President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has abandoned much of the diplomatic restraint that characterised his dealings with Donald Trump since their confrontation in the Oval Office in February 2025. In an interview on 14 October, the Ukrainian president accused his American counterpart of moving towards Russia and choosing the wrong side of history.
His intervention followed a series of American decisions that have increased pressure on Kyiv while offering Moscow economic and diplomatic advantages. A controversial agreement involving Russian diesel exports, uncertainty surrounding the provision of American intelligence and sudden restrictions on military satellite communications have brought relations between the two countries to their most difficult point since Trump’s return to the White House.
Zelenskyy’s criticism was unusually personal. Questioned about whether he felt betrayed by Washington’s recent decisions, he acknowledged the sense of betrayal but emphasised that Ukraine’s survival could not be treated as a commercial negotiation. He said Ukraine was not selling its country and argued that an American president claiming to act as an intermediary must not favour one of the belligerents.
The shift reflects the apparent exhaustion of a strategy Kyiv has pursued for more than a year: avoid openly challenging Trump, maintain personal contact with the White House and hope that American support can be preserved through diplomatic accommodation. That calculation is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain as Washington’s demands threaten to constrain Ukraine’s military operations without producing corresponding concessions from Russia.
The immediate demonstration of Ukraine’s dependence on American technology came during the night of 13–14 October, when SpaceX imposed restrictions on Starshield, the military-grade version of its Starlink satellite communications service.
According to accounts provided by Ukrainian frontline commanders, the changes disrupted connections to terminals travelling above approximately 160 kilometres per hour, forcing the abandonment of several drone missions. The restrictions affected systems used for reconnaissance, interception and strikes against Russian military targets.
As EU Today reported on 14 October, the disruption exposed a weakness extending beyond individual drone missions. Satellite communications form part of Ukraine’s operational infrastructure, supporting the movement of battlefield information, remote weapons control and communications across areas where conventional networks are vulnerable to Russian electronic warfare.
An interruption imposed remotely by a commercial provider can therefore affect military capabilities without any physical attack on Ukrainian equipment. Decisions taken outside Ukraine’s military command structure can alter the effectiveness of systems already deployed on the battlefield.
Ukraine’s Defence Ministry subsequently opened discussions with American officials, SpaceX and NATO partners while examining alternative communications arrangements.
Later on Wednesday, former Ukrainian defence minister Mykhailo Fedorov announced that Starlink functionality at speeds up to 160 kilometres per hour was being restored. Work was still required to remove the restrictions on Starshield altogether. The partial reversal offered immediate operational relief but did not resolve the underlying dependency.
There is no established evidence that the Trump administration ordered SpaceX to impose the restrictions. Nevertheless, their timing, amid mounting disagreements over Ukraine’s military operations, has reinforced Kyiv’s concerns about relying on communications infrastructure controlled by an American company.
The dispute over satellite access coincides with growing uncertainty about American intelligence cooperation.
Following Russian ballistic missile strikes on Kyiv on 12–13 October, Zelenskyy complained that Ukraine had received no advance warning from its international partners. The attacks damaged residential buildings and energy infrastructure, while Ukraine’s authorities raised concerns about the absence of advance intelligence.
Advance information about Russian missile launches is particularly important when ballistic weapons leave civilians only minutes to reach shelters. Intelligence cooperation also supports Ukrainian air-defence units in assessing threats and preparing interceptions.
Trump denied on 13 October that Washington had stopped sharing intelligence with Ukraine. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha likewise confirmed that cooperation continued. The absence of warnings about particular attacks therefore cannot be equated with a complete suspension of American assistance.
Yet the consequences of unreliable warning arrangements remain serious. For Ukraine, the distinction between information withheld, delayed or simply unavailable offers little protection when Russian ballistic missiles reach civilian neighbourhoods without sufficient warning.
The wider concern is that intelligence provision could become another instrument of diplomatic pressure. Accounts of negotiations over Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries have raised the possibility that Washington might use such assistance as leverage. Reports of explicit threats have been disputed, but the controversy has increased uncertainty surrounding a capability central to Ukraine’s defence.
The confrontation has also exposed a contradiction in Washington’s approach to the war.
Trump’s agreement allowing Russian diesel to return to international markets offers Moscow additional export opportunities at a time when Ukrainian attacks have damaged refining capacity and disrupted domestic fuel supplies.
The American administration has justified the arrangement partly through the need to ease fuel prices. Yet the initially announced quantities are modest in relation to international petroleum markets, raising questions about how much immediate relief the measure can realistically provide.
For Putin, its diplomatic significance may be considerably greater. Russia has secured a relaxation of American economic restrictions while Washington simultaneously presses Kyiv to limit attacks on the infrastructure that generates revenue for Moscow’s war economy.
The commercial implications of Washington’s sanctions reversal extend beyond the initial shipment volumes. The Treasury authorisation permits certain transactions involving Russian-origin diesel until April 2027, creating opportunities for international traders and financial intermediaries while leaving the broader sanctions framework formally intact.
Trump’s proposed energy ceasefire has compounded the difficulty. As EU Today examined earlier this week, Kyiv has offered to suspend strikes against Russian energy facilities if Moscow reciprocates. Russian attacks on Ukrainian power infrastructure have nevertheless continued.
An arrangement in which Ukraine stops targeting Russian refineries while Russia retains the ability to strike Ukrainian electricity generation would remove an important source of pressure on Moscow without protecting Ukrainian civilians.
Such an outcome would change the military and economic conditions of the war in Russia’s favour, regardless of how Washington describes its diplomatic objectives.
Zelenskyy’s sharper language also reflects a possible reassessment of where influence over American policy can be exercised.
For much of Trump’s second presidency, Kyiv’s diplomacy has concentrated on preserving a workable relationship with the president himself. That approach assumes that personal engagement can influence White House decisions even when Trump’s broader political instincts favour accommodation with Putin.
The events of October suggest that this strategy has reached its limits.
Ukraine’s alternative is not necessarily an outright confrontation with Washington. Rather, it involves placing greater weight on Congress, the American defence establishment and the institutional relationships that have supported Ukraine since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.
There is a historical precedent. During Trump’s first presidency, Congress supported military assistance to Ukraine despite differences within the administration over relations with Russia. Under Joe Biden, congressional resistance also demonstrated how domestic American politics could determine the timing and scale of weapons deliveries.
The months-long delay in approving the 2024 military assistance package contributed to severe ammunition shortages at a critical stage of Russia’s offensive operations. Ukraine’s loss of Avdiivka illustrated the danger of making battlefield planning dependent on political negotiations in Washington.
The congressional elections on 3 November 2026 could alter the balance of power. A change in control of either chamber would increase opportunities for oversight, investigations and legislative pressure on the administration, although Congress cannot independently direct every aspect of intelligence sharing or presidential diplomacy.
A less compliant Congress could nevertheless make it politically harder for the White House to restrict Ukrainian assistance without explanation.
For European governments, the dispute carries implications extending well beyond the immediate confrontation between Trump and Zelenskyy.
The transatlantic security relationship has historically depended on the assumption that American military capabilities, intelligence networks and political commitments would remain available to European allies during a major security crisis.
