hold the inner-German border and assumed a possible retreat across deep defensive lines before counter-attacking.

The Flexible Response strategy relied heavily on the explicit threat of nuclear escalation in the theater to offset Warsaw Pact forces’ conventional numerical superiority.

After the end of the Cold War and disintegration of the Soviet Union,  NATO was said to have adopted an expeditionary, crisis-management model. In this model, deterrence was linked to political goodwill, and force structures were optimized for out-of-area counter-insurgency campaigns.

This resulted in a lean force model with thin ammunition reserves and a lack of the rapid forward mobilization needed for high-intensity, continent-scale conventional combat.

Against this background, the “Theory of Victory” is said to address post-Cold War vulnerabilities by institutionalizing a modern denial posture. It replaces reliance on early tactical nuclear escalation with conventional, technology-driven mass.

Apparently,  it abandons the concept of “liberation after occupation,” acknowledging that the civilian cost and physical destruction associated with liberating occupied territory are strategically unacceptable in the modern geopolitical environment.

Instead, it shows the capacity to neutralize an incursion early and convince potential adversaries that the cost of an attack will always outweigh any conceivable strategic gain.

Finally, by linking it to Article 5, NATO’s latest concept displays elements of calculated “strategic ambiguity”; it is id. NATO will not publicly define the exact point at which an attack would trigger its collective-defense clause, as doing so would help adversaries calculate how far they can escalate without provoking an allied response.

The ambiguity is designed to complicate enemy calculations, ensuring that hybrid operations, gray-zone provocations, or minor border incursions carry the unpredictable risk of drawing a full, multi-domain response from the alliance.

While the reactions of America’s major European NATO allies to General Grynkewich were not available at the time of writing, it is fair to guess they were reassured that Washington is prepared to fight if attacked.

However, erstwhile Warsaw Pact member and now Russia’s biggest critic, Poland, which has joined NATO, does not seem fully satisfied. Reports quoting the Polish weekly “Polityka” question the fundamental premise of NATO’s military strategy: preventing an adversary from achieving its goals, rather than launching an offensive campaign to destroy a foreign military power fully.

This perspective, detailed by defense analyst Marek Świerczyński, unpacks the structural reality behind General Alexus Grynkewich’s “Theory of Victory” speech.

He argues that beyond NATO’s institutional focus on calculated deterrence, escalation control, and defending its current borders, the alliance should fight deep inside Russia, without crossing the border, to crush the Russian military as a whole (through missile and drone firepower).

But then, this is a limited view. Overall, General Grynkewich seems to reflect that current NATO thinking is to de-escalate with Russia, not to defeat it strategically or to change its regime. The core objective of the Theory of Victory strategy is strictly containment, deterrence, and risk management.

In that sense, the name of the theory may be a little misleading.

• Author and veteran journalist Prakash Nanda is Chairman of the Editorial Board of the EurAsian Times and has been commenting on politics, foreign policy, and strategic affairs for nearly three decades. He is a former National Fellow of the Indian Council for Historical Research and a recipient of the Seoul Peace Prize Scholarship.
• The author can be reached at prakash.nanda (at) hotmail.com

The post Top USAF General Reveals NATO Plan to Fight Russia — But it is Designed for Containment, Not Decisive Defeat appeared first on EURASIAN TIMES.

VTM

Barrosões apresentaram grande rigor tático, espírito de sacrifício, muito compactos a defender e competentes no ataque. Bragança muito mal no primeiro tempo, melhorou na segunda parte e não empatou porque na baliza esteve uma parede chamada Dani, guarda-redes dos “Bravos do Barroso”.

Jogo bastante disputado, muito físico, e também por aqui se pode explicar os dez amarelos mostrados pelo árbitro, mais dois vermelhos, um para cada banco de suplentes.

O Bragança não esteve bem durante os primeiros 45 minutos, tem apenas uma clara oportunidade de golo através de um remate forte de Pipo, um dos mais inconformados do conjunto da casa. O Montalegre defendeu bem e procurava sair para o ataque da mesma forma. Aos 12’, o Montalegre não aproveita um buraco na defensiva contrária e, antes do intervalo, Tiago Correia tem disparo venenoso ao lado do alvo. Ainda nos primeiros 45 minutos, Gonçalo, avançado do Bragança, ficou a queixar-se de agressão. Ao intervalo, 0-0.

