Number 116 on Rue Réaumur in Paris sits at the crossroads of the two worlds that define Revolut. On one side lies the historic financial district centered around the stock exchange; on the other, the Sentier neighborhood, home to much of the French capital’s technology ecosystem. It is at this intersection of finance and technology that the bank is preparing its new headquarters for Western Europe.

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© Benjamin Girette (EL PAÍS)

Just as Vladimir and Estragon waited for Godot in Beckett’s famous play, the world may now be waiting for Xi Jinping in the present political drama. America is stuck in two wars. In Ukraine, it would like to reach a compromise with Russia. In the Middle East, it is trying to bring down Tehran’s regime, […]

The post Wars and the oil blockades may be waiting for Xi’s party congress appeared first on Asia Times.

Beijing warns against ‘discriminatory’ step after France drops opposition to British role in Made in Europe package

No 10 has left the door open to imposing tariffs on Chinese-made electric vehicles as part of the Made in Europe package, prompting a warning from Beijing that such a move would be “discriminatory”.

Downing Street said on Friday that it would “welcome the objective to have the UK included in the Industrial Accelerator Act” after France dropped its opposition to Britain joining the scheme.

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© Photograph: Nick Carey/Reuters

© Photograph: Nick Carey/Reuters

© Photograph: Nick Carey/Reuters

Beijing warns against ‘discriminatory’ step after France drops opposition to British role in Made in Europe package

No 10 has left the door open to imposing tariffs on Chinese-made electric vehicles as part of the Made in Europe package, prompting a warning from Beijing that such a move would be “discriminatory”.

Downing Street said on Friday that it would “welcome the objective to have the UK included in the Industrial Accelerator Act” after France dropped its opposition to Britain joining the scheme.

Continue reading...

© Photograph: Nick Carey/Reuters

© Photograph: Nick Carey/Reuters

© Photograph: Nick Carey/Reuters

Beijing recalca a la comunidad internacional «la necesidad urgente de un alto el fuego efectivo en Gaza, la garantía total del acceso humanitario y el fin de los asentamientos en Cisjordania» .

O Brasil deve voltar ao posto de oitava maior economia do mundo em 2027, deixando para trás Rússia e Itália.

A projeção faz parte do documento Perspectivas da Economia Mundial, divulgado nesta semana pelo Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI).

Notícias relacionadas:

• FMI prevê crescimento de 2,2% do PIB do Brasil em 2026.

De acordo com o estudo, o Produto Interno Bruto (PIB, conjunto de todos os bens e serviços produzidos no país) brasileiro alcançará US$ 2,80 trilhões (R$ 14,65 trilhões) no ano que vem.

Em 2026, o país termina na décima posição do ranking, com PIB de US$ 2,655 trilhões.

Para 2027, a lista mantém os Estados Unidos como maior potência econômica, seguida pela China.

Confira o Top 10 das economias mundiais, segundo a projeção do FMI, instituição multilateral vinculada às Nações Unidas.

1. Estados Unidos: US$ 34,44 trilhões
2. China: US$ 22,94 trilhões
3. Alemanha: US$ 5,66 trilhões
4. Índia: US$ 4,52 trilhões
5. Reino Unido: US$ 4,49 trilhões
6. Japão: US$ 4,47 trilhões
7. França: US$ 3,65 trilhões
8. Brasil: US$ 2,80 trilhões
9. Itália: US$ 2,77 trilhões
10. Rússia: US$ 2,68 trilhões

A última vez em que o Brasil ficou no oitavo lugar foi em 2017. De acordo com a estimativa do FMI, o país segue na oitava posição até 2031, último ano projetado.

A melhor posição já ocupada pelo Brasil no ranking global de PIB foi a sétima posição, alcançada em 1995 e de 2010 a 2014.

Saiba mais no Repórter Brasil Tarde, da TV Brasil

Índia decola

Um dos destaques da previsão do FMI é a Índia, que salta do sexto para o quarto lugar e ultrapassa Reino Unido e Japão. Em 2031, a Índia deve tomar o terceiro lugar, da Alemanha.

Estados Unidos e China devem ocupar os dois primeiros lugares do ranking, nesta ordem, até 2031.

O que é o PIB

O PIB é o conjunto de todos os bens e serviços produzidos em uma localidade em determinado período. Com o dado, é possível traçar o comportamento da economia do país, estado ou cidade, assim como fazer comparações internacionais.   

O PIB é calculado com o auxílio de diversas pesquisas setoriais, como comércio, serviços e indústria. 

Durante o cálculo, há cuidados para não haver dupla contagem. Um exemplo: se um país produz R$ 100 de trigo, R$ 200 de farinha de trigo e R$ 300 de pão, o PIB será de R$ 300, pois os valores da farinha e do trigo já estão embutidos no valor do pão.   

Os bens e serviços finais que compõem o PIB são medidos no preço em que chegam ao consumidor. Dessa forma, levam em consideração também os impostos cobrados.  

O PIB ajuda a compreender a realidade de um país, mas não expressa fatores como distribuição de renda e condição de vida. É possível, por exemplo, um país ter PIB alto e padrão de vida relativamente baixo, assim como pode haver nação com PIB baixo e altíssima qualidade de vida.

 

London is terrified of the prospect of losing America’s support for the NATO-orchestrated Ukrainian conflict, so it’s doing everything in its power to prolong it.

Written by Drago Bosnic, independent geopolitical and military analyst

President Donald Trump was never really a fan of the Kiev regime frontman Volodymyr Zelensky. Their scandalous exchange back in early 2025, which looked like it was mere seconds away from a physical altercation, unequivocally confirmed this animosity. Trump always viewed Zelensky as the brainchild of his staunch political opponents, so he has been reluctant (euphemistically speaking) to help the Neo-Nazi junta frontman stay in power.

Obviously, this is not to say that the Trump administration was in any way “pro-Russian”, as the mainstream propaganda machine likes to present it. Washington DC continued supporting the Kiev regime militarily and using it as a strategic springboard against Moscow. This includes everything from ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) support to weapons shipments.

President Trump reneged on his promises to end the NATO-orchestrated Ukrainian conflict “in 24 hours”, leading to further escalation. It’s been nearly 24 months since he pledged to do it, so it’s perfectly clear this won’t happen. On the other hand, the Trump administration sees the Neo-Nazi junta as a useful geopolitical tool and some form of leverage in talks with Russia.

Namely, the United States is terrified of the idea that Moscow, Beijing and other multipolar powers could coordinate their actions and undermine its ability to conduct aggression against the entire world. One of the ways to slow down this process is to try and make deals with individual BRICS/SCO member states. Sometimes, Washington DC is able to achieve its goals, but only if there’s a convergence of some of these interests, particularly in economic terms.
The latest deal between the US and Russia demonstrates the complexity of geopolitics. Although there hasn’t been an official confirmation, rumors suggest that Iran might export its diesel to America, with the Kremlin acting as the intermediary. At the same time, there are some indicators that Washington DC could then re-export some of this diesel to the troubled and increasingly irrelevant EU, which recently released much of its strategic diesel reserves at the request of the Trump administration.