That assumption is increasingly difficult to reconcile with an American administration prepared to link assistance to Ukraine with wider commercial negotiations and domestic political objectives.
The consequences are particularly acute in areas where European capabilities remain insufficient to replace American systems quickly, including satellite intelligence, strategic reconnaissance, missile defence and specialised communications.
Europe can expand weapons production, finance Ukrainian purchases and develop alternatives to American technology. Replacing the full range of capabilities provided by the United States, however, requires investment measured in years rather than months.
The problem will not necessarily disappear when Trump leaves office. His return to power demonstrated that the American foreign-policy consensus which supported European security for decades can be challenged through the electoral process.
Future American administrations may seek to restore traditional alliances, but European governments must now account for the possibility that another election could reverse those commitments.
For Zelenskyy, the immediate calculation is exceptionally difficult. Public criticism risks provoking further retaliation from a president whose administration still controls capabilities essential to Ukraine’s defence. Continued diplomatic restraint, however, has not prevented Washington from offering concessions to Russia or introducing uncertainty into Ukraine’s military planning.
His latest intervention suggests that Kyiv is no longer convinced that avoiding confrontation will preserve American support. The question is whether greater political scrutiny of Washington’s decisions can prevent a further erosion of assistance before Russia turns the resulting military advantages into territorial gains.
The European Union has maintained its Article 7 proceedings against Hungary despite acknowledging significant improvements in the country’s rule-of-law situation since Prime Minister Péter Magyar’s government took office earlier this year.
Ministers meeting at the General Affairs Council in Luxembourg on Tuesday, 13 October, reviewed reforms introduced by the Hungarian administration and received an updated assessment from the European Commission.
The proceedings, initiated by the European Parliament in September 2018, remain open eight years after concerns over judicial independence, corruption, media freedom and democratic accountability first prompted action under the EU treaties.
No decision was announced to terminate the procedure following the latest meeting.
European Commissioner Michael McGrath said ahead of the discussions that Hungary had made substantial progress towards addressing the institutional problems inherited from the administration of former prime minister Viktor Orbán.
Speaking in Luxembourg, McGrath acknowledged improved cooperation between the Hungarian government and European institutions.
However, he also indicated that the reform process remained incomplete, noting that the new administration had been in office for only several months.
The Commission’s assessment reflects the changing relationship between Budapest and Brussels following Magyar’s election victory and the subsequent introduction of reforms intended to restore judicial and institutional independence.
As EU Today reported in June, the change of government created an opportunity to resolve long-standing disputes over the condition of Hungary’s democratic institutions and the suspension of European funding.
The latest Council discussions indicate that the EU is prepared to recognise reforms already undertaken without automatically treating them as sufficient to close the Article 7 procedure.
The European Parliament initiated the proceedings in 2018 after raising concerns over developments affecting Hungary’s constitutional system, judicial independence, corruption safeguards and civil society.
Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union provides mechanisms for responding when a member state is considered at risk of seriously breaching the Union’s fundamental values.
Under its preventive provisions, the Council can determine whether there is a clear risk of such a breach.
More severe measures, including the possible suspension of certain membership rights, require additional procedures and higher institutional thresholds.
Hungary’s case has remained within the preventive stage, with successive Council meetings examining the country’s legal and political developments.
The Council’s account of the 13 October meeting confirms that Hungarian representatives presented measures intended to address concerns raised by the European Parliament and member states during earlier proceedings.
The Commission also briefed ministers on its latest assessment.
The meeting did not produce a formal finding that the outstanding concerns had been fully resolved.
Since assuming office, Magyar has sought to reverse elements of the institutional structure established during Orbán’s lengthy premiership.
The reforms have included measures concerning public administration, judicial accountability and the relationship between national institutions and European law.
The new government has also attempted to improve relations with Brussels after years of disputes that affected EU budget decisions, sanctions policy and cooperation over Ukraine.
EU Today has previously examined Magyar’s programme of institutional renewal and the political difficulties involved in changing institutions shaped by the previous administration.
Reforming legislation does not necessarily transform the institutions responsible for applying it.
Judicial appointments, regulatory structures, public procurement procedures and anti-corruption enforcement may all require additional measures before the effects of reform can be fully assessed.
The European Commission must therefore consider not only the laws adopted by the new government but also whether the institutions concerned operate independently and effectively.
The Article 7 proceedings are closely associated with wider disputes over Hungary’s access to European funding, although the relevant legal mechanisms are different.
During Orbán’s administration, the Commission and Council used financial conditionality procedures to restrict access to certain EU resources because of concerns affecting the protection of the Union’s budget.
Magyar’s reforms have opened the possibility of reversing some of those restrictions.
As EU Today reported in September, the Commission moved towards releasing €4.2 billion following changes intended to address rule-of-law concerns.
The financial decisions involve compliance with conditions attached to EU funding and can proceed independently of the Article 7 mechanism.
Consequently, the release of money does not automatically establish that all the institutional problems identified in the original parliamentary proceedings have been resolved.
Likewise, the continuation of Article 7 does not necessarily prevent the Commission from recognising progress under separate funding arrangements.
McGrath addressed the possibility of terminating the procedure during remarks before Tuesday’s meeting.
He explained that the Commission could provide its assessment but did not have unilateral authority to bring the Article 7 process to an end.
In his recorded statement in Luxembourg, the Commissioner pointed to the responsibilities of the European Parliament, which initiated the case, and the Council, which has conducted the subsequent examination.
The institutional arrangements mean that improved relations between the Commission and the Hungarian government cannot by themselves dispose of the proceedings.
The Council must consider the reforms and the remaining concerns within the framework established by the treaties.
Political agreement among member states will consequently be required to determine how the process develops.
The latest discussions take place against a substantially different political background from previous years.
Budapest has recently withdrawn objections to further steps in Ukraine’s EU accession negotiations following Ukrainian legislation addressing educational rights for Hungarian speakers and other national minorities.
The change has removed one obstacle to enlargement negotiations and reflects the government’s more cooperative approach towards other EU institutions.
Nevertheless, Hungary’s position on foreign policy and enlargement is distinct from the assessment of its domestic rule-of-law arrangements.
The Council’s examination remains focused on the institutional concerns that led to the procedure being initiated.
The Irish presidency’s summary of the October Council meeting confirms that ministers received an update rather than reaching a new formal determination.
The proceedings therefore remain open while the Commission and member states continue examining the measures introduced by Magyar’s administration.
The coming decisions will establish how European institutions respond when a new government undertakes reforms intended to reverse the conduct that originally led to action under Article 7.
For Hungary, the outcome will influence its relationship with Brussels well beyond the immediate debate over EU funding. For the Union, it will demonstrate how its rule-of-law procedures operate when political circumstances change and the member state concerned begins addressing previously identified institutional problems.
Washington is pressing the victim, not the aggressor, a Ukrainian diplomat says. President Donald Trump is using the threat of cutting military aid and intelligence as a tool to pressure Ukraine, while failing to apply enough pressure on Russia to stop the war, says Oleksandr Khara, executive director of the Center for Defense Strategies, Espreso reports.
Ukraine’s drones and air defense still lean on US satellite intelligence and weapons, which gives Trump room to squeeze Kyiv rather than Moscow. Khara argues Trump wants to end the war on Ukraine’s and Europe’s account to restore normal relations with Russian ruler Vladimir Putin, treating Ukraine as the weak link to be pushed.
