Nel dicembre 2021, la Russia presentò agli Stati Uniti e alla NATO due bozze di accordi formali per ottenere garanzie di sicurezza legalmente vincolanti, facendo intendere che se non fossero state accolte ci sarebbero state delle conseguenze.

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In effetti, dopo il rifiuto di Washington di prenderle in considerazione, il 24 febbraio 2022 la Federazione Russa intraprese l’Operazione Militare Speciale in Ucraina, ancora in corso.

Tra le richieste avanzate allora da Mosca sottolineiamo:

• Blocco dell’allargamento della NATO: l’impegno formale a impedire ulteriori espansioni dell’Alleanza Atlantica, escludendo esplicitamente l’adesione dell’Ucraina.
• Limitazioni alle Forze Militari: il divieto per la NATO di dispiegare truppe o armamenti nei Paesi entrati a far parte dell’Alleanza Atlantica dopo il maggio 1997.
• Basi negli ex Stati sovietici: il divieto per gli Stati Uniti di stabilire basi militari o sviluppare cooperazione bilaterale nei Paesi dell’ex URSS che non fanno parte della NATO.
• Missili a raggio intermedio e corto: il divieto reciproco di dispiegare missili a raggio intermedio e corto in aree da cui possano colpire il territorio dell’altra parte.
• Attività militari: la limitazione delle esercitazioni e delle attività militari della NATO in Europa orientale, nel Caucaso e in Asia centrale.

Stati Uniti e NATO nel 2021 rifiutarono le richieste principali (in particolare il veto sull’allargamento della NATO e il ritiro delle infrastrutture militari ai confini del 1997), offrendo invece di negoziare su temi specifici come il controllo degli armamenti e la trasparenza delle esercitazioni.

Perciò, il 17 febbraio 2022 Mosca consegnò una contro-risposta formale agli Stati Uniti, lamentando la mancanza di disponibilità a fornire garanzie vincolanti e preannunciando la necessità di adottare misure ‘tecnico-militari’: pochi giorni dopo ci fu l’invasione dell’Ucraina.

La Russia aveva fondati motivi per ritenere che Kiev stesse per entrare nella NATO e uno dei bersagli inziali dei suoi missili balistici (13 marzo e 17 maggio 2022) furono proprio i centri di addestramento ucraini di Yavoriv (nella zona di Leopoli, vicino al confine polacco ma all’interno dei confini ucraini), a tutti gli effetti infrastrutture della NATO, come visibile nelle mappe della stessa Alleanza Atlantica (1).

Tralasciando le questioni diplomatiche e l’auspicata volontà comune di riaffermare i principi delle Nazioni Unite che venivano espressi nel documento presentato da Mosca e sui quali l’Amministrazione Trump ha tirato oggi una riga definitiva, è interessante capire se siano stati compiuti dei passi da parte dell’attuale presidenza statunitense per venire incontro alle richieste russe (2).

All’art. 1: Russia e U.S.A. non intraprenderanno azioni né parteciperanno o sosterranno attività che pregiudichino la sicurezza dell’altra Parte; non attueranno misure di sicurezza – adottate da ciascuna Parte individualmente o nell’ambito di un’organizzazione internazionale, di un’alleanza militare o di una coalizione – che possano compromettere gli interessi fondamentali di sicurezza dell’altra Parte.

Sul supporto decisivo dell’intelligence USA e dei grandi gruppi tecnologici statunitensi (da Starlink a Palantir, entrambi vicini all’Amministrazione Trump) all’Ucraina al fine di colpire il territorio della Federazione Russa ho già ampiamente scritto in precedenza e perciò non mi soffermo (3).

Articolo 2

Le Parti si adopereranno affinché tutte le organizzazioni internazionali, le alleanze militari e le coalizioni a cui partecipa almeno una delle Parti si attengano ai principi sanciti dalla Carta delle Nazioni Unite.

Abbiamo assistito recentemente alla doppia aggressione condotta dalla “Coalizione Epstein” all’Iran, senza alcun fondamento nel diritto internazionale e senza alcuna considerazione dei “principi sanciti dalla Carta delle Nazioni Unite”. Per non parlare del supporto statunitense ai bombardamenti israeliani su Siria, Libano e Yemen (aggressione alla quale contribuisce in gran parte l’Arabia Saudita) o del rapimento illegittimo del Presidente venezuelano Maduro.

Articolo 3

Le Parti non utilizzeranno i territori di altri Stati allo scopo di preparare o compiere un attacco armato contro l’altra Parte o altre azioni che pregiudichino gli interessi fondamentali di sicurezza dell’altra Parte.

Naturalmente, la violazione di questo articolo non avviene solo utilizzando il territorio ucraino per colpire la Russia; recentemente, sul sito del Ministero della Difesa di Mosca è comparso un elenco di venti aziende europee accusate di essere parte integrante dell’apparato militare-industriale ucraino. Quattro hanno sede in Italia, tre in Germania, due in Gran Bretagna, due in Polonia, due in Turchia, due in Repubblica Ceca, poi sono rappresentate anche imprese con basi in Israele, Spagna, Paesi Bassi, Lituania e Lettonia. Tutto ciò avviene con il consenso implicito degli Stati Uniti. Anche le infrastrutture della NATO e le basi militari statunitensi in Europa (Sigonella ad esempio in Italia nel 2022) contribuiscono così ad alimentare questo conflitto (4).

Articolo 4

Gli Stati Uniti d’America si impegneranno a impedire un’ulteriore espansione verso Est dell’Organizzazione del Trattato del Nord Atlantico e a negare l’adesione all’Alleanza agli Stati dell’ex Unione delle Repubbliche Socialiste Sovietiche. Gli Stati Uniti d’America non stabiliranno basi militari nel territorio degli Stati dell’ex Unione delle Repubbliche Socialiste Sovietiche che non siano membri dell’Organizzazione del Trattato del Nord Atlantico, né utilizzeranno le loro infrastrutture per attività militari di alcun tipo, né svilupperanno con essi una cooperazione militare bilaterale.

Senza trascurare l’immediato ingresso di Svezia e Finlandia nella NATO all’inizio dell’Operazione Militare Speciale, l’attuale Amministrazione a Washington ha annunciato l’invio di ulteriori 5.000 soldati statunitensi in Polonia e l’istituzione di una nuova base militare permanente nel Paese (ridenominata “Fort Trump”). Ma gli U.S.A. non si sono fermati qui; in Armenia, nazione che fa ancora formalmente parte dell’Organizzazione per il Trattato di Sicurezza Collettiva e dell’Unione Economica Eurasiatica, lo scorso settembre Washington e Erevan hanno tenuto un nuovo ciclo di consultazioni bilaterali sulla difesa e firmato un verbale congiunto d’intesa (jointly agreed minutes) per dare seguito alla Charter on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership sottoscritta nel maggio 2026. Gli accordi discussi riguardano:

Supporto alla trasformazione e riforma delle Forze Armate armene.

Addestramento di sottufficiali (NCO), istruttori, comandanti junior e personale per il mantenimento della pace (peacekeeping).

Istruzione militare ed esercitazioni congiunte.

Sviluppo delle capacità industriali della difesa e potenziale fornitura di equipaggiamenti tramite il programma Foreign Military Sales (FMS) e programmi educativi come l’IMET, orientando l’Armenia verso una progressiva modernizzazione degli standard militari occidentali.

Articolo 5

Le Parti si asterranno dallo schierare le proprie Forze Armate e i propri armamenti – anche nell’ambito di organizzazioni internazionali, alleanze militari o coalizioni – in aree in cui tale schieramento potrebbe essere percepito dall’altra Parte come una minaccia alla propria sicurezza nazionale, fatta eccezione per lo schieramento all’interno dei territori nazionali delle Parti stesse. Le Parti si asterranno dal far volare bombardieri pesanti equipaggiati con armamenti nucleari o non nucleari, o dallo schierare navi da guerra di superficie di qualsiasi tipo – anche nell’ambito di organizzazioni internazionali, alleanze militari o coalizioni – in aree situate rispettivamente al di fuori dello spazio aereo nazionale e delle acque territoriali nazionali, dalle quali sia possibile colpire obiettivi nel territorio dell’altra Parte.

Poco più di un mese fa, si è tenuta un’esercitazione aerea della NATO nel nord-est della Polonia, nelle vicinanze di Kaliningrad con alcune decine di velivoli. All’esercitazione hanno partecipato caccia statunitensi e norvegesi, un aereo di sorveglianza NATO E-3A Sentry AWACS, velivoli per il rifornimento in volo e un aereo statunitense EA-37B per la guerra elettronica: Mosca teme che si tratti di manovre preparatorie all’isolamento dell’enclave russa dal resto della Federazione e ha risposto duramente ma soltanto sul piano diplomatico.  Inoltre, la NATO Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), la difesa antimissile balistica dell’Alleanza Atlantica, è una rete costituita da sensori e da sistemi missilistici che i Paesi Membri offrono quale contributo nazionale alla struttura, i cui punti di riferimento in Europa sono lo European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), statunitense, con il sistema americano Aegis Ashore schierato in Romania e Polonia e le navi Aegis per la BMD, stazionate nelle acque spagnole. Il sistema radar della IAMD si trova in Turchia, mentre l’infrastruttura di comando e controllo in Germania (5). Nel 2016 (grazie all’annullamento del Trattato ABM deciso da Trump) gli Stati Uniti hanno prima messo in funzione una base ABM in Romania, un sistema che utilizza lanciamissili Aegis potenzialmente in grado di lanciare Tomahawk con testata nucleare ad oltre 2400 chilometri di distanza, successivamente nel 2022 hanno costruito un sito Aegis in Polonia, ancora più vicino ai confini russi. Gli Stati Uniti hanno sempre sostenuto che i siti ABM hanno lo scopo di fermare le testate puntate sull’Europa dall’Iran o dalla Corea del Nord. Mosca ovviamente non la pensa così; François Geleznikoff, direttore delle applicazioni militari presso la Commissione per l’energia atomica e le energie alternative, intervenne nel marzo 2019 in audizione presso l’Assemblea Nazionale francese sull’argomento contraddicendo Washington: “Negli Stati Uniti, la Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) non si rivolge realmente alla Corea del Nord (gli americani hanno armi che permetterebbero loro di vetrificare il Paese più volte) ma piuttosto alla Russia, in risposta alle dichiarazioni del presidente Putin” (6).

Articolo 6

Le Parti si impegnano a non dislocare missili a raggio intermedio e a corto raggio lanciabili da terra al di fuori dei propri territori nazionali, né in aree dei propri territori nazionali dalle quali tali armi possano colpire obiettivi situati nel territorio nazionale dell’altra Parte.

Il 22 settembre 2026, Stati Uniti, Danimarca e Groenlandia hanno firmato a New York un accordo di sicurezza trilaterale che prevede l’apertura e la gestione di due nuove basi militari americane e la modernizzazione di quella esistente. Gli Stati Uniti ottengono ampie libertà di movimento (aria, terra e mare) per collegare le basi e la possibilità di utilizzare l’isola per il sistema di difesa missilistica (la Pituffik Space Base – ex Thule Air Base – nel nord-ovest dell’isola, ospita sistemi radar d’allerta precoce per i missili balistici). Il sistema difensivo pensato dagli Stati Uniti si evolverà da una presenza concentrata in un unico punto a una rete di strutture distribuite su tutta l’isola. Anche perché le due nuove basi non saranno le uniche installazioni militari che si insedieranno sull’isola (7).