Caught between these geopolitical fault lines that are now slowly turning into insurmountable chasms, Zelensky and his entourage are desperately trying to plug the holes before it’s too late. Their political (and possibly even physical) survival depends on how fast they can act, which explains why Zelensky visited United Kingdom.
Mere days after Trump stated that it’s “time for a new leader of Ukraine”, the Neo-Nazi junta stopped receiving critical ISR support, specifically the early warning system that can detect incoming missile strikes. Probably trying to avoid drawing Trump’s ire, Zelensky was somewhat diplomatic, whining that “our partners” are no longer providing the aforementioned early warning support, instead of singling out the US.

Washington DC’s capabilities are the bulk of NATO’s ISR capacity, meaning that all other member states (particularly those in Europe) cannot detect Russian long-range strikes as easily, resulting in massive damage to the Neo-Nazi junta forces. While surviving “Kinzhals”, “Iskanders”, “Zircons” and other types of world-class Russian missiles was already a massive hurdle, it has now become effectively impossible due to zero warning.

Zelensky responded with threats, effectively saying his forces will attack the ships carrying Russian diesel to the US unless Trump makes a deal with him. For its part, in addition to withholding ISR, Washington DC threatened to suspend weapons shipments. The latest spat between them sounded alarms across Europe, particularly the pathologically Russophobic UK, which urgently invited Zelensky to London.

Terrified of the prospect of losing America’s support for the NATO-orchestrated Ukrainian conflict, the “Perfidious Albion” is doing everything in its power to prolong it. Something similar happened back in the early days of the special military operation (SMO), when the then UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson urgently flew to Kiev to ensure Zelensky opts out of the already signed deal with Russia.
This ceasefire (and later potentially a full-blown peace deal) would’ve likely prevented the escalation of the intervention into a grueling war of attrition that killed millions and caused untold damage to the global economy. Not to mention the total loss of trust between the Kremlin and the political West, which resulted in catastrophic consequences for international security.

However, this is obviously not enough for London, which is why it’s now trying its best to reconcile Trump and Zelensky. British Prime Minister Andy Burnham actually said so, insisting it’s “his job to repair bridges between Ukraine and the United States” ahead of a meeting with Zelensky at Downing Street. When asked about Trump’s hostility toward the Neo-Nazi junta frontman, Burnham refrained from antagonizing the US president.
Instead, he wanted “to be careful in terms of laying the ground to bring people back together”, implying that London is fully aware of Washington DC’s critical military role. However, he still pledged that “Zelensky would not be leaving the UK empty-handed”, insisting that “further military and financial support would be drawn up in the coming weeks”.

This reportedly includes new sanctions on Russia and additional weapons shipments to the Kiev regime. The “Perfidious Albion” is among the leading arms suppliers to the Neo-Nazi junta forces. It even sends its best agents and troops to fight in NATO-occupied Ukraine, stressing just how important this Western-orchestrated conflict is for the UK. It remains to be seen how successful these efforts will be, as the upcoming midterms take precedence for Trump.

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• Ukraine Runs Out of Patriot Missiles as Trump Turns on Zelensky
• UK To Help Ukraine Escalate With More Storm Shadow Missiles
• Russian Forces Concentrate Record Drone Strikes on Kirovohrad Region, Expand Attacks on Industry, Rail, and Airfields

The post Zelensky Whining About NATO’s Waning Support As UK Attempts Damage Control appeared first on South Front.

Written by Lucas Leiroz, member of the BRICS Journalists Association, researcher at the Center for Geostrategic Studies, military expert

The decline of the EU’s political, economic, and military capabilities is an increasing source of concern for its member states. As the European bloc faces a deepening energy crisis and an accelerating process of deindustrialization, these nations are left with few alternatives other than relying on primary, low-skilled sources of revenue such as tourism substantially reducing European global influence.

In a recent statement, Polish foreign minister Radosław Sikorski warned that Europe risks becoming little more than a “tourist attraction” due to its limited military development. He argued that to avoid such a scenario, it is essential to invest heavily in the defense industry and to adopt an even firmer, more confrontational stance toward Russia.

Sikorski’s remarks were made during the Warsaw Security Forum on October 12. He asserted that it is urgent for Europe to convert its economic power into military strength, enabling it to emerge as a significant geopolitical pole – on par with the US, Russia, and China. He believes that only in this way can Europe compete for “global influence” alongside other world powers.

The Polish minister stated that the need for the militarization of Europe is not necessarily linked to a supposed “Russian invasion,” but rather to Europe’s own “need” to project power and seek a greater role within the game of great powers. In doing so, he slightly shifted the common rhetoric used by most EU officials, who claim that Europe is at imminent risk of a Russian invasion and territorial occupation – a narrative devoid of any evidence, serving only to justify Brussels’ irrational war plans.

Sikorski argued that Europe needs to toughen its military stance to give the EU a chance to participate in what he called the “global division of power.” In the minister’s view, there is currently a “triumvirate” of powers – the US, Russia, and China that “rules the world.” Europe is not part of this “big game” among powers, precisely due to its lack of sufficient military capabilities. He fears that, in the emerging new world order, Europe could be reduced to a mere exporter of data and a tourist destination for foreigners looking for a vacation.

“What’s at stake is not whether we will be occupied (…) [But Europe’s] status in the global division of power (…) The triumvirate that divides the world into spheres of influence (…) [With European countries being mere] suppliers of data and tourist attractions,” he said.

Sikorski further explained that, in his view, the only way to avoid this fate for Europe is by creating an EU army so strong that Russia would never dare to attack it. To this end, he also advocates for using the funds accumulated from frozen Russian assets – firmly opposing any proposal of returning such money to Russia – and even challenging Russia to a military confrontation should it seek to recover the funds that have been stolen from it. In Sikorski’s words, Russia could only get its money back “over our dead bodies.”

Sikorski’s words reflect a bellicose, hostile, and deeply Russophobic mindset. Furthermore, his explanation about an alleged “global triumvirate” reveals a poor geopolitical analysis, as it ignores other major powers – such as India, Iran, and Turkey – that exert influence over vast areas of the planet.

Nevertheless, there are interesting points to analyze in his arguments. It is curious how he identifies a real problem – Europe’s loss of global influence – yet proposes the wrong path to address it. Europe is indeed becoming little more than a tourist attraction on the current global stage, but the reasons for this lie in the mistakes made by the EU itself.

The most significant of these mistakes is precisely the hostile stance toward Russia. Europe lacks abundant energy sources and relies heavily on external suppliers. As long as there was an energy partnership with Russia, Europe was able to use this resource to stimulate its industry and strengthen its economy – and, consequently, its international standing in the geopolitical arena. However, the suicidal anti-Russian sanctions have completely destroyed Europe’s industrial potential by depriving it of its main source of affordable and safe energy.

