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France’s Modular Rampart Point Defense Launcher Has Gone To Sea

22 September 2026 at 20:02

A French Navy Mistral class amphibious assault ship has been photographed carrying Naval Group’s new Rampart modular launcher, a system designed to allow a single weapon station to employ different types of rockets, missiles, and other effectors against a wide range of threats.

The imagery, captured off Toulon during training on September 21, reveals the launcher installed on the ship’s forward starboard sponson. While the specific identity of the vessel is unclear, this represents the first publicly observed evidence that Rampart has moved into shipboard testing.

🇫🇷 French Navy Mistral-class amphibious assault ship and 🇫🇷French Navy Suffren (Barracuda)-class nuclear-powered attack submarine off Toulon, France – September 21, 2026.@WarshipCam pic.twitter.com/6xYm6E5J9R

— G.GYSSELSSHIPCOLLECTION (@GGYSSELSSHIPS) September 22, 2026

Naval Group announced in June that the first at-sea firing campaign for Rampart was planned for October aboard a Mistral class ship during the French Navy’s Wildfire counter-drone exercise.

What makes Rampart unusual is its modular architecture. Rather than being built around one missile or rocket, the system uses interchangeable launch modules that can accommodate different weapons. This allows a ship to carry large numbers of relatively inexpensive guided rockets for counter-drone work while retaining the option of using larger and more capable short-range missiles against more challenging targets.

Système de lancement polyvalent et modulaire, sur le stand de NAVAL GROUP lors du Salon de l'industrie naval de défense (EURONAVAL) à Villepinte le 6 novembre 2024. (Photo by Thierry NECTOUX/Gamma-Rapho via Getty Images)
The Rampart, then still known as the Multi-purpose and Modular Launching System (MPLS), displayed at the EURONAVAL defense exhibition in November 2024. Photo by Thierry NECTOUX/Gamma-Rapho via Getty Images

Because the launch modules are interchangeable, the mix can theoretically be changed as the mission or threat environment changes.

The approach is aimed squarely at a problem that has become increasingly important for naval forces: defending expensive ships against potentially large numbers of inexpensive uncrewed systems and missiles without relying exclusively on high-cost interceptors.

Rampart was previously known as the Multi-purpose and Modular Launching System (MPLS). Naval Group unveiled the concept in 2023 as a self-funded development effort and formally presented the Rampart earlier this year.

The launcher uses four interchangeable ammunition modules. Depending on the configuration, Naval Group says that the system can accommodate up to 80 Thales 68mm laser-guided rockets or 48 NATO-standard 70mm laser-guided rockets. Other configurations can carry smaller numbers of short-range missiles (four to six per module, depending on type) or other effectors, including decoys.

The system has already been demonstrated with guided rockets. A January 2026 test involved a Thales 68mm guided rocket, followed by a series of firings at the Canjuers range in southern France in May. Those trials, seen in the video below, included engagements against targets at roughly two miles and a five-rocket salvo.

The relatively small guided rockets are particularly relevant to counter-drone operations. They offer a way of engaging aerial targets with a weapon substantially smaller than a conventional surface-to-air missile, while still providing precision guidance.

As well as rockets, Naval Group has been working with Thales on the Lightweight Multirole Missile (LMM). Also known as Martlet, the LMM is intended to tackle a range of challenging airborne and surface targets, as you can read about here.

The company has also explored integration of loitering munitions and other missiles, while a separate agreement with the UAE-based EDGE Group covers trials of the SkyKnight surface-to-air missile.

The company has also pursued integration of Poland’s Piorun short-range air-defense missile. This may well be with a view to a potential Polish purchase of Rampart to arm its forthcoming frigates, which you can read about here.

Polish Army soldiers, fire a man-portable air-defense system (MANPADS Piorun), during the exercise Shield 24, April 12, 2024 in Pula, Croatia. This annual event bolsters Croatian air defense capabilities against low and medium-altitude threats. Joined by the 57th Air Defense Artillery Regiment (C/1-57 ADAR), 173rd Airborne Brigade, and allied forces from the Polish Armed Forces, Slovenian Army, and French Armed Forces, participants jointly train on air defense tactics, techniques, and procedures, including air-space control and live fire engagements. (U.S. Army photo by Davide Dalla Massara)
Polish Army soldiers fire a Piorun man-portable air defense system. U.S. Army photo by Davide Dalla Massara

This means the launcher is effectively being developed as an open weapons-integration platform, rather than as a dedicated launcher for one or a small set of particular munitions.

That openness could make Rampart attractive to a wide range of navies. Instead of requiring customers to adopt a completely new missile family, the launcher can potentially be configured around weapons already in their inventories or sourced from their domestic defense industries. A country could therefore buy the common Rampart launcher while retaining control over the effectors it wants to integrate, whether those are guided rockets, short-range missiles, loitering munitions or other systems. At the same time, when it comes to air threats, this is very much a point defense system for close-in engagements, and a last line of defense to complement longer-range and more capable systems.

Naval Group has described the system as capable of operating either autonomously or as part of a ship’s combat system, with a stabilized turret and integrated fire-control equipment.

That integration will be particularly important during the upcoming sea trials. A launcher that works against stationary or land-based targets still has to contend with ship motion, vibration, sea spray, sensor integration, and the compressed timelines involved in defending a moving vessel.

France operates three Mistral class amphibious assault ships, which serve as major aviation, command, and amphibious warfare platforms. Their size and mission make them high-value assets that could face a broad range of aerial threats during operations. Another two vessels were built to the same design for Russia, before being placed under embargo, and then sold to the Egyptian Navy.

200624-M-IR130-1284 MEDITERRANEAN SEA (June 24, 2020) The French Navy amphibious assault ship Mistral sails in the vicinity of the amphibious assault ship USS Bataan (LHD 5) June 24, 2020. The Bataan is conducting operations in U.S. 6th Fleet in support of regional allies and partners, and U.S. national security interest in Europe and Africa. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Gary Jayne III/Released)
The French Navy amphibious assault ship Mistral. U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Gary Jayne III/Released

Naval Group’s choice of a Mistral for the initial at-sea campaign provides an opportunity to test Rampart under realistic operational conditions while integrating it with an existing French naval combat system.

In its basic form, each Mistral is armed with a pair of Simbad launchers, each of which is fitted with two Mistral short-range surface-to-air missiles. In terms of guns, each of the vessels is armed with two 30mm and two 20mm cannons, two 7.62mm M134 Miniguns, and four 12.7mm machine guns. Adding even a single Rampart launcher provides considerably more options against aerial targets across a wide range of threats — depending on the effectors that are included.

Loading guided rockets into a Rampart launcher during ground-based tests. Naval Group screencap

Recent U.S. and allied operations in the Middle East have highlighted the problem of large-scale missile and drone attacks causing forces to expend substantial numbers of interceptors, raising concerns about both magazine depth and the cost of using high-end missiles against lower-cost threats. Directed-energy weapons could eventually provide a way out of that cost-exchange problem, but shipboard laser systems remain in the early stages of operational development. Navies cannot simply wait for them to mature, creating an immediate requirement for lower-cost, high-capacity kinetic options. Rampart’s large guided-rocket capacity and ability to mix different effectors are aimed at exactly that gap.

If Rampart can reliably engage drones with inexpensive guided rockets while retaining the ability to employ more capable missiles from the same launcher, it could offer navies an additional defensive layer between conventional guns and high-end surface-to-air missile systems.

Critically, new effectors could potentially also be integrated as they become available, allowing the system to evolve without replacing the entire turret.

Reflecting the urgency of the requirement, Naval Group’s development path for Rampart has been relatively rapid.

Naval Group has also demonstrated a ground-based Rampart, mounted on a high-mobility truck chassis. This configuration is intended for mobile air defense missions as well as protection of fixed sites, giving the system a role beyond ship self-defense. The truck-mounted version could provide a rapidly relocatable launcher for counter-drone and short-range air-defense missions, while retaining the same basic modular architecture and ability to employ different effectors.

Sur le stand John Cockerill, un châssis Zetros équipé du Rampart (ex lanceur modulaire polyvalent, ou LMP) de Naval Group. Avantage : un seul système de lancement pour des armements divers (roquettes, missiles, grenades, leurres, drones…) pic.twitter.com/6v4R93HGsj

— Vincent Lamigeon (@VincentLamigeon) June 16, 2026

The photographs from Toulon indicate that the Rampart concept is now moving from the range to the French fleet, albeit on an experimental basis. The forthcoming sea campaign will be an important milestone and should provide a better idea of how this system works at sea.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

 

The post France’s Modular Rampart Point Defense Launcher Has Gone To Sea appeared first on TWZ.

North Korea Tests New Hwasong-11Ma Hypersonic Missile

22 September 2026 at 19:44

North Korea has released imagery of what appears to be a flight test of an updated version of its Hwasong-11Ma hypersonic missile, nearly a year after the weapon first appeared publicly at a military technology exhibition in Pyongyang.

Launch of a Hwasong-11Ma-1 missile from the test facility in Anbyon County, south of Wonsan. North Korean State Media

The September 20 test involved a short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) booster fitted with a hypersonic glide vehicle, according to photographs released by North Korean state media. A display screen visible in the imagery identifies the weapon as the Hwasongpho-11Ma-1, or Hwasong-11E-1 in the equivalent English-language designation.

The test was conducted from the east coast near Anbyon County, south of Wonsan, an area North Korea has repeatedly used for missile testing. The launch site allows missiles to be fired eastward over the Sea of Japan, providing a relatively controlled area for testing short- and medium-range systems.

Another two views of the launch of the Hwasong-11Ma-1 missile. North Korean State Media

South Korean and Japanese authorities say they detected two launches on September 20, with the first occurring at approximately 3:00 p.m. local time and the second several hours later.

North Korean photographs show the missile being launched from a coastal location, with Kim Jong Un and senior missile officials observing the test. Kim’s daughter, Kim Ju Ae, also appears in the imagery.

Kim Jong Un and Kim Ju Ae monitor the progress of the Hwasong-11Ma-1 test. North Korean State Media

North Korea displayed a mock-up of what it called the Hwasong-11Ma at its Defense Development-2025 exhibition in October 2025. The design uses the basic architecture of the Hwasong-11 family, known in the West as the KN-23 family, but substitutes a distinctive glide wedge-shaped vehicle for the conventional warhead arrangement.

The Hwasong-11Ma, among other weapons, on display at the weapons exhibition in Pyongyang in October 202. North Korean State Media

North Korea claimed another hypersonic missile test that same month, but did not release launch imagery clearly connecting that test to the Hwasong-11Ma. The missile was subsequently shown again during a military parade in Pyongyang.

Hwasong-11Ma missiles on five-axle TELs at last October’s military parade in Pyongyang. North Korean State Media

The latest “-1” designation suggests an iterative evolution of the Hwasong-11Ma, although Pyongyang has not explained what modifications it represents.

Based on the imagery, the new configuration also includes a modified launcher, with the missile carried on a six-axle transporter-erector-launcher (TEL). When the Hwasong-11Ma was first shown, it was mounted on a five-axle TEL. The latest vehicle also appears to incorporate modified retractable covers around the missile.

It remains unclear whether the new TEL represents a standardized operational vehicle or a test configuration.

Preliminary illustration of the new launch vehicle for North Korea's hypersonic missiles. pic.twitter.com/dZ31LA1cbn

— Tal Inbar (@inbarspace) September 22, 2026

As with previous North Korean weapons announcements, the country’s state media claims need to be treated very cautiously. Pyongyang has a long record of publicizing weapons systems and test results that cannot be independently verified, while some of its purported hypersonic tests have left outside analysts unable to determine whether the advertised maneuvering performance was actually demonstrated.

Perhaps the most revealing test-related imagery comes from a display screen photographed at the launch site.

Kim Jong Un and his daughter can be seen watching the screen, which shows the apparent flight trajectory of the Hwasong-11Ma-1. The displayed path initially follows a ballistic trajectory before descending and then performing a pull-up maneuver, regaining altitude before continuing toward the target area.

That type of trajectory is consistent with the basic concept behind a hypersonic glide vehicle. The booster provides the initial velocity and altitude, after which the unpowered glide body follows a relatively shallow, atmospheric flight path at hypersonic speeds, while maneuvering rather than following a simple ballistic path.

The graphic is useful for understanding what Pyongyang says the weapon is designed to do, but it does not independently demonstrate that the missile actually followed the depicted trajectory.

The flight data visible on the display provides some unusually specific figures.

Enhancing the original image released by North Korea allows for an excellent view of the HS-11Ma hypersonic glide missile trajectory, providing altitude and speed data. Note: Slight inaccuracies in the numbers may occur due to the use of AI tools. pic.twitter.com/M4LkfF5VYu

— Tal Inbar (@inbarspace) September 22, 2026

According to the North Korean imagery, the missile traveled 908.2 kilometers (564.3 miles), reached an altitude of 35.8 kilometers (22.2 miles), and remained in flight for approximately 445 seconds, or 7.4 minutes.

The display gives a velocity of 2,146 meters per second, equivalent to roughly 4,800 mph. That is hypersonic velocity in the aerodynamic sense, but speed alone is not what makes a hypersonic glide weapon particularly challenging to defend against. More consequential parameters include sustained controlled flight, maneuverability, guidance, and accuracy.

Other portions of the display appear to show additional points along the flight, including different times, altitudes, and speeds. None of these figures have been independently verified.

The TEL raises one of its two Hwasong-11Ma-1 missiles into the launch position. North Korean State Media

The claimed range is particularly noteworthy because it does not match the publicly reported tracking data from South Korea and Japan.

South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said North Korea launched two SRBMs from the Wonsan area on September 20. The missiles were assessed to have traveled approximately 450 and 600 kilometers, respectively.

Japan similarly reported two launches, assessing the first at approximately 440 kilometers and the second at approximately 590 kilometers, with maximum altitudes of roughly 60 and 70 kilometers.

Those figures are substantially different from the 908.2-kilometer distance shown on North Korea’s display.

The Hwasong-11Ma-1 climbs after launch. North Korean State Media

The discrepancy does not necessarily establish that either side’s data are incorrect. The North Korean figure could represent a different measurement of the flight path, or could correspond to a portion of the test that was not reflected in the public South Korean and Japanese assessments. It is also possible, if not highly probable, that Pyongyang selectively presented or altered the data.

South Korean analysts have already raised questions about the unusually long distance displayed by North Korea. Yonhap reported that experts suggested Pyongyang may have altered the figure to portray the test as more successful.

Regardless of the range actually achieved in this test, the Hwasong-11Ma/Ma-1 is significant because it represents an attempt to combine a relatively compact SRBM with a maneuvering hypersonic glide vehicle.

The underlying Hwasong-11 family is a well-established North Korean missile design. In its KN-23 configuration, members of the family have also been used by Russia against Ukraine. By placing a glide vehicle on this type of booster, Pyongyang could potentially give a regional strike weapon a flight profile substantially different from that of a conventional ballistic missile. The Hwasong-11Ma/Ma-1 also uses a solid-fuel booster, allowing for faster launches than earlier liquid-fuel designs.

The original North Korean Hwasong-11 short-range ballistic missile. North Korean State Media

In principle, the Hwasong-11Ma/Ma-1 could give North Korea an additional hypersonic strike option against more heavily defended targets in South Korea. Having road-mobile TELs would also provide greater operational flexibility despite their relatively limited range, while making it more difficult for adversaries to locate and track the launchers.

A genuine boost-glide weapon creates significant challenges for defending forces since the sheer speed of the weapon bypasses most air defenses. Its trajectory can also become less predictable after the boost phase. Maneuvering at lower altitudes could also reduce the time available to detect, track, and engage the weapon.

A close-up look at the Hwasong-11Ma’s boost-glide-vehicle. North Korean State Media

However, the available imagery does not establish the extent of the vehicle’s maneuverability, its ability to maintain controlled flight, its accuracy, or the reliability of the complete missile system.

North Korea has made similar claims about its hypersonic weapons in the past.

Pyongyang says it has flight-tested multiple hypersonic boost-glide vehicle designs since at least 2021, but there continue to be questions about what degree of actual capability the country has achieved in this regard. Viable wedge-shaped boost-glide vehicles have historically been extremely difficult to design and then bring to an operational state.

The challenge is not simply reaching hypersonic speed. A weapon has to sustain controlled flight and maneuverability under extreme thermal loads, while also overcoming demanding materials-science, guidance, and navigation requirements. The terminal phase is harder still. Accurately finding and striking a moving target, particularly a ship, requires a highly capable seeker and guidance system. Integrating a nuclear warhead introduces another layer of engineering and weapons-design challenges.

Those demands have made hypersonic weapons a major technological challenge for the United States and other major powers. China is currently widely regarded as the leading country in deploying and developing operational hypersonic systems, although important questions remain about the capabilities and maturity of individual weapons.

Pyongyang said it first flight-tested a wedge-shaped hypersonic glide vehicle in 2021 aboard the liquid-fuel Hwasong-8, before pairing a similar-looking vehicle with the solid-fueled Hwasong-16B intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) in 2024.