Articolo 7

Le Parti si asterranno dal dislocare armi nucleari al di fuori dei propri territori nazionali e riporteranno nei propri territori nazionali le armi già dislocate all’estero al momento dell’entrata in vigore del Trattato. Le Parti elimineranno tutte le infrastrutture esistenti per il dislocamento di armi nucleari al di fuori dei propri territori nazionali. Le Parti non addestreranno personale militare o civile proveniente da Paesi non dotati di armi nucleari all’uso di tali armi. Le Parti non condurranno esercitazioni o attività di addestramento per forze convenzionali che prevedano scenari di impiego di armi nucleari.

A partire dal 13 ottobre 2026, si svolgerà in Italia Steadfast Noon, ‘Mezzogiorno risoluto’, l’esercitazione che l’Alleanza atlantica svolge ogni anno e che coinvolgerà le basi aeree di Aviano, in provincia di Pordenone, e Ghedi, nel Bresciano, oltre a diverse località in tutta l’area di responsabilità ben oltre il Nord del Paese. “È necessario il contributo congiunto di tutti gli Alleati: si tratta di un’iniziativa che non può limitarsi a un singolo Paese”, ha riferito il colonnello David Bull, capo delle operazioni nucleari della Nato, facendo riferimento al fatto che anche lo spazio aereo dei Paesi limitrofi potrebbe essere coinvolto. Vi parteciperanno velivoli in grado di svolgere missioni convenzionali e nucleari, anche se l’esercitazione non prevede l’impiego di armi atomiche. “Ma siamo in sintonia con Roma sul fatto che si tratti di un’esercitazione nucleare”, ha poi precisato Barrows. Gli Stati Uniti saranno presenti con equipaggi di volo e personale addetto alla manutenzione. Secondo gli stessi documenti del Pentagono, in Italia sarebbero dislocate circa 80 ordigni nucleari sotto controllo statunitense nelle basi militare italiane a Ghedi e Aviano (8).

Conclusioni

Il sintetico panorama offerto da questo articolo vuole dimostrare che la Russia non potrà cantare vittoria nemmeno dopo aver completato la conquista del Donbass, perché l’inizio dell’Operazione Militare Speciale in Ucraina è legato a considerazioni di sicurezza geopolitica tuttora irrisolte se non addirittura aggravatesi rispetto al 2022.

Se qualcuno al Cremlino crede che dopo un eventuale accordo con l’attuale Amministrazione U.S.A., la Russia verrà lasciata stare si sbaglia di grosso, perché l’Occidente collettivo si sta già preparando non solo al dopo Putin ma anche al dopo Trump.

L’obiettivo degli Stati Uniti non è altro che prendere tempo in attesa del verificarsi di almeno una delle due condizioni: l’allontanamento di Mosca dalla partnership strategica con Pechino e il conseguente rallentamento della dedollarizzazione – gli Stati Uniti non pagheranno di certo il diesel russo in rubli – e la fine della preparazione da parte della NATO ad un conflitto diretto contro la Russia – termine individuato nel 2030, quando sicuramente Trump non sarà più alla Casa Bianca.

Dal punto di vista occidentale la considerazione della Russia non è cambiata molto da quando il direttore della rivista “Foreign Policy”, l’israelo-statunitense John Feffer, la definì una “Nigeria con le armi nucleari”; secondo questa visione, Mosca deve tornare ad essere una sorta di ‘colonia estrattiva’ o ‘appendice di materie prime’ a esclusivo vantaggio delle industrie euro-statunitensi. A maggior ragione nel momento in cui la competizione tecnologica con la Cina necessita da parte degli Stati Uniti di quelle risorse strategiche di cui la Federazione Russa è ricca.

Pochi giorni fa, i 32 membri del Comitato Militare della NATO (quello statunitense in primis), erano a Kiev per ribadire il loro sostegno incondizionato all’Ucraina “rimasta costantemente al centro delle valutazioni, delle decisioni e della pianificazione futura dell’Alleanza”. Prima di fare qualsiasi altra concessione a Washington, Vladimir Putin dovrebbe pensarci bene: passare da una vittoria tattica ad una sconfitta strategica potrebbe essere più semplice di quanto sembra.

____

(1) https://www.nato.int/structur/nmlo/links/yavoriv-training-centre.pdf. Il sito internet è oggi irraggiungibile (forse per mascherare le prove?), ma la sua presenza come infrastruttura dell’Alleanza Atlantica era rintracciabile ancora nel giugno 2024. Come ammise anche il “Corriere della Sera”, i morti furono più di 300 e tra di essi numerosi soldati e addestratori della NATO: Giulia Fasano, Nella base militare di Yavoriv i morti sono stati trecento, 26 marzo 2022. Anche secondo il quotidiano “Repubblica”: “Il ‘Centro internazionale per la pace e la sicurezza’ di Yavoriv ospitava istruttori occidentali, come conferma il Ministro della Difesa di Kiev”.

(2) Il documento completo è stato pubblicato sul sito internet del Ministero degli Esteri della Federazione Russa: Treaty between The United States of America and the Russian Federation on security guarantees, 17 dicembre 2021.

(3) Ad esempio, cfr. Le basi della CIA in Ucraina: chiave del contenimento anti-russo in Europa, “Strategic Culture Foundation”, 11 aprile 2026.

(4) Nel contesto del conflitto in Ucraina e della postura di deterrenza della NATO, le basi militari presenti sul territorio italiano (gestite sia dalle Forze Armate italiane che dagli Stati Uniti) svolgono funzioni chiave di sorveglianza aerea, intelligence, logistica e comando, cfr. ad esempio Federico Petrangeli, Supporting Kyiv: Italy’s Military Assistance between Strategic Continuity and Political Division, IAI, 11 giugno 2026.

(5) Senato della Repubblica italiana, Schema di decreto ministeriale di approvazione del programma pluriennale di A/R n. SMD 32/2025, relativo all’ammodernamento, al rinnovamento e al potenziamento della capacità nazionale di difesa aerea e missilistica a protezione del territorio nazionale e dell’Alleanza Atlantica, alla protezione di teatro delle forze schierate in aree di operazione, inclusa la componente navale (n. 377), Resoconto sommario del 4 febbraio 2026.

(6) Stefano Vernole, La forza di dissuasione nucleare francese, Focus CeSEM, 3 maggio 2022.

(7) Stefano Vernole, Gli Stati Uniti hanno messo le mani sulla Groenlandia dimostrando la totale irrilevanza dell’Unione Europea, “Strategic Culture Foundation”, 5 ottobre 2026.

(8) Redazione Peacelink, L’esercitazione nucleare della NATO Steadfast Noon 2026 comincerà sui cieli italiani il 13 ottobre.

Ursula von der Leyen has the answer. Borrow even more money. Borrow like there’s no tomorrow.

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The most remarkable thing about the rapid demise of the U.S. is that when it hits the bottom of the ocean floor economically, it will be in a better state than the EU. The panic among EU leaders, in particular Ursula von der Leyen, is breathtaking. Barely a week passes before she makes another crackpot policy announcement, gives herself a salary increase, or makes a statement about needing to give even more money to Ukraine. But in recent months these announcements have become more radical and existential, and we are seeing a new dawn now in the EU where the only solution to cover up the feral spending and borrowing is to fabricate a war with Russia and then blame Putin for the whole fiasco.

Every now and again we get a sober reminder about the economic situation of the U.S., EU and Russia. The recent news that Putin is going to sell around 2 million tonnes of diesel oil to “global markets” (as U.S. media phrases it), the lion’s share going to the U.S. before, during and just after the midterm elections in a bid to stabilise the price to help Trump. We will have to assume that countries who buy some of their diesel from the U.S. will continue doing so, but it might, in fact, be Russian oil.

There’s a lot of fake news buzzing around originating from Trump, who likes to distract journalists away from the top issues. It’s hard to see how the American public will respond to Trump’s latest decision to buy Russian diesel, but it’s hard to see this being a solution to the global oil crisis, let alone Trump’s record-low ratings. Will Trump really go ahead with a new wave of strikes on Iran after the midterms, as he has said? Or is it that his own intelligence agencies have picked up information that Iran is poised for a massive strike, and so therefore he is obliged to send even more troops, plus a carrier, to the region?

Regardless of how France and Germany get their diesel in the coming weeks, after Trump forced these governments to dip into their own reserves by threatening a U.S. export ban, it’s hard to see how the Achilles heel of most EU economies – crude oil products – can still be controlled by Moscow. While intellectually challenged figures like Mark Rutte make such stupid comments about how Russia could never win a war with NATO based on comparative GDP data, this latest move might be a huge wake-up call for Macron and Merz, the latter facing dismally low poll ratings. How do you continue to fund a war in Ukraine with the ‘frenemy’ relationship pushed to breaking point, such as is the case now with the U.S. having to buy diesel from Russia? EU countries loathe Putin, as the one hope they had to magically breathe new life into EU economies by taking Ukraine under its wing was shattered when Russian forces invaded. Putin is everything they are not. Nobody can deny Putin is a leader – the very thing that is so desperately lacking in EU countries. Leadership.

But the situation now has reached farce. With a global diesel crisis brought about by Trump’s war with Iran, EU countries are expected to buy diesel on the international market, topped up by Russia. In fact, buying oil from your enemy is nothing new. Countries have been doing this for decades. Even in Syria, we saw terror groups in the north-east of the country take over the oil infrastructure and then sell oil back to the Assad regime.

It’s hard to see how EU countries will draw a line in the sand between their geostrategic military objectives and their very realistic need for a stable oil supply. But in the midst of this chaos, Ursula von der Leyen has the answer. Borrow even more money. Borrow like there’s no tomorrow. Her latest proposal is to expand the current seven-year EU budget to 2 trillion euros, and there is only one way this can be achieved, as member states are never going to cough up more for the EU experiment. She will be forced to borrow from international banks to replace a previous loan of 750 billion euros for COVID. This is the solution for failing economies. Where once for so many years EU apparatchiks would defend the EU’s failure to implement its own rule book, in preference for constantly adopting new legislation, now this seems to have been replaced by ‘create a panic about Russia and make the EU a sort of executive of NATO without a single trace of democratic virtue’. Von der Leyen doesn’t stipulate what this massive increase is for, but we can assume some of it will be siphoned off for Ukraine. Madness on steroids. But hidden in the text is a new series of taxes which the EU itself could impose on individuals, and so in the smoke-and-mirrors confusion we see there is a back-door way to start taxing EU citizens, something Brussels never touched before. How long has the whole project got?

Brussels, 13 October, (Brussels Morning Newspaper) – A Brussels fatal shooting near the European Parliament has left one man dead and prompted a criminal investigation, raising concerns about public safety in the Belgian capital’s European Quarter.

