The administration of US President Donald Trump is considering the restoration of Russian natural gas supplies to Europe, including through Ukraine’s pipeline network, as part of a proposed settlement to end Russia’s war against Ukraine. The initiative would offer Moscow renewed energy revenues while potentially opening opportunities for American investors to participate in the trade.
According to a New York Times investigation published on 17 October, presidential envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner have raised the proposal with Ukrainian and European officials, including President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The White House has confirmed that economic incentives for Russia and Ukraine form part of its peace diplomacy, although no agreement on renewed gas transit has been announced.
The proposal would require Ukraine to reopen a transit route that ceased operating for Russian exports in January 2025, while European governments would be expected to resume purchases they have spent years reducing. American negotiators reportedly regard the prospect of renewed commercial revenues as an incentive for President Vladimir Putin to reach a settlement.
There is, however, a considerable difference between offering Russia a commercial opportunity after a verified peace agreement and restoring a source of revenue and political influence before Moscow has demonstrated any willingness to abandon its territorial objectives.
The reported initiative represents a reversal of Trump’s earlier position on European energy security.
During his first presidency, Trump repeatedly warned Germany that its dependence on Russian energy exposed it to political pressure from Moscow. Speaking at the United Nations General Assembly in September 2018, he accused Berlin of becoming dangerously dependent on Russian supplies. Members of the German delegation visibly smiled at his remarks.
The episode acquired renewed significance after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Germany had developed an extensive commercial relationship with Gazprom, while the Nord Stream pipelines were intended to facilitate Russian gas deliveries directly to Germany, bypassing traditional transit countries, including Ukraine.
Trump maintained his opposition to those energy relationships well into his second presidency. As EU Today reported in September 2025, he told European governments that continuing to purchase Russian energy amounted to financing the war against themselves.
Washington is now reportedly considering precisely the commercial relationship that Trump previously identified as a strategic danger.
The change cannot be explained solely by the objective of ending the war. It also coincides with discussions about a substantially different economic arrangement, in which American commercial interests could participate in infrastructure and transactions previously dominated by Russia and European energy companies.
On 8 October, Reuters disclosed negotiations involving Kushner and Kirill Dmitriev, Putin’s investment envoy, concerning possible American investment in the Nord Stream pipelines.
The discussions included the prospect of US investors profiting from renewed Russian gas deliveries to Europe. Separate negotiations have involved assets belonging to the Russian energy company Lukoil.
The White House has denied that Nord Stream was a subject of recent discussions and has said any agreements must benefit American taxpayers and companies. There is no established evidence that Witkoff, Kushner or members of Trump’s family would personally profit from the proposed gas arrangements.
Nevertheless, the possibility of American participation changes the commercial equation. Russian gas returning to Europe through infrastructure involving US investors would no longer be exclusively a Russian-European business relationship.
That distinction matters financially, but it does not necessarily resolve the underlying security problem. American ownership of transit infrastructure would not eliminate Moscow’s ability to influence production, supply volumes or export decisions.
The European Union has already confronted the consequences of allowing an energy relationship to become a source of geopolitical leverage. Introducing American intermediaries would not, by itself, remove that vulnerability.
The proposal also conflicts with legislation already adopted by the European Union.
In January 2026, the Council formally approved a regulation phasing out Russian natural gas imports. The restrictions began taking effect in March, with the remaining long-term LNG imports scheduled to end in January 2027 and pipeline imports in autumn 2027.
Consequently, restoring substantial Russian supplies would require changes to existing EU policy or the use of legally available exceptions. Neither Washington nor Moscow can make that decision on Europe’s behalf.
Germany has already opposed the reported American initiative. Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s security adviser, Günter Sautter, reportedly objected during discussions in Florida, while former economy minister Robert Habeck warned against recreating dependence on an unreliable supplier.
The economic attraction remains understandable. European industry faces substantial energy costs, and cheaper pipeline gas could offer relief to some consumers and manufacturers. Yet commercial prices do not account for the wider costs associated with supply disruption, strategic exposure and the potential use of energy exports as political leverage.
Europe’s decision to reduce Russian gas imports was therefore not simply a change of supplier. It was a response to the security implications of its previous energy model.
The initiative also intersects with divisions inside European politics, particularly in Germany.
Alternative for Germany (AfD) has repeatedly advocated restoring Russian energy imports, arguing that sanctions and expensive replacement supplies have damaged German industry. Sahra Wagenknecht’s left-wing BSW has advanced similar arguments concerning energy prices and relations with Moscow.
The overlap extends beyond energy policy. On 14 October, AfD and BSW representatives supported a motion in Saxony-Anhalt calling for an end to military assistance for Ukraine.
A US-backed proposal to restore Russian gas could give these parties an additional argument against the federal government’s existing approach. They would be able to point to Washington’s own negotiations when questioning the economic and strategic rationale for maintaining restrictions on Russian energy.
This does not establish that the Trump administration’s gas initiative is intended to strengthen particular European political movements. It does demonstrate how the same policy could serve several objectives simultaneously: commercial rapprochement with Russia, a negotiating incentive for Moscow and a change in the European debate over sanctions.
The central uncertainty concerns the relationship between renewed revenues and Russian military objectives.
Washington’s argument assumes that the prospect of substantial future gas income could persuade Putin to accept a settlement. Yet negotiations over commercial cooperation have so far produced no demonstrated change in Moscow’s fundamental territorial demands.
Meanwhile, Russia continues attacking Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. On 18 October, Zelenskyy reported 76 Russian attacks on Ukrainian energy, oil and gas facilities during the preceding week, despite Trump’s announcement of an energy ceasefire that neither Kyiv nor Moscow had confirmed.
There is also an unresolved contradiction in Washington’s wider sanctions policy. Having previously demanded that Europe stop financing Russia through energy purchases, Trump has recently suspended additional American sanctions against Moscow while his representatives explore new economic arrangements.
For Ukraine, renewed transit could restore revenue lost when the previous gas agreement expired. For Russia, however, the potential benefits extend beyond immediate export earnings. Access to European markets would restore commercial relationships and a degree of political influence that Moscow lost after the invasion.
The distinction is fundamental. A peace settlement that permits carefully regulated economic cooperation after Russian withdrawal and enforceable security guarantees would be different from an agreement that restores Moscow’s commercial advantages in anticipation of concessions that have not yet been secured.
The question for European governments is therefore not merely whether Russian gas could once again become cheaper than alternative supplies. It is whether restoring that trade would leave Europe better protected against another confrontation with Moscow, or recreate the vulnerabilities that became apparent in 2022.
Washington’s proposed economic bargain cannot answer that question on Europe’s behalf.
Quando comparado ao mesmo mercado de trabalho registrado em 2023, houve crescimento de 8,6% no período.
As unidades da federação que mais empregam são Minas Gerais (62.631 postos de trabalho); Pará (27.047); e Bahia (9.147).
Além dos dados sobre empregos, o painel permite consultar informações sobre o perfil dos trabalhadores, remuneração média e as 21 substâncias relacionadas a essas atividades, entre elas, alumínio, ouro, ferro, cobre, terras-raras, nióbio, titânio e lítio.
A análise do mercado formal de trabalho da indústria extrativa mineral da plataforma foi realizada a partir dos microdados da Relação Anual de Informações Sociais (Rais) e do Novo Cadastro Geral de Empregados e Desempregados (Novo Caged), disponibilizados pelo Ministério do Trabalho e Emprego (MTE).