VIDEO: Korean Central Television (KCTV) broadcasted footage of North Korea successfully testing the new "Hwasong-16B" hypersonic intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) on Tuesday. pic.twitter.com/VNdhLAeyyK

— NK NEWS (@nknewsorg) April 3, 2024

In its coverage of the latest test, North Korean state media initially avoided identifying the weapon, describing the event as a successful trial of a “new-type weapon” that it said was significant for the rapid development of weapons technology.

Kim said the development would give adversaries an “incurable headache” and deliver what he described as a “cruel and unavoidable blow.”

Tal Inbar, the head of the Space and UAV Research Center at Israel’s Fisher Institute for Air and Space Strategic Studies identifies the Hwasong-11Ma/Ma-1 as a “very significant weapon, bringing hypersonics to the operational/tactical arena and [posing] a challenge to … air and missile defense systems.”

Whatever the exact achievements of the test, the imagery points to continued development of a weapon North Korea first publicly displayed nearly a year ago. The appearance of a new, six-axle TEL, a potentially modified missile, combined with the apparent flight test, suggests that the Hwasong-11Ma/Ma-1 program has progressed since its initial public unveiling.

What remains uncertain is how much of that progress represents a genuine improvement in operational capability.

The latest test therefore provides another indication of the resources and attention Pyongyang is devoting to hypersonic weapons, but the available evidence is still insufficient to determine how closely the Hwasong-11Ma-1’s actual performance matches the capabilities depicted by North Korean state media.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post North Korea Tests New Hwasong-11Ma Hypersonic Missile appeared first on TWZ.

Torpedo Fired From Uncrewed Submarine For The First Time By U.S., U.K.

22 September 2026 at 18:09

A British Excalibur uncrewed underwater vehicle (UUV) has fired a U.S. Mk 48 heavyweight torpedo in what is said to be a first-of-its-kind test for both countries. Though just a proof-of-concept so far, this is a significant new step for the United States and the United Kingdom toward future operational fleets of armed UUVs.

The U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy conducted the armed UUV test at the British Underwater Test & Evaluation Center (BUTEC), a maritime test range in Scotland, on September 13. Personnel from the Pentagon’s Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) and the Naval Undersea Warfare Center Keyport Division (NUWC Keyport), as well as unspecified industry partners, also took part, per a U.S. Navy press release.

📰 U.S. NAVY UPDATE: U.S. Navy and Royal Navy Successfully Test Fire Torpedo from Unmanned Undersea Vehicle

📍WASHINGTON – On September 13, 2026, the U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy successfully conducted the proof-of-concept launch of an exercise U.S. Mk 48 Heavyweight Torpedo… pic.twitter.com/lVB4wYSwC0

— Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (@USNavyCNO) September 22, 2026

The test was also carried out under the umbrella of Pillar 2 of the trilateral Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) defense cooperation agreement, which was first announced in 2021. AUKUS’ Pillar 2 covers a wide range of advanced technology cooperation, with particular focus on uncrewed platforms and autonomy. Pillar 1 of the agreement centers on support for Australia’s establishment of a nuclear submarine force.

For the September 13 test, the Mk 48 torpedo was slung under the Excalibur UUV. The nearly 40-foot (12-meter) long, 19-metric-ton submersible drone has a large internal payload bay, but it is reportedly not large enough to accommodate the Mk 48, which is the standard heavyweight torpedo in U.S. Navy service today. The 19-foot-long, 21-inch-diameter weapon has been successively upgraded over the years to expand its capabilities and improve its resistance to enemy countermeasures.

Screen captures from a video the US Navy released today showing the release of the Mk 48 torpedo from the Excalibur UUV during the test earlier this month. USN captures
A stock picture of a Mk 48-series torpedo. DOD
A US Navy infographic detailing just some of the upgrades to the Mk 48 series over the decades. The Navy has now moved on to the further improved Mk 48 Mod 8 variant. USN

The Royal Navy officially unveiled Excalibur, which was developed by U.K.-based MSubs under Project Cetus, last year. The external torpedo launch capability was the result of two additional efforts, called Project Broadsword and Trial Iron, according to the U.S. Navy release.

A picture of an Excalibur UUV at the time of its unveiling in 2025, giving a good general sense of its size. Royal Navy

The September 13 test “successfully validated the mechanical, electrical, and software integration of a U.S. kinetic payload onto an allied autonomous vessel, proving that allied forces can rapidly achieve weapon interchangeability,” the Navy’s release adds. “Approved in February 2026 by the Department of the Navy Rapid Capabilities Office (DONRCO), the project was executed in less than seven months.”

How the Excalibur UUV was controlled during the test and whether the torpedo was launched at a test target of some kind are unknown. TWZ has reached out for more information.

A look at the Excalibur UUV submerged, from the video the US Navy released today. USN capture

“BROADSWORD is a great example of how AUKUS Pillar II drives interoperability in across the alliance. Demonstrating the launch of a US torpedo from a UK extra-large unmanned underwater vehicle (XLUUV) is an important early step in developing lethality in our undersea autonomous systems,” U.S. Navy Vice Adm. Robert Gaucher, Director of Submarine Programs, did say in a statement. “We look forward to continuing to leverage the AUKUS partnership to keep pushing the potential warfighting advantages of unmanned undersea systems.”

“This successful test marks a historic first for allied undersea warfare,” U.S. Navy Adm. Daryl Caudle, Chief of Naval Operations, also said in a statement. “Proving that we can seamlessly launch a U.S. heavyweight torpedo from a Royal Navy autonomous underwater vehicle validates our shared vision for true interchangeability.

“This is a really important moment in our journey towards building a hybrid navy, which is where the Royal Navy will sail with crewed ships and submarines alongside uncrewed and autonomous vessels,” Luke Pollard, U.K. Minister of State for Defence Readiness and Industry, separately said in an interview with LBC radio. “It is a substantial increase in our lethality, to show that torpedoes can be fired not just by the Astute class hunter-killer submarines that we have in the Royal Navy, but also now by our uncrewed systems.”

A Royal Navy Astute class nuclear-powered attack submarine. UK Ministry of Defense

The U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy employ various tiers of UUVs operationally today, but primarily for mine-sweeping and reconnaissance and surveillance missions. Future fleets of submersible drones capable of carrying out attacks on other vessels will create entirely new operational possibilities. Operated closely together with crewed surface warships and submarines, torpedo-toting UUVs could be sent ahead into riskier environments and offer an immediate option for engaging any threats they might find. Even a bigger UUV like Excalibur would also be more challenging for opponents to spot and track than a traditional attack submarine.

Excalibur is also in a category of larger and more capable submersible drones that offer significant endurance and higher degrees of autonomy. Adding in the ability to launch torpedoes, in turn, then opens the door to new concepts for employing these UUVs in groups more independently of crewed companions. In the future, for instance, armed Excaliburs or similar UUVs might be deployed to a particular maritime choke point to not just monitor for enemy movements, but actively hold them at risk.

In addition, in general, UUVs offer a way to expand total undersea warfare capacity in a more cost-effective manner compared to acquiring and fielding more traditional submarines. The ability to have more presence below the waves at a lower price point also translates to more persistence across large areas, something that could be especially valuable across the broad expanses of the Pacific, as well as other bodies of water globally. This presents additional targeting challenges and uncertainty for opponents.

“In securing the North Atlantic, especially against those nations that wish to do us harm, like Russia, the ability for us to now say it’s not just where our submarines are that you need to worry about – it is about how we create greater deterrence and question marks in the eyes of our adversary, with uncrewed systems there as well,” U.K. Minister Pollard said in speaking with LBC.

Pollard’s remarks here speak to particular considerations the British government is faced with just in its backyard. This includes the so-called Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap, which is the main path through which Russian Navy submarines transit to and from bases in the northwestern end of that country and the Atlantic proper. There is also the English Channel and the nearby Baltic Sea. The Royal Navy has limited capacity with its crewed submarines to monitor this and other critical regional chokepoints. UUVs could then help take pressure off its fleet of just five (of a planned seven) Astute class submarines, helping free those boats up for the myriad other missions they are tasked with, including carrier escort and special operations support.

“By converting commercial and allied uncrewed undersea hulls into high-end strike assets, the partnership drastically alters the cost-exchange ratio in contested maritime environments,” the U.S. Navy’s press release today notes, as well.

There are still many questions still to be answered about future larger UUV operations, including just how they will be deployed and recovered. Video the U.S. Navy released today shows that the torpedo-armed Excalibur was launched into the water in Scotland using a commercial truck-mounted crane. U.S. shipbuilders Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII) and General Dynamics National Steel and Shipbuilding Company (NASSCO), among others, have been working on new options for launching and retrieving larger drone submersibles from surface warships. External carriage on the hulls of ships and/or submarines might also be an option in the future.

A picture from a test in 2022 of a prototype portable cradle for launching large UUVs developed by HII. The UUV seen here is that company’s Proteus design. HII

Additional torpedo and other munition options for UUVs beyond the full-size Mk 48 could also be on the horizon. The U.S. Navy has invested heavily in compact and lightweight torpedo designs that could be well suited for employment from underwater drones like Excalibur.

The U.S. Navy says it is working with its international partners on another similar UUV capability demonstration, but this time involving an Anduril Dive-XL, under what is dubbed Project Cutlass. This effort “will tackle advanced payload integration data, command and control architectures, and tactical employment scenarios to further mature uncrewed undersea capabilities,” according to the U.S. Navy’s release.

The Royal Australian Navy is already in the process of acquiring and fielding a militarized version of the Dive-XL, called Ghost Shark. It’s also worth noting that the Dive-XL evolved from the earlier Dive-LD design. The Dive-LD is in at least limited operational U.S. Navy service now, a fact that was revealed by Iran’s capture of one of these submersible drones earlier this month, as you can read more about here.

The U.S. Navy is also continuing to push ahead with plans to field a force of Orca XLUUVs from Boeing. In August, the service announced that an Orca had conducted a 1,000-nautical-mile transit in the Pacific the preceding month as part of the ongoing development of that design.

Other countries are pursuing larger UUVs, as well. China has been making strides in this regard and is in some ways ahead of other competitors globally.

Excalibur’s ability to launch a standard Mk 48 heavyweight torpedo is already an important show of progress now toward a shared goal of a future underwater ecosystem that includes submersible drones that are able to attack other vessels.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

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What Is Really Behind the Cancellation of the Freedom Shield Exercise?

22 September 2026 at 09:30
The reduction in the scale of US-South Korean military exercises is not a gesture of goodwill toward the DPRK, but rather an instrument of Donald Trump’s political pressure on Seoul aimed at forcing it to support US foreign policy in the Middle East and to block South Korea’s ambitions to gain operational control over its […]

Nella gara dei sussidi i paesi piccoli perdono*

22 September 2026 at 09:06

Nel 2024 la Germania ha erogato circa un quarto del totale degli aiuti di stato dell’Ue. Imitare le grandi economie su questo terreno è per i piccoli una strategia costosa. Servono politiche orizzontali, interventi verificabili e più coordinamento europeo.

L'articolo Nella gara dei sussidi i paesi piccoli perdono* proviene da Lavoce.info.

Nova Barragem em Discussão Pública e novo perímetro rega da Várzea de Odeleite, em visita pelo AdP AQUA no concelho de Castro Marim

22 September 2026 at 07:11

Em Castro Marim a Câmara Municipal foi visitar o traçado da Rede Rega da Várzea de Odeleite, que estará em testes no próximo mês de Outubro, depois de décadas à espera e uma conturbada obra, assumida pelo município

O Município de Castro Marim realizou recentemente uma visita técnica ao terreno para acompanhar o progresso de duas infraestruturas hídricas decisivas para o futuro do concelho e para a sustentabilidade da agricultura local.

A comitiva municipal esteve a inspecionar o traçado da Rede de Rega da Várzea de Odeleite. Este projeto, aguardado há décadas pela população e pelos produtores locais, entra finalmente na sua fase final de concretização. Após um processo complexo e uma empreitada conturbada — que o próprio Município assumiu para garantir a sua conclusão —, o sistema estará em fase de testes já no próximo mês de outubro. O arranque deste regadio representa uma conquista histórica para o concelho, permitindo otimizar o aproveitamento da água, apoiar os agricultores e revitalizar a economia rural da Várzea de Odeleite.

No âmbito desta mesma deslocação, a comitiva visitou a localidade da Tenência para observar no terreno os locais onde está prevista a implantação do paredão da futura Barragem da Foupana. Esta infraestrutura estratégica é considerada fundamental para reforçar a resiliência hídrica e o armazenamento de água no Algarve.

O processo da Barragem da Foupana encontra-se atualmente numa fase determinante, estando em discussão pública até ao próximo dia 16 de outubro. O Município de Castro Marim sublinha a importância da participação de toda a comunidade, agricultores e entidades locais nesta consulta pública, garantindo que as necessidades do concelho e da região sejam devidamente acauteladas.

Com a entrada em testes da Rede de Rega de Odeleite e o avanço do projeto da Barragem da Foupana, Castro Marim reafirma o seu compromisso direto e empenho na gestão inteligente da água, no combate à escassez hídrica e na valorização do seu território.

Chinese Next-Generation Submarine Developments Spotted In New Satellite Imagery

22 September 2026 at 01:29

Recent satellite imagery of a shipyard in northeastern China offers interesting new insights into the country’s next-generation submarine developments. The images notably show a pumpjet propulsor and other features worth examining on an example of what is generally described as a new class of nuclear-powered attack submarine, or SSN.

TWZ has obtained a new image taken on September 18 of the submarine in question, which is being built at the Bohai Shipyard in Huludao, from Vantor. Janes reported on this submarine earlier today, based on a separate Vantor image from September 1. The outlet also described the boat as a Type 095, a commonly used, but still unofficial designation. This is something we will come back to later on.

A wider view of the new Chinese submarine under construction at the Bohai Shipyard in Huludao on September 18, 2026. Satellite image ©2026 Vantor

As mentioned, the pumpjet propulsor immediately stands out in both images. This is also understood to be a feature on the Type 093B nuclear-powered attack submarine, a significantly improved variation on that earlier design, which first emerged in the early 2020s. Compared to traditional exposed propellers and more basic shrouded types, pumpjets offer benefits for quieter operation and efficiencies, especially at higher submerged speeds.

The recent imagery also highlights the submarine’s X-shaped stern plane arrangement. This is not found on the Type 093B, which is considered to be something of a bridge between that class and the next-generation design. Broadly speaking, an X-shaped configuration offers advantages when it comes to enhanced maneuverability, efficiency, and safety, which can be particularly useful in littoral environments. It can also provide benefits when it comes to acoustic signature reductions across significant parts of the submarine’s operating envelope compared to the cruciform stern planes.

Another Chinese submarine design that emerged in 2024, currently referred to as the Type 041 or Zhou class, and that is understood to feature a hybrid nuclear/conventional propulsion system, also has an X-shaped stern configuration. The first known example of the Type 041 came to light after it appeared to have sunk in a shipyard.

Crane barges seen surrounding the first known Type 041 submarine after it apparently sank at China’s Wuchang Shipyard in 2024. PHOTO © 2024 PLANET LABS INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. REPRINTED BY PERMISSION

An X-shaped stern arrangement also looks to be a feature on yet another new class of submarine that appeared at the JN (Jiangnan) Shipyard in Shanghai earlier this year. Initial reports also suggested that the design lacked a traditional sail. However, it has been confirmed that it has a sail, but that is very small proportionally to the overall size of the boat. Truncated sails can offer performance and other advantages, but there are trade-offs.

The image of the submarine that Janes obtained also notably shows an open rectangular-shaped section aft of the sail. The September 18 image that we received from Vantor shows a structure placed over that section of that submarine, obscuring ongoing work on that part of the boat. The Type 095 is widely expected to feature some type of vertical launch system (VLS) array able to accommodate a variety of anti-ship and land-attack cruise missiles, as well as potentially hypersonic types. The Type 095 is also sometimes referred to as a guided missile submarine, or SSGN, as a result. The open area seen in the September 1 shot could be where the VLS array is set to be fitted. It might also provide access to the reactor compartment or another area of the submarine.

The clearest photos we have on the Type 095 SSN!

As we can see, there is one confirmed chamber than could physically fit about 18-24 VLS Cells. There is a big chance that more than one VLS Chamber exists, with an estimate VLS count from 24-48+ VLS pic.twitter.com/0ZJ8gsl4su

— PLA Military Updates🇨🇳 (@PLA_MilitaryUpd) September 21, 2026

Interestingly, the September 18 image also shows what look to be at least two relatively large circular openings, side-by-side, at the bow end of the submarine in front of the sail, the purpose of which is not immediately clear. There is a possibility these could also be for vertically launching munitions or other payloads. As a point of comparison, U.S. Virginia class nuclear attack submarines, starting with the Block III version, have two large-diameter Virginia Payload Tubes (VPT), one in front of the other, in the bow in front of their sails. At the same time, the openings on the submarine in Huludao also appear to be in a position that is very close to where the submarine’s main sonar array would be installed, and they could be tied to that aspect of the design, too.

