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Raffinerie, l’Italia decida di essere un Paese
di Margherita Furlan
19 settembre 2026
Aramco compra gasolio nel Mediterraneo dopo gli attacchi alle sue raffinerie. In quella stessa finestra di mercato si forma il prezzo che paghiamo alla pompa. L’Italia ci arriva senza impianti e senza bandiera
La fila di Aramco
Da alcune settimane Saudi Aramco presenta offerte d’acquisto nella finestra di contrattazione gestita da Platts per carichi di gasolio nel Mediterraneo. Secondo gli intermediari che seguono quella piattaforma, la società statale saudita cerca migliaia di tonnellate di prodotto raffinato; altri operatori riferiscono che sta sondando anche il mercato della benzina in Europa. L’azienda ha rifiutato di commentare.1
Conviene soffermarsi su cosa significhi. Aramco estrae, raffina e vende: è strutturalmente venditrice di distillati, non compratrice. Nel luglio 2025 l’Arabia Saudita aveva toccato il massimo storico delle esportazioni di gasolio, con una media mensile di 611mila barili al giorno, e Aramco si presentava come fornitore quasi solitario nelle finestre di valutazione del Nord Europa e del Mediterraneo, spesso a prezzi inferiori a quelli degli altri.2 Quattordici mesi dopo si mette in fila dall’altra parte del banco.
Il motivo non è un capriccio commerciale, sono gli impianti. Gli Houthi hanno rivendicato l’attacco alla raffineria di Yanbu, sul Mar Rosso, e nel corso dell’estate hanno colpito ripetutamente il centro di trattamento di Jazan, più a sud. Poi, il 10 settembre, droni partiti dall’Iraq hanno incendiato le stazioni di pompaggio dell’oleodotto Est-Ovest nelle aree di Riad e Medina: il ministero dell’Energia saudita ha confermato l’attacco e la chiusura «precauzionale» della conduttura, mentre le immagini satellitari mostravano il pennacchio di fumo sopra la linea e i danni estesi a una stazione vicino ad Al Mesba’ah.
Quella conduttura non è un’infrastruttura qualunque. Con lo Stretto di Hormuz sostanzialmente sbarrato dallo scoppio della guerra tra Stati Uniti, Israele e Iran nel febbraio 2026, l’oleodotto Est-Ovest è diventato la via di fuga del petrolio saudita: milleduecento chilometri dai giacimenti orientali al porto di Yanbu, con circa cinque milioni di barili al giorno dirottati su quella direttrice. Lo aveva detto l’amministratore delegato di Aramco, Amin Nasser: nel contenere la crisi di approvvigionamento il tubo aveva pesato più del rilascio delle riserve strategiche.3 Gli attacchi dell’aprile precedente avevano già sottratto al regno circa 600mila barili al giorno di capacità produttiva. Ad agosto l’estrazione saudita era scesa a 6,24 milioni di barili quotidiani, un livello che nessuno si aspettava di vedere dal principale produttore dell’OPEC.4
Nel frattempo si chiudeva anche l’altra uscita. Gli Houthi hanno proclamato a luglio un blocco marittimo contro le navi saudite, hanno preso il porto yemenita di Mokha e si sono avvicinati alle isole Hanish, cioè alla soglia di Bab el-Mandeb; il traffico attraverso quello stretto è calato di circa il sessanta per cento. Hormuz da una parte, Bab el-Mandeb dall’altra, l’oleodotto in mezzo è fermo: il regno che ha costruito la propria centralità mondiale sulla capacità di consegnare greggio ovunque si è ritrovato con tre porte socchiuse e un ordine d’acquisto da firmare nel Mediterraneo.
Il resto è politica. Nei giorni dell’avanzata su Mokha il principe ereditario Mohammed bin Salman avrebbe telefonato due volte a Donald Trump per chiedere raid contro il movimento yemenita, secondo funzionari statunitensi citati dalla stampa americana.5 Riad, per ora, ha evitato la rappresaglia diretta contro l’Iraq e Baghdad ha condannato l’attacco e apprezzato la scelta di non reagire.6 Il petroliere più potente del pianeta ha scoperto che la sua potenza dipendeva da cose fragili: una stazione di pompaggio, una colonna di distillazione, una rotta.
Il bersaglio non è più il pozzo
C’è una regolarità, in questi mesi, che i comunicati non dicono e le mappe sì. Nessuno bombarda i giacimenti. Si colpiscono le stazioni di pompaggio, le raffinerie, i terminali, i tubi. Il giacimento è profondo, disperso, difficile da distruggere e costoso da presidiare; l’impianto che trasforma il greggio in qualcosa di utilizzabile è invece un oggetto concentrato, visibile dal satellite, vulnerabile a un drone che costa quanto un’utilitaria. La stessa grammatica si legge sul fronte opposto dell’Eurasia, dove da due anni le raffinerie russe sono bersaglio sistematico dei droni ucraini, con fermate di impianti e contrazioni della produzione di carburante. Non è una coincidenza tecnica: è una dottrina che si è diffusa perché funziona.
Clausewitz aveva chiamato centro di gravità il punto da cui dipende la coesione dell’intera forza avversaria, quello contro cui vanno concentrate tutte le energie.7 Per un secolo si è creduto che nel settore energetico quel centro fosse la risorsa: chi possiede il sottosuolo comanda. La stagione che stiamo attraversando dice il contrario. Il centro di gravità è la catena di trasformazione e di trasporto e chi la colpisce ottiene con mezzi minuscoli effetti che nessun esercito convenzionale potrebbe produrre a quel costo. Un movimento armato yemenita, senza marina né aviazione, ha ridotto le esportazioni del primo produttore mondiale e ne ha fatto un compratore di gasolio sul mercato libero.
Ne discendono due conseguenze che riguardano direttamente l’Europa. La prima è che il vantaggio difensivo è scomparso: proteggere una rete di impianti e di condutture costa incomparabilmente più che attaccarla e nessuna quantità di navi in scorta può cambiare questa aritmetica. La seconda è che la sicurezza energetica ha smesso di essere un problema di contratti di fornitura per diventare un problema d’infrastrutture fisiche. Si può avere il barile e non avere il litro. Si può avere il litro e non avere il modo di farlo arrivare. Chi ha smontato pezzi della propria capacità di trasformazione pensando che il mercato avrebbe sempre provveduto ha fatto una scommessa sulla stabilità permanente delle rotte altrui. Quella scommessa, nell’anno in cui il re del greggio si mette in fila per comprare carburante, si sta rivelando per quello che era.
Il prezzo non nasce alla pompa
Qui il ragionamento smette di essere mediorientale e diventa italiano perché il collegamento fra Yanbu e il distributore sotto casa non è una metafora, ma un meccanismo documentato e pubblico.
Il prezzo industriale dei carburanti in Italia, cioè quel che resta una volta tolte accisa e imposta sul valore aggiunto, non segue il costo di produzione delle raffinerie nazionali. Segue la quotazione internazionale dei prodotti raffinati nel bacino mediterraneo, il cosiddetto Platts CIF Med, rilevato dall’agenzia che pubblica le valutazioni giornaliere sulla base delle contrattazioni fisiche. Lo scrive senza giri di parole l’associazione delle aziende petrolifere italiane nella propria nota metodologica sui prezzi: la materia prima del prezzo alla pompa è la quotazione Platts, e il margine lordo è la differenza fra il prezzo di vendita al netto delle tasse e quel valore. Lo ripete la stessa associazione quando deve spiegare perché il greggio scende e i carburanti no: il riferimento non è il Brent, sono le valutazioni dei raffinati.8
Vale la pena fermarsi su cosa sia quella finestra. Non è una borsa regolamentata con un’autorità di vigilanza pubblica: è un processo di valutazione gestito da una società privata di informazione sui mercati, alimentato dalle offerte che gli operatori presentano in un intervallo di tempo definito. L’Autorità garante della concorrenza e del mercato, in un’indagine del 2023 sui prezzi dei carburanti, ha osservato che i riferimenti internazionali dei prodotti petroliferi, Platts compreso, sono esposti a rischi di opacità, e lo ha argomentato richiamando da un lato procedimenti per sospette manipolazioni conclusi in giurisdizioni extraeuropee, dall’altro l’adozione di apposite linee guida da parte delle autorità internazionali di regolamentazione.9 È un’istituzione italiana che dice, in punta di diritto, che il termometro del nostro prezzo alla pompa non è un oggetto neutro.
In quella finestra, da alcune settimane, compra Saudi Aramco.
Il risultato lo hanno letto tutti sui cartelloni. Il 16 settembre 2026 il gasolio in modalità self service ha toccato il massimo storico italiano a 2,246 euro al litro, quasi due centesimi sopra il precedente primato del 17 marzo 2022, con 2,326 euro sulla rete autostradale e la quotazione all’ingrosso oltre i milleduecento euro per mille litri; il giorno seguente il servito viaggiava a 2,376.10 Senza il taglio dell’accisa il prezzo medio nazionale sarebbe stato di 2,416 euro.11
Nessuno impone a Roma cosa pagare. Semplicemente, il quadro dentro cui quel prezzo si forma è stato costruito da altri, si aggiorna ogni giorno in una finestra di mercato dove lo Stato italiano non siede, e il nostro margine di azione si è ridotto a decidere se restituire ai cittadini qualche centesimo di accisa. Non è dipendenza dal barile: è dipendenza dalla struttura.
Il mercato si era già ristretto
C’è un antefatto che rende il gesto di Aramco molto più pesante di quanto appaia e che riguarda l’Europa da vicino: la riserva di gasolio del Mediterraneo si era assottigliata per decisione politica mesi prima che i droni arrivassero su Yanbu.
Fino al 2022 circa il quaranta per cento del gasolio importato dall’Unione europea veniva dalla Russia. L’embargo ha chiuso quel canale ma non ha ridotto la domanda: l’ha deviata. Si è aperta così la scappatoia della raffinazione, il cosiddetto refining loophole, per cui India, Turchia e in parte Cina compravano greggio russo a prezzi scontati proprio grazie alle sanzioni occidentali, lo lavoravano nei propri impianti e rivendevano all’Europa prodotti formalmente non russi, perché la nazionalità di un carburante, nel diritto commerciale, è quella del Paese in cui avviene la trasformazione, non quella del pozzo. Non era un traffico clandestino: era legale, pubblico e quantificato. Nel giugno 2025 l’Europa ha ricevuto 124mila barili al giorno di gasolio dall’India e 94mila dalla Turchia, pari rispettivamente al sette e al cinque per cento delle importazioni totali; secondo le stime di Kpler, che includono anche il carburante per aerei, l’India, fino a pochi anni prima inesistente come esportatore verso il nostro continente, ha coperto nel 2024 il sedici per cento dell’import europeo, in un anno in cui il greggio russo rappresentava il trentotto per cento degli acquisti indiani.12
Per tre anni, insomma, l’Europa ha continuato a bruciare molecole di origine russa passate per Jamnagar o per İzmir, dichiarando di non comprare più dalla Russia. Poi, nel luglio 2025, il diciottesimo pacchetto di sanzioni ha chiuso anche quella porta: dal 21 gennaio 2026 è vietato importare nell’Unione prodotti petroliferi ottenuti in Paesi terzi a partire da greggio di origine russa, con esenzione per alcuni partner e per i Paesi esportatori netti di greggio.13 La misura ha due caratteristiche che meritano di essere dette. La prima è che nessuna analisi di laboratorio può stabilire l’origine di una molecola dopo la raffinazione, tanto più che si lavorano miscele di greggi diversi: l’applicazione dipende quindi da autocertificazioni e da tracciamenti documentali, e già al momento dell’annuncio gli operatori prevedevano un carosello di trasbordi destinato a confondere le carte. La seconda è che quel divieto ha ristretto l’offerta disponibile nel bacino mediterraneo in un momento in cui l’Europa non aveva ricostruito un grammo della capacità di raffinazione che aveva dismesso.
Ora si guardi la sequenza per intero, perché è la cosa più istruttiva di tutta questa vicenda. Il 21 gennaio 2026 l’Unione europea restringe per via normativa il proprio accesso al gasolio. A febbraio la guerra tra Stati Uniti, Israele e Iran sbarra lo Stretto di Hormuz. Durante l’estate gli attacchi degli Houthi mettono fuori uso a intermittenza gli impianti sauditi sul Mar Rosso. Il 10 settembre saltano le stazioni di pompaggio dell’oleodotto Est-Ovest. E in quel bacino ristretto, dove l’Europa deve comprare per forza, entra come acquirente anche il maggiore produttore mondiale. Nessuno di questi eventi, preso da solo, era imprevedibile; il loro sovrapporsi era un rischio di sistema che qualcuno avrebbe dovuto valutare prima di firmare i provvedimenti e prima di autorizzare le conversioni di impianti. Il differenziale fra il prezzo del gasolio e quello del greggio, che è la misura esatta della scarsità di capacità di raffinazione, aveva già superato i ventisei dollari al barile nell’estate 2025, il massimo dal febbraio 2024. Era un segnale, ed era leggibile da chiunque.
Va detto con chiarezza quel che l’Unione ha deciso senza dotarsi degli strumenti per reggerne le conseguenze non lo pagano le cancellerie, bensì chi mette il gasolio nel furgone alle sei del mattino.
La deindustrializzazione ha un indirizzo
A questo punto la domanda giusta non è perché il gasolio costi tanto, ma perché l’Italia sia arrivata a questo appuntamento in queste condizioni. E la risposta ha una data d’inizio, una sequenza e dei documenti.
Fra il 2000 e il 2024 il Paese ha perso il 12,7 per cento della propria capacità di raffinazione.14 Non è stata un’emorragia improvvisa: è stata una successione di decisioni aziendali, ciascuna ragionevole dal punto di vista di chi la prendeva, che sommate hanno prodotto un risultato che nessuno ha mai deliberato in Parlamento.
La raffineria di Cremona della Tamoil ha chiuso nel 2011 ed è stata convertita in deposito: l’amministratore delegato della società lo raccontò ai deputati della Commissione Attività produttive, spiegando che un impianto nella pianura padana, senza sbocco al mare, non riusciva più a collocare l’eccesso di olio combustibile e di benzina.15 La Raffineria di Roma, a Pantano di Grano, comunicò nel giugno 2012 l’intenzione di trasformare, a decorrere dal 30 settembre di quell’anno, lo stabilimento di lavorazione e stoccaggio in mero deposito di oli minerali: la dismissione dell’attività di raffinazione è scritta negli atti autorizzativi.16 La IES di Mantova, comprata quattro anni prima dal gruppo ungherese MOL, annunciò nell’ottobre 2013 la trasformazione graduale in deposito a partire dal gennaio successivo, con 350 esuberi su 390 dipendenti. Nel frattempo Eni fermava per sei mesi Porto Marghera e metteva in cassa integrazione a zero ore cinquecento persone a Gela.