De acordo com os dados do portal, a participação masculina (100.765 empregos) equivale a 78% do total de empregos relacionados a minerais críticos e estratégicos (129.423). As mulheres ocupam os 22% restantes, 28.658 postos.
No gráfico de empregos, relacionados aos MCE, 51.714 são de mão de obra qualificada, o equivalente a 23% de todos os empregos.
Os trabalhadores com ensino superior somam 30.707, que representa 14%. Destes mais de 30 mil postos de trabalho, 19.060 são ocupados por homens e 11.647, por mulheres.
Quando considerados os empregos gerados por tipo de mineral, o extrativismo que mais emprega é do ferro (70.027 postos de trabalho). Seguido por metais preciosos que somam 21.313 empregos.
Em 2025, as remunerações médias dos trabalhadores de níveis de escolaridade fundamental, médio e superior foram respectivamente de R$ 3.218; R$ 4.142 e R$ 11.856.
O portal também mostra a distribuição territorial dos municípios produtores com um mapa geoespacial.
Entre os municípios com maior número de trabalhadores em atividades relacionadas aos MCE estão Parauapebas (PA), com 8.234 empregos; Nova Lima (MG), com 8.218; e Congonhas (MG), com 7.114.
Em Parauapebas, são 8.234 trabalhadores (71,4% do gênero masculino e 28,6% do gênero feminino), sendo 1.851 com nível superior.
Em Nova Lima, dos 8.218 empregados (63,3% do gênero masculino e 36,7% do gênero feminino), 4.776 tem nível superior.
Em Congonhas, são 7.114 trabalhadores (73,2% do gênero masculino e 26,8% gênero feminino), sendo 1.234 trabalhadores com nível superior.
Para contribuir com a transparência e a divulgação de informações sobre o desempenho da mineração no país, o site apresenta informações de exploração, valor investido e produção e comércio exterior.
De acordo com os indicadores, em 2025 o país tinha 1.012 áreas em produção que resultaram em R$ 250,4 bilhões ao país.
UK home secretary’s meeting comes after PM said he wanted to rejoin European law enforcement databases
The UK home secretary, Shabana Mahmood, will meet the EU’s home affairs commissioner on Monday for further talks just days after Andy Burnham said he wanted to rejoin European law enforcement databases from which the UK has been locked out of since Brexit.
According to the European Commission, they will discuss “migration, border management, law enforcement cooperation and counter-terrorism”, with the latest Frontex data published on Monday showing a 43% decline in small boats crossing the Channel.
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© Photograph: Marcin Nowak/Anadolu/Getty Images
© Photograph: Marcin Nowak/Anadolu/Getty Images
© Photograph: Marcin Nowak/Anadolu/Getty Images
UK home secretary’s meeting comes after PM said he wanted to rejoin European law enforcement databases
The UK home secretary, Shabana Mahmood, will meet the EU’s home affairs commissioner on Monday for further talks just days after Andy Burnham said he wanted to rejoin European law enforcement databases from which the UK has been locked out of since Brexit.
According to the European Commission, they will discuss “migration, border management, law enforcement cooperation and counter-terrorism”, with the latest Frontex data published on Monday showing a 43% decline in small boats crossing the Channel.
Continue reading...
© Photograph: Marcin Nowak/Anadolu/Getty Images
© Photograph: Marcin Nowak/Anadolu/Getty Images
© Photograph: Marcin Nowak/Anadolu/Getty Images
© PIERO CRUCIATTI
By Mohammad Molaei | Press TV | October 18, 2026
The two-week exchange of fire between the United States and Iran, triggered by Washington’s attempt to force open an illegal southern corridor through the Strait of Hormuz, represented the most consequential direct military confrontation between them since the 40-day war.
The Iranian response to the unprovoked and illegal American aggression was not a chaotic escalation but a methodical, layered military campaign that drew on years of doctrinal development, weapons investment, and operational planning.
The efforts of the Islamic Republic’s armed forces, spearheaded by the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) aerospace and naval branches, executed a decisive and swift response.
What unfolded was a layered operation with nine distinct but interlocking lines of effort. Each line reinforced the others. Infrastructure degradation reduced American operational tempo; area denial forced repositioning that compounded the effects of that degradation; extended-range precision strikes demonstrated that repositioning offered no sanctuary; ISR attrition blinded American targeting systems; terrorist suppression closed the land flank, while strikes on utility infrastructure imposed costs on host nations and denied services to American bases.
One can employ the open-source reporting, satellite imagery, and the observable pattern of strikes to examine each dimension of Iran’s military response in detail, and construct a coherent operational picture. It is getting exceedingly clear that the ceasefire period has very likely translated to a window for reconstitution and preparation in Iranian strategic calculus.
The primacy of solid-fuel tactical ballistic missiles
Iran’s decision to anchor its retaliatory campaign in solid-fuel tactical ballistic missiles was not accidental. It reflected a decade-long investment in a specific capability designed precisely for this kind of confrontation. Solid-fuel ballistic missiles offer decisive operational advantages over their liquid-fuel predecessors. They require no fueling time at the launch site, dramatically compressing the window between a launch order and missile departure.
This matters enormously in a sensitive environment where adversary assets, particularly MQ-9 Reaper drones and maritime patrol aircraft, are actively hunting for launch preparations.
A liquid-fuel missile requires a visible, time-consuming fueling sequence that creates a detectable signature. A solid-fuel missile can be transported, erected, and fired in a fraction of that time, often before a targeting solution can be developed and a strike authorized.
These missiles are road-mobile, launched from transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) that can disperse across Iran’s mountainous terrain, making pre-emptive targeting extremely difficult.
Having destroyed much of the air defense systems belonging to the US and its Arab allies using the older, less sophisticated liquid fuel missiles in previous wars, Iran’s strikes this time primarily relied on its tactical solid-fuel ballistic missile inventory, meaning the various variants of the Fateh family.
Simply put, the choice of solid-fuel systems reflected a calculated assessment of the adversary’s weakened interception capacity, an assessment that proved accurate.
The air defense inventory crisis
Perhaps the single most consequential factor shaping the operational environment was the state of US and allied air defense missile inventories.
The United States entered this round of military aggression with critically depleted stocks of its most capable interceptors. The Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) and Standard Missile-6 (SM-6), which arm Aegis-equipped destroyers and cruisers and provide the American Navy’s primary ballistic missile defense capability at sea, have been drawn down through a combination of expenditure in the Red Sea campaign against Yemen, the costly defense of Israel during two previous wars, and the simple reality that production rates have never kept pace with consumption.
The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, which provides upper-tier defense against medium and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, is similarly constrained.
The decision not to employ Aegis and THAAD at full capacity was therefore a forced one. The United States simply could not spend its remaining meager inventory of SM-3 and THAAD interceptors against Iranian tactical ballistic missiles, which, while accurate and damaging, are not the only threats to American interests.
Doing so would have left the United States strategically exposed against another serious contingency in East Asia or Europe. The calculus was that American military bases had to absorb more hits to preserve the interceptors.
Moreover, the Patriot system, which bore the brunt of terminal-phase defense in recent weeks across the region, was in no better condition. Years of expenditure across Ukraine, the occupied territories, the Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea mission have drawn PAC-3 and PAC-3 MSE stocks to extremely low levels.
