EU leaders have failed to settle their differences over the 2028–2034 budget, with Germany demanding further reductions to the proposed spending framework and the European Council taking charge of negotiations ahead of a difficult December deadline.

European Union leaders have ended their Brussels summit without agreement on the bloc’s next seven-year budget, after German Chancellor Friedrich Merz rejected the scale of spending envisaged under the latest compromise proposal and demanded deeper cuts.

The discussions on 15–16 October exposed the continuing division between governments determined to contain national contributions and those seeking to protect agricultural subsidies, regional development and new European investment programmes. The dispute now threatens the political timetable for approving the 2028–2034 Multiannual Financial Framework, the budget that will determine the Union’s spending priorities over the next seven years.

In their formal summit conclusions, leaders invited European Council President António Costa to take negotiations forward towards a timely agreement. No new spending settlement was endorsed, despite the Irish presidency having presented revised figures immediately before the summit.

Germany rejects the compromise

The European Commission originally proposed a framework approaching €2 trillion in current prices, arguing that Europe needed greater financial capacity to meet its growing responsibilities in defence, competitiveness, technological development, migration and external security.

Ireland, which holds the rotating Council presidency, submitted a revised negotiating document on 10 October intended to narrow the differences between governments. The latest proposal includes substantial reductions compared with the Commission’s initial ambitions while seeking to preserve financing for established EU programmes.

Those concessions have not satisfied Berlin. Merz argues that the Union must recognise the difficult fiscal position facing national governments and that the proposed increases in common spending remain excessive.

Germany, the largest contributor to the EU budget in absolute terms, has been working with other budget-conscious governments to seek reductions from the original Commission proposal.

EU Today reported on the proposed €141 billion in reductions, including the implications for defence and competitiveness funding.

The Irish compromise has done little to bridge the divide. The revised framework seeks to combine greater financial restraint with protection for agricultural and cohesion policies, while retaining significant investment in security, research and competitiveness.

Yet every attempt to rebalance the proposed spending exposes another political conflict.

Agriculture, cohesion and defence compete for funding

The Common Agricultural Policy and cohesion funding remain among the largest and most politically sensitive components of the EU budget. Agricultural payments support farmers across the Union, while cohesion programmes finance infrastructure, regional investment and economic development, particularly in less prosperous territories.

Governments benefiting heavily from those programmes are reluctant to accept reductions, particularly when national finances are already under pressure.

France, Italy and other countries defending traditional EU expenditure have therefore resisted attempts to transfer the burden of budget restraint disproportionately onto agriculture and regional support.

At the same time, the Commission has argued that the EU cannot simply preserve the spending structure of previous decades while promising a stronger role in European defence, industrial development and economic security.

The contradiction is increasingly apparent. European governments demand greater independence from external suppliers, stronger military capabilities and sustained financial support for Ukraine, yet remain unwilling to agree on the larger common budget that might help deliver those objectives.

Cuts to research, innovation, cross-border infrastructure or defence-industrial programmes would not necessarily produce immediate political costs. Their consequences would emerge later, through investments postponed, capabilities not developed and projects left dependent on national budgets.

Conversely, reducing agricultural payments or regional investment would produce more immediate resistance from farmers, local authorities and national governments.

The demands of 17 EU governments seeking to protect farm and cohesion spending illustrate the growing tension between established programmes and the Union’s newer strategic priorities.

A timetable becoming difficult to defend

The Council’s budget negotiations had been intended to deliver a political agreement before the end of 2026. That would leave 2027 for the European Parliament and member states to complete the legislation required for the new financial framework to operate from January 2028.

Failure to reach that timetable would not immediately stop EU expenditure. It would, however, compress the period available for completing the detailed legal arrangements underpinning individual programmes and could complicate the uninterrupted delivery of funding at the beginning of the next budget cycle.

The political environment is hardly favourable. Several governments face difficult domestic debates over public spending, taxation and the demands of European integration. In France, the approach of the 2027 presidential election adds another complication to negotiations requiring sensitive national concessions.

Agreement on the seven-year framework requires unanimity among member states, followed by the consent of the European Parliament. The latter has already argued that the EU needs sufficient financial resources to match the responsibilities its governments have assigned to it.

Costa now faces the task of converting competing national positions into a financial settlement that all 27 governments can accept. That will require decisions not only about the overall ceiling but also about the balance between national allocations and programmes managed at European level.

The Brussels summit has demonstrated that the principal disagreements remain unresolved. The next negotiating round will determine whether governments are prepared to compromise on spending priorities or whether their ambitions for a more capable European Union will once again run ahead of their willingness to finance it.

Dal 6 maggio 2025 Merz è cancelliere della Repubblica Federale Tedesca: “Raramente le aspettative nei confronti di un cancelliere tedesco sono state tanto alte quanto quelle che ruotano attorno al presidente della Cdu, Friedrich Merz”, ha scritto Mariam Lau, nelle primissime righe del suo interessante saggio La Germania di Merz (pubblicato in Italia da posteditori, 2025). Peccato che Merz non abbia avuto la fortuna di Angela Merkel, e forse nemmeno il suo talento politico. Ha infatti ereditato una Germania diventata “malato d’Europa” senza riuscire a guarirla. Una Germania in profonda crisi economica ma ancor di più politica: ormai il suo governo si regge su precari equilibri parlamentari, minati sempre più dall’avanzata di Alternativa per la Germania (Afd) che ha trionfato nelle elezioni locali e soprattutto nei sondaggi, cavalcando populismo e identitarismi, sull’onda di uno slogan che ha contagiato le destre europee, “remigrazione”. Cacciare gli stranieri indesiderati costerebbe alla Germania quattro punti di Pil, secondo l’Istituto Leibniz per la ricerca economica di Halle (Iwh). Una follìa, per Merz, “il termine remigrazione non è altro che una forma di pulizia etnica basata sull’origine e il colore della pelle”. Tono duro, ma posizione debole, quella del cancelliere che vorrebbe rifondare il centrodestra tedesco e ridefinire la rotta in Europa, in una sorta di campo largo del conservatorismo democratico.

Nell’era dell’incertezza aggravata dalla complessa situazione geopolitica internazionale, Merz si aggrappa alla clausola non scritta del Brandmauer (sorta di cordone sanitario mantenuto dai partiti principali che rifiutano alleanze con l’Afd) per governare la Germania, ma all’interno del suo stesso partito ci sono segnali contraddittori, ed inquietanti. Insomma, il trono vacilla.

E riemergono vecchie ambiguità. In una Germania dove la memoria sbiadisce e i conti col passato tardano a definirsi, avere avuto un nonno nazista pone Merz in un’imbarazzante posizione, un’arma che gli oppositori, esterni ma soprattutto interni possono impugnare contro di lui. Mariam Lau gli dedica il primo capitolo del suo saggio, “All’ombra della guerra”. Nata a Teheran ma cresciuta a Berlino, Mariam Lau è una nota giornalista che lavora alla Die Zeit, ed è tra i massimi esperti di Afd, Cdu, dell’area conservatrice, delle politiche migratorie, una delle voci più autorevoli nell’analisi delle trasformazioni della destra tedesca ed europea. Tutto nasce nel gennaio del 2004, quando Merz, allora parlamentare e vicecapogruppo della Cdu al Bundestag, partecipa ad un meeting elettorale nella sua cittadina natale, a Brilon, nel Sauerland, che dal 1999 è amministrata dai socialdemocratici: “E’ tempo di prendere d’assalto il municipio rosso”, si sgola dal palco Merz. C’è chi interpreta queste veementi parole con quelle pronunciate il primo maggio del 1933 dal nonno Josef Paul Sauvigny (1875-1967), il quale era stato borgomastro di Brilon dal 1917 al 1937.