A close-up look at the bow end of the submarine under construction in Huludao as seen in the September 18, 2026, image. Satellite image ©2026 Vantor
The Block III Virginia class submarine USS John Warner seen at its commissioning ceremony with one of its two Virginia Payload Tubes open. USN

“I think it’s too early to be sure about the VLS configuration from publicly available imagery. I realize people assume the large rectangular space halfway behind the sail is the VLS, but I am not sure this is the case and I’d caution to jump to conclusions. The space could also be related to work on the reactor compartment,” Alex Luck, a naval analyst who closely tracks submarine and Chinese navy developments, told TWZ. “With Type 093B, the VLS after launch was initially covered with a tarp, and then the installed launchers were readily visible quite quickly during the fitting-out process. The work process may change with these newer boats, but the different appearance during launch and fitting out needs to be considered in that regard.”

“I do expect Type 095 to have a VLS of some sort, but I am not sure as of yet what the configuration would look like, or where exactly it is located,” he added.

The bigger outstanding question may be exactly what type of submarine is currently being built now at the Bohai Shipyard. Based on a review of additional imagery from Planet Labs’ archive, the boat appears to be around 394 feet (120 meters) long. When the first example of what was assessed to be a Type 095 emerged in Huludao in February, it was estimated to have a length of roughly 361 feet (110 meters). The ‘small sail’ design that broke cover earlier this year in Shanghai is also estimated to be some 394 feet/120 meters long based on available imagery, but also looks to be narrower than the boat presumed to be a Type 095 in February.

“One significant question is the nature and difference between the boat launched by Bohai in February, and the two newer hulls launched in late May/early June both by Bohai and at Jiangnan in Shanghai,” Luck, the naval analyst, also told TWZ. “Specifically, we do not quite know whether they are for different operational roles, or rather a two step development for one final configuration of a new SSN. I think the latter is at least plausible.”

“A related question then is what boat we are looking at now with the new imagery, i.e. the February boat or the newer hull Bohai had launched,” he continued. “Without exact and reliable measurements that question for now is unresolved in the public discourse. For now we need more, and more detailed imagery, including of the different boats together, to clarify these aspects.”

“This [September 1] image reinforces my impression that the boat launched in February may have been a one off not including the full spec featured on the notional 095A launched by Bohai and Jiangnan in late May. We’ve already seen both versions side by side in Bohai,” Luck also wrote on X after Janes‘ published its report.

This image reinforces my impression that the boat launched in February may have been a one off not including the full spec featured on the notional 095A launched by Bohai and Jiangnan in late May. We've already seen both versions side by side in Bohai. https://t.co/wBMkB1gmSQ

— Alex Luck (@AlexLuck9) September 21, 2026

Regardless, the emergence in recent years of so many new, more modern submarines, and across what appear to be several distinct classes, is significant. It is no secret that China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is working to significantly expand the size and capabilities of its submarine force with a clear eye toward extending operations further and further out in the Pacific, at least. In the past, U.S. officials have publicly said the overall quality of newer Chinese submarines has been getting closer in parity to American designs.

“The PLA Navy is executing a significant strategic shift from diesel-electric to all-nuclear construction, representing a fundamental departure from historical construction patterns,” U.S. Navy Rear Adm. Mike Brookes, head of the Office of Naval Intelligence, wrote in prepared remarks ahead of a hearing before members of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission in March.

In particular, the Type 095, as well as the new Type 096 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, “represent next-generation platforms expected to enter service during the late 2020s through 2030s,” Brookes also wrote at that time. “These submarines will incorporate substantial advancements in nuclear reactor design, sensor performance, weapons integration, and noise quieting technologies.”

Submarine modernization efforts are just one aspect of a larger effort by the PLAN to expand its capabilities above and below the waves. Chinese shipyards have also been producing ever-more capable aircraft carriers, amphibious assault ships, destroyers, frigates, and more in recent years, as well. The pace of China’s construction of new surface ships and submarines has also been growing, creating a particularly significant and still-widening disparity in this regard with the U.S. Navy. This is something that has become increasingly concerning, as TWZ routinely highlights.

Work in Huludao, as well as shipyards elsewhere in China, is certainly already revealing interesting new insights into China’s next-generation submarine efforts.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post Chinese Next-Generation Submarine Developments Spotted In New Satellite Imagery appeared first on TWZ.

Un misterioso destello en la Vía Láctea que lleva dos décadas emitiendo ondas de radio desconcierta a los astrónomos

Un equipo internacional de astrónomos ha publicado un estudio detallado sobre VT J1906+0849, una fuente de radio descubierta en el sondeo VLASS (Very Large Array Sky Survey) que no se parece a ningún otro objeto conocido en la Vía Láctea. El trabajo, liderado por Jessie M. Miller, del Instituto de Tecnología de California, y publicado […]

Le PEA est devenu le premier motif de litige financier en France : comment sécuriser le vôtre, étape par étape

20 September 2026 at 10:44

Par Vincent Clairmont

La médiation de l'Autorité des marchés financiers a traité 462 dossiers relatifs au PEA en 2025, contre 185 en 2024 — une hausse de près de 150 % qui fait du plan d'épargne en actions le premier motif de saisine du médiateur, devant l'épargne salariale et les SCPI. Le mouvement ne ralentit pas : 1 865 dossiers tous produits confondus au premier semestre 2026, en progression de 31 % sur un an, le PEA conservant la tête. Près des trois quarts de ces dossiers portent sur un seul acte : le transfert d'un établissement à un autre. Et 92 % des propositions du médiateur ont été acceptées par les deux parties en 2025 — autrement dit, dans la quasi-totalité des dossiers instruits, le tort n'était pas du côté de l'épargnant.

Le PEA est devenu le premier motif de litige financier en France : comment sécuriser le vôtre, étape par étape
LE COURRIER
DES STRATÈGES
Restez libre !
Le PEA est devenu le premier motif de litige financier en France : comment sécuriser le vôtre, étape par étape

LA NEWSLETTER · GRATUITE

Le Courrier,
chaque matin.

L'essentiel de l'actualité, passé au crible par les cinq plumes du Courrier. Dans votre boîte, chaque jour ouvré.

Gratuit. Vous restez libre de partir quand vous voulez.

JE M'INSCRIS lecourrierdesstrateges.fr
lecourrierdesstrateges.fr
Restez libre !

Ces chiffres ne décrivent pas un produit défaillant. Ils décrivent un produit dont l'avantage fiscal repose entièrement sur une variable administrative — la date d'ouverture du plan — que le titulaire ne détient pas lui-même. Ce que vous protégez dans un PEA n'est pas votre capital : c'est un compteur, tenu par un tiers, et que trois ou quatre gestes mal exécutés suffisent à remettre à zéro. Je reprends le cycle de vie du plan étape par étape, avec à chaque étape le geste défensif correspondant.

Le PEA est devenu le premier motif de litige financier en France : comment sécuriser le vôtre, étape par étape
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DES STRATÈGES
Restez libre !

ABONNEMENT

Allez au fond
des choses.

Deux grands formats par jour. Les cinq plumes du Courrier. La série Sécession, le dimanche.

Le monde commente. Vous, vous comprenez.

S'ABONNER lecourrierdesstrateges.fr
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1. À l'ouverture : démarrer le compteur avant d'avoir l'argent

Un contribuable ne peut détenir qu'un seul PEA. Le plafond de versements est de 150 000 euros, porté à 225 000 euros en cumulant avec un PEA-PME, et limité à 20 000 euros pour le PEA jeunes ouvert par un majeur de moins de 25 ans rattaché au foyer fiscal de ses parents. Un couple marié ou pacsé dispose donc de deux plans, soit 300 000 euros de versements.

Le point décisif est ailleurs : l'antériorité fiscale — les cinq années au terme desquelles les gains sortent exonérés d'impôt sur le revenu — court à compter de la date du premier versement, quel qu'en soit le montant. Un plan ouvert avec dix euros et laissé dormir cinq ans est fiscalement mûr ; un plan ouvert aujourd'hui avec 150 000 euros ne l'est pas.

Je préconise d'ouvrir un PEA dès aujourd'hui avec le versement minimal accepté par l'établissement — de 10 à 500 euros selon les enseignes — si vous n'en détenez pas encore, y compris si vous n'avez aucune intention d'investir en actions dans l'immédiat. Le coût est nul, le gain est de cinq ans d'antériorité. Et archivez immédiatement l'avis d'opération du premier versement en PDF, hors de l'espace client de la banque : c'est la seule preuve d'antériorité que vous détiendrez en propre, et vous en aurez besoin.

Le PEA est devenu le premier motif de litige financier en France : comment sécuriser le vôtre, étape par étape
LE COURRIER
DES STRATÈGES
Restez libre !

TELEGRAM · L'INFO EN CONTINU

Entre deux éditions,
le fil.

La newsletter vous donne le matin. Le fil vous donne l'instant.

Gratuit, et en continu.

REJOINDRE LE FIL t.me/resterlibre
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Restez libre !

2. Au fil des versements : le plafond n'est pas ce que vous croyez

Les 150 000 euros plafonnent le cumul des versements, pas la valeur du plan. Un PEA alimenté à hauteur de 150 000 euros et qui en vaut 400 000 après quinze ans

Raffinerie, l’Italia decida di essere un Paese

19 September 2026 at 10:50

Raffinerie, l’Italia decida di essere un Paese
di Margherita Furlan
19 settembre 2026