The victim … Read more

Brussels, 13 October, (Brussels Morning Newspaper) – EU AI and cloud rules are facing growing financial scrutiny after a reported study warned that Europe’s push for greater technological independence could cost more than €100 billion over the next … Read more

Brussels, 13 October, (Brussels Morning Newspaper) – European elections could bring significant changes to the European Union’s political direction, with shifting parliamentary alliances influencing decisions on migration, climate action, economic competitiveness and defence. As the European Parliament continues … Read more

Sofia, Bulgaria, 13 October, (Brussels Morning Newspaper) – Black Sea drone attacks struck two commercial vessels off Bulgaria’s coastline on Tuesday, sinking one cargo ship and leaving 11 sailors missing. The incidents have triggered rescue operations, diplomatic tensions … Read more

Près de dix ans de procédure, une réclamation initiale de 1,86 million d’euros, puis 310 511 € exigés au titre du travail dissimulé d’un sous-traitant : l’affaire illustre le poids financier d’un redressement contesté. Le 7 septembre 2026, le tribunal judiciaire de Lyon a annulé la totalité de la somme réclamée par l’URSSAF, faute pour celle-ci d’avoir produit les procès-verbaux permettant de vérifier le bien-fondé de la dette.

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Le 7 septembre 2026, le pôle social du tribunal judiciaire de Lyon (RG n° 20/00821) a rendu une décision qui devrait faire réfléchir l’administration. Une URSSAF demandait des comptes à une entreprise pour les fautes présumées d’un autre. Elle n’a pas été capable de prouver ce qu’elle avançait.

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Une créance née en 2016, annulée en 2026

Tout commence en septembre 2016, l’URSSAF notifie à une entreprise donneuse d’ordre une lettre d’observations évaluant le redressement à 1 860 411 euros. Après les observations de l’entreprise, le montant est ramené à 272 310 euros. En mars 2019, une mise en demeure réclame finalement 310 511 euros.

Cette somme comprend 217 797 euros de cotisations, 54 450 euros de majorations de redressement et 38 264 euros de majorations de retard. Le fondement juridique est la solidarité financière prévue par l’article L. 8222-2 du code du travail : un donneur d’ordre peut être tenu de répondre des sommes dues au titre du travail dissimulé commis par son sous-traitant.

Les faits reprochés à ce dernier couvrent la période de janvier 2013 à mars 2015. L’entreprise contestait toutefois la précision des procès-verbaux constatant le travail dissimulé, indispensables pour vérifier le périmètre des sommes mises à sa charge.

Sans les procès-verbaux, le redressement s’effondre

Dans son jugement du 7 septembre 2026 (RG n° 20/00821), le pôle social du tribunal judiciaire de Lyon relève que l’URSSAF n’a pas produit ces procès-verbaux aux débats. L’entreprise ne pouvait donc pas vérifier si les cotisations réclamées correspondaient effectivement à des travaux réalisés pour son compte.

Le tribunal annule le redressement dans son intégralité et assortit sa décision de l’exécution provisoire. Il s’agit néanmoins d’un jugement de première instance, susceptible d’appel : l’affaire n’est donc pas nécessairement close.

Au-delà des 310 511 euros abandonnés à ce stade, le dossier soulève une question de rapport de force. Entre la notification initiale de 2016 et le jugement de 2026, le temps a passé, tandis que l’entreprise devait défendre sa position face à une créance considérable. Les frais d’avocat, l’incertitude financière et la mobilisation des dirigeants constituent un coût potentiel que l’annulation ne fait pas automatiquement disparaître.

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par Russia TRUTH

Une succession rapide de manœuvres diplomatiques a permis à Donald Trump d’être publiquement réhabilité, à Vladimir Poutine de garder le contrôle stratégique total et à Volodymyr Zelensky de sombrer dans une rage sans bornes :

• L’accord bilatéral sur le diesel : La Maison Blanche et le Kremlin ont conclu un accord en vertu duquel le Trésor américain accorde une dérogation renouvelable aux sanctions sur les exportations russes de diesel jusqu’au 7 avril 2027. En contrepartie, Moscou a accepté de lever son interdiction temporaire d’exportation nationale de distillats moyens, apportant ainsi un soulagement immédiat, tant psychologique que concret, à un marché mondial du diesel mis à mal par les interdictions de transport maritime imposées au Moyen-Orient.

• L’effondrement du mythe de la «trêve énergétique» : Les rumeurs relayées par les médias occidentaux alléguant que Moscou aurait accepté une cessation provisoire des frappes aériennes et des tirs de missiles sur le réseau électrique ukrainien en échange d’un allègement plus large des sanctions ont été totalement discréditées. La position russe reste inébranlable : pas de cessez-le-feu provisoire ni sur terre, ni en mer, ni dans les airs.

• Moscou suspend officiellement les négociations : Lors d’un point presse officiel rendant compte du sommet téléphonique entre Poutine et Trump, le conseiller du Kremlin en matière de politique étrangère, Youri Ouchakov, a lancé une bombe diplomatique : la Russie a officiellement révoqué sa décision de septembre dernier de reprendre les négociations trilatérales avec Washington et Kiev. Invoquant les tentatives d’attaques par drones menées par l’Ukraine contre des bureaux de vote russes lors des élections à la Douma d’État, Poutine a informé Trump que le processus de négociation est suspendu indéfiniment tandis que les forces russes progressent sur l’ensemble du front.

• Rupture entre Washington et Kiev : Axios a confirmé que Donald Trump a personnellement adressé six exigences distinctes à Zelensky, lui ordonnant de mettre immédiatement fin aux raids de drones ukrainiens visant les raffineries russes. Zelensky a défié ces six exigences. Piégé par la dépendance de son pays aux financements occidentaux, Zelensky s’en est ouvertement pris à Trump, qualifiant le dialogue entre Washington et Moscou de «trahison en coulisses» et accusant la Maison Blanche d’utiliser les réunions à Miami comme écran de fumée pour traiter directement avec le Kremlin.

1. La transaction sur le diesel : un levier stratégique négocié contre un répit électoral

L’accord conclu entre Washington et Moscou est présenté par la Maison Blanche comme une avancée majeure. En réalité, cet accord marque le recul logique d’une puissance hégémonique surendettée, confrontée aux réalités économiques à l’approche des élections de mi-mandat de novembre :

• Le mécanisme de la dérogation : tout comme le Trésor américain a discrètement délivré des licences renouvelables pour permettre aux raffineries indiennes d’acheter du pétrole brut russe acheminé par voie maritime à la suite des premières escalades dans le golfe Persique en février, Washington a de nouveau accordé une dérogation d’urgence pour le diesel russe. Confronté à la réalité des pénuries de diesel agricole et routier, Trump a cédé sur ce que son dispositif de sanctions s’efforçait d’empêcher depuis des années.

• Le levier calculé de Novak : le vice-premier ministre russe Alexandre Novak a signalé il y a plusieurs semaines que les stocks nationaux de diesel en Russie affichent un excédent, la récolte agricole de cette année étant suffisante et comparable à celle de l’année dernière. L’interdiction russe des exportations, loin d’être un acte de désespoir déclenché par les frappes de drones ukrainiens, constituait un instrument de levier géopolitique. Moscou a retenu les distillats hors du marché jusqu’à ce que Washington soit contraint de négocier un assouplissement des sanctions.

• L’arithmétique du réel : comme l’ont démontré les analystes énergétiques, les volumes de diesel exportables par la Russie couvrent environ neuf jours de consommation intérieure américaine. Le véritable moteur de la crise énergétique mondiale reste le blocus du golfe Persique et de la mer Rouge. Pourtant, en acceptant de libérer ce volume, Moscou a obtenu une concession politique majeure de la part de Trump tout en démontrant aux pays du Sud que les régimes de sanctions occidentaux sont mis de côté dès que les prix intérieurs menacent une élection américaine.

2. Le point presse d’Ouchakov : la Russie claque la porte des négociations

La révélation géopolitique cruciale du jour provient du compte-rendu officiel de Youri Ouchakov sur le sommet téléphonique Poutine-Trump.

Pour la première fois depuis le lancement de l’opération militaire spéciale en 2022, la Fédération de Russie a officiellement et publiquement retiré son offre de pourparlers diplomatiques :

Poutine expose à Trump la doctrine russe durcie :

Les tentatives du régime de Kiev de perturber notre processus démocratique par des attaques terroristes contre des bureaux de vote ont réduit à néant toute possibilité de négociations. Nos forces armées détiennent l’initiative et avancent avec assurance. C’est à nous de déterminer si et quand des pourparlers auront un sens.

Il s’agit là d’un tournant décisif.

Tout au long du conflit, Moscou a maintenu une position cohérente : nous restons ouverts à un règlement politique et diplomatique selon nos conditions.

En lançant des attaques massives de drones contre les capitales provinciales russes et les bureaux de vote pendant les élections à la Douma, Bankova a fait le jeu de l’état-major russe.

Poutine a profité de cet incident pour mettre définitivement fin à cette voie de négociation, informant Trump que la Russie n’envisagera pas de discussions trilatérales tant que ses forces auront l’initiative opérationnelle totale.

Selon Ouchakov, Trump n’a pas réagi ; il a promis d’envoyer des «signaux» fermes à la délégation ukrainienne qui attendait à Miami.

3. Le coup de folie de Bankova : six défis, l’arnaque des 27 milliards d’euros et la rupture de Séoul

À Kiev, la prise de conscience que Donald Trump négocie des accords énergétiques directement avec Vladimir Poutine a provoqué une réaction démesurée de la part de Volodymyr Zelensky :

• Les six exigences : un reportage d’Axios a confirmé que la Maison Blanche a émis six directives distinctes à l’intention de Bankova, ordonnant la fin immédiate des attaques contre les infrastructures de raffinage russes. La motivation de Trump est purement intéressée : chaque frappe contre un craqueur de catalyseur russe fournit aux traders de Wall Street un prétexte pour faire grimper les cours à terme du diesel. Zelensky a rejeté toutes ces directives. Mettre fin aux frappes reviendrait à admettre que toute la campagne estivale de drones n’a abouti à aucun résultat stratégique.

• Le racket des 27 milliards d’euros : les dirigeants ukrainiens ne peuvent se permettre d’arrêter l’offensive de drones, car celle-ci constitue leur principal argumentaire utilisé pour extorquer des fonds à Bruxelles. Des responsables du ministère ukrainien de la Défense ont récemment déclaré que sans 27 milliards d’euros de subventions européennes immédiates, le montage de drones sur le territoire national serait interrompu. En déployant des munitions volantes pour incendier des réservoirs de stockage périphériques dans des villes de province russes, Bankova fabrique des images destinées à persuader des dirigeants européens comme Friedrich Merz et Ursula von der Leyen de continuer à faire affluer l’argent des contribuables dans les caisses du régime.