The Pentagon’s response was telling. Rather than accelerating full-capability PAC-3 MSE production, it has chosen to pursue the cheaper, less capable PAC-3ACE Cost Reduction Initiative variant. More revealing still were the recent PAC-2 GEM-T orders, an older interceptor not procured by the US in decades, signaling just how severely stocks had been exhausted.
That the world’s most sophisticated air defense enterprise was compelled to resurrect a 1990s-era design to sustain basic readiness is the starkest indicator of the American munitions crisis that Iranian planners appear to have understood, measured, and exploited with precision.
The situation among Persian Gulf states was equally dire. Saudi Arabia and the UAE had expended substantial portions of their Patriot PAC-3 interceptor stocks during years of Yemeni military missile and drone attacks, and entered the 40-day imposed war with depleted inventories. The situation is even direr in Kuwait and Bahrain, with the Persian Gulf microstates effectively running out of Patriots, being forced to solely rely on American-operated systems.
PAC-3, the most capable variant of the Patriot system against ballistic missiles, has effectively been exhausted in several batteries. PAC-2, the older and less capable variant, is the only available option in certain areas against Iranian missiles, and even that missile is running low as well. The collective air defense architecture of the Persian Gulf states, which had appeared formidable on paper, has been effectively hollowed out.
Iranian operational planners were aware of these facts. The sequencing and volume of Iranian missile salvos during the exchange reflected a deliberate attempt to exploit the gap between what the defense could theoretically intercept and what it could actually intercept given real-world inventory constraints.
Iran’s multi-layered operational strategy
What distinguished Iran’s response from a simple missile barrage was its architectural coherence. Iranian planners did not merely fire missiles at American targets; they executed a phased, multi-domain retaliatory campaign with distinct operational objectives at each stage, each phase creating the conditions for the next.
The campaign can be understood as having five interlocking lines of effort: infrastructure degradation, area denial and operational displacement, precision strike at extended range, ISR and logistics attrition, and proxy terrorist force suppression.
Together, they constituted a campaign design far more sophisticated than most Western analysts had publicly credited Iran with possessing.
The overarching logic was one of progressive operational constriction. Rather than attempting to destroy US forces – an objective beyond Iran’s reach given American conventional superiority – the campaign aimed to degrade, displace, and exhaust them.
Each successful strike reduced American operational capacity; forced repositioning that consumed time and resources, and demonstrated to regional partners that proximity to American occupation forces carried real costs.
Infrastructure degradation
The first phase of the Iranian retaliatory campaign targeted the physical infrastructure of American military power in the Persian Gulf region. This was not indiscriminate bombardment. Satellite imagery and post-strike assessments revealed a pattern of targeting that prioritized specific high-value nodes: radar installations, fuel and ammunition storage facilities, maintenance hangars, and communications infrastructure.
Radar systems were a particular priority. The ability to detect, track, and target Iranian missiles and UAVs depends on a layered network of radar systems. By striking radar installations at air bases, Iran degraded the situational awareness that underpins both offensive operations and defensive intercepts. A radar that is destroyed or forced offline creates a coverage gap that cascades through the entire air defense architecture.
Logistics infrastructure was targeted with equal deliberateness. Fuel depots, ammunition storage sites, and maintenance facilities at American bases around the Persian Gulf were struck with sufficient accuracy to cause meaningful operational disruption.
An air force that cannot fuel its aircraft, rearm them, or repair battle damage cannot sustain sortie rates. The targeting of logistics was a direct attack on the tempo of American air operations to derail the American aggression against Iranian sites and reduce the pressure on Iranian forces.
The accuracy of these strikes, achieved at ranges of several hundred kilometers, validated the operational utility of Iran’s solid-fuel ballistic missile force and demonstrated that the IRGC aerospace force had developed the targeting data, launch procedures, and quality control necessary to achieve consistent results against fixed infrastructure.
The anti-access/area denial campaign
The most strategically significant dimension of the Iranian retaliatory campaign was its systematic execution of an Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy that progressively pushed American air operations out of the Persian Gulf and into increasingly distant and operationally constrained locations.
The logic of A2/AD in this context was straightforward. The closer American aircraft operate to Iran, the shorter their flight times, the larger their payloads, the less refueling they require, and the more sorties they can generate per day.
Conversely, every additional hundred kilometers of distance imposes compounding costs: greater tanker support, longer mission times, reduced payload, increased crew fatigue, and more complex coordination. By rendering the Persian Gulf operationally untenable for American air assets, Iran systematically degraded the offensive capacity of the aggressors.
The first displacement was from the Persian Gulf itself. Sustained missile and drone attacks against air bases made sustained operations from those locations unfeasible. The American response was to shift primary air operations to bases in Jordan – Al-Azraq and Muwaffaq Salti –which offered greater distance from Iranian missile systems.
Iran’s response was to extend its reach to Jordan. Multiple strikes against American bases, documented by US casualties and satellite imagery showing damaged hangars and destroyed aircraft, demonstrated that Iran had the capability to contest operations from that distance.
The retaliatory strikes destroyed American aircraft, damaged infrastructure, and forced the US war machine to reconsider the viability of Jordan as a primary operating location.
The second displacement was to the occupied territories. American air assets, including tanker aircraft critical to sustaining long-range strike operations, were pushed further west to Israeli military bases.
This displacement carried its own operational costs. The distance from Iranian targets increased further, and the concentration of American assets in the occupied territories created its own targeting opportunities for Iran, which has demonstrated both the willingness and capability to strike at extended ranges.
A particularly telling indicator of this displacement dynamic was the repositioning of the RQ-4 Global Hawk strategic reconnaissance aircraft, which had been operating from Al Dhafra in the UAE and from Jordanian facilities, to Sigonella Naval Air Station in Sicily.
The Global Hawk, with its long endurance and high-altitude sensors, is a critical ISR asset for tracking Iranian missile launches and providing targeting data. Its displacement to Sicily represented a dramatic reduction in persistent surveillance coverage over Iran and the Persian Gulf, with direct consequences for the effectiveness of American strike operations.
A qualitative leap in extended-range precision
One of the most significant revelations of the recent round of US aggression and Iran’s retaliation was the demonstrated accuracy of Iranian ballistic missiles at ranges exceeding 1,000 kilometers. Previous assessments of Iranian ballistic missile accuracy had generally been skeptical about the ability to achieve consistent precision at such distances. The strikes on Jordanian targets, located well over 1,000 kilometers from Iranian launch sites, completely shattered that skepticism.
The circular error probable (CEP) – the radius within which 50 percent of strikes fall – observed in the Jordanian strikes was dramatically smaller than what Iranian missiles had previously demonstrated at comparable ranges. Strikes that hit specific buildings, specific aircraft shelters, and specific sections of structures, rather than simply landing somewhere on a base, indicated a qualitative improvement in guidance accuracy that demands explanation.
Several hypotheses present themselves, and the evidence suggests that the answer likely involves a combination of all of them. First are technical improvements. Iran may have upgraded the terminal guidance systems on its Kheibarshekan, Haj Qasem, and Fattah variants, potentially incorporating improved inertial navigation, satnav receivers, or optical terminal seekers that allow the missile to better correct its trajectory in the final phase of flight.