“Trump wants to use restrictions, levers of influence on Ukraine to achieve his goal. To end or stop this war at any cost, at the expense of Ukraine and Europe, to restore normal relations with Putin,” Khara said.
Using American aid as leverage over Kyiv is not new for Trump, the diplomat noted, recalling earlier instances in which support was blocked or suspended.
Trump wants a visible success in ending the war, Khara says, partly against the backdrop of US domestic politics. He has economic tools to press Moscow but is in no hurry to use them, and his administration is instead gradually loosening sanctions on Russia.
“He doesn’t want to pressure Russia. He thinks Ukraine is the weak link and that it needs to be pushed,” Khara stressed.
Ukraine’s dependence on US support has fallen thanks to European partners, he added, so Kyiv has more room to keep fighting even as European states keep buying American weapons for it.
An energy ceasefire is possible only on strict terms, Khara believes. Kyiv could agree to stop striking Russian refineries only if Moscow halts attacks on Ukraine’s power generation and transmission, heating, and the Black Sea ports and the ships heading to them.
Until such a deal exists, Ukraine must hit harder, he argued, because steadily draining Russia’s economic resources is what could force the Kremlin to reconsider.
“As long as there is no such agreement, and no desire from Russia, we must increase this pressure and destroy as much of their energy infrastructure as possible,” Khara said.
The Ukrainian government on Tuesday night said that its access to the SpaceX-owned Starlink satellite internet service was throttled, prompting critics to question the wisdom of depending on any company owned by far-right billionaire Elon Musk. According to a Wednesday report in The New York Times, Ukrainian officials suspect that orders to restrict their access […]
The post Throttling Ukraine’s Starlink access heightens concerns over Musk appeared first on Asia Times.
This story originally appeared in Jacobin on Oct. 12, 2026. It is shared here with permission.
Speaking with members of the newly formed AutoZone Workers Union, you would never guess that one of them had just been fired — and that another would be the next morning. That’s what happened to Nathan DuCongé and then David Valencia after they won their union election. On a Zoom call with Jacobin, though, their joy was contagious. DuCongé and his coworkers were all smiles and banter as they talked about their union campaign, how it feels to win, and the unexpected boost they received from filmmaker Boots Riley.
On Friday, September 25, an AutoZone store in White Plains, New York, became the first of the company’s nearly seven thousand American retail locations to unionize. DuCongé and his coworkers, now members of United Auto Workers (UAW) Local 259, said they hadn’t been sure which way the vote would go.
“The deck was really stacked against these workers trying to organize here,” said Brian Murray, an experienced organizer brought on in August by UAW Local 259 Vice President Mike DiGuiseppe. “It was because of their sticking together, the amount of fun they have, and their camaraderie, their solidarity for each other, [that] they were able to overcome a lot of union busting.” He added, “I would have expected [them] to not have succeeded in winning that vote, but they did.”
DuCongé moved to New York City two years ago and soon started working for AutoZone as a part-time employee. A year later, he became a parts sales manager. He said he decided to start organizing his store after he was removed from the schedule one Saturday in April, and instead went to a joint meeting of the Emergency Workplace Organizing Committee (EWOC) and the New York City Democratic Socialists of America (NYC-DSA). There he was connected with UAW members who encouraged him to unionize.
By then, DuCongé and Valencia, who was hired several months after him, had already discussed the possibility of a union. Valencia’s turning point came in 2025, when he worked a Fourth of July shift and found out from his paycheck that he wasn’t getting holiday pay. “I went in and I told my manager that day . . . I’m going to make a union.”
“I know this isn’t always the case, but for us, it was already there,’ said Valencia. ‘We were already a union.“
Valencia said he already knew DuCongé’s political orientation when he approached him about unionizing. “We got to talking about it, and it took a long time because we didn’t have the institutional knowledge on where to even begin, until by chance Nate met someone at a DSA meeting. They hooked us up with the UAW, and the rest is history.”
Given the store’s small size, the workers’ specific grievances, and the tight-knit relationships among several key employees, DuCongé and Valencia felt it would be a good place to test whether AutoZone could be organized.
“I know this isn’t always the case, but for us, it was already there,” said Valencia. “We were already a union.”
Juan Accostupa, a full-time sales associate who has worked at AutoZone for ten years and trained many of the organizers, described the extra responsibilities workers take on. “We’re not just a retail place. We do a lot of work,” he said. “We unload the trucks, we do installations — batteries, headlights, brake lights, wiper blades, whatever the case might be — and we’re just not getting paid properly.”
“You’re expected to do a lot for so little,” said DuCongé. “These are the kind of things that mechanics are paid to do, right?”
Accostupa said he has made minimum wage throughout his tenure at the store. “Some people think this is, like, a revolution thing. It’s not. We’re just asking for what should be done: better pay and better benefits. That’s it.”
Jess Omelia, a part-time commercial driver who previously worked for a Pepperidge Farm warehouse in Florida with “really great benefits,” said working for minimum wage with little to no benefits was a huge adjustment. “It was a job that I needed at the time, so I took it.”
“Some people think this is, like, a revolution thing. It’s not. We’re just asking for what should be done: better pay and better benefits.“
Omelia said the lack of holiday pay for part-time employees came as a shock. She recalled being put on the schedule for Mother’s Day even though she was the only one among her coworkers with a toddler. “I was the only one there working on Mother’s Day,” she said. “It was only my store manager there. He had given everyone the day off or people had called out to be with their families.”
Workers also cited other reasons for unionizing: inconsistent and last-minute scheduling, inadequate equipment, no say in how they handle their routine responsibilities or in disciplinary procedures, and a push to upsell customers known as “WITTDTJR” — short for the AutoZone slogan “What It Takes To Do the Job Right.”
“We would literally come in and underneath the [sales] numbers every day, there would be a threatening note underneath that you need to get these numbers up,” said Omelia. “You would be punished and your hours would be taken away if you weren’t upselling.”
Workers said their card drive proceeded with little incident until July, when corporate got wind of it. After the workers sent their demand letter and submitted their cards in late July, AutoZone promptly rejected them, saying DuCongé’s involvement as a parts sales manager — a position the company says is supervisory — nullified them.
DuCongé disputes that categorization. Under the National Labor Relations Act, a supervisor must have the authority, using independent judgment, to make or effectively recommend decisions like hiring, firing, disciplining, or promoting other workers — authority DuCongé said he did not have. Rather than fight the issue, which could have delayed an election, the workers resubmitted the cards without him.
“I just felt like it would be selfish if I tried to fight for my eligibility,” said DuCongé. “I never wanted to stand in the way of these people. They’re my friends, my coworkers. It was a good feeling to be able to just help.” He added, “As a member of DSA as well, I felt that as a responsibility. It was kind of like, hey, look, I’m in this organization, I might as well do something that lives up to the organization and the reason why I’m in it.”
Workers said that at a prehearing meeting in late August, AutoZone made clear that it intended to challenge the election not before the National Labor Relations Board but in federal court in Tennessee, where the company is based. At the same meeting, the workers and AutoZone signed an agreement that locked in the list of eligible voters to prevent challenges to votes on election day.