Alcuni studiosi locali avevano rintracciato tra le pagine ingiallite della Sauerländer Zeitung il testo di quel discorso: “La nuova Germania celebra oggi la sua prima Festa nazionale (…), giovane e vigoroso come le folle dei suoi acerbi difensori, il nuovo Reich si apre davanti a noi. Le tempeste della rivoluzione nazionale scrosciano ancora su di esso, le tempeste primaverili hanno spazzato via tutta l’immondizia, scacciato le nuvole che finora hanno voluto sottrarci il sole”. E ancora: “Questa tempesta, che per qualcuno può apparire violenta, si placherà dopo aver ripulito l’aria da tutte le esalazioni velenose che si sono accumulate in anni di travisata libertà e di impotente autodistruzione. Ma mentre sino a oggi la forza e le aspirazioni edificatrici tedesche erano divise e dissanguate dalle beghe di partito e dai ripetuti cambi di guida, oggi ci sono una volontà che ci unisce, una forza che ci ispira, un Führer che ci chiama”.

L’amministrazione comunale fece di tutto per ostacolare le ricerche sul passato del nonno di Merz. Reinhard Sommer, primo consigliere distrettuale di Briton per conto della Cdu, ai giornalisti della Tageszeitung spiegò tale ostracismo perché si voleva “gettare Merz nello stesso calderone degli estremisti di destra”. Merz intentò una causa al quotidiano berlinese Tageszeitung che gli aveva rivolto ulteriori domande sul nonno, “ma la stragrande maggioranza degli articoli” sul nonno e l’incauta frase sull’assalto al municipio rosso non venne contestata. La stessa Tageszeitung commentò che “nessuno può scegliere le sue origini. Il problema non è il passato nazista del nonno, ma l’atteggiamento del nipote (…) L’uomo che ama fomentare dibattiti sull’orgoglio nazionale ha una visione della storia e della famiglia di cui nessun tedesco dovrebbe essere orgoglioso”.

“Mio nonno non era un nazionalsocialista”, scrisse Merz alla Berliner Zeitung, però poi le tre pagine del suo intervento (su sua richiesta) vennero ritirate. Era vero che il nonno avesse militato nelle SA, come riserva, ammise poi Merz, ma solo perché avrebbe altrimenti dovuto aderire al partito nazista. Aggiunse che il nonno fu promosso sergente, “senza il suo assenso”, come sempre senza il suo assenso fu trasferito alla Nsdap, “ed era probabilmente vero che dopo il 1929 Josef Paul Sauvigny avesse per un breve periodo coltivato aspettative nei confronti dei nazionalsocialisti”. Il nonno ottenne il prepensionamento nel 1937 perché “i nazisti lo disgustavano”, e, quale prova, Merz sventolò un articolo del quotidiano nazista Der Stürmer in cui il borgomastro di Brilon era definito un “compagno ebreo”. La mossa di Merz era strumentale: prevenire un possibile attacco della Tageszeitung che aveva ottenuto dall’Archivio di Stato di Düsseldorf il dossier (30 pagine) sulla denazificazione di Sauvigny. Tra i vari documenti recuperati, la dichiarazione (10 dicembre 1947) in cui ammetteva d’essere stato Oberscharführer della riserva delle SA, confermando d’aver raggiunto le Squadre d’Assalto il primo luglio del 1933, sei mesi prima del Putsch di Röhm. Merz, scrive Lau, comprendeva le motivazioni del nonno: “Inizialmente associava i nazionalsocialisti alla speranza che qualcosa nelle condizioni catastrofiche della Germania e anche della sua città natale cambiasse, per questo rimase in carica. Solo così si può comprendere il discorso che mio nonno tenne il primo maggio 1933 (…) E’ ovvio che non approverei mai frasi del genere al giorno d’oggi”.

E tuttavia, la tesi che il nonno si fosse dimesso perché disgustato dai nazisti “non è del tutto suffragata dal saluto che Peter Schramm, governatore distrettuale nominato dai nazionalsocialisti, rivolse al commiato di Sauvigny nel 1937. Stando alle sue parole, il sindaco aveva ‘nonostante l’età avanzata, agito subito in linea con i suoi sentimenti nazionali e ricoperto sempre la sua carica nello spirito nazionalsocialista’”. Il nonno, durante la denazificazione, fu classificato in terza categoria, il che gli vietava di rivestire incarichi pubblici (oltre che ricevere il 60 per cento della pensione). Protestò, invocando la propria innocenza, “devo essere considerato una vittima del nazismo”. Fu ascoltato: venne derubricato nel 1948 alla quarta categoria, quella dei “simpatizzanti”, e poté godere della pensione completa.

Proprio il 4 novembre verrà inaugurata a Berlino la mostra “Norimberga e i raduni del Partito Nazista”, organizzato dal Dokumentationszentrum Reichsparteiitagsgelände, un progetto destinato ai giovani e al futuro per schiarire le ombre che ancora oscurano le connessioni col tragico passato vissuto e spesso occultato dei loro nonni e bisnonni. A dimostrazione che il passato non può essere camuffato, ma affrontato.

L'articolo Il nonno di Merz era nazista? Il cancelliere si trova in un’imbarazzante posizione proviene da Il Fatto Quotidiano.

Dal 6 maggio 2025 Merz è cancelliere della Repubblica Federale Tedesca: “Raramente le aspettative nei confronti di un cancelliere tedesco sono state tanto alte quanto quelle che ruotano attorno al presidente della Cdu, Friedrich Merz”, ha scritto Mariam Lau, nelle primissime righe del suo interessante saggio La Germania di Merz (pubblicato in Italia da posteditori, 2025). Peccato che Merz non abbia avuto la fortuna di Angela Merkel, e forse nemmeno il suo talento politico. Ha infatti ereditato una Germania diventata “malato d’Europa” senza riuscire a guarirla. Una Germania in profonda crisi economica ma ancor di più politica: ormai il suo governo si regge su precari equilibri parlamentari, minati sempre più dall’avanzata di Alternativa per la Germania (Afd) che ha trionfato nelle elezioni locali e soprattutto nei sondaggi, cavalcando populismo e identitarismi, sull’onda di uno slogan che ha contagiato le destre europee, “remigrazione”. Cacciare gli stranieri indesiderati costerebbe alla Germania quattro punti di Pil, secondo l’Istituto Leibniz per la ricerca economica di Halle (Iwh). Una follìa, per Merz, “il termine remigrazione non è altro che una forma di pulizia etnica basata sull’origine e il colore della pelle”. Tono duro, ma posizione debole, quella del cancelliere che vorrebbe rifondare il centrodestra tedesco e ridefinire la rotta in Europa, in una sorta di campo largo del conservatorismo democratico.

Nell’era dell’incertezza aggravata dalla complessa situazione geopolitica internazionale, Merz si aggrappa alla clausola non scritta del Brandmauer (sorta di cordone sanitario mantenuto dai partiti principali che rifiutano alleanze con l’Afd) per governare la Germania, ma all’interno del suo stesso partito ci sono segnali contraddittori, ed inquietanti. Insomma, il trono vacilla.