Aramco compra gasolio nel Mediterraneo dopo gli attacchi alle sue raffinerie. In quella stessa finestra di mercato si forma il prezzo che paghiamo alla pompa. L’Italia ci arriva senza impianti e senza bandiera
La fila di Aramco
Da alcune settimane Saudi Aramco presenta offerte d’acquisto nella finestra di contrattazione gestita da Platts per carichi di gasolio nel Mediterraneo. Secondo gli intermediari che seguono quella piattaforma, la società statale saudita cerca migliaia di tonnellate di prodotto raffinato; altri operatori riferiscono che sta sondando anche il mercato della benzina in Europa. L’azienda ha rifiutato di commentare.1
Conviene soffermarsi su cosa significhi. Aramco estrae, raffina e vende: è strutturalmente venditrice di distillati, non compratrice. Nel luglio 2025 l’Arabia Saudita aveva toccato il massimo storico delle esportazioni di gasolio, con una media mensile di 611mila barili al giorno, e Aramco si presentava come fornitore quasi solitario nelle finestre di valutazione del Nord Europa e del Mediterraneo, spesso a prezzi inferiori a quelli degli altri.2 Quattordici mesi dopo si mette in fila dall’altra parte del banco.
Il motivo non è un capriccio commerciale, sono gli impianti. Gli Houthi hanno rivendicato l’attacco alla raffineria di Yanbu, sul Mar Rosso, e nel corso dell’estate hanno colpito ripetutamente il centro di trattamento di Jazan, più a sud. Poi, il 10 settembre, droni partiti dall’Iraq hanno incendiato le stazioni di pompaggio dell’oleodotto Est-Ovest nelle aree di Riad e Medina: il ministero dell’Energia saudita ha confermato l’attacco e la chiusura «precauzionale» della conduttura, mentre le immagini satellitari mostravano il pennacchio di fumo sopra la linea e i danni estesi a una stazione vicino ad Al Mesba’ah.
Quella conduttura non è un’infrastruttura qualunque. Con lo Stretto di Hormuz sostanzialmente sbarrato dallo scoppio della guerra tra Stati Uniti, Israele e Iran nel febbraio 2026, l’oleodotto Est-Ovest è diventato la via di fuga del petrolio saudita: milleduecento chilometri dai giacimenti orientali al porto di Yanbu, con circa cinque milioni di barili al giorno dirottati su quella direttrice. Lo aveva detto l’amministratore delegato di Aramco, Amin Nasser: nel contenere la crisi di approvvigionamento il tubo aveva pesato più del rilascio delle riserve strategiche.3 Gli attacchi dell’aprile precedente avevano già sottratto al regno circa 600mila barili al giorno di capacità produttiva. Ad agosto l’estrazione saudita era scesa a 6,24 milioni di barili quotidiani, un livello che nessuno si aspettava di vedere dal principale produttore dell’OPEC.4
Nel frattempo si chiudeva anche l’altra uscita. Gli Houthi hanno proclamato a luglio un blocco marittimo contro le navi saudite, hanno preso il porto yemenita di Mokha e si sono avvicinati alle isole Hanish, cioè alla soglia di Bab el-Mandeb; il traffico attraverso quello stretto è calato di circa il sessanta per cento. Hormuz da una parte, Bab el-Mandeb dall’altra, l’oleodotto in mezzo è fermo: il regno che ha costruito la propria centralità mondiale sulla capacità di consegnare greggio ovunque si è ritrovato con tre porte socchiuse e un ordine d’acquisto da firmare nel Mediterraneo.
Il resto è politica. Nei giorni dell’avanzata su Mokha il principe ereditario Mohammed bin Salman avrebbe telefonato due volte a Donald Trump per chiedere raid contro il movimento yemenita, secondo funzionari statunitensi citati dalla stampa americana.5 Riad, per ora, ha evitato la rappresaglia diretta contro l’Iraq e Baghdad ha condannato l’attacco e apprezzato la scelta di non reagire.6 Il petroliere più potente del pianeta ha scoperto che la sua potenza dipendeva da cose fragili: una stazione di pompaggio, una colonna di distillazione, una rotta.
Il bersaglio non è più il pozzo
C’è una regolarità, in questi mesi, che i comunicati non dicono e le mappe sì. Nessuno bombarda i giacimenti. Si colpiscono le stazioni di pompaggio, le raffinerie, i terminali, i tubi. Il giacimento è profondo, disperso, difficile da distruggere e costoso da presidiare; l’impianto che trasforma il greggio in qualcosa di utilizzabile è invece un oggetto concentrato, visibile dal satellite, vulnerabile a un drone che costa quanto un’utilitaria. La stessa grammatica si legge sul fronte opposto dell’Eurasia, dove da due anni le raffinerie russe sono bersaglio sistematico dei droni ucraini, con fermate di impianti e contrazioni della produzione di carburante. Non è una coincidenza tecnica: è una dottrina che si è diffusa perché funziona.
Clausewitz aveva chiamato centro di gravità il punto da cui dipende la coesione dell’intera forza avversaria, quello contro cui vanno concentrate tutte le energie.7 Per un secolo si è creduto che nel settore energetico quel centro fosse la risorsa: chi possiede il sottosuolo comanda. La stagione che stiamo attraversando dice il contrario. Il centro di gravità è la catena di trasformazione e di trasporto e chi la colpisce ottiene con mezzi minuscoli effetti che nessun esercito convenzionale potrebbe produrre a quel costo. Un movimento armato yemenita, senza marina né aviazione, ha ridotto le esportazioni del primo produttore mondiale e ne ha fatto un compratore di gasolio sul mercato libero.
Ne discendono due conseguenze che riguardano direttamente l’Europa. La prima è che il vantaggio difensivo è scomparso: proteggere una rete di impianti e di condutture costa incomparabilmente più che attaccarla e nessuna quantità di navi in scorta può cambiare questa aritmetica. La seconda è che la sicurezza energetica ha smesso di essere un problema di contratti di fornitura per diventare un problema d’infrastrutture fisiche. Si può avere il barile e non avere il litro. Si può avere il litro e non avere il modo di farlo arrivare. Chi ha smontato pezzi della propria capacità di trasformazione pensando che il mercato avrebbe sempre provveduto ha fatto una scommessa sulla stabilità permanente delle rotte altrui. Quella scommessa, nell’anno in cui il re del greggio si mette in fila per comprare carburante, si sta rivelando per quello che era.
Il prezzo non nasce alla pompa
Qui il ragionamento smette di essere mediorientale e diventa italiano perché il collegamento fra Yanbu e il distributore sotto casa non è una metafora, ma un meccanismo documentato e pubblico.
Il prezzo industriale dei carburanti in Italia, cioè quel che resta una volta tolte accisa e imposta sul valore aggiunto, non segue il costo di produzione delle raffinerie nazionali. Segue la quotazione internazionale dei prodotti raffinati nel bacino mediterraneo, il cosiddetto Platts CIF Med, rilevato dall’agenzia che pubblica le valutazioni giornaliere sulla base delle contrattazioni fisiche. Lo scrive senza giri di parole l’associazione delle aziende petrolifere italiane nella propria nota metodologica sui prezzi: la materia prima del prezzo alla pompa è la quotazione Platts, e il margine lordo è la differenza fra il prezzo di vendita al netto delle tasse e quel valore. Lo ripete la stessa associazione quando deve spiegare perché il greggio scende e i carburanti no: il riferimento non è il Brent, sono le valutazioni dei raffinati.8
Vale la pena fermarsi su cosa sia quella finestra. Non è una borsa regolamentata con un’autorità di vigilanza pubblica: è un processo di valutazione gestito da una società privata di informazione sui mercati, alimentato dalle offerte che gli operatori presentano in un intervallo di tempo definito. L’Autorità garante della concorrenza e del mercato, in un’indagine del 2023 sui prezzi dei carburanti, ha osservato che i riferimenti internazionali dei prodotti petroliferi, Platts compreso, sono esposti a rischi di opacità, e lo ha argomentato richiamando da un lato procedimenti per sospette manipolazioni conclusi in giurisdizioni extraeuropee, dall’altro l’adozione di apposite linee guida da parte delle autorità internazionali di regolamentazione.9 È un’istituzione italiana che dice, in punta di diritto, che il termometro del nostro prezzo alla pompa non è un oggetto neutro.
In quella finestra, da alcune settimane, compra Saudi Aramco.
Il risultato lo hanno letto tutti sui cartelloni. Il 16 settembre 2026 il gasolio in modalità self service ha toccato il massimo storico italiano a 2,246 euro al litro, quasi due centesimi sopra il precedente primato del 17 marzo 2022, con 2,326 euro sulla rete autostradale e la quotazione all’ingrosso oltre i milleduecento euro per mille litri; il giorno seguente il servito viaggiava a 2,376.10 Senza il taglio dell’accisa il prezzo medio nazionale sarebbe stato di 2,416 euro.11
Nessuno impone a Roma cosa pagare. Semplicemente, il quadro dentro cui quel prezzo si forma è stato costruito da altri, si aggiorna ogni giorno in una finestra di mercato dove lo Stato italiano non siede, e il nostro margine di azione si è ridotto a decidere se restituire ai cittadini qualche centesimo di accisa. Non è dipendenza dal barile: è dipendenza dalla struttura.
Il mercato si era già ristretto
C’è un antefatto che rende il gesto di Aramco molto più pesante di quanto appaia e che riguarda l’Europa da vicino: la riserva di gasolio del Mediterraneo si era assottigliata per decisione politica mesi prima che i droni arrivassero su Yanbu.
Fino al 2022 circa il quaranta per cento del gasolio importato dall’Unione europea veniva dalla Russia. L’embargo ha chiuso quel canale ma non ha ridotto la domanda: l’ha deviata. Si è aperta così la scappatoia della raffinazione, il cosiddetto refining loophole, per cui India, Turchia e in parte Cina compravano greggio russo a prezzi scontati proprio grazie alle sanzioni occidentali, lo lavoravano nei propri impianti e rivendevano all’Europa prodotti formalmente non russi, perché la nazionalità di un carburante, nel diritto commerciale, è quella del Paese in cui avviene la trasformazione, non quella del pozzo. Non era un traffico clandestino: era legale, pubblico e quantificato. Nel giugno 2025 l’Europa ha ricevuto 124mila barili al giorno di gasolio dall’India e 94mila dalla Turchia, pari rispettivamente al sette e al cinque per cento delle importazioni totali; secondo le stime di Kpler, che includono anche il carburante per aerei, l’India, fino a pochi anni prima inesistente come esportatore verso il nostro continente, ha coperto nel 2024 il sedici per cento dell’import europeo, in un anno in cui il greggio russo rappresentava il trentotto per cento degli acquisti indiani.12
Per tre anni, insomma, l’Europa ha continuato a bruciare molecole di origine russa passate per Jamnagar o per İzmir, dichiarando di non comprare più dalla Russia. Poi, nel luglio 2025, il diciottesimo pacchetto di sanzioni ha chiuso anche quella porta: dal 21 gennaio 2026 è vietato importare nell’Unione prodotti petroliferi ottenuti in Paesi terzi a partire da greggio di origine russa, con esenzione per alcuni partner e per i Paesi esportatori netti di greggio.13 La misura ha due caratteristiche che meritano di essere dette. La prima è che nessuna analisi di laboratorio può stabilire l’origine di una molecola dopo la raffinazione, tanto più che si lavorano miscele di greggi diversi: l’applicazione dipende quindi da autocertificazioni e da tracciamenti documentali, e già al momento dell’annuncio gli operatori prevedevano un carosello di trasbordi destinato a confondere le carte. La seconda è che quel divieto ha ristretto l’offerta disponibile nel bacino mediterraneo in un momento in cui l’Europa non aveva ricostruito un grammo della capacità di raffinazione che aveva dismesso.
Ora si guardi la sequenza per intero, perché è la cosa più istruttiva di tutta questa vicenda. Il 21 gennaio 2026 l’Unione europea restringe per via normativa il proprio accesso al gasolio. A febbraio la guerra tra Stati Uniti, Israele e Iran sbarra lo Stretto di Hormuz. Durante l’estate gli attacchi degli Houthi mettono fuori uso a intermittenza gli impianti sauditi sul Mar Rosso. Il 10 settembre saltano le stazioni di pompaggio dell’oleodotto Est-Ovest. E in quel bacino ristretto, dove l’Europa deve comprare per forza, entra come acquirente anche il maggiore produttore mondiale. Nessuno di questi eventi, preso da solo, era imprevedibile; il loro sovrapporsi era un rischio di sistema che qualcuno avrebbe dovuto valutare prima di firmare i provvedimenti e prima di autorizzare le conversioni di impianti. Il differenziale fra il prezzo del gasolio e quello del greggio, che è la misura esatta della scarsità di capacità di raffinazione, aveva già superato i ventisei dollari al barile nell’estate 2025, il massimo dal febbraio 2024. Era un segnale, ed era leggibile da chiunque.
Va detto con chiarezza quel che l’Unione ha deciso senza dotarsi degli strumenti per reggerne le conseguenze non lo pagano le cancellerie, bensì chi mette il gasolio nel furgone alle sei del mattino.
La deindustrializzazione ha un indirizzo
A questo punto la domanda giusta non è perché il gasolio costi tanto, ma perché l’Italia sia arrivata a questo appuntamento in queste condizioni. E la risposta ha una data d’inizio, una sequenza e dei documenti.
Fra il 2000 e il 2024 il Paese ha perso il 12,7 per cento della propria capacità di raffinazione.14 Non è stata un’emorragia improvvisa: è stata una successione di decisioni aziendali, ciascuna ragionevole dal punto di vista di chi la prendeva, che sommate hanno prodotto un risultato che nessuno ha mai deliberato in Parlamento.
La raffineria di Cremona della Tamoil ha chiuso nel 2011 ed è stata convertita in deposito: l’amministratore delegato della società lo raccontò ai deputati della Commissione Attività produttive, spiegando che un impianto nella pianura padana, senza sbocco al mare, non riusciva più a collocare l’eccesso di olio combustibile e di benzina.15 La Raffineria di Roma, a Pantano di Grano, comunicò nel giugno 2012 l’intenzione di trasformare, a decorrere dal 30 settembre di quell’anno, lo stabilimento di lavorazione e stoccaggio in mero deposito di oli minerali: la dismissione dell’attività di raffinazione è scritta negli atti autorizzativi.16 La IES di Mantova, comprata quattro anni prima dal gruppo ungherese MOL, annunciò nell’ottobre 2013 la trasformazione graduale in deposito a partire dal gennaio successivo, con 350 esuberi su 390 dipendenti. Nel frattempo Eni fermava per sei mesi Porto Marghera e metteva in cassa integrazione a zero ore cinquecento persone a Gela.
Il Parlamento lo sapeva. Nel 2012 la Camera svolse una indagine conoscitiva specifica sulla crisi della raffinazione, con audizioni di aziende e sindacati, e il documento conclusivo registrava il rischio di chiusura di almeno quattro o cinque siti e la necessità di interventi a tutela del settore.17 Gli interventi non sono arrivati. È arrivata, invece, una narrazione più comoda.
Perché la seconda ondata è stata raccontata in tutt’altro modo. Porto Marghera è diventata bioraffineria nel 2014, Gela nel 2019, Livorno è in conversione con completamento previsto fra la fine del 2026 e l’inizio del 2027. Ogni annuncio è stato presentato come transizione ecologica e sul piano delle emissioni ha una sua logica difendibile. Sul piano della sicurezza degli approvvigionamenti, però, i numeri raccontano un’altra storia, perché le scale non sono paragonabili: Livorno, che sta completando il passaggio alla bioraffinazione, trattava quattro milioni di tonnellate di greggio l’anno e nessun impianto a scarti e oli vegetali lavora volumi simili. Un litro di gasolio idrogenato da scarti alimentari non è un litro di gasolio fossile in meno da importare: è un’altra filiera, con materie prime diverse, volumi diversi e limiti propri. La colonna di distillazione che smetti di far girare non torna.
Pasolini aveva coniato, per descrivere l’Italia che si trasformava sotto i suoi occhi, la formula dello «sviluppo senza progresso»: un Paese che si modernizza nelle forme e si impoverisce nella sostanza, perché il criterio della trasformazione non è il bene comune ma la convenienza di chi la guida.18 Non è un’analogia forzata. La dismissione della raffinazione italiana è stata razionale per ogni singolo azionista e distruttiva per l’interesse nazionale e nessuno, in vent’anni, si è preso la responsabilità politica di dire che quelle due razionalità non coincidevano.
Oggi restano poco più di dieci impianti attivi, di cui tre convertiti o in conversione alla bioraffinazione. È il patrimonio con cui l’Italia si presenta al mercato in cui, da alcune settimane, compra anche Saudi Aramco.
Il cambio di bandiera
Gli impianti sopravvissuti hanno cambiato proprietario, e la geografia di quei passaggi dice più di qualsiasi dichiarazione programmatica.
La ISAB di Priolo Gargallo, il complesso di raffinazione più grande del Paese, è passata in dieci anni dalla genovese Erg alla russa Lukoil, da questa al fondo cipriota G.O.I. Energy nel 2023, sotto la pressione delle sanzioni e con accordi decennali di fornitura e di ritiro affidati alla società di intermediazione Trafigura, e infine, nella primavera del 2026, a un gruppo italiano. È la vicenda più istruttiva dell’intero dossier e merita un capitolo a sé.
Sarroch, in Sardegna, è la seconda gamba del sistema: trecentomila barili al giorno, oltre un quinto dei carburanti italiani, in gran parte gasolio, cioè esattamente il prodotto di cui l’Europa non è autosufficiente. Era la Saras della famiglia Moratti; dal 2024 è di Vitol, il maggiore operatore mondiale indipendente nel commercio di petrolio. Augusta, centosettantamila barili al giorno, è della algerina Sonatrach, che l’ha rilevata nel 2018 da Esso Italia. Milazzo è per metà kuwaitiana, joint venture paritaria fra Eni e Kuwait Petroleum. Già nel febbraio 2024, facendo i conti con l’ingresso di Vitol in Saras, Il Sole 24 Ore osservava che circa metà della capacità di raffinazione italiana passava sotto controllo straniero.19
Poi è arrivato il passaggio più grande, e quasi nessuno se n’è accorto. Nel settembre 2025 la famiglia Brachetti Peretti ha firmato l’accordo vincolante per cedere il 99,82 per cento di Italiana Petroli, il gruppo Api, alla SOCAR, la compagnia petrolifera di Stato dell’Azerbaigian. Nel pacchetto, valutato attorno ai tre miliardi di euro, ci sono la raffineria di Falconara Marittima, quella di Trecate e oltre quattromilacinquecento stazioni di servizio a marchio IP. Il perfezionamento è arrivato nella primavera del 2026, dopo le autorizzazioni in materia di concorrenza, sovvenzioni estere e poteri speciali dello Stato. Non è più solo la raffinazione: è la rete capillare attraverso cui gli italiani fanno il pieno.
Sia chiaro cosa si sta dicendo e cosa no. Non c’è nulla di illegittimo in queste operazioni e nulla da eccepire sui compratori: un trader olandese, un fondo cipriota, una compagnia di Stato algerina e una azera hanno fatto quello che è nel loro mandato, cioè comprare beni che rendono. Il punto è l’altro lato del tavolo. Una raffineria per un operatore di mercato è un margine fra il costo del greggio e il valore dei prodotti e se quel margine si assottiglia la si spegne; per uno Stato è la differenza tra avere il petrolio e il carburante. Sono due criteri diversi e l’Italia ha lasciato che prevalesse il primo senza mai dichiarare di averlo scelto. La normativa sui poteri speciali è stata applicata come procedura di controllo su singole operazioni, non come strumento di una politica industriale: ha accompagnato i passaggi di proprietà, non li ha orientati.
È un mutamento reale dei rapporti di potere travestito da ordinaria amministrazione. La cessione dell’apparato di raffinazione italiano ne è un caso quasi scolastico. Nessun voto parlamentare ha mai stabilito che il Paese rinunciasse al controllo della propria capacità di trasformazione. È accaduto in quindici anni, un atto societario alla volta, e ogni singolo atto era legittimo.
Priolo, quattro proprietari in dieci anni
Se si vuole capire che cosa accade a un’infrastruttura strategica quando la si affida integralmente al mercato dei capitali conviene guardare da vicino Priolo Gargallo, provincia di Siracusa: le due raffinerie riunite sotto la sigla ISAB valgono circa un quinto della capacità di raffinazione nazionale, coprono una quota consistente della domanda elettrica siciliana, occupano attorno a mille persone in via diretta e ne sostengono diverse migliaia nell’indotto. Non è uno stabilimento, è un pezzo dell’ossatura del Paese.
La sequenza dei proprietari, in poco più di dieci anni, è questa: il gruppo genovese Erg esce dalla raffinazione, l’impianto passa alla russa Lukoil attraverso la controllata Litasco e nel 2023, quando le sanzioni rendono impossibile sia importare greggio russo che ottenere credito bancario per comprarne altrove, viene ceduto al fondo cipriota G.O.I. Energy. La cessione, secondo il Financial Times, fu agevolata dal gruppo di intermediazione Trafigura e da un investitore privato, e fu approvata dal governo italiano con l’esercizio dei poteri speciali; i dettagli delle condizioni imposte non sono stati resi pubblici. Lo Stato, in altre parole, ha scelto e autorizzato il compratore, e lo ha fatto in forza di un decreto legge concepito proprio per proteggere l’impianto durante l’uscita dei russi.
L’assetto era questo: la proprietà al fondo, il capitale circolante a Trafigura, che avrebbe fornito il greggio e ritirato i prodotti raffinati per dieci anni. Poi è arrivato il conto. Nel gennaio 2025 la società apre una procedura di composizione negoziata della crisi per gestire tensioni finanziarie; secondo il Financial Times l’azionista di controllo indiretto avrebbe cercato di usare quella procedura per rinegoziare o risolvere il contratto decennale con il trader, giudicato penalizzante per l’impianto, e l’esistenza di quel vincolo avrebbe ostacolato le trattative con possibili acquirenti. Nell’autunno 2025 emerge in sede giudiziaria che il prezzo di acquisto non sarebbe stato integralmente saldato al venditore russo, con un debito indicato fra i 150 e i 190 milioni di euro, e il tribunale apre alla possibilità di pignoramento delle quote. Nel febbraio 2026 la procedura di crisi si chiude con esito positivo; nella primavera il fondo firma la cessione a un gruppo italiano, con un’operazione articolata in due fasi, la prima relativa al 51 per cento. Il via libera dell’Autorità garante della concorrenza è arrivato; il vaglio dei poteri speciali, mentre scriviamo, è ancora davanti al governo, e i sindacati territoriali chiedono di essere coinvolti in quel passaggio.
Bilancio di dieci anni: quattro assetti proprietari, due procedure straordinarie, un contenzioso internazionale, perdite per centinaia di milioni nel 2023 e nel 2024 e un ritorno all’utile nel 2025 grazie a condizioni di mercato favorevoli. I lavoratori hanno attraversato l’intero percorso senza mai sapere chi fosse davvero il loro datore di lavoro l’anno successivo, e il sindacato, al primo tavolo con la nuova proprietà, ha dovuto porre come condizioni non negoziabili cose che in un Paese con una politica industriale sarebbero ovvie: salvaguardia dei livelli occupazionali, tutela dell’indotto, un cronoprogramma certo d’investimenti a partire dalla manutenzione di un impianto che tratta idrocarburi in un sito di interesse nazionale per le bonifiche.
David Harvey ha chiamato accumulazione per spoliazione quel meccanismo per cui il capitale, quando il profitto ordinario si comprime, torna a guadagnare non producendo di più ma appropriandosi di beni già esistenti, spesso pubblici o socialmente costruiti, e rimettendoli in circolo come attività finanziarie. La vicenda di Priolo non è la sua illustrazione perfetta, e sarebbe scorretto presentarla come tale: qui il rischio industriale c’è stato davvero e le perdite pure. Ma il nucleo del ragionamento tiene. Un impianto che vale un quinto della capacità nazionale è stato trattato per un decennio come una partecipazione da acquistare, da rifinanziare e da rivendere, mentre la sua funzione, per il Paese, era un’altra: garantire che ci fosse carburante. Quando il criterio finanziario e quello della sicurezza divergono, non è il primo a cedere.
Il ritorno dell’impianto sotto controllo italiano è una buona notizia e va detto. Ma è avvenuto per iniziativa di un gruppo privato al termine di una crisi, non per effetto di una strategia nazionale ed è ancora una volta lo Stato a doversi limitare a dire sì o no a un’operazione decisa da altri. Il golden power è solo un semaforo: regola il traffico, non decide dove si va.
Il fornitore diventa concorrente
L’Italia è un Paese che produce gasolio. Secondo i dati del ministero dell’Ambiente e della Sicurezza energetica relativi al 2025, il fabbisogno nazionale di gasolio si aggira sui 23,3 milioni di tonnellate e la produzione delle raffinerie italiane sfiora i 25 milioni: siamo esportatori netti, con circa 7,9 milioni di tonnellate vendute all’estero contro 5,2 importate. Chi racconta un Paese incapace di raffinare dice una cosa falsa.
E allora perché il prezzo alla pompa tocca il massimo storico proprio mentre a migliaia di chilometri saltano le stazioni di pompaggio saudite? Perché l’esposizione italiana non è fisica, è di posizione. Due numeri lo spiegano meglio di un saggio. Il 60 per cento del gasolio che importiamo proviene dall’area del Golfo, e il 47 per cento arriva dalla sola Arabia Saudita. Il nostro primo fornitore di gasolio è esattamente il soggetto che da alcune settimane presenta offerte d’acquisto nella finestra mediterranea dove si forma il nostro prezzo industriale. Non ha smesso di venderci: ha cominciato a comprare dove compriamo noi. Il fornitore è diventato concorrente, e ci è arrivato nel giro di un trimestre, senza che nessuno decidesse nulla.
Immanuel Wallerstein descriveva l’economia mondiale come un sistema unico articolato in centro, periferia e semiperiferia, dove la posizione di ciascuno non dipende dalla ricchezza assoluta ma dal punto che occupa nella divisione del lavoro e nella catena del valore.20 L’Italia energetica sta esattamente lì, nel mezzo: trasforma molto, decide poco, non controlla né la risorsa a monte né le regole di formazione del prezzo a valle. È una posizione che funziona benissimo quando il sistema è stabile e diventa una trappola nel momento in cui qualcuno, in Yemen o in Iraq, scopre che una stazione di pompaggio si buca con un drone.
L’accisa come anestetico
Lo Stato italiano f l’unica cosa che gli è rimasta da fare, e la fa in entrambe le direzioni nello stesso anno.
Il primo movimento è strutturale. Il decreto legislativo 43 del 2025 avvia il riavvicinamento graduale fra l’accisa sulla benzina e quella sul gasolio, e il decreto ministeriale del 14 maggio 2025 lo mette in pratica: un centesimo e mezzo in meno al litro sulla benzina, un centesimo e mezzo in più sul gasolio.21 Poi la legge di bilancio per il 2026 accelera bruscamente: dal primo gennaio le due aliquote sono parificate a 672,90 euro per mille litri, il che significa 4,05 centesimi in meno sulla benzina e 4,05 in più sul gasolio, senza gradualità, con la motivazione esplicita di superare un sussidio ambientalmente dannoso censito nel catalogo del ministero dell’Ambiente.22 La logica ambientale è comprensibile. L’effetto sociale, in un Paese dove il gasolio muove l’autotrasporto, l’agricoltura e la quota maggioritaria del parco veicoli, è una tassa che colpisce chi lavora. E c’è un precedente che nessuno ha chiarito: dopo il riequilibrio del maggio 2025 il rincaro sul gasolio si è trasferito ai prezzi quasi integralmente, mentre lo sconto sulla benzina, almeno sulla rete autostradale, si è visto in misura ridicola, tanto che un’associazione di consumatori ha depositato un esposto all’Antitrust.23 La partita di giro, sulla carta a somma zero, è diventata un aumento netto per il cittadino.
Il secondo movimento è d’emergenza, e va nella direzione opposta. Da quando il prezzo internazionale del gasolio ha cominciato a correre, il governo taglia la stessa accisa che ha appena aumentato: l’aliquota viene ridotta in via temporanea a 532,90 euro per mille litri, cioè quattordici centesimi al litro, più tre centesimi di minore imposta sul valore aggiunto, per uno sconto complessivo di diciassette centesimi.24 E lo fa per periodi brevissimi, rinnovati di decreto in decreto: dal 28 luglio al 6 agosto, dal 27 agosto al 5 settembre, poi fino al 10, poi fino al 17 con una copertura di circa 85 milioni di euro, poi con uno sconto dimezzato e infine ridotto a poco più di sei centesimi. Sedici proroghe, circa due miliardi di euro in sette mesi, e un prezzo che nel frattempo ha toccato comunque il massimo storico.
Messi in fila, i due movimenti raccontano meglio di qualunque analisi lo stato della politica energetica italiana. A gennaio lo Stato alza l’accisa sul gasolio di quattro centesimi per ragioni ambientali; da luglio la taglia di quattordici per ragioni sociali; a settembre torna a ridurre lo sconto perché non ci sono più coperture. È l’unica leva rimasta a un Paese che ha perso il controllo di tutto il resto della catena, e viene azionata avanti e indietro come il volante di un’automobile che ha i freni altrove. Ogni proroga dura una settimana o dieci giorni, esattamente la durata dell’attenzione mediatica che la accompagna.
Due miliardi sono una cifra seria. Sono circa quanto il Paese avrebbe speso per costituire una riserva strategica di prodotti finiti di dimensioni significative, o per finanziare la quota pubblica di un piano di ammodernamento della capacità di raffinazione residua. Sono stati spesi, invece, per ridurre di qualche centesimo e per qualche giorno un prezzo che si forma in una finestra di contrattazione privata nel Mediterraneo, dove nel frattempo è entrata a comprare Saudi Aramco. Un Paese senza controllo sulla catena può soltanto anestetizzare il dolore, mai curarlo.
Riprendersi la catena: i tre anelli
Mattei non aveva pozzi. Aveva capito che il potere non stava nel giacimento ma nella catena che porta il greggio dal sottosuolo al serbatoio e che quella catena si poteva costruire anche partendo da un Paese sconfitto e privo di risorse. A Tunisi, il 10 giugno 1960, nel giorno in cui firmava con il governo tunisino l’intesa per costruire una raffineria, spiegò che quelle intese nulla avevano a che vedere con «il modello obsoleto del capitalismo coloniale del XIX secolo», perché prevedevano compartecipazione finanziaria e cogestione fra Paesi produttori e Paesi consumatori, in condizioni di eguaglianza.25 Negli appunti preparati per quel viaggio, rimasti inutilizzati e conservati nell’archivio storico dell’Eni, la formulazione era ancora più tagliente: la condizione coloniale, annotava, esiste quando il gioco della domanda e dell’offerta di una materia prima vitale è «alterato da una potenza egemonica: anche privata, di monopolio o di oligopolio», e nel settore petrolifero quella potenza aveva un nome, il cartello.26 Sessantasei anni dopo, l’incontro fra domanda e offerta del nostro gasolio si decide in una finestra di contrattazione privata che l’Autorità garante della concorrenza definisce esposta a rischi di opacità. La definizione di Mattei non è invecchiata: si è solo spostata di soggetto.
Che cosa vuol dire, in concreto, riprendersi la catena nel 2026? Tre anelli, e per ciascuno una cosa che si può firmare.
La raffinazione. Dichiarare gli impianti infrastrutture strategiche a tutti gli effetti, sottoporne ogni passaggio di proprietà e ogni riconversione a un vaglio che non sia solo di legittimità ma di merito, e vincolare le conversioni a bioraffineria a un piano nazionale che stabilisca prima quanta capacità fossile il Paese deve conservare e per quanti anni. Non si tratta di fermare la transizione: il punto è smettere di affidarne il calendario ai margini industriali di operatori privati esteri. Sul fronte delle scorte l’architettura esiste già e va usata: il decreto legislativo 249 del 2012, che recepisce la direttiva europea sull’obbligo di mantenere una riserva minima, ha istituito l’Organismo centrale di stoccaggio italiano, le cui funzioni sono affidate ad Acquirente Unico sotto vigilanza ministeriale, e ha stabilito che le scorte specifiche siano di proprietà pubblica e conservate sul territorio nazionale.27 Il punto è la composizione: in una crisi come quella di questo settembre a mancare non è il barile, è il litro raffinato. Servono scorte di prodotti finiti, in quantità dichiarate e verificabili.
La logistica. Abbiamo i rigassificatori, il terminale di Trieste con l’oleodotto transalpino che rifornisce anche Austria, Germania e Repubblica Ceca, il gasdotto adriatico che porta in Puglia il gas del Caspio, le condutture dall’Algeria e dalla Libia. Quello che manca non è l’infrastruttura, è la regia: un soggetto pubblico che tratti direttamente con i produttori, come faceva l’Eni delle origini, invece di comprare da intermediari che lucrano sulla differenza. Il Piano Mattei del governo ha preso il nome; il metodo era un altro, e consisteva in contratti diretti, condizioni migliori per il Paese produttore e controllo italiano dell’infrastruttura di trasporto.
La rotta. Il 17 settembre, al forum Risorsa Mare della Spezia, il ministro della Difesa ha annunciato di avere deciso con il capo di Stato maggiore di attivare la Marina per garantire il transito delle navi di interesse nazionale attraverso Bab el-Mandeb, aggiungendo di non voler aspettare che sia la missione europea Aspides a stabilire se le navi possano passare. L’Italia è il primo contributore navale di quella missione, e questo rende la frase più interessante di quanto sembri: non è un atto di forza verso lo Yemen, è la constatazione che la cornice europea non decide. Una scorta, però, è una toppa. Una rotta si tiene aperta prima di tutto con la diplomazia: con l’Egitto, che vive di Suez ed è il primo interessato alla riapertura del traffico, con i Paesi rivieraschi del Mar Rosso e del Golfo, e con chi controlla militarmente la costa yemenita, perché la storia dei passaggi obbligati insegna che si negoziano prima di essere scortati. È la lezione mediterranea di Moro, che cercò nel dialogo con il mondo arabo una posizione autonoma per l’Italia, e di Craxi, che a Sigonella dimostrò che rivendicare la giurisdizione nazionale di fronte all’alleato non significa uscire dall’alleanza.
Chi esegue e chi decide
I fatti di questi giorni, non le opinioni, dicono dove siamo. Dal 31 luglio 2026 l’Italia guida la missione di sorveglianza aerea della NATO nei cieli baltici, con quattro Eurofighter e un centinaio di uomini a Šiauliai: primo decollo su allarme il 3 agosto, drone non identificato abbattuto il 15 settembre dopo essere entrato dalla Bielorussia. Il 17 settembre la Marina viene attivata per Bab el-Mandeb. Sul fronte finanziario, il Paese ha chiesto accesso ai prestiti europei del programma per l’industria della difesa, con una dotazione indicativa di 14,9 miliardi notificata dalla Commissione, da restituire in quarantacinque anni. Alla pompa, il gasolio sta a 2,25 euro al litro.
È un profilo riconoscibile: un Paese che presidia i cieli di altri, scorta le proprie navi in un mare che non controlla, s’indebita per armamenti decisi altrove e resta fuori dai tavoli dove si tratta di ciò che paga. Ma questo profilo non è un destino, è una serie di scelte, e chi lo definisce inevitabile sta spacciando per realismo una scelta. L’Italia una politica estera l’ha avuta, quando ha deciso di averla, e non l’ha mai avuta contro l’America: l’ha avuta accanto all’America, con la schiena dritta.
Un governo che volesse cominciare a riprendersi la catena non avrebbe bisogno di una legge di bilancio. Avrebbe bisogno di tre firme. Un provvedimento che dichiari le raffinerie infrastrutture strategiche e subordini conversioni e cessioni a un piano nazionale della raffinazione. Una richiesta formale, a Bruxelles e a Washington, perché l’Italia sieda al tavolo in cui si discute dell’energia che arriva nelle case degli italiani. Una convocazione dei Paesi rivieraschi del Mediterraneo e del Mar Rosso, con l’Egitto in testa, per una rotta negoziata invece che soltanto pattugliata.
Nessuna delle tre costa un euro. Costano una cosa sola, ed è la sola che in questi anni è mancata: decidere di essere un Paese.
Perché la fila in cui si è messa Aramco dice esattamente questo. Chi controlla la trasformazione e il trasporto detta le condizioni a chi possiede la materia prima, e non il contrario. Il regno che ha il più grande giacimento del mondo lo ha imparato in una settimana, con tre stazioni di pompaggio in fiamme. Noi abbiamo avuto quindici anni per impararlo e abbiamo usato quel tempo per vendere gli impianti, chiamare transizione le chiusure e ridurre le accise di sei centesimi.
La guerra è il prodotto. Il caos è la materia prima. E la sovranità, quando non la si difende, è la merce.