Yet other employees who hold the same position as DuCongé were allowed to vote. Two workers who were transferred to the store in mid-August were also deemed eligible.
In the lead-up to the vote, workers reported being subjected to heavy surveillance, multiple antiunion meetings per week, and threats of disciplinary action against the organizers.
“We were having three meetings a week. It was constant . . . and they were really just reading off of a script every time,” said Omelia. “It was just all anti-union. They were extremely against it, said that they would do everything in their power to fight it. If we didn’t like the conditions, [they said] that we could quit and go to another store.”
Valencia said the anti-union messaging relied on half-truths and accusations, including misleading claims about union dues and employees’ ability to communicate with their manager. Organizers, he said, were accused of misleading or threatening workers into voting yes, and were portrayed as using the campaign to land union jobs paid for by workers’ dues.
Workers said AutoZone brought in managers from locations around the country to surveil the store. “There were up to eight, nine people in the store a day, and even the customers were like, ‘What’s going on?’” said Omelia. “There would be times where they’re literally just standing at the back of the store with their arms crossed, just watching us.”
DuCongé said that after the workers submitted their demand letter on July 24, an account under the name of AutoZone CEO Philip Daniele showed up among the viewers of one of his Instagram stories.
In a September 4 recording shared with Jacobin, management threatened to fire DuCongé for union activity on the grounds that he was a supervisor: “If you continue to involve [yourself] in unionization activity, we will accept your invitation to fire you.”
LaborLab, a workers’ rights watchdog group, estimates that AutoZone spent around $200,000 trying to defeat the union. “They do everything except pay you more,” said Murray.
Despite the onslaught of anti-union activity, the workers said the solidarity they felt with one another kept them moving forward. When Omelia’s mother died, her coworkers took up a collection. “I came into work, and they had a little envelope, and they all pitched in to help with my mom’s funeral costs. That’s how close we are.” Accostupa was quick to point out that every manager declined to contribute.
Support also came from outside the store. DuCongé, a filmmaker himself, had posted on social media about how inspiring he found Boots Riley’s new film, I Love Boosters. To his surprise, Riley started reposting updates on their organizing efforts. His first feature, Sorry to Bother You, follows a group of telemarketers who organize and go on strike.
“Boots has been massively influential on my personal life, my filmmaking efforts, but also really, really influential for this campaign,” he told Jacobin. “The solidarity is going beyond the movies and TV shows that he makes.” He added, “I just can’t thank him enough, truly, for helping us out.”
Workers said management kept talking to employees about the election in the twenty-four hours before the vote — and even during it. “On the day of voting, during voting happening, managers were pulling some of those people out of the store, and trying to sway those votes,” said Omelia.
Barred from voting and, he said, from entering the store, DuCongé stayed nearby. He recounted the moment:
I didn’t know what to do with myself, so I just stand on this hill that’s looking down at the store . . . I felt locked onto the ground, and there’s this groundhog sitting right next to me, just also looking out there too. I’m looking at the groundhog, and then eventually it just looks at me, like, “What are you looking at?” It turns out we’re both just looking down at the store. There’s this beautiful sunset and all these crows and everything, and that’s when Mike [DiGuiseppe] texted us the news, and said, “You won.” I just collapsed.
The final tally was 6–4 in favor of the union. Despite the prehearing agreement, and despite his serving as the union’s election observer, Valencia’s vote was challenged during voting, but, in the end, every eligible vote was counted.
The day after the vote, AutoZone fired DuCongé. In a recording provided to Jacobin, management tells him: “Effective immediately, AutoZone is terminating your employment as a result of the failure to act appropriately as a manager by engaging in and/or facilitating union activity.”
The following day, another worker was fired for, in DuCongé and Valencia’s words, “not stopping the union.”
Valencia says he was fired too, on October 3, the morning after the Zoom call. Asked on the call whether he was worried about his job, he had said, “If I get fired, I get fired. They’re going to have to come up with a good reason, because I’m in the bargaining unit. It won’t be so easy.”
“If I get fired, I get fired. They’re going to have to come up with a good reason, because I’m in the bargaining unit.“
That same day, AutoZone filed three objections to the election with the National Labor Relations Board, a move the union sees as a delay tactic. The workers seem undeterred.
“We fought for this and we did it. It’s funny, I was telling the staff and everybody else, we were like the Knicks. Knicks in six,” said Accostupa. “The thing about it was we won six and four, 6–4. That was the key.”
Next they intend to help workers at other AutoZone stores organize. “I deliver to other stores, so I see the things that they go through,” said Omelia. “They were watching this election and waiting to see what happened with us to see if they could move forward.”
Valencia says AutoZone runs on the work of people like him and his coworkers. “People come into AutoZone frantic,” he says. “You help them out, you send them on their way with a smile on their face. It’s a good thing. We’re not saving the world, but one person at a time, we’re making their day better.”
“The workers on the ground are really providing all the value to the companies that eat up all the value,” Valencia says, “and all the people at the top that take all the profits that we create. And we just want some kind of compensation that looks closer to the value that we provide.”
Poland’s Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski has publicly criticized SpaceX chief Elon Musk over the latest disruptions in Starlink's operation in Ukraine. Poland is the largest supplier of Ukraine’s terminals, having provided about 29,500, roughly half the network. It also has a Starlink ground station in Wola Krobowska that provides connectivity for much of Central and Eastern Europe, including Ukraine, RMF24 reports.
On 13 October, SpaceX imposed a 100 mph (160 km/h) speed limit on the StarShield military package that Ukrainian forces use, disrupting drone missions without warning. Poland, which pays about $50 million a year for Ukraine’s Starlink terminals, told Musk it is watching.
“Hey, @elonmusk, big man, are you playing politics with your products again? As your European customers, we are watching you,” Sikorski wrote on X.
The “big man” jab echoed their 2025 clash, when Musk told Sikorski to “be quiet, small man” after the minister noted that Warsaw, not SpaceX as charity, pays for the service.
Be quiet, small man.
— Elon Musk (@elonmusk) March 9, 2025
You pay a tiny fraction of the cost.
And there is no substitute for Starlink.
Meanwhile, presidential adviser Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov said that this could not be a coincidence and was most likely tied to the current political situation.
The cap bites exactly where Ukraine’s drones do their work. The StarShield package had previously carried no data speed limit, and the change directly affected drones that use Starlink to steer in flight, the 7th Air Assault Corps said.
“During flights, the connection could drop for 10 to 20 seconds at speeds of just 110 to 120 kilometers per hour. The drones kept moving, but these interruptions made them harder to control,” the corps said, describing problems that now start well below the new ceiling.
A dependence Kyiv has feared for years. The limit revives an old worry. Ukraine neither owns nor controls Starlink, and the restriction follows fresh fears of a shutdown after Musk backed US President Donald Trump’s call for Zelenskyy to resign.
The EU is shying away from triggering rules that would shield people and companies working at or with the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague from US sanctions, preferring instead months-long diplomatic outreach.
The European Commission on Wednesday (14 October) told reporters in Brussels that it was doing everything to seek “practical solutions”, while hoping that its diplomacy will help the court, which prosecutes people for war crimes, genocide, and other atrocities.