• La crise diplomatique avec Séoul : l’irritabilité diplomatique de Zelensky s’est étendue au-delà de Washington. Après la capture de deux soldats nord-coréens dans la région frontalière de Koursk, un accord a été conclu avec Séoul pour transférer secrètement les prisonniers en vue de les interroger. Ignorant la demande explicite de confidentialité formulée par la Corée du Sud pour éviter tout conflit avec Pyongyang, Zelensky a annoncé publiquement l’opération à des fins de relations publiques. Lorsque Séoul a protesté, Bankova a refusé de présenter des excuses, déclenchant une rupture diplomatique sans précédent qui a abouti au retrait par la Corée du Sud de son ambassadeur à Kiev — s’aliénant inutilement un partenaire qui avait fourni plus de 500 000 obus d’artillerie de 155 mm pour la campagne de 2023.

4. Le théâtre de la décapitation : sous-stations, centres de la SBU et le «Collegium» de Surovikin

Tandis que les diplomates échangent leurs reproches, la campagne aérienne stratégique russe contre Kiev est entrée dans une phase opérationnelle meurtrière :

1. La destruction du réseau électrique : des observateurs indépendants du secteur électrique confirment que les frappes russes sur la sous-station de Kievska de 750 kV et les nœuds de transformation du nord ont contourné les boucliers de protection en béton en ciblant les transformateurs de réduction de tension, les disjoncteurs et les parcs de refroidissement. Toute la rive droite (moitié ouest) de Kiev reste plongée dans une coupure d’électricité totale. Le réseau de métro étant à l’arrêt et les pompes de relevage d’eau à haute pression hors service, l’assainissement municipal a cessé de fonctionner, provoquant des refoulements d’eaux usées généralisés dans tout le centre administratif.

2. Les ogives coupe-câbles : les Forces aériennes russes (VKS) ont introduit des sous-munitions spécialisées, déployées par des appareils Geran-4 à propulsion à réaction, conçues spécifiquement pour sectionner les lignes aériennes à haute tension. En coupant les lignes reliant la production nucléaire de base de l’ouest à Kiev, les forces russes s’assurent que, même si les transformateurs des sous-stations sont réparés, le courant ne puisse physiquement atteindre la capitale.

3. Le collège de Surovikin : des sources militaires faisant autorité confirment que, bien que le chef d’état-major général Valery Gerasimov conserve officiellement le commandement suprême, le général Sergei Surovikin dirige activement la campagne d’interdiction et de destruction des infrastructures sur l’ensemble du théâtre d’opérations, à la tête d’un collège restreint de généraux supérieurs, dont Andrey Mordvichev et le vice-ministre de la Défense Yunus-Bek Yevkurov. Les caractéristiques de ce groupe de commandement — blocus systématique des ponts, ciblage méthodique des nœuds administratifs du SBU et publication de coupes architecturales du bunker souterrain de Zelensky situé sous la rue Bankova — indiquent une opération destinée à rendre la capitale fonctionnellement inhabitable pour le régime.

5. Usure sur le front : Dobropillya nettoyée, mines saisies, poches encerclées

Sur le terrain, les formations interarmes russes progressent à un rythme accéléré à travers les dernières lignes de fortifications ukrainiennes :

• La prise d’assaut de la mine de Dobropilska : le ministère russe de la Défense a confirmé que des groupes d’assaut de la 51e armée interarmes et des formations spécialisées d’infanterie de marine ont nettoyé les secteurs ouest de Dobropillya, pénétrant dans les galeries fortifiées de la mine de charbon de Dobropilska. Plus de 82 structures fortifiées ont été nettoyées en l’espace de 24 heures. La prise des imposants terrils de la mine offre aux observateurs d’artillerie russes un contrôle de tir direct et panoramique sur les lignes arrière de Druzhkivka.

• La liquidation des poches de résistance du nord : dans le nord-est de l’oblast de Kharkiv, les dernières poches de résistance du groupement frontalier ukrainien, fort de 1 700 hommes, ont été éliminées. Les forces russes ont libéré les hameaux centraux de la région, déplaçant ainsi le centre de gravité opérationnel du Groupe de forces Nord vers l’encerclement direct du nœud logistique de Velykyi Burluk. Au nord de Soumy, les positions avancées ukrainiennes le long des lisières de forêt se sont effondrées, rapprochant les détachements russes avancés à portée d’artillerie des limites municipales de Soumy.

• Le couloir mortel du Dniepr méridional : à Zaporijia, la fermeture du pont de Vantovyi (Khortytsia) a transformé les voies d’approvisionnement de la rive est en champ de bataille meurtrier. Les opérateurs de drones FPV russes, bénéficiant d’une ligne de visée ininterrompue au-dessus des fonds asséchés du réservoir de Kakhovka, ont établi un contrôle total des tirs sur tout le trafic routier tentant de renforcer le front sud.

Le crépuscule de la guerre par procuration

Les événements du 10 octobre 2026 marquent la fin d’une époque dans l’art de gouverner moderne :

• Donald Trump a obtenu sa dérogation temporaire sur le diesel pour protéger ses arrières sur le plan politique intérieur, reconnaissant ainsi que l’arme unipolaire des sanctions est inopérante.

• Vladimir Poutine a fait savoir que la Fédération de Russie ne se prêtera plus au jeu des négociations trilatérales théâtrales alors que ses soldats traversent les lignes défensives ukrainiennes.

• Et à Kiev, Volodymyr Zelensky est confiné dans une capitale plongée dans l’obscurité et envahie par les eaux usées — hurlant des insultes à ses protecteurs américains, rompant ses liens avec ses fournisseurs asiatiques et regardant ses brigades d’élite périr dans les tourbières du Donbass.

La transaction est conclue. Les illusions sont brisées.

Le maître impérial a conclu son accord parallèle sur le carburant, son mandataire a été abandonné à son sort, et la machine militaire souveraine de la Fédération de Russie achève méthodiquement la guerre dans la steppe eurasienne.

Publiéà l’origine par RussiaTruth 

Traduction:  ReseauInternational

Hamas mudou completamente o mapa do Oriente Médio, impediu a causa palestina de cair no esquecimento e dificultou a normalização de relações entre Israel e os países muçulmanos.

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Em 7 de outubro de 2023 iniciou-se, a partir de Gaza, uma memorável operação militar, na qual aproximadamente 4 mil homens armados das unidades de elite dos vários movimentos da resistência palestina local (Jihad Islâmica Palestina, FPLP, FDLP, Comitês de Resistência Popular, etc., liderados pelo Hamas) lançaram-se como um copo transbordando sobre os assentamentos sionistas dos arredores.

A ação era, simultaneamente, resposta à intensificação das expropriações de famílias palestinas na Cisjordânia, à pressão crescente sobre a Mesquita Al-Aqsa e à política de apaziguamento dos países árabes, e visava através da captura de militares (ativos e reservas) israelenses forçar a entidade sionista a uma guerra de atrito que pudesse conduzir a um desgaste significativo de Israel, internamente e externamente, e a uma reproposição da questão do Estado Palestino.

Ao que tudo indica, uma das expectativas da liderança do Hamas era de que o Hezbollah e o Irã e, talvez, as organizações militares da Cisjordânia se engajariam, também, brevemente e de forma sustentada, no conflito com Israel. Por uma série de motivos – totalmente diferentes para cada um dos atores – isso não aconteceu, exceto no caso do Hezbollah, e de forma limitada até a invasão terrestre do Líbano e, no caso do Irã, também de forma limitada durante a Guerra dos 12 Dias.

O evento levou a transformações cataclísmicas no Oriente Médio que podemos já descrever e a um panorama que, talvez, seja desconcertante para muitos que previram um cenário de vitória total sionista.

Não é nossa pretensão fazer uma descrição minuciosa dos processos que foram iniciados a partir da Guerra de Gaza, de modo que apenas tentaremos resumir cada um dos cenários em seus principais eventos e panorama atual.

Quanto à Gaza em si, a sua população foi vítima de limpeza étnica. Os números de mortes, se somarmos todas as causas, talvez chegue a 200 mil, ou seja, 10% da população a Faixa de Gaza. Uma parte significativa da liderança do Hamas, por sua vez, foi assassinada durante a guerra. Israel, porém, foi derrotada no conflito, considerando que não conseguiu alcançar os seus objetivos de destruir o Hamas, ocupar permanentemente toda a Faixa de Gaza e deslocar a população palestina. Os danos materiais e sociais para Israel, por sua vez, foram imensos. 60 bilhões de dólares em perdas econômicas gerais, aumento das tensões sociais internas e destruição total – talvez irreversível – da imagem internacional de Israel. Ademais, incapaz de derrotar o Hamas, Israel foi obrigada a aceitar um acordo de paz imposto pelos EUA. Enquanto isso, o Hamas segue com aproximadamente 12 mil soldados ativos e mais 15 mil recrutas jovens em treinamento, de modo que em breve retornará a aproximadamente o mesmo nível de força que antes de 7 de outubro de 2023.

Na frente libanesa, o conflito levou ao deslocamento de mais de 1 milhão de libaneses de suas casas, ao assassinato de Hassan Nasrallah, líder do Hezbollah, e de alguns outros líderes do movimento, à desestabilização política do Líbano, e envolveu a invasão por terra do país por parte do Estado de Israel, que, porém, não conseguiu também alcançar seus objetivos de forçar o governo libanês a desarmar o Hezbollah. O Hezbollah, por sua vez, que foi degradado de forma significativa entre 2023 e 2024 por tentar operar como forças armadas regulares, retornou à guerra de insurgência e com o aumento no uso de drones e novas ferramentas tecnológicas, bloqueou o avanço de Israel em 2026.

Quanto à Síria, testemunhamos o colapso do governo de Bashar Al-Assad e a tomada do país pelas milícias terroristas ligadas à Al-Qaeda, ao ISIS e outros grupos extremistas, os quais levaram à presidência Ahmed Sharrah. Israel se aproveitou do momento para destruir a maior parte do hardware militar sírio e ocupar uma faixa de segurança no entorno das Colinas de Golã, estabelecendo uma tênue aliança com as tribos e milícias druzas da região. A Queda de Assad impôs dificuldade para a logística do Hezbollah, que contava com a Síria para o trânsito de equipamento vindo do Irã. Se Israel esperava ter passagem livre pela Síria, porém, a situação é tornada mais complexa pelo fato de que a região é disputada, enquanto área de influência, com a Turquia, de modo que as tensões entre ambos países segue aumentando.

Os cenários palestino, libanês e sírio permitiam dizer, no início de 2025, por exemplo, que Israel estaria avançando significativamente em seus objetivos delineados no Plano Oded Yinon de desestabilizar e fragmentar os países vizinhos para facilitar a construção da Grande Israel. Teríamos aqui, naquele momento, a derrocada da estratégia do Crescente Xiita e do projeto geopolítico de Qassem Soleimani. Quando acrescentamos os cenários iraquiano e iraniano, bem como o contexto geral do Oriente Médio, a situação muda significativamente.

Porque no espaço entre a Guerra dos 12 Dias e a Guerra do Irã vimos o colapso do poder regional dos EUA no Oriente Médio, a ascensão do Irã a principal pretendente à hegemonia regional e o recuo de Israel para uma posição mais defensiva e de retaguarda.