Il Parlamento lo sapeva. Nel 2012 la Camera svolse una indagine conoscitiva specifica sulla crisi della raffinazione, con audizioni di aziende e sindacati, e il documento conclusivo registrava il rischio di chiusura di almeno quattro o cinque siti e la necessità di interventi a tutela del settore.17 Gli interventi non sono arrivati. È arrivata, invece, una narrazione più comoda.
Perché la seconda ondata è stata raccontata in tutt’altro modo. Porto Marghera è diventata bioraffineria nel 2014, Gela nel 2019, Livorno è in conversione con completamento previsto fra la fine del 2026 e l’inizio del 2027. Ogni annuncio è stato presentato come transizione ecologica e sul piano delle emissioni ha una sua logica difendibile. Sul piano della sicurezza degli approvvigionamenti, però, i numeri raccontano un’altra storia, perché le scale non sono paragonabili: Livorno, che sta completando il passaggio alla bioraffinazione, trattava quattro milioni di tonnellate di greggio l’anno e nessun impianto a scarti e oli vegetali lavora volumi simili. Un litro di gasolio idrogenato da scarti alimentari non è un litro di gasolio fossile in meno da importare: è un’altra filiera, con materie prime diverse, volumi diversi e limiti propri. La colonna di distillazione che smetti di far girare non torna.
Pasolini aveva coniato, per descrivere l’Italia che si trasformava sotto i suoi occhi, la formula dello «sviluppo senza progresso»: un Paese che si modernizza nelle forme e si impoverisce nella sostanza, perché il criterio della trasformazione non è il bene comune ma la convenienza di chi la guida.18 Non è un’analogia forzata. La dismissione della raffinazione italiana è stata razionale per ogni singolo azionista e distruttiva per l’interesse nazionale e nessuno, in vent’anni, si è preso la responsabilità politica di dire che quelle due razionalità non coincidevano.
Oggi restano poco più di dieci impianti attivi, di cui tre convertiti o in conversione alla bioraffinazione. È il patrimonio con cui l’Italia si presenta al mercato in cui, da alcune settimane, compra anche Saudi Aramco.
Il cambio di bandiera
Gli impianti sopravvissuti hanno cambiato proprietario, e la geografia di quei passaggi dice più di qualsiasi dichiarazione programmatica.
La ISAB di Priolo Gargallo, il complesso di raffinazione più grande del Paese, è passata in dieci anni dalla genovese Erg alla russa Lukoil, da questa al fondo cipriota G.O.I. Energy nel 2023, sotto la pressione delle sanzioni e con accordi decennali di fornitura e di ritiro affidati alla società di intermediazione Trafigura, e infine, nella primavera del 2026, a un gruppo italiano. È la vicenda più istruttiva dell’intero dossier e merita un capitolo a sé.
Sarroch, in Sardegna, è la seconda gamba del sistema: trecentomila barili al giorno, oltre un quinto dei carburanti italiani, in gran parte gasolio, cioè esattamente il prodotto di cui l’Europa non è autosufficiente. Era la Saras della famiglia Moratti; dal 2024 è di Vitol, il maggiore operatore mondiale indipendente nel commercio di petrolio. Augusta, centosettantamila barili al giorno, è della algerina Sonatrach, che l’ha rilevata nel 2018 da Esso Italia. Milazzo è per metà kuwaitiana, joint venture paritaria fra Eni e Kuwait Petroleum. Già nel febbraio 2024, facendo i conti con l’ingresso di Vitol in Saras, Il Sole 24 Ore osservava che circa metà della capacità di raffinazione italiana passava sotto controllo straniero.19
Poi è arrivato il passaggio più grande, e quasi nessuno se n’è accorto. Nel settembre 2025 la famiglia Brachetti Peretti ha firmato l’accordo vincolante per cedere il 99,82 per cento di Italiana Petroli, il gruppo Api, alla SOCAR, la compagnia petrolifera di Stato dell’Azerbaigian. Nel pacchetto, valutato attorno ai tre miliardi di euro, ci sono la raffineria di Falconara Marittima, quella di Trecate e oltre quattromilacinquecento stazioni di servizio a marchio IP. Il perfezionamento è arrivato nella primavera del 2026, dopo le autorizzazioni in materia di concorrenza, sovvenzioni estere e poteri speciali dello Stato. Non è più solo la raffinazione: è la rete capillare attraverso cui gli italiani fanno il pieno.
Sia chiaro cosa si sta dicendo e cosa no. Non c’è nulla di illegittimo in queste operazioni e nulla da eccepire sui compratori: un trader olandese, un fondo cipriota, una compagnia di Stato algerina e una azera hanno fatto quello che è nel loro mandato, cioè comprare beni che rendono. Il punto è l’altro lato del tavolo. Una raffineria per un operatore di mercato è un margine fra il costo del greggio e il valore dei prodotti e se quel margine si assottiglia la si spegne; per uno Stato è la differenza tra avere il petrolio e il carburante. Sono due criteri diversi e l’Italia ha lasciato che prevalesse il primo senza mai dichiarare di averlo scelto. La normativa sui poteri speciali è stata applicata come procedura di controllo su singole operazioni, non come strumento di una politica industriale: ha accompagnato i passaggi di proprietà, non li ha orientati.
È un mutamento reale dei rapporti di potere travestito da ordinaria amministrazione. La cessione dell’apparato di raffinazione italiano ne è un caso quasi scolastico. Nessun voto parlamentare ha mai stabilito che il Paese rinunciasse al controllo della propria capacità di trasformazione. È accaduto in quindici anni, un atto societario alla volta, e ogni singolo atto era legittimo.
Priolo, quattro proprietari in dieci anni
Se si vuole capire che cosa accade a un’infrastruttura strategica quando la si affida integralmente al mercato dei capitali conviene guardare da vicino Priolo Gargallo, provincia di Siracusa: le due raffinerie riunite sotto la sigla ISAB valgono circa un quinto della capacità di raffinazione nazionale, coprono una quota consistente della domanda elettrica siciliana, occupano attorno a mille persone in via diretta e ne sostengono diverse migliaia nell’indotto. Non è uno stabilimento, è un pezzo dell’ossatura del Paese.
La sequenza dei proprietari, in poco più di dieci anni, è questa: il gruppo genovese Erg esce dalla raffinazione, l’impianto passa alla russa Lukoil attraverso la controllata Litasco e nel 2023, quando le sanzioni rendono impossibile sia importare greggio russo che ottenere credito bancario per comprarne altrove, viene ceduto al fondo cipriota G.O.I. Energy. La cessione, secondo il Financial Times, fu agevolata dal gruppo di intermediazione Trafigura e da un investitore privato, e fu approvata dal governo italiano con l’esercizio dei poteri speciali; i dettagli delle condizioni imposte non sono stati resi pubblici. Lo Stato, in altre parole, ha scelto e autorizzato il compratore, e lo ha fatto in forza di un decreto legge concepito proprio per proteggere l’impianto durante l’uscita dei russi.
L’assetto era questo: la proprietà al fondo, il capitale circolante a Trafigura, che avrebbe fornito il greggio e ritirato i prodotti raffinati per dieci anni. Poi è arrivato il conto. Nel gennaio 2025 la società apre una procedura di composizione negoziata della crisi per gestire tensioni finanziarie; secondo il Financial Times l’azionista di controllo indiretto avrebbe cercato di usare quella procedura per rinegoziare o risolvere il contratto decennale con il trader, giudicato penalizzante per l’impianto, e l’esistenza di quel vincolo avrebbe ostacolato le trattative con possibili acquirenti. Nell’autunno 2025 emerge in sede giudiziaria che il prezzo di acquisto non sarebbe stato integralmente saldato al venditore russo, con un debito indicato fra i 150 e i 190 milioni di euro, e il tribunale apre alla possibilità di pignoramento delle quote. Nel febbraio 2026 la procedura di crisi si chiude con esito positivo; nella primavera il fondo firma la cessione a un gruppo italiano, con un’operazione articolata in due fasi, la prima relativa al 51 per cento. Il via libera dell’Autorità garante della concorrenza è arrivato; il vaglio dei poteri speciali, mentre scriviamo, è ancora davanti al governo, e i sindacati territoriali chiedono di essere coinvolti in quel passaggio.
Bilancio di dieci anni: quattro assetti proprietari, due procedure straordinarie, un contenzioso internazionale, perdite per centinaia di milioni nel 2023 e nel 2024 e un ritorno all’utile nel 2025 grazie a condizioni di mercato favorevoli. I lavoratori hanno attraversato l’intero percorso senza mai sapere chi fosse davvero il loro datore di lavoro l’anno successivo, e il sindacato, al primo tavolo con la nuova proprietà, ha dovuto porre come condizioni non negoziabili cose che in un Paese con una politica industriale sarebbero ovvie: salvaguardia dei livelli occupazionali, tutela dell’indotto, un cronoprogramma certo d’investimenti a partire dalla manutenzione di un impianto che tratta idrocarburi in un sito di interesse nazionale per le bonifiche.
David Harvey ha chiamato accumulazione per spoliazione quel meccanismo per cui il capitale, quando il profitto ordinario si comprime, torna a guadagnare non producendo di più ma appropriandosi di beni già esistenti, spesso pubblici o socialmente costruiti, e rimettendoli in circolo come attività finanziarie. La vicenda di Priolo non è la sua illustrazione perfetta, e sarebbe scorretto presentarla come tale: qui il rischio industriale c’è stato davvero e le perdite pure. Ma il nucleo del ragionamento tiene. Un impianto che vale un quinto della capacità nazionale è stato trattato per un decennio come una partecipazione da acquistare, da rifinanziare e da rivendere, mentre la sua funzione, per il Paese, era un’altra: garantire che ci fosse carburante. Quando il criterio finanziario e quello della sicurezza divergono, non è il primo a cedere.
Il ritorno dell’impianto sotto controllo italiano è una buona notizia e va detto. Ma è avvenuto per iniziativa di un gruppo privato al termine di una crisi, non per effetto di una strategia nazionale ed è ancora una volta lo Stato a doversi limitare a dire sì o no a un’operazione decisa da altri. Il golden power è solo un semaforo: regola il traffico, non decide dove si va.
Il fornitore diventa concorrente
L’Italia è un Paese che produce gasolio. Secondo i dati del ministero dell’Ambiente e della Sicurezza energetica relativi al 2025, il fabbisogno nazionale di gasolio si aggira sui 23,3 milioni di tonnellate e la produzione delle raffinerie italiane sfiora i 25 milioni: siamo esportatori netti, con circa 7,9 milioni di tonnellate vendute all’estero contro 5,2 importate. Chi racconta un Paese incapace di raffinare dice una cosa falsa.
E allora perché il prezzo alla pompa tocca il massimo storico proprio mentre a migliaia di chilometri saltano le stazioni di pompaggio saudite? Perché l’esposizione italiana non è fisica, è di posizione. Due numeri lo spiegano meglio di un saggio. Il 60 per cento del gasolio che importiamo proviene dall’area del Golfo, e il 47 per cento arriva dalla sola Arabia Saudita. Il nostro primo fornitore di gasolio è esattamente il soggetto che da alcune settimane presenta offerte d’acquisto nella finestra mediterranea dove si forma il nostro prezzo industriale. Non ha smesso di venderci: ha cominciato a comprare dove compriamo noi. Il fornitore è diventato concorrente, e ci è arrivato nel giro di un trimestre, senza che nessuno decidesse nulla.
Immanuel Wallerstein descriveva l’economia mondiale come un sistema unico articolato in centro, periferia e semiperiferia, dove la posizione di ciascuno non dipende dalla ricchezza assoluta ma dal punto che occupa nella divisione del lavoro e nella catena del valore.20 L’Italia energetica sta esattamente lì, nel mezzo: trasforma molto, decide poco, non controlla né la risorsa a monte né le regole di formazione del prezzo a valle. È una posizione che funziona benissimo quando il sistema è stabile e diventa una trappola nel momento in cui qualcuno, in Yemen o in Iraq, scopre che una stazione di pompaggio si buca con un drone.
L’accisa come anestetico
Lo Stato italiano f l’unica cosa che gli è rimasta da fare, e la fa in entrambe le direzioni nello stesso anno.
Il primo movimento è strutturale. Il decreto legislativo 43 del 2025 avvia il riavvicinamento graduale fra l’accisa sulla benzina e quella sul gasolio, e il decreto ministeriale del 14 maggio 2025 lo mette in pratica: un centesimo e mezzo in meno al litro sulla benzina, un centesimo e mezzo in più sul gasolio.21 Poi la legge di bilancio per il 2026 accelera bruscamente: dal primo gennaio le due aliquote sono parificate a 672,90 euro per mille litri, il che significa 4,05 centesimi in meno sulla benzina e 4,05 in più sul gasolio, senza gradualità, con la motivazione esplicita di superare un sussidio ambientalmente dannoso censito nel catalogo del ministero dell’Ambiente.22 La logica ambientale è comprensibile. L’effetto sociale, in un Paese dove il gasolio muove l’autotrasporto, l’agricoltura e la quota maggioritaria del parco veicoli, è una tassa che colpisce chi lavora. E c’è un precedente che nessuno ha chiarito: dopo il riequilibrio del maggio 2025 il rincaro sul gasolio si è trasferito ai prezzi quasi integralmente, mentre lo sconto sulla benzina, almeno sulla rete autostradale, si è visto in misura ridicola, tanto che un’associazione di consumatori ha depositato un esposto all’Antitrust.23 La partita di giro, sulla carta a somma zero, è diventata un aumento netto per il cittadino.
Il secondo movimento è d’emergenza, e va nella direzione opposta. Da quando il prezzo internazionale del gasolio ha cominciato a correre, il governo taglia la stessa accisa che ha appena aumentato: l’aliquota viene ridotta in via temporanea a 532,90 euro per mille litri, cioè quattordici centesimi al litro, più tre centesimi di minore imposta sul valore aggiunto, per uno sconto complessivo di diciassette centesimi.24 E lo fa per periodi brevissimi, rinnovati di decreto in decreto: dal 28 luglio al 6 agosto, dal 27 agosto al 5 settembre, poi fino al 10, poi fino al 17 con una copertura di circa 85 milioni di euro, poi con uno sconto dimezzato e infine ridotto a poco più di sei centesimi. Sedici proroghe, circa due miliardi di euro in sette mesi, e un prezzo che nel frattempo ha toccato comunque il massimo storico.