 

L'articolo Raffinerie, l’Italia decida di essere un Paese proviene da Casa del Sole TV.

German Forces Surge Onto Baltic Island In First-Of-Its-Kind NATO Drill

18 September 2026 at 20:12

Swedish and German forces are conducting what appears to be the first joint rehearsal of their rapid-reinforcement plans for the Baltic island of Gotland. The exercise is another step in Sweden’s defense planning for an island whose position in the middle of the Baltic gives it an outsized strategic importance for controlling access, protecting the Baltic states, and maintaining NATO’s freedom of movement in a region where Russian military activity remains a persistent concern.

Silver Wotan 2026 / Weiterer Text über ots und www.presseportal.de/nr/179237 / Die Verwendung dieses Bildes für redaktionelle Zwecke ist unter Beachtung aller mitgeteilten Nutzungsbedingungen zulässig und dann auch honorarfrei. Veröffentlichung ausschließlich mit Bildrechte-Hinweis.
German and Swedish warships stand offshore while a Swedish CB90 fast assault craft operates in the harbor at Visby. Bundeswehr/Marc Tessensohn

The exercise, Silver Wotan 2026, running between September 14-23, brings together Swedish and German forces across the land, maritime, and air domains. The scenario is built around a Swedish request for allied assistance, with German forces moving personnel and equipment across the Baltic before integrating with Swedish units already defending the island. The operation is testing the entire process of getting allied combat power to Gotland, protecting it during the movement to Visby, and rapidly incorporating it into the island’s existing defensive network.

A video shows troops coming ashore on Swedish CB90 fast assault craft, a type that German soldiers are also trained to operate:

A rapid deployment of German and Swedish forces to Gotland island is being carried out today. Units from 🇸🇪 and 🇩🇪 are rehearsing the swift reinforcement of the strategic island in order to ensure the security of the Baltic Sea.#SilverWotan#NATO pic.twitter.com/A0r3LF8XUP

— Försvarsmakten (@Forsvarsmakten) September 18, 2026

The strategic importance of Gotland has grown considerably following Sweden’s accession to NATO in March 2024, which was a direct response to the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Located approximately halfway between mainland Sweden and the Baltic states, the island occupies a central position in the Baltic Sea, close to the maritime approaches to the Gulf of Finland and within reach of the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. Its location gives forces operating from Gotland a potentially significant position from which to conduct surveillance, air defense, and maritime operations, while also making the island an important part of the wider network connecting NATO’s northern and eastern members.

The location of Gotland within the Baltic region. Google Earth

At the same time, Gotland sits within an extremely complex littoral environment, where shallow waters, islands, narrow maritime approaches, and the proximity of multiple states can make both offensive operations and defensive planning more difficult. The region has also been shaped by longstanding Swedish concerns about Russian clandestine activity, including intelligence gathering and other forms of covert or deniable activity. The complexity of the Baltic operating environment can make such activities harder to detect and attribute, adding another layer of uncertainty alongside the more conventional military challenges facing the region.

The unloading operation in Visby. The vehicles seen here were transported by sea from Karlskrona to the Swedish mainland. Bundeswehr/Marc Tessensohn

Geography has long made Gotland important to Swedish defense planning, but its significance has taken on a broader dimension since Sweden joined the alliance. NATO has described the island as strategically important to its freedom of maneuver in the Baltic, while Swedish officials have highlighted its potential role as a hub for military operations and logistics in the region.

The current exercise is designed around the practical difficulties of reinforcing such a position.

Military equipment is being transported by sea to Visby, Gotland’s principal port, including by commercial ferry. In Visby, Swedish and German personnel are securing the harbor and conducting the reception of the arriving force. Among the equipment being moved are air defense systems, while Swedish forces are also operating coastal defense systems armed with anti-ship missiles.

German Army vehicles roll into Visby during Silver Wotan. Bundeswehr/Marc Tessensohn

Meanwhile, publicly available flight-tracking data showed German Luftwaffe transport aircraft, including at least one Airbus A400M airlifter, apparently involved in the effort. The commercial airport at Visby has long also been used for military activities related to Gotland and the wider Baltic region.

”A rapid deployment of German and Swedish forces to Gotland island is being carried out today” https://t.co/z6oLs1LCT4 pic.twitter.com/n18MdST6r1

— Jamming (@balticjam) September 18, 2026

The movement is supported by Swedish and German naval forces and other aircraft, creating a scenario in which the maritime transit, protection of the port, air operations, and subsequent movement of troops and equipment ashore all form part of the same military problem. Once ashore, the arriving forces have to be moved into position and integrated with Swedish units already responsible for defending the island.