Sinais de que o projeto israelense era mais frágil do que parecia à primeira vista apareceram já no conflito com o Irã em 2025. Incapaz de derrotar o Irã, que fustigava as defesas e infraestruturas israelenses com enxames de drones e mísseis, Israel teve que apelar por ajuda aos EUA, que realizaram um ataque aéreo majoritariamente simbólico contra instalações nucleares vazias no Irã. Isso não passou despercebido.

A nova rodada de conflito em 2026, iniciando-se no final de fevereiro, apesar de iniciar com o assassinato do Aiatolá Ali Khamenei, levou à eliminação de boa parte das bases dos EUA no Oriente Médio, ao bloqueio do Estreito de Ormuz, à destruição das capacidades antiaéreas israelenses, à evacuação das tropas estadunidenses no Iraque e à destruição do mito da superioridade militar incontestável dos EUA.

De fato, a incapacidade dos EUA de alcançar seus objetivos políticos militarmente no Oriente Médio (após o fracasso da tentativa de revolução colorida de janeiro), mesmo usando 2 porta-aviões (1 dos quais pode ter sido seriamente danificado nas operações), sua incapacidade de proteger seus aliados árabes, a própria incapacidade dos aliados árabes de defenderem a si mesmos, o esgotamento parcial dos estoques de mísseis dos inimigos do Irã, e a capacidade iraniana de rapidamente repor sua liderança e de agir militarmente de forma descentralizada, bem como sua demonstração de que sua capacidade industrial-militar permanecia ativa, mudaram o mapa geopolítico no Oriente Médio.

Em alguma medida, hoje, é o Irã quem dá as cartas. A evacuação do Iraque pelos EUA reabre o país para a penetração da influência iraniana, o que põe em risco até mesmo o domínio da Síria por Ahmed Sharrah.

Para contornar o controle iraniano de Ormuz, os sauditas têm experimentado com usar o Mar Vermelho e rotas terrestres. Se esses esforços fossem bem-sucedidos, a importância de Ormuz diminuiria e, com isso, o poder de barganha do Irã. O problema é que, exatamente quando isso começou a acontecer, o Ansarullah iemenita entrou no tabuleiro, iniciando uma operação militar em larga escala para derrotar os rebeldes apoiados por Riad. A resposta saudita aos avanços houthis levou ao fechamento parcial do Estreito de Bab-el-Mandeb e a ataques não apenas contra as instalações da ARAMCO, mas até mesmo contra poços de petróleo sauditas.

Se retornamos ao panorama geopolítico israelense, enfim, o país se encontra ainda com um problema palestino em Gaza, o Hezbollah ativo no Líbano, sem poder avançar na Síria por causa da ameaça turca e com suas capacidades militares defensivas bastante reduzidas.

Longe da “Pax Judaica” e da “Grande Israel” estamos vendo o reposicionamento dos atores geopolíticos e o ator na posição mais vantajosa é, hoje, o Irã. As negociações recentes entre Israel e os países árabes sunitas não muda significativamente o cenário.

3 anos depois da Operação Dilúvio Al-Aqsa, portanto, não nos é possível dizer se os objetivos de Ismail Hanyeh e Yahya Sinwar foram alcançados, mas é impossível negar que a ousadia do Hamas mudou completamente o mapa do Oriente Médio, impediu a causa palestina de cair no esquecimento e dificultou a normalização de relações entre Israel e os países muçulmanos.

Cuanto más aleja la tecnología al actor, más debe aumentar su responsabilidad.

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De persona a objetivo

¿Qué será de la humanidad cuando la tecnología sea capaz de reconocer, clasificar, rastrear y, en última instancia, matar a seres humanos sin que quienes ejecutan los ataques los hayan visto jamás?

Mi amigo Mohammad Reza Dehshiri planteó precisamente esta pregunta, y su respuesta es contundente.

El peligro, escribe, no es la inteligencia artificial, sino la inhumanidad artificial; es decir, la posibilidad de que las máquinas se vuelvan más precisas precisamente cuando los humanos dejen de sentirse responsables de lo que esas máquinas hacen en su nombre.

Con este artículo, inicio una serie que toma el análisis de Dehshiri como punto de partida e intenta llevarlo más allá. Si el problema es la «inhumanidad artificial», la respuesta no puede estar en una IA «más ética», como si la ética fuera un módulo que se instalara a posteriori en un sistema que ya ha sido diseñado.

Necesitamos recuperar una categoría que la jerga tecnológica ha vuelto casi innombrable: la inteligencia humana, entendida no como un vestigio que hay que proteger en medio de las complejidades de la automatización, sino como una forma de conocimiento con características propias y distintivas, que ningún aumento en la potencia computacional puede reemplazar.

La llamaré Inteligencia Humana, y la ambigüedad es deliberada. En la jerga de los servicios de inteligencia, HUMINT se refiere a la más antigua de las disciplinas de inteligencia: aquella que se basa en las personas, las fuentes, los idiomas y la visita paciente y frecuente a distintos lugares.

En terminología filosófica, la expresión denota la facultad de comprender. La tesis de esta primera contribución es que estos dos significados ahora convergen, y que su convergencia tiene implicaciones geopolíticas que se extienden mucho más allá del debate sobre la ética de las armas.

Podemos describir la cadena operativa de la guerra contemporánea en siete etapas: detectar, identificar, clasificar, predecir, priorizar, seleccionar el objetivo, atacar.

Cada eslabón puede perfeccionarse técnicamente sin que la secuencia, tomada en su conjunto, se perfeccione moralmente. El fenómeno resultante se denomina «dataficación de la vida humana»: el individuo reducido a una identidad, una ubicación, un patrón de comportamiento, un índice de amenaza.

Esto no es una abstracción. En abril de 2024, una investigación de Yuval Abraham para +972 Magazine y Local Call describió a «Lavender», un sistema utilizado por las fuerzas armadas israelíes en Gaza para asignar a decenas de miles de personas una probabilidad de afiliación a grupos armados.

Según fuentes internas citadas en la investigación, la verificación humana de cada nombre a menudo no duraba más de veinte segundos: el tiempo necesario para determinar que el objetivo era un hombre.

Las Fuerzas de Defensa de Israel han refutado este relato y han descrito a «Lavender» como una base de datos diseñada para apoyar a los analistas.

Sin embargo, incluso si se acepta la versión oficial, el meollo del asunto sigue siendo el mismo: había un operador humano presente, y su presencia no fue suficiente para transformar la recomendación del sistema en un juicio.

La psicología cognitiva tiene un nombre para este fenómeno, el sesgo de automatización: la tendencia de quienes trabajan con un sistema automatizado a tratar sus recomendaciones como un sustituto de su propia verificación y a no buscar la información que pudiera contradecirlas.

Ya en 1976, Joseph Weizenbaum —quien había creado uno de los primeros programas conversacionales de la historia— ya distinguía entre la capacidad de calcular y la capacidad de juzgar, y argumentaba que hay tareas que no deberían confiarse a una computadora, incluso si esta fuera capaz de realizarlas. Medio siglo después, esta distinción se ha vuelto aún más apremiante. La computación trabaja con lo que ya se ha traducido en datos. El juicio debe decidir si esa traducción ha sido fiel.

Dehshiri deja claro este punto con cuatro distinciones: la precisión técnica no es precisión ética; la exactitud no es justicia; la automatización no es responsabilidad; la superioridad tecnológica no es superioridad moral.

Yo agregaría una quinta, de naturaleza epistémica, de la que dependen las demás: la correlación no es comprensión. Un sistema de aprendizaje automático reconoce patrones estadísticos en un conjunto de datos. No sabe qué es una escuela, porque no sabe qué es un niño, y ni siquiera sabe que no sabe esto.

L’iraniano cita un interesante estudio de caso: el 28 de febrero de 2026, en las primeras horas de la guerra, la escuela primaria Shajareh Tayyebeh en Minab, en la provincia de Hormozgan, fue alcanzada varias veces durante el horario escolar.

Las cifras proporcionadas por las autoridades iraníes oscilan entre 150 y 175 muertos, la gran mayoría de los cuales eran niñas, junto con docenas de maestros y algunos padres; el fiscal del distrito fijó el número total de muertos en 156.

Washington nunca ha reconocido directamente su responsabilidad ni ha publicado los resultados de la investigación del Pentágono. Amnistía Internacional ha descrito el incidente, en el mejor de los casos, como un grave fallo de inteligencia.

Hay un detalle, revelado por imágenes satelitales, que traslada el análisis del plano moral al fáctico.

Según los medios occidentales, la escuela se encontraba junto a una base naval perteneciente a la Guardia Revolucionaria y anteriormente había formado parte de ella; entre las explicaciones que circulan en los círculos estadounidenses se encuentra la de datos de selección de objetivos desactualizados.

Si se confirmara esta hipótesis, Minab no sería un caso de una máquina que cometió un error, sino de una base de datos que había dejado de corresponder a la realidad. El edificio había cambiado. Los datos, no.

Ningún algoritmo de clasificación, por muy sofisticado que sea, puede detectar que un antiguo edificio militar se ha convertido en una escuela si nadie ha registrado el cambio. Todos los que vivían en Minab lo sabían: los padres que llevaban a sus hijas a la escuela cada mañana, el conductor del autobús escolar, los maestros.

Este es precisamente el tipo de información que recopila el HUMINT y que la guerra a distancia tiende a considerar superflua, porque es lenta, costosa y difícil de ampliar. Con base en fuentes de dominio público, la responsabilidad de EE. UU. parece altamente probable, aunque las circunstancias exactas siguen sin estar claras y el nivel de certeza en este punto es bajo: un error en la base de datos, un error de clasificación o una aceptación consciente del riesgo.

Sin embargo, las tres hipótesis convergen en la misma pregunta. ¿Quién, antes del ataque, verificó si había personas en ese edificio?

Más allá del «human-in-the-loop»

El debate internacional se ha conformado durante mucho tiempo con el principio de human-in-the-loop, según el cual un ser humano forma parte del ciclo de toma de decisiones.

Esta fórmula es insuficiente: una persona puede estar presente en el ciclo y, sin embargo, limitarse a dar el visto bueno a la recomendación del algoritmo.

Él propone sustituirlo por un principio más exigente, al que denomina humanity-in-command: la capacidad efectiva de cuestionar, rechazar, anular y detener el proceso automatizado.

La historia de la Guerra Fría ofrece dos ejemplos que aclaran lo que esto significa en la práctica. El 26 de septiembre de 1983, el sistema soviético de alerta temprana Oko señaló el lanzamiento de cinco misiles balísticos desde Estados Unidos.

El oficial de guardia, Stanislav Petrov, descartó la alarma como una falsa alarma y no la reportó como un ataque en curso, razonando que un primer ataque estadounidense nunca consistiría en solo cinco misiles.

Tenía razón: el satélite había confundido el reflejo del sol en las nubes con lanzamientos de misiles.

Veintiún años antes, el 27 de octubre de 1962, en el mar del Caribe, el submarino soviético B-59, aislado y bajo fuego de cargas de profundidad, estaba a punto de lanzar un torpedo con ojiva nuclear. El lanzamiento requería el consentimiento de los tres oficiales de mayor rango a bordo, y Vasily Arkhipov se negó a darlo.

