Nearly a month ago, we reported on a uniquely configured vessel that was far along in its construction at Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard on Changxing Island in Shanghai. The intentions behind this design appeared to be as an uncrewed underwater vehicle (UUV) mothership, capable of deploying a handful of very large vehicles or many more smaller ones via its stern garage door and well deck. Its large pylons would be used to lift the vessels up and down out of the water and to different levels in the ship. Now it appears China has not just one, but two of these vessels nearly complete.
Make sure to read our initial report on this vessel configuration for full context by clicking here.
The new image was taken in Guangzhou and the vessel has a near identical shape, but with smaller proportions and minor changes to its overall moldline, compared to the larger one in Shanghai. This new vessel appears to be about a third smaller overall than its counterpart. The lift towers number six in total instead of six larger ones and six smaller ones on the Shanghai vessel. Regardless, the major design features are all there, including the flight deck and hangar behind the forward superstructure, the location of the smokestacks, and so on.
While two of these assets could still be considered largely intended for experimental use, a growing fleet would have increasing tactical and even strategic importance. Being able to easily launch and recover large numbers of UUVs, or a few very large ones, far from Chinese shores would provide an asymmetric capability. A fleet of ships that is dedicated to deploying, recovering, and tending to these systems, some of which can remain on patrol for very long periods, would be a major indication of how important China sees UUV operations as part of its future strategy.
There have been rumors that these vessels are part of a larger overall program that will see more ships with similar capabilities constructed. Once again, this would be a strong indication that these vessels’ utility will go beyond testing and limited operational use cases. The launch and recovery of large UUVs remains a conceptual work in progress for the U.S., with nothing similar in the U.S. Navy’s inventory, as we discussed in our original post.
Large long-range UUVs can be used for many tasks, from mapping the sea floor to hunting submarines and ships to searching for mines to launching cruise missiles and drones to being turned into immensely destructive weapons in their own right that can circumvent traditional strategic defenses. For China, providing a credible threat to America’s outposts deep in the Pacific and even the U.S. seaboard would be on the table.
There is speculation online as to where exactly this vessel was built. The first place that came to mind is Guangzhou Shipyard International’s (GSI) facilities on Longxue Island, just southeast of the city of Guangzhou. GSI is a subsidiary of the China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC). It is here that many of China’s most unique vessels are born. These include drone test ships of various kinds, massive beach landing barges, and giant supply ships. Upon closer review of archival satellite imagery, we can say for certain that GSI did build this ship. An image from October 2nd shows it peeking out of a covered graving yard area at the facility prior to launch.
The emergence of two of these large UUV tenders in such a short period of time underscores China’s major bet on the technologies they will support. If more ships are added to the currently known fleet of two, a clearer picture of the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s large UUV plans, and its expeditionary potential, will come into focus.
Contact the author: Tyler@twz.com
The post Second Chinese Submarine Drone Mothership Emerges appeared first on TWZ.
This weekly update from the Kyiv Independent aims to shed light on the situation facing Ukrainians living under Russian occupation and the ever-tightening control of information imposed by the Kremlin.
Key news as of Oct. 17:
Two Romanian F-16s shot down two jet-powered Russian Geran attack drones over Romania’s territorial waters near Sulina on the evening of 17 October, Romania’s Defense Ministry said. The ministry released cockpit images of the mission the next day, as NATO allies prepare to discuss Black Sea security at a special session Romania requested.
This comes as Moscow continues its air attacks on Ukraine, while the US is trying to make deals with Russia over its diesel and lift sanctions. Russia keeps striking Ukraine’s energy system and cities, while its drones and suspected saboteurs keep turning up inside NATO, from tankers hit off Romania to a foiled arson attempt at a Starlink site in Lithuania.
The F-16s took off from the 86th Air Base at Borcea at 17:43 after radar detected a group of air targets about 120 km east of Zmiinyi (Snake) Island, flying southwest, Ukrainian military outlet Militarnyi reported, citing the ministry. The first drone entered Romanian airspace at 17:59 and was shot down at 18:01 southeast of Sulina. The second entered at 18:01 and was downed at 18:05 east of Sulina.
Both were jet-powered attack drones of the Geran family, the ministry said. The Geran is Russia’s version of the Iranian-designed Shahed. When first detected, the drones were about 65 km from the coast of Russian-occupied Crimea and 140 km from the Ukrainian-held shore, and their southwest course may point to Russian origin, Militarnyi calculated.
The ministry posted the cockpit images on 18 October, showing a missile launch and a fireball over the sea. “Targets spotted, identified, engaged and neutralized!” it wrote.
A special session of the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s top decision-making body, will discuss defense and deterrence in the Black Sea on 20 October at Romania’s request. Romanian President Nicușor Dan has confirmed that the two tankers that caught fire near Sulina last week were hit by drones, and a NATO military source told Reuters they were Russian.
Romanian radar has logged 54 drone intrusions into the country’s air and sea space since Russia’s full-scale invasion, 35 of them this year, and the military has shot down six such targets in 2026, Defense Ministry data show.
Within hours, Poland’s Operational Command said it was checking a possible airspace violation by an unknown object overnight into 18 October. Troops, police, and military police searched for a possible crash site south of Lublin after residents reported the loud sound of a flying object around 02:00, Militarnyi reported.
On the morning of 18 October, an unknown drone entered Lithuania’s airspace and triggered air raid alerts, the country’s crisis management center said. NATO jets accompanied it but could not shoot it down because of bad weather, Defense Minister Robertas Kaunas said. Debris preliminarily identified as drone parts was later found in the village of Juodžioniai in Pasvalys district, and the army said the drone may have entered from the direction of Poland.
Romania moved from escorting Russia’s stray drones to firing on them in July, when its F-16s downed three in 72 hours.
Il debito degli Stati Uniti è fuori controllo. Il Fondo Monetario Internazionale ha definito la sostenibilità del debito pubblico statunitense preoccupante, con una traiettoria giudicata insostenibile nel medio e nel lungo periodo.
I problemi americani, però, non resteranno dall’altra parte dell’Oceano e toccheranno anche l’Europa e l’Italia. Questo perché gli Stati Uniti, per finanziare il proprio maxi-debito, offrono rendimenti alti e privi di rischio reale.
Non bene. Gli Stati Uniti spenderebbero circa 2,9 miliardi di dollari al giorno solo per gli interessi sul debito. Sono i dati pubblicati dal Tesoro sull’anno fiscale chiuso il 30 settembre scorso.
Il deficit è a 1.990 miliardi di dollari, il 12% in più dell’anno precedente, e gli interessi sono diventati la terza voce del bilancio federale, dietro a pensioni e Medicare e prima della difesa. Gli interessi netti hanno raggiunto la cifra record di 1.050 miliardi, crescendo più delle entrate, della spesa complessiva e del PIL.
La difficoltà degli Stati Uniti è legata al costo del denaro: tasso medio al 3,53% (il doppio del 2021), debito lordo oltre i 40.000 miliardi e rendimento del decennale sopra il 5% dopo le tensioni e la guerra con l’Iran, contro il 4,1% previsto dal Congressional Budget Office.
Le stime, inoltre, rischiano di peggiorare: come calcola il Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, se i rendimenti restassero un punto sopra le stime, nel 2030 gli interessi costerebbero 2.800 miliardi, pari al 5,9% del PIL.
Fin qui il problema sembra riguardare solo gli Stati Uniti, ma non è così. Il Tesoro americano deve rinnovare oltre 10.000 miliardi di dollari di debito a breve termine. Per convincere gli investitori a comprare i suoi titoli (i Treasury), sta offrendo tassi di interesse molto elevati, superiori al 5%.