The Swedish Gotland Regiment, P 18, provides the core of the island’s permanent military presence. The regiment, Sweden’s youngest and smallest, has been rebuilding its capabilities since Sweden began expanding its military presence on Gotland. Its forces form the basis of the ground-defense structure into which allied reinforcements would be incorporated.

Soldiers of the P18 Gotland Regiment of the Swedish Army camouflage an armoured vehicle during a field exercise near Visby on the Swedish island of Gotland on May 17, 2022. Finland and Sweden are expected to announce this week whether to apply to join NATO following Russia's Ukraine invasion, in what would be a stunning reversal of decades-long non-alignment policies. On Sweden's strategically-located Baltic Sea island of Gotland, Home Guard troops were last week called in for a special month-long training exercise, coinciding with annual military exercises taking place across Finland and Sweden next week. (Photo by Jonathan NACKSTRAND / AFP) (Photo by JONATHAN NACKSTRAND/AFP via Getty Images)
Soldiers of the Gotland Regiment of the Swedish Army camouflage an armoured vehicle during an earlier field exercise near Visby. Photo by Jonathan NACKSTRAND / AFP

Swedish coastal defense capabilities are another important element of the drill. Land-based anti-ship missiles provide the island with a means of threatening hostile surface vessels operating in the surrounding waters, giving the defense of Gotland a direct connection to the wider maritime battle for the Baltic. During Silver Wotan, Swedish and German forces are also conducting anti-surface warfare activities alongside the broader reinforcement operation.

Germany is contributing more than 500 troops to the exercise, part of approximately 2,000 Bundeswehr personnel involved, including elements from the army, navy, and air force. The German Luftwaffe has deployed Panavia Tornado aircraft for surveillance, while German naval forces are participating in the maritime component, and German ground personnel are involved in the reinforcement and security activities on Gotland.

Piloten mit einer Nachtsichtbrille im Cockpit des Tornados 46+45 im Rahmen der Mission Counter Dash in Incirlik, Türkei, am 14.04.2016
Stock photo of a Luftwaffe Tornado ECR equipped for a reconaissance mission. Bundeswehr

The exercise scenario is particularly relevant against the backdrop of Russia’s continuing military presence in the Baltic region.

Russia maintains major military infrastructure in Kaliningrad, including naval, air, missile, and air defense capabilities, while the Russian Baltic Fleet operates from bases in the region. Kaliningrad’s position between Poland and Lithuania gives Moscow a significant military foothold inside the NATO area, while Russian forces and military infrastructure elsewhere along the Baltic add to the complexity of operating and reinforcing allied territory in the region.

The security environment around the Baltic has also deteriorated considerably since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. NATO has increased its surveillance and military activity in the region, including the launch of Baltic Sentry in January 2025 following a series of incidents involving critical undersea infrastructure. The alliance has subsequently expanded efforts to monitor maritime activity and protect infrastructure and sea lines of communication.

A picture taken on February 4, 2025 shows a Helicopter 15 (HKP15) (L) on the flight deck of patrol ship HMS Carlskrona (P04) on open water near Karlskrona, Sweden, as part of the NATO Baltic Sea patrol mission, the Baltic Sentry, aimed to secure critical underwater infrastructure. The patrol ship HMS Carlskrona (P04) set off from the naval port in Karlskrona on February 4, 2025 to become part of NATO's Baltic Sentry operation as one of several Swedish ships that are part of Standing NATO Maritime Group One (SNMG1). This is the first time the ship has hoisted the NATO flag on board. The purpose of NATO's Baltic Sentry operation is to demonstrate presence and secure critical underwater infrastructure. (Photo by Johan NILSSON / TT NEWS AGENCY / AFP) / Sweden OUT (Photo by JOHAN NILSSON/TT NEWS AGENCY/AFP via Getty Images)
A Swedish Navy Helicopter 15 on the flight deck of patrol ship HMS Carlskrona as part of the NATO Baltic Sea patrol mission, Baltic Sentry, aimed to secure critical underwater infrastructure. Photo by Johan NILSSON / TT NEWS AGENCY / AFP

Swedish authorities have stressed that Silver Wotan was planned in advance and is not being conducted in response to a specific imminent Russian threat. The exercise nonetheless reflects the operational environment in which Swedish and NATO planners now have to consider the possibility that maritime and air movements across the Baltic could be monitored, disrupted, or contested.

The exercise also builds on a series of increasingly large Swedish-led activities designed to test the reception of allied forces on Swedish territory. During Aurora 26 earlier this year, more than 18,000 troops from 13 countries participated in operations across Sweden, including the deployment of allied forces to Gotland alongside the Gotland Regiment and Swedish Home Guard. NATO described that activity as an emergency deployment intended to test the reinforcement of the island.

A Dutch Boeing AH-64 Apache attack helicopter takes part in a combat display during a press day for the military exercise Aurora 26 at the Revingehed training field outside Lund in Skane, Southern Sweden on April 29, 2026. The exercise at Revingehed includes personnel from several NATO countires with the focus on lessons learned from the war in Ukraine including drones. (Photo by Johan NILSSON / various sources / AFP via Getty Images) / Sweden OUT
A Dutch AH-64 Apache attack helicopter takes part in Exercise Aurora 26 in southern Sweden on April 29, 2026. Photo by Johan NILSSON / various sources / AFP

Silver Wotan places a more concentrated emphasis on the Swedish-German relationship and on the movement of an allied force into the island’s existing defensive structure.

Germany’s participation is also consistent with its growing military role in the Baltic and along NATO’s northeastern flank. Berlin is already providing forces for NATO’s forward defense in Lithuania and has increasingly emphasized the ability to move German forces rapidly across northern Europe in support of allied operations.

For Sweden, meanwhile, Gotland has become one of the clearest examples of how NATO membership has changed the country’s defense planning. The island remains a Swedish responsibility, but its location means that what happens there has consequences well beyond Sweden’s territorial defense.

Silver Wotan 2026 / Weiterer Text über ots und www.presseportal.de/nr/179237 / Die Verwendung dieses Bildes für redaktionelle Zwecke ist unter Beachtung aller mitgeteilten Nutzungsbedingungen zulässig und dann auch honorarfrei. Veröffentlichung ausschließlich mit Bildrechte-Hinweis.
German and Swedish troops on a Swedish CB90 fast assault craft. Bundeswehr/Marc Tessensohn

A defended and adequately supplied Gotland provides NATO with a strategically positioned base for surveillance and defensive operations in the Baltic, while the ability to reinforce it demonstrates that the alliance can maintain access to the island even as the surrounding maritime and air environment becomes more contested.

The exercise comes as European allies are being forced to plan for a NATO in which the United States may provide less of the conventional military weight it has supplied for decades. The Pentagon is reviewing the size and posture of U.S. forces in Europe, including the forces and capabilities Washington would make available in a European crisis, while NATO’s top commander has said further U.S. troop withdrawals should be expected as European allies build up their own conventional capabilities.

Silver Wotan 2026 / Weiterer Text über ots und www.presseportal.de/nr/179237 / Die Verwendung dieses Bildes für redaktionelle Zwecke ist unter Beachtung aller mitgeteilten Nutzungsbedingungen zulässig und dann auch honorarfrei. Veröffentlichung ausschließlich mit Bildrechte-Hinweis.
A German and a Swedish soldier involved in securing Visby during Silver Wotan 2026. Bundeswehr/Marc Tessensohn

At the same time, the alliance now describes Russia as its most significant and direct security threat, citing military activity alongside airspace violations, sabotage, cyber operations, and other forms of hybrid pressure. There are also growing concerns that Russia could try something in the Baltics, while it continues to step up its gray-zone activities regardless. NATO officials have warned that Russia could rebuild enough military capacity to pose a more serious conventional challenge to the alliance before the end of the decade.

There are escalating warnings from Poland that Russia is preparing to widen its war against Ukraine, with "accidental" missile and drone strikes on NATO territory.

Such a move – Russia falsely claiming air strikes that hit NATO allies happened by accident – would be designed to…

— Deborah Haynes (@haynesdeborah) September 18, 2026

For Sweden and Germany, the Silver Wotan exercise is a practical test of how quickly European forces can reinforce and defend one of the Baltic’s most strategically important positions. As the security environment grows more contested and Europe prepares for a future in which U.S. forces may not be as readily available, the ability to move allied combat power across the region and integrate it into existing defenses is becoming an increasingly important part of NATO’s deterrence.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post German Forces Surge Onto Baltic Island In First-Of-Its-Kind NATO Drill appeared first on TWZ.

Marine Colonel Who Led Mideast Combat Deployment Wants His Own Drone Boats

18 September 2026 at 19:01

The officer who led the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) on its recent combat deployment to the Middle East told us he needs his own uncrewed surface vessels (USVs) on future deployments. Operationalizing USVs is an area where the Marines are lagging behind. In particular, he wants the ability to send USVs forward to reconnoiter potential highly-contested beach landing areas, a mission largely assumed by the Navy.

As we have frequently reported, the military use of USVs is now proliferating around the globe at an increasing rate. Ukraine has employed sea drones to devastating effect against Russia’s Black Sea Fleet vessels and facilities, forcing the general evacuation of Russian naval assets from occupied Crimea to bases in Russia proper. During Operation Epic Fury, the U.S. used them for the first time in combat, as one-way attack weapons against Iranian targets, to hunt for mines, and for a search and rescue operation to locate the crew of an AH-64 Apache helicopter downed by Iran, as well as general broad-area surveillance and awareness. China is investing heavily in the space, as well, along with many other navies around the globe, both friend and foe.

The following video shows the first U.S. use of a USV as a kamikaze weapon.

Yesterday, using multiple one-way attack surface drones, CENTCOM forces successfully struck a submarine and ship maintenance facility in Iran. Three Corsair unmanned surface vessels hit the port at Bandar Abbas Naval Base, marking the first time American forces have employed sea… pic.twitter.com/bOM2kmgRxz

— U.S. Central Command (@CENTCOM) July 13, 2026

“There was a lot in theater that were being used, but it wasn’t something that we went out with,” Col. Chris P. Niedziocha told us when asked if the 31st MEU deployed with USVs. He then answered in the affirmative in response to a question about if MEUs need sea drones on future deployments. He said it is part of the “explosion in robotics and autonomy” being used in combat.

“These systems are incredibly useful and capable,” explained Niedziocha, now director of the USMC Expeditionary Warfare School. “And you say, ‘Hey, you know, [in] the next war, if the first thing you’re putting through the breach isn’t a robot, something’s wrong. You say never send a Marine someplace you haven’t sent a bullet. I think the new way is [you] never want to send a Marine someplace you haven’t already sent a robot. So yeah, we’re embracing [the technology] and we’re not leaders. We’re fast followers in that regime.”

Asked for specific use cases he sees for USVs, the colonel talked about using them before putting Marines ashore.

“I can tell you if you’re doing an amphibious operation, you want to understand what’s waiting beneath the surface in the water column,” Niedziocha noted. “So something can go either with a side-looking sonar array or even forward-looking to demonstrate that there’s nothing there, and the hydrography and bathymetry is what you… need for the operation to be successful.”

Hydrography measures “the shape and features of the shoreline; the characteristics of tides, currents, and waves; and the physical and chemical properties of the water itself,” according to NOAA. Bathymetry, which is part of that, focuses on mapping the depths and shapes of underwater terrain.

NOAA

These functions are critical for mine detection and determining whether there are man-made or natural obstacles that would impede landing operations. While these missions are largely being performed by the Navy, including with USVs, the Marines are moving toward making that an organic capability. Recently, the Marines announced they were testing a counter-mine USV system. The evaluation was conducted late last month at Camp Pendleton by the Program Manager Combat Support Systems (PM CSS) Explosive Hazard Defeat Team.

The test of the USV was “in response to a littoral capability gap,” according to the media release. “The solution: seek a commercial USV solution that is equipped with integrated autonomous driving and payloads that consist of Sonar, Forward-Looking Infrared (FLIR) cameras, Line of Sight (LOS) Communications and Acoustic Communications (AComms).”

This was part of the overall effort to develop “solutions that enable increased standoff for Marines to detect, investigate and neutralize threats,” the release added. “The innovation of Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and Littoral Explosive Ordnance Neutralization (LEON) systems will provide Marine EOD Technicians with the confidence to operate in contested environments while preserving combat power, increasing operational reach, and minimizing exposure to explosive threats.”

LEON is a so-called system of systems, using a remotely operated vehicle, diver equipment, an unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV), a USV, and an Amphibious Unmanned Ground Vehicle to enable “EOD to confirm and mark hazards and obstacles from very shallow water to the beach zone,” the media release added.

While unmanned systems have long been part of EOD operations, “we’re expanding that into maritime systems that allow more endurance and less risk for operators,” said Chief Warrant Officer 2 Alfredo Andrade, officer in charge, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Company, 7th Engineer Support Battalion (ESB). “Some of the conflicts that we are engaged in take a toll on the force, and surging in new forces is costly. It turns into a logistical problem. To preserve the safety and the health of the forces… the USV and the [LEON] program exist to ensure that we have readily available combat power.”

In late August at Camp Pendleton, the PM CSS Explosive Hazard Defeat Team tested an Unmanned Surface Vessel in response to a littoral capability gap. The solution: seek a commercial USV solution that is equipped with integrated autonomous driving and payloads that consist of Sonar, Forward-Looking Infrared (FLIR) cameras, Line of Sight (LOS) Communications and Acoustic Communications (AComms). The LEON System of Systems (SOS) consists of five increments of capabilities to include a Remotely Operated Vehicle, diver equipment, Unmanned Underwater Vehicle, Unmanned Surface Vehicle, and an Amphibious Unmanned Ground Vehicle. LEON enables EOD to confirm and mark hazards and obstacles from very shallow water to the beach zone. (PAE Marine Corps photo by Kristiana Gehly)
In late August at Camp Pendleton, the PM CSS Explosive Hazard Defeat Team tested an unmanned surface vessel in response to a littoral capability gap. (PAE Marine Corps photo by Kristiana Gehly) Kristiana Gehly

While Niedziocha didn’t address USVs for offensive combat roles, the Marines have evaluated them for that use as well as for logistics, among other functions.

Our Autonomous Low-Profile Vessel (ALPV) solicitation is now accepting submissions.

The @DeptofWar and the @USMC need to resupply units spread over wide distances in contested littoral environments. Increased all-domain threats targeting logistics capabilities, locations, and… pic.twitter.com/Af8v0DTRHS

— Department of War Innovation Unit (@DIU_x) March 3, 2026

There have been many other tests, as well. Including one just this summer at RIMPAC. These trials saw the launch and recovery of one of Splash Industries’ Typhoon USVs aboard the USS Essex. The ‘Gator Navy’ of amphibious assault vessels that haul Marines and their kit around the oceans is uniquely suited to act as USV motherships. Their well decks allow for easy deployment and recovery of USVs of many sizes and capabilities near seamlessly. So it won’t be surprising if these vessels and the Marines aboard them quickly become staples in the Pentagon’s USV playbook.

Watch us land one of our drone-boats inside a moving US Navy warship during RIMPAC. This world-first resupply mission was performed completely autonomously using a Splash Industries Typhoon USV. pic.twitter.com/AEzNzZjsL1

— Ivan Avanesov (@i_vanesov) July 14, 2026

Still, the Marines have a long way to go to catch up to how these systems are already being used.

The Houthi rebels of Yemen actually pioneered the operational use of kamikaze USVs years ago and Ukraine has led the way in advancements of these systems. They first employed them as kamikaze weapons, but then added machine guns and rockets and later missiles, which were used to shoot down Russian helicopters and jets. Ukraine has also used them to launch first-person view (FPV) and bomber drone attacks as well as deliver uncrewed ground vehicles (UGVs) into enemy territory. Last week, Ukraine claimed to have attacked a Russian USV with a USV, marking another first.

You can see that engagement in the following video.

Ukraine's Navy says a Sargan unmanned surface vessel destroyed a Russian unmanned boat with machine-gun fire in the Black Sea, the first-ever battle between unmanned surface vessels. Ukrainian Navy personnel operated in coordination with HUR. #Ukraine pic.twitter.com/Avg4ecz8m6

— NOELREPORTS 🇪🇺 🇺🇦 (@NOELreports) September 12, 2026

Having recently returned from a six-month deployment that saw the Marine Corps’ first use of its Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) concept in a combat setting during the fight against Iran, Niedziocha has a good sense of the realities of modern warfare. His Marines operated forward arming and refueling points (FARPs) for various aircraft in combat for the first time and set up remote sensing locations.

That a commander like him sees value in USVs is a good sign for progress in the development of these systems.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The post Marine Colonel Who Led Mideast Combat Deployment Wants His Own Drone Boats appeared first on TWZ.