Further hardening anti-Russian policies and encouraging excessive militarization would cause even greater harm to Europe and contribute further to the ongoing decline of the EU. Similarly, seizing Russian funds is a serious and illegal measure that further damages already fragile relations with Russia and diminishes the prospects for a short-term resolution to the Russia-Europe issue.

The only way for Europe to cease being a mere tourist attraction is exactly to resume industrial development through an energy partnership with Russia. Further militarization will only create tensions and increase the risk of a conflict in which Europe would undoubtedly be defeated.

You can follow Lucas on X (formerly Twitter) and Telegram.

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MORE ON THE TOPIC:

• After Poland, Suspected Arson Targets Starlink Stations in Bulgaria (Video)
• Poles Protest Mass Ukrainian Migration
• Starlink Restrictions Disrupt Ukrainian Drones Amid Rising Tensions With Washington

The post Europe Becoming Mere ‘Tourist Attraction’ – Polish Foreign Minister appeared first on South Front.

Lacking the material conditions to challenge Chinese industrial supremacy, the European Union insists on turning its economic difficulties into a justification for a new escalation of hostilities.

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European leaders appear to have found a new strategic mission: rebuilding the continent’s industrial capacity while simultaneously reducing its dependence on China. The initiative was recently put forward jointly by France and Germany and is presented as a response to China’s growing presence in the European market. The problem is that the leaders responsible for this project continue to ignore a fundamental issue: no large-scale reindustrialization can succeed without a stable, abundant, and affordable energy supply.

Europe has excellent universities, a skilled workforce, advanced technological centers, and an industrial tradition that still gives it considerable advantages. However, these assets cannot function in isolation. Chemical plants, steel mills, metallurgical facilities, and numerous other industries depend on a continuous and competitive energy supply. Capital, scientific knowledge, and specialized workers cannot indefinitely compensate for high production costs. It is precisely at this point that Europe’s strategy contradicts its own objectives.

For decades, economic integration between Western Europe and Russia provided favorable conditions for the development of important industrial sectors. Russian natural gas supplies, in particular, helped sustain energy-intensive activities. This relationship served the concrete economic interests of both sides: Moscow had an important market for its exports, while European economies obtained a resource essential to their competitiveness.

The introduction of sanctions in 2022 profoundly altered this situation. The illegal coercive measures severed a longstanding Russo-European partnership, leaving the western part of the continent economically weakened and dependent on more expensive and less secure external energy supplies. Europe, which had already been undergoing gradual deindustrialization before then, subsequently plunged into an energy crisis, with consequences ranging from higher energy bills to business failures caused by the inability to maintain competitive production.

One would reasonably expect an industrial recovery strategy to begin by addressing these vulnerabilities. Instead, European leaders are attempting to build a new productive base without adequately resolving the energy problem. Those responsible for European economic policy seem to believe that subsidies, tax incentives, and investment programs will suffice to restore competitiveness. Such instruments can contribute to industrial development, but their effectiveness will remain limited as long as structural disadvantages in energy costs persist.

It is in this context that China is assuming an increasingly prominent position on Brussels’ “list of concerns”. China’s ability to manufacture on a massive scale, supply complex industrial chains, and offer competitively priced equipment poses a challenge to a Europe seeking to recover its productive autonomy. Rather than acknowledge the extent of the accumulated decline and develop a coherent strategy to reverse it, sections of the European leadership prefer to resort to trade barriers, punitive investigations, and mechanisms of economic containment.

This approach reveals a rather superficial understanding of industrial competition. Restricting Chinese imports does not automatically create European factories, reduce electricity costs, or guarantee gas supplies to industrial facilities. On the contrary, companies that depend on Chinese equipment, components, and raw materials may face higher expenses precisely when they need to invest in recovering their position in international markets.

The Russian question makes this situation even more delicate. Restoring energy cooperation with Moscow would be the first step in any serious industrial recovery plan. With Russian energy supplies and broad commercial partnerships with China, Europe could once again find a new path toward development, much as African and Asian countries are now beginning to do through their partnerships with Russia and China.

Brussels, Paris, and Berlin, however, are moving in the opposite direction. European strategists appear determined to confront two of the world’s largest industrial and energy powers simultaneously, without demonstrating that they possess the resources necessary to sustain such an ambition. First, they undermined a fundamental energy relationship with Russia. Now, they risk turning China into a permanent trade adversary.

Ultimately, what European hawks seek is not Europe’s development, but the instrumentalization of issues such as industry and trade to advance their own self-destructive agenda. Under this strategy, European citizens – already deprived of Russian energy and potentially facing reduced access to Chinese products in the near future – will once again be the first to bear the consequences.

Thailand introduced subsidies and tax cuts to encourage electric vehicle adoption. Now it is trying to recalibrate, alarmed by the threat to its industrial landscape.

Ministro da Educação, Ciência e Inovação explicou que as equipas técnicas dos dois países têm trabalhado desde junho, para a retoma dos trabalhos da comissão, suspensa, que não se reúne desde 2019.

© ANTÓNIO COTRIM/LUSA

Pequim está a desenvolver hardware e software de IA competitivos e planeia exportá-los assim que a procura interna estiver satisfeita, diz uma especialista em economia chinesa. O mundo está à beira de um “Choque da China 3.0”, impulsionado pela exportação de inteligência artificial, biotecnologia e robôs, que pode ser mais duro do que a vaga atual, diz uma das principais economistas especialistas em China. “Já estamos no ponto de partida do Choque da China 3.0”, disse Alicia Garcia-Herrero ao South China Morning Post, a partir de Taipé, após um painel virtual organizado na quarta-feira em Washington pelo Peterson Institute for

A questão de Taiwan não pode ser reduzida a uma disputa territorial distante. Nenhum povo deve ver o seu futuro decidido pela ameaça ou pelo uso da força.

The EU is preparing to curb Chinese imports of chemicals and industrial machinery, following a successful deal with Beijing that capped hybrid car exports to the bloc.

The European Commission “showed openness” to proposing safeguards, referring to an emergency brake on imports that can cover entire sectors, an EU diplomat told EUobserver on Thursday (15 October).

And there was “broad support” for the idea among member states for the commission to proceed, the diplomat said.

Last week, trade commissioner Maroš Šefčovič agreed with Beijing to cap imports of Chinese hybrid cars at 350,000 next year, which was less than half the amount expected this year.

He called the deal a “blueprint” for other sectors, a view which was publicly echoed by EU Commission president Ursula von der Leyen, also on Thursday. 

Under World Trade Organization (WTO) and EU rules, anti-dumping and anti-subsidy cases require Brussels to prove that Chinese firms sell at unfairly low prices or receive subsidies.

Safeguards do not need evidence under WTO rules, which allows them to be used as an emergency measure.

And the commission only has to show that a surge in imports is seriously harming European producers. 

“We like the idea, chemicals, machinery where there’s still a lot of Chinese overproduction needs to be managed,” said another EU diplomat.

The instrument had its limits: Safeguards have to apply to all countries, not just China, and can last no more than eight years.