Second are tactical improvements. Iranian launch crews may have refined their pre-launch survey procedures, improving the accuracy of the initial position fix that the missile’s inertial navigation system uses as its reference point. Third are software improvements, which mean updates to the missile’s flight control algorithms could improve trajectory optimization and reduce the accumulated errors that degrade accuracy over long distances.
The most likely explanation is a combination of all three – a systematic program of improvement across the technical, procedural, and software dimensions of missile accuracy that had been underway for years and was now being demonstrated operationally for the first time at this range, following the experiences of the 40-day war.
The MQ-9 hunt
The MQ-9 Reaper drone occupied a central and uniquely vulnerable position in American military offensives against Iran. The Reaper is not merely a strike platform but the primary persistent ISR asset used to locate and track mobile Iranian missile launchers, particularly after the heavy attrition of similar Israeli military systems.
Without the MQ-9’s ability to loiter for extended periods, the capacity to find and destroy TELs before they fire, or to conduct battle damage assessment after strikes, is dramatically reduced.
Iran understood this dependency and targeted it systematically during this campaign. The campaign against MQ-9 assets operated on multiple levels. Ground-based air defense systems, which had previously demonstrated the ability to engage high-altitude targets, were used to engage Reapers operating over Iranian territory and adjacent areas.
But Iran also struck the ground infrastructure that supports MQ-9 operations: the maintenance facilities, fuel systems, satellite communication ground stations, and launch-and-recovery equipment that allow the aircraft to operate.
Western media reporting confirmed the destruction of a number of MQ-9 aircraft on the ground at Jordanian bases and, in a particularly striking detail, the destruction of some aircraft while still in their transport canisters before assembly.
This achievement indicates that Iran has developed targeting intelligence on the logistics chain supporting drone operations, not merely the operational bases themselves. Destroying aircraft before they are assembled and made operational is a force multiplication achievement. It eliminates capability before it can be employed, at a point when the aircraft is most vulnerable and least defended.
The cumulative effect of the MQ-9 campaign was a significant degradation of American persistent ISR coverage over Iran. This directly reduced the effectiveness of the hunt for mobile missile launchers, allowing Iranian TELs greater freedom of movement and survivability.
Suppressing proxy terrorist forces in Iraq
From the first day of the exchange, Iran conducted daily retaliatory strikes against armed terrorist groups in Iraq that had the capability and potential motivation to conduct land attacks against Iranian territory or to serve as a forward platform for American-directed operations.
This campaign was methodical and comprehensive, targeting personnel concentrations, weapons storage facilities, and command infrastructure.
Iran’s western flank, which includes the border with Iraq, represents a potential vulnerability. Armed terrorist groups in Iraq, some with historical ties to American intelligence, could in theory conduct cross-border raids, provide intelligence for American strikes, or serve as a distraction that forced Iran to divert defensive resources.
By striking these groups preemptively and continuously, Iran sought to exhaust their operational capacity before it could be brought to bear.
The daily rhythm of these retaliatory strikes was itself a message. It demonstrated that Iran had persistent targeting intelligence on these groups’ locations, that it was willing to expend munitions on this secondary campaign even while conducting the primary campaign against American forces, and that it intended to maintain pressure regardless of any ceasefire negotiations that might be underway.
The logic of reciprocity
Iran’s retaliatory strikes on electrical and water infrastructure in Kuwait represented a deliberate response that operated on two distinct logics simultaneously.
The first was reciprocity: Iran’s own civilian infrastructure had been targeted, and the strikes on Kuwaiti infrastructure were a direct signal that such targeting would not be absorbed without response to the aggressor and its facilitators.
The second was military utility. American forces in the Persian Gulf region depend on host nations’ electrical grids and water supplies for base operations. Infrastructure that serves both civilian and military purposes is, under the laws of armed conflict, a legitimate military target when the military use is substantial and the strike is proportionate.
The targeting of Kuwait’s infrastructure was also a message to Persian Gulf states more broadly. Kuwait, like Bahrain, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, hosts American military facilities and had provided varying degrees of support to American operations.
By demonstrating the ability and willingness to strike Kuwaiti infrastructure, Iran was communicating that the costs of hosting American forces were not abstract. They were concrete, immediate, and would be borne by the host nation as well as the American military.
The pillars of operational success
Iran’s two-week retaliatory campaign against American aggression and attempts to force open an illegal southern corridor through the Strait of Hormuz largely succeeded on every dimension that its operational planners had identified.
The exchange demonstrated that Iran had developed, over decades of institutional study and investment, a military capability genuinely capable of contesting American power projection in the Persian Gulf region, even after two high-intensity wars.
It demonstrated something relevant to the strategic environment of the region – that the costs of American military aggression in the Persian Gulf had increased substantially; that the infrastructure of American power projection was more vulnerable than pre-war assessments had suggested; and that Iran possessed both the capability and the operational sophistication to exploit those vulnerabilities in a systematic and disciplined manner.
© DIOGO VENTURA/OBSERVADOR
By Arman Shariati | Press TV | October 18, 2026
American media this week began circulating a carefully placed story, claiming that the US military has drafted strike options against Iran that include deployment of the GBU-43/B Massive Ordnance Air Blast Bomb, the weapon branded as the “Mother of All Bombs.”
CNN was the first to report it on October 15, followed immediately by a wave of amplification across the mainstream American and European media.
US President Donald Trump, appearing later on Newsmax in an interview, did not deny the story. He offered instead a characteristically garbled endorsement, describing the MOAB as “like a tiny nuclear bomb, but it’s not nuclear,” and adding that the US may have to “take a shot” at Pickaxe Mountain in Iran’s Karkas mountain range.
The narrative was set, and it deserves to be taken apart with facts.
The GBU-43/B is an enormous munition by conventional standards. It carries approximately 8,500 kilograms of high explosive in a casing that brings its total weight to around 9,800 kilograms, just under 10 tons. Stretched end to end, it measures just over nine meters.
It is GPS-guided and essentially designed to detonate above the ground.
The MOAB is a thermobaric, or fuel-air, weapon. This description explains precisely why the weapon is irrelevant to the current discussion. A thermobaric weapon does not carry all of its oxidizer within its casing the way a conventional explosive does.
Instead, on detonation, it disperses a fine aerosol of fuel particles or reactive material into the surrounding atmosphere. A secondary ignition then detonates this cloud together with the ambient oxygen in the air itself, producing a pressure wave of exceptional duration and reach.
The fireball essentially consumes the atmosphere around it. The result is a weapon optimized for destroying things on or just above the surface, such as personnel in the open, light structures, and cave mouths, across a wide area. What the MOAB does not and cannot do is drive energy downward through hundreds of meters of solid rock.
Trump’s description, “like a tiny nuclear bomb,” is not merely imprecise. It is exactly the kind of rhetorical inflation that makes the current hostile military campaign against the Islamic Republic of Iran intelligible as communication strategy rather than military planning.
The MOAB has been used in combat once. On April 13, 2017, during Trump’s first term, a single GBU-43/B was dropped on a tunnel complex in Nangarhar province in eastern Afghanistan, claiming to target the ISIS (Daesh) Khorasan infrastructure.
The US administration at the time announced that the strike had killed approximately 90 ISIS-K militants. The actual battle damage assessment remained classified. What was confirmed is that a very large explosion occurred in a mountainous area of eastern Afghanistan.