E riemergono vecchie ambiguità. In una Germania dove la memoria sbiadisce e i conti col passato tardano a definirsi, avere avuto un nonno nazista pone Merz in un’imbarazzante posizione, un’arma che gli oppositori, esterni ma soprattutto interni possono impugnare contro di lui. Mariam Lau gli dedica il primo capitolo del suo saggio, “All’ombra della guerra”. Nata a Teheran ma cresciuta a Berlino, Mariam Lau è una nota giornalista che lavora alla Die Zeit, ed è tra i massimi esperti di Afd, Cdu, dell’area conservatrice, delle politiche migratorie, una delle voci più autorevoli nell’analisi delle trasformazioni della destra tedesca ed europea. Tutto nasce nel gennaio del 2004, quando Merz, allora parlamentare e vicecapogruppo della Cdu al Bundestag, partecipa ad un meeting elettorale nella sua cittadina natale, a Brilon, nel Sauerland, che dal 1999 è amministrata dai socialdemocratici: “E’ tempo di prendere d’assalto il municipio rosso”, si sgola dal palco Merz. C’è chi interpreta queste veementi parole con quelle pronunciate il primo maggio del 1933 dal nonno Josef Paul Sauvigny (1875-1967), il quale era stato borgomastro di Brilon dal 1917 al 1937.

Alcuni studiosi locali avevano rintracciato tra le pagine ingiallite della Sauerländer Zeitung il testo di quel discorso: “La nuova Germania celebra oggi la sua prima Festa nazionale (…), giovane e vigoroso come le folle dei suoi acerbi difensori, il nuovo Reich si apre davanti a noi. Le tempeste della rivoluzione nazionale scrosciano ancora su di esso, le tempeste primaverili hanno spazzato via tutta l’immondizia, scacciato le nuvole che finora hanno voluto sottrarci il sole”. E ancora: “Questa tempesta, che per qualcuno può apparire violenta, si placherà dopo aver ripulito l’aria da tutte le esalazioni velenose che si sono accumulate in anni di travisata libertà e di impotente autodistruzione. Ma mentre sino a oggi la forza e le aspirazioni edificatrici tedesche erano divise e dissanguate dalle beghe di partito e dai ripetuti cambi di guida, oggi ci sono una volontà che ci unisce, una forza che ci ispira, un Führer che ci chiama”.

L’amministrazione comunale fece di tutto per ostacolare le ricerche sul passato del nonno di Merz. Reinhard Sommer, primo consigliere distrettuale di Briton per conto della Cdu, ai giornalisti della Tageszeitung spiegò tale ostracismo perché si voleva “gettare Merz nello stesso calderone degli estremisti di destra”. Merz intentò una causa al quotidiano berlinese Tageszeitung che gli aveva rivolto ulteriori domande sul nonno, “ma la stragrande maggioranza degli articoli” sul nonno e l’incauta frase sull’assalto al municipio rosso non venne contestata. La stessa Tageszeitung commentò che “nessuno può scegliere le sue origini. Il problema non è il passato nazista del nonno, ma l’atteggiamento del nipote (…) L’uomo che ama fomentare dibattiti sull’orgoglio nazionale ha una visione della storia e della famiglia di cui nessun tedesco dovrebbe essere orgoglioso”.

“Mio nonno non era un nazionalsocialista”, scrisse Merz alla Berliner Zeitung, però poi le tre pagine del suo intervento (su sua richiesta) vennero ritirate. Era vero che il nonno avesse militato nelle SA, come riserva, ammise poi Merz, ma solo perché avrebbe altrimenti dovuto aderire al partito nazista. Aggiunse che il nonno fu promosso sergente, “senza il suo assenso”, come sempre senza il suo assenso fu trasferito alla Nsdap, “ed era probabilmente vero che dopo il 1929 Josef Paul Sauvigny avesse per un breve periodo coltivato aspettative nei confronti dei nazionalsocialisti”. Il nonno ottenne il prepensionamento nel 1937 perché “i nazisti lo disgustavano”, e, quale prova, Merz sventolò un articolo del quotidiano nazista Der Stürmer in cui il borgomastro di Brilon era definito un “compagno ebreo”. La mossa di Merz era strumentale: prevenire un possibile attacco della Tageszeitung che aveva ottenuto dall’Archivio di Stato di Düsseldorf il dossier (30 pagine) sulla denazificazione di Sauvigny. Tra i vari documenti recuperati, la dichiarazione (10 dicembre 1947) in cui ammetteva d’essere stato Oberscharführer della riserva delle SA, confermando d’aver raggiunto le Squadre d’Assalto il primo luglio del 1933, sei mesi prima del Putsch di Röhm. Merz, scrive Lau, comprendeva le motivazioni del nonno: “Inizialmente associava i nazionalsocialisti alla speranza che qualcosa nelle condizioni catastrofiche della Germania e anche della sua città natale cambiasse, per questo rimase in carica. Solo così si può comprendere il discorso che mio nonno tenne il primo maggio 1933 (…) E’ ovvio che non approverei mai frasi del genere al giorno d’oggi”.

E tuttavia, la tesi che il nonno si fosse dimesso perché disgustato dai nazisti “non è del tutto suffragata dal saluto che Peter Schramm, governatore distrettuale nominato dai nazionalsocialisti, rivolse al commiato di Sauvigny nel 1937. Stando alle sue parole, il sindaco aveva ‘nonostante l’età avanzata, agito subito in linea con i suoi sentimenti nazionali e ricoperto sempre la sua carica nello spirito nazionalsocialista’”. Il nonno, durante la denazificazione, fu classificato in terza categoria, il che gli vietava di rivestire incarichi pubblici (oltre che ricevere il 60 per cento della pensione). Protestò, invocando la propria innocenza, “devo essere considerato una vittima del nazismo”. Fu ascoltato: venne derubricato nel 1948 alla quarta categoria, quella dei “simpatizzanti”, e poté godere della pensione completa.

Proprio il 4 novembre verrà inaugurata a Berlino la mostra “Norimberga e i raduni del Partito Nazista”, organizzato dal Dokumentationszentrum Reichsparteiitagsgelände, un progetto destinato ai giovani e al futuro per schiarire le ombre che ancora oscurano le connessioni col tragico passato vissuto e spesso occultato dei loro nonni e bisnonni. A dimostrazione che il passato non può essere camuffato, ma affrontato.

L'articolo Il nonno di Merz era nazista? Il cancelliere si trova in un’imbarazzante posizione proviene da Il Fatto Quotidiano.

Francia e Germania si accordano su un “approccio comune volto a garantire il futuro dell’industria automobilistica europea“. E provano a trascinare gli altri Paesi europei sulla loro linea. Il compromesso raggiunto da Emmanuel Macron e Friedrich Merz punta ufficialmente a conciliare due obiettivi: concedere più “flessibilità” alle case automobilistiche nella transizione dai motori a combustione e rafforzare la produzione industriale europea. Di fatto, Berlino ottiene un allentamento degli obiettivi climatici, Parigi punta a legare più strettamente il sostegno pubblico alla produzione nell’Unione. Stellantis festeggia: “Accogliamo con favore l’accordo come un passo importante verso la finalizzazione del pacchetto europeo per il settore automobilistico. Insieme alle discussioni in corso al Parlamento europeo e alle posizioni già espresse da diversi Stati membri, riteniamo che possa contribuire a concludere rapidamente il processo, garantendo al nostro settore le flessibilità e la chiarezza di cui ha bisogno, affinché possa concentrarsi su ciò che sa fare meglio: innovare e offrire soluzioni ai propri clienti”.