Messi in fila, i due movimenti raccontano meglio di qualunque analisi lo stato della politica energetica italiana. A gennaio lo Stato alza l’accisa sul gasolio di quattro centesimi per ragioni ambientali; da luglio la taglia di quattordici per ragioni sociali; a settembre torna a ridurre lo sconto perché non ci sono più coperture. È l’unica leva rimasta a un Paese che ha perso il controllo di tutto il resto della catena, e viene azionata avanti e indietro come il volante di un’automobile che ha i freni altrove. Ogni proroga dura una settimana o dieci giorni, esattamente la durata dell’attenzione mediatica che la accompagna.
Due miliardi sono una cifra seria. Sono circa quanto il Paese avrebbe speso per costituire una riserva strategica di prodotti finiti di dimensioni significative, o per finanziare la quota pubblica di un piano di ammodernamento della capacità di raffinazione residua. Sono stati spesi, invece, per ridurre di qualche centesimo e per qualche giorno un prezzo che si forma in una finestra di contrattazione privata nel Mediterraneo, dove nel frattempo è entrata a comprare Saudi Aramco. Un Paese senza controllo sulla catena può soltanto anestetizzare il dolore, mai curarlo.
Riprendersi la catena: i tre anelli
Mattei non aveva pozzi. Aveva capito che il potere non stava nel giacimento ma nella catena che porta il greggio dal sottosuolo al serbatoio e che quella catena si poteva costruire anche partendo da un Paese sconfitto e privo di risorse. A Tunisi, il 10 giugno 1960, nel giorno in cui firmava con il governo tunisino l’intesa per costruire una raffineria, spiegò che quelle intese nulla avevano a che vedere con «il modello obsoleto del capitalismo coloniale del XIX secolo», perché prevedevano compartecipazione finanziaria e cogestione fra Paesi produttori e Paesi consumatori, in condizioni di eguaglianza.25 Negli appunti preparati per quel viaggio, rimasti inutilizzati e conservati nell’archivio storico dell’Eni, la formulazione era ancora più tagliente: la condizione coloniale, annotava, esiste quando il gioco della domanda e dell’offerta di una materia prima vitale è «alterato da una potenza egemonica: anche privata, di monopolio o di oligopolio», e nel settore petrolifero quella potenza aveva un nome, il cartello.26 Sessantasei anni dopo, l’incontro fra domanda e offerta del nostro gasolio si decide in una finestra di contrattazione privata che l’Autorità garante della concorrenza definisce esposta a rischi di opacità. La definizione di Mattei non è invecchiata: si è solo spostata di soggetto.
Che cosa vuol dire, in concreto, riprendersi la catena nel 2026? Tre anelli, e per ciascuno una cosa che si può firmare.
La raffinazione. Dichiarare gli impianti infrastrutture strategiche a tutti gli effetti, sottoporne ogni passaggio di proprietà e ogni riconversione a un vaglio che non sia solo di legittimità ma di merito, e vincolare le conversioni a bioraffineria a un piano nazionale che stabilisca prima quanta capacità fossile il Paese deve conservare e per quanti anni. Non si tratta di fermare la transizione: il punto è smettere di affidarne il calendario ai margini industriali di operatori privati esteri. Sul fronte delle scorte l’architettura esiste già e va usata: il decreto legislativo 249 del 2012, che recepisce la direttiva europea sull’obbligo di mantenere una riserva minima, ha istituito l’Organismo centrale di stoccaggio italiano, le cui funzioni sono affidate ad Acquirente Unico sotto vigilanza ministeriale, e ha stabilito che le scorte specifiche siano di proprietà pubblica e conservate sul territorio nazionale.27 Il punto è la composizione: in una crisi come quella di questo settembre a mancare non è il barile, è il litro raffinato. Servono scorte di prodotti finiti, in quantità dichiarate e verificabili.
La logistica. Abbiamo i rigassificatori, il terminale di Trieste con l’oleodotto transalpino che rifornisce anche Austria, Germania e Repubblica Ceca, il gasdotto adriatico che porta in Puglia il gas del Caspio, le condutture dall’Algeria e dalla Libia. Quello che manca non è l’infrastruttura, è la regia: un soggetto pubblico che tratti direttamente con i produttori, come faceva l’Eni delle origini, invece di comprare da intermediari che lucrano sulla differenza. Il Piano Mattei del governo ha preso il nome; il metodo era un altro, e consisteva in contratti diretti, condizioni migliori per il Paese produttore e controllo italiano dell’infrastruttura di trasporto.
La rotta. Il 17 settembre, al forum Risorsa Mare della Spezia, il ministro della Difesa ha annunciato di avere deciso con il capo di Stato maggiore di attivare la Marina per garantire il transito delle navi di interesse nazionale attraverso Bab el-Mandeb, aggiungendo di non voler aspettare che sia la missione europea Aspides a stabilire se le navi possano passare. L’Italia è il primo contributore navale di quella missione, e questo rende la frase più interessante di quanto sembri: non è un atto di forza verso lo Yemen, è la constatazione che la cornice europea non decide. Una scorta, però, è una toppa. Una rotta si tiene aperta prima di tutto con la diplomazia: con l’Egitto, che vive di Suez ed è il primo interessato alla riapertura del traffico, con i Paesi rivieraschi del Mar Rosso e del Golfo, e con chi controlla militarmente la costa yemenita, perché la storia dei passaggi obbligati insegna che si negoziano prima di essere scortati. È la lezione mediterranea di Moro, che cercò nel dialogo con il mondo arabo una posizione autonoma per l’Italia, e di Craxi, che a Sigonella dimostrò che rivendicare la giurisdizione nazionale di fronte all’alleato non significa uscire dall’alleanza.
Chi esegue e chi decide
I fatti di questi giorni, non le opinioni, dicono dove siamo. Dal 31 luglio 2026 l’Italia guida la missione di sorveglianza aerea della NATO nei cieli baltici, con quattro Eurofighter e un centinaio di uomini a Šiauliai: primo decollo su allarme il 3 agosto, drone non identificato abbattuto il 15 settembre dopo essere entrato dalla Bielorussia. Il 17 settembre la Marina viene attivata per Bab el-Mandeb. Sul fronte finanziario, il Paese ha chiesto accesso ai prestiti europei del programma per l’industria della difesa, con una dotazione indicativa di 14,9 miliardi notificata dalla Commissione, da restituire in quarantacinque anni. Alla pompa, il gasolio sta a 2,25 euro al litro.
È un profilo riconoscibile: un Paese che presidia i cieli di altri, scorta le proprie navi in un mare che non controlla, s’indebita per armamenti decisi altrove e resta fuori dai tavoli dove si tratta di ciò che paga. Ma questo profilo non è un destino, è una serie di scelte, e chi lo definisce inevitabile sta spacciando per realismo una scelta. L’Italia una politica estera l’ha avuta, quando ha deciso di averla, e non l’ha mai avuta contro l’America: l’ha avuta accanto all’America, con la schiena dritta.
Un governo che volesse cominciare a riprendersi la catena non avrebbe bisogno di una legge di bilancio. Avrebbe bisogno di tre firme. Un provvedimento che dichiari le raffinerie infrastrutture strategiche e subordini conversioni e cessioni a un piano nazionale della raffinazione. Una richiesta formale, a Bruxelles e a Washington, perché l’Italia sieda al tavolo in cui si discute dell’energia che arriva nelle case degli italiani. Una convocazione dei Paesi rivieraschi del Mediterraneo e del Mar Rosso, con l’Egitto in testa, per una rotta negoziata invece che soltanto pattugliata.
Nessuna delle tre costa un euro. Costano una cosa sola, ed è la sola che in questi anni è mancata: decidere di essere un Paese.
Perché la fila in cui si è messa Aramco dice esattamente questo. Chi controlla la trasformazione e il trasporto detta le condizioni a chi possiede la materia prima, e non il contrario. Il regno che ha il più grande giacimento del mondo lo ha imparato in una settimana, con tre stazioni di pompaggio in fiamme. Noi abbiamo avuto quindici anni per impararlo e abbiamo usato quel tempo per vendere gli impianti, chiamare transizione le chiusure e ridurre le accise di sei centesimi.
La guerra è il prodotto. Il caos è la materia prima. E la sovranità, quando non la si difende, è la merce.
L'articolo Raffinerie, l’Italia decida di essere un Paese proviene da Casa del Sole TV.
Swedish and German forces are conducting what appears to be the first joint rehearsal of their rapid-reinforcement plans for the Baltic island of Gotland. The exercise is another step in Sweden’s defense planning for an island whose position in the middle of the Baltic gives it an outsized strategic importance for controlling access, protecting the Baltic states, and maintaining NATO’s freedom of movement in a region where Russian military activity remains a persistent concern.
The exercise, Silver Wotan 2026, running between September 14-23, brings together Swedish and German forces across the land, maritime, and air domains. The scenario is built around a Swedish request for allied assistance, with German forces moving personnel and equipment across the Baltic before integrating with Swedish units already defending the island. The operation is testing the entire process of getting allied combat power to Gotland, protecting it during the movement to Visby, and rapidly incorporating it into the island’s existing defensive network.
A video shows troops coming ashore on Swedish CB90 fast assault craft, a type that German soldiers are also trained to operate:
A rapid deployment of German and Swedish forces to Gotland island is being carried out today. Units from
— Försvarsmakten (@Forsvarsmakten) September 18, 2026
The strategic importance of Gotland has grown considerably following Sweden’s accession to NATO in March 2024, which was a direct response to the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Located approximately halfway between mainland Sweden and the Baltic states, the island occupies a central position in the Baltic Sea, close to the maritime approaches to the Gulf of Finland and within reach of the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. Its location gives forces operating from Gotland a potentially significant position from which to conduct surveillance, air defense, and maritime operations, while also making the island an important part of the wider network connecting NATO’s northern and eastern members.
At the same time, Gotland sits within an extremely complex littoral environment, where shallow waters, islands, narrow maritime approaches, and the proximity of multiple states can make both offensive operations and defensive planning more difficult. The region has also been shaped by longstanding Swedish concerns about Russian clandestine activity, including intelligence gathering and other forms of covert or deniable activity. The complexity of the Baltic operating environment can make such activities harder to detect and attribute, adding another layer of uncertainty alongside the more conventional military challenges facing the region.
Geography has long made Gotland important to Swedish defense planning, but its significance has taken on a broader dimension since Sweden joined the alliance. NATO has described the island as strategically important to its freedom of maneuver in the Baltic, while Swedish officials have highlighted its potential role as a hub for military operations and logistics in the region.
The current exercise is designed around the practical difficulties of reinforcing such a position.
Military equipment is being transported by sea to Visby, Gotland’s principal port, including by commercial ferry. In Visby, Swedish and German personnel are securing the harbor and conducting the reception of the arriving force. Among the equipment being moved are air defense systems, while Swedish forces are also operating coastal defense systems armed with anti-ship missiles.
Meanwhile, publicly available flight-tracking data showed German Luftwaffe transport aircraft, including at least one Airbus A400M airlifter, apparently involved in the effort. The commercial airport at Visby has long also been used for military activities related to Gotland and the wider Baltic region.
”A rapid deployment of German and Swedish forces to Gotland island is being carried out today” https://t.co/z6oLs1LCT4 pic.twitter.com/n18MdST6r1
— Jamming (@balticjam) September 18, 2026
The movement is supported by Swedish and German naval forces and other aircraft, creating a scenario in which the maritime transit, protection of the port, air operations, and subsequent movement of troops and equipment ashore all form part of the same military problem. Once ashore, the arriving forces have to be moved into position and integrated with Swedish units already responsible for defending the island.
The Swedish Gotland Regiment, P 18, provides the core of the island’s permanent military presence. The regiment, Sweden’s youngest and smallest, has been rebuilding its capabilities since Sweden began expanding its military presence on Gotland. Its forces form the basis of the ground-defense structure into which allied reinforcements would be incorporated.
Swedish coastal defense capabilities are another important element of the drill. Land-based anti-ship missiles provide the island with a means of threatening hostile surface vessels operating in the surrounding waters, giving the defense of Gotland a direct connection to the wider maritime battle for the Baltic. During Silver Wotan, Swedish and German forces are also conducting anti-surface warfare activities alongside the broader reinforcement operation.
Germany is contributing more than 500 troops to the exercise, part of approximately 2,000 Bundeswehr personnel involved, including elements from the army, navy, and air force. The German Luftwaffe has deployed Panavia Tornado aircraft for surveillance, while German naval forces are participating in the maritime component, and German ground personnel are involved in the reinforcement and security activities on Gotland.
The exercise scenario is particularly relevant against the backdrop of Russia’s continuing military presence in the Baltic region.
Russia maintains major military infrastructure in Kaliningrad, including naval, air, missile, and air defense capabilities, while the Russian Baltic Fleet operates from bases in the region. Kaliningrad’s position between Poland and Lithuania gives Moscow a significant military foothold inside the NATO area, while Russian forces and military infrastructure elsewhere along the Baltic add to the complexity of operating and reinforcing allied territory in the region.
The security environment around the Baltic has also deteriorated considerably since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. NATO has increased its surveillance and military activity in the region, including the launch of Baltic Sentry in January 2025 following a series of incidents involving critical undersea infrastructure. The alliance has subsequently expanded efforts to monitor maritime activity and protect infrastructure and sea lines of communication.
Swedish authorities have stressed that Silver Wotan was planned in advance and is not being conducted in response to a specific imminent Russian threat. The exercise nonetheless reflects the operational environment in which Swedish and NATO planners now have to consider the possibility that maritime and air movements across the Baltic could be monitored, disrupted, or contested.
The exercise also builds on a series of increasingly large Swedish-led activities designed to test the reception of allied forces on Swedish territory. During Aurora 26 earlier this year, more than 18,000 troops from 13 countries participated in operations across Sweden, including the deployment of allied forces to Gotland alongside the Gotland Regiment and Swedish Home Guard. NATO described that activity as an emergency deployment intended to test the reinforcement of the island.
Silver Wotan places a more concentrated emphasis on the Swedish-German relationship and on the movement of an allied force into the island’s existing defensive structure.
Germany’s participation is also consistent with its growing military role in the Baltic and along NATO’s northeastern flank. Berlin is already providing forces for NATO’s forward defense in Lithuania and has increasingly emphasized the ability to move German forces rapidly across northern Europe in support of allied operations.
For Sweden, meanwhile, Gotland has become one of the clearest examples of how NATO membership has changed the country’s defense planning. The island remains a Swedish responsibility, but its location means that what happens there has consequences well beyond Sweden’s territorial defense.