The strategic effect on ISIS-K’s operational capacity in the region was, at best, ambiguous. The organization has continued to carry out attacks in the months and years that followed. That one strike, against an unprotected tunnel network in soft ground, in an area with no air defense, delivered by a slow cargo aircraft operating in uncontested airspace, is the entire operational history of this weapon.
The target reportedly under consideration is Kuh-e Kolang Gaz La, internationally known as the Pickaxe Mountain, in the Karkas range of central Iran. The facility buried beneath it reportedly sits under more than 100 meters of hard granite.
To suggest that an air-burst weapon, however large, could threaten such a target is to misunderstand the physics of the problem at the most elementary level.
The United States possesses a weapon actually designed for this task, namely the GBU-57/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator; a 13,600-kilogram bomb built specifically to drive through reinforced concrete and hardened rock before detonating.
The MOP was used against Iranian nuclear sites on June 22, 2025, during the 12-day imposed war. Its effectiveness against the deepest and most hardened of those facilities, particularly the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, remains a matter of genuine debate.
If the weapon engineered for penetration cannot be confirmed to have neutralized Fordow, a target much less protected than Pickaxe Mountain, then the notion that an air-burst weapon detonating above the mountain surface would accomplish anything beyond scorching rock is not a serious military proposition.
Even setting aside hardened underground targets, the MOAB offers no material advantage against any conventional surface target that cannot be achieved more efficiently and with far less operational risk by using multiple precision-guided JDAMs delivered from fighter aircraft operating at standoff ranges.
The MOAB does not expand the target set. It does not add capability. It adds spectacle.
There is a further operational reality that receives almost no attention in the current American media narrative. The GBU-43/B is confirmed to be deliverable only by the C-130 family of cargo aircraft. Flying such a platform into contested Iranian airspace is not a minor planning consideration and introduces significant operational difficulties.
The United States lost two MC-130J Commando IIs during its wars of aggression against Iran. The idea of routing another slow cargo aircraft into that same environment in order to drop a weapon that cannot reach the target it is supposedly meant to destroy compounds the absurdity.
What the current MOAB narrative resembles most closely is not a serious military planning process. It resembles the late-war German doctrine of the Wunderwaffe, the wonder weapon.
Under mounting pressure, facing an unwinnable strategic position, Nazi Germany’s leadership turned to announcements of extraordinary new weapons that would change the course of the war. The V-1 and V-2 generated genuine fear and caused real casualties.
They did not alter the strategic outcome by a single day. The function of the wonder weapon is not primarily military. It is political. It tells a domestic audience and a wavering alliance that there are still options, that new instruments of power remain available, that the situation is not as bad as it looks.When strategy fails, spectacle fills the gap.
The Trump administration is conducting a war that did not emerge from American strategic interests. It entered the war of aggression to further Israeli goals and expansionist ambitions, has absorbed significant losses and embarrassments, and now approaches midterm elections with a public that has not been offered a clear account of what victory looks like.
In that very context, the MOAB story makes complete sense as an information management campaign, to paint a picture of a strong American military, when the truth is something else.
There is one more thing worth stating plainly. Even if the MOAB is used, even if a C-130 penetrates Iranian airspace, releases the weapon over Pickaxe Mountain, and produces the largest conventional explosion seen in the region, Iran will be compelled to respond.
Not because the strike will have damaged anything of military significance. A major attack that fails to achieve its stated objective does not end a war. It resets the escalation clock. Tehran’s hand will be forced, and it will answer with something commensurate in visibility, and Iran has demonstrated repeatedly that it possesses the means and the will to do exactly that.
The MOAB is a very large bomb, but it is particularly good at the thing it is now being asked to symbolize. What it is, in the current context, is a prop, useful for an interview, useful for a news campaign, and essentially useless for anything happening 100 meters below the surface of a granite mountain in central Iran.
Arman Shariati is a Tehran-based military analyst and researcher.
Al Mayadeen | October 18, 2026
Iran has obtained the technology behind a US-made 14-ton GBU bomb and now possesses samples of the weapon, Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naqdi, senior advisor to the Commander-in-Chief of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC), stated.
Speaking during the “Fedayeen for Iran” military exercise in Sari, Naqdi said Iranian forces acquired some of the bombs after they failed to detonate during the 12-day war, allowing local forces to seize them and study their technology.
“We should recall that during the 12-day war, 14-ton bombs were dropped,” Naqdi said, adding that “the failure of some of the 14-ton bombs to explode enabled the local forces to seize them.”
“Today, Iran possesses samples of these bombs alongside the manufacturing country,” he asserted, adding that Iranian forces have analyzed all the technologies associated with the US 14-ton bomb and now possess its technology in full.
What is the GBU?
The weapon Naqdi referred to is a GBU, or Guided Bomb Unit, a designation used by the US military for a broad family of air-dropped precision-guided bombs.
GBUs use guidance systems to direct their warheads toward designated targets, with different variants ranging from conventional precision bombs to much heavier bunker-busting weapons.
The term “14-ton bomb” is generally associated with the US GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator, a deep-penetration weapon designed to strike heavily fortified underground facilities, such as Iran’s nuclear facilities bombed during the 12-day war.
The GBU-57 is one of the largest conventional bombs in the US arsenal and is designed to penetrate deeply buried and hardened targets before detonating. Its deployment requires specialized heavy aircraft.
Iran has heavy fighter jet at hand
Earlier, Iranian Defense Minister Mehrdad Akhlaghi announced Sunday that a heavy Iranian fighter jet will take its first flight next year.
Naqdi also warned that Iran’s response to any renewed US aggression would extend to infrastructure and energy investments belonging to those involved in attacks against Iran in the region.
“In the event of any mistake, the investments related to the infrastructure and energy of the aggressors in the region will be within the operational targeting circle,” he said.
Responding to US threats involving the use of weapons such as the “Mother of All Bombs,” Naqdi said Iran’s Armed Forces have demonstrated advanced missile and deterrence capabilities capable of delivering a decisive response to any aggression.
Iran advances domestic defense production
The emphasis on domestic defense production forms part of Iran’s broader strategy of military self-reliance.
Iranian officials have repeatedly linked the development of indigenous defense capabilities to the need to maintain national security and deterrence without relying on foreign suppliers.
The focus on precision, missile range, and warhead development also reflects the importance Iranian military planners place on technological advancement as a component of deterrence.
Esta ermida foi erguida num ponto alto de uma vila algarvia e, no passado, serviu mesmo de ponto de vigia militar por ter vista para Espanha.
O conteúdo Foto do dia: este templo algarvio tem marcas militares e vista para Espanha aparece primeiro em Algarve Marafado.
During their visit to Kyiv in September, US President Donald Trump’s envoys urged Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to consider restarting the pipelines that once carried Russian gas to Europe, The New York Times reported on 17 October. They presented it as part of a peace deal with Russia. In the weeks that followed, they pressed the idea with European officials, while Washington freed Russian diesel and spared Russia’s oil buyers from new US penalties.
Energy sales fund Russia’s war, and Ukraine’s halt of transit in January 2025 left TurkStream as Gazprom’s only pipeline route into the EU. Meanwhile, Russia has kept bombing Ukraine’s grid through the energy truce Washington declared on 11 October.
Envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner put the idea to Zelenskyy when they met him in Kyiv, the newspaper reported, citing people familiar with the talks. Trump officials argued that transit fees, which Ukraine gave up at about $1 billion a year, would benefit Kyiv, and that European voters would eventually want cheaper energy. Russia’s share of EU gas imports had fallen from 45% in 2021 to 13% last year.
The envoys presented renewed Russian gas sales as one of the economic incentives in a wider settlement covering Russia’s relationship with NATO, security guarantees for Ukraine, and territorial control. Some European and Ukrainian officials suspected Washington would seek a cut of the profits. The White House denied that the Nord Stream pipeline had been a subject of recent discussions. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov claimed that resuming energy cooperation is in Russia’s interest and, right now, even more in Europe’s.
At Ukraine talks the envoys hosted in Florida last week, Günter Sautter, security adviser to German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, forcefully opposed the idea. German lawmakers have called a return to Russian deliveries a disaster for European security, even treason, as the far-right AfD courts Gazprom to bring the gas back. Former Economy Minister Robert Habeck, who steered Germany off Russian gas after 2022, said Trump “seems to have more sympathies with Vladimir Putin than he has with the Ukrainians.”
Rather than pressure Putin or strengthen Ukraine, the administration has spent much of its peace effort on economic incentives for Russia, the newspaper wrote. The US Treasury cleared imports of Russian diesel on 9 October. On 16 October, Trump waived the penalties on Russia’s oil buyers that Congress had passed in the Graham Act. Washington is also weighing relief for sanctioned shadow fleet tankers. And the White House ordered limits on the military satellite service Ukraine’s forces rely on, Reuters reported.
Putin’s economic envoy Kirill Dmitriev claimed the ice had broken and more joint initiatives would follow, including data centers powered by Russian nuclear energy. The talks also cover the sale of Lukoil’s foreign assets to a group that includes the US government, the newspaper reported earlier this month. Zelenskyy, who had heard the pitch in Kyiv, alluded to it in a Financial Times interview this week.
“The question will be when will the next deal be? Maybe it will be gas. Definitely it will be gas,” he said.
Reopening the pipelines could hand Moscow back significant revenue and strengthen its sway over Europe’s energy market, Liga noted. Each new concession lowers the price Russia pays for continuing the war.
Global South Media Center launches in China with teleSUR, Prensa Latina, Brasil de Fato and Pan Africa TV to strengthen Southern media cooperation.
Related: China Deploys Liaoning Carrier Strike Group to Western Pacific for Military Drills
The Global South Media Center was established in China on Sunday as a new platform for cooperation among media organizations from Latin America, Africa and Asia.
The initiative, known by its Spanish acronym CMPSur, was created by four media outlets with correspondents in China: teleSUR, Cuba’s Prensa Latina, Brazil’s Brasil de Fato and Ghana’s Pan Africa TV.
The launch took place during the Global South Academic Forum, held in Shanghai on October 17 and 18 under the theme “Global South Political Parties: Governance and Modernization.”
The forum brought together political leaders, academics, researchers and media representatives from Asia, Africa, Latin America and other developing regions.
Jeff Xiong, secretary general of the Global South Academic Forum, said the new media center seeks to strengthen joint journalistic production and build narratives from the perspective of the peoples of the South.
The platform aims to deepen links between China and other Global South countries while challenging the dominant communication frameworks of the Global North.
Xiong highlighted the role of the Global South Academic Forum in creating the conditions for multinational cooperation. He also expressed hope that additional media organizations from developing countries would join the initiative.
The Global South Media Center plans to expand the circulation of stories about China among audiences in Africa, Asia and Latin America through collaboration among outlets from different regions.
The initiative reflects a growing effort by Southern media to coordinate reporting, share content and develop common perspectives on development, governance and international relations.
The center will not replace the editorial independence of its founding organizations. Instead, it is expected to provide a framework for exchanging material, coordinating coverage and promoting joint productions.
The creation of the platform comes at a time when media organizations in developing countries face increasing pressure from concentrated technology platforms, algorithmic distribution and dependence on foreign digital infrastructure.
The Global South Academic Forum has become a space for discussing those challenges alongside broader questions of governance, development and international cooperation.
Global South Academic Forum | UNESCO—Media development and information
The Global South Media Center was announced during a panel on communication, party governance and social mobilization.
Participants discussed how media organizations can respond to the expansion of artificial intelligence and growing technological inequalities between developed and developing countries.
Alejandro Gómez, vice president of Prensa Latina, defended technological sovereignty and informational independence as essential conditions for Southern media.
He said developing countries must build their own capacities rather than relying exclusively on infrastructure and platforms controlled by external actors.
Gómez proposed the creation of a permanent training mechanism in artificial intelligence for journalists and media organizations in the Global South.
The initiative would be developed in cooperation with Chinese institutions and other specialized organizations. It could include training in AI-assisted reporting, data verification, digital security, content production and responsible use of new technologies.
The Prensa Latina executive also emphasized the need for Southern media to produce their own narratives about international transformations.
He argued that dominant global media frameworks often condition coverage of countries such as Cuba and limit the visibility of perspectives from developing nations.
The proposal reflects a broader concern that artificial intelligence may reinforce existing inequalities if Southern countries do not participate in the design, regulation and use of these technologies.
AI tools can help journalists analyze information, translate content, identify trends and improve audience engagement. However, they can also reproduce biases, amplify misinformation and concentrate power in companies that control the underlying models.
For media organizations in the Global South, the challenge is to use new technologies without becoming dependent on foreign platforms or losing control over editorial decisions.
The Global South Media Center could therefore play a role in training, research and the development of shared technological standards.
teleSUR President Patricia Villegas also defended South-South cooperation as a means of strengthening communication sovereignty.
She said media organizations in the South must reduce their dependence on digital infrastructures and technological platforms controlled by external actors.
Villegas warned about the influence of algorithms on the circulation of content. She argued that platforms can determine which stories reach audiences and which voices remain marginal.
The teleSUR president called for greater collaboration among Southern media, including the exchange of productions and the transfer of technological capacities.
She highlighted China’s role as a strategic partner for expanding communication cooperation and strengthening the ability of developing countries to produce and distribute their own content.
Villegas also referred to the creation of teleSUR+ in July 2026. The collaborative platform brings together audiovisual material, texts and photographs produced by media organizations and creators from the Global South.
She also mentioned the Global South correspondent network in Beijing, which includes Brasil de Fato, Prensa Latina and Brazil’s TVT, with the planned incorporation of an African media outlet.
The correspondent network provides a practical model for the new media center. It allows participating outlets to share reporting, coordinate coverage and reduce the costs of maintaining international bureaus.
UNESCO—Global Media and Information Literacy | International Federation of Journalists
The Global South Media Center represents an effort to build a more coordinated voice for developing countries in the international information system.
Media organizations from the South often face unequal access to technology, advertising revenue, satellite capacity, distribution networks and international audiences.
Many outlets rely on platforms owned or controlled by companies based in the Global North. Those platforms can shape visibility through algorithms, moderation policies and commercial priorities.
The new center seeks to address that imbalance by promoting cooperation among media with shared interests in sovereignty, development and multilateralism.
The initiative also responds to the need for greater representation of Southern perspectives in coverage of China, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean.