The EU rarely uses WTO safeguards, but did so on steel, also aimed at China, which expired in June, after reaching the eight-year limit, and which have since been replaced by a separate EU steel regime.

And the Centre for European Reform, a prominent think-tank in Brussels, previously suggested exempting the EU’s 76 free-trade partners from safeguards so that the measures fell mainly on China.

It was a legal moot point in the WTO if that was OK, but the EU has done something similar before. 

Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and 10 other countries were left out of the steel safeguard, but using this tool to address Chinese imports was still seen as a temporary solution.

Before the end of the year, the EU commission aims to present diversification tools to reduce reliance on Chinese goods, as well as a mechanism to compensate companies hit by Chinese countermeasures.

And the package would include an instrument to shut Chinese companies out of the EU market if need be, in a measure first proposed in a Franco-German paper last week.

Google Maps still shows a prosperous image of Pacific Place, a business center on the busy Valley boulevard in a suburb east of Los Angeles, California. But that picture no longer matches reality. The windows of a mental health clinic and a real estate agency have been boarded up to protect the premises from vandalism. One by one, shops pulled down their shutters until the mall was almost deserted. Several businesses belonging to an enigmatic figure also closed: Guojun Xuan, a wealthy Chinese immigrant who is at the center of a chilling case involving the alleged mistreatment of 21 children at his Arcadia mansion.

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© Los Angeles Times (Los Angeles Times via Getty Imag)

Europe’s trade deficit with China reached a record $34.8bn [€31bn] in September, as EU leaders meet in Brussels on Thursday (15 October) to discuss Europe’s competitiveness agenda and what they call “macroeconomic imbalances” — a euphemism to avoid mentioning China by name.

EU heads of state and government are expected to give a mandate to the EU Commission to propose a set of trade defence measures and tools to reduce the EU’s reliance on Chinese industry, based on a new Franco-German blueprint, as a united front spreads across the bloc. 

There was a move towards a “surprising unitary position” on Beijing among member states, said an EU diplomat, ahead of a two-day summit in Brussels which began on Thursday (15 October).

A joint letter and policy paper submitted by French president Emmanuel Macron and German chancellor Friedrich Merz to commission president Ursula von der Leyen last week was viewed by many EU diplomats as marking a decisive shift towards a more consolidated EU stance on trade relations with China. 

“For a long time, there were significant differences between these two countries on how to deal with China, how to address the economic situation,” parliament president Roberta Metsola told reporters on Thursday. 

The diplomat added that the commission’s trade diversification package, designed to reduce the bloc’s reliance on Chinese industrial inputs and curb Chinese exports, will be presented by the end of the year and will be based on the Franco-German paper. 

But the commission, for its part, has downplayed the prospect of rapid progress to EU-Chinese trade statistics. “It’s an issue which is not going to be solved in a couple of months,” said one official. 

‘Be ready for escalation’ but do nothing

This article continues, but the full version is available only to EUobserver.com subscribers. Visit account.euobserver.com/membership

By Madeline CARR

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Recent warnings from American AI leaders have created the impression that the world is only beginning to confront the dangers of advanced artificial intelligence.

Dario Amodei, chief executive of tech company Anthropic, has called for governments to intervene to slow the development of increasingly powerful AI models.

His proposal begins with independent evaluators embedded inside AI companies, moves on to regulation and progresses to government-backed coordination among democratic states.

Ultimately, it seeks global agreements with China on testing of AI systems, dangerous applications of the technology and the pace of AI development.

Yet there is a China-shaped hole in this narrative. The Asian superpower is portrayed as the difficult final participant in a governance system that the US and its allies must first create.

In fact, China has already established an extensive system of AI rules, assessment, filing, technical standards and government oversight. Here’s how China’s AI governance system has developed in stages alongside the technology itself.

Beijing’s 2022 rules on algorithmic recommendation services apply to technologies that select, rank, filter or recommend online content to users.

They compel companies that use algorithms to examine how they work, to protect the personal information of users, to give users certain controls, and to introduce safeguards for workers, consumers, children and older people.

China’s deep synthesis provisions, effective from January 2023, extended regulation to synthetic (or AI-generated) text, images, audio and video. AI companies must authenticate users, protect data, keep relevant records, assess their systems and identify synthetic material that could be mistaken for authentic content.

The interim measures for generative artificial intelligence services were introduced in August 2023. These added rules for public-facing generative AI, particularly those that can influence public opinion or persuade uses in other ways.

The measures apply to the legality and quality of training data, users’ personal information, intellectual property and discrimination based on protected characteristics. The rules also cover transparency by AI companies and the accuracy and reliability of products.

Under the rules, companies must address problems found in their services. These services must undergo a security assessment to examine their risks and compliance with Chinese legislation. The companies must also file information about their algorithms with Chinese authorities.

These mechanisms are not identical to the independent evaluators that would be embedded in AI companies, as has been proposed by Amodei. But they perform some of the same functions.

Frontier risks

Beijing’s latest set of measures is called the AI safety governance framework 3.0, published in September 2026. It sets out a broad approach to identifying, grading and responding to risks throughout the lifecycle of AI systems.

Building on earlier versions, the framework covers AI model and data risks, vulnerabilities in open source models (those which can be freely modified by users), AI’s effects on employment and society and increasingly autonomous systems.

It includes a dedicated mechanism for managing risks associated with rapidly developing AI agents (systems that carry out tasks in response to instructions by a user).

The framework addresses some of the same dangers now generating alarm in Silicon Valley, including highly autonomous systems, the misuse of chemical, biological and nuclear technologies, and the possibility of humans losing control of advanced AI. It proposes continual safety evaluations, risk based safeguards, humans being in charge, and emergency intervention mechanisms.

An independent analysis by the US Carnegie Endowment for International Peace thinktank has described the framework as China’s attempt to “to advance frontier safety without the need for heavy handed regulatory interventions”.

Legal consequences

None of this means that Chinese AI rules should be transplanted elsewhere. Its institutions, regulatory traditions and technological priorities are different.

Many functions now presented as urgent aspirations in the US, including evaluation, accountability for AI companies, risk classification for AI systems, regulatory filing, technical standards and government oversight are already embedded in the governance architecture of the world’s other AI superpower.

The US is free to conclude that a market-led system best serves its economic and strategic interests. The Trump administration has favoured a “minimally burdensome” national approach to AI and has sought to limit more demanding state-level regulation.

But a market-led model cannot mean privatising the rewards of AI while exporting its risks. US companies may capture the commercial gains, while governments elsewhere are left to investigate security incidents, protect public systems and absorb the wider costs when those technologies fail. The OpenAI agent that gained unauthorised access to Australia’s state healthcare service shows how AI risks are being exported.

If Washington rejects extensive controls before systems are released, the US needs a credible legal regime for assessing who is liable for damage caused by those AI models. Otherwise, countries dependent on foreign AI systems will face increasingly difficult choices about whose technology to trust, and on what terms.

Silicon Valley’s governing ethos has long been to “move fast and break things”. That was always a questionable principle for technologies woven deeply into public life. It is untenable for companies whose own leaders now warn that their products could cause catastrophic harm.

Beijing has already surrounded its AI sector with public obligations, regulatory oversight and an evolving framework of risk assessment. A global debate that treats such governance as a future aspiration should at least recognise that one country is already ahead of the curve.

Original article: theconversation.com

EU leaders gathering in Brussels must reconcile demands for stronger industrial protection, affordable energy and a workable budget while maintaining support for Ukraine.

Europe’s economic vulnerabilities converge in Brussels today as EU leaders confront three closely connected challenges: competition from China, persistently expensive energy and disagreement over the Union’s next long-term budget. Together, they raise a question that successive summits have struggled to answer: can Europe translate its economic weight into a coherent strategy?

The immediate pressure comes from industry. Reuters reports that manufacturers blame rising Chinese exports for factory closures, while governments face mounting anxiety about employment and competitiveness. The political danger is clear. When established parties promise prosperity but communities experience industrial decline, voters become increasingly receptive to those offering simpler, more confrontational answers.

The Commission’s recent agreement with Beijing to limit Chinese hybrid-car imports offers leaders evidence that negotiation can deliver results. Yet one sectoral arrangement cannot settle a much broader dispute. Chemicals, steel and machinery remain sources of concern, demonstrating that Europe’s difficulties extend well beyond its automotive industry.

Europe should nevertheless distinguish between legitimate competition and demonstrably unfair trading practices. A trade deficit alone does not establish wrongdoing. Imported goods can benefit consumers and businesses that depend on affordable components. The stronger case for intervention rests on evidence of subsidies, market distortions or strategic dependencies that leave essential industries dangerously exposed.

Germany’s changing position is therefore significant. Previously a prominent opponent of EU tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, Berlin now backs Franco-German proposals for stronger action, including measures addressing chemicals and PET packaging plastics. Europe’s largest economy appears increasingly willing to reconsider assumptions that once favoured commercial engagement above confrontation.

That shift could strengthen Brussels’ negotiating position. Beijing has less reason to compromise when European capitals publicly disagree about whether action is necessary. A common approach would make the threat of trade measures more credible. But unity will be tested whenever retaliation threatens particular national industries or commercially influential companies.

Energy presents an equally demanding challenge. According to Reuters, draft summit conclusions seek additional short-term relief and refer to a proposed one-year delay in methane-emissions requirements affecting oil and gas imports. These remain proposals under discussion, rather than measures already agreed by leaders.

Temporary adjustments may ease immediate pressures, but postponing regulation cannot substitute for an energy strategy. European manufacturers need confidence about future costs before committing investment. That requires reliable supplies, stronger electricity networks and faster delivery of additional generating capacity. Repeated emergency interventions leave companies uncertain about the conditions under which they will operate.

Trade protection and energy policy must consequently work together. Raising barriers against imported products will achieve little if European factories remain burdened by uncompetitive operating costs. Equally, cheaper energy cannot compensate indefinitely for unfair competition. Treating these problems separately risks producing expensive measures that fail to address the underlying industrial weakness.

The budget discussion will expose whether governments are prepared to finance their ambitions. The proposed 2028–2034 framework requires unanimity, and Reuters reports that a special summit is planned for late November to pursue agreement. The familiar divide between national contributions and shared expenditure remains difficult to bridge.

Every government can identify European priorities worth supporting. Agreement becomes harder when those priorities require higher contributions, changes to established funding arrangements or reductions elsewhere. A credible settlement must explain which investments genuinely benefit from collective action and how spending will deliver measurable results. Larger totals alone cannot establish strategic seriousness.

Ukraine gives these negotiations an additional urgency. President Volodymyr Zelenskiy is expected to join Friday’s discussions, with financing for 2027 among the anticipated subjects. Europe’s ability to sustain assistance will test the durability of commitments repeatedly expressed at summit tables.

Ultimately, this gathering should be judged by whether its decisions reinforce one another. Defending industry, securing affordable energy and funding common commitments are parts of the same task. Europe possesses substantial market power and institutional resources. Its continuing challenge is to combine them effectively, before another round of political assurances gives way to further industrial disappointment.

La vittoria del Parti Québécois e il referendum del 19 ottobre in Alberta riportano al centro il problema della coesione canadese. La separazione resta minoritaria, soprattutto nell’Ovest, ma il riemergere simultaneo delle spinte centrifughe rappresenta una sfida politica per Mark Carney.

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A pochi mesi dal consolidamento parlamentare del governo liberale di Mark Carney, il Canada si trova ad affrontare una questione che sembrava essersi progressivamente allontanata dal centro della scena politica: quella della propria coesione interna. La vittoria del Parti Québécois (PQ) nelle elezioni provinciali del Québec del 5 ottobre e il referendum previsto per il 19 ottobre in Alberta, nel quale gli elettori saranno chiamati a pronunciarsi sull’eventuale avvio del procedimento verso un successivo referendum vincolante sulla separazione dal Canada, hanno riportato contemporaneamente alla ribalta due forme molto diverse di contestazione dell’assetto federale.

Sarebbe eccessivo sostenere che il Canada si trovi alla vigilia della disgregazione. In Alberta, soprattutto, tutti i dati disponibili indicano che l’opzione favorevole alla permanenza nella federazione dovrebbe prevalere con un margine molto ampio. Tuttavia, il fatto stesso che una delle province economicamente più importanti del Paese abbia ritenuto politicamente possibile sottoporre agli elettori una domanda di questo genere dimostra il malcontento di una parte della popolazione: una questione che fino a pochi anni fa apparteneva soprattutto alle frange più radicali del cosiddetto western alienation è entrata nella sfera della politica istituzionale.

Il caso del Québec, invece, ha radici molto più profonde. Le elezioni provinciali del 5 ottobre hanno riportato al governo, dopo oltre un decennio, il Parti Québécois guidato da Paul St-Pierre Plamondon. Il PQ ha conquistato 59 dei 127 seggi dell’Assemblée nationale, fermandosi cinque seggi sotto la maggioranza assoluta. Ottenendo circa il 28% dei voti, ha chiuso la consultazione elettorale davanti al Parti Libéral du Québec, attestatosi poco sopra il 24%, al Parti Conservateur du Québec, con circa il 21%, e a Québec Solidaire, che ha raccolto oltre il 12% conquistando nove seggi. La Coalition Avenir Québec (CAQ), al governo dal 2018, è invece crollata al 13,3% senza ottenere alcun seggio.

Un tale esito impone certamente una lettura prudente, in quanto il successo del PQ non equivale a un mandato maggioritario per l’indipendenza. Il partito, infatti, ha beneficiato della frammentazione del voto e ha ottenuto la percentuale più bassa mai registrata da una formazione vincitrice nella storia elettorale del Québec, mentre i sondaggi continuano inoltre a collocare il sostegno alla separazione dal Canada intorno al 30%, ben lontano da una maggioranza sociale. Lo stesso St-Pierre Plamondon ha indicato che non intende convocare un nuovo referendum finché Donald Trump resterà alla Casa Bianca, sostenendo che la pressione tariffaria e l’instabilità derivante dai rapporti con gli Stati Uniti rendono necessario evitare, per il momento, un’ulteriore crisi costituzionale.

Ciò non riduce tuttavia la portata della vittoria del PQ. Per la prima volta dopo molti anni, il governo della seconda provincia più popolosa del Canada sarà guidato da una formazione che considera esplicitamente l’indipendenza del Québec il proprio obiettivo storico. Inoltre, sommando i 59 deputati del PQ ai nove di Québec Solidaire, anch’esso favorevole alla sovranità del Québec sebbene attraverso un percorso politico e sociale profondamente diverso, nell’Assemblée nationale esiste una maggioranza numerica di deputati eletti sotto le insegne di partiti indipendentisti. Questo non significa che PQ e Québec Solidaire formeranno automaticamente un blocco comune, né che un referendum sia imminente, ma conferma che la questione nazionale québécoise è tutt’altro che scomparsa.

La sua natura, inoltre, resta profondamente diversa dal separatismo emergente in Alberta. Il nazionalismo del Québec dispone di una propria continuità storica, linguistica e culturale, di una tradizione intellettuale e politica consolidata e di istituzioni che hanno progressivamente acquisito un grado considerevole di autonomia rispetto a Ottawa. I referendum del 1980 e del 1995, quest’ultimo perduto dagli indipendentisti per uno scarto inferiore all’1%, hanno mostrato quanto la questione possa arrivare a mettere in discussione l’esistenza stessa della federazione canadese.

La situazione dell’Alberta nasce invece prevalentemente da fattori economici, fiscali ed energetici. La provincia, cuore dell’industria petrolifera canadese, ha sviluppato da tempo un forte risentimento nei confronti del governo federale, accusato da settori rilevanti dell’opinione pubblica occidentale di utilizzare la ricchezza prodotta dalle province delle praterie per finanziare politiche redistributive decise nell’Est, imponendo contemporaneamente vincoli ambientali e normativi penalizzanti per il settore degli idrocarburi.

Sebbene tutti i sondaggi siano concordi sul fatto che il referendum non dovrebbe avere esito positivo, la trasformazione di una rivendicazione precedentemente marginale in una questione sottoposta ufficialmente all’intero corpo elettorale provinciale rappresenta un passaggio qualitativo da non sottovalutare. Significa che una parte della classe politica dell’Alberta considera ormai il ricorso alla minaccia separatista uno strumento legittimo di pressione nei confronti del governo federale. La premier Danielle Smith ha annunciato che voterà per la permanenza nel Canada e non sostiene personalmente la separazione, ma è stato il suo governo ad aggiungere la domanda al referendum provinciale (che consiste di un totale di dieci quesiti). La stessa Smith ha presentato la consultazione come uno strumento attraverso il quale permettere agli albertani di esprimere il proprio malcontento nei confronti di Ottawa.

Una vittoria del 70% o persino superiore dell’opzione federalista non cancellerebbe il fatto che circa un quinto dell’elettorato di una provincia fondamentale per l’economia canadese sia disposto a considerare almeno l’avvio di un processo di separazione. Nel gennaio 2026 Ipsos aveva addirittura registrato un sostegno iniziale alla prospettiva separatista del 28% in Alberta, praticamente identico al 31% rilevato in Québec, salvo poi constatare che il consenso si dimezzava quando agli intervistati venivano prospettati i costi concreti dell’indipendenza. In altre parole, per una parte consistente degli elettori il separatismo albertano funziona soprattutto come voto di protesta e strumento negoziale nei confronti del centro federale.

Per Mark Carney, la contemporaneità dei due fenomeni costituisce una sfida particolarmente delicata. Il primo ministro ha costruito la propria strategia economica e internazionale attorno al concetto di “autonomia strategica” canadese. Di fronte all’uso crescente delle tariffe, delle catene di approvvigionamento e delle dipendenze economiche come strumenti di pressione, soprattutto da parte dell’amministrazione Trump, Carney ha sostenuto che il Canada debba ridurre la propria vulnerabilità nei confronti degli Stati Uniti, diversificando mercati, partner e infrastrutture.

Nel suo discorso al Lowy Institute di Sydney dello scorso marzo, il premier aveva affermato esplicitamente che l’integrazione economica non deve più trasformarsi in subordinazione e che le medie potenze devono costruire capacità sovrane nei settori strategici, dall’energia ai minerali critici, dall’intelligenza artificiale ai sistemi di pagamento. La stessa impostazione è stata successivamente ripresa nei rapporti con l’Unione Europea e nell’apertura di nuovi canali economici verso l’Asia.

Particolarmente significativa, in questo senso, è stata la normalizzazione dei rapporti con la Cina. Nello scorso mese di gennaio Carney è stato il primo capo di governo canadese a recarsi ufficialmente a Pechino dal 2017, incontrando Xi Jinping e Li Qiang e inaugurando un nuovo partenariato strategico sino-canadese incentrato su energia, commercio, agroalimentare, sicurezza e multilateralismo. Ottawa ha indicato apertamente la Cina come uno dei mercati necessari per ridurre l’eccessiva dipendenza economica dagli Stati Uniti.

Questa strategia incontra però un paradosso fondamentale. Per ridurre la dipendenza dagli Stati Uniti e rivolgersi maggiormente ai mercati asiatici, il Canada ha bisogno proprio delle risorse energetiche dell’Alberta. Il nuovo oleodotto Pacific Link, che dovrebbe trasportare un milione di barili al giorno verso la costa della Columbia Britannica, è uno dei pilastri materiali di questo progetto. Il 1° ottobre Carney ha annunciato l’accelerazione dell’iter autorizzativo, definendo il progetto di interesse nazionale e collegandolo esplicitamente all’obiettivo di raddoppiare le esportazioni canadesi verso mercati diversi dagli Stati Uniti. Oltre il 90% delle esportazioni petrolifere canadesi è stato storicamente diretto verso il mercato statunitense: aprire una nuova grande direttrice verso il Pacifico significa tentare di trasformare l’Alberta da provincia dipendente dall’accesso al mercato statunitense in piattaforma energetica della proiezione canadese verso l’Asia.

Non è dunque casuale che Carney abbia scelto di presentare il progetto proprio a Fort McMurray, nel cuore delle sabbie bituminose albertane, accanto a Danielle Smith e a poche settimane dal referendum. La politica energetica diventa così contemporaneamente politica estera e politica di coesione nazionale. Offrire all’Alberta infrastrutture, accesso diretto ai mercati mondiali e un ruolo centrale nella strategia di diversificazione canadese significa rispondere alle spinte centrifughe non attraverso una semplice riaffermazione dell’autorità federale, ma cercando di modificare le condizioni economiche che le alimentano.

Una logica analoga, sebbene applicata a un contesto completamente diverso, emerge nel rapporto con il Québec. Dopo la vittoria di St-Pierre Plamondon, Carney ha evitato un confronto frontale con il nuovo governo provinciale, insistendo invece sulla necessità di un “federalismo cooperativo” fondato su infrastrutture, abitazioni, crescita economica e difesa degli interessi canadesi di fronte alle pressioni statunitensi. Il premier sa che trasformare immediatamente la questione in uno scontro tra Ottawa e Québec City potrebbe offrire agli indipendentisti esattamente il terreno politico di cui hanno bisogno per allargare un consenso alla sovranità che oggi resta minoritario.

L’atteggiamento dell’amministrazione Trump produce quindi un duplice effetto sulla politica del vicino settentrionale. Da un lato, le pressioni economiche statunitensi hanno accelerato la ricerca canadese di una maggiore autonomia e hanno reso più urgente la costruzione di un mercato interno maggiormente integrato. Dall’altro, proprio la percezione di una minaccia esterna contribuisce per il momento a frenare i separatismi: St-Pierre Plamondon ritiene troppo rischioso organizzare un referendum sull’indipendenza mentre il Canada è impegnato in uno scontro commerciale con Washington; parallelamente, in Alberta la ricerca di nuovi mercati per il petrolio può ridurre alcune delle ragioni economiche del malcontento verso Ottawa.

Il Canada non appare dunque prossimo alla dissoluzione. Ma il ritorno simultaneo della questione nazionale del Québec e del separatismo albertano indica che il modello federale sta attraversando una fase di crescente tensione. In una fase nella quale Mark Carney cerca di costruire un Canada più autonomo dagli Stati Uniti, più presente sui mercati asiatici e dotato di maggiori capacità economiche e strategiche proprie, emerge con forza una contraddizione: per conquistare maggiore autonomia all’esterno, Ottawa deve prima garantire la propria coesione all’interno. Il petrolio dell’Alberta, il peso demografico ed economico del Québec, le infrastrutture interprovinciali e il consenso delle popolazioni che compongono la federazione non sono questioni separate dalla politica internazionale canadese, ma ne costituiscono la condizione materiale.

Per Carney, la costruzione dell’“autonomia strategica” canadese passa ormai anche dalla capacità di dimostrare che il Canada possiede ancora un progetto federale sufficientemente credibile da tenere insieme le sue componenti.

par Alvaro GARCIA LINERA

En 1858, Karl Marx avait prédit l’ascension de l’Asie au rang de centre du capitalisme. Aujourd’hui, la Chine confirme sa prophétie en occupant une position dominante dans l’économie mondiale (19,9% du PIB mondial en PPA) et dans le secteur industriel : elle est en tête dans 7 des 10 industries les plus avancées, dans la transition énergétique et dans la fabrication de haute technologie. Sa croissance a multiplié son économie par 54 depuis 1990 grâce à la planification et aux investissements de l’État. Bien que les États-Unis conservent la primauté du dollar et de leurs bases militaires, la Chine est le plus grand créancier mondial et la puissance décisive. L’article conclut en critiquant l’aveuglement des élites latino-américaines qui se tournent vers des puissances en déclin.

En 1858, Karl Marx s’était penché sur la marginalisation imminente de l’Europe et des États-Unis face à l’expansion du capitalisme en Asie. Dans une lettre adressée à Engels, il exprimait sa crainte qu’une future révolution européenne ne soit géographiquement réduite à un «petit coin» du monde, compte tenu de la montée de la société bourgeoise dans de vastes régions de la planète telles que la Chine, le Japon, l’Australie et la Californie (Œuvres complètes, vol. 40).

Nous étions au milieu du XIXe siècle, marqué par la domination mondiale absolue de l’Empire britannique, l’élan de la première révolution industrielle — la puissance de la vapeur, l’industrie textile — et la présence des États-Unis en tant que puissance intermédiaire fournissant du coton aux grandes usines de Manchester. Mais au-delà de tout cela, Marx voyait en Asie, et en Chine en particulier, la formation embryonnaire du nouveau cœur du capitalisme mondial.

Cent soixante-huit ans se sont écoulés, et les prédictions de Marx ont été confirmées par l’histoire. Aujourd’hui, la Chine est la plus grande économie de la planète. En mesurant le PIB en parité de pouvoir d’achat (PPA) — ce qui élimine les distorsions liées aux taux de change du marché et aux différences de coût de la vie —, le FMI estime que l’économie chinoise représente aujourd’hui 19,9% de l’économie mondiale, tandis que celle des États-Unis atteint 14,5% et celle de l’Union européenne (UE), 14%. En 1990, le PIB de la Chine ne représentait que 3% du total mondial, celui des États-Unis 19% et celui de l’Europe 23% (IMF DataMapper, 2026). Si l’on prend en compte l’ensemble de l’Asie, le PIB du continent atteint 49% du total mondial.

Cela n’a rien de surprenant. En 1700, l’économie asiatique représentait 60% de l’économie mondiale, tandis que celle de l’Europe atteignait un peu moins de 30% et celle de l’ensemble des États-Unis, 3% (Piketty, Le Capital au XXIe siècle, p. 76). À cette époque, le revenu moyen d’un Chinois était similaire à celui d’un habitant des Pays-Bas, alors leader commercial et financier de l’Europe. La colonisation européenne de l’Asie a détourné cette trajectoire pendant 200 ans, et aujourd’hui, ce continent est à nouveau à la tête de l’économie mondiale.

Mais la Chine n’est pas seulement en tête aujourd’hui en termes de taille de son PIB, mais aussi en ce qui concerne les fondements matériels sous-jacents de la puissance du pays.

En ce qui concerne la valeur ajoutée manufacturière, la Chine génère 29% du total mondial, tandis que les États-Unis et l’Union européenne y contribuent chacun à hauteur de 17% (Statista Research, 2025). On estime que d’ici 2030, cette part atteindra 45% (ONUDI, 2024). Ce leadership ne se limite pas à la fabrication de masse de jouets ou d’appareils électroménagers, mais s’étend également aux domaines des technologies de pointe et à la maîtrise de l’ensemble de la chaîne de valeur des produits. L’Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF) — un groupe de réflexion américain — montre que la Chine est déjà leader dans 7 des 10 industries les plus avancées au monde : les systèmes informatiques et électroniques, les produits chimiques, les machines et équipements, les métaux de base, les véhicules à moteur, les produits métalliques transformés et les équipements électroniques. De leur côté, les États-Unis occupent la première place dans la production de technologies de l’information et de services — en particulier la conception de puces d’IA —, dans le secteur pharmaceutique et dans d’autres secteurs des transports (ITIF, 2026).

En 2024, la Chine a fabriqué 86% des panneaux solaires mondiaux, 80% des batteries électriques, 72% des voitures électriques, 64% des smartphones, 54% des robots industriels et 49% des drones (El País, 25 septembre 2026).

En matière de consommation d’électricité, l’essor de la Chine a été spectaculaire. En 1990, la Chine consommait moins de 1 000 térawattheures (TWh), tandis que les États-Unis en consommaient 3 000 TWh. En 2025, la Chine a atteint 10 300 TWh, tandis que la consommation des États-Unis stagne depuis 20 ans autour de 4200 TWh (EIA, 2026).

De plus, la Chine est le premier «État électrique» au monde, étant à la fois le plus grand investisseur et le plus grand producteur mondial d’énergies alternatives. Elle a réussi à réduire le coût de production de l’énergie solaire de 350 dollars par MWh en 2016 à 35–60 dollars par MWh d’ici 2025. Ce coût est inférieur à celui de l’électricité produite à partir du gaz en cycle combiné (60–120 dollars par MWh) ou du charbon (71–170 dollars par MWh) (Lazard, LCOE, 2026).

La Chine est un pays qui ne produit pas de pétrole et qui, au cours du siècle dernier, a été l’un des plus grands extracteurs de charbon pour la production d’énergie. Cependant, au cours de la dernière décennie, c’est le pays qui a le plus contribué à la transition énergétique mondiale. Sa capacité installée de production d’énergie solaire s’élève aujourd’hui à 1175 TWh, alors que le reste du monde ne produit à lui seul que 1600 TWh (Statista, avril 2026). Aujourd’hui, la Chine dispose d’un complexe de production dont la capacité annuelle de fabrication de panneaux solaires s’élève à 1200 TWh, de sorte qu’en moins de 10 ans, une fois les problèmes de stockage et de transport surmontés, elle pourrait fabriquer suffisamment de panneaux pour enrayer le changement climatique (Tooze, 19 septembre 2025). Aucun pays au monde ne possède aujourd’hui une telle capacité de restauration écologique à l’échelle mondiale.

Dans l’ensemble, la croissance de l’économie chinoise représente entre 25% et 30% de la croissance de l’économie mondiale. De 1990 à 2025, la croissance moyenne de son PIB a été de 8,5%, atteignant 14% certaines années, bien qu’elle se soit stabilisée ces dernières années autour de 5%. Ce développement sans précédent lui a permis de multiplier la taille de son économie par 54 depuis 1990, alors que les États-Unis l’ont multipliée par 5,1 et l’Union européenne par 2,9 au cours de la même période (Banque mondiale, données ouvertes, 2026).

Grâce à une combinaison mûrement réfléchie d’ouverture aux investissements étrangers, de transferts de technologie, de soutien à l’investissement privé national et de création d’entreprises publiques dans des secteurs stratégiques de l’économie, la Chine a atteint cette position de leader tout en maintenant un taux d’investissement annuel qui, depuis plus de deux décennies, oscille entre 35% et 45% du PIB. À titre de comparaison, ce taux s’est établi à environ 17% aux États-Unis et à 22% dans l’Union européenne.

Sur le plan commercial, de 1990 à 2025, la Chine a accumulé un excédent commercial de 9 700 milliards de dollars. Pour la seule année 2025, alors que les États-Unis avaient déclaré une guerre commerciale, cet excédent a atteint 1100 milliards de dollars (BBC, janvier 2026). De plus, comme dans toutes les économies développées, la dette publique est élevée. Pour 2025, elle est estimée à 120% du PIB, un chiffre très proche des 125% des États-Unis (FMI, 2026). À cette différence près que la totalité de la dette chinoise est contractée en yuan auprès de banques d’État chinoises, tandis que la majeure partie de la dette américaine est détenue par des investisseurs privés et des gouvernements étrangers.

Ces flux de revenus ont permis à la Chine de devenir le premier créancier bilatéral mondial, devant la Banque mondiale ou le FMI. De 1990 à 2025, la Chine a accordé des prêts commerciaux d’une valeur de 2200 milliards de dollars, notamment aux États-Unis (AidData, novembre 2025). Ce chiffre est déjà supérieur aux 1300 milliards de dollars que, sur la même période, les États-Unis ont versés à titre d’aide militaire et économique à leurs pays alliés (USAFacts, septembre 2026). Ainsi, alors que la Chine a mis en place une infrastructure mondiale pour l’approvisionnement en matières premières et la distribution de marchandises (la «Route de la soie»), les États-Unis ont maintenu des armées et des dirigeants soumis à leurs desseins politiques.

Malgré toute cette puissance économique, la Chine — contrairement à ce qu’ont fait les États-Unis au XXe siècle et, avant eux, le Royaume-Uni — n’a pas encore établi l’hégémonie mondiale de sa monnaie, n’a pas déployé de bases militaires pour garantir sa suprématie politique, et n’exporte pas non plus sa culture ou son système politique comme un modèle à imiter par le reste des pays.

Aujourd’hui, le dollar continue de remplir la fonction de monnaie de réserve mondiale pour 85% des opérations de change mondiales, représente 58% des réserves internationales des banques d’États et sert de monnaie de règlement au sein du système SWIFT pour la plupart des paiements internationaux (BRI, 25 février 2026). Mais sur le plan intérieur, la Chine a déjà créé le deuxième plus grand marché obligataire au monde, évalué à 28 000 milliards de dollars, derrière celui des États-Unis, qui représente 61 000 milliards de dollars (Deutsche Bank, juillet 2026). De même, elle compte trois des dix centres financiers les plus importants au monde (Shanghai, Hong Kong et Shenzhen) et a lancé le système CIPS comme alternative pour les paiements internationaux.

Quant aux bases militaires à l’étranger, la Chine en possède trois, contre 750 pour les États-Unis, et, pour l’instant, elle ne semble pas intéressée par l’exportation de son modèle d’organisation politique appelé «socialisme aux caractéristiques chinoises». Quant à l’expansion culturelle, elle n’en est qu’à ses débuts — jeux vidéo, esthétique asiatique, plateformes de vente en ligne rapides —, alors que le marché intérieur gagne en importance pour la croissance économique. Aux États-Unis, la consommation des ménages représente 69% du PIB ; en Chine, 40% (Banque mondiale, 2026). À titre de comparaison, il y a vingt ans, le rapport entre le revenu par habitant de la Chine et celui des États-Unis était de 1 pour 20. Aujourd’hui, ce rapport est de 1 pour 3,5. Dans moins de 50 ans, il sera de 1 pour 1 (Milanovic, 2026). Tout indique que le «Grand Renouveau du pays chinois», par lequel ses dirigeants envisagent le rétablissement de la grandeur mondiale de leur pays, ne se mesure pas à l’aune de la précipitation de quelques décennies, mais à celle de la patience obstinée de plusieurs siècles.

Il ne fait aucun doute que la Chine est déjà aujourd’hui le centre du monde. Et, face à cela, il est tout simplement pathétique de voir les élites réactionnaires d’Amérique latine chercher désespérément à obtenir un visa américain ou acheter un appartement à Madrid pour rehausser leur statut de «modernes». Elles courent dans tous les sens, hébétées, à la poursuite des mirages de pays qui ne sont désormais plus que de «petits coins» du monde.

Publié à l’origine par  China Beyond the Wall

Traduction:  Reseau International