“We haven’t made any decisions yet. But we continue to discuss at every level,” said a commission spokesperson, when pressed on whether a little-known blocking statue, which would presumably damper the impact of the US sanctions, remains an option.
And an EU summit in Brussels on Thursday is expected to ask the US to reverse the decision, according to draft conclusions seen by EUobserver.
The EU’s little-known “blocking statute” would prevent EU companies and banks from complying with the sanctions. It was first used against US sanctions on Cuba, Iran and Libya.
The Trump administration had, last Friday, announced financial sanctions on the ICC as part of a larger assault to dismantle the court, after it issued arrest warrants for Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, its former defence minister Yoav Gallant, and Hamas military commander Mohammed Deif.
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European regions and cities demand clear rules and solid financial backing to help Europe’s ailing car industry through the shift to electric vehicles (EVs). The European Committee of the Regions (CoR) on Wednesday adopted an opinion on the European Commission’s Automotive Package, arguing that the transition will only succeed if regions are adequately equipped to carry it.
Regions said electrification is crucial to achieving climate-neutral road transport, but that success depends on affordability and access. They called for charging infrastructure across regions, funded by European, national and regional budgets, as well as targeted demand support in lower-income regions.
“Europe’s regions and cities have spoken with one voice: competitiveness and electrification by 2035 go hand in hand,” said María Chivite, President of the Navarre region in Spain, who drafted the opinion. Europe can only lead the transition, she argued, if regions receive “real financing”.
The Commission proposed the Automotive Package in December. It suggests a 90-percent-cut in tailpipe emissions from 2035, with the remaining 10 percent offset through low-carbon steel or e-fuels and biofuels. The CoR welcomed these temporary flexibilities but warned that they must not delay zero-emission mobility.
Brigitte Torloting, Chair of the Automotive Regions Alliance (ARA) and Vice-President of France’s Grand Est region, warned that time is short and “global competition will not wait for us”. She called for a strategy that protects automotive production in the regions, backed by strong European instruments such as “European preference.” Without a clear framework and targeted investment, she said, Europe risks losing its industrial base, from small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to major suppliers.
“European preference” is an approach first introduced in the Commission’s proposal for an Industrial Accelerator Act in March and is designed to prioritise EU-based manufacturing. The Commission suggests public procurement contracts and state-subsidised industrial projects to source a minimum percentage of materials or components from European producers. For EV production, the Commission proposed that 70% of components for new cars – excluding the battery – must originate within the EU.
CoR members also welcomed the “Made in the EU” approach to strenghten European production but insisted it must be proportionate, so that SMEs and regional supply chains are not buried in red tape.
With automotive production concentrated in specific territories, the opinion also calls for targeted cohesion funding, skills and quality jobs.
According to EU figures for 2024, the automotive industry contributed 7 percent of EU gross domestic product (GDP), about EUR 170 billion in exports and supported around 13.8 million jobs, 3.5 million of them in manufacturing. According to CoR figures, the 41 regions organised in the Automotive Regions Alliance (ARA) generate more than 40 percent of EU GDP.
This story was produced by the European Newsroom (enr) in cooperation with the European Committee of the Regions (CoR). The editorial responsibility lies with the enr.
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Ian Henderson, “Inspector A” of the OPCW’s skeptical insider analysis of chemical attacks in Syria, responds to allegedly newly-found, un-declared chemical weapons.
If Douma one of the highest-profile “proven” chemical attacks attributed to Syria’s former Bashar Assad government has been shown to be fake, what does it say about new, undeclared Syrian chemical weapons that have supposedly been found?
It says we should be extremely skeptical about news of such discoveries.
I spent years compiling an insider’s analysis of the evolving Western narrative of Syrian chemical attacks while I was at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) as well as afterwards.
My conclusion was it is nigh impossible to prove a negative in this situation; to say there had never been a chemical attack by the Syrian government forces.
However, when it came to high-profile allegations of such attacks in the Syrian towns of East Ghouta, Khan Sheykhoun, Ltamenah, Saraqib and Douma, there were fatal flaws in the official narratives.
There were unmistakable signs, clear to us on the inside, of fabrication.
The Douma attack eight years ago appeared to be the last of a series of chemical allegations against the regime.
Yet the saga continues. The OPCW sent a new mission to Syria this May to try to find alleged, undeclared chemical weapons from the government of Bashar al-Assad, who was ousted in 2024.
Before examining the intentions and results of this mission, it is useful to review how the Western-backed OPCW handled its investigation into the 2018 chemical weapons attack in Douma, a suburb of Damascus.
I was an OPCW inspector on that mission and this is why I blew the whistle.
The Establishment Narrative
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in July 2020, during a visit to the Kremlin. (The Kremlin)
Just how much could of the establishment narrative that blamed Assad for using chemical weapons be believed ?
Devised during the early part of the Western and Gulf-backed jihadist war to overthrow Assad a decade and a half ago – and built upon steadily by Western belligerents throughout the crisis – the story that Assad had “gassed his own people” was widely believed with mainstream media fully on board.
Doubters were glibly dismissed, including “official” dissenters such as some senior inspectors at the OPCW. I was among them.
The chemical allegations followed a well-oiled procedure. Armed opposition groups – who were seeking direct Western military intervention to support their effort to overthrow Assad – would raise the alarm online by posting slick images and videos of an alleged chemical attack.
The OPCW would generally believe the opposition groups and their witnesses and accept items of supposed “evidence” handed over to them, sometimes months after the alleged attack. Until the Douma allegation in 2018, the fact-finding mission never got to the scene of any Syrian chemical attack after an initial attempt in 2014 went awry.
The fact-finding report would be secretly drafted under the direct control of OPCW top management, bypassing any procedural or technical oversight, and would conclude that it was “reasonable to believe” that a chemical attack had indeed taken place.
The follow-up investigations by the heavily politicized Joint Investigative Mechanism (J.I.M.), or by the later Investigation and Identification Team (I.I.T.), would suggest that “a reasonable person would believe” that the Syrian Armed Forces were responsible for the attack.
OPCW inspectors are not fools. Many of us saw what was going on, seeing the tight political control that the U.S. and to a lesser degree the U.K. exerted over anything to do with the Syrian file. But the draconian confidentiality regime in the OPCW kept everyone subdued.
The breakthrough came after the April 2018 Douma allegation.
For the first time, an OPCW team actually got to the scene of an alleged chemical attack, at the town of Douma, in southwestern Syria, about 10 kilometers (6 miles) northeast of Damascus.
We did our job thoroughly, and in doing so we identified serious flaws in the allegation.
OPCW Extreme Measures
Headquarters of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in The Hague, The Netherlands. (CEphoto/Wikimedia Commons/ CC BY-SA 4.0)
The OPCW resorted to ever-escalating measures to bring things back on track. After trying to secretly modify the interim report by withdrawing it from publication and sneaking in the preordained conclusions that were required by influential delegations, senior OPCW officials went to extremes.
They removed all the team members who had gone to Douma and produced a flawed Fact Finding Mission report written by persons unknown, none of whom had much knowledge of what the Douma team had done.
The fact-finding report predictably found that “it was reasonable to believe” there had been an attack with chlorine in Douma. This was followed much later by the OPCW’s inevitable I.I.T. report that blamed the Syrian regime for the attack.