A defended and adequately supplied Gotland provides NATO with a strategically positioned base for surveillance and defensive operations in the Baltic, while the ability to reinforce it demonstrates that the alliance can maintain access to the island even as the surrounding maritime and air environment becomes more contested.
The exercise comes as European allies are being forced to plan for a NATO in which the United States may provide less of the conventional military weight it has supplied for decades. The Pentagon is reviewing the size and posture of U.S. forces in Europe, including the forces and capabilities Washington would make available in a European crisis, while NATO’s top commander has said further U.S. troop withdrawals should be expected as European allies build up their own conventional capabilities.
At the same time, the alliance now describes Russia as its most significant and direct security threat, citing military activity alongside airspace violations, sabotage, cyber operations, and other forms of hybrid pressure. There are also growing concerns that Russia could try something in the Baltics, while it continues to step up its gray-zone activities regardless. NATO officials have warned that Russia could rebuild enough military capacity to pose a more serious conventional challenge to the alliance before the end of the decade.
There are escalating warnings from Poland that Russia is preparing to widen its war against Ukraine, with "accidental" missile and drone strikes on NATO territory.
— Deborah Haynes (@haynesdeborah) September 18, 2026
Such a move – Russia falsely claiming air strikes that hit NATO allies happened by accident – would be designed to…
For Sweden and Germany, the Silver Wotan exercise is a practical test of how quickly European forces can reinforce and defend one of the Baltic’s most strategically important positions. As the security environment grows more contested and Europe prepares for a future in which U.S. forces may not be as readily available, the ability to move allied combat power across the region and integrate it into existing defenses is becoming an increasingly important part of NATO’s deterrence.
Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com
The post German Forces Surge Onto Baltic Island In First-Of-Its-Kind NATO Drill appeared first on TWZ.
The officer who led the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) on its recent combat deployment to the Middle East told us he needs his own uncrewed surface vessels (USVs) on future deployments. Operationalizing USVs is an area where the Marines are lagging behind. In particular, he wants the ability to send USVs forward to reconnoiter potential highly-contested beach landing areas, a mission largely assumed by the Navy.
As we have frequently reported, the military use of USVs is now proliferating around the globe at an increasing rate. Ukraine has employed sea drones to devastating effect against Russia’s Black Sea Fleet vessels and facilities, forcing the general evacuation of Russian naval assets from occupied Crimea to bases in Russia proper. During Operation Epic Fury, the U.S. used them for the first time in combat, as one-way attack weapons against Iranian targets, to hunt for mines, and for a search and rescue operation to locate the crew of an AH-64 Apache helicopter downed by Iran, as well as general broad-area surveillance and awareness. China is investing heavily in the space, as well, along with many other navies around the globe, both friend and foe.
The following video shows the first U.S. use of a USV as a kamikaze weapon.
Yesterday, using multiple one-way attack surface drones, CENTCOM forces successfully struck a submarine and ship maintenance facility in Iran. Three Corsair unmanned surface vessels hit the port at Bandar Abbas Naval Base, marking the first time American forces have employed sea… pic.twitter.com/bOM2kmgRxz
— U.S. Central Command (@CENTCOM) July 13, 2026
“There was a lot in theater that were being used, but it wasn’t something that we went out with,” Col. Chris P. Niedziocha told us when asked if the 31st MEU deployed with USVs. He then answered in the affirmative in response to a question about if MEUs need sea drones on future deployments. He said it is part of the “explosion in robotics and autonomy” being used in combat.
“These systems are incredibly useful and capable,” explained Niedziocha, now director of the USMC Expeditionary Warfare School. “And you say, ‘Hey, you know, [in] the next war, if the first thing you’re putting through the breach isn’t a robot, something’s wrong. You say never send a Marine someplace you haven’t sent a bullet. I think the new way is [you] never want to send a Marine someplace you haven’t already sent a robot. So yeah, we’re embracing [the technology] and we’re not leaders. We’re fast followers in that regime.”
Asked for specific use cases he sees for USVs, the colonel talked about using them before putting Marines ashore.
“I can tell you if you’re doing an amphibious operation, you want to understand what’s waiting beneath the surface in the water column,” Niedziocha noted. “So something can go either with a side-looking sonar array or even forward-looking to demonstrate that there’s nothing there, and the hydrography and bathymetry is what you… need for the operation to be successful.”
Hydrography measures “the shape and features of the shoreline; the characteristics of tides, currents, and waves; and the physical and chemical properties of the water itself,” according to NOAA. Bathymetry, which is part of that, focuses on mapping the depths and shapes of underwater terrain.
These functions are critical for mine detection and determining whether there are man-made or natural obstacles that would impede landing operations. While these missions are largely being performed by the Navy, including with USVs, the Marines are moving toward making that an organic capability. Recently, the Marines announced they were testing a counter-mine USV system. The evaluation was conducted late last month at Camp Pendleton by the Program Manager Combat Support Systems (PM CSS) Explosive Hazard Defeat Team.
The test of the USV was “in response to a littoral capability gap,” according to the media release. “The solution: seek a commercial USV solution that is equipped with integrated autonomous driving and payloads that consist of Sonar, Forward-Looking Infrared (FLIR) cameras, Line of Sight (LOS) Communications and Acoustic Communications (AComms).”
This was part of the overall effort to develop “solutions that enable increased standoff for Marines to detect, investigate and neutralize threats,” the release added. “The innovation of Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and Littoral Explosive Ordnance Neutralization (LEON) systems will provide Marine EOD Technicians with the confidence to operate in contested environments while preserving combat power, increasing operational reach, and minimizing exposure to explosive threats.”
LEON is a so-called system of systems, using a remotely operated vehicle, diver equipment, an unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV), a USV, and an Amphibious Unmanned Ground Vehicle to enable “EOD to confirm and mark hazards and obstacles from very shallow water to the beach zone,” the media release added.
While unmanned systems have long been part of EOD operations, “we’re expanding that into maritime systems that allow more endurance and less risk for operators,” said Chief Warrant Officer 2 Alfredo Andrade, officer in charge, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Company, 7th Engineer Support Battalion (ESB). “Some of the conflicts that we are engaged in take a toll on the force, and surging in new forces is costly. It turns into a logistical problem. To preserve the safety and the health of the forces… the USV and the [LEON] program exist to ensure that we have readily available combat power.”
While Niedziocha didn’t address USVs for offensive combat roles, the Marines have evaluated them for that use as well as for logistics, among other functions.
Our Autonomous Low-Profile Vessel (ALPV) solicitation is now accepting submissions.
— Department of War Innovation Unit (@DIU_x) March 3, 2026
The @DeptofWar and the @USMC need to resupply units spread over wide distances in contested littoral environments. Increased all-domain threats targeting logistics capabilities, locations, and… pic.twitter.com/Af8v0DTRHS
There have been many other tests, as well. Including one just this summer at RIMPAC. These trials saw the launch and recovery of one of Splash Industries’ Typhoon USVs aboard the USS Essex. The ‘Gator Navy’ of amphibious assault vessels that haul Marines and their kit around the oceans is uniquely suited to act as USV motherships. Their well decks allow for easy deployment and recovery of USVs of many sizes and capabilities near seamlessly. So it won’t be surprising if these vessels and the Marines aboard them quickly become staples in the Pentagon’s USV playbook.
Watch us land one of our drone-boats inside a moving US Navy warship during RIMPAC. This world-first resupply mission was performed completely autonomously using a Splash Industries Typhoon USV. pic.twitter.com/AEzNzZjsL1
— Ivan Avanesov (@i_vanesov) July 14, 2026
Still, the Marines have a long way to go to catch up to how these systems are already being used.
The Houthi rebels of Yemen actually pioneered the operational use of kamikaze USVs years ago and Ukraine has led the way in advancements of these systems. They first employed them as kamikaze weapons, but then added machine guns and rockets and later missiles, which were used to shoot down Russian helicopters and jets. Ukraine has also used them to launch first-person view (FPV) and bomber drone attacks as well as deliver uncrewed ground vehicles (UGVs) into enemy territory. Last week, Ukraine claimed to have attacked a Russian USV with a USV, marking another first.
You can see that engagement in the following video.
Ukraine's Navy says a Sargan unmanned surface vessel destroyed a Russian unmanned boat with machine-gun fire in the Black Sea, the first-ever battle between unmanned surface vessels. Ukrainian Navy personnel operated in coordination with HUR. #Ukraine pic.twitter.com/Avg4ecz8m6
— NOELREPORTS
Having recently returned from a six-month deployment that saw the Marine Corps’ first use of its Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) concept in a combat setting during the fight against Iran, Niedziocha has a good sense of the realities of modern warfare. His Marines operated forward arming and refueling points (FARPs) for various aircraft in combat for the first time and set up remote sensing locations.
That a commander like him sees value in USVs is a good sign for progress in the development of these systems.
Contact the author: howard@twz.com
The post Marine Colonel Who Led Mideast Combat Deployment Wants His Own Drone Boats appeared first on TWZ.
Japan has said it is keeping the door open to acquiring nuclear-powered submarines, a potentially major shift for a country whose submarine force has historically relied exclusively on conventional propulsion. Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi confirmed recently that Tokyo is not ruling out nuclear-powered submarines as it considers the future requirements of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF).
Should Japan ultimately pursue the capability, it would join an exclusive group of nations operating nuclear-powered submarines. China, France, India, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States are currently the only countries with nuclear-powered submarines in active service. Brazil is already working to join the club, while Australian and South Korean nuclear-powered submarine plans are somewhat longer-term.
Japan’s submarine fleet is already regarded as among the most capable conventionally powered forces, and is very much at the forefront of advanced naval propulsion technologies. Even with that considerable expertise, however, developing and sustaining a nuclear propulsion capability would represent a huge challenge, requiring expertise and infrastructure far beyond those needed to build Japan’s existing conventionally powered submarines.
Koizumi’s comments do not represent a decision to acquire nuclear-powered submarines, nor do they indicate that Japan has begun a procurement program. They do, however, mark a significant evolution in the country’s public debate over submarine propulsion and point to a growing willingness within the Japanese defense establishment to consider capabilities that were previously largely outside the mainstream of defense planning.
Currently, Japan operates one of the world’s most capable conventional submarine fleets, centered on increasingly sophisticated diesel-electric boats equipped with air-independent propulsion and advanced lithium-ion batteries. These submarines are well suited to operations around Japan and the country’s surrounding waters.
The JMSDF currently operates 22 conventionally powered submarines, maintaining the force structure established in the 2010s while progressively replacing older boats with the more capable Taigei class. Five Taigei class submarines are now in JMSDF service, with additional boats in the pipeline.
Nuclear propulsion, however, would offer substantially greater endurance and sustained underwater speed, allowing Japanese submarines to conduct longer-range operations across the broader Western Pacific with minimal support. This is a requirement that is becoming increasingly relevant as Tokyo’s strategic focus expands beyond its immediate maritime approaches.
China’s rapidly expanding naval force, including its growing submarine fleet and increasingly distant maritime operations, is forcing Tokyo to consider how it would monitor and potentially counter Chinese forces farther from the Japanese archipelago. A nuclear-powered attack submarine could remain submerged for extended periods without the endurance limitations imposed by conventional propulsion, making it particularly useful for long-range surveillance, tracking, and sea-denial missions.
Japan’s debate is also unfolding alongside a significant development in neighboring South Korea. Seoul has confirmed plans to develop a new class of nuclear-powered submarines, a move that could add further momentum to an emerging undersea competition in Northeast Asia. South Korea’s decision is particularly relevant to Tokyo because it demonstrates that nuclear propulsion is no longer merely a theoretical capability for U.S. allies in the region. While the missions and strategic priorities of the Japanese and South Korean navies are different, both countries face the challenge of operating in waters increasingly contested by China and North Korea.
The development could also create new opportunities for Japan to work more closely with Australia and the other AUKUS partners. Australia is in the process of acquiring its own conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine capability under AUKUS Pillar I, with U.S. and U.K. nuclear-powered submarines also scheduled to operate from Australia. Japan has separately been identified as a potential partner for AUKUS Pillar II, which covers advanced capabilities and technology cooperation.
A Japanese decision to pursue SSNs could eventually create a much deeper basis for cooperation with Australia, including submarine interoperability, undersea warfare, workforce and technical expertise, infrastructure, sustainment, and potentially aspects of the industrial base. Analysts have already examined how Japan could fit into the wider AUKUS submarine ecosystem as Australia’s nuclear-submarine program develops.
A Japanese nuclear-powered submarine with a robust capacity to launch land attack cruise missiles would also be a powerful component in the country’s emerging “counterstrike” posture, which is increasingly centered on acquiring the ability to strike targets at longer ranges.
Japan has already begun deploying domestically developed long-range missile systems, including the Upgraded Type 12 surface-to-ship missile, while also acquiring the U.S.-made Tomahawk cruise missile.
An SSN would potentially add a highly survivable, mobile platform to this emerging strike architecture, allowing Japan to position long-range weapons farther from its home territory and complicating an adversary’s efforts to locate and neutralize them. That could be particularly valuable in a conflict in which Japanese air bases, missile batteries, and other fixed infrastructure were under attack.
The potential SSN requirement also fits with Japan’s expanding expeditionary ambitions. As the JMSDF converts its Izumo class helicopter destroyers to operate F-35B fighters, giving Japan a more credible carrier aviation capability, nuclear-powered attack submarines could provide a valuable escort for these increasingly important surface groups. Their speed, endurance, and ability to remain submerged for extended periods makes SSNs particularly well suited to accompanying carrier forces on longer-range deployments and supporting contingencies farther from Japanese waters.
Looking at the bigger picture, it is highly significant that nuclear propulsion was effectively excluded from Japan’s conventional defense debate for decades. More recently, however, Japanese defense officials and policymakers have begun examining whether future submarines will require a different propulsion system. The issue is now one that can be discussed openly at the ministerial level.
Nevertheless, pursuing a nuclear-powered submarine program would come with huge challenges.
Building and operating nuclear-powered submarines would require Japan to establish an entirely different industrial, regulatory, and training infrastructure. The vessels would also be considerably more expensive and complex to build and operate than Japan’s existing conventionally powered submarines. Tokyo would have to resolve questions involving nuclear regulation, reactor technology, maintenance facilities, crew training, and the handling of nuclear material.
There would also be a significant political dimension. Although naval nuclear propulsion is fundamentally different from possessing nuclear weapons, any move in that direction would inevitably receive scrutiny in a country whose postwar security policy has been shaped by its experience with nuclear weapons and its longstanding non-nuclear principles.