È “approccio equilibrato” che permetterà all’Ue di perseguire i suoi obiettivi climatici e, in parallelo, rafforzare la sovranità tecnologica, la base industriale e la competitività internazionale della sua industria automobilistica, rivendica la dichiarazione diffusa dall’Eliseo. La Germania, che ospita big come Volkswagen, Bmw e Mercedes, vuole ridurre la pressione su un settore messo alle strette dalla concorrenza cinese, i costi industriali e una domanda di auto elettriche inferiore alle attese. La Francia vuole evitare che il mercato europeo diventi uno sbocco per veicoli e componenti prodotti prevalentemente all’estero. Il compromesso scambia dunque flessibilità normativa con protezione industriale. Ma per Transport & Environment (T&E), organizzazione europea che si occupa di trasporti sostenibili, si tratta di “un errore storico”: l’accordo rischia di essere un boomerang e finirà per rallentare gli investimenti nelle tecnologie del futuro. Secondo le sue stime, con regole meno stringenti la quota di veicoli elettrici nell’offerta delle case automobilistiche nel 2030 scenderebbe dal 57% previsto con gli obiettivi attuali al 43%.

La normativa europea ora in vigore prevede dal 2035 una riduzione del 100% delle emissioni medie di CO₂ allo scarico delle nuove auto e dei nuovi furgoni rispetto ai valori di riferimento del 2021. La Commissione ha proposto di annacquarla passando a un taglio del 90% mentre il restante 10% verrebbe compensato attraverso l’utilizzo di acciaio a basse emissioni di carbonio prodotto nell’Unione o da combustibili sintetici e biocarburanti. L’intesa franco-tedesca va oltre: secondo quanto illustrato da Merz, l’obiettivo sarebbe una riduzione del 90% dal 2035, senza obbligo di compensare il restante 10%. Resteranno vincoli sulle emissioni medie delle flotte e le condizioni dovranno essere definite dalla normativa europea. Il cambiamento sostanziale è che verrebbe abbandonato l’obiettivo di azzerare le emissioni allo scarico delle nuove auto, lasciando maggiore spazio a tecnologie diverse dall’elettrico puro. Francia e Germania ribadiscono comunque l’obiettivo di sviluppare e produrre in Europa la prossima generazione di veicoli elettrici. La tesi è che la transizione debba proseguire senza imporre una traiettoria tecnologica troppo rigida a un’industria che attraversa una fase difficile.

L’altro pilastro dell’intesa è il rafforzamento della produzione europea. Il principio è utilizzare incentivi pubblici, appalti e altri strumenti di sostegno per favorire gli investimenti nell’Unione, anziché alimentare le filiere dei concorrenti extraeuropei. Ma stabilire che cosa significhi prodotto in Europa non è semplice visto che molte componenti arrivano da oltre confine. È il caso delle batterie, destinate ad avere un peso crescente nel valore delle auto elettriche.

Transport & Environment critica proprio i requisiti prospettati per il contenuto europeo delle batterie, almeno il 10% nel biennio 2028-2029 e il 20% nel 2030-2031. Secondo l’organizzazione, le soglie sono insufficienti a proteggere gli investimenti europei, considerando che nel 2025 oltre il 50% delle celle impiegate nelle auto elettriche vendute nell’Ue era già prodotto in Europa. Il rischio è che un’auto assemblata nell’Unione possa beneficiare della qualifica di prodotto europeo pur utilizzando batterie cinesi. L’organizzazione avverte che questi vincoli potrebbero compromettere gli investimenti nelle gigafactory europee, mettendo a rischio una capacità produttiva stimata in 164 GWh nel 2027 e 254 GWh nel 2030. “Germania e Francia stanno commettendo un errore storico”, dice Andrea Boraschi, direttore di T&E Italia.

Il ragionamento è che se gli obiettivi climatici diventano meno impegnativi, i costruttori possono avere meno necessità di accelerare lo sviluppo e la commercializzazione dei modelli elettrici. Nel breve periodo questo potrebbe aiutare a contenere i costi e difendere i margini delle auto tradizionali. Nel lungo periodo, però, rischia di ritardare gli investimenti nelle tecnologie che stanno trasformando il mercato mondiale. Allo stesso modo la maggiore gradualità potrebbe proteggere temporaneamente i posti di lavoro legati ai motori tradizionali e alla componentistica, ma non garantisce la creazione di nuove attività nelle batterie, nell’elettronica e nel software. Se queste filiere si sviluppassero soprattutto fuori dall’Europa, la difesa delle lavorazioni esistenti non sarebbe sufficiente a salvaguardare la competitività futura.

In ogni caso l’intesa a due ha davanti una lunga strada prima di tradursi eventualmente in una modifica delle regole europee. Sarà necessario trovare un’intesa con gli altri Stati membri e con il Parlamento europeo, dove restano differenze sulle modalità e sui tempi della transizione. Parigi e Berlino si dicono “determinate” a “lavorare rapidamente con i partner europei” per giungere a un accordo. “Abbiamo una responsabilità nei confronti dei nostri lavoratori, delle nostre industrie e dei nostri cittadini: far sì che l’Europa resti un attore di primo piano nella trasformazione globale dell’industria automobilistica”, concludono, ribadendo l’obiettivo di creare “un’industria automobilistica europea competitiva, innovativa e decarbonizzata, che produca in Europa e crei i posti di lavoro di domani”. Secondo Merz, l’Italia è “ampiamente d’accordo”. Anche se non è stata invitata a partecipare.

L'articolo Accordo Francia-Germania “per garantire il futuro dell’auto europea”. Ma con meno vincoli si rischia di rallentare gli investimenti nell’elettrico proviene da Il Fatto Quotidiano.

Das interessanteste am neuen 7-Jahreshaushalt der EU sind die Tricks, mit denen Ursula von der Leyen sich die alleinige Verfügungsgewalt über viele hundert Milliarden Euro sichern will, indem sie durchzudrücken versucht, dass gigantische Fonds aufgesetzt werden, deren genauer Verwendungszweck nihct festgelegt ist oder geändert werden kann. Nach den Erfahrungen mit der Bestellung von Covid-„Impfstoffen“ durch […]

"These are frozen Russian assets held in Europe, belonging to Russians who are destroying Ukraine and killing people there every day... the idea of releasing these assets is completely out of the question," said Finnish Prime Minister Petteri Orpo.

Germany is preparing a new meeting of the Coalition of the Willing to coordinate further support for Ukraine, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said on 12 October following a conversation with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz.

Russia continues to strike Ukraine’s energy infrastructure despite US President Donald Trump’s claim that Moscow has agreed to an energy truce. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz is initiating a meeting of European leaders to discuss assistance to Ukraine in this situation.

Kyiv and Berlin have also agreed to hold a meeting of national security advisers in the E3 format, with Ukraine participating, according to the statement. The format involves an informal grouping of three leading European countries: the United Kingdom, France and Germany.

Zelenskyy and Merz discuss energy truce and support for Ukraine

During the conversation, the two sides also discussed US President Donald Trump’s proposal for an energy truce and Russia’s subsequent actions. Russian forces continue to attack Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, Zelenskyy noted.

“This is exactly how the Russians behave when pressure eases. It is very important that Europe continue to act on principle,” Zelenskyy stressed.

Germany is coordinating preparations for a meeting of the Coalition of the Willing, the Ukrainian president noted. The two sides also discussed support for Ukraine’s financial stability. Further steps are to be coordinated in greater detail during a meeting scheduled for this week, Zelenskyy said.

The Coalition of the Willing seeks additional support for Ukraine

The Coalition of the Willing was initiated by the United Kingdom and France, which held talks with representatives of 37 countries in March 2025 on supporting Ukraine in the event of a peace agreement. The initiative envisaged financial assistance and the deployment of troops, air forces or naval forces to protect Ukraine against renewed Russian aggression, Bloomberg reported.