The post Montalegre apagou chama do líder appeared first on A Voz de Trás-os-Montes.

VTM

O Presidente da República, António José Seguro, esteve na Casa de Mateus, para presidir à cerimónia de entrega do Prémio D. Diniz 2026, que distinguiu a escritora Djaimilia Pereira de Almeida pela sua obra “Livro da Doença”.

Durante o seu discurso, o chefe de Estado salientou a importância de valorizar o interior como prioridade nacional e alertou para a necessidade de combater as desigualdades territoriais e de criar oportunidades fora dos grandes centros urbanos. “O interior de Portugal não pode ser visto apenas a partir das suas dificuldades”.

António José Seguro salientou a importância de garantir serviços públicos de qualidade, melhores acessibilidades e condições que permitam atrair investimento e fixar a população. Defendeu ainda que o interior deve ser valorizado não apenas pelas suas dificuldades demográficas, mas também pelo seu património, instituições e riqueza cultural.

The post Seguro diz que a cultura é motor de desenvolvimento do interior appeared first on A Voz de Trás-os-Montes.

As obras da dessalinizadora em Albufeira e da captação de água no rio Guadiana, no Pomarão, vão implicar um investimento conjunto de cerca de 305 milhões de euros (ME), sendo que já foram apresentadas duas candidaturas no valor de quase 300 milhões.

Segundo Helena Lucas, presidente da Águas do Algarve, o projeto de tomada de água do Guadiana no Pomarão, no concelho de Mértola, distrito de Beja, para reforçar o abastecimento de água ao Algarve através de uma ligação à barragem de Odeleite, representará um investimento de 188,7 ME, com uma candidatura já entregue de 172,9 ME ao Sustentável 2030, programa financiado pelo Fundo de Coesão.

A responsável adiantou que o concurso para a empreitada da captação já encerrou, estando “sete propostas abertas para avaliar nos próximos meses”.

Já a Estação de Dessalinização de Água do Mar do Algarve (EDAM), em Albufeira, custará 116,9 ME, com uma candidatura de 110,3 ME já apresentada ao Sustentável 2030. “Esperemos que continue a não haver atrasos, e que em 2029, que é a nossa janela de oportunidade para construir e colocar em serviço [estes equipamentos], possamos, de facto, estar descansados no que se refere à resiliência hídrica do Algarve”, perspetivou.

A partir do Pomarão, que vai permitir a captação de, em média, 16 hectómetros cúbicos anuais de água, “teremos sempre uma possibilidade de garantir uma segurança hídrica anual, que não tínhamos antes”. Com a dessalinizadora, que numa primeira fase prevê produzir 16 hectómetros cúbicos de água por ano, “podemos ir repondo os níveis para haver sempre disponibilidade para o abastecimento público”.

Segundo Helena Lucas, atualmente é necessário captar “cerca de 75 hectómetros de água por ano” para garantir o abastecimento público no Algarve.

A Agência Portuguesa do Ambiente revelou, no final de setembro, que o Algarve iria iniciar o novo ano hidrológico com 74% de armazenamento nas seis principais albufeiras, num total de 328 milhões de metros cúbicos, mais 13 milhões do que há um ano.

Também ouvido na comissão parlamentar de Ambiente e Energia requerida pelo PS, o presidente da Comissão de Coordenação e Desenvolvimento Regional do Algarve, José Apolinário, frisou que os 16 municípios da região têm em curso obras, num montante estimado em 120 ME, para reduzir as atuais perdas de água de 20% para 15% até 2030.

O presidente do Turismo do Algarve, André Gomes, adiantou, por sua vez, na mesma ocasião, que cerca de 130 empreendimentos turísticos algarvios – 30% da oferta regional de camas – já aderiram ao selo “Save Water”, atribuído desde 2024, tendo reduzido o seu consumo anual de água em 12%.

Ukrainian forces have reported the sudden loss of satellite communications during high-speed drone operations after SpaceX imposed new restrictions on its military-grade Starshield service. The disruption revives questions over American control of Ukraine’s battlefield communications and follows earlier controversies involving Elon Musk’s intervention in Ukrainian military operations.