En ninguno de los dos casos el hombre aprobó una recomendación del sistema. La contradijo. Y no lo hizo porque tuviera más datos: de hecho, los datos eran el problema.

Lo hizo porque sabía plantearse una pregunta que ningún procedimiento le exigía hacer, a saber, si lo que estaba viendo tenía sentido en el contexto de todo lo demás que sabía sobre el mundo.

Petrov estaba familiarizado con la doctrina nuclear estadounidense; Arkhipov sabía la diferencia entre un ataque y una amenaza. Es esta capacidad de comparar la señal con el panorama general, el detalle con lo que es plausible, lo que yo denomino Inteligencia Humana. Vale la pena señalar que el Dena fue hundido por un submarino. No sabemos qué se les preguntó a sus oficiales, ni qué margen de discreción tenían para tomar decisiones.

Esta propuesta debe aclararse, ya que existe el riesgo de reducirla a un llamado humanista genérico. La Inteligencia Humana, tal como yo la entiendo, se estructura en tres niveles distintos, cada uno de los cuales marca un límite estructural —más que contingente— de la inteligencia artificial.

El primer nivel es epistémico. La tradición escolástica distinguía entre intellectus, el acto mediante el cual la mente capta inmediatamente una verdad, y ratio, el proceso discursivo de pasar de un elemento a otro: para Tomás de Aquino (Summa Theologiae, I, q. 79, a. 8), ambos no son facultades distintas, sino aspectos de un único intelecto, en el que el razonamiento comienza con una comprensión y regresa a una comprensión. Los sistemas actuales de aprendizaje automático logran una ratio de una potencia sin precedentes, capaz de inferir, combinar y predecir a escalas inaccesibles para la mente humana.

Carecen del aspecto del intellectus, es decir, de la comprensión del significado de lo que procesan. Esta es una tesis filosófica y debe presentarse como tal, pero tiene consecuencias prácticas precisas: un sistema desprovisto de comprensión no puede saber cuándo su propio modelo del mundo se ha vuelto falso.

El segundo aspecto es práctico. La Prudentia, según la definición tomista, es la razón recta aplicada a la acción, y su tarea específica consiste en aplicar el principio universal al caso particular. La máquina generaliza: su valor radica en asignar el caso individual a una clase.

La prudencia hace lo contrario, porque debe reconocer qué es lo que, en este caso particular, queda fuera de la clase. La guerra, que es el ámbito de lo singular y lo imprevisto, es el escenario donde esta diferencia tiene mayor peso.

La nota Antiqua et nova del Vaticano, de enero de 2025, retomó esta línea de pensamiento, haciendo hincapié en la naturaleza encarnada y relacional de la inteligencia humana y su irreducibilidad a una mera función de procesamiento.

El tercer nivel es relacional, y es aquí donde el significado filosófico se encuentra con el de los servicios de inteligencia. Sherman Kent, quien de hecho fundó el campo de los estudios de inteligencia en los Estados Unidos de la posguerra, lo definió ante todo como conocimiento, incluso antes que como organización o actividad.

El HUMINT es la forma de este conocimiento que pasa a través del otro como persona: alguien que habla su idioma, conoce sus costumbres, sabe interpretar un barrio y puede distinguir una fiesta de una manifestación.

Durante las últimas tres décadas, las grandes potencias han ido desviando progresivamente recursos hacia disciplinas técnicas, desde la inteligencia de señales hasta la vigilancia satelital, pasando por las plataformas de fusión de datos. Minab ilustra el costo de este desequilibrio.

Nada de esto implica un rechazo a la tecnología. La inteligencia humana no se opone a la IA de la misma manera que un manual se opone a un mecánico. Establece una jerarquía: el algoritmo como herramienta subordinada a un juicio que no puede producir por sí mismo. Y de ahí se deriva un principio, formulado por Dehshiri, que merece convertirse en un criterio operativo: cuanto más aleja la tecnología al actor de las consecuencias de sus propias acciones, más debe aumentar —y no disminuir— la responsabilidad consciente de quien toma la decisión.

Desde el punto de vista geopolítico

Hasta ahora, el tema podría parecer una cuestión de filosofía moral. No es solo eso. La distribución de la capacidad de guerra algorítmica es una distribución de poder, y las reglas que la rigen serán redactadas —si es que llegan a redactarse— por aquellos que tienen interés en limitarlas lo menos posible.

El estado del derecho internacional lo confirma. El grupo de expertos gubernamentales establecido en virtud de la Convención sobre Ciertas Armas Convencionales ha estado discutiendo los sistemas de armas autónomas letales desde 2017 sin haber llegado a un instrumento vinculante.

En noviembre de 2023, Estados Unidos promovió una declaración política sobre el uso militar responsable de la IA, que por definición no es vinculante; en diciembre del mismo año, la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas adoptó la primera resolución dedicada a estos sistemas, mientras que el Comité Internacional de la Cruz Roja ha venido pidiendo desde 2021 la prohibición de los sistemas autónomos impredecibles y de aquellos diseñados para atacar a seres humanos.

En junio de 2024, en su intervención en la cumbre del G7 en Borgo Egnazia, el papa Francisco pidió que nunca se le permitiera a una máquina decidir sobre la vida de una persona. La brecha entre estas posturas y la realidad en los campos de batalla de 2026 se mide en víctimas.

También existe una asimetría más profunda. Quienes controlan los datos deciden quién es un objetivo, y las víctimas de la guerra algorítmica se encuentran en su mayoría fuera de Occidente: en Gaza, Irán, el Sahel y Yemen.

Para los Estados que no producen las plataformas ni controlan sus bases de datos, la inteligencia humana se convierte así en una cuestión de soberanía.

Un país que cuenta con pericia lingüística, conocimiento regional y redes de inteligencia humana conserva su autonomía de juicio; un país que confía su visión del mundo a sistemas diseñados en otros lugares —a menudo por empresas privadas— la cede junto con sus datos. En un orden que tiende hacia la multipolaridad, esta distinción separará a los actores que juzgan de aquellos que son juzgados.

Esto conduce a una propuesta concreta, que desarrollaré en futuros artículos. Junto con el principio general de una supervisión humana significativa, el derecho internacional humanitario podría codificar una obligación específica de verificación humana del estatus civil de cada infraestructura fija incluida en una lista de objetivos, con una fecha de vencimiento más allá de la cual la información se vuelve inválida y debe renovarse utilizando fuentes directas. Esta es una norma mínima.

Aplicada a Minab, habría requerido que alguien preguntara si ese edificio seguía siendo lo que los registros indicaban que era.

La tecnología puede determinar cómo un arma llega a su objetivo, mientras que le corresponde a la humanidad decidir si ese objetivo debe ser atacado. La pregunta subyacente a todo esto es quién, en términos prácticos, ejerce esa humanidad, con qué herramientas de conocimiento y dentro de qué instituciones.

En Minab, alguien debería haber sabido que había una escuela allí. El hecho de que nadie lo supiera, o de que nadie preguntara, es el punto desde el cual debemos volver a empezar.

Traducción:  Observatoriode trabajador@s en lucha

By John REES

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Preparations for war with Russia and complicity in Israel’s genocide in Gaza have set off a struggle over jobs, wages and military production

War preparation is now a reality across Europe. Within a single September week, Poland issued fresh warnings, Germany ran drills and national alerts, military exercises were held across the Baltic, and Lithuania published plans to evacuate residents of Vilnius in the event of an attack.

The Finnish government is in full cry over the prospect of war, reminding its citizens yet again that they should be ready, in mind and in practice, for the disruption it would bring.

On 18 September, French President Emmanuel Macron gathered party leaders and presidential hopefuls at the Elysee Palace to hear the heads of France’s intelligence services describe what his office called the rapid deterioration of the international situation.

Nato, meanwhile, talks ever more openly about Russian sabotage, cyber attacks, arson and drone attacks.

Many workers and citizens across the continent, though, are not convinced by the war fever.

Thousands of Airbus workers in Spain began strike action on 1 July after rejecting the company’s pay and conditions offer.

Representatives of the UGT and CGT unions said the stoppage had slowed military and commercial production and would make it harder for the company to meet its delivery target. Airbus’s eight sites in Spain produce military transport planes and parts for commercial aircraft and satellites.

As the Defence Matters website reported: “The industrial pressure is not confined to commercial aviation. Spain is central to Airbus Defence and Space, including military transport and satellite activity. European governments are asking manufacturers to increase output at the same time as companies compete for engineers, technicians and production workers.”

Supply lines are so tight that Airbus has had to hire giant Antonov An-124 heavy-lift aircraft to ferry parts from one plant to another just to keep production running.

Air Data News reported that the strike “threatens key military aircraft programmes”, noting that the Eurofighter plant near Madrid and the military transport aircraft site near Seville were both affected.

Spanish unions said about 90 percent of eligible workers took part in the stoppage on 25 August, part of an indefinite strike. The strikes were called after workers voted at plant-level assemblies to reject the company’s offer.

French unions briefed on the dispute said the three striking Spanish unions represent about 40 percent of Airbus Spain’s roughly 14,000 employees. Workers were seeking inflation-linked pay rises, the restoration of previous remote-working arrangements and sick-leave benefits.

After the intervention of Industry Minister Jordi Hereu and concessions from Airbus, the strikers paused the stoppage on 10 September, but not the movement. Two days later, around 8,000 workers from Airbus sites across Spain marched through Madrid to keep the pressure on.

On 1 October, 77 percent of those voting backed an improved offer providing for the restoration of lost purchasing power, inflation-linked pay rises and the protection of remote-working rights, a settlement that months of industrial action had forced out of the company.

The Airbus dispute shows the leverage workers hold in the very industries on which Europe’s rearmament depends.

Trains and the TUC

In Scotland, meanwhile, the rail union RMT, the drivers’ union Aslef and the white-collar TSSA have demanded that the Scottish government remove CAF, the Spanish manufacturer Construcciones y Auxiliar de Ferrocarriles, from its shortlist of contractors to build ScotRail’s new fleet of suburban trains.

The company is included in the UN human rights database of businesses involved in Israeli settlements for its role in running the Jerusalem light rail and helping to extend it into territory illegally seized by Israel.

Aslef made clear that its members would refuse to drive CAF trains, a position echoed by TSSA general secretary Maryam Eslamdoust when she urged the Scottish government to “think again”.

Scottish Greens co-leader Gillian Mackay put the first minister on the spot, asking him directly: “So will the first minister agree that CAF should be blocked from this contract, and will he stand with the rail workers who have refused to drive trains produced by a company that they say profits from apartheid?”

In his response, the first minister confirmed that ScotRail was seeking advice on the contract.

For the second year running, delegates at the Trades Union Congress (TUC) backed a motion opposing increases in arms spending.

This year’s motion passed with even more support than last year’s, which reversed the TUC’s previous backing, advocated by the GMB and Unite unions, for higher defence spending.

Speaking in favour of the motion, Alex Gordon, a former RMT president and national officer of the Stop the War Coalition, said: “This movement is about fighting for jobs, for public services, for investment in the industries of the future that our young people, that our young workers need.

“Those industries are not military industries. The skills of the workers in the military sector are vital skills, vital skills that need to be used in civilian production.”