In reaching its conclusions, the drafters claimed, as usual, to have been informed by anonymous experts. The context in the reports was usually along the lines of the fact-finding mission (F.F.M.) “asked an expert about this and the expert said it was possible.” Many qualified experts and commentators, including me, consider this laughable.
The OPCW were going too far, and ultimately this led to the ongoing dispute where the two most senior and experienced inspectors in the F.F.M. team objected.
The drafter of the team’s interim report, Dr. Brendan Whelan (“Inspector B”), was one. I was the other. In my case I had also led the politically-mandated inspections at two facilities of the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre (S.S.R.C.) suspected of harbouring illicit chemical weapons activities.
Here again, we did our work thoroughly and in drafting the S.S.R.C. inspection reports I made clear that there was nothing amiss in either of the facilities.
This didn’t stop the U.S., U.K. and France from conducting punitive missile strikes on Barzah S.S.R.C., on the basis of social media postings on the Douma allegation, even before the OPCW team had arrived at the incident scene.
Destroyed Barzah Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre labs, Nov. 7, 2018. (Ian Henderson/OPCW/courtesy former Syrian government)
Rather than another detailed analysis of the Douma scandal, suffice it to say, the official Douma narrative has been clearly and scientifically picked apart by many credible observers, including by Dr. Whelan and me.
This has been widely reported, although predictably not much in the mainstream media.
The OPCW and Western delegations have been in crisis management mode ever since the first leak, that of an internal engineering summary that cast doubt on the allegation that chlorine cylinders had been dropped from aircraft, raising the possibility that militants had placed the cylinders to stage the scene of a chemical attack.
I was the author of that report.
Nose of chlorine cylinder alleged to have smashed through a steel-reinforced concrete roof at apartment building “Location 2,” April. 21, 2018. (OPCW, courtesy former Syrian government)
Worse still for the prevailing Douma narrative, Dr. Whelan recently won a legal case against the OPCW for their charges against him of confidentiality breaches.
In their submissions, the OPCW inadvertently admitted to suppressing the key toxicology assessment (incidentally by NATO specialists) that dismissed chlorine as the likely cause of death of deceased victims shown in images posted from the scene.
[See: OPCW Inadvertently Admitted Burying Critical Evidence on Syria Chemical Weapons Investigation]
The OPCW has refused to engage in any discussion on the facts and scientific substance of the case, ever since concerns were first raised by Dr. Whelan and me.
This intransigence to re-open the file is likely dictated by the needs of the three belligerent governments that subjected Syria to punitive missile strikes in retaliation for the supposed Syrian chemical attack even before the Douma F.F.M. had started work.
Any updated or corrected findings on Douma would be inconvenient.
The New OPCW Mission
Still apparently seeking to prove its case, the OPCW formed a new Syria mission in May aimed at “finding” alleged missing, un-declared chemical weapons.
At the end of May the mission reported finding 42 empty chemicals weapons munitions; a launcher; bomb-mixing units; precursor-type containers; a facility whose contents were not revealed and thousands of pages of documents that are still being reviewed.
The mission also found 650 kg of “a chemical compound known to have been used by the former government for the production of nerve agents,” which the report does not name. It says an unknown quantity of hexamine, a legal chemical with wide industrial use, was found but it is not clear if this is the same compound as in the 650 kg.
In September, the Syrian government, now under the leadership of a former al-Qaeda and ISIS leader, began destroying the empty bombs, but not any of the chemicals that were found, presumably meaning none were banned.
Despite all the fanfare of these results being presented at a U.N. Security Council meeting last month, it appears that the new OPCW mission came up as empty as those bombs.
None of these discoveries does anything to prove that Assad ever used a chemical weapon, in other words, nothing to prove that I, along with other OPCW officials and countless observers and commentators who challenged the Assad chemical weapons narrative were wrong.
Presumably after all the effort in creating that narrative, Western governments and mainstream media that promoted the Iraq war and then the Syrian conflict to achieve regime change in that country, require a tidier ending than the mess they made of the Iraqi WMD story.
Sept. 3 U.N. Security Council meeting on OPCW mission:
An early press release from the OPCW is telling. It shows what they were attempting to prove with this May mission, in particular two rather flimsy suggestions.
They report the discovery of some of the empty munitions,
“including the same type of aerial bombs that were used in chemical attacks in Ltamenah in March 2017 and Khan Shaykhun in April 2017.”
This refers to empty M4000 aerial bombs, declared by the Syrians as part of their stockpile.
Aside from the questionable Douma-like irregularities surrounding “evidence” used by the OPCW to conclude that sarin-filled M4000 bombs were used in those attacks, it’s important to mention something else.
The Syrians had clearly explained to us that 2,000 of these bombs, never filled, had been set aside to be “repurposed,” in other words to be filled with high explosive to turn them into conventional munitions. These could turn up anywhere.
A second questionable statement in the press release is,
“Rockets were also found, of the same type as those that were used in the Ghouta chemical weapons attack in August 2013.”
This relates to artillery rockets crudely modified with a large cylindrical payload container added at the front.
For a start, the U.N./OPCW report of Ghouta did not attempt to identify the perpetrators of that sarin attack, since it was not part of their mandate. The accusations against the regime have always been political, something the mainstream media happily took up.
The Most Credible Analysis So Far
The Ghouta sarin attack took place on Aug. 21, 2013 and according to Western sources killed more than 1,000 people in the Damascus suburb.
The most serious investigation of the Ghouta incident to date points to the attack being launched from opposition-occupied positions, and remains the most credible analysis of the attack.
The opposition forces allegedly responsible were from the al-Nusra Front, which conducted joint operations in 2013 in the Damascus area with the Liwa Al Islam opposition group. Al-Nusra were known to be in possession of sarin, according to reporting by Seymour Hersh, who wrote:
“In the months before the [Aug. 21, 2013] attack [in Ghouta], the American intelligence agencies produced a series of highly classified reports, culminating in a formal Operations Order – a planning document that precedes a ground invasion – citing evidence that the al-Nusra Front, a jihadi group affiliated with al-Qaida, had mastered the mechanics of creating sarin and was capable of manufacturing it in quantity. When the attack occurred al-Nusra should have been a suspect, but the administration cherry-picked intelligence to justify a strike against Assad.”
Indeed the U.N./OPCW team was in Damascus at the time of the attack in Ghouta because it was responding to an earlier request from the Syrian government to investigate chemical attacks against their forces.
The OPCW release also mentions a typical catch-all referring to “quantities of separately stored chemicals and related equipment, the nature of which is currently under technical analysis.”
There will always be suggestions of vague bits and pieces, rusty remnants that “may have been a part of” alleged undeclared elements of a chemical weapons program.
And, keep in mind, it’s been 22 months since the Assad government was ousted and their enemies in the opposition group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) have been running the country.
So far as I can see, the OPCW hasn’t found anything remotely close to the desired smoking gun. Anything real, I should say.
Partners in the Anti-Assad Chemical Narrative
Syrian President Ahmaad Al Shaara, former Al Nusra/HTS fighter, with Secretary of State Marco Rubio in New York City, September 2025. (State Department Photo, Wikimedia)
We need to keep in mind how this is working. There are three partners in this latest endeavour on the anti-Assad chemical narrative.