The latest meeting of the Coalition of the Willing took place on 24 August and was the 16th meeting, according to a statement on the website of the President of Ukraine. Zelenskyy called on partners to strengthen Ukraine’s air defense and provide at least 300 missiles for Patriot systems for the winter, the statement said.

The president also proposed bringing forward part of the European loan financing planned for 2027 so that Ukraine could receive the funds this year. He separately stressed the need to find a mechanism for using frozen Russian assets to defend Ukraine and to unblock the maritime corridor in the Black Sea.

“We value this format—the Coalition of the Willing. It brings together countries that are ready not only to talk about security but also to act. We need this—to act and build real security together,” Zelenskyy stressed.

A ceasefire in words, but fresh attacks on energy infrastructure in practice

Ukraine and Russia had allegedly agreed to an immediate energy ceasefire, US President Donald Trump said on Truth Social on 11 October. However, at the time of publication, neither Kyiv nor Moscow had confirmed such an agreement, Ukrainska Pravda reported.

Ukraine supports the ceasefire and is awaiting details from the US side, Volodymyr Zelenskyy said in a post on X the same day. Russia must also agree to halt the strikes, he stressed.

Ukrainian forces had received the relevant orders, and Kyiv was ready to refrain from striking Russian energy infrastructure provided Russia reciprocated, Zelenskyy said in his evening address on 11 October.

Russia continued attacking Ukraine’s energy infrastructure after the ceasefire was announced, including striking a gas production facility and a petrol station, Zelenskyy said on his official Telegram channel on 12 October. Moscow had shown no willingness to abide by the ceasefire, the president added.

UK Prime Minister Andy Burnham said Russia interfered in the 2016 referendum that took Britain out of the European Union, in podcast excerpts released on 11 October, the Associated Press reported. His remarks are believed to be the first time a British prime minister has publicly acknowledged such meddling.

Russia’s information war keeps running through Europe’s ballots. German security sources said in August that Moscow was escalating disinformation before state elections, and Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation found more than 200 Russian fake news sites aimed at France last year.

One question, one clear answer

Burnham told The Rest Is Politics podcast that he asked his advisers whether Russia had interfered in the 2016 vote. He asked after taking office in July.

“I’ve had the clear answer that yes, there was,” he said.

He argued that such things must now be put clearly on the record. He did not say how Russia interfered or offer evidence, and Moscow has long denied interfering in foreign votes.

Burnham said he had discussed Russian interference with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz in Berlin the previous week. “You know he was saying to me that the AfD are clearly linked to Russia, funded I believe,” Burnham said, referring to Germany’s far-right Alternative for Germany party. Putting such interference on the record would help “voters in Germany and France understand that some of this politics is instigated via our enemies, namely Russia,” he added.

Years of silence

In 2020, Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee found that the government had actively avoided investigating whether Russia meddled in the referendum. The report noted open-source signs of Russian attempts to sway the Brexit campaign. The government, it said, had never looked for hard evidence.

The government rejected the committee’s call for a review.

“We have seen no evidence of successful interference in the EU Referendum,” it said.

That same year, London said Russian actors had almost certainly tried to interfere in the 2019 general election. The government said they did it by amplifying leaked UK-US trade documents online.

From 2019 to 2016

Three weeks ago, Burnham stopped short of this. At the UN General Assembly on 22 September, he said the Kremlin spends around £1.3 billion each year on manipulating information. That is roughly $1.7 billion at recent exchange rates. He cited evidence that Russian agencies tried to interfere in the 2019 general election, but he did not mention 2016.

In the same speech, he said Britain had already helped Moldova protect its elections from Russian interference.

German industry expects Russian sabotage against the country’s companies to persist and take more forms, the deputy head of the Federation of German Industries (BDI) told Handelsblatt. His warning follows alarms from Germany’s intelligence services, which describe the country as a main target of Russia’s covert campaign in Europe.

Russia keeps striking Ukrainian cities and power plants every day while trying to weaken the European support that keeps Ukraine fighting. Germany is home to arms makers producing with and for Ukraine, so pressure on its companies targets the supply behind Ukraine’s defense.

Industry expects attacks to last and change form

The warning came from Holger Lösch, the BDI’s deputy managing director.

“German industry is preparing for the threat to persist and for attack methods to become more varied,” he told Handelsblatt. “Companies don’t end up in the crosshairs by chance,” he added.

Russian influence and sabotage operations are no longer an abstract scenario, and companies, critical infrastructure, and defense supply chains are already among their targets, Lösch said. Companies now receive more threat warnings, and their cooperation with the authorities has improved significantly, he noted. “What is still missing are joint procedures to quickly derive concrete measures from warnings,” Lösch said, calling the protection of the economy a cornerstone of national security.

German intelligence describes a Russian shadow war

The warning comes a week after a public hearing of the intelligence oversight panel of the Bundestag, Germany’s parliament, on 5 October. There, Martin Jäger, head of Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service (BND), said Russia was waging a shadow war against Germany. “Germany has become a main obstacle to Russian hegemonic power projection in Europe and thus a target of Russian action,” Jäger said. “The danger of attacks against targets in Germany remains real and present,” he warned.

Sinan Selen, head of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), Germany’s domestic intelligence agency, told the same hearing that Russia was showing a readiness for sabotage and killings.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said on 1 October that Germany was preparing for further hybrid attacks, “including serious ones,” and would respond “quickly and very clearly,” as it did after the drone attack at Leipzig airport.

Drone bombs, arson, and paid saboteurs on German soil

In August, a drone carrying Semtex explosives hit the wing of a Ukrainian An-124 cargo plane at Leipzig/Halle Airport but did not explode. Germany blamed Russia on 1 September, and German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul said Germany was not at war with Russia but was a “target of war.”

German authorities suspect Russian intelligence of commissioning an arson attack near two Munich defense firms, and a confidential Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) assessment counted more than 165 suspected sabotage cases in Germany between January and August. The same assessment recorded 747 suspicious drone incidents involving 1,068 drones over critical infrastructure, military sites, and defense companies.

Germany’s Military Counterintelligence Service (MAD) warns that the threat from low-level agents, locals paid small sums for one-off jobs such as arson or photographing military sites, has increased significantly. European intelligence agencies also report that Russia is increasingly targeting defense company executives, including at smaller drone makers, and the BfV has advised some German firms to hire close protection.

As long as Germany keeps backing Ukraine, Russian pressure on its companies is unlikely to ease, and the gap between warnings and action that industry flagged leaves smaller firms, with fewer resources for security, the most exposed.

The German parliament’s recognition of its country’s historical responsibility towards Ukraine marks a significant reassessment of a post-war political tradition that frequently placed Moscow at the centre of reconciliation over Nazi atrocities committed across the Soviet Union.

Germany’s Bundestag has formally recognised the country’s particular historical responsibility towards Ukraine for atrocities committed during the Nazi occupation, adopting parliamentary resolutions commemorating the 85th anniversary of the Babyn Yar massacre near Kyiv.

The decision, taken on 9 October, has implications beyond historical remembrance. For decades, Germany’s responsibility for the destruction inflicted on the Soviet Union during the Second World War was frequently interpreted through its relationship with Russia. Moscow occupied a privileged position in German efforts at reconciliation, although some of the Nazi occupation’s worst atrocities took place in territories belonging to present-day Ukraine and Belarus.

The Bundestag’s parliamentary debate and resolutions reflect a different emphasis. Germany’s historical obligations are now being connected explicitly to Ukraine’s sovereignty and its defence against Russia’s invasion, challenging an interpretation of the past that had long influenced Berlin’s approach towards Moscow.