For those reasons, Koizumi’s statement should be viewed less as an announcement of a Japanese nuclear-submarine program than as evidence that the political barrier to discussing such a program is falling.
The next question is whether the Japanese government will move from keeping the option open to actually studying a nuclear-powered submarine design, propulsion technology, and acquisition pathway in detail.
If it does, the consequences could extend well beyond Japan’s submarine fleet. A Japanese nuclear-powered submarine capability would represent a major enhancement of Tokyo’s ability to operate across the Western Pacific and could alter the undersea balance between Japan, China, and the United States’ other regional allies. At the very least, the idea is one that is now part of wider discussions at the highest levels.
Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com
The post Japan Opens The Door To Acquiring Nuclear-Powered Submarines appeared first on TWZ.
The 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit’s (31st MEU) recent deployment to the Middle East marked the first time the United States Marine Corps (USMC) used its Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) concept in a combat setting, the service confirmed to TWZ on Thursday. At its core, EABO involves relatively small groups of Marines quickly establishing bases of operation in forward areas, often within the enemy’s weapons range. During operations in the fight against Iran, Marines refueled and rearmed their own aircraft, as well as those from the joint force, at these austere locales. They also set up remote sensing locations, among other actions from the EABO playbook.
This employment of EABO for Epic Fury is a highly significant development. After years of progressively evolving the EABO playbook, it was no longer an experimental exercise. This meant that Marines were forward deployed in a contested area in a region where established bases were taking heavy fire from Iranian missile and drone barrages. Troops were killed in some of these attacks and U.S. aircraft, buildings and equipment were damaged and destroyed across the Middle East. Pushing aircraft from the MEU, as well as the joint force, to FARPs (forward arming and refueling point) would have been a relevant asset preservation tactic as well as one that would help accelerate combat operations, and it’s exactly what EABO is meant to do.
The 31st MEU’s six-month deployment began in January in the Pacific, before the unit was ordered to the Middle East in March, returning to Okinawa, Japan, in July. That’s where it is stationed as the USMC’s only continuously forward-based MEU.
“This was the first time we were able to implement EABO in combat operations since the concept was created for the force,” Capt. Steven J. Keenan, a USMC spokesperson, told us. “We have practiced it many times, but this was a first for supporting a Joint Force named operation with forward FARPs and forward bases that supported joint ops and combat power sustainment.”
EABO was first introduced in 2020 by then-Commandant Gen. David Berger in his Force Design 2030 plan for the future of the Corps. It was created with a fight against China in mind, especially utilizing small Pacific islands. The idea is to have highly mobile, low-signature forces deployed forward in austere, contested or potentially contested maritime locations. The mission is to “support sea control operation, conduct sea denial operations within the littorals, contribute to maritime domain awareness, provide forward command, control, communications, computers, combat systems, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, targeting, and counter-targeting capability and forward sustainment,” according to the Marines.
The news of the first activation of the EABO concept in combat came Wednesday during a media roundtable with Col. Chris P. Niedziocha, who commanded the 31st MEU during its deployment to the Middle East in support of Operation Epic Fury. Now director of the USMC Expeditionary Warfare School, Niedziocha discussed EABO and a range of other operations during that deployment, including boarding vessels during the blockade of Iranian ports.
The 31st MEU was embarked aboard the Tripoli Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), which consisted of the America class amphibious assault ship USS Tripoli, San Antonio class amphibious transport dock ship USS New Orleans, and Whidbey Island class dock landing ship USS Rushmore. You can read more about the ARG/MEU and its assets in our initial story about the deployment to the Middle East here.
“You’re starting to see this has been validated,” the colonel said of the EABO concept during the roundtable TWZ attended virtually. “It’s still nascent, but we actually, for the first time, demonstrated what we thought we were able to do, which I think is pretty exciting. And then things like forward arming and refueling to extend the operational reach of aircraft and expeditionary reloading, and then the ever-present logistic challenge of doing something like that. So that’s pretty significant.”
“We successfully implemented critical Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO), establishing sensor expeditionary advanced bases and forward arming and refueling points (FARPs) where none existed,” the colonel added. “Through our forward logistic elements, we proved that an agile Marine Air-Ground Task Force can sustain itself and generate ready, lethal power in contested maritime environments, directly setting the theater for follow-on joint forces.”
One of the objectives of the FARPs was to reduce reliance on the Marines’ fleet of KC-130 aerial refuelers and serve as jumping-off points for its F-35B Lightning II fighters.
“There was all manner of tankers all the time, but the FARP is to extend the operational reach, and if you can do it, you reduce the load on that,” Niedziocha noted. “Because there’s some aircraft that are basically for expeditionary austere operations, especially the F-35B,” the Marine Corps’ variant of the aircraft designed for short take off and vertical landing.
“There are some trade-offs associated with the Bravo,” Niedziocha pointed out, using a slang for the jets. “There’s less internal fuel, but you have the lift [system], which gives you the option to do these kinds of things. So, the goal there was to walk that fine line between providing the full sortie over wherever you needed it, and keeping the ships far enough away to make them as survivable as possible.”
In addition to the F-35Bs and other aircraft organic to the 31st MEU, the FARPs were also used by Army helicopters, Keenan told us. Imagery posted on the Pentagon’s image distribution site also showed U.S. Army Gray Eagle drones and Marine MV-22B Osprey tiltrotor aircraft were included.
Niedziocha did not provide details about where the FARPs were set up, but a U.S. defense official told us they were “disaggregated throughout the Middle East.” The official declined to provide further information, citing operational security concerns since they are still being used.
“Throughout the deployment, the Tripoli ARG and 31st MEU successfully conducted over 1,600 mishap-free flight hours of combat aviation missions, including precision strikes, transporting 800,000 pounds of cargo, and moving 5,000 personnel,” a 31st MEU overview of the deployment explained. “The units also provided sustained combat support to joint force operations by delivering critical intelligence and refueling over 300 aircraft ashore and underway.”
The colonel also didn’t provide details about the sensor expeditionary advanced bases. According to the Marines, “a sensing expeditionary advanced base (SEAB) brings together coastal surveillance radars, electronic sensors, and Marines ashore to extend maritime domain awareness, complementing the radars and sensors already at work aboard naval ships off the coast.”
“When SEAB systems identify surface vessels in nearby sea lanes, small unmanned aircraft system (sUAS) operators launch their platforms to visually identify and track the contacts,” the Marines added. “Sensor data and imagery are transmitted in real time across the blue-green command network to decision-makers.”
This capability could have been used to track Iran’s remaining fleet of small boats that it has used to harass shipping and mine the Strait of Hormuz, as well as larger vessels trying to transport oil. Other sensors, like radars and counter-drone systems, could also help identify incoming threats and provide general situational awareness. The EABO concept was employed as part of the 31st MEU’s larger role in supporting the blockade and mine clearance efforts.
The 31st MEU interdicted four vessels during the deployment, three of which led to boardings. On April 19, Marines boarded the MV Touska; on April 28, the MV Blue Star III; and on May 19, the MT Celestial Sea.
The Touska was boarded after USS Spruance fired multiple 5-inch rounds, targeting the engine room and disabling the vessel’s propulsion. The crew of the vessel was retained for about two weeks before being repatriated.
Niedziocha told us that none of the crews offered any resistance.
“At two in the morning, when 30 Force Reconnaissance Marines fast rope onto your vessel, [you are] just compliant with a capital C. They did exactly what they were directed to do. The overmatch that you put onto that vessel is pretty surprising. And then there’s overwatch provided by UAS and manned aircraft, so you create this bubble around the vessel. So yeah, they complied.”
You can see the Touska being boarded in the following video.
The U.S. just released a video of its forces boarding and seizing the Iranian container ship M/V Touska near the Hormuz Strait after it tried to break the U.S. naval blockade pic.twitter.com/FpB2obb3jY
— Visegrád 24 (@visegrad24) April 20, 2026
Two years ago, as the EABO concept was maturing, TWZ was invited to get an exclusive look at how an advanced EABO concept would be put into action, including how squadrons operated the F-35B out of an austere combat environment while generating combat sorties. It was an unprecedented and exclusive peek into the EABO playbook and what a real fight in the Pacific with the USMC’s most advanced fighter aircraft could actually look like. You can read about that in our story here. It appears the operations in the Middle East mirrored this exercise closely.
Now back in Japan, the ARG/MEU is getting ready for a new deployment, said the colonel.
“We got back to Okinawa, I think July 22nd, and they had already begun their workup cycle in earnest to be on the water in early January to go out and do another Iron Fist [training exercise] with the Japanese, and then long periods of a crisis response,” said Niedziocha, who relinquished command in August before moving on to his new role. “Just being there, present in the First Island Chain to partner with your allies, demonstrates the resolve and commitment to deter whatever needs deterring.”
As noted earlier in this story, the EABO concept was designed with a Pacific fight in mind. Its first combat employment in the Middle East clearly offers lessons that can now be adapted to enhance EABO operations globally.
Contact the author: howard@twz.com
The post USMC Used Its Expeditionary Operations Playbook In Combat For First Time During Epic Fury appeared first on TWZ.
The Lee Administration leaked the possibility of deploying Korean forces to the Strait of Hormuz on September 3. The backlash was immediate from Korean civil society that opposes any type of support for Trump’s war of aggression. Furthermore, recent polls reveal that even 55% of Lee’s supporters oppose the dispatching of forces. And while the Lee administration has publicly backtracked, stating that nothing has been decided, it is, nonetheless, quietly undergoing the process of deployment: more than simply an assessment of the security conditions on the Strait of Hormuz, the Lee administration sent a team to check key military bases and ports that could be used at the United Arab Emirates.
Despite growing public opposition, the Lee administration is expected to introduce at the end of September a motion into the National Assembly, where it is likely to pass given his party’s considerable majority. Unlike his predecessor, the impeached Yoon Suk-yeol, President Lee is not a pro-US ideologue; he is a pragmatist. Why then is Lee going out on a limb with this deployment when the rest of the world is staying out of it?
Well, South Korea’s history has always been entangled and shaped by US foreign policy. The darker side to South Korea’s pop-culture is a country dominated and shaped through US policy and interventions. Today, it hosts the largest overseas US military base and controls the Korean military (through wartime operational control). In effect, it’s never been a sovereign state. Its economic, political, and military interests have always been beholden to the United States.
Today, Lee is horsetrading with Trump: military support in exchange for more favorable terms in the US’s AI global supply chain of semiconductors and data centers along with a return of wartime operational control. While Lee’s pragmatism is navigating the real structural constraints on South Korea, it is ultimately short-sighted and harmful to Koreans and the world.
The war in Iran is inflicting considerable pain to the world’s economies, including South Korea that imports 61% of its crude oil through the Strait of Hormuz. Yet, even from a completely pragmatic perspective, sending Korean forces to the Hormuz does nothing to resolve this problem. In fact, getting entangled with US aggression against Iran would strain the 64-year diplomatic relations with Iran while putting a target on South Korean assets in the region. Furthermore, if the world’s greatest naval and air power cannot secure freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, how could South Korea’s contribution make a difference? In fact, the deployment of Korean troops prolongs this war of aggression by giving Trump cover and leverage to demand that other countries, such as Japan, also deploy forces.
This isn’t the first time that South Korea would deploy forces due to US requests. In 2004, after pressure from the George W. Bush Administration, the Roh Moo-hyun administration deployed non-combat support troops to Iraq. In response, a militant Islamic group kidnapped a Korean translator and, when the Roh administration refused to cancel further and withdraw current deployment, beheaded the translator.
Most importantly, this war of aggression is not only illegal under international standards, but deployment also violates article five of the Korean constitution that mandates the government to “maintain international peace” and “renounce all aggressive war.” Thus, whether intervening in the frontlines, or in the rear, whether combatant or non-combatant, any deployment would be complicit in Trump’s war of aggression.
Ultimately, as Hamid Shahrabi, an Iranian activist and co-founder of the Global Resistance for Peace & Justice states, securing free passage through the Strait of Hormuz can be achieved but not through military pressure and destruction but by adhering to the “Islamabad MOU, which outlined measures to ensure free passage through the Strait.”
Being dominated by the US brings out the pragmatic among South Koreans. Yet, the world demands that we fight and that we hold the line against Trump. Deploying forces will prolong Trump’s illegal war of aggression. Fortunately, if Koreans can be pragmatic, they can also be fierce fighters against US imperialism when provoked. Instead of fanning the flames of war, we should fight to extinguish Trump’s forever wars.
Dae-Han Song is a part of the International Strategy Centerand the No Cold War collective and is an associate at the Korea Policy Institute.
This article was produced by Globetrotter.
The U.S. military’s top officer on Wednesday talked about how AI is changing the character of warfare and offered two examples to illustrate his points. His comments included new insights into how two U.S. Army AH-64 Apache crew members were rescued after being shot down by an Iranian drone near the coast of Oman in June. The recovery effort involved America’s first known use of an uncrewed surface vessel (USV) executing a personnel recovery action as part of a military search and rescue operation.
“Information moves so fast that leader decision times have compressed from weeks down to days down to seconds,” explained Air Force Gen. Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, during his keynote speech at the Air & Space Forces Air, Space and Cyber Conference that TWZ is attending. “In the future fight, advantage will go to the side who can see first, who can understand first, decide first, and act first, and along the way, be a learning organization, and no factor is accelerating change as fast as artificial intelligence and advancing cyber capabilities.”
“AI is here now, and it’s already changing the way militaries see, sense, decide, and act across the joint force,” the chairman proclaimed.
The first example Caine used to highlight these changes took place on June 8. After the Apache went down, “U.S. CENTCOM launched a rapid, responsive joint search and rescue effort to recover the crew. That response drew on the totality of the joint force, and ultimately was required to use enabled unmanned vessels to participate in the rescue of downed U.S. service members for the first time ever.”
As we noted in our previous coverage, CENTCOM deployed “a U.S. Navy Corsair unmanned surface vessel,” the command’s spokesman told us at the time.
The ability to pull off that rescue mission “did not appear overnight,” Caine pointed out. “It came from the men and women of Task Force 59, CENTCOM’s forward-leaning unmanned joint maritime unit who spent the last several years testing, integrating, and operationalizing unmanned systems and AI in one of the most demanding and kinetic environments on Earth right now.”
“What helped make this possible was not a bunch of general officers and flag officers,” Caine continued. “What made this possible was a bunch of entrepreneurial sailors and members of the joint force on watch floors, at piers, managing networks of unmanned systems across thousands of miles of water, and using AI to turn massive amounts of data into a crisp, clear, perfect maritime picture that allowed us to go grab those two soldiers in the water.”