First, we have the Western governments, belligerents in the Syrian conflict, which worked hard on building the chemical narrative to delegitimise the regime.
The U.K. government offered specialists to check out suspected sites in Syria to prepare them for the May mission in order to “assist” the current government in finding evidence of hidden chemical weapons.
That leads us to the second group, the government in Syria, reportedly eager to please their Western sponsors in return for economic favours. They are the Al-Nusra/HTS extremists who, in the case of Douma, fabricated the scene to raise a chemical false flag allegation against the Assad.
The third partner is the OPCW.
That means the various groups who have been on this mission are a). those who staged scenes of chemical attacks; b). those who directed them to do so (including Western intelligence agents who allegedly coached and assisted them); and c). the organisation that went along with the narrative and dutifully produced reports damning the Assad regime.
It may appear to the reader that I’m suggesting that the OPCW reports on Syrian chemical weapons will continue to be little more than propaganda, the usual sexed-up nonsense. Perhaps so. In disputing this, these assertions will be dismissed as conspiracy theories.
However, this argument is weakened because the source of the alternative narrative is the scientists and senior inspectors (many “Western”) from within the OPCW teams, including the Douma fact-finding mission and Scientific Studies and Research Centre inspections.
This is why Douma remains a key element in the debate. If they did it once (and doggedly stuck to their guns), they probably did it before.
Many serious and eminent observers are imploring the OPCW to conduct a review of the Douma case, including by the OPCW’s own Scientific Advisory Board.
I see this being done by credible, independent and neutral experts in the fields of chemistry, toxicology, metallurgy and engineering, overseen by the relevant professional institutes.
These experts would report their findings transparently, putting their names and reputations behind their analysis. This will clear up the Douma controversy, either demonstrating that it could have actually happened as alleged, or demonstrating the flaws in the OPCW reports.
Exposing a clear and deliberate fraud would seriously weaken the Western narrative on alleged Syrian chemical attacks. Therefore, in my view, it is not going to happen under the purview of the OPCW.
Ever.
I don’t mean to suggest that those calling for a review are unrealistically hopeful. But the risks of such a review are perhaps too high for it ever to be envisaged by the Western group that was aligned with the efforts on regime change in Syria — chiefly the U.S., the U.K. and France.
This does not mean it can’t happen. There is more than enough open-source material, as well as now-unclassified facts, images, analysis results and information available from the OPCW itself, from former OPCW officials and inspectors, and held by Member States, that would support a credible in-depth review.
The basis for expert analysis would be the material used in the fact-finding mission and I.I.T. reports themselves.
By now we know there isn’t any “smoking gun” evidence. If there had been, it would have been cited in the mission and I.I.T. reports.
Trust me, this study will bear clear results. My hope is that someone sufficiently curious and responsible will commission and fund it.
Original article: consortiumnews.com
No longer so red: Long a swing state, Ohio went for President Donald Trump back in 2016, in 2020, and in 2024. Now, with midterms approaching, it looks likely to vote blue again, and there are early indicators that Republicans have failed to win over Ohio's working-class voters in particular.
"After the first days of early voting in Ohio, a state that could help determine control of the Senate, there are clear signs Democrats are more enthusiastic to vote," reports CNN. "So far, affiliated Democrats make up larger shares of pre-election voters than they did two years ago, even in the most Republican parts of the state. At this point in 2024, Republicans had a 30-percentage point lead over Democrats in counties that voted for President Donald Trump by 20 points or more, according to data from the Ohio Secretary of State. This year, that's shrunk to just five points."
Take this data with a grain of salt: It is just early-voter data.
But this is all rather high-stakes because Republicans are defending a Senate seat, as well as the governor's office. Two races for House seats are considered toss-ups. The conventional wisdom has been that Ohio is now solidly red, with three cycles of presidential election data to support that. But it's possible Trump has pissed off the voters who supported him to such a degree that Ohio will be sent back into swing-state territory.
"God knows we didn't vote for this," one voter—a pastor who went for Trump, then Biden, then Trump—told Reuters, referring to inflation. Other voters wonder about the decline in manufacturing jobs and the fact that the president has paid lip service to these problems but done very little to actually improve people's circumstances.
On Monday, Trump rallied in support of Sen. Jon Husted, who hopes to retain his seat. In the Mahoning Valley, the president announced a few new, uh, incentives to voters: a Defense Department facility based in Cleveland, and promises that a heat provider for Youngstown remained open. "The Youngstown area for decades used to vote Democrat, and then you ran for office in 2016 and flipped it red forever," said Husted in his speech. "Is that right, folks?"
OpenAI arrest: The FBI arrested a Saudi national who worked at OpenAI "and charged him with installing a hidden audio recording device in an executive conference room," per the Department of Justice. Abdulrahman Alfozan had worked as an engineer at OpenAI since July 2025, in the San Francisco office. The company found the recording device "plugged into a USB port on the back of a television in an executive conference room," per Reuters. The device had a microphone and allegedly connected to a camera; the data it stored was encrypted.
"At this time, we have no indications of this individual inappropriately accessing or exfiltrating model weights, source code, or customer data. The employee was terminated," said OpenAI. It's not clear who Alfozan may have been working for or with; he has been a permanent resident of the U.S. since 2020, with stints at Meta and Microsoft.
"If convicted, Alfozan faces up to five years in prison, a $250,000 fine and three years of supervised release," notes Reuters.
Scenes from New York: Mayor Zohran Mamdani has reportedly reached a deal with the City Council to ban horse carriages in the city, per Politico. I'll admit, I don't really care, but I'm intrigued by the fact that the reason this has taken so long to get through has been because the union representing the carriage-drivers has been so successful at advocating for its members' interests.
This is the greatest post in the history of FIRE Reddit. Perfection. pic.twitter.com/dh1tesicfi
— Conservative Dividend Investing (@CDInewsletter) October 13, 2026
"Blessed" is a useful religious concept that has no adequate secular equivalent
"I was lucky" almost wholly fails to convey the weight and sentiment of providence that comes when things go better than you had any right to hope
— Jack (@tracewoodgrains) October 13, 2026
The post Ohio's Democrat Momentum appeared first on Reason Magazine.
Manville’s academic psychologist finds herself trapped in a tower block wasteland in 1980s Warsaw. Bizarre and surreal details add to the sinister vibe
Part cold war thriller, part Kafkaesque reverie, this movie takes us back to the sinister drear of Poland in 1981, when General Jaruzelski has just introduced martial law in reaction to the dangerous new mood of freedom occasioned by the Solidarity trade unions. The director is Kasia Adamik, daughter of The Green Border’s Agnieszka Holland; the film is adapted from a story by Olga Tokarczuk, called Professor Andrews Goes to Warsaw.
Lesley Manville plays Professor Andrews, an academic clinical psychologist (like Tokarczuk) from Britain with testy, peremptory mannerisms; her indulgence is a fondness for taking Polaroid photos. She has attained a certain level of celebrity for a book on dreams, despite claiming that she never dreams herself. Andrews has been invited to give a lecture in Warsaw, during which she begins to outline views on mental illness not unlike those of Laing or Foucault; but her speech is chaotically disrupted by students shouting that Poland itself is an oppressive asylum.