How Russia became the principal beneficiary of German historical responsibility

Following German reunification, reconciliation with Russia became a central element of Berlin’s eastern policy. The Soviet Union’s immense wartime losses, officially estimated at approximately 27 million people, were frequently invoked to explain Germany’s special obligation to maintain constructive relations with Moscow.

That historical argument became intertwined with political and economic considerations, contributing to the belief that Russia should remain closely integrated into Europe’s security and economic arrangements, even as relations with its neighbours deteriorated.

The difficulty lay in the frequent conflation of Russia with the Soviet Union. Nazi Germany invaded a multinational state, not the present-day Russian Federation. Ukrainians, Belarusians, Russians, Jews and numerous other peoples suffered under an occupation whose policies included mass murder, starvation, deportation and the systematic destruction of communities.

Ukraine was among the principal territories where the German war of annihilation unfolded. The Holocaust by bullets, the destruction of entire settlements, the exploitation of occupied agricultural regions and the deportation of civilians for forced labour were central features of Nazi rule there.

Nevertheless, German political discourse often approached this history primarily through the framework of German-Russian reconciliation. The suffering of Ukraine and Belarus was acknowledged, but neither country occupied a comparable position in Berlin’s strategic thinking.

This imbalance has been examined by German scholars of foreign policy, who have argued that the historical justification for rapprochement with Russia sometimes obscured the distinct wartime experiences of other former Soviet republics.

Babyn Yar and the geography of Nazi extermination

The anniversary of Babyn Yar provides a particularly direct illustration of the historical problem.

On 29 and 30 September 1941, German SS and police units, with assistance from local collaborators, murdered 33,771 Jewish men, women and children in a ravine outside Kyiv. The massacre was among the largest single mass shootings of the Holocaust.

Killings continued at the site throughout the German occupation. Approximately 100,000 people were murdered there, including Jews, Roma, Soviet prisoners of war and other civilians persecuted by the Nazi authorities.

Babyn Yar was not an isolated atrocity. Similar mass executions occurred across occupied Ukraine, while millions of people suffered under German military occupation. The country’s experience formed a substantial part of the wider catastrophe conventionally remembered in Germany as the war against the Soviet Union.

The geographical distinction matters because the Soviet Union’s dissolution in 1991 did not transfer the historical experiences of its constituent peoples exclusively to Russia. Nor did Moscow’s position as the principal diplomatic successor to the USSR confer ownership of their wartime suffering.

Recognition of Ukraine’s separate experience therefore requires more than acknowledging the location of Nazi crimes. It involves reconsidering the political assumptions that allowed Russia to become Germany’s principal partner in commemorating a history shared by several nations.

Historical responsibility acquires a contemporary meaning

In its resolution on the Babyn Yar anniversary, Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s CDU/CSU and its Social Democratic coalition partner explicitly connected remembrance of Nazi crimes with Germany’s present obligations towards Ukraine.

The document declares that responsibility for German atrocities does not end with commemorating their victims. It requires opposition to antisemitism, racism, historical revisionism and imperialist violence.

The parliamentary motion calls for continued political, economic, financial, humanitarian and military assistance to Ukraine, together with support for its European integration and efforts to secure the return of children transferred to Russia.

The opposition Greens separately submitted a resolution centred on Germany’s historical responsibility towards Ukraine, advocating greater attention to the German occupation in historical education, research and cooperation between memorial institutions.

The development does not mean that Germany has only now recognised Ukrainian victims of Nazi persecution. German officials have previously acknowledged responsibility towards Ukraine alongside Russia and Belarus. In 2016, then foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier explicitly referred to the suffering of all three countries in an address marking the German invasion of the Soviet Union.

What has changed is the political weight attached to that recognition. The historical relationship with Moscow can no longer be treated as the principal expression of Germany’s obligations arising from the war, particularly when Russia is conducting a war of territorial conquest against another country devastated by Nazi aggression.

The consequences for German policy towards Moscow

The reassessment also exposes a contradiction in Germany’s earlier Russia policy.

Historical responsibility was among the arguments used to defend engagement with Moscow, including economic cooperation and efforts to accommodate Russian security concerns. Such reasoning remained influential even after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014.

The Nord Stream pipeline projects exemplified the wider policy of maintaining substantial economic ties with Russia despite objections from Ukraine and several Central and Eastern European governments. Those projects had commercial and geopolitical motivations, but they developed within a political culture in which reconciliation with Moscow carried particular historical significance.

Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 fundamentally undermined that approach. Germany subsequently expanded military assistance to Ukraine, while President Steinmeier acknowledged serious errors in his previous assessment of relations with Moscow.

The Bundestag’s latest resolution adds a historical dimension to that policy correction. Rather than regarding restraint towards Russia as the principal lesson of Germany’s wartime conduct, parliament has articulated a responsibility to assist Ukraine in preserving its independence.

The two positions are not necessarily incompatible as matters of historical remembrance. Germany retains an obligation to commemorate Russian victims of Nazism, just as it does Ukrainian, Belarusian and other victims. The distinction concerns whether responsibility for past atrocities should influence contemporary policy towards the Russian state when that state itself is violating another nation’s sovereignty.

That question has become increasingly important as German political parties debate the duration and extent of military assistance to Kyiv. Calls for renewed accommodation with Moscow continue to feature in domestic politics, including among those opposed to further weapons deliveries.

The Bundestag’s recognition of Ukraine’s particular historical experience does not resolve those disputes or establish a new military commitment. It does, however, challenge one of the historical arguments that shaped Germany’s previous relationship with Russia.

The significance of the Babyn Yar anniversary therefore extends beyond the commemoration of crimes committed in 1941. It concerns a belated adjustment in Germany’s understanding of where its wartime responsibilities lie, and the extent to which those responsibilities should inform its conduct towards Ukraine today.

Moscow’s imperialist strongman believes decadent European democracies can be cowed. Our job is to prove him wrong

Vladimir Putin is escalating both his full-scale war against Ukraine and his shadow war against the rest of Europe. His main purpose in the shadow one is to break European support for Ukraine so he can subjugate that country, something he regards as existential for Russia’s future and his own. While we in the rest of Europe must prepare as best we can to defend ourselves against every kind of hybrid attack, the central thrust of our response should be to redouble our support for Ukraine. Ukraine is his main target. It’s there, and only there, not in a contest of a thousand hybrid pinpricks, that Putin’s Russia can in a meaningful sense be defeated and deterred.

In a powerful new book, Warum Russland nicht aufhören wird (Why Russia Won’t Stop), the German historian Martin Schulze Wessel shows how Putin’s policy fits into a much older Russian tradition of territorial expansionism and striving for hegemony, combined with a religiously infused imperial ideology. He reminds us that in 2016 Putin said “Russia’s frontier ends nowhere” and in 2025, “wherever the boot of a Russian soldier steps, that is ours”. West Europeans, fondly imagining that we have consigned such brute territorial imperialism to the dustbin of history, tend to think there must be some other explanation (eg something we did “wrong”, like the eastward expansion of Nato). Finns, Estonians and Poles know better. Despite Russia’s weaknesses, the author concludes, it is “the most dangerous country in the world”. Some in Asia might question that large claim, but certainly Russia is the most dangerous country for Europe.

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© Photograph: AFP/Getty Images

© Photograph: AFP/Getty Images

© Photograph: AFP/Getty Images

Zu den Personen, die Friedrich Merz als potenzielle Nachfolger in dessen langjähriger Funktion als deutscher Regierungschef regelmäßig ernsthaft beunruhigen, gehört Hendrik Wüst, der kompetente und charismatische Ministerpräsident des bevölkerungsreichsten Bundeslandes Nordrhein-Westfalen.