Ports and classrooms

Dockworkers’ unions in at least six countries are planning an international day of action and strikes on 30 October to protest against the war on Gaza and demand an immediate end to the genocide of the Palestinian people.

This coordinated mobilisation follows a strike on 6 February this year that shut down cargo operations at more than 20 Mediterranean and European ports to halt arms shipments bound for Israel.

“No to the war economy, government rearmament plans, and the project of militarisation of ports and strategic infrastructure from [the] EU,” the unions said in their statement. “Public resources must be used to meet people’s social needs, not to finance war.”

The signatories include CGT FNPD in France, Enedep in Greece, LAB in the Basque Country, Liman-Is in Turkey, ODT in Morocco, and Orsa Porti and USB in Italy.

The next generation, at least in Germany, seems even less enthusiastic about the prospect of a new European war. More than 45,000 school students across the country walked out of class in late September to protest against plans for compulsory military service, after hundreds of young men were summoned for medical examinations.

The School Strike Against Conscription initiative said demonstrations took place in more than 100 cities after the German defence ministry began calling in 18-year-old men for medical screening. Service itself remains voluntary for now, but the screening is compulsory.

Students took to the streets demanding a halt to the forced checks, the repeal of the new military service law and an end to what they call a step-by-step return to the draft.

This is now the ground on which European politics is being fought. It is a contest between a political establishment obsessed with war and preparations for war, and millions of workers across the continent unwilling to pay for rearmament with their wages, jobs and living standards.

These are the opening shots in that battle.

Original article:  middleeasteye.net

By Yang Xuefeng

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At present, under the impact of factors such as deep adjustments in the global balance of economic power, frequent geopolitical crises, the “weaponization” of finance, and the accelerating pace of technological progress, the existing international monetary system is unable to cope with complex and rapidly changing external challenges and is undergoing continuous evolution.

I. Stylized Facts: The Basic Landscape of the Current International Monetary System

In the process of global de-dollarization, the international monetary system has shown a trend of evolving from the hegemonic system of unipolar dollar dominance formed after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system toward a parallel pattern of multipolarization, regionalization, and digitalization. The dollar’s core position remains, but its hegemonic status is gradually being eroded.

1. Reserve Currency: De-dollarization Continues to Deepen, and a Multipolar Coexistence Pattern Is Gradually Taking Shape

Data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) show that the dollar’s reserve share has declined from 69.74% in 2000 to 56.42% in 2025, with a clear long-term downward trend. Even though there were periodic rebounds during this period, the long-term downward trajectory remains unchanged. This long-term non-cyclical decline can be explained by central banks’ construction and rebalancing of reserve portfolios based on market efficiency and asset security under the existing institutional system.

The trend toward diversification of reserve currencies is becoming increasingly obvious. In the process of building diversified reserves, central banks have included non-traditional international currencies in their portfolios, broadening the options for international reserve currencies. The share of non-traditional international currencies in international reserve currencies has risen from 2.48% in 2017 to 6.13% in 2025. Although the absolute share is still not high, it has increased by nearly 1.5 times.

The substitution effect of gold reserves is significant. From 2022 to 2025, global central banks’ net gold purchases exceeded 4,000 tons, and official gold reserves surpassed U.S. Treasury bonds for the first time. The logic behind this is both the increased demand for central bank asset allocation under the trend of weakening dollar credit and a strategic reconstruction of sovereign states’ control over financial assets under financial sanctions.

2. Settlement Currency: Dollar Settlement Is Retreating, and Local Currency Settlement Is Rising Trendily

In 2025, the dollar accounted for 56% of global trade settlement. Its dominant position remains, but its leading advantage is declining. The dollar’s advantage in trade settlement comes from the dollar-denominated and dollar-settled system for mainstream global commodities (such as crude oil, gold, copper, soybeans, etc.), especially the petrodollar system. This system has provided strong support for the dollar in maintaining its core position in the international monetary system.

Although the petrodollar system has been impacted in recent years, and some oil-producing countries, oil-consuming countries, and countries subject to U.S. sanctions have continuously advanced de-dollarization in oil settlement—for example, China and Russia use renminbi and rubles in oil settlement, and China and Saudi Arabia use dollars and renminbi in oil settlement—the scale of non-dollar oil settlement is still too small compared with global petrodollar settlement to shake the dollar’s oil settlement position. However, de-dollarization of oil settlement means the reconstruction of the oil settlement system, that is, the transition from a dollar monopoly settlement system to a multi-currency coexistence settlement system. In the long run, the shift in the balance of currency settlement, or in other words the substitution of other currencies for the dollar, will continue to continuously shake the dollar’s trade settlement position.

3. Payment Currency: Position Remains Solid, but Payment Infrastructure Is Becoming Multi-threaded

Data from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) for May 2026 show that the dollar accounted for 50.73% of global payments, a slight increase from 50.49% at the end of 2025. On the one hand, this comes from dollar trade settlement. Dollar trade settlement must be realized through dollar payments for funds to land; as much dollar trade settlement as there is corresponds to as much dollar payment. On the other hand, the dollar accounts for nearly 90% of global trade financing, slightly more than 80% of global trade financing, and together with the safe-haven demand for dollar assets, these financial transactions greatly support the dollar’s payment share.

Although the dollar’s share in international payments has not yet changed significantly, the global cross-border payment system, namely the two-tier architecture system mainly composed of SWIFT and the Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS), is being impacted by multi-threading. These shocks come from security demands arising from the abuse of the global cross-border payment system in geopolitical conflicts. With the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022, the United States used its control over the global cross-border payment system to cut off Russia’s dollar settlement channel in order to strike its economy. Sovereign states have reassessed the risks of relying on a single global cross-border payment system and urgently need to seek safe and alternative cross-border payment systems, such as discussions among BRICS countries on the feasibility of the “BRICS Bridge” payment platform, China’s acceleration of building the renminbi cross-border payment system, and the euro area’s acceleration of promoting the launch of the digital euro. As safe and alternative global cross-border payment systems are gradually implemented and used, a multi-threaded pattern of the international payment system has initially taken shape.

II. Theoretical Logic: The Internal Mechanism of the Evolution of the International Monetary System

Today, international currency is developing along a trend of diversification, but its institutional foundation still belongs to the Jamaica system. Compared with the Bretton Woods system, the Jamaica system made two important adjustments: first, it reset the monetary anchor and abolished the fixed parity between gold and the dollar, replacing the “gold anchor” with a “fiat credit anchor.” While completely freeing the dollar’s issuance, it also solved the problem of gold runs; second, exchange rate arrangements became diversified, and member countries could arrange exchange rates independently, thus resolving the problem of speculative currency attacks under fixed exchange rates. Through this institutional arrangement, the “Triffin Dilemma” under the Bretton Woods system—the dilemma between increasing dollar supply to meet global liquidity demand and maintaining the fixed dollar-gold parity—was broken. However, the Jamaica system produced a “new Triffin Dilemma,” namely the contradiction between meeting the dollar demand for international liquidity and maintaining dollar credit.

The U.S. current account deficit exports dollars, and capital flows back to the capital market, forming a perfect cycle. This cycle is basically the solution to the “new Triffin Dilemma.” However, its cornerstone is maintaining dollar credit. The maintenance of dollar credit is the result of multiple dimensions working together, such as monetary policy independence, financial market depth, fiscal deficit scale, foreign policy stability, financial sanctions, and the level of fintech development. Changes in various factors will affect dollar credit to different degrees. In recent years, U.S. foreign policy and financial sanctions have become the main drivers weakening dollar credit.

First, U.S. anti-globalization policies have damaged the nodes of the dollar credit network. President Trump implemented a series of anti-globalization policies, such as imposing tariffs, withdrawing from international organizations, and building exclusive small circles. To some extent, the implementation of these policies restricts the development of global trade liberalization and promotes the reshaping of the global trade landscape. The dollar is a beneficiary of global trade liberalization. The market fragmentation and rising protectionism brought about by changes in the trade landscape objectively loosen the path dependence effect dominated by the dollar’s network externalities and narrow the scope of the dollar’s use. As a result, its share in pricing, payment, and settlement is gradually compressed, whether in the use of the dollar in bilateral trade between the United States and other countries or in the use of the dollar in trade between countries other than the United States.

Second, financial sanctions have shaken the cornerstone of dollar credit. The manifestation of financial sanctions is the weaponization of the dollar, that is, the United States uses its dominance over international dollar clearing and control over U.S. Treasury bonds to long-term implement sanctions against Russia, Iran, North Korea, and other countries, such as freezing dollar assets and cutting off dollar clearing channels (removing them from the SWIFT system), to achieve its geopolitical policy goals. The weaponization of the dollar means that the dollar assets held by various countries have no security at all. Once the security attribute as a global public good is stripped from the dollar, dollar credit becomes worthless. Therefore, the United States’ abuse of dollar hegemony not only causes other countries around the world to lose confidence in dollar credit but also prompts them to think about rebuilding the future international monetary order. The rational choice in thinking about how to reduce dependence on the dollar is to choose an international currency that can replace the dollar and has sufficient security attributes. This is also the fundamental reason why “de-dollarization” has become a global consensus.

III. Response Strategies: Pragmatic Paths in the Evolution of the International Monetary System

Looking back at the continuously evolving international monetary landscape, we see that the decline of monetary hegemony is a long-term process. In this process, China’s strategic principles are: first, reduce excessive dependence on a single sovereign currency and enhance China’s cross-border payment and overseas asset security; second, China actively participates in the reform of the international monetary system and contributes Chinese wisdom to it.

1. Build and Improve the Financial Infrastructure for Renminbi Internationalization

The goal of building the financial infrastructure for renminbi internationalization is to construct an autonomous, controllable, widely covered, and efficiently cleared renminbi cross-border payment system (CIPS). The main current problem is that, in response to financial sanctions, China’s CIPS is usable but still cannot achieve complete autonomy and control. It is necessary to improve CIPS’s capacity for autonomy and control. CIPS and SWIFT are cooperative in cross-border renminbi clearing business. Under certain conditions, SWIFT can affect the normal operation of CIPS. Therefore, while using SWIFT’s global network advantages to expand CIPS network users, China should gradually enhance the technical independence of CIPS operations. At the same time, it is also necessary to fill gaps in the global layout of clearing banks. Strengthen the establishment of renminbi clearing banks in countries and regions with layout blind spots (such as Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, and other blank areas) to form a “point-line-surface” full-coverage overseas renminbi clearing service network.

2. Build a Multilateral Network for the Use of the Renminbi

Currency network externalities affect the level of currency internationalization. The reason the dollar can stand out among international currencies depends more on inertial effects external to the network. At present, the renminbi’s “circle of friends” is increasingly expanding, but it more often serves bilateral renminbi settlement between China and other countries and regions. The use of the renminbi among third countries is still in its infancy, and a multilateral interconnected renminbi network has not yet formed. To promote the use of the renminbi among third countries, on the one hand, it is necessary to promote the renminbi’s functions of pricing, settlement, investment, and financing among China’s neighboring countries and countries along the Belt and Road Initiative; on the other hand, China’s neighboring countries should be taken as a breakthrough point, relying on close economic and trade ties and a convenient renminbi interconnection network, to promote the renminbi’s use as a “public good” in trade and investment among third countries.