Un grande vantaggio per risparmiatori e fondi di investimento, che preferiscono spostare i capitali negli Stati Uniti anziché investirli in Europa. Il rapporto Draghi metteva già in guardia sui circa 300 miliardi di euro di risparmio europeo che vanno ogni anno all’estero, principalmente verso i mercati americani.
Questo denaro finisce così per finanziare le innovazioni tecnologiche americane (data center, intelligenza artificiale, microchip) e la difesa degli Stati Uniti. Risorse che potrebbero andare a sostenere la transizione ecologica, la riconversione industriale e l’autonomia strategica dell’Unione Europea, ma gli USA offrono di più.
L’Europa sta già pagando il conto, ma l’Italia versa un prezzo doppiamente alto a causa dell’enorme dimensione del suo debito pubblico. Sul piano dei conti pubblici l’Italia si sta comportando bene e i mercati si fidano, come dimostra lo spread storicamente basso intorno ai 105 punti.
Il punto è che il rendimento dei BTP italiani non può scendere sotto un certo margine: se il debito americano (la valuta di riserva mondiale) rende il 5%, nessun investitore comprerebbe un BTP italiano a un tasso molto inferiore, ad esempio al 3%. I tassi USA stabiliscono una sorta di tetto minimo dal quale l’Italia non può prescindere.
Ed è in questo contesto che il Tesoro italiano si trova costretto a collocare il BTP Valore e il nuovo BTP Valore Insieme con rendimenti e cedole particolarmente alti, proprio per convincere le famiglie a trattenere i risparmi in patria.
Secondo il Fondo Monetario Internazionale c’è il rischio che si inneschi un meccanismo difficile da arrestare: più debito porta a una maggiore esposizione all’aumento dei tassi e, se gli investitori iniziano a dubitare della sostenibilità dei conti, possono chiedere interessi ancora più alti per prestare denaro.
Secondo le stime del Fondo, il costo medio effettivo del finanziamento dei governi potrebbe salire dal 2,3% del 2021 al 3,7% nel 2031.
Il debito pubblico mondiale, già al 94% del PIL nel 2025, potrebbe così raggiungere il 100% entro il 2029. Cosa fare, dunque? La direttrice generale del FMI, Kristalina Georgieva, ha indicato poche ma significative linee:
L’avvertimento finale, però, riguarda tutti: più si rinvia il riequilibrio dei conti pubblici, più diventerà costoso e doloroso raggiungerlo.
Bisogna andare a Nizza, in avenue Dr Ménard, sulla collina di Cimiez, per conoscere da vicino Marc Chagall. E’ qui che si può vedere non solo il famoso “messaggio biblico” dell’artista ma toccare con mano un museo progettato, pensato ed inaugurato dallo stesso pittore russo. Ogni spazio, finestra e vetrata, parla di Chagall che ha saputo trasformare una villa in rovina dai primi del Novecento in un luogo capace di ospitare una collezione permanente e mostre come quella di quest’estate dedicata agli schizzi e ai modelli per il soffitto dell’Opéra Garnier.
E se nel 1973, quando fu inaugurato il museo, a visitarlo erano in trenta mila oggi si registrano 200 mila presenze ogni anno. Ad attrarre così tante persone in avenue Dr Ménard sono, soprattutto, quei dodici dipinti che illustrano la Genesi e l’Esodo, esposti nella sala principale e le cinque tele che evocano il Cantico dei Cantici nella sala esagonale adiacente.
Certamente i colori in sé, restano la maggiore qualità espressiva dell’artista e balzano subito all’occhio ma il fascino di questo percorso sta nel fermarsi davanti ad ogni opera per meditarla. Solo sostando a lungo, in silenzio, dinanzi a “il Paradiso” si può cogliere l’intrinseco universale e rivoluzionario messaggio di Chagall: l’uomo e la donna sono una cosa sola.
E’ questo l’annuncio che continua a essere “nuovo” dopo decenni dalla creazione del quadro: la coppia primordiale è intrecciata come per diventare una sola cosa, con solo due braccia e tre gambe e sta per condividere insieme il frutto proibito, quello dell’albero della conoscenza del bene e del male che li renderà uguali a Dio. E’ l’Umanità non il maschio o la femmina. Così come in “Abramo e i tre angeli” le figure protagoniste (Abramo e Sara) spinte verso sinistra, sono eloquenti nell’esprimere lo stupore dell’annuncio della nascita di un figlio in età avanzata. Ma anche stavolta solo riflettendo su quest’opera si può cogliere – osservando i tre angeli seduti sulla panca – la lontana eco di quelli raffigurati nell’icona della Trinità di Andrej Rublev a Mosca.
Nel ciclo del “Cantico dei Cantici”, Chagall, riesce a parlare di Dio, incarnando la Parola biblica con la sua vita. Guardare a questi dipinti solo con idolatria per l’artista sarebbe sciocco perché ogni tela cela una complessità da decifrare con i giusti strumenti. Basti pensare al terzo quadro del ciclo. Chagall sembra aver voluto raccontare la propria storia in questo dipinto: la rappresentazione di Gerusalemme, al centro, è duplice: in alto, la città assomiglia alla sua visione di Saint-Paul-de-Vence, con le sue mura. In basso, capovolta, si trova Vitebsk (paese natio), riconoscibile dal santuario con il tetto verde che lo corona. L’intera sezione inferiore del dipinto, capovolta, evoca quindi la giovinezza dell’artista; quella superiore un inno alla sua nuova vita nel sud della Francia.
Unica anche la mostra permanente dal titolo “Chagall all’opera” realizzata in collaborazione con il Centre “Georges Pompidou” dove dal 2023 sono conservati 151 opere donate dai nipoti dell’artista. Il pittore, nel 1960, accettò l’incarico di rifare il soffitto dell’Opéra di Parigi, a condizione di non essere pagato. Ne uscì un dipinto – preceduto da quarantuno schizzi e modelli (in parte visibili a Nizza) – che omaggia i grandi compositori dell’opera e del balletto, Parigi e la Francia.
L'articolo Cosa nascondono davvero i dipinti di Marc Chagall? Dal Paradiso in cui uomo e donna diventano una cosa sola alle città della sua vita: viaggio nel museo di Nizza progettato dall’artista proviene da Il Fatto Quotidiano.
With a flight deck packed with carrier-based aircraft, including stealthy fifth-generation F-35Cs, the USS Theodore Roosevelt pulled into Yokosuka, Japan, on Friday. Roosevelt is the first non-resident U.S. carrier to visit the key naval port, strategically located on the east side of Japan, in more than four years. Yokosuka is home to the USS George Washington and America’s only forward-based Carrier Strike Group (CSG).
The Roosevelt, which serves as the flagship of CSG 9, escorted by guided-missile cruiser USS Chosin and destroyer USS Decatur, completed the journey from San Diego in 19 days − maneuvering around a typhoon in the Western Pacific − and will participate in the upcoming combined exercise Keen Sword 27. Meanwhile, the USS George H.W. Bush departed Thailand after a five-day port call and returned to the Middle East, and the USS Abraham Lincoln arrived home after a nearly eleven-month combat deployment.
Here’s TWZ’s weekly carrier tracker monitoring America’s flattop fleet, including deployed CSGs and Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs), using publicly available open-source information. Check out last week’s report here.
Roosevelt and Chosin chopped into the U.S. 7th Fleet-Pacific Command (PACOM) area of responsibility (AOR) and arrived at Commander, Fleet Activities Yokosuka on the morning of October 16. The CSG will spend a few days in port before beginning participation in exercise Keen Sword, a “premier joint-bilateral field training exercise designed to increase readiness and interoperability between the Japan Self-Defense Forces and U.S. military forces,” according to the 7th Fleet press release. The brief visit allows the crew to complete maintenance, resupply, and disembark for liberty before resuming routine operations.