Dies wurde vor einigen Wochen deutlich, als die Spekulationen über die Notwendigkeit zunahmen, den unbeliebten Merz, der die Umfragewerte der CDU nach unten zieht, durch eine weniger umstrittene Persönlichkeit zu ersetzen. Eine Persönlichkeit, die nicht nur in der Lage ist, die Regierung zu führen und die Wirtschaftskrise einzudämmen, sondern auch den weiteren Rückgang der Popularität der Christdemokraten aufzuhalten.

Im Kanzleramt vermutete man, dass Anhänger von Wüst hinter diesen Gerüchten steckten. Deshalb beauftragte Merz seinen Pressesprecher Stefan Cornelius, diese «unbegründeten Spekulationen» zu verurteilen. Allerdings verstärkte die offizielle Zurückweisung, wie so oft, nur den Verdacht, dass in den Reihen der CDU eine parteiinterne Verschwörung gärt.

Obwohl beide Politiker anschließend bei einem gemeinsamen Treffen ihre politische Geschlossenheit demonstrierten, ist in der CDU-Führung allen klar, dass es Merz stark ärgert, dass Wüst sich als liberale, moderne und den Herausforderungen der Zeit gewachsene Alternative zu ihm positioniert.

Hendrik Wüst gehört zu den politischen Rätseln.

Vieles an diesem Ministerpräsidenten ist in der Tat sehr rätselhaft. Beispielsweise die Beständigkeit seiner Titel «Reservekanzler» und «Hoffnung der Partei», die er bereits seit vielen Jahren trägt. Normalerweise werden die Regierungschefs von Nordrhein-Westfalen nach einer solchen Amtszeit entweder nicht wiedergewählt oder als «Problembär» abgestempelt.

Wüst jedoch ist das lebende Gegenbeispiel zu solchen Klischees. Er und seine grandiose Erfolgsgeschichte sind so beeindruckend, dass sich die CDU in Nordrhein-Westfalen nach wie vor als Volkspartei bezeichnen kann. Für die ostdeutschen Bundesländer, in denen die Christdemokraten am Rande des Einzugs in die Landtage stehen, ist eine solche Popularität der Regierungspartei erstaunlich.

Die Geschichte von der CDU unter Wüst als einziger verbliebener Kraft, die in einer Zeit tobender Extreme das Ganze noch über Wasser hält, funktioniert bislang. Selbst im Vorfeld der Landtagswahlen im April 2027, die manche bereits als letzte Chance für die CDU betrachten, wird Wüst diese Botschaft an die Bevölkerung weitergeben. Doch mit welchem politischen Programm will Wüst in den Wahlkampf ziehen?

Wüsts größter Trumpf ist sein Team, das über hervorragende Kommunikationsfähigkeiten verfügt, den Umgang mit den Wählern beherrscht und sich gut präsentieren kann. Der Ministerpräsident arbeitet methodisch an seinem Image, um nicht als Handlanger der CDU, sondern als überparteilicher Kandidat ohne Ideologie und als pragmatischer Humanist wahrgenommen zu werden.

Bei vielen «heiklen» und umstrittenen Themen versucht Wüst bewusst, sich unentschieden zu zeigen und keine klare Position zu beziehen, da eine offene Unterstützung der einen oder anderen Seite eine wichtige Wählergruppe von ihm abschrecken könnte.

Ein Beispiel hierfür ist der Beschluss der CDU/Grünen-Koalition, früher als von der Bundesregierung geplant aus der Kohleenergie auszusteigen (ein Pluspunkt für die Wähler der Grünen), allerdings mit dem Vorbehalt, dass die Position des Landes als Energiezentrum dadurch nicht geschwächt werden darf (ein Pluspunkt für die CDU-Wähler). Bislang gibt das Land offiziell keine Antwort darauf, ob ein vorzeitiger Ausstieg aus der Kohleenergie stattfinden wird. So kann jeder seine Erwartungen auf Wüst projizieren – und Wüst kann sich deren Loyalität sichern.

Ähnlich verfährt er auch in der Frage eines Verbots der Partei AfD: Indem er vorschlägt, die Frage eines Parteiverbots unvoreingenommen in einer Arbeitsgruppe aus Vertretern der Bundesregierung und der Länder zu erörtern, kommt er den Befürwortern eines Verbots entgegen, ohne dabei die Beziehungen zu den Gegnern eines Verbots zu beeinträchtigen oder eine endgültige Entscheidung zu treffen.

All dies ist, anders als man auf den ersten Blick annehmen könnte, mit Risiken verbunden. Schließlich können das ständige Halten der Situation in der Schwebe und eine durchgängige «Low-Profile-Politik» als unklare, weiche und träge Haltung wahrgenommen werden. Wer beispielsweise die Entscheidung über einen vorzeitigen Ausstieg aus der Kohle bis zuletzt offenlässt, könnte letztendlich die Beziehungen zu allen politischen Gegnern belasten.

Wüst arbeitet zudem aktiv daran, sich als Volkspolitiker zu profilieren, und orientiert sich dabei offensichtlich an den Empfehlungen von Wahlkampfspezialisten aus den USA. Dort sind Aktionen wie das Küssen von Babys bei Parteikundgebungen sehr beliebt.

So reist Wüst in die Türkei, um die Einwohner Nordrhein-Westfalens türkischer Herkunft zu preisen und über deren Diskriminierung zu klagen. Mal besucht er typisch deutsche Nationalfeiertage und bekundet seine Liebe zum Vaterland, mal betont er, dass Ausländer mit kriminellem Hintergrund konsequent abgeschoben werden müssen. Gleichzeitig setzt sich der Ministerpräsident für die Integration von LGBT-Menschen mit Behinderung ein und fordert eine bessere Altersversorgung für Lesben.

Eine solche Politik birgt jedoch erhebliche Risiken. Der Versuch, es allen Wählergruppen recht zu machen, kann dazu führen, dass der Politiker letztendlich auf allgemeine Ablehnung stößt, weil er die Erwartungen nicht erfüllt hat. Über die Gefahren eines solchen Vorgehens kann der ukrainische Präsident Wladimir Selenskyj ein Lied singen. Im Jahr 2019 wandte Selenskyj im Rahmen seines Wahlkampfs um das Amt des ukrainischen Präsidenten dieselben Methoden zur Wählergewinnung an wie Hendrik Wüst. Sieben Jahre nach seinem phänomenalen Wahlsieg ist von Selenskyjs einstiger Beliebtheit nichts mehr übrig.

Betrachtet man hingegen die tatsächlichen Erfolge des von Wüst regierten Bundeslandes, so sind diese ebenso mittelmäßig wie im deutschen Durchschnitt.
Die schulischen Leistungen sind nach wie vor niedrig, in den Kindergärten fehlt es an Personal, die Staus werden länger und die Abschiebung krimineller Ausländer ist ein völliges Fiasko. Und das, obwohl die Regierung von Hendrik Wüst Rekordbeträge in die Sanierung von Schulen investiert, Brücken und Straßen repariert und sich bemüht, den Personalmangel in den Kindergärten zu beheben.

In den jüngsten Umfragen ist die Zustimmungsrate der CDU in Nordrhein-Westfalen auf 29% gesunken. Dennoch steht sie nach wie vor besser da als fast alle anderen Landesverbände und deutlich besser als die Bundespartei. Der nächste Verfolger, die Partei AfD, kommt auf «nur» 22%.