Continue reading...
© Photograph: Danny James/Courtesy of Signature Entertainment
© Photograph: Danny James/Courtesy of Signature Entertainment
© Photograph: Danny James/Courtesy of Signature Entertainment
LA NEWSLETTER · GRATUITE
L'essentiel de l'actualité, passé au crible par les cinq plumes du Courrier. Dans votre boîte, chaque jour ouvré.
Gratuit. Vous restez libre de partir quand vous voulez.
JE M'INSCRIS lecourrierdesstrateges.frLe dispositif illustre les dérives d’une administration qui prétend simplifier les démarches tout en éloignant les services publics des automobilistes.
ABONNEMENT
Deux grands formats par jour. Les cinq plumes du Courrier. La série Sécession, le dimanche.
Le monde commente. Vous, vous comprenez.
S'ABONNER lecourrierdesstrateges.frL’arrêté du 21 juillet 2026, publié au Journal officiel le 26 juillet, impose deux conditions aux professionnels habilités à accéder au système d’immatriculation des véhicules (SIV) : au moins trois ans d’existence et d’activité pour l’entreprise, et un minimum de 200 opérations d’immatriculation sur les douze derniers mois pour chaque établissement connecté. Les professionnels déjà habilités devaient justifier leur conformité avant le 1er octobre. À défaut, leur habilitation est retirée de plein droit, sans décision individuelle préalable.
Les estimations divergent fortement. Selon Mobilians, la moitié des 37 000 professionnels habilités pourraient être concernés. L’administration avance, elle, une proportion de 5 % sous le seuil. La Fédération nationale de l’automobile (FNA) estime qu’un automobiliste sur deux pourrait perdre l’accès à un professionnel habilité, une proportion qui atteindrait 84 % en zone rurale.
Entre 2022 et 2024, la Cour des comptes a identifié 291 sociétés fictives ayant immatriculé près d’un million de véhicules, pour un préjudice supérieur à 550 millions d’euros. Mais ces montants concernent la fraude, pas les garages honnêtes réalisant peu d’opérations. Surtout, la Cour évoquait un seuil de « 100 voire 200 opérations » pour les nouveaux candidats. Le ministère a retenu 200 et l’a étendu aux professionnels déjà en activité.
TELEGRAM · L'INFO EN CONTINU
La newsletter vous donne le matin. Le fil vous donne l'instant.
Gratuit, et en continu.
REJOINDRE LE FIL t.me/resterlibreEn septembre, la FNA a déposé un recours gracieux auprès des ministres de l’Intérieur et des Transports. Appuyée sur un sondage de 950 professionnels, dont 92,9 % se déclarent favorables à sa démarche, elle demandait notamment la suppression du seuil ou son abaissement à 100 opérations, une transition de douze mois et des adaptations pour les territoires ruraux.
Le 5 octobre, les services de la Sécurité routière ont refusé ces demandes, jugeant un réexamen du seuil « pas envisageable ». Le recours gracieux n’a, à ce stade, pas reçu de réponse. Des aménagements sont néanmoins à l’étude, notamment le dépôt de certaines démarches via un compte de personne morale sur le portail de l’ANTS et la priorité donnée à une procédure en ligne pour les déclarations d’achat.
Si vous voulez voir les vidéos exclusives de décryptage, rejoignez notre chaîne Telegram gratuite en cliquant sur ce lien :
Depuis la fermeture des guichets préfectoraux en novembre 2017, les garages habilités constituent un relais de proximité essentiel. La mise à jour progressive des habilitations risque donc de réduire l’accès au service sans qu’un guichet public soit disponible pour prendre le relais. Au nom de la lutte contre la fraude, l’État fait peser sur les professionnels réguliers et leurs clients le coût d’un dispositif de contrôle défaillant. Un garage de village réalisant cent cartes grises par an n’est pas une société fictive. Les zones rurales, déjà privées de guichet public, en subiront l’effet le plus direct. Le citoyen qui veut immatriculer son véhicule se retrouve face à une machine dématérialisée, sans interlocuteur et sans alternative locale.
TIPS · SANS ABONNEMENT
Un média libre vit de ses lecteurs. Un pourboire ponctuel, sans compte ni engagement, quand le cœur vous en dit.
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LAISSER UN POURBOIRE merci !
Ukraine’s presidential adviser Serhii Beskrestnov said SpaceX had imposed a 100 mph (160 km/h) speed limit on its military Starshield service overnight into 14 October, disrupting several missions without warning Ukraine’s defense forces.
Ukraine’s forces use Starlink-connected drones to strike Russian positions and logistics, including targets behind the front line. Unlike earlier restrictions introduced at Kyiv’s request to stop Russian forces from exploiting Starlink, the latest change reportedly targets the military Starshield service and was imposed without warning Ukraine’s military.
Beskrestnov wrote that the restriction applies to the “military package” of Starshield services. He said the move “obviously cannot be a coincidence” and was connected with the “current political situation,” but did not explain what he meant.
Activist Serhii Sternenko, a former adviser to Ukraine’s defense minister, reported that connections began disappearing at speeds above 160 km/h. He suggested SpaceX had acted at the Trump administration’s request but provided no evidence. Starlink does not work inside Russia, and the drones hitting Russia’s oil industry use other means of communication, Reuters noted. Sternenko added that the ordinary satellite terminals were still working.
Later on 14 October, Sternenko wrote that, according to military reports, restrictions had been tightened further, with connections starting to drop at 60–70 km/h. Beskrestnov later warned that the restriction also hits Starlink-linked interceptor drones, which he called Ukraine’s most effective current defense against jet-powered Shaheds.
Ukraine’s 7th Rapid Reaction Corps confirmed the disruptions in a statement to Reuters. The corps’ press service told Novynarnia that its units on the Huliaipole front began experiencing problems overnight. The corps said the change affected drones controlled through Starlink in flight and concerned Starshield’s data-transmission speed, which it said had previously been unrestricted.
The corps said connections could disappear for 10–20 seconds at movement speeds of 110–120 km/h, complicating drone control. Flying slower creates its own risk, it said, because “slower targets become more vulnerable to being hit by the enemy.”
Some high-speed drones, particularly mid-range strike models, must reach high speed quickly, the corps said. An unstable connection “will make it impossible to launch such aircraft or use them as intended.” Since the start of the day, one unmanned systems unit on the Huliaipole front had to cancel some missions because of connection problems, the corps said.
In late January, SpaceX began restricting Starlink in Ukraine at Kyiv’s request after Russian forces started mounting terminals on strike drones. After Russian drones struck a passenger train in Kharkiv Oblast on 27 January, Beskrestnov, then an adviser to the defense minister, suggested one of them may have been controlled via Starlink. In early February, Ukraine introduced a whitelist under which only registered terminals could continue operating. Beskrestnov called the earlier countermeasures “temporary” and “emergency.”
SpaceX had not publicly commented on the restriction, and Ukraine’s Defense Ministry was looking into its cause, Radio Svoboda reported. Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski asked Elon Musk on X whether he was “playing politics with your products again,” adding: “As your European customers, we are watching you.”
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