Japan Opens The Door To Acquiring Nuclear-Powered Submarines

18 September 2026 at 17:36

Japan has said it is keeping the door open to acquiring nuclear-powered submarines, a potentially major shift for a country whose submarine force has historically relied exclusively on conventional propulsion. Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi confirmed recently that Tokyo is not ruling out nuclear-powered submarines as it considers the future requirements of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF).

Should Japan ultimately pursue the capability, it would join an exclusive group of nations operating nuclear-powered submarines. China, France, India, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States are currently the only countries with nuclear-powered submarines in active service. Brazil is already working to join the club, while Australian and South Korean nuclear-powered submarine plans are somewhat longer-term.

A submarine of the Japanese Maritime Defence Force surfaces during a naval review on October 26, 2003 off Sagami Bay, Japan. Prime Minister Koizumi reviewed the 52-strong fleet as well as 53 aircraft.
A submarine of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force surfaces during a naval review off Sagami Bay, Japan. Photo by Koichi Kamoshida/Getty Images

Japan’s submarine fleet is already regarded as among the most capable conventionally powered forces, and is very much at the forefront of advanced naval propulsion technologies. Even with that considerable expertise, however, developing and sustaining a nuclear propulsion capability would represent a huge challenge, requiring expertise and infrastructure far beyond those needed to build Japan’s existing conventionally powered submarines.

Koizumi’s comments do not represent a decision to acquire nuclear-powered submarines, nor do they indicate that Japan has begun a procurement program. They do, however, mark a significant evolution in the country’s public debate over submarine propulsion and point to a growing willingness within the Japanese defense establishment to consider capabilities that were previously largely outside the mainstream of defense planning.

Secretary of War Pete Hegseth hosts a bilateral meeting with Japanese Minister of Defense Shinjirō Koizumi at the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., Jan. 15, 2026. (DoW photo by U.S. Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Alexander Kubitza)
Secretary of War Pete Hegseth hosts a bilateral meeting with Japanese Minister of Defense Shinjirō Koizumi at the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., Jan. 15, 2026. (DoW photo by U.S. Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Alexander Kubitza)

Currently, Japan operates one of the world’s most capable conventional submarine fleets, centered on increasingly sophisticated diesel-electric boats equipped with air-independent propulsion and advanced lithium-ion batteries. These submarines are well suited to operations around Japan and the country’s surrounding waters.

The JMSDF currently operates 22 conventionally powered submarines, maintaining the force structure established in the 2010s while progressively replacing older boats with the more capable Taigei class. Five Taigei class submarines are now in JMSDF service, with additional boats in the pipeline.

The first-of-class Taigei was launched on October 14, 2020, at the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) shipyard in the city of Kobe, in the western prefecture of Hyogo. Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force

Nuclear propulsion, however, would offer substantially greater endurance and sustained underwater speed, allowing Japanese submarines to conduct longer-range operations across the broader Western Pacific with minimal support. This is a requirement that is becoming increasingly relevant as Tokyo’s strategic focus expands beyond its immediate maritime approaches.

China’s rapidly expanding naval force, including its growing submarine fleet and increasingly distant maritime operations, is forcing Tokyo to consider how it would monitor and potentially counter Chinese forces farther from the Japanese archipelago. A nuclear-powered attack submarine could remain submerged for extended periods without the endurance limitations imposed by conventional propulsion, making it particularly useful for long-range surveillance, tracking, and sea-denial missions.

Japan’s debate is also unfolding alongside a significant development in neighboring South Korea. Seoul has confirmed plans to develop a new class of nuclear-powered submarines, a move that could add further momentum to an emerging undersea competition in Northeast Asia. South Korea’s decision is particularly relevant to Tokyo because it demonstrates that nuclear propulsion is no longer merely a theoretical capability for U.S. allies in the region. While the missions and strategic priorities of the Japanese and South Korean navies are different, both countries face the challenge of operating in waters increasingly contested by China and North Korea.

A South Korean Ministry of Defense rendering shows how the nuclear-powered Jang Bogo N Project boats may look. MND

The development could also create new opportunities for Japan to work more closely with Australia and the other AUKUS partners. Australia is in the process of acquiring its own conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine capability under AUKUS Pillar I, with U.S. and U.K. nuclear-powered submarines also scheduled to operate from Australia. Japan has separately been identified as a potential partner for AUKUS Pillar II, which covers advanced capabilities and technology cooperation.

A Japanese decision to pursue SSNs could eventually create a much deeper basis for cooperation with Australia, including submarine interoperability, undersea warfare, workforce and technical expertise, infrastructure, sustainment, and potentially aspects of the industrial base. Analysts have already examined how Japan could fit into the wider AUKUS submarine ecosystem as Australia’s nuclear-submarine program develops.

Concept art of the submerged SSN-AUKUS nuclear-powered attack submarine. U.K. Ministry of Defense illustration

A Japanese nuclear-powered submarine with a robust capacity to launch land attack cruise missiles would also be a powerful component in the country’s emerging “counterstrike” posture, which is increasingly centered on acquiring the ability to strike targets at longer ranges.

Japan has already begun deploying domestically developed long-range missile systems, including the Upgraded Type 12 surface-to-ship missile, while also acquiring the U.S.-made Tomahawk cruise missile.

Launch of the first Tomahawk missile from the Kongō class Aegis destroyer Chōkai at an undisclosed location in the Pacific. Japan Ministry of Defense

An SSN would potentially add a highly survivable, mobile platform to this emerging strike architecture, allowing Japan to position long-range weapons farther from its home territory and complicating an adversary’s efforts to locate and neutralize them. That could be particularly valuable in a conflict in which Japanese air bases, missile batteries, and other fixed infrastructure were under attack.

The potential SSN requirement also fits with Japan’s expanding expeditionary ambitions. As the JMSDF converts its Izumo class helicopter destroyers to operate F-35B fighters, giving Japan a more credible carrier aviation capability, nuclear-powered attack submarines could provide a valuable escort for these increasingly important surface groups. Their speed, endurance, and ability to remain submerged for extended periods makes SSNs particularly well suited to accompanying carrier forces on longer-range deployments and supporting contingencies farther from Japanese waters.

Looking at the bigger picture, it is highly significant that nuclear propulsion was effectively excluded from Japan’s conventional defense debate for decades. More recently, however, Japanese defense officials and policymakers have begun examining whether future submarines will require a different propulsion system. The issue is now one that can be discussed openly at the ministerial level.

Nevertheless, pursuing a nuclear-powered submarine program would come with huge challenges.

150227-N-DB801-126 - PEARL HARBOR, Hawaii - (Feb. 27, 2015) - The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) submarine JS Hakuryu (SS 503) arrives at the submarine piers of Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Feb. 27. While in port, the submarine's crew will conduct various training evolutions, continue to build positive relationships with the United States and have the opportunity to enjoy the sights and culture of Hawaii. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Steven Khor/Released)
The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Sōryū class submarine Hakuryū arrives at the submarine piers of Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Steven Khor/Released

Building and operating nuclear-powered submarines would require Japan to establish an entirely different industrial, regulatory, and training infrastructure. The vessels would also be considerably more expensive and complex to build and operate than Japan’s existing conventionally powered submarines. Tokyo would have to resolve questions involving nuclear regulation, reactor technology, maintenance facilities, crew training, and the handling of nuclear material.

There would also be a significant political dimension. Although naval nuclear propulsion is fundamentally different from possessing nuclear weapons, any move in that direction would inevitably receive scrutiny in a country whose postwar security policy has been shaped by its experience with nuclear weapons and its longstanding non-nuclear principles.

For those reasons, Koizumi’s statement should be viewed less as an announcement of a Japanese nuclear-submarine program than as evidence that the political barrier to discussing such a program is falling.

230704-N-NY362-1143 PHILIPPINE SEA (July 4, 2023) Japanese Oyashio-class submarine JDS Yaeshio (SS 598) transits the Philippine Sea during Pacific Vanguard 23, July 4. Pacific Vanguard is an opportunity for the four Indo-Pacific navies to strengthen their skills in maritime operations, anti-submarine warfare operations, air warfare operations, live-fire missile events, and advanced maneuvering scenarios in the Mariana Islands Range Complex (MIRC). The U.S. military routinely operates in designated land, air, and sea areas of the Mariana Islands to safely train military service members in equipment use, tactics, joint operations, and humanitarian aid missions. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Santiago Navarro).
The Japanese Oyashio class submarine Yaeshio transits the Philippine Sea during Exercise Pacific Vanguard 23. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Santiago Navarro

The next question is whether the Japanese government will move from keeping the option open to actually studying a nuclear-powered submarine design, propulsion technology, and acquisition pathway in detail.

If it does, the consequences could extend well beyond Japan’s submarine fleet. A Japanese nuclear-powered submarine capability would represent a major enhancement of Tokyo’s ability to operate across the Western Pacific and could alter the undersea balance between Japan, China, and the United States’ other regional allies. At the very least, the idea is one that is now part of wider discussions at the highest levels.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Japan Opens The Door To Acquiring Nuclear-Powered Submarines appeared first on TWZ.

L’AfD, lo “scisma” tedesco e il conformismo editoriale: appunti critici su un’intervista a senso unico

18 September 2026 at 17:08
Ho recentemente letto un articolo a firma di Mattia Ferraresi Germania. La condanna dei vescovi non ferma il voto ad AfD, pubblicato nella rubrica Tracce di CLONLINE, che ha come ...

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USMC Used Its Expeditionary Operations Playbook In Combat For First Time During Epic Fury

17 September 2026 at 22:46

The 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit’s (31st MEU) recent deployment to the Middle East marked the first time the United States Marine Corps (USMC) used its Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) concept in a combat setting, the service confirmed to TWZ on Thursday. At its core, EABO involves relatively small groups of Marines quickly establishing bases of operation in forward areas, often within the enemy’s weapons range. During operations in the fight against Iran, Marines refueled and rearmed their own aircraft, as well as those from the joint force, at these austere locales. They also set up remote sensing locations, among other actions from the EABO playbook.

This employment of EABO for Epic Fury is a highly significant development. After years of progressively evolving the EABO playbook, it was no longer an experimental exercise. This meant that Marines were forward deployed in a contested area in a region where established bases were taking heavy fire from Iranian missile and drone barrages. Troops were killed in some of these attacks and U.S. aircraft, buildings and equipment were damaged and destroyed across the Middle East. Pushing aircraft from the MEU, as well as the joint force, to FARPs (forward arming and refueling point) would have been a relevant asset preservation tactic as well as one that would help accelerate combat operations, and it’s exactly what EABO is meant to do.

The 31st MEU’s six-month deployment began in January in the Pacific, before the unit was ordered to the Middle East in March, returning to Okinawa, Japan, in July. That’s where it is stationed as the USMC’s only continuously forward-based MEU.

A map of the 31st MEU’s deployment. (31st MEU)

“This was the first time we were able to implement EABO in combat operations since the concept was created for the force,” Capt. Steven J. Keenan, a USMC spokesperson, told us. “We have practiced it many times, but this was a first for supporting a Joint Force named operation with forward FARPs and forward bases that supported joint ops and combat power sustainment.”

EABO was first introduced in 2020 by then-Commandant Gen. David Berger in his Force Design 2030 plan for the future of the Corps. It was created with a fight against China in mind, especially utilizing small Pacific islands. The idea is to have highly mobile, low-signature forces deployed forward in austere, contested or potentially contested maritime locations. The mission is to “support sea control operation, conduct sea denial operations within the littorals, contribute to maritime domain awareness, provide forward command, control, communications, computers, combat systems, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, targeting, and counter-targeting capability and forward sustainment,” according to the Marines.

A Marine holding a Stinger missile launcher stands in front of a Combat Rubber Raiding Craft on Ukibaru Island off the coast of Okinawa during Exercise Hagatna Fury 21. (USMC) A Marine holding a Stinger missile launcher stands in front of a Combat Rubber Raiding Craft on Ukibaru Island off the coast of Okinawa during Exercise Hagatna Fury 21. USMC

The news of the first activation of the EABO concept in combat came Wednesday during a media roundtable with Col. Chris P. Niedziocha, who commanded the 31st MEU during its deployment to the Middle East in support of Operation Epic Fury. Now director of the USMC Expeditionary Warfare School, Niedziocha discussed EABO and a range of other operations during that deployment, including boarding vessels during the blockade of Iranian ports.

The 31st MEU was embarked aboard the Tripoli Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), which consisted of the America class amphibious assault ship USS Tripoli, San Antonio class amphibious transport dock ship USS New Orleans, and Whidbey Island class dock landing ship USS Rushmore. You can read more about the ARG/MEU and its assets in our initial story about the deployment to the Middle East here.

USS Tripoli. (Staff Sgt. Samuel Ruiz)

“You’re starting to see this has been validated,” the colonel said of the EABO concept during the roundtable TWZ attended virtually. “It’s still nascent, but we actually, for the first time, demonstrated what we thought we were able to do, which I think is pretty exciting. And then things like forward arming and refueling to extend the operational reach of aircraft and expeditionary reloading, and then the ever-present logistic challenge of doing something like that. So that’s pretty significant.”

“We successfully implemented critical Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO), establishing sensor expeditionary advanced bases and forward arming and refueling points (FARPs) where none existed,” the colonel added. “Through our forward logistic elements, we proved that an agile Marine Air-Ground Task Force can sustain itself and generate ready, lethal power in contested maritime environments, directly setting the theater for follow-on joint forces.”

One of the objectives of the FARPs was to reduce reliance on the Marines’ fleet of KC-130 aerial refuelers and serve as jumping-off points for its F-35B Lightning II fighters.

“There was all manner of tankers all the time, but the FARP is to extend the operational reach, and if you can do it, you reduce the load on that,” Niedziocha noted. “Because there’s some aircraft that are basically for expeditionary austere operations, especially the F-35B,” the Marine Corps’ variant of the aircraft designed for short take off and vertical landing. 

“There are some trade-offs associated with the Bravo,” Niedziocha pointed out, using a slang for the jets. “There’s less internal fuel, but you have the lift [system], which gives you the option to do these kinds of things. So, the goal there was to walk that fine line between providing the full sortie over wherever you needed it, and keeping the ships far enough away to make them as survivable as possible.”

An F-35B Lightning II aircraft taxis to a forward arming and refueling point in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, May 26, 2026. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Maksim Masloboev)
An F-35B Lightning II aircraft taxis to a forward arming and refueling point in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, May 26, 2026. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Maksim Masloboev) Cpl. Maksim Masloboev

In addition to the F-35Bs and other aircraft organic to the 31st MEU, the FARPs were also used by Army helicopters, Keenan told us. Imagery posted on the Pentagon’s image distribution site also showed U.S. Army Gray Eagle drones and Marine MV-22B Osprey tiltrotor aircraft were included.

An MQ-9 Reaper drone lands at a forward arming and refueling point in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, May 26, 2026. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Maksim Masloboev)
A Gray Eagle drone lands at a forward arming and refueling point in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, May 26, 2026. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Maksim Masloboev) Cpl. Maksim Masloboev

U.S. Marines with the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, transport aircraft ordinance to a forward arming and refueling point in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, May 26, 2026. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Maksim Masloboev)
U.S. Marines with the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit transport AIM-120 AMRAAMs to a forward arming and refueling point in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, May 26, 2026. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Maksim Masloboev) Cpl. Maksim Masloboev

Niedziocha did not provide details about where the FARPs were set up, but a U.S. defense official told us they were “disaggregated throughout the Middle East.” The official declined to provide further information, citing operational security concerns since they are still being used.

“Throughout the deployment, the Tripoli ARG and 31st MEU successfully conducted over 1,600 mishap-free flight hours of combat aviation missions, including precision strikes, transporting 800,000 pounds of cargo, and moving 5,000 personnel,” a 31st MEU overview of the deployment explained. “The units also provided sustained combat support to joint force operations by delivering critical intelligence and refueling over 300 aircraft ashore and underway.”

The colonel also didn’t provide details about the sensor expeditionary advanced bases. According to the Marines, “a sensing expeditionary advanced base (SEAB) brings together coastal surveillance radars, electronic sensors, and Marines ashore to extend maritime domain awareness, complementing the radars and sensors already at work aboard naval ships off the coast.”

“When SEAB systems identify surface vessels in nearby sea lanes, small unmanned aircraft system (sUAS) operators launch their platforms to visually identify and track the contacts,” the Marines added. “Sensor data and imagery are transmitted in real time across the blue-green command network to decision-makers.”

U.S. Marines with 12th Marine Regiment, 3rd Marine Division, prepare to set-up a Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR) system during a routine unit level training exercise on Iejima, Okinawa, Japan, July 15, 2023. The G/ATOR provides an air defense and surveillance capability and is used to locate enemy weapon systems. As the stand-in force aviation combat element, 1st MAW is utilizing expeditionary advanced bases to expand kill chain functions and bridge Marine aviation command and control (C2), sensor, and shooter capabilities across the joint force. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Staff Sgt. Manuel A. Serrano)
U.S. Marines with 12th Marine Regiment, 3rd Marine Division, prepare to set up a Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR) system during a routine unit level training exercise on Iejima, Okinawa, Japan, July 15, 2023. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Staff Sgt. Manuel A. Serrano) Gunnery Sgt. Manuel Serrano

This capability could have been used to track Iran’s remaining fleet of small boats that it has used to harass shipping and mine the Strait of Hormuz, as well as larger vessels trying to transport oil. Other sensors, like radars and counter-drone systems, could also help identify incoming threats and provide general situational awareness. The EABO concept was employed as part of the 31st MEU’s larger role in supporting the blockade and mine clearance efforts.