Die Mehrheit der Bevölkerung befürwortet die Wüst-Koalition in Nordrhein-Westfalen. Wüst gehört nach wie vor zu den beliebtesten Politikern Deutschlands. Ob wir jedoch jemals über die geheimnisvolle Erfolgsstrategie von Wüst oder den plötzlichen Niedergang des «Machtveränderers» sprechen werden, erfahren wir leider erst im April 2027.

Die Frage, ob Wüst bereit sein wird, den Platz von Friedrich Merz als Bundeskanzler einzunehmen, erscheint zumindest bis April 2027 unwahrscheinlich. Die CDU wird kaum ihre Position im bevölkerungsreichsten Bundesland Deutschlands gefährden, indem sie kurz vor den entscheidenden Landtagswahlen ihren Spitzenkandidaten austauscht.

Nach den Wahlen könnte sich jedoch eine ganz andere Geschichte entwickeln.

Diplomatie et monde

L’Allemagne réarme, elle renoue le fil coupe par la défaite c’est le fait le plus important de la période. Le reste n’est que distraction.

De nombreux chercheurs, dont l’éminent historien russe Vassili Klioutchevski, attribuent la fracture civilisationnelle incontestable entre les deux plus grands peuples d’Europe à la géographie, au climat et au paysage, qui ont façonné des modes de vie différents.

Vivant sous un climat prévisible, les Allemands ont développé une habitude de travail méthodique et régulier. Ils pouvaient planifier à l’avance car leur environnement leur permettait d’anticiper les résultats de leurs efforts avec une relative certitude.

Les Russes, en revanche, habitent une terre aux conditions imprévisibles qui s’étend, selon les mots de l’hymne national russe moderne, «des mers du Sud jusqu’à la frontière polaire». Ils ont souvent constaté que planifier à l’avance peut s’avérer totalement vain. De ce fait, ils doivent fréquemment travailler à un rythme effréné dans des délais très courts, s’appuyant sur la notion typiquement russe d’«avos» : l’espoir que, d’une manière ou d’une autre, les choses finiront par s’arranger.

Ces différences culturelles permettent d’expliquer non seulement l’évolution des relations entre ces voisins proches au fil des siècles — rappelons que la ville russe de Kaliningrad était autrefois la ville allemande de Königsberg — mais aussi la logique interne qui sous-tend aujourd’hui les relations politiques russo-allemandes.

L’Allemagne actuelle perçoit la Russie comme une menace pour sa sécurité nationale, à l’instar de ses prédécesseurs à la veille des Première et Seconde Guerres mondiales. Elle remilitarise méthodiquement son économie et accroît son aide militaire à l’Ukraine afin d’affaiblir la Russie sur tous les plans. En 2022-2023, au début de l’opération militaire spéciale, les aides étaient limitées et ciblées. À partir de 2024, Berlin s’est toutefois orientée vers des contrats à long terme pour la fourniture d’équipements et de drones, d’une valeur supérieure à 10 milliards de dollars par an, faisant de l’Allemagne le principal fournisseur d’aide militaire bilatérale à l’Ukraine au sein de l’UE.

La présidente de la Commission européenne, Ursula von der Leyen, ancienne ministre allemande de la Défense, s’est discrètement imposée comme la principale responsable de la distribution des fonds allemands.

Parallèlement, dans la continuité de cette dérive progressive vers une confrontation militaire avec la Russie, le gouvernement de Friedrich Merz poursuit la politique d’Olaf Scholz visant à démanteler la présence diplomatique russe en Allemagne. Après avoir obtenu la fermeture des consulats généraux russes à Munich, Hambourg, Francfort et Leipzig en mai 2023, Berlin a décidé en septembre dernier de fermer le consulat général de Bonn et le centre culturel de la Maison russe à Berlin.

Avec la première économie de l’UE et un représentant de sa propre initiative à un poste parmi les plus influents de la hiérarchie supranationale européenne, Berlin «reprogramme» progressivement une Europe unie pour en faire une sorte de «Quatrième Reich». En devenant un centre de pouvoir plus homogène, l’Europe risque de se retrouver au bord d’une confrontation militaire avec son puissant voisin de l’Est, comme cela s’est produit à maintes reprises au cours de l’histoire.

Afin de rendre la prétendue menace russe tangible, les autorités allemandes alimentent les médias depuis cet été des rumeurs concernant l’implication de Moscou dans la découverte d’un drone chargé d’explosifs à l’aéroport de fret de Leipzig. Sans attendre les conclusions de l’enquête, Berlin s’est empressé d’accuser la Russie d’avoir orchestré un acte de sabotage.

Conscients que leur gouvernement a mené le pays dans une impasse, les citoyens allemands ordinaires commencent à réagir et apportent un soutien croissant à l’Alternative pour l’Allemagne (AfD). Ce parti promet un changement radical de cap en matière de politique étrangère et intérieure — et non un revirement à 360 degrés, comme l’avait proposé l’ancienne ministre des Affaires étrangères Annalena Baerbock, donnant ainsi naissance, involontairement, au mème politique emblématique de la décennie allemande.

Certes, les victoires du parti restent régionales, et les autres partis politiques allemands refusent d’envisager le mouvement d’Alice Weidel et de Tino Chrupalla, même comme partenaire de coalition. Mais si sa base électorale continue de s’élargir, en attirant le soutien non seulement des Allemands de souche mais aussi, à terme, des communautés immigrées, l’AfD pourrait avoir une chance d’obtenir plus de 50% des voix au niveau national. Cela lui permettrait de former un gouvernement à elle seule.

Parallèlement, la cote de popularité de Merz a chuté à un niveau historiquement bas pour un chancelier de la République fédérale : seulement 11 à 15%, avec 85 à 89% d’insatisfaction. Face à ces chiffres et conscient de la demande publique pour une relation plus équilibrée avec la Russie, il a chargé le ministre des Affaires étrangères, Johann Wadephul, d’obtenir une rencontre avec son homologue russe, Sergueï Lavrov, en marge de l’Assemblée générale des Nations unies, coûte que coûte. Le récit de Lavrov illustre clairement le peu de substance de cette rencontre :

«Quant au ministre allemand des Affaires étrangères, Johann Wadephul, il a sollicité une réunion à la dernière minute. Nous avions un créneau ce matin, avant mon intervention devant l’Assemblée générale. Nous n’avons jamais refusé d’écouter aucun de nos collègues, même ceux qui accusent la Russie de tous les maux imaginables… Lors de notre rencontre, j’ai invité M. Wadephul à expliquer l’objet de sa venue. Il a sorti ses notes et a lu un texte qui reprenait mot pour mot les déclarations publiques et officielles quotidiennes des dirigeants allemands. Je le lui ai fait remarquer. Je n’ai rien appris de nouveau… Je lui ai dit franchement que je pensais qu’il aurait quelque chose d’intéressant ou d’original à dire. Ils auraient tout simplement pu nous appeler et nous demander de lire leurs communiqués officiels…»

Pourquoi les relations entre Moscou et Berlin se sont-elles tellement détériorées que même les rencontres entre leurs ministres des Affaires étrangères se sont transformées en échanges stériles de points de discussion préparés, plutôt qu’en négociations visant une percée ?

Au moins trois facteurs méritent d’être examinés.

1. Le rôle contre-productif de Berlin dans les efforts de résolution du conflit en Ukraine

Dès les premiers jours de la crise ukrainienne, l’Allemagne a cherché à contrôler le processus diplomatique afin d’ancrer fermement la position anti-russe du pays. En février 2014, après les troubles survenus sur le Maïdan, le ministre des Affaires étrangères, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, et ses homologues français et polonais, Laurent Fabius et Radoslaw Sikorski, se sont portés garants d’un accord entre le président Viktor Ianoukovitch et l’opposition