Mainstream media in the Global North have often presented developing countries through narratives focused on crisis, instability or dependence. Southern media organizations argue that those narratives ignore local experiences, historical context and the diversity of development models.
The Global South Media Center aims to provide alternative coverage that reflects the voices of communities, governments and social movements in the South.
The platform could support reporting on infrastructure, public health, education, food sovereignty, climate adaptation, digital governance and regional integration.
It could also promote stories about cooperation among developing countries, including China’s role in infrastructure, technology and trade.
The center’s creation is part of a wider effort to strengthen South-South cooperation in communication.
The Global South Academic Forum has promoted exchanges among academics, institutional representatives and media organizations on governance, development, international cooperation and the role of developing countries in global affairs.
The forum’s discussions have included state capacity, social mobilization, institutional innovation and the use of party organizations to strengthen governance.
Those themes are closely connected to the media agenda. Communication is not only a technical issue; it is also part of how societies organize political participation and respond to global challenges.
The panel in Shanghai emphasized that media organizations must prepare for the impact of artificial intelligence while defending editorial independence and public interest journalism.
Participants argued that technological innovation should not replace journalists but should support their work by improving research, verification and audience access.
The Global South Media Center could therefore become a space for developing ethical guidelines on AI, protecting journalists’ rights and promoting responsible use of new technologies.
The launch of the Global South Media Center has geopolitical significance because communication has become a central arena of global competition.
Countries and media organizations increasingly compete to shape narratives about development, security, technology and international cooperation.
China’s role in the initiative reflects its growing engagement with Africa, Asia and Latin America. Beijing has expanded partnerships in infrastructure, trade, education and digital technology through initiatives such as the Belt and Road Forum and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation.
For Southern media, cooperation with China offers access to training, technology and new distribution channels. It also allows them to diversify their sources of information and reduce dependence on traditional Western media networks.
For China, the platform provides an opportunity to strengthen its image among Global South audiences and present its development experience through media organizations from the region.
The initiative does not eliminate political differences among participating countries. Media organizations in the Global South have different political systems, editorial traditions and national interests.
However, the center reflects a shared concern about technological dependence and the unequal distribution of global communication power.
The platform could also influence debates about digital sovereignty, data governance and the regulation of artificial intelligence.
Developing countries have increasingly argued that international standards should address the concentration of technological power and protect the right of nations to control their own digital infrastructure.
The Global South Media Center may become part of that broader discussion by promoting training, content exchange and cooperation among media organizations.
Its success will depend on whether participating outlets can sustain joint projects, develop shared standards and expand the initiative beyond its founding members.
The launch of the Global South Media Center marks an attempt to build a stronger communication network for countries seeking greater influence over the global information order.
SEO Title: Global South Media Center: 4 Outlets Launch Bold New Platform in China
La « paix » factice des Gontcharenko ukrainiens et les « Wunderwaffen » de Kiev.
par Paolo Hamidouche
6 octobre 2026. La nouvelle — si l’on peut l’appeler ainsi, étant donné qu’il s’agit essentiellement d’une tentative maladroite et manifeste de « rouler » Moscou — est que le député de la Rada Alekseï Gontcharenko, un homme habitué par le passé à se faire photographier en compagnie de Joe Biden ou au cœur des scènes les plus violentes du Maïdan ukrainien, a récemment fait une déclaration dictée par la panique, tout en surfant sur l’humeur de la population qui, selon les sondages officiels ukrainiens, penche à 72 % en faveur d’un accord avec la Russie. « Ponts partiellement fermés à Kiev », a déclaré Gontcharenko, « attaques contre le secteur énergétique. Attaques contre les entreprises. Attaques contre les dépôts. Attaques contre les centres de données. Nous sommes confrontés à un problème énorme. Et la stratégie choisie par le gouvernement, à savoir la quête d’une « Wunderwaffe » [arme miracle] qui résoudrait tous nos problèmes, est absurde ».
Gontcharenko appartient au groupe parlementaire « Solidarité européenne », dirigé par l’ancien président issu du coup d’État Petro Porochenko, bien que, officiellement, ce groupe ne soutienne pas de telles positions ; celles-ci sont en revanche partagées par certains députés du groupe « Serviteur du peuple » de Vladimir Zelensky — chef de file du régime issu du coup d’État néo-nazi —, selon qui, toutefois, la sortie de Gontcharenko répondrait à des instructions précises reçues d’émissaires non identifiés de Donald Trump. « La réalité est la suivante : nous sommes en train de perdre la guerre », affirme Gontcharenko ; « nous perdons un nombre considérable d’hommes ; nous n’avons pas assez de fonds propres pour financer la guerre, et encore moins pour gouverner le pays ; nous perdons des activités commerciales et économiques : pour la première fois en 100 ans, nous n’avons pas produit une seule tonne d’acier en une semaine ». Il propose donc de parvenir à un accord avec la Russie, tout en tablant sur le fait que le régime bandériste conserve le contrôle de la majeure partie de l’Ukraine. « Si nos alliés américains veulent des prix de l’énergie bas… et que les sanctions contre la Russie sont de toute façon levées, peut-être ne devrions-nous pas être assez stupides pour ne pas en profiter. »
Goncharenko propose donc d’accepter de renoncer à l’adhésion à l’OTAN — bien que, comme le laisse entendre son raisonnement, ce ne soit qu’en paroles, l’Ukraine demeurant une force agissant par procuration pour l’Alliance atlantique, sous le parapluie occidental : « Pour tenter de parvenir à un accord, nous devons envoyer un signal. Prenons la question de la neutralité, par exemple. Revenons à la réalité. Serons-nous admis dans l’OTAN ? Si nous sommes admis, l’OTAN nous aidera-t-elle en cas de guerre ? Nous connaissons la réponse à ces questions… Laissons entendre que nous sommes prêts à discuter de neutralité… Nous poursuivrons notre coopération avec l’OTAN comme c’est le cas actuellement. Nous créerons un budget européen commun pour financer notre armée. Nous poursuivrons le réarmement. » Telle est l’idée maîtresse, exprimée sans détour et assez ouvertement pour, d’une part, s’aligner sur un sentiment populaire las de la guerre et, d’autre part, éviter d’être accusé de « trahison » par les nazis et les nationalistes.