The 31st MEU interdicted four vessels during the deployment, three of which led to boardings. On April 19, Marines boarded the MV Touska; on April 28, the MV Blue Star III; and on May 19, the MT Celestial Sea.

The Touska was boarded after USS Spruance fired multiple 5-inch rounds, targeting the engine room and disabling the vessel’s propulsion. The crew of the vessel was retained for about two weeks before being repatriated.

Niedziocha told us that none of the crews offered any resistance.

“At two in the morning, when 30 Force Reconnaissance Marines fast rope onto your vessel, [you are] just compliant with a capital C. They did exactly what they were directed to do. The overmatch that you put onto that vessel is pretty surprising. And then there’s overwatch provided by UAS and manned aircraft, so you create this bubble around the vessel. So yeah, they complied.”

You can see the Touska being boarded in the following video.

The U.S. just released a video of its forces boarding and seizing the Iranian container ship M/V Touska near the Hormuz Strait after it tried to break the U.S. naval blockade pic.twitter.com/FpB2obb3jY

— Visegrád 24 (@visegrad24) April 20, 2026

Two years ago, as the EABO concept was maturing, TWZ was invited to get an exclusive look at how an advanced EABO concept would be put into action, including how squadrons operated the F-35B out of an austere combat environment while generating combat sorties. It was an unprecedented and exclusive peek into the EABO playbook and what a real fight in the Pacific with the USMC’s most advanced fighter aircraft could actually look like. You can read about that in our story here. It appears the operations in the Middle East mirrored this exercise closely.

F-35Bs on san clémente island for austere operations training during Steel Knight exercise.
James Deboer

Now back in Japan, the ARG/MEU is getting ready for a new deployment, said the colonel.

“We got back to Okinawa, I think July 22nd, and they had already begun their workup cycle in earnest to be on the water in early January to go out and do another Iron Fist [training exercise] with the Japanese, and then long periods of a crisis response,” said Niedziocha, who relinquished command in August before moving on to his new role. “Just being there, present in the First Island Chain to partner with your allies, demonstrates the resolve and commitment to deter whatever needs deterring.” 

As noted earlier in this story, the EABO concept was designed with a Pacific fight in mind. Its first combat employment in the Middle East clearly offers lessons that can now be adapted to enhance EABO operations globally.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The post USMC Used Its Expeditionary Operations Playbook In Combat For First Time During Epic Fury appeared first on TWZ.

South Korea shouldn’t abet Trump in Hormuz

16 September 2026 at 23:47

The Lee Administration leaked the possibility of deploying Korean forces to the Strait of Hormuz on September 3. The backlash was immediate from Korean civil society that opposes any type of support for Trump’s war of aggression. Furthermore, recent polls reveal that even 55% of Lee’s supporters oppose the dispatching of forces. And while the Lee administration has publicly backtracked, stating that nothing has been decided, it is, nonetheless, quietly undergoing the process of deployment: more than simply an assessment of the security conditions on the Strait of Hormuz, the Lee administration sent a team to check key military bases and ports that could be used at the United Arab Emirates.

Despite growing public opposition, the Lee administration is expected to introduce at the end of September a motion into the National Assembly, where it is likely to pass given his party’s considerable majority. Unlike his predecessor, the impeached Yoon Suk-yeol, President Lee is not a pro-US ideologue; he is a pragmatist. Why then is Lee going out on a limb with this deployment when the rest of the world is staying out of it?

Well, South Korea’s history has always been entangled and shaped by US foreign policy. The darker side to South Korea’s pop-culture is a country dominated and shaped through US policy and interventions. Today, it hosts the largest overseas US military base and controls the Korean military (through wartime operational control). In effect, it’s never been a sovereign state. Its economic, political, and military interests have always been beholden to the United States. 

Today, Lee is horsetrading with Trump: military support in exchange for more favorable terms in the US’s AI global supply chain of semiconductors and data centers along with a return of wartime operational control. While Lee’s pragmatism is navigating the real structural constraints on South Korea, it is ultimately short-sighted and harmful to Koreans and the world.

The war in Iran is inflicting considerable pain to the world’s economies, including South Korea that imports 61% of its crude oil through the Strait of Hormuz. Yet, even from a completely pragmatic perspective, sending Korean forces to the Hormuz does nothing to resolve this problem. In fact, getting entangled with US aggression against Iran would strain the 64-year diplomatic relations with Iran while putting a target on South Korean assets in the region. Furthermore, if the world’s greatest naval and air power cannot secure freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, how could South Korea’s contribution make a difference? In fact, the deployment of Korean troops prolongs this war of aggression by giving Trump cover and leverage to demand that other countries, such as Japan, also deploy forces.

This isn’t the first time that South Korea would deploy forces due to US requests. In 2004, after pressure from the George W. Bush Administration, the Roh Moo-hyun administration deployed non-combat support troops to Iraq. In response, a militant Islamic group kidnapped a Korean translator and, when the Roh administration refused to cancel further and withdraw current deployment, beheaded the translator.

Most importantly, this war of aggression is not only illegal under international standards, but deployment also violates article five of the Korean constitution that mandates the government to “maintain international peace” and “renounce all aggressive war.” Thus, whether intervening in the frontlines, or in the rear, whether combatant or non-combatant, any deployment would be complicit in Trump’s war of aggression.

Ultimately, as Hamid Shahrabi, an Iranian activist and co-founder of the Global Resistance for Peace & Justice states, securing free passage through the Strait of Hormuz can be achieved but not through military pressure and destruction but by adhering to the “Islamabad MOU, which outlined measures to ensure free passage through the Strait.”

Being dominated by the US brings out the pragmatic among South Koreans. Yet, the world demands that we fight and that we hold the line against Trump. Deploying forces will prolong Trump’s illegal war of aggression. Fortunately, if Koreans can be pragmatic, they can also be fierce fighters against US imperialism when provoked. Instead of fanning the flames of war, we should fight to extinguish Trump’s forever wars.

Dae-Han Song is a part of the International Strategy Centerand the No Cold War collective and is an associate at the Korea Policy Institute.

This article was produced by Globetrotter.

Apache Crew Rescue Highlights Need For AI In Combat Says Joint Chiefs Chairman

16 September 2026 at 20:36

The U.S. military’s top officer on Wednesday talked about how AI is changing the character of warfare and offered two examples to illustrate his points. His comments included new insights into how two U.S. Army AH-64 Apache crew members were rescued after being shot down by an Iranian drone near the coast of Oman in June. The recovery effort involved America’s first known use of an uncrewed surface vessel (USV) executing a personnel recovery action as part of a military search and rescue operation.

“Information moves so fast that leader decision times have compressed from weeks down to days down to seconds,” explained Air Force Gen. Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, during his keynote speech at the Air & Space Forces Air, Space and Cyber Conference that TWZ is attending. “In the future fight, advantage will go to the side who can see first, who can understand first, decide first, and act first, and along the way, be a learning organization, and no factor is accelerating change as fast as artificial intelligence and advancing cyber capabilities.”

“AI is here now, and it’s already changing the way militaries see, sense, decide, and act across the joint force,” the chairman proclaimed.

The first example Caine used to highlight these changes took place on June 8. After the Apache went down, “U.S. CENTCOM launched a rapid, responsive joint search and rescue effort to recover the crew. That response drew on the totality of the joint force, and ultimately was required to use enabled unmanned vessels to participate in the rescue of downed U.S. service members for the first time ever.”

A flight of U.S. Army AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, armed with rockets and Hellfire missiles, taxi out to conduct a scheduled flight in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility. In addition to rockets and missiles, the Apache is additionally armed with a 30mm chain gun. (U.S. Army photo)
A flight of U.S. Army AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, armed with rockets and Hellfire missiles, taxi out to conduct a scheduled flight in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility. In addition to rockets and missiles, the Apache is additionally armed with a 30mm chain gun. (U.S. Army photo) U.S. Army Central

As we noted in our previous coverage, CENTCOM deployed “a U.S. Navy Corsair unmanned surface vessel,” the command’s spokesman told us at the time.

The Corsair uncrewed surface vessel (USV) (Saronic)

The ability to pull off that rescue mission “did not appear overnight,” Caine pointed out. “It came from the men and women of Task Force 59, CENTCOM’s forward-leaning unmanned joint maritime unit who spent the last several years testing, integrating, and operationalizing unmanned systems and AI in one of the most demanding and kinetic environments on Earth right now.”

“What helped make this possible was not a bunch of general officers and flag officers,” Caine continued. “What made this possible was a bunch of entrepreneurial sailors and members of the joint force on watch floors, at piers, managing networks of unmanned systems across thousands of miles of water, and using AI to turn massive amounts of data into a crisp, clear, perfect maritime picture that allowed us to go grab those two soldiers in the water.”

A top-down view of the Saronic Corsair USV. (Saronic)

The second example Caine shared about the use of AI “points in the other direction, not how quickly we are using these tools, but how quickly these tools are changing the threat.”

In Ukraine, “we see first-person view drones operating in heavily contested EMI [electromagnetic interference] environments. Some now using AI-enabled computer vision to continue to drive towards targets, even when there’s no GPS or the links are cut. That gives small units affordable precision and shows how quickly software and autonomy are changing what is possible at the tactical edge, and the results are stark.”

The use of AI to enable lower-end drone warfare is a topic TWZ has been among the first to point out.

“In certain locations on the front line of troops right now, the life expectancy of a new Russian recruit arriving on the front lines is as little as 20 to 30 minutes,” Caine added. “Think about that. This is what happens when low-cost precision is fielded fast, adapted quickly, and scaled across the battlefield.”

“The price of lethal exchange is decreasing day over day,” the chairman noted. “One wonders what the future of close air support looks like, but I am comforted by the fact that each and every one of you are in this room thinking about that. Taken together, these examples from the Straits of Hormuz to the front lines in Ukraine show how quickly technology is changing the character of war, and this means our joint force needs to do two things at one time.”

“[W]e need to prepare the joint force to win in this kind of conflict,” the general stated. “We have to assume from now on that our formations will be hunted by autonomous systems, jammed across the spectrum, and tracked in real time, and we have to transition the joint force to be prepared to fight and win our future war by generating and delivering lethality at scale with an agile, optimized, high-low mix of combat capabilities to give the young members of the 2.8-million member all volunteer joint force the tools that they need before they need them.”

Contact the author: howard@twz.com 

The post Apache Crew Rescue Highlights Need For AI In Combat Says Joint Chiefs Chairman appeared first on TWZ.

Industrial Base Concerns Over Building F/A-XX And F-47 Remain: Top Pentagon Procurement Officer

16 September 2026 at 16:55

As both the Navy and the USAF were racing to field a new generation of advanced tactical jets, the seagoing service’s program hit a wall. A major reason behind this from the Pentagon was concern that the U.S. industrial base could not handle simultaneous final development and production of two extremely complex new fighter aircraft. This was a controversial justification that many had a hard time swallowing. The Navy’s program, dubbed F/A-XX, is supposedly back on and a down-select on who will build it is coming soon, but that concern appears to linger among at least one of the Department of War’s top acquisition officials.

Though he remains confident that the U.S. Air Force F-47 sixth-generation fighter will fly in the next two years, Air Force Gen. Dale R. White, Director, Critical Major Weapon Systems — the service’s leading weapons procurement advisor — remains concerned about the overall capacity of industry to provide the military with the aircraft it needs, including two new fighters. His comments were in response to questions about the Navy’s challenges in building its own sixth-gen fighter alongside F-47.

The concerns are “not unique” to the F-47 or the Navy’s program but the problem exists to various degrees across the industrial base too, White told reporters Tuesday during a media roundtable at the Air & Space Forces’ Air, Space and Cyber Conference that TWZ is attending.

White has a dual-hatted role, serving as the Pentagon’s top weapons procurement officer and as the senior acquisition advisor to the Secretary of the Air Force for all acquisition matters.

With the first example of Boeing’s F-47 sixth-generation stealth fighter for the U.S. Air Force now in production, a company official has highlighted how its prototyping effort allowed the program to move forward at a rapid pace. Winning the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program was “humbling,” said Steve Parker, president and CEO of Boeing Defense, Space and Security. He added that the fact the F-47 is now in production is testament to “the maturity of our design and pedigree coming off the prototype.”
A rendering of the F-47. (U.S. Air Force) U.S. Air Force

“We’re seeing it in multiple platforms,” said White, who did not elaborate. “And so what we’re having to do is, at some point, we’re having to make some trade space in between some of these.”

“I see Boeing making smart investments,” White said of the prime contractor of the F-47, selected for the U.S. Air Force’s Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) ‘fighter’ initiative. “They have a lot of CAPEX [capital expenditure] that they’re pouring in, but we have to get through the process of the design piece, getting that completed and closed out. Then we all hit some major milestones with things like flight tests and software and those things.”

F-47 specifications infographic (USAF)

“Really, it’s just being able to manage the overall resourcing as it relates to number one, people resources,” the general added. “Number two, when you start getting into the production conversation, do we have enough capacity to be able to produce at that rate? And so, by and large, I have concerns. I have concerns about the capacity of our industrial base, but they are not unique to F-47 or to any program.”

As for the F-47, White said the program “continues to progress exceptionally well.”

“As you know, many, many years in tech maturation and risk reduction gave us a tremendous head start on this program,” White explained. “Extremely proud of what the team has done, what they continue to do each and every day. We are still absolutely on [the] path to be able to hit the mark of flying within this administration. So we see no issues in front of us right now.”

While the first example of the F-47 has been in production for about a year now, the Navy has yet to even select a prime contractor for its next generation fighter. The current competitors for the F/A-XX are Boeing and Northrop Grumman. A decision was supposed to have been made by last month.

“The F/A-XX program remains on track, and we have no further information to provide at this time,” a Navy official told us last week.

Despite intervention from Congress, the next-generation carrier-based fighter has remained in question since the Pentagon moved to effectively shelve the program last year.

In response to a question from TWZ earlier this year, the Chief of Naval Operations acknowledged the uncertainty over the F/A-XX program.

“One of the challenges we’re seeing is, not only [are] our peer competitors improving their capability for anti-air, either air-to-air or surface-to-air, but the lower cost of entry of very capable weapons is also making more players on the field in which that level of stealth and technology is required,” Adm. Daryl Caudle told us back in April at the Sea-Air-Space 2026 exposition. “So this is not about the need for a peer adversary. This is just having an aircraft that can operate with a level of uncertainty and with the acceptable level of risk.”

With Boeing as a finalist, it is also possible that F/A-XX could be a variant of the F-47. As we noted in a past story, the Boeing render for its F/A-XX concept is remarkably similar to artwork for its F-47.

Likely a navalized F-47 variant as expected. https://t.co/4lZkpUjqfz

— Tyler Rogoway (@Aviation_Intel) August 28, 2025

Last year, Steve Parker, Boeing Defense and Space CEO, said he didn’t see a problem with his company building both jets stating that this had been part of the strategy all along.

If this is the case, the company’s claim that it would not have a problem building both the Navy and Air Force next-generation fighters would make more sense. There are a number of advantages when it comes to establishing a high-degree of commonality between F/A-XX and F-47, although there would also be challenges, especially when it comes to getting the most out of a design that was not meant to operate from a carrier deck and scaling production up for both services. There is already significant sharing of elements of both the Navy’s and Air Force’s sixth-generation fighter programs. So commonality in some subsystems and interoperability are already baked in.

We should hopefully finally get a clearer picture in the coming weeks about the status of the F/A-XX and possibly the answer to who will actually build it, which will give us a better idea of what the industrial base impact actually will be.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The post Industrial Base Concerns Over Building F/A-XX And F-47 Remain: Top Pentagon Procurement Officer appeared first on TWZ.

South Korea’s Hormuz Dilemma: A Test of Strategic Decision-Making

16 September 2026 at 14:59
South Korea faces a difficult choice over whether and how to support maritime security efforts in the Strait of Hormuz. With pressure from the United States, risks from Iran, and the continuing threat from North Korea, Seoul must balance alliance commitments with its own security priorities. The Hormuz crisis has placed South Korea in a […]

In Tribute to the Koreans Killed After the Great Kantō Earthquake

16 September 2026 at 12:30
On September 1, 2026, Tokyo’s Yokoamichō Park hosted a memorial ceremony to commemorate the Koreans who succumbed to the “Kantō Massacre” that followed the Great Kantō Earthquake of 1923. The organizers of the ceremony called on the Japanese authorities to establish a full picture of what happened and to prevent a recurrence of such events. […]
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