The second example Caine shared about the use of AI “points in the other direction, not how quickly we are using these tools, but how quickly these tools are changing the threat.”
In Ukraine, “we see first-person view drones operating in heavily contested EMI [electromagnetic interference] environments. Some now using AI-enabled computer vision to continue to drive towards targets, even when there’s no GPS or the links are cut. That gives small units affordable precision and shows how quickly software and autonomy are changing what is possible at the tactical edge, and the results are stark.”
The use of AI to enable lower-end drone warfare is a topic TWZ has been among the first to point out.
“In certain locations on the front line of troops right now, the life expectancy of a new Russian recruit arriving on the front lines is as little as 20 to 30 minutes,” Caine added. “Think about that. This is what happens when low-cost precision is fielded fast, adapted quickly, and scaled across the battlefield.”
“The price of lethal exchange is decreasing day over day,” the chairman noted. “One wonders what the future of close air support looks like, but I am comforted by the fact that each and every one of you are in this room thinking about that. Taken together, these examples from the Straits of Hormuz to the front lines in Ukraine show how quickly technology is changing the character of war, and this means our joint force needs to do two things at one time.”
“[W]e need to prepare the joint force to win in this kind of conflict,” the general stated. “We have to assume from now on that our formations will be hunted by autonomous systems, jammed across the spectrum, and tracked in real time, and we have to transition the joint force to be prepared to fight and win our future war by generating and delivering lethality at scale with an agile, optimized, high-low mix of combat capabilities to give the young members of the 2.8-million member all volunteer joint force the tools that they need before they need them.”
Contact the author: howard@twz.com
The post Apache Crew Rescue Highlights Need For AI In Combat Says Joint Chiefs Chairman appeared first on TWZ.
As both the Navy and the USAF were racing to field a new generation of advanced tactical jets, the seagoing service’s program hit a wall. A major reason behind this from the Pentagon was concern that the U.S. industrial base could not handle simultaneous final development and production of two extremely complex new fighter aircraft. This was a controversial justification that many had a hard time swallowing. The Navy’s program, dubbed F/A-XX, is supposedly back on and a down-select on who will build it is coming soon, but that concern appears to linger among at least one of the Department of War’s top acquisition officials.
Though he remains confident that the U.S. Air Force F-47 sixth-generation fighter will fly in the next two years, Air Force Gen. Dale R. White, Director, Critical Major Weapon Systems — the service’s leading weapons procurement advisor — remains concerned about the overall capacity of industry to provide the military with the aircraft it needs, including two new fighters. His comments were in response to questions about the Navy’s challenges in building its own sixth-gen fighter alongside F-47.
The concerns are “not unique” to the F-47 or the Navy’s program but the problem exists to various degrees across the industrial base too, White told reporters Tuesday during a media roundtable at the Air & Space Forces’ Air, Space and Cyber Conference that TWZ is attending.
White has a dual-hatted role, serving as the Pentagon’s top weapons procurement officer and as the senior acquisition advisor to the Secretary of the Air Force for all acquisition matters.
“We’re seeing it in multiple platforms,” said White, who did not elaborate. “And so what we’re having to do is, at some point, we’re having to make some trade space in between some of these.”
“I see Boeing making smart investments,” White said of the prime contractor of the F-47, selected for the U.S. Air Force’s Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) ‘fighter’ initiative. “They have a lot of CAPEX [capital expenditure] that they’re pouring in, but we have to get through the process of the design piece, getting that completed and closed out. Then we all hit some major milestones with things like flight tests and software and those things.”
“Really, it’s just being able to manage the overall resourcing as it relates to number one, people resources,” the general added. “Number two, when you start getting into the production conversation, do we have enough capacity to be able to produce at that rate? And so, by and large, I have concerns. I have concerns about the capacity of our industrial base, but they are not unique to F-47 or to any program.”
As for the F-47, White said the program “continues to progress exceptionally well.”
“As you know, many, many years in tech maturation and risk reduction gave us a tremendous head start on this program,” White explained. “Extremely proud of what the team has done, what they continue to do each and every day. We are still absolutely on [the] path to be able to hit the mark of flying within this administration. So we see no issues in front of us right now.”
While the first example of the F-47 has been in production for about a year now, the Navy has yet to even select a prime contractor for its next generation fighter. The current competitors for the F/A-XX are Boeing and Northrop Grumman. A decision was supposed to have been made by last month.
“The F/A-XX program remains on track, and we have no further information to provide at this time,” a Navy official told us last week.
Despite intervention from Congress, the next-generation carrier-based fighter has remained in question since the Pentagon moved to effectively shelve the program last year.
In response to a question from TWZ earlier this year, the Chief of Naval Operations acknowledged the uncertainty over the F/A-XX program.
“One of the challenges we’re seeing is, not only [are] our peer competitors improving their capability for anti-air, either air-to-air or surface-to-air, but the lower cost of entry of very capable weapons is also making more players on the field in which that level of stealth and technology is required,” Adm. Daryl Caudle told us back in April at the Sea-Air-Space 2026 exposition. “So this is not about the need for a peer adversary. This is just having an aircraft that can operate with a level of uncertainty and with the acceptable level of risk.”
With Boeing as a finalist, it is also possible that F/A-XX could be a variant of the F-47. As we noted in a past story, the Boeing render for its F/A-XX concept is remarkably similar to artwork for its F-47.
Likely a navalized F-47 variant as expected. https://t.co/4lZkpUjqfz
— Tyler Rogoway (@Aviation_Intel) August 28, 2025
Last year, Steve Parker, Boeing Defense and Space CEO, said he didn’t see a problem with his company building both jets stating that this had been part of the strategy all along.
If this is the case, the company’s claim that it would not have a problem building both the Navy and Air Force next-generation fighters would make more sense. There are a number of advantages when it comes to establishing a high-degree of commonality between F/A-XX and F-47, although there would also be challenges, especially when it comes to getting the most out of a design that was not meant to operate from a carrier deck and scaling production up for both services. There is already significant sharing of elements of both the Navy’s and Air Force’s sixth-generation fighter programs. So commonality in some subsystems and interoperability are already baked in.
We should hopefully finally get a clearer picture in the coming weeks about the status of the F/A-XX and possibly the answer to who will actually build it, which will give us a better idea of what the industrial base impact actually will be.
Contact the author: howard@twz.com
The post Industrial Base Concerns Over Building F/A-XX And F-47 Remain: Top Pentagon Procurement Officer appeared first on TWZ.
The Ukrainian Navy is claiming one of its uncrewed surface vessels (USV) sank a Russian USV, marking the first time one of these weapons, also known as drone boats, destroyed another. The engagement is the latest iteration in the use of combat drone boats, which Ukraine has employed to devastating effect against Russia’s Black Sea Fleet vessels and facilities, forcing the general evacuation of Russian naval assets from occupied Crimea to bases in Russia proper. The use of weaponized USVs is now proliferating around the globe at an increasing rate.
The incident took place somewhere in the Black Sea, said the Ukrainian Navy, which provided no details about when it happened or exactly where. TWZ cannot independently verify this claim; however, we cannot find any evidence of a drone boat killing another drone boat in the past.
“Units of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) detected the target,” the Ukrainian Navy stated on Telegram. “The Ukrainian Navy’s ‘Sargan 3000’ unmanned boat, equipped with a remotely operated weapon station (RWS) Protector 12.7 mm, successfully destroyed it. This is the first naval battle in history between unmanned boats.”
An 81-second video released by the Ukrainian Navy opens with a view from the Sargan 3000’s onboard camera. It shows the Ukrainian USV acquiring, then engaging the Russian USV with its machine gun. It then cuts to a closer view of the Protector gun system firing at the Russian drone boat. At about the 30-second mark, the view switches to a feed from an aerial platform, though it is unclear if it is piloted or a drone. The video continues with the Sargan 3000 raking the Russian USV with its heavy machine gun until pieces start flying off and it eventually sinks, stern first.
Ukraine's Navy says a Sargan unmanned surface vessel destroyed a Russian unmanned boat with machine-gun fire in the Black Sea, the first-ever battle between unmanned surface vessels. Ukrainian Navy personnel operated in coordination with HUR. #Ukraine pic.twitter.com/Avg4ecz8m6
— NOELREPORTS
The Sargan 3000 (the name means needlefish in Ukrainian) was first introduced by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in April as a “multi-purpose platform that has undergone testing and entered service with the Ukrainian Navy. These uncrewed vessels are highly maneuverable and capable of carrying out strike missions.”
Though initially designed as a kamikaze weapon, it evolved into a platform for remote-controlled weapons, according to the Russian AmalNews outlet.
“The maritime drone features a specialized low-profile hull with distinctive hydrodynamic lines and is constructed from materials that reduce its radar signature,” the publication explained. “The Sargan-3000 USV is equipped with a waterjet propulsion system (presumably powered by a diesel or hybrid engine to ensure a long operational range).”
AmalNews states that the Sargan 3000 is 6.9 meters (about 22.6 feet) long, 2.2 meters (about 7.2 feet) wide, with an operational radius of up to 1,600 km (about 994 miles) and can carry a payload of 450 kg (about 992 pounds). It travels at an estimated speed range of 40-55 knots.
During operations, the Sargan 3000 connects to Ukraine’s Delta situational awareness system, “enabling the real-time transmission of target data, video feeds, and telemetry to operators,” AmalNews noted. “It features multi-channel control capabilities, including redundant satellite communication terminals (utilizing secure Western commercial networks and NATO military networks).”
It is also equipped with “an autonomous inertial and optical navigation system to ensure operation in the event of GPS jamming, and it incorporates electronic countermeasures (ECM) modules.”
There are several variants of this USV. They include those equipped with machine guns; rockets; FPV drones; an electronic warfare version and one that lays mines, the publication added.
Ukraine’s Sargan-3000 naval drone was presented in an FPV drone carrier variant, additionally fitted with a remote weapon station. The type first appeared in combat conditions in early June, when one washed ashore and detonated in the waters of Romania’s Constanța port. #Ukraine pic.twitter.com/QyKnyJFqUq
— NOELREPORTS
The Sargan 3000’s Protector remote weapon station is made by Kongsberg.
The drone boat’s first publicly known combat engagement took place in July, when one “destroyed the Russian Federation’s FSB border guard ship Izumrud,” the Ukrainian Navy stated at the time.
“Ukrainian naval sailors sank the border guard ship of the 2nd rank with the Sargan-3000 maritime unmanned complex near Novorossiysk,” the Ukrainian Navy claimed on Facebook. “Among the crew of the ship are dead and wounded.”
It is unclear whether the USV acted as a kamikaze vessel or a weapons platform, although the former is most likely.
“It was Izumrud that on November 25, 2018, participated in the attack on the ships of the Ukrainian Navy in the Kerch Strait,” the service added. “Revenge is inevitable.”
Ukraine's Navy has sunk the Russian FSB Border Guard patrol ship Izumrud near Novorossiysk using the Sargan-3000 unmanned maritime system.
— SPRAVDI — Stratcom Centre (@StratcomCentre) July 14, 2026
The vessel, a Rank 2 patrol ship, reportedly sustained catastrophic damage, with casualties and injuries among its crew.
The Izumrud was… pic.twitter.com/7VjKDH2ReD
One sea drone killing another is a notable development given the damage these systems can inflict and the challenge of locating and destroying them on open waters. Being able to operate on the water over long distances and timeframes, they can be used to hunt down other drone boats, as what appears to have taken place in this engagement, or serve as a picket line of sorts to protect harbors, vessels and other targets that have been attacked by USVs in the past.
The Russian drone boat, which is not identified, did not appear to be armed.
The Houthi rebels of Yemen actually pioneered the operational use of kamikaze USVs years ago. We first reported about this capability in January 2017, when an explosive-laden Houthi USV struck a Saudi frigate. Before that, Iran developed various crude kamikaze USVs and those capabilities soon migrated to its Houthi proxies, which put them to use in the Red Sea for the first time.
Ukraine has led the way in advancements of these systems, first employing them as kamikaze weapons, but then adding machine guns and rockets and later missiles, which were used to shoot down Russian helicopters and jets. Ukraine has also used these to launch FPV and bomber drone attacks as well as deliver uncrewed ground vehicles (UGV) into enemy territory.
You can see that delivery in the following video.
No soldiers. Just machines.
— Ivan Khomenko (@KhomenkoIv60065) July 13, 2026
Ukraine has carried out the world's first known combat mission in which a sea drone transported and deployed an armed ground robot behind Russian lines on the occupied Kinburn Spit. pic.twitter.com/zyJdFXWxVb
In the wake of the Ukrainian success with these weapons, Russia developed its own drone boats, and in August 2025, launched its first attack on a Ukrainian vessel.
The U.S. used drone boats as kamikaze weapons for the first time in July, during an attack “on a submarine and ship maintenance facility in Iran,” U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) announced on X at the time.
Yesterday, using multiple one-way attack surface drones, CENTCOM forces successfully struck a submarine and ship maintenance facility in Iran. Three Corsair unmanned surface vessels hit the port at Bandar Abbas Naval Base, marking the first time American forces have employed sea… pic.twitter.com/bOM2kmgRxz
— U.S. Central Command (@CENTCOM) July 13, 2026
Regardless, it looks like history was made with this incident in the Black Sea. But this involved a sea drone hunting down and destroying another that couldn’t fight back. Given the rapid pace of weapons development by both sides in the Ukraine war, it seems inevitable that a duel between two armed drones boats could soon follow.
Contact the author: howard@twz.com
The post First-Ever Kill Of A Drone Boat By Another Drone Boat Claimed By Ukraine appeared first on TWZ.
Saudi Arabia on Friday announced it had to temporarily shut down the key east-west pipeline after drone attacks on Thursday from an Iranian-backed militia group in Iraq. As we have explained in the past, the Kingdom has diverted millions of barrels of oil per day through pipelines to its Yanbu port on the Red Sea in an effort to minimize the energy shortages due to hostilities near the Persian Gulf that have closed the Strait of Hormuz.
The pipeline was shut down a day after the Houthi rebels of Yemen increased their control over the crucial Bab al-Mandab Strait (BAM), a narrow body of water separating the Red Sea from the Gulf of Aden. Combined with Iran vastly curtailing shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, this gives Tehran significant control over two of the world’s most crucial passageways for the flow of oil.
3. The Houthis have reportedly attempted to seize ROYG-controlled islands in the Red Sea from which Houthi fighters could launch attacks on international shipping. Houthi forces reportedly landed on the Hanish Islands in the southern Red Sea on the morning of September 10 after… pic.twitter.com/tiFPgNDOHZ
— Institute for the Study of War (@TheStudyofWar) September 11, 2026
“The East-West pipeline, in the regions of Riyadh and Medina, was subjected to several attacks on Thursday morning, September 10, 2026,” Saudi Arabia’s Energy Ministry posted on X. “The line was shut down as a precaution. The attacks resulted in some injuries, and medical care has been provided to those injured.”