Ukraine’s armed forces have reported serious disruptions to drone operations after Elon Musk’s SpaceX introduced new restrictions on its Starshield satellite communications service overnight on 13–14 October. The changes reportedly caused Ukrainian unmanned aircraft to lose connectivity when travelling faster than 160 kilometres per hour, forcing the abandonment of several military missions.

The restrictions were confirmed by Serhiy Beskrestnov, an adviser to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on defence technologies, who said Ukrainian forces had received no advance warning. According to his account of the disruption, the new limit of 100 miles per hour applies to Starshield, the military communications service developed by SpaceX for government and defence applications.

Serhiy Sternenko, a prominent Ukrainian volunteer and former adviser to the defence minister, was among the first to report the problem. In a statement published on Wednesday morning, he said satellite connections had begun disappearing once drones exceeded the new speed threshold, disrupting several important missions. Sternenko suggested that the decision might have been taken at the request of President Donald Trump’s administration, although no evidence establishing such an instruction has been made public.

Four Ukrainian military personnel speaking to Ukrainska Pravda independently reported problems with Starshield. One commander provided footage purportedly showing two Ukrainian drones losing their satellite connections during flight and becoming unable to complete their missions.

The restrictions do not appear to affect ordinary Starlink terminals operating within their existing speed limits. However, military-grade Starshield connectivity allows Ukraine to operate certain unmanned systems at considerably higher speeds, including aircraft conducting long-range missions against Russian military and industrial targets.

Previous disputes over Starlink access

The latest interruption is not the first occasion on which SpaceX has limited Ukraine’s military use of its satellite network. Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022, Starlink has become an essential component of Ukrainian battlefield communications, supporting frontline command systems, artillery coordination and unmanned operations.

In September 2022, during Ukraine’s counteroffensive in the south, Starlink communications failed in areas where Ukrainian forces were attempting to advance against Russian positions. A subsequent investigation published in July 2025 reported that Musk had personally ordered the suspension of service across parts of the battlefield, including areas around Kherson.

The interruption reportedly affected reconnaissance, artillery targeting and communications between military units at a critical stage of the operation. The investigation raised questions about the ability of a private technology provider to influence military operations through decisions governing access to its infrastructure.

Another controversy emerged in September 2023, when Musk acknowledged refusing a Ukrainian request to activate Starlink coverage near Sevastopol in Russian-occupied Crimea. Ukrainian forces had intended to use unmanned naval vessels against Russia’s Black Sea Fleet.

Musk argued that enabling the operation could have made SpaceX complicit in a major escalation of the war. His explanation also challenged earlier accounts suggesting he had actively switched off an existing connection, rather than declined to activate coverage in the requested area.

In February 2023, SpaceX president Gwynne Shotwell had already confirmed restrictions on Ukrainian drone operations, explaining that the company had not intended its commercial communications network to be used directly as a weapon.

Military dependence and American leverage

The Pentagon attempted to establish a more formal relationship with SpaceX in June 2023, contracting the company to provide satellite communications to Ukrainian forces. However, the contractual arrangements and the extent of American government authority over operational restrictions have never been fully disclosed.

Ukraine subsequently gained access to Starshield, which SpaceX describes as a secure satellite network intended specifically for national security applications. Unlike the commercial Starlink service, Starshield is designed to support government communications and other sensitive operations.

The latest restrictions therefore concern a service intended for military use rather than the civilian network at the centre of earlier disputes. Their introduction without advance notification has renewed concerns about Ukraine’s dependence on communications infrastructure controlled outside the country.

The timing is particularly sensitive as Washington and Kyiv continue to disagree over Ukrainian strikes against Russian energy facilities and the terms of a possible ceasefire. Ukraine has maintained that attacks against Russia’s oil industry are part of its campaign to reduce Moscow’s ability to finance and sustain the invasion.

Nevertheless, there is currently no independently established connection between those diplomatic disagreements and SpaceX’s decision to impose the new speed restriction. Neither a technical explanation nor evidence of an instruction from Washington had been publicly established when the disruption was reported.

For Ukrainian commanders, the immediate problem is operational. High-speed unmanned aircraft depend on reliable communications for navigation, mission management and the transmission of information. A restriction introduced without warning can render previously functioning systems ineffective in the middle of an operation.

The incident has exposed a persistent vulnerability in Ukraine’s military communications arrangements: even where the necessary aircraft, operators and mission capabilities are available, their employment may remain subject to restrictions imposed by an external satellite operator.