3. Build an Open and Developed Domestic Financial Market

Although the domestic financial market has made considerable progress in opening up and market construction, the global attractiveness of renminbi assets is still clearly insufficient, due to both opening mechanism problems and financial product problems. First, further accelerate the opening of the financial market and launch more distinctive financial products open to overseas institutions to meet overseas institutions’ renminbi asset allocation and hedging needs. Second, increase the supply of high-quality financial assets. Around the “five major articles” of finance, deepen supply-side reform of the financial market, increase the supply of technology and green financial products, promote the rapid development of the panda bond market, and use high-quality financial products to raise overseas institutions’ incentive to allocate renminbi assets, thereby increasing their allocation share of renminbi assets. Third, accelerate the construction of an offshore renminbi center in the Shanghai Pilot Free Trade Zone. Connect supply and demand between offshore and onshore markets, coordinate the development of offshore and onshore markets, and ultimately lay the market foundation for building a smooth domestic and international financial circulation mechanism for the renminbi.

4. Actively Participate in the Reform of the International Monetary System

The development of the international monetary system toward multipolarity objectively converges toward the coexistence of several sovereign currencies in a competitive equilibrium. As the world’s second-largest economy supported by a strong economic size, China should provide the world with safe renminbi reserve assets and an efficient and convenient global renminbi settlement network. To this end, it is necessary to further advance international financial cooperation at two levels. At the level of building a regional financial safety net, relying on the continuously increasing scale of renminbi swap agreements and the increasingly complete renminbi clearing network, inject renminbi liquidity when regional economic crises occur, and enhance the region’s ability to respond to crisis shocks. At the level of promoting reform of international financial governance, continue to promote reform of governance imbalances caused by the “veto power,” use voting mechanism reform to constrain the hegemonic behavior of hegemonic currencies, participate in the formulation of global financial rules, oppose the weaponization of financial infrastructure, and safeguard its neutrality and public good attributes.

Author: Yang Xuefeng, Associate Researcher at the Institute of World Economy, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences

Original article: sass.org.cn

À partir du 1er novembre 2026, les foyers ouverts seront interdits dans 95 communes de la métropole européenne de Lille (MEL), y compris lorsqu’ils servent de chauffage d’appoint. Aucune loi nationale n’a pourtant été votée pour imposer cette interdiction : le dispositif repose sur des arrêtés préfectoraux, pris au nom de la qualité de l’air. Quant aux sanctions encourues, les montants annoncés varient selon les sources, sans que les particuliers disposent d’une réponse suffisamment claire.

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À partir du 1er novembre 2026, allumer sa cheminée à foyer ouvert deviendra une infraction dans les 95 communes de la Métropole de Lille. Aucune loi n’a été votée, aucun débat parlementaire n’a eu lieu. Un arrêté préfectoral suffit. Et le montant de l’amende varie selon l’humeur des services, faute de texte clair.

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Des interdictions qui gagnent du terrain

Dans la métropole de Lille, l’interdiction concernera les foyers ouverts, qu’ils soient utilisés comme chauffage principal ou simplement pour profiter d’un feu occasionnel. La mesure s’inscrit dans une évolution déjà engagée ailleurs en France.

En Isère, 123 communes de la région grenobloise sont soumises à cette restriction depuis octobre 2024. Depuis le 1er janvier 2026, 174 autres communes sont venues s’y ajouter, portant le total à 297. Dans l’agglomération lyonnaise, l’interdiction des foyers ouverts a été étendue à 166 communes au 1er avril 2026.

Les restrictions ne concernent pas seulement les cheminées traditionnelles. En Isère, les poêles et inserts installés avant 2002 sont également interdits depuis janvier 2026 dans les 123 communes initialement concernées. Autour de Lyon, cette restriction doit entrer en vigueur en 2028, tandis que d’autres territoires sont concernés par un calendrier courant jusqu’en 2030.

Le fondement juridique de ces mesures tient aux plans de protection de l’atmosphère et aux arrêtés préfectoraux qui les mettent en œuvre. Autrement dit, une réglementation déterminante pour la vie quotidienne peut s’imposer à l’échelle locale sans passer par un vote spécifique du Parlement.

Une amende, mais quelle certitude juridique ?

Combien coûte l’infraction ? Les montants annoncés varient du simple au décuple. 135 € selon certains services, 450 € en cas de récidive selon d’autres. Dans la métropole lilloise, certains documents évoquent 1 500 €. Aucun texte clair ne permet de trancher. Les services eux-mêmes n’arrivent pas à donner le montant exact. Une contravention de 3e classe, matérialisée par une amende forfaitaire de 68 euros, peut grimper jusqu’à 450 euros en cas de majoration décidée par la justice. Mais pour une interdiction préfectorale, la base juridique reste floue.

L’enjeu est concret pour les ménages qui utilisent le bois pour se chauffer, mais aussi pour ceux qui souhaitent conserver une cheminée pour un usage occasionnel. Remplacer un équipement ancien par un appareil plus récent représente un coût, même lorsque des aides existent. L’Ademe propose notamment le Fonds Air Bois, destiné à soutenir le remplacement d’appareils de chauffage au bois polluants dans certains territoires. Mais l’existence de ces aides ne signifie ni que tous les foyers sont éligibles, ni que le remplacement est intégralement financé.

La lutte contre la pollution atmosphérique peut justifier des restrictions. Pour utant, le chauffage au bois est pour de nombreux foyers ruraux et périurbains, la réponse la plus économique à la flambée des prix de l'énergie.

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“I’m okay.” That was the last message I sent my mother before an Israeli strike hit us, a group of seven journalists reporting in southern Lebanon.

Three years ago, on 13 October 2023, my colleague Dylan Collins and I headed to the southern border of Lebanon to cover the situation following cross-border shelling between Israeli forces and Hezbollah. We spent the morning filming UN peacekeeping force patrols along the blue line dividing Lebanon and Israel. The atmosphere was calm and nothing suggested that the day was about to change and upend our lives. We went to a coffee shop near a UN post where journalists from different outlets had gathered and there we met our friend and Reuters colleague Issam Abdallah. 

Around 4:50PM, we heard a bombardment in a nearby town so we moved to an exposed hill in Alma Al-Shaab, where Al-Jazeera journalists Carmen Joukhadar and Elie Brakhya were positioned. Together with colleagues from Reuters, we were a group of seven journalists, all wearing press vests, reporting next to a car marked “TV”. We were clearly identifiable as press and spent about an hour filming while an Israeli drone hovered above us. At 5:57 I finished filing my photos and sent a message to my mother to tell her I was okay. Seconds later, I found myself on the ground, bleeding and screaming for help. Dylan rushed over with a tourniquet, but before he even had the time to put it, another strike hit.

Everyone disappeared and I was left alone, unable to move and the heat of the flames creeping closer to my face. I was terrified of burning alive, so I started crawling away with the camera still hanging from my neck and its strap tightening around my neck with every move. Two weeks later, I woke up from an induced coma with one leg missing, the other severely damaged, and Issam dead. 

Not an isolated attack

What followed was as horrific and brutal as the attack itself and it didn’t stop there. What happened to us was not an isolated incident — for three years I watched journalists being killed in Lebanon and Gaza by Israeli forces in ways that felt painfully familiar. 

In October 2024, Israeli forces struck a compound in Hasbaya where journalists were staying and killed media workers Ghassan Najjar, Mohammed Reda and Wissam Kassem, while they slept.

Human Rights Watch found no evidence of military activity at the site and concluded that the strike was deliberate and should be investigated as war crime.

Then in April 2026, journalist Amal Khalil was killed in southern Lebanon after an Israeli strike hit the building where she had taken shelter with her colleague Zainab Faraj, leaving both women trapped under the rubble. Investigations found that Israeli forces repeatedly obstructed rescue efforts.

Since our attack, dozens of journalists have been killed in Lebanon, and nearly 200 journalists have been killed in Gaza by Israeli forces.

Many have been mired by Israel with the same false allegations that they were “terrorists.” The dead can’t defend themselves against such accusations, but I survived and I can speak about what happened to us. 

In June 2026 in an interview on France 2, Israel’s ambassador to France described the 13 October attack as a “mistake” saying that we were not targeted because we were journalists, but because Israeli forces had mistaken us for “terrorists.” The evidence tells a different story.

Five independent investigations by Agence France-Presse, Amnesty, Human Rights Watch, Reuters, and UNIFIL found no indication of fighters or military activity at the site, and no cross-border exchange of fire for more than 40 minutes before we were struck with a 120mm tank shell. 

These investigations matter because they establish with certainty evidence beyond my own personal account.

What remains unanswered is who gave the order, who fired the double-tap strike, and why no one has been held accountable. These are basic questions that can be answered by Israel if they were sought by EU member states.

Three years on, Issam’s family and the survivors of this attack deserve to know: Who gave the order?

Evidence alone cannot deliver justice, someone must be willing to act on it. In the face of this attack, including the targeting of four of its own citizens on Lebanese soil, the Lebanese government has failed us. 

Neither Lebanon nor Israel are party to the Rome Statute, meaning that the International Criminal Court does not have jurisdiction to prosecute those responsible for the attack.

In 2024, Lebanon approved a special declaration that would have allowed the Court to investigate war crimes committed after 7 October 2023, only to later reverse its decision for political reasons.

And now, making our legal path even more complicated, in June 2026 Lebanon signed a new framework agreement with Israel whereby Clause 13 commits both sides to cease “all hostile and adverse actions in international and legal fora.”

EU urged to act

I have no hope left that we will ever get justice for what we lost, but I will not rest before I know the names and faces of those responsible. 

Our case is the most documented instance of Israeli forces targeting the press on record. The October 13 targeted attack was perpetrated by Israeli forces on a group of journalists clearly identifiable as press.

If we cannot get answers in the face of such overwhelming evidence, what does it mean for the hundreds of journalists killed by Israeli fire throughout the region for which there is no such evidence? 

This is where the European Union must act. The EU has repeatedly said that journalists must not be attacked and that violations of international law must be met with accountability. Today, we demand actions not just words and statements. The EU must demand that Israel provide a full account of the 13 October attack, including who ordered, authorized and carried out the strikes.

For me, this is not an abstract question of foreign policy. Issam was my friend. I survived that attack with one leg missing. I know what it means when the people responsible for an attack are allowed to remain unnamed and unaccountable.

I am asking the EU not simply to stand with journalists in words, but to stand with us in action.

The EU has political, diplomatic, and legal leverage. It should use it. If Israel refuses to fully explain what occurred and disclose those responsible for killing and maiming journalists who were visibly identifiable as press, EU member states should use every available mechanism to pursue accountability, including further targeted sanctions or suspending trade with Israel.

I refuse to believe that a military with advanced surveillance could have simply mistaken us for fighters and attacked us in a double-tap strike, a tactic repeatedly used by Israel in this war. But, if that’s truly what happened, then Israel must still answer for how such incompetence and failure was possible. 

For now, justice evades us, but the truth of who gave the order is within reach and we must demand it.