“Emergency teams and specialized technical teams began work immediately after the attacks occurred, and took the necessary measures to secure the line and verify its safety, in accordance with approved safety procedures and emergency plans, and in coordination with relevant authorities,” the ministry added. “Any updates will be announced in due course.”
A before and after of the East-West Pipeline pumping station showed that it wasn’t just “hit”, it was absolutely MANGLED.
— Brett Erickson (@BrettErickson28) September 11, 2026
The past 24 hours have been nothing short of catastrophic for the global energy markets, but the harsh reality?
The pain is just getting started. pic.twitter.com/aei8HPplB3
Showing the complexity of this situation and the high degree of coordination among various Iranian-backed proxies, the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused Iranian proxies in Iraq of carrying out the attack. The Kingdom subsequently said it would hold off on responding to “give the brotherly Iraqi government an opportunity to take the necessary measures to prevent attacks launched from Iraqi territory against the Kingdom and neighboring countries,” according to the Arab News.
Officials in Baghdad quickly responded to that request, firing a regional commander overseeing operations where the attack was launched from.
“The Prime Minister, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Mr. Ali Falih Al-Zaidi, directed the formation of an investigative committee regarding the Maysan Operations Command,” the Iraqi Prime Minister’s Office announced on X. “His Excellency ordered the dismissal of the Operations Commander from his position, following confirmation that the attacks targeting the brothers in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia were launched from one of the sites within the province.”
وجّه رئيس مجلس الوزراء، القائد العام للقوات المسلحة، السيد علي فالح الزيدي بتشكيل مجلس تحقيقي بحق قيادة عمليات ميسان.
— المكتب الإعلامي لرئيس الوزراء
وأمر سيادته بإعفاء قائد العمليات من منصبه، على خلفية ثبوت انطلاق الاعتداءات التي طالت الأشقاء في المملكة العربية السعودية من أحد المواقع داخل المحافظة.…
On Friday, the Houthis acknowledged that they captured new stretches of Red Sea coast from the Saudi-backed factions they’ve been battling. This includes the port of Mokha and the key islands of Perim (also known as Mayun) and Zuqar.
In a quick recap of what’s changed, the port provides a potential new surveillance and launching point for the Houthis. From here they can deploy mines, standoff weapons, as well as uncrewed surface vessels (USVs) that can be used to attack shipping. The islands give the Houthis a presence in the middle of shipping lanes. This is especially true for Perim, which sits in the narrowest part of the BAM, less than two miles west of Yemen and about 13 miles east of Djibouti, giving the Houthis a commanding presence at the mouth of the Red Sea. Its position could even allow Houthis to launch attacks on shipping using lower-end munitions, such as anti-tank guided missiles and even rocket artillery.
However, maintaining a major military presence on these islands would be a challenge logistically, especially should the U.S. or its allies attack positions there. You can read more about how the fall of the islands unfolded in our report here.
As they swept through the coastal region, the Houthis captured a treasure trove of U.S.-made Oshkosh M-ATV mine-resistant vehicles, pickup trucks mounted with heavy weapons, artillery pieces, and large quantities of ammunition and small arms abandoned by retreating National Resistance and Giants Brigade forces.
Videos show the scale of equipment the Houthis captured during the western coast offensive.
— Clash Report (@clashreport) September 11, 2026
The "booty" footage from Mokha and surrounding positions includes U.S.-made Oshkosh M-ATV mine-resistant vehicles, pickup trucks mounted with heavy weapons (technicals), armored… pic.twitter.com/n3VPyoSmHk
Houthis Display Vehicles and Weapons Seized in Mocha
— GAROWE ONLINE (@GaroweOnline) September 11, 2026
Yemen’s Houthis have displayed vehicles, weapons and military supplies they say they captured in the Red Sea port city of Mocha after Yemeni government forces backed by Saudi Arabia and its allies withdrew from the city.… pic.twitter.com/JmTMNY6wIS
Iran, which has held off on getting the Houthis directly involved during Epic Fury, has now played its hand and is putting the Houthis in a better position to close the strait than ever before. This was always a ‘sum of all fears’ scenario for oil exports from the Middle East and now Iran could put maximum pressure on the United States and the world to end the conflict in their favor, with oil potentially being cut off from both the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.
Houthis are likely preparing to close the strait with a much better position than they had before. Having both straits closed has long been a 'sum of all fears' middle east energy crisis. Been writing about this exact scenario for over a decade. U.S. stretched thin, especially in…
— Tyler Rogoway (@Aviation_Intel) September 11, 2026
Still, on Friday, the Houthis tried to allay those concerns, promising they would limit their control of the BAM to just Saudi vessels.
“The Yemeni armed forces confirm that maritime navigation is safe for all companies, except for Saudi Arabian ships, which have previously been placed under a ban,” Houthi spokesman Brig. Gen. Yahya Saree proclaimed. “We are continuing to uphold the equation of blockade with blockade, striking enemy Saudi Arabian troop concentrations, and escalating in response to their actions, until the aggression ceases and the blockade is lifted from our dear people.”
Their rationale is that this campaign is all about defending against attacks by the Saudis and their proxies.
The conflict between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis grew out of a civil war in Yemen that erupted in 2014. It expanded a year later when a Saudi-led coalition joined forces with the government ousted by the Houthis and raged on until the parties reached a tenuous ceasefire in 2022. Tensions, however, reignited after that conflict ended when the Houthis joined the U.S.-Iran conflict on the side of their major supporter. In addition to a blockade on Saudi shipping, the Houthis began striking Saudi refineries and other oil infrastructure, including pipelines near the coast.
Houthi assurances about their intentions have meant little in the past. In 2023, when they launched their earlier campaign against Red Sea shipping, the Houthis also claimed a narrow rationale. They said they were doing so on behalf of Palestinians being killed during the Israel-Hamas war. The reality turned out to be that the Houthis were striking even ships not connected to Israel. This ultimately led to the U.S. and allies deploying warships to protect commercial vessels, battles with the rebel group on the water and a campaign of airstrikes on Houthi land targets.
It should be noted that the Saudis held off on getting involved that fight.
Amid all this, the per-barrel price of Brent crude rose to more than $109 yesterday, but was back down to $104 today, according to OilPrice.com.
We have long suggested that the U.S. could get pulled back into a new conflict with the Houthis. Now the rebel group’s rapid defeat of the Saudi-backed forces has reportedly already led to an American role in that fight.
“More than 100 US military advisers are on the ground in Saudi Arabia providing intelligence and targeting support to the Kingdom in its military campaign against the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen,” CNN reported on Thursday, citing multiple sources familiar with the effort. “The US military personnel are working as part of a newly-established joint forces command, which was formed in recent weeks amid signs Iran was ramping up its own efforts to aid Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia, one of the sources, a US official, said. That official put the total at roughly 200 troops.”
Still, there are limits on the U.S. role.
“The US is sharing intelligence with Saudi Arabia — as it routinely does already — but it is not participating directly in strikes,” CNN noted. “The US is also not helping refuel Saudi warplanes or providing other operational support, as it has in past fighting with the Houthis.”
Then-Defense Secretary James Mattis ended that in 2018 during the first Trump presidency after growing concerns over the large number of civilian casualties being inflicted. The Saudi coalition’s fight against the Houthis also complicated the U.S. counterterrorism campaign against Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).
CENTCOM commander Adm. Brad Cooper “flew to the kingdom overnight Thursday as Yemen’s Riyadh-backed forces crumbled in the face of a lightning Houthi offensive southward along Yemen’s western coast this week,” Al-Monitor reported. “He was expected to meet with top Saudi officials as they seek to consolidate the battered military effort by forces aligned with Yemen’s government.”
Trump, as we noted at the top of this story, has already declined to intervene kinetically.
“Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) called President Trump twice Thursday, urging him to launch strikes against the Houthis as the Iran-backed group closed in on a vital Red Sea chokepoint,” Axios reported, citing two U.S. officials. “Trump declined, and U.S. officials stressed the administration has no plans to intervene directly against the Houthis for now.”
Asked if the U.S. would take direct military action against the Houthis, a senior White House official didn’t rule it out but said it is currently relying on regional partners to carry the burden.
“The United States is focused on protecting our core national security interests—such as ensuring freedom of navigation in the Red Sea—while empowering our regional partners to take the lead in managing and resolving regional security challenges,” the senior official told us. “We are in continuous dialogue with Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Yemen Government regarding regional stability.”
The war against Iran and the ongoing mission to try to protect freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz have already strained the U.S. military. There have been 18 troops killed, more than 800 wounded and wide scale destruction of U.S. bases and equipment. U.S. commanders have warned that the ongoing conflict is unsustainable without deeply degrading America’s ability to respond to other contingencies. How much the U.S. could commit to a fight against the Houthis is an open question, especially if the Iran war spun-up again. During the Red Sea operation, at times two carrier strike groups and many other assets in the air and on the sea, were needed to sustain that operation.
“A second front potentially adds more U.S. military risk as we try to sustain a military that has been involved in a protracted deployment to support our economic pressure-focused strategy,” former CENTCOM commander Joseph Votel told us on Friday. “The U.S. can do just about anything, but it will be a choice that will impact sustainment, create longer-term deployments and impact other national security priorities.”
Contact the author: howard@twz.com
The post The Outlook Is Getting Grimmer By The Day For Oil Exports From The Red Sea appeared first on TWZ.
Il Pnrr originario prevedeva varie riforme. Alcune sono state realizzate, altre no. Gli ostacoli principali sono stati due, uno di natura politica e uno prevalentemente economico. E ora il Piano, rivisto più volte, misura sempre più gli atti formali.
L'articolo Due ostacoli per le riforme Pnrr proviene da Lavoce.info.
The Iranian-backed Houthi rebels have captured Mokha – a key Red Sea port in southwestern Yemen near the Bab al-Mandab (BAM) Strait. There are also reports they seized two islands located in the Red Sea shipping lanes. These moves against the Saudi Arabian-backed forces that previously held these areas could further cement the Houthis’ control over the narrow chokepoint to the Gulf of Aden, where the group has already imposed a blockade on Saudi oil exports.
The Houthis’ drive to control the BAM has been emboldened by the U.S. being stretched thin in its ongoing fight against Iran. Combined with Tehran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz, this threatens to add to the Islamic Republic’s command over the flow of oil from the Middle East. It is a maximum pressure campaign on the U.S. and global markets, something we have predicted for years. Amid all this activity, the per-barrel price of Brent Crude is well over the $100 mark now.
The rapid advance on Mokha was planned and backed by Iran, according to the leader of Saudi-backed forces that retreated from Mokha, which is about 50 miles north of the BAM. It took place as Tehran has taken a more belligerent stance in the region that has seen it reportedly damage U.S. aircraft in a recent attack on Jordan earlier this week and get closer to striking U.S. Navy warships with ballistic missiles.
“The Joint Forces have formed a command center south of the city of Mokha, following Houthi breakthroughs across various combat axes under heavy fire, in which the Houthis used various types of weapons,” Deputy Chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), Lt. Gen. Tareq Saleh, said in his acknowledgment that his forces lost the port. The PLC was created in 2022 to represent the internationally recognized government of Yemen.
“The armed forces on the West Coast — the National Resistance, the Giants [Brigades], and the Homeland Shield — in addition to units of the Taiz axis west of the governorate, have paid a heavy price, martyrs and wounded, over the past days as they confronted the Houthi attack, which was planned by Iran, supported by it, and carried out with the participation of its various proxies/tools.”
“Thanks to God, our armed forces were able to repel an enemy combat formation a short time ago in the province of Taiz, forcing it to withdraw,” Houthi spokesman Brig. Gen. Yahya Saree proclaimed. “This was achieved by targeting it with a number of locally manufactured surface-to-air missiles.”
Videos have emerged showing Houthi forces inside Mokha and its airport and a large amount of equipment being seized.
The people of the port city of Al-Mokha gave a warm reception to Yemeni armed forces fighters following the city's strategic liberation. pic.twitter.com/0XDrveJPxU
— IRNA News Agency ☫ (@IrnaEnglish) September 10, 2026
— Iran Observer (@IranObserver0) September 10, 2026
The Core Military of the Houthis has entered the City of Mokha
Additionally, all Islands Key to Controlling the Bab… pic.twitter.com/95HI4TJ6Bm
Houthi forces captured the key coastal city of Mokha overnight after Saudi/UAE backed forces retreated.
— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) September 10, 2026
Seen here, Houthi fighters pose with an abandoned M-ATV MRAP at the city’s critical seaport. pic.twitter.com/1WD6l08MVc
Houthi fighters were filmed on the runway of Mokha international airport after capturing the city. pic.twitter.com/56Rc4BwsNf
— Open Source Intel (@Osint613) September 10, 2026
Holy score. This footage from Al Jazeera shows some of the equipment that was left behind for the Yemeni to capture in Mokha. https://t.co/yc0nwRlIse pic.twitter.com/Jn8VT571LY
— Reno (@theRenoNara) September 10, 2026
Even before the capture of Mokha, the rebel group held the BAM under threat with its array of drones and missiles, some of which it launched from deeper in Yemen. In fact, the group became the first to fire anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) at vessels during its campaign against Red Sea shipping.
Mokha, however, provides a potential new surveillance and launching point for the Houthis to deploy mines as well as aerial drones and uncrewed surface vessels (USVs) they can use to attack shipping. As we have reported previously, the rebel group pioneered the operational use of some of these weapons.
The Houthis “are determined to control the ports in order to use booby-trapped boats from areas close to shipping lanes,” Col. Abdul Basit Al-Baher, a Yemeni army officer and military analyst, told Arab News last month as the rebels were pushing closer to the port.
You can see video and images of a Houthi USV that struck the Greek-owned ship Tutor in the Red Sea in 2024 below.
Photos of Houthi kamikaze USV right before it struck Greek-owned cargo ship Tutor.
— Clash Report (@clashreport) June 17, 2024
The ship's guard were totally confused as to what they were observing.
They couldn't even react before it hit the ship. https://t.co/ZwFlWnsFAR pic.twitter.com/8ORRrvZWH6
In addition to Mokha, the Houthis also reportedly captured two important islands that could also add to its control over shipping through the strait. However, TWZ cannot independently confirm this.