Le politologue Vladimir Fesenko, proche du camp présidentiel ukrainien, estime que la déclaration de Goncharenko reflète un sentiment répandu dans le pays : « Beaucoup de gens disent qu’il est nécessaire d’entamer des pourparlers de paix avec la Russie et qu’il faut faire des concessions ; certains le disent à voix basse, d’autres entre eux, et d’autres encore lors de discussions privées. » Goncharenko se contente d’exprimer publiquement la même position que celle qui, d’une manière ou d’une autre, fait déjà l’objet de discussions à huis clos au sein de notre société… Je ne m’avancerai pas sur une évaluation chiffrée pour l’instant — bien qu’il existe des données sociologiques —, mais je pense que le nombre réel de ces personnes est plus élevé ; tout le monde ne répond pas aux questions des sociologues. » Quoi qu’il en soit, ajoute-t-il, Goncharenko cherche à tirer parti de la situation militaire, politique et socio-psychologique actuelle : « Il se rend compte que les gens sont fatigués, que beaucoup sont déprimés. De plus en plus de personnes souhaitent sincèrement mettre fin à la guerre, quitte à faire des concessions. Il a perçu ce sentiment et veut surfer sur cette vague, en devenir le leader, élaborer son programme politique et exploiter ce moment favorable. Telle est sa stratégie politique. »
« Le sien », tout est relatif, objecte le politologue ukrainien et farouche russophobe Iouri Romanenko : connaissant le personnage, on peut dire que Trump est en train de façonner une fausse image de « pacificateur » à travers ce « prostitué » qu’est Gontcharenko, lequel est promu par les Américains comme l’une des alternatives politiques pour l’Ukraine de l’après-guerre. Quant à Porochenko, bien que le groupe « Solidarité européenne » ait pris ses distances avec les déclarations de Gontcharenko, l’ancien président joue un jeu bien précis, puisque Gontcharenko n’a pas été exclu du groupe à la Rada : Porochenko « est habile à cet égard. Sa stratégie est rationnelle… on se prémunit contre les risques, on lance un appât et, s’il se passe quelque chose, on a les outils adéquats en main… Supposons que Gontcharenko se présente à la présidence et lance sa campagne ; Porochenko observera les sondages et évaluera les chances respectives de Zaloujny et de Gontcharenko, ou de quelqu’un d’autre… si des élections ont lieu, s’il reste un pays, si un État existe encore à ce moment-là. Voilà comment les choses vont se passer ».
Outre les velléités « pacifistes » de Gontcharenko, Romanenko évoque également la situation militaire, qu’il est légitime de supposer étroitement liée à la sortie du député de « Solidarité européenne ». Ainsi, selon Romanenko, dans la guerre contre la Russie, l’Ukraine a misé sur un miracle, espérant un coup de chance. La référence est évidente aux fameux « Flamingo » (FP-7), dont la production, en accord avec l’Allemagne, a également été abordée lors de la visite de Friedrich Merz à Kiev le 4 octobre. Romanenko explique : « Le schéma est à peu près celui-ci : on croit aux miracles, on attend une arme miracle qui changera tout, on espère que la Russie s’effondrera d’elle-même ou que l’OTAN interviendra. En attendant, combien de temps combattrons-nous ? Jusqu’au bout, jusqu’au dernier Ukrainien. Le gouvernement est en quête d’une « Wunderwaffe », une arme miracle qui résoudra tous nos problèmes. »
Le fait est, affirme le politologue, que même l’apparition de missiles balistiques ukrainiens ne changerait pas la donne, étant donné que la Russie en posséderait de toute façon bien davantage, même si Kiev, précise-t-il, pourrait trouver une parade aux drones à réaction russes.
Mais la Russie en concevra alors de nouveaux et « nous chercherons à nouveau une parade. Et ainsi de suite, dans un cercle vicieux. Chaque cycle nous coûte des milliers de vies et d’immenses destructions. Les Ukrainiens aiment le mysticisme. Nous croyons aux signes, au salut miraculeux qui surviendra on ne sait comment, à l’idée que nous finirons par nous en sortir. Mais la réalité est cruelle. Les bons meurent, et les armes miracles arrivent trop tard ou n’arrivent jamais. »
Même un nazi convaincu, comme l’ancien commandant de compagnie du bataillon « Aïdar », Evgueni Dikiy, affirme qu’il est inutile d’annoncer sans cesse des dates de lancement de missiles balistiques ukrainiens contre Moscou, puisque la Russie a déjà frappé avec succès les sites de production de FirePoint et de ses sous-traitants. Indiquer des « dates précises, dans ces circonstances, est à mon avis une erreur : il aurait mieux valu garder le silence, comme cela a été fait pour le FP-7. » « Ils ne l’ont annoncé qu’une fois le déploiement au combat déjà entamé… Je pense qu’il serait judicieux d’imposer le silence également au sujet du FP-9, destiné au Moskva. » Les inquiétudes des nazis sont compréhensibles, commente Anatoli Lapine sur PolitNavigator ; mais, alors que les « Géraniums » « décommunisent » quotidiennement les infrastructures de Kiev, le régime de Zelensky a simplement besoin d’apaiser tant bien que mal le mécontentement de la population, et les promesses de représailles via les nouveaux « Flamingos » servent précisément à cela.
À cet égard, l’ancien secrétaire adjoint du Conseil de sécurité ukrainien, Serhiy Kryvonos, soutient que le programme de missiles balistiques FirePoint est une pure farce et que la démonstration du lancement du FP-7 n’est rien d’autre qu’une tentative de justifier le détournement de milliards de dollars. « Ce n’est pas le premier lancement de ce missile dont je me souvienne ; c’est le quinzième ou le seizième. Et, une fois de plus, il n’a donné aucun résultat. S’il y avait eu un résultat, les autorités l’auraient claironné sur tous les toits. Il s’agit d’une énième escroquerie populiste bon marché destinée aux naïfs… plus de deux milliards de dollars ont été dépensés ces deux dernières années pour la campagne FirePoint… avec cette somme, nous aurions pu bombarder l’Empire russe avec de simples tabourets, en termes de quantité… nous ne voyons pas de cibles effectivement touchées en territoire ennemi, nous ne voyons rien, et nous ne voyons pas l’argent investi dans ce projet… Regardez plutôt avec quelle systématicité, malheureusement, opère l’industrie de défense ennemie et comment elle accélère la modernisation de ses drones aériens, en étendant leurs capacités. Nous poursuivons un projet qui remonte à la Seconde Guerre mondiale, en essayant de présenter comme une arme miracle un missile dont le potentiel est épuisé. Que ferons-nous de cette arme miracle, même si elle parvenait à voler sur les 250 à 300 kilomètres promis ? Pour nous, cela ne résout absolument rien. »
En effet, affirme le politologue ukrainien Ruslan Bortnik, Kiev a amélioré ses contre-mesures face aux drones russes, mais en paie le prix fort. Selon lui, la proportion de drones russes atteignant Kiev aurait chuté à 10-15 % : « Nous pourrions assister à une baisse d’efficacité des drones russes — les fameux « paquets » — qui sont abattus plus fréquemment. Par ailleurs, une attaque balistique a visé Kiev cette semaine, mais certains missiles, y compris balistiques, ont été interceptés ; cela indique que le système de défense aérienne ukrainien s’est doté de munitions, notamment antimissiles, qui sont partiellement utilisées… et pourtant, la défense aérienne a un coût élevé… le rapport coût-efficacité ne joue pas en faveur de l’Ukraine. En d’autres termes, la Russie mobilise moins de ressources tout en infligeant des dégâts plus importants. L’Ukraine doit dépenser davantage pour abattre ces armes relativement bon marché. »
D’après Bortnik, la phase la plus intense de la guerre aérienne connaîtra un premier pic en décembre et un second en février ; « alors, amis, préparons-nous ». Surtout — permettons-nous d’ajouter — ne prêtons aucune importance aux discours de propagande de personnages comme Goncharenko : s’il en était encore besoin, la visite du chancelier allemand à Kiev a précisément servi à rappeler où et par qui se prennent les décisions concernant la guerre en Ukraine contre la Russie. La paix, nécessaire aux calculs électoraux de la Maison Blanche, pourra très bien faire fi des déclarations à la Goncharenko.
Publié à l’origine par Divergence Politique
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