“Our crew is honored to visit Yokosuka and experience the rich culture and hospitality of Japan,” the commanding officer of Roosevelt, Capt. Will Mathis, said in the release. “Port visits like this are vital for crew morale and mission readiness, allowing our Sailors to rest, recharge, and prepare to operate seamlessly alongside our allies during exercise Keen Sword.”
The five-ship CSG, the composition of which a Navy official confirmed to TWZ, is currently operating on a disaggregated basis − a common practice employed by strike groups with multiple ongoing missions. The duo that departed the U.S. at the end of September linked up with another element of the group, Pearl Harbor-based guided missile destroyer USS Decatur, as they were steaming westbound past the Hawaiian Islands, based on public Automatic Identification System (AIS) data. Decatur arrived in Yokosuka the day after Roosevelt but was not mentioned in the press release.
USS Carl M. Levin, also stationed in Hawaii, was the first ship from the group to deploy, according to DVIDS, the military’s content-sharing platform. Levin departed on September 9 and is operating at an undisclosed location. USS Paul Hamilton, the final ship assigned to CSG 9 to deploy, left San Diego on October 10 after onloading ammo at Bravo Pier and moored at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam on October 15, AIS data shows. Henry J. Kaiser class fleet replenishment oiler USNS Tippecanoe supported the group’s transit across the Pacific, conducting multiple replenishments-at-sea (RAS), and recently entered the East Sea/Sea of Japan via the Tsugaru Strait before going dark on AIS.
Multiple reports indicated that medium unmanned surface vessel (MUSV) Seahawk (2) deployed with the group, which would represent a significant operational achievement and the first time a drone boat was assigned to a CSG, but the MUSV quietly slipped out of Point Loma on October 8, more than ten days after Roosevelt. Seahawk reappeared on AIS and docked in Hawaii for a couple days before continuing its journey westbound in the Pacific on October 16. If Seahawk is assigned to CSG 9, it is currently disaggregated, and whether it will join Roosevelt to participate in exercise Keen Sword 27 is unknown.
Acting Secretary of the Navy Hung Cao seemingly confirmed the deployment, saying during a panel at the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) convention that “the Teddy Roosevelt carrier strike group just deployed on October 8 with a medium sized unmanned surface vessel. This is the first carrier strike group to ever deploy with a large size unmanned surface vessel.” However, Roosevelt was more than halfway to Japan on the date referenced. “This is a force multiplier, imagine having more guns out there,” he added.
TWZ reached out to the Secretary’s office for clarification and to confirm the deployment but did not receive a response. “Seahawk’s operations represent continued progress in the Navy’s efforts to integrate unmanned systems into Fleet operations. As with any emerging capability, we continue to learn, adapt, and refine how these systems are employed,” a Navy official told us.
Surrounded by small boats, with hundreds of spectators lining the channel in San Diego Bay and thousands more watching online, the USS Abraham Lincoln arrived home from a historic ten-and-a-half-month combat deployment. The flagship of CSG 3 and her crew of more than 5,000 Sailors and Marines served as the tip of the spear in the war against the Iranian regime, first during Operation Epic Fury and then the subsequent blockades, and set a new record for the most consecutive days at sea without a port call.
Lincoln pulled into Naval Air Station North Island and moored at Berth Lima on October 8, 321 days after casting off on November 21, 2025. Sailors in dress whites manned the rails as the carrier transited the bay, escorted on both sides by small boats and jet skis flying American flags, while family and friends eagerly waited pierside for their return. The video below, shared by the Pentagon, captures the moment.
Lincoln now lays claim to the second-longest deployment in the modern carrier era, falling just five days short of the 326-day post-Vietnam record held by the USS Gerald R. Ford. The flattop traveled over 93,000 nautical miles during the cruise − more than four trips around the Earth, a post by the public affairs officer highlighted − and conducted 72 replenishments-at-sea, received 20-plus million gallons of aviation fuel, and flew more than 14,000 sorties that totaled 28,500 flight hours, a press release from the Navy highlighted.
The release confirmed for the first time that Lincoln broke the previous record of 206 days set by USS Dwight D. Eisenhower during the COVID pandemic for days spent underway between port visits, as TWZ first reported. “The ship’s 208 uninterrupted days at sea between Guam and Oman, and its 286 consecutive days at sea between departing San Diego and arriving in Thailand, are record-breaking marks for modern aircraft carriers.”
Lincoln’s cruise took her through both U.S. 7th Fleet and U.S. 5th Fleet AORs. During Operation Epic Fury, which began on February 28 and lasted almost 40 days, Lincoln took up station in the northern Arabian Sea as Commander, Task Force (CTF) 50 and pressured Iran’s southern flank. When major combat operations wound down, the carrier and her air wing patrolled and enforced the blockade line during both rounds that followed.
Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 9, the “Navy’s premier next-generation air wing that served as the primary offensive power” for CSG 3, flew 14,037 sorties − including 4,000 combat missions − and dropped more than 1.37 million pounds of ordnance on thousands of targets while employing 1,499 precision weapons. “This concentrated firepower significantly degraded Iranian Navy capabilities,” a separate statement noted.
“The rapid mobilization and combat execution of CVW-9 during Operation Epic Fury demonstrated the unmatched flexibility of a U.S. Navy carrier strike group,” Capt. J.W. Stigi, commander of CVW-9, said in the statement. “Pairing fifth-generation F-35C stealth and sensor fusion with fourth-generation workhorse strike and electronic attack platforms, Team Shogun destroyed Iran’s conventional Navy and secured vital maritime chokepoints in support of our commander’s objectives.”
Kill marks painted on the island superstructure show CSG 3 destroyed 106 one-way attack drones fired by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), 34 Iranian Navy and IRGC ships, 23 inbound cruise missiles, and 10 enemy submarines. The strike group dropped 1,463 air-to-ground munitions in total, a Sailor explaining the marks said in a video on social media.
The USS George H.W. Bush and her destroyer escort, USS Delbert D. Black, departed Phuket, Thailand, on October 9 after a five-day liberty visit. “Nearly 5,000 Sailors from across the strike group experienced the sights and sounds Thailand has to offer, deepening their understanding of the Thai people and strengthening interpersonal bonds,” according to a press release.
“The Sailors and I had an amazing time in this beautiful country, and I sincerely thank the people of Thailand for their incredible welcome,” Capt. Justin T. Issler, the commanding officer of George H.W. Bush, said about the stop. “This port visit to Phuket was a tremendous opportunity for the crew. We are grateful to our Thai allies for hosting us, and we look forward to continuing our mission here in 7th Fleet, alongside Thailand and our other regional allies and partners.”
Bush dropped anchor approximately two nautical miles south of Ao Makham Deep Sea Port on October 4 after 187 consecutive days at sea. After leaving Phuket, the carrier stopped broadcasting AIS while steaming due south at 10 knots. Imagery on DVIDS confirms that the CSG returned to the Middle East and operating in the U.S. 5th Fleet AOR to “support maritime security and stability,” joining the George Washington CSG once again as the second strike group in the region.
Destroyer USS Mason, which deployed as the integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) commander for the CSG but has disaggregated at times, arrived in Singapore on October 5, likely for a port call. The Arleigh Burke class destroyer departed on October 9 and was last tracked heading northwestbound in the Malacca Strait, likely to rejoin the CSG. The other two destroyers assigned to the CSG, USS Ross and USS Donald Cook, remained in 5th Fleet during the visit.
Marking a major milestone, an F-35C Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter made the first arrested landing aboard a Gerald R. Ford class carrier, the Navy’s newest and most advanced class of aircraft carriers that are being built to replace the aging Nimitz fleet. The trap was made by Lt. Cmdr. Robert Mason with the “Salty Dogs” of Air Test and Evaluation Squadron (VX) 23 aboard the future USS John F. Kennedy in the Western Atlantic on October 13. The first catapult launch followed the next day, pictures on DVIDS showed.
VX-23, based out of Naval Air Station Patuxent River in Maryland, is part of the Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division and was putting Kennedy through the ongoing Aircraft Compatibility Testing to assess the “operational capabilities of the ship’s aircraft launch and recovery equipment.” A team from the Patuxent River-based F-35 Integrated Test Force, detached to the ship, conducted the evaluation using a specially instrumented example of the jet. One of the two pictured was externally equipped with an inert Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) bomb.
The Navy took preliminary acceptance of Kennedy, which is still considered a Pre-Commissioning Unit, on September 29. This process allows the service to conduct at-sea testing and build underway proficiency while the shipbuilder, Huntington Ingalls Industries, completes final system checks ahead of expected delivery in spring 2027. Kennedy got underway on October 13 and returned to her homeport of Naval Station Norfolk three days later.
The lead ship of the class, the USS Gerald R. Ford, does not currently embark F-35Cs and will need upgrades to field the Navy’s most advanced jet. Back in 2019, TWZ warned that the stealth jet wouldn’t fly from the troubled class for years. Because of this, Congress required that Kennedy be equipped to embark F-35Cs, which led to additional delays for the Navy’s next carrier.
Overall, three U.S. carriers are deployed, three are working up in various states of readiness, three are in maintenance availabilities, one is post-deployment, one is being used primarily for training before deactivation next year, and another will be delivered in 2027. Two amphibious ready groups are deployed, one is forward-deployed, three are working up or in port, and three are in maintenance.
Note: Positions are general approximations. Non-deployed LHA/LHD amphibious warships are not shown.
Contact the author: ian@twz.com or @ianellisjones
The post Where Are The Aircraft Carriers?: October 17, 2026 appeared first on TWZ.
Army leaders preparing for a potential fight in the Pacific told us that some of the biggest lessons they’ve learned from the war in Ukraine and America’s now-paused fight against Iran are to move around assets that you can and find a better way to camouflage those that you can’t. While seemingly common sense, these lessons come from watching how war is now waged. The ubiquity of drones in Ukraine providing constant overwatch and strike capabilities, and U.S. troops killed and equipment destroyed or damaged by massive Iranian barrages on static installations are informing changes to how the Army trains, equips and operates.
These conversations took place during the recently wrapped Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA) annual convention in Washington, D.C., which TWZ attended.
“A lot of the things that are happening right now in terms of long-range fires, integrated air and missile defense, and the lessons that we’re learning from them, we’re able to bring a lot of that to our potential challenges in the Pacific,” Gen. Ron Clark, commander of U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC), told us at a media roundtable. “Specifically, I am thinking through mobility and camouflage. So it’s one of those age-old Army forgotten sciences of how to hide in plain sight and how to camouflage ourselves from observation, because the ability to be able to see surface entities is almost ubiquitous.”
“Our ability to be able to use electronic warfare, to be able to use just good old-fashioned camouflage, and the ability to deceive our adversary is a must,” Clark added. You can read more about the U.S. military’s camouflage and deception efforts in our story here.
As we have frequently reported about the Ukraine war, both sides have been using a variety of “old-fashioned” tactics to duck, dodge and hide. They range from practices like smokescreens to hide from drones to updates on measures from the past like paint schemes designed to obfuscate vehicles and other equipment from AI-enabled targeting systems.
As tough as things have been for Ukraine and for U.S. forces in the Middle East, the challenges will be even greater in the Pacific, Clark warned.
In Europe and the Middle East, “it’s not a near-peer adversary that we will be working against,” said Clark, referring respectively to Russia and Iran.
“Whereas in our theater, it absolutely is,” the USARPAC commander noted in a reference to China without naming the country. “So our ability to scale that and to think through the problem sets of how do we fight Type One, Type Two UAS? How do we think through ballistic missile defense holistically in the region? We spend a lot of time working with the joint force for solutions associated with that. How do we maneuver inside an archipelagic environment?”
For the Army, any fight in the Pacific will require soldiers to be able to hop islands and move through vast swaths of ocean, constantly hunted and frequently inside the Chinese weapons engagement zone. Clark said that the Army’s organic fleet of ships like landing craft, small tugs, and modular causeway systems operated by the service’s 8th Theater Sustainment Command will be vital for maneuver.
The Army, however, is struggling to keep its aging fleet of 70 of these vessels in the water and it got rid of a number of others over the years. Concerns about this underappreciated force have been something TWZ has raised for years.
“But we also have to be able to conduct tactical maneuver with forces on the ground that can provide long-range precision fires, as an example, and then move so that fires, radars, sensors are not easily targeted,” Clark added. “Because if they can see you, they can hit you. And if you know they have an opportunity to return fire, they will. So our lessons that we’re learning are, in some cases, are very, very relevant. In some cases, we can learn from some of the changing characteristics of war.”
Still, the wide-open plains and dense cities of Ukraine are quite different from the beaches and jungles of the Pacific, Clark reminded us.
“The way we generally fight does not equate specifically in the Ukraine piece to the maneuver that you would see out of U.S. forces if deployed in a conflict like that,” the USARPAC commander explained. “To be able to use operational maneuver and tactical maneuver in a way that it’s not just simply drone on drone or firing long range fires at one another at scale for an extended period of time. We find our way to work through that problem set and maneuver to positions of advantage and to prevail.”
— Special Kherson Cat
The drone approaches from above and flies directly into the helicopter’s spinning main rotor. It’s unclear whether… pic.twitter.com/GCb9FodXG3
Regardless of the terrain, the ubiquity of drones in the Ukraine war has made maneuver and resupply deadly endeavors, with much of the front lines bogged down with limited territorial advances by either combatant.
When we pushed further on that point, Gen. Xavier T. Brunson, commander of United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command and United States Forces Korea, weighed in.
“To be able to move with sensors everywhere at all times causes us to achieve positions of advantage from distributed locations,” Brunson pointed out. “So the fight is: you look at maneuver. You might maneuver to a position of advantage, knowing that you’re going to change that again. The ability to utilize not only joint sensors but joint effectors, if you will, joint fires, to be able to use those things from different positions changes the shape of the operating environment.”
The bottom line, he added, is that “maneuver is always going to be maneuver. You’re going from A to B, but you might go from A to A1 to A2 to A3 to get to B, and that’s what I think we realize in this distributed fight that’s going on in Ukraine, and so we continue to watch to see what lessons might be coming back into” effect.
In part reacting to lessons learned from Ukraine and the Middle East, the Army is also changing how it trains, Clark stated. In South Korea, he said the service has to get out of the habit of concentrating so heavily on just two annual major training exercises.
“We recognize… that largely the two big exercises every year in Korea focus on large command posts,” Clark proffered. “We’ve got to move away from that. So what we intend to do is take advantage of the knowledge that we have of the threats that exist or that prevail in the Ukraine fight.”
Clark said these discussions are underway with his deputy commander, Republic of Korea Army Gen. Sungmin Kim.
“We talk about how we would operate in a distributed fashion. You know as well as I do, there’s a location that we go to to train every year in Korea, and we stay in that place,” Clark said in response to a question from another reporter. “What would it look like if we train from Jeju all the way up to Gyeonggi Province in the north? What would that look like, just with our headquarters alone?”
“So just imagine,” Clark postulated, “if we train across the entirety of the peninsula, and got ourselves in the shape where we would say [to North Korea], ‘You can’t utilize the things that you’ve learned in the fight and the battlefield in Ukraine on us, because we learned the same lessons and we’ve distributed ourselves in such a way that we don’t make ourselves the target. We won’t be moored in place,’ and that’s what I’m talking about when I talk about positional advantage. It might not be the same place to the continuum. It might not be the same place when you’re in crisis or conflict or competition. We might have to change that, and that’s what we’re learning.”
Another lesson from Ukraine that Army leaders should be paying attention to, said another panelist, is how both sides are using aerial and ground drones to supply frontline forces and evacuate the wounded because human efforts have now become too deadly, thanks to drones.
“I think you also can’t talk about Ukraine without talking about autonomy,” said Tara Murphy Dougherty, CEO of a company called Air, which provides AI-based sustainment solutions to the Army.
“One of the advantages that you get from using simulation and automation, and really using models and compute in order to create convoy plans, as opposed to humans with Excel spreadsheets, is you are able to do many fewer actual convoys because you’re using all of your capabilities so much more effectively and efficiently,” Dougherty posited. “And while it’s an indirect example, I think it does tie to soldier protection because you’re putting fewer soldiers out there in vulnerable settings. I see that not as an end-goal outcome; we need convoys.”
Ultimately, however, the Army will have to advance what Ukraine and Russia are doing with the deployment of aerial drones and uncrewed ground vehicles for logistics by creating “convoys” of autonomous vehicles.
“I see the end goal outcome as having as many autonomous convoys as possible, and we’ve heard today already at this event some of those ideas,” the CEO added. “In the interim, until we get to more autonomy in medevac and more autonomy in convoys when it’s non-soldier material that’s going out to the battlefield, let’s try and put fewer out there while actually getting more material and capability into the force where it needs to be.”
The Iranian missile and drone barrages on fixed U.S. bases across the Middle East have created some very costly lessons for American forces. As we noted earlier in this story, several troops were killed and critical air defense radars, aircraft and other important equipment were destroyed or damaged. U.S. installations across the region have also suffered damage.
In another media session, we pressed Army officials operating in South Korea about what they learned from watching the destruction caused by Iran and what they are doing to address it.
You can see a satellite image of damage to a U.S. radar site in Jordan below:
NEW: The radar for a THAAD system was struck and apparently destroyed in Jordan while two other THAAD radar systems may have been hit in the UAE, satellite images show – w/ @ThomasBordeaux7 https://t.co/qiuWVQgyda
— Gianluca Mezzofiore (@GianlucaMezzo) March 5, 2026
“We certainly are watching what’s happening, and we are learning from what is happening in Operation Epic Fury,” Lt. Gen. Joseph “Joe” Hilbert, commanding general of Eighth Army, stationed in South Korea, told us. “We’re learning what’s happening in Ukraine, and we are working through changes in our own tactics and techniques and procedures to be able to react to those threats and to be able to defend against them.”
For more details, he turned the microphone over to Col. Rosanna “Ro” M. Clemente, commander of the 35th Air Defense Artillery Brigade in South Korea.
“Drawing from those lessons learned, a lot of it is trying to understand how our systems are being hunted by the adversary,” she told us. “So, strictly into all of our training plans, and as we conduct our own internal exercises, all of our air defenders are practicing something as simple as mobility and survivability jumps, which is being able to reposition and displace your systems to different alternative locations based on any type of threat warnings that we receive. They’re very, very well trained. I think all of our soldiers know how to move their systems extremely, extremely well. They move them quickly, and they are able to move them and reposition them into different locations across the peninsula that still maintains that ballistic missile defense coverage.”
In addition, “we also have to rely on the other pillars of integrated air and missile defense, most specifically the passive defensive measures that we also have in place,” she added.
Those measures involve “a little bit more than just hardening – but a couple of other techniques that we’ve learned from the Russia-Ukraine war in terms of deception, how to move things around, create distractions, and make sure that we create different types of dilemmas for the adversary in terms of where our capabilities are and where are they positioned to protect its defended assets.”
Contact the author: howard@twz.com
The post What The Army’s Pacific Commanders Are Learning From Ukraine And Iran Conflicts appeared first on TWZ.
By K. J. NOH, POPULAR RESISTANCE
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Over seventy years ago, the US took control of South Korea’s military. To this day, it still controls it.
Why?
This confounds every notion of state sovereignty: a supposedly sovereign country — South Korea — has its own military subjugated under US control.
Opcon (operational control) of one nation’s army by another country is usually temporary, usually during wartime among allies.
In Korea, it has lasted over 76 years.
South Korea has asked for opcon back, repeatedly. It has been three decades since South Korea first made the demand.
The US has always delayed, filibustered, waffled, and moved goal posts.
More recently, the US has signaled more delay on the return of opcon, despite current president Lee Jae Myung’s demand that it be transferred back before the end of his term in 2030.
The allies are currently assessing the “full operational capability” (FOC) after validating the “initial operational capability” (IOC).
Seoul aims to wrap up the FOC certification and announce a target year for the Opcon transition at the upcoming SCM, before moving on to the remaining assessment of the “full mission capability,” which it expects to take about a year or so….[However] Washington remains firm in its position that Seoul is not ready for FOC certification, weighing on Seoul’s push to accelerate the Opcon transition.
This follows on US Forces Korea Commander Xavier Brunson’s repeated declarations of his opposition to Opcon transfer: only conditions matter, not timelines. According to Brunson, there can be no timeline to return control of South Korea’s troops to South Korea. Seventy six years is not enough.
South Korea had originally insisted on deadlines for the return of opcon. The US delayed, and delayed, and denied. It finally agreed–but only if certain conditions were met. These were agreed to in 2014, and reaffirmed them in 2017. Yet another decade has passed since those agreements.
Conditions for the return of opcon:
Cutting through the fog, there are essentially three conditions that the US has predicated as preconditions for South Korea to regain control over its own troops:
1. Can South Korea defend itself? (Can it operate its own military effectively? Does it have capacity, materiel, systems, and institutions?)
2. Are US and South Korea forces interoperable? (Can they coordinate in war?)
3. Are the conditions stable enough for opcon transfer?
The answer to the first is, of course. South Korea has one of the most powerful and well-equipped militaries in the world.
The second is, of course, the US and South Korea have been rehearsing interoperability for over seventy years.
The third is key: it is a catch-22 designed to undermine the entire process.
Conditions-based Opcon Transfer (COPT) sets specific benchmarks and tests for opcon transfer. These are the goalposts that are being constantly shifted.
However, the third condition is critical. It requires the de-escalation of tensions between North and South:
“Conducive Security Environment: The security environment on the Korean Peninsula and in the broader region must be stable and conducive to a safe, uninterrupted transfer.”
This is the catch-22:
If there is de-escalation of tensions, the required “tests” are not conducted and the benchmarks and certifications are not achieved — they are tied to field-condition wargames. Doing these wargames and tests escalates tensions with North Korea.
If there are tensions, then condition 3 is not met, and Opcon cannot be transferred.
It’s a formula for ensuring opcon is never transferred.
The simple fact is, it does not take 20+years to transfer opcon. “Wartime” opcon is transferred very rapidly. Armies coalesce, and opcon is transferred. Syngman Rhee turned over opcon in July of 1950 and the US was immediately in charge. It doesn’t take years and decades to transfer opcon. It takes hours or days. Returning it should be even faster. But that would require political will.
Here are some other important things to understand about opcon:
Opcon transfer conditions are actually classified:
The US keeps these conditions under wraps, and therefore the South Korean public or its representatives cannot challenge them publicly because they are not known. We only know the general outlines. The South Korean side can only hope the US will agree they have been met. This is yet another abrogation of sovereignty and democracy in addition to the original breach: “We will keep your military, unless you meet our secret conditions, which you cannot discuss, debate or challenge, because they are secret”.
Condition 3, “Conducive security environment” has always been a kill switch:
We know that security conditions have always been a tacit condition because, in the past, whenever opcon transfer looked justified and imminent, the security environment would suddenly degrade, scuttling the whole project. For example, just as the deadline for Roh Moo Hyun-negotiated Opcon transfer was approaching in 2012, the sudden sinking of the ROKS military ship Cheonan-Ho derailed wartime opcon transfer to 2015. That deadline has also passed and gone. Recent North-Korea attributed mine explosions near the DMZ fit this pattern, as have other numerous, suspicious incidents.
The concoction of “peacetime opcon” is nonsense:
The US claims it only has “wartime” opcon because it transferred “peacetime” opcon to South Korea in 1994. However, this very concept is nonsense:
1) Opcon means control of operations. Operations mean warfighting. “Wartime opcon”, ie. “wartime warfighting control” is a pleonasm. The only time operational control of a military is important is during fighting, just as the only time steering a car matters is when it’s moving.
The invention and transfer of “peacetime” opcon to Korea was a booby prize created to give the appearance that something had changed. Think of those Fisher-Price toy steering wheels you stick on the dashboard while someone else steers the car–it’s a political toy. It gives the illusion of control but it means nothing. The fact is, the US would never allow its military to be subjugated to a foreign command, even a shared command. The simple fact is, the US never shares control.
2) Immediately after “peacetime” opcon transfer in 1994, the US instituted CODA (Combined Delegated Authority), which continues US control of planning and execution of war. As Clint Work observes correctly, “The ROK JCS was granted the term OPCON for political purposes, and the US CFC was given the term CODA for accomplishing missions”. So much for peacetime “control”.
3) Last but not least, the US gets to unilaterally decide what constitutes peacetime and what constitutes wartime. When the US declares Defcon III, it’s wartime. Korean troops must fall in line under US opcon. If you get to slice the cake and then decide which portion you take, it’s your bloody cake. If you share a car, but only one party decides when it gets to be driven, and they drive, they own the car, you are maintenance. If one party unilaterally decides when it gets control, it has control, regardless of any protestations to the contrary.
But why does the US need to keep Opcon?
The US needs control over ROK troops because it is planning for war with China in the Pacific. It has been doing so since it drew up formal plans, AirSea Battle in 2009. For war, it needs SK as a military proxy: it needs the cannon fodder. South Korea has 3.6 million combat-ready troops: 500,000 regular and 3.1 million reserve. It has one of the most powerful and advanced militaries in the world, as well as the defense industrial base to sustain it. Furthermore, SK troops have always fought in US wars as proxies: more military-aged men in South Korea saw combat in Vietnam than Americans did as a proportion of population — 325,000 were deployed–the largest foreign deployment after the US. It was also the third largest deployment to Iraq. The US can avoid a draft because SK has one.
USFK Commander Xavier Brunson has made this US agenda of weaponizing South Korea for war against China explicit, comparing South Korea to “fixed aircraft carrier”, a dagger pointed at China, and a critical part of US war strategy because it is already inside China’s defense perimeter.
As the Hankyoreh Newspaper points out:
When his “dagger” comment is tied to his previous remarks, it’s evident that Brunson expects Korea to play an offensive role capable of striking the Chinese heartland, and Japan to play a defensive role supporting Korea…Brunson commented last August that he would like F-35 fighters with stealth capabilities and a multi-domain task force (MDTF) capable of wrecking China’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) network to be assigned to USFK. These comments suggest that Brunson means to treat Korea as a forward base equipped with military options for launching direct strikes against China.
Brunson recently announced that the multi-domain task force will be deployed to Korea. These build on his previous statements on preparing the peninsula for war with China:
…[this] orientation clarifies how forces on the peninsula can impose costs, not only on the CCP’s Northern Theater Army, but also on the [Russian] Northern Fleet, thus demonstrating the significant strategic potential that exists on the peninsula to influence adversary operations in both adjacent seas… existing force positioning, particularly on the Korean Peninsula, may offer greater strategic advantages… advantageously positioned assets already inside the [Chinese] defensive perimeter, capable of immediate cost-imposition [ie. attack] against multiple adversaries.
This simultaneous fiction of pretending it doesn’t control South Korea’s troops became necessary when US-opconned SK troops massacred civilians in Gwangju. The need to avoid accountability created the legal fiction of “peacetime opcon”, but that doesn’t obviate the US need for control as it prepares for and escalates to war.
The real reason why opcon transfer is taking so long is the US is trying to create a structure that maintains control of the SK army while pretending that it doesn’t. This involves a crazy-quilt of parallel & unified command structures, multiplying command authorities, phased operating assessments, Frankenstein-cobbled-
With war with China on the horizon, South Korea needs to reclaim opcon rapidly. It remains to be seen if president Lee Jae Myung can pull off this hat trick. However, the consequences of not doing so could be catastrophic.
Original article: popularresistance.org
A former U.S. diplomat appeared in court in South Korea Friday facing charges of defamation against President Lee Jae Myung for comments made on American soil in a case that has left him stranded in the Asian country.
Morse Tan's troubles began after he delivered a talk in June 2025 at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., and responded to a question where he brought up the South Korean leader's alleged involvement in a crime as an adolescent.
Since visiting the country in May, Tan has not been allowed to leave due to the case against him, having been charged under the Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection, etc., and the Criminal Act.
Tan issued his remarks about Lee’s alleged juvenile crimes at a National Press Club event titled: "Report on Election Fraud in the June 3 South Korean Presidential election." In response to a question about President Lee and other issues, Tan responded by citing allegations from a few years back that Lee was involved in a gang rape and murder when he was a teenager. He added that Lee, now 62, was sent to a juvenile detention center and did not complete junior high and high school.
SOUTH KOREAN PRESIDENT JUMPS TO INVEST IN MILITARY AFTER TRUMP CUTS JOINT EXERCISES
South Korean prosecutors say the criminal allegations against Lee are unsubstantiated, according to the Korea JoongAng Daily. The outlet wrote that they said Lee had not "been prevented from attending middle or high school due to such a criminal record."
Another South Korean news outlet, KBS World reported that "the prosecution previously verified that there was no record of Lee’s being incarcerated at a juvenile detention center and concluded that the rumors about his incarceration were false."
Asia Business Daily reported that Tan's attorney said that "Even if jurisdiction is recognized, the statements did not present false information, and Tan was not aware that they were false," adding, "He had no intention to defame."
Tan told Fox News Digital on Friday that he "pleaded not guilty because I believe that Lee Jae Myung is guilty" during his hearing at the Seoul Central District Court.
Tan, who has taught constitutional law and served as the dean of Liberty University’s law school, told Fox News Digital his "protected speech is about as protected as it gets." He said South Korea’s prosecutor invoked "criminal defamation, a dubious category which does not exist in the U.S.," to prosecute him.
A spokesperson for the South Korean Embassy in Washington, D.C. told Fox News Digital, "This case is being handled in accordance with the relevant laws and regulations, established principles and due process in the Republic of Korea and the restriction on departure is also imposed and reviewed accordingly."
Tan says he is disappointed that the U.S. Ambassador to South Korea, Michelle Steel, a former Republican congresswoman from California, has not publicly commented on Tan’s legal case — both Steel and Tan are Korean-Americans.
A U.S. State Department spokesperson declined to comment on the specifics of the case.
"The Trump Administration has no higher priority than the safety and security of Americans," the spokesperson told Fox News Digital. "Due to privacy and other considerations, we have nothing further to share at this time."
Tan said the case against him violated his due process rights, and the South Korean judicial system lacks jurisdiction to bring the case. He added that the second charge against him involves his July 2025 talk in South Korea, where he "raised some issues as questions" involving the president. "This is political lawfare. This is a persecution, not a prosecution," he said.
TRUMP SHOULD PRESS XI ON CHINA’S PERSECUTION OF BELIEVERS AT HOME AND ABROAD
Tan believes the motivation for seeking to criminalize his free speech stems from the South Korean government’s view of him as a "threat" and an outspoken critic of Lee’s alleged appeasement policy toward the North Korean communist regime.
"People consider me to be leading a movement against the communizing of South Korea," Tan said.
Tan accused the present government of being aligned with North Korean and Chinese communist regimes "against the U.S. and the Korean people."
Tan points to bias against him by South Korean authorities, who he says prohibited him from attending the funeral of his grandmother, while it allows South Korean prisoners to attend funerals for family members.
KBS World reported that the "Police, who had initially decided not to hand over Tan’s case to the prosecution, launched a reinvestigation at the prosecution’s request."
CLICK HERE TO DOWNLOAD THE FOX NEWS APP
National Review Online also reported that the Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency Cyber dismissed a complaint about Tan’s alleged defamatory statements in April 2026, declaring "no right to prosecute."
According to South Korean law, Tan could face a prison term if found guilty.
Click to see full-size image. (Korean Central News Agency)
North Korea said Saturday it had tested a new precision-guided torpedo that uses artificial intelligence to detect and track targets.
The underwater test of the “super-speed” Zam-2.0 torpedo took place on October 15 to confirm technical upgrades, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said.
According to the state-run news agency, AI had been incorporated into the weapon’s target detection and guidance functions.
The test demonstrated technology intended to improve the efficiency and performance of the propulsion system, KCNA said, adding that the weapon had undergone more than 180 rounds of testing over the past five years.
The announcement came days after Pyongyang said it had test-fired two types of cruise missiles from a submarine, following weeks of tension with Seoul over a landmine explosion along the countries’ border.
In addition, North Korea announced earlier this month an AI-assisted launch of an intermediate-range hypersonic missile, claiming the weapon could change its flight path at low altitude and could not be avoided. Hypersonic missiles travel at more than five times the speed of sound and can maneuver during flight, making them harder to track and intercept.
South Korea test-fired its own hypersonic glide vehicle days after North Korea announced its test, describing the weapon as a strategic asset capable of changing the course of a battle. Pyongyang subsequently questioned whether Seoul’s test had achieved hypersonic flight, a claim South Korea rejected.
In September, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un emphasized the need to improve AI capabilities in the country’s weapons systems.
The latest tests come as the two Koreas appear to be intensifying their competition over hypersonic weapons and as speculation grows about a possible meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Kim during Trump’s Asia tour next month. World leaders are scheduled to gather for November’s Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in China.
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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Previously, SouthFront: Analysis and Intelligence was at southfront.org.
The .org domain name had been blocked by the US (NATO) (https://southfront.press/southfront-org-blocked-by-u-s-controlled-global-internet-supervisor/) globally, outlawed and without any explanation
Back before that, from 2013 to 2015, SouthFront: Analysis and Intelligence was at southfront.com
The post North Korea Says It Tested AI-Guided Torpedo System appeared first on South Front.
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By Konstantin Asmolov – New Eastern Outlook – October 17, 2026
South Korean President Lee Jae-myung is trying to maneuver between pressure from the United States, which demands participation in the conflict with Iran, and risks to national security and reputation, opting for a strategy of stalling and minimizing a direct military presence.
The previous article explained why South Korea refused to join the United States in the “denuclearization of Iran” and how, in response, Donald Trump struck at Lee Jae-myung’s ambitions, nudging him toward the desired choice. And although President Lee’s rhetoric ultimately seems anti-war, in reality there are many loopholes remaining: for example, not a new contingent, but a decisive increase and expansion of the existing contingent’s mandate.
“No!” or “Maybe”
On September 16, Donald Trump said on social media that countries that “provided no assistance” would, after the war with Iran ended, have to “compensate” the United States for damages. Trump did not say whom he meant.
On September 17, First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea Park Yun-ju stated that the ROK’s participation in an international operation in the Strait of Hormuz region depends on a number of factors and is tied not only to relations with the United States but also to the safety of navigation, energy supplies, and the protection of the country’s citizens.
On September 18, Lee Jae-myung stated that South Korea would not deploy troops or military equipment in a way that would draw the country into the war between the United States and Iran. However, he allowed for minimal measures to protect South Korean vessels, oil delivery routes, and citizens, pointing to disruptions in crude oil supplies as one of the risks.
Apparently, eyebrows were raised in Washington, after which on September 19 the Blue House indicated that President Lee Jae-myung’s remarks did not amount to a rejection of Trump’s call for military cooperation. An administration official said that the government is considering practical ways to assist in close contact with the international community, including the United States.
The Specifics of the Future Conflict
Because the war with Iran follows a sine curve, and Donald Trump’s promises to “flatten Iran” alternate with talk of peace, it is possible that, once Trump enters a peace phase, Seoul’s need to rush to help the United States will temporarily disappear. Therefore, let us consider the scenario in which Seoul is actively pressed to help Washington—at least as proof of the Republic of Korea’s allied status.
Compared with previous deployments of South Korean troops as U.S. allies—whether in Vietnam or Iraq—they find themselves in a far more difficult situation. In both cases, this was a ground war in which South Koreans performed auxiliary tasks and mainly carried out clearing operations and fought poorly armed guerrillas, or guarded South Korean specialists while stationed in territory controlled by the Kurds.
However, although Iran does not have nuclear weapons, it has ballistic missiles and kamikaze drones in abundance. This means that wherever South Korean troops are located, they could become targets, especially since South Koreans have no experience countering such a threat, and any serious losses would both damage the country’s domestic political standing and hurt the president’s reputation. As the saying goes, victory has many fathers, but defeat always has one—and he is often the scapegoat.
If anything goes wrong, President Lee will be symbolically held responsible as the person who initiated South Korean participation in the war. At the same time, he may also be criticized for the fact that, in seeking to neutralize the threat of a military coup, he carried out a whole set of measures that could be seen as a certain decline in military readiness—which, alas, performed poorly when confronted with Iranian drones.
Lee Jae-myung’s Two Strategies
Lee Jae-myung understands this situation perfectly and will therefore adhere to two strategies.
The first is to stall for as much time as possible, especially since, under the country’s constitution, sending troops abroad must go through parliament. Because the conflict is escalating and there is domestic opposition, the timing of any troop deployment remains in question.
The situation is interesting: parliament is generally under President Lee’s control, and if he says “yes,” the National Assembly will vote according to his will. But if Lee throws up his hands and says, “I’m in favor, but the Korean people are against it, and we have a democracy, which I cannot go against,” then, on the one hand, outside observers may perceive this as a mutiny on board; on the other, the United States may find another painful way to push Seoul in the right direction. The hope here is rather that the geopolitical situation or Trump’s mood will change and assistance will not be needed.
The second strategy is to send assistance but minimize Korean participation in direct combat: patrol operations, intelligence and surveillance, demining assistance, medical or other humanitarian aid. As a government source told Yonhap, “we are discussing how to contribute safely, without direct participation in combat,” and according to the Dong-A Ilbo, South Korea is considering sending a P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft designed for long-range maritime surveillance, a supply ship, and explosive ordnance disposal specialists.
Another option is the Cheonghae Unit (the newest destroyer with a special forces team aboard), which has long been in the Middle East and is engaged in protecting shipping and responding to threats, including piracy. Increasing its size is not the same as deploying a new contingent, and when, on July 24, 2019, during one of the previous rounds of escalation, the United States demanded not only an increase in South Korea’s share of the costs of maintaining American troops but also the deployment of South Korean naval forces to the Strait of Hormuz, the Cheonghae contingent, which was supposed to fight Somali pirates, “expanded its area of operations” from the Gulf of Aden to the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Gulf. In 2021, Cheonghae was also in the strait, but it was withdrawn to leave a window of opportunity for negotiations after Iran seized a South Korean tanker.
Iran’s Response: What Matters to Tehran Is the Fact Per Se, Not the Scale
It seems that the Iranian side responds in this respect much as North Korea does: what matters is the very fact of Seoul’s participation on the side of the United States, not the scale of such measures. Diplomats and officials have already issued a series of warnings, voicing fairly specific and inconvenient response options for Seoul.
On September 7, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei published a warning in Korean, stating that Tehran would regard the military presence or participation of any third country in operations in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz as direct support for the aggressor, which could entail “serious consequences.” At the same time, the diplomat stressed the importance of friendly relations with Seoul.
Earlier, Iranian expert Mohammad Marandi said that South Korea’s participation in the war could make it an enemy of Iran, and retaliatory strikes could affect not only military but also economic assets of South Korean companies in the Persian Gulf countries. South Korea gets most of its energy resources from the Near and Middle East, and a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and attacks on vessels delivering petroleum products to South Korea would force it to urgently rethink its supply chains.
At the same time, the most convenient and safe backup supply-chain option is also uncertain, because it involves obtaining petroleum products from Russia. Talks on this issue have already begun, and South Korea is trying to prepare its European partners for the possibility of obtaining Russian petroleum products. But, first, the EU still has to be persuaded; second, it is not at all clear that Moscow would welcome this with open arms, knowing that this is not a conceptual turn toward Russia but a desire to solve a problem now that is de facto completely irrelevant to Moscow.
In Lieu of a Conclusion
Lee Jae-myung remains trapped. Refusing to send troops could lead to a further deterioration in relations with Trump, who could take actions against South Korea, such as imposing new tariffs. Sending troops carries certain reputational and domestic political risks. This is harder than a “test of strategic thinking” and a choice between two great evils.
Therefore, we will follow with great interest whether a parliamentary discussion finally takes place and what its verdict will be. It is interesting to see how ready South Korean military personnel and South Korean weapons are to take part in a modern war.
Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, leading research fellow at the Center for Korean Studies of the Institute of China and Modern Asia at the Russian Academy of Sciences
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Dal 2020 le padelle antiaderenti non possono essere prodotte con PFOA, ovvero l’acido perfluoroottanoico. Si tratta di una sostanza della famiglia dei PFAS, le sostanze considerate cancerogene per la salute umana dall’Agenzia Internazionale per la Ricerca sul Cancro. Da allora molti prodotti presentano la scritta “senza PFAS”. Non tutti i produttori mantengono la promessa allo stesso modo: in diversi test di laboratorio sono state trovate tracce di queste sostanze.
Ci sono poi produttori che vengono accusati apertamente di fare ancora uso di tali sostanze, in un contesto nel quale l’Europa si sta impegnando attivamente per vietare i PFAS nei prodotti di consumo di uso quotidiano. Ci sono delle deroghe per alcuni settori considerati critici, come la difesa e la sanità; la proposta ufficiale è attesa per l’inizio del 2027, dopo la relazione finale dell’Agenzia Europea per le Sostanze Chimiche che arriverà a dicembre.
La direzione dell’Europa sembra essere quella del divieto delle sostanze PFAS. Anche i lobbisti, come cita Euronews, sono per la riduzione di queste sostanze in maniera sensata, ma anche misurata e proporzionata.
La proposta di legge è attesa per l’inizio del 2027, dopo l’arrivo della relazione finale dell’Agenzia Europea per le Sostanze Chimiche, prevista per dicembre 2026. Già nel marzo 2026 però l’agenzia aveva affermato che le sostanze PFAS “rappresentano rischi crescenti per le persone e per l’ambiente”, chiedendo un divieto generalizzato del loro utilizzo, con eccezioni in assenza di alternative.
Alternative che esistono in cucina, e per questo uno dei settori che dovrebbe veder sparire i PFAS è proprio questo.
Un produttore di pentole francese, Groupe SEB, è stato raggiunto da un ultimatum di tre organizzazioni ambientaliste. Secondo queste, il gruppo continua a utilizzare PFAS in alcune sue pentole antiaderenti. Scrivono che l’azienda utilizza un approccio “obsoleto e inadeguato”, ma soprattutto non conforme ai requisiti di legge previsti tanto dalla normativa europea quanto da quella francese in materia di responsabilità sociale d’impresa.
L’azienda continuerebbe a utilizzare il PTFE, che è un tipo di PFAS impiegato da molti altri produttori, nello specifico da chi produce pentole e padelle, per via della resistenza all’acqua, alle macchie e al grasso. Rispetto ad altri PFAS tossici, il PTFE non è stato collegato al cancro. Secondo le organizzazioni ambientaliste, però, l’azienda ha utilizzato pratiche commerciali ingannevoli legate alla campagna pubblicitaria di questo prodotto, raccontandolo come totalmente sicuro.
Perché, anche se il PTFE non è tossico, come spiegano gli esperti è il modo in cui viene prodotto e smaltito che può rilasciare PFAS tossici. Uno dei metodi di smaltimento errati è quello tramite incenerimento. Quindi questi prodotti, se utilizzati quotidianamente, non causano problemi di salute, ma la maniera nella quale sono stati prodotti e il modo in cui saranno smaltiti in futuro potrebbero aver contaminato o contaminare l’ambiente.
Le accuse arrivano in un momento di acceso dibattito in attesa della legge del 2027. A questa diffida l’azienda ha risposto che “esaminerà i contenuti e risponderà in conformità con la legge”.
Non c’è quindi in gioco soltanto la salute singola di chi acquista una padella antiaderente con PFAS, ma anche un più ampio fenomeno di inquinamento. I PFAS sono diventati un simbolo della crisi ambientale. Il Belgio, per esempio, è stato denunciato per violazione dei diritti umani per la sua incapacità di affrontare la contaminazione da PFAS.
Hélène Duguy, ambientalista di ClientEarth:
I PFAS sono piuttosto emblematici di una realtà sociale diffusa, che accetta danni collaterali in nome di profitti a breve termine.
Sono sostanze difficili da rimuovere dall’ambiente e possono avere effetti dannosi sulla salute umana. L’inquinamento da PFAS, inoltre, è particolarmente diffuso in Europa. Secondo le indagini del 2023, in tutto il continente ci sono circa 23.000 siti contaminati da PFAS. In Italia 300 famiglie saranno risarcite proprio a causa della diffusione di PFAS.
All’inizio del 2026 è entrata in vigore una normativa che impone ai singoli Stati di monitorare i livelli di PFAS nell’acqua potabile. Nel caso i risultati siano superiori ai limiti, dovranno adottare misure per ridurre i livelli e tutelare la salute pubblica. Il problema, secondo le organizzazioni, è che in questo modo si agisce sul sintomo ma non sulla prevenzione, ovvero andando alla fonte per fermare la produzione, la commercializzazione o il rilascio stesso dei PFAS.
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