There are claims that the Houthis seized Perim Island, which sits right in the middle of the BAM. In 2021, satellite images we obtained showed completion of a new, approximately 6,150-foot-long runway on the island as well as hangars and other facilities. The installation was supposedly meant primarily to support drone operations and was built by the United Arab Emirates.
This strategically located island sits in the narrowest part of the BAM, less than two miles west of Yemen and about 13 miles east of Djibouti, giving the Houthis a commanding presence at the mouth of the Red Sea.
Zuqar Island, which was also reportedly captured, sits in the middle of the Red Sea about 80 miles north of Perim Island. In the custody of the Yemeni government since 1998, it was being “used by government forces to track shipping traffic, monitor movements by Houthi rebels and stop weapons smuggling in the Red Sea,” according to The National.
Last year, images emerged of construction of a runway on the island.
It is unclear who built this island runway, though there have been indications that it could have been the United Arab Emirates once again.
A closer look at the new 2.1 km runway on Yemen’s
— Rich Tedd
Zuqar Island sits about 7 km east of the northbound shipping lane in the Red Sea. Control over these two islands could allow the Houthis to mirror the pattern Iran established in the Strait of Hormuz by directing traffic to pass through a narrow passage between Qeshm and Larak islands.
The conflict between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis grew out of a civil war in Yemen that erupted in 2014. It expanded a year later when a Saudi-led coalition joined forces with the government ousted by the Houthis and raged on until the parties reached a tenuous ceasefire in 2022. The Saudis held off on getting involved in the recent Red Sea conflict which saw the U.S. and coalition warships duking it out with the Houthis, and eventually led to a U.S.-led air campaign over Yemen. Tensions, however, reignited after that conflict ended when the Houthis joined the U.S.-Iran conflict on the side of their major supporter. In addition to the aforementioned blockade, the Houthis began striking Saudi refineries.
The Houthis already control the port of Hodeidah, about 100 miles to the north. Capturing Mokha and the two islands extends their reach even closer to the BAM.
In the wake of the Houthi blockade imposed in July, traffic in the BAM fell by 15%, according to Lloyd’s List Intelligence.
“On average, 273 ships sailed through the chokepoint each week between 27 July and 23 August,” the organization reported. “The naval ban on Saudi Arabia came into effect on 20 July, and the weekly average in the run up date was 319. Still, traffic remains above volumes seen before the crisis in the Middle East Gulf that led to a flurry of activity in the Red Sea as Saudi oil was redirected to Yanbu.”
As we have explained in the past, Saudi Arabia has diverted millions of barrels of oil per day through pipelines to its Yanbu port on the Red Sea in an effort to minimize the energy shortages due to the hostilities near the Persian Gulf.
The biggest impact of the blockade, Lloyd’s List Intelligence notes, is that it is driving up the cost to deliver oil by forcing traffic north through the Suez Canal, “extending voyage times and tying up capacity. In the Middle East, rising use of Hormuz shuttle tankers and multiple STS transfers is creating delays and increasing vessel utilization. Combined, these rising inefficiencies have led to the third VLCC spot-rate spike since the beginning of the crisis in the Middle East Gulf.”
The Houthi strikes on Saudi’s oil infrastructure, including a Houthi missile and drone attack against the Saudi Aramco refinery at Jazan on the Red Sea earlier this week, add a further dilemma for Riyadh, making it harder to get its product to points of shipment.
Video of of the aftermath of those strikes, which you can see below, emerged on social media.
Following Houthi strikes, fires can be seen raging at the Jizan oil refinery in Saudi Arabia. pic.twitter.com/tAqOPlsmvS
— OSINTdefender (@sentdefender) September 8, 2026
All this is raising the specter of the U.S. having to get as involved as it did during the previous Houthi campaign against shipping that ended last September, which could pull resources away from Iranian-focused operations, if supporting such an operation is even possible at all at this point. The Navy, and other key elements of the U.S. military, is overstretched and worn down by continuous deployments for many months leading up to Venezuela and then Iran, and now six months after Operation Epic Fury.
U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf are under increasing pressure as tensions with Iran continue to simmer. On Tuesday, several U.S. Air Force jets were damaged in an Iranian missile barrage on Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, according to CBS News. An A-10 Thunderbolt II close support jet lost a wing and about eight F-15E Strike Eagle multi-role fighters were slightly damaged and returned to service, the network noted.
There is also a report that Acting Navy Secretary Hung Cao said Iranian forces “blew the hell out of Bahrain” where the U.S. military has a number of key facilities, including the headquarters of the U.S. Fifth Fleet. The country has been the subject of frequent Iranian barrages since the U.S. and Israel first attacked on Feb. 28.
Cao’s assessment matches what we have seen and heard prior to his comments and raises anew the question of whether the U.S. will return to Bahrain and other bases in the region heavily attacked by Iran.
In an exclusive interview, Acting Navy Secretary Hung Cao told me that Iranian forces "blew the hell out of Bahrain."
— Ryan Morgan (@R_S_Morgan) September 10, 2026
While open-source analyses have long indicated that the U.S. Fifth Fleet Headquarters at Naval Support Activity Bahrain sustained extensive damage in the early…
On the sea, Iranian missiles are getting closer to hitting U.S. Navy warships, the Wall Street Journal reported.
“At least three times in the past week, Iranian forces have launched missiles at American warships, including an aircraft carrier, taking direct aim at the U.S. Navy in a way it hasn’t done since the start of the war,” the newspaper noted. “The attempted strikes on warships have led to much closer calls than previous attempts, with Iran using maneuverable warheads, people familiar with the attacks said.”
Amid this activity, traffic through the Strait remains suppressed.
“Vessel transits via the Strait of Hormuz fell on Wednesday to seven from 12 the previous day, preliminary ship-tracking data showed on Thursday, with levels also below the 10-day average of 14,” Reuters reported. “Out of these seven ships, four vessels exited and three entered, according to the data.”
However, an exact figure is hard to come by. Some vessels could be sailing through the waterway with their transponders turned off and would not be counted toward the totals, the outlet added.
As it is, oil prices are skyrocketing. As of noon Thursday, the per barrel price of Brent Crude exceeded $107, the highest price since July when it fell to just over $77 per barrel, according to OilPrice.com.
It will take some time before we get a better picture of how the Houthi seizure of the port of Mokha, and possibly Perim and Zuqar islands, will affect the global economy due to rising oil prices, either through reduced supply, increased cost of delivery or some combination of the two. With no end in sight to the U.S. conflict with Iran that helped to drive these actions, the Yemeni rebel group has incentives to inflict economic pain wherever it can.
Contact the author: howard@twz.com
The post Houthis’ Stranglehold On Strategic Bab Al-Mandab Strait Grows Stronger appeared first on TWZ.
Recently released pictures have highlighted a particularly interesting feature on the U.S. Navy’s Arleigh Burke class destroyer USS Mustin: a piggy-backed point defense system with a .50 caliber machine gun mounted on top of a 30mm chain gun. The Mk 38 Mod 4 Gun Weapon System (GWS) is interesting to examine as it offers significant boosts in firepower and other capabilities, including against drones, compared to preceding Mk 38 types.
Yesterday, Destroyer Squadron 15’s (DESRON 15) public affairs office released several pictures showing USS Mustin replenishing at sea in the Indian Ocean, including one highlighting the ship’s Mk 38 Mod 4 GWS (also sometimes confusingly referred to as a Machine Gun System, or MGS). DESRON 15 had put out another group of pictures late last month showing the weapon system being fired during routine training. Mustin was the first vessel in the Navy to receive Mod 4, and still looks to be the service’s only warship with this new version.
Though designated as a Mk 38 variant, the Mod 4 is fundamentally different from other Mk 38 types currently in service in the U.S. Navy, as well as several foreign naval arms.
“The Mk 38 Mod 4 Machine Gun System (MGS) is an upgrade … to address deficiencies in meeting Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems (C-UAS) requirements,” the Navy has said in the past. “In addition, the upgrade will also improve performance against surface targets and maintain Anti-Terrorist / Force Protection capabilities.”
To take a step back quickly, the original Mk 38 Mod 0 was developed internally by the Navy in the late 1970s and was simply a manually operated deck-mounted 25mm M242 Bushmaster chain gun with a maximum rate of fire of 180 rounds per minute. The M242 was entering U.S. Army service at around the same time as the main armament for the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. A product improved Mod 1 version was the first Mk 38 to actually enter serial production and began to be fitted to Navy ships in the late 1980s.
Following the deadly terrorist attack on the Arleigh Burke class destroyer USS Cole in the port of Aden in Yemen in 2000, the Navy began to acquire Mk 38 Mod 2s, also known as the Typhoon Weapon System, from United Defense (later BAE Systems).
The Mod 2 “introduced remote-control operation and mount stabilization and allowed the weapon to maintain aim even as the ship pitched and rolled. It also added a new electro-optical/infrared sensor and a laser rangefinder, giving the system reliable day/night target performance,” according to the Navy. “Beyond sensors, Mod 2 brought improved ammunition handling and enhanced interfaces – resulting in faster and more reliable engagement. Testing showed it delivered two to three times the strike accuracy of its predecessor.”
The Mk 38 Mod 2 otherwise featured the same M242 gun as the Mod 0/1 types, feeding from a magazine on the mount that could be loaded with up to 168 rounds. It is worth noting here that this is less than a minute of total firing time at the weapon’s maximum rate of fire. However, it can also be fired in single-shot and three-round burst modes, as well as at a lower automatic rate of fire of 100 rounds per minute.
In the 2010s, the Navy began acquiring the Mk 38 Mod 3 from BAE Systems, which added a smaller 7.62x51mm Mk 52 Mod 0 chain gun feeding from a 750-round magazine to the complete weapon system. The Mk 52 is also a much faster-firing weapon than the M242, with a maximum rate of fire of 570 rounds per minute.
The Mod 3 “also incorporated an improved EO/IR sensor that provides 330-degree surveillance capability and multiple fields of view,” per the Navy. “This sensor is decoupled from the gun, allowing operators to scan independently of the weapon and reducing the chance of alerting an adversary that they’ve been detected.”
Over the years, Mk 38 1/2/3 types have been integrated on a wide array of Navy ships, including Ticonderoga class cruisers, Arleigh Burke class destroyers, Nimitz and Ford class aircraft carriers, as well as a host of other amphibious warfare ships and auxiliaries.
All of this brings us back to the Mk 38 Mod 4, the Navy’s designation for a version of the Seahawk DS30 series from MSI Defense Systems, which the service first began acquiring in the late 2010s. The Mk 38 Mod 4’s main weapon is a 30mm Mk 44 Mod 3 Bushmaster II chain gun. Like the M242, the Mk 44 also has single-shot and burst modes, as well as low and high fully automatic settings (100 and 200 rounds per minute, respectively). The Mk 44 is also found on versions of the Mk 46 Gun Weapon System installed on stealthy Zumwalt class destroyers and San Antonio class amphibious warfare ships. It is used in a variety of ground-based applications and on the U.S. Air Force’s AC-130J Ghostrider gunship aircraft. As mentioned, the Mk 38 Mod 4 also has a .50 caliber M2 machine gun with a rate of fire of around 500 rounds per minute. The system’s magazine capacity for each gun is not immediately clear.
The complete Mk 38 Mod 4 also comes with a new Mk 48 Mod 2 electro-optical sight system (EOSS), which is mounted separately on the ship, and a Mk 134 Mod 0 operator console for remote operation. Furthermore, the complete system is designed to be fully integrated with the Aegis Combat System on Arleigh Burke class destroyers like USS Mustin. The optical turret appears to replace the older EOSS system mounted atop the bridge that was primarily used to target the ship’s 5-inch gun. It isn’t clear how these new mounts are individually targeted simultaneously as they don’t appear to have their own optics. Radar targeting through Aegis would be a big advancement for at least some targets types, like drones. The older Mk 38s had their own individual FLIR systems. It’s still possible these new turrets could have a basic boresighted electro-optical system as well.
In a July 2022 test, a Mk 38 Mod 4 system “successfully identified, tracked and engaged both surface and aerial targets using live ammunition against fixed and moving targets,” according to the Navy. The event “also highlighted the enhanced fire-control chain, the 30 mm gun’s improved performance and its ability to counter new challenges.”
The USS Mustin received its Mk 38 Mod 4 in 2024 and, as noted, this destroyer still appears to be the only ship in the Navy with this new weapon system, for reasons that are not entirely clear. The service had signed a contract with MSI Defense for an initial low-rate production batch of 15 systems in 2023. Other versions of the Seahawk DS30 are in use today on several classes of naval vessels globally, including British Type 23 frigates.
“USS Mustin (DDG 89), an Arleigh Burke class Aegis guided missile destroyer, was the first U.S. Navy warship to receive the upgrade. [The Naval Surface Warfare Center] Dahlgren Division is now finalizing the configuration so the system can be introduced to a wider set of platforms as fleet requirements evolve,” according to an official news item from Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) just this past February.
The Navy’s 2027 fiscal year budget request, released earlier this year, makes clear the plan is still to integrate the Mk 38 Mod 4 at least on all Flight IIA and Flight III subvariants of the Arleigh Burke destroyer. The Mk 38 Mod 4 is also set to be a feature on future U.S. Coast Guard icebreakers, which will also have combat systems derived from Aegis.
All remaining Mk 38 Mod 2s in Navy service are being brought up to the Mod 3 standard, as well.
For the Navy’s Arleigh Burke class destroyers, specifically, the Mk 38 Mod 4 reflects broader efforts to improve and expand the shorter-range defensive capabilities of those ships, especially against growing drone threats. An increasing number of these destroyers are also being equipped with new anti-drone interceptors. In addition, the service is working to replace the 20mm Vulcan cannon-armed Mk 15 Phalanx Close-in Weapon Systems (CIWS) on all subvariants in the class with different launchers for RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missiles (RAM) to further bolster defenses against drones, as well as incoming missiles and other aerial threats.
In general, the Navy has been investing heavily in new counter-drone defenses for ships across its fleets in recent years. These efforts include laser and high-power microwave directed energy weapons, as well as various types of physical interceptors and electronic warfare systems. Lessons learned from the ongoing conflict with Iran, as well as recent operations in and around the Red Sea, together with observations from the war in Ukraine, have only underscored the increasingly critical need for additional layers of protection against uncrewed attackers in the air and at sea. Small crewed boats attacking in large groups remain a real threat, too.
Mustin may not be the only Navy warship equipped with the Mk 38 Mod 4 for much longer, if the system has not already started finding its way at least onto more Arleigh Burke class destroyers.
Contact the author: joe@twz.com
The post Navy Destroyer Packs New ‘Piggy-Backed’ Point Defense System That Combines 30mm And .50 Cal Guns appeared first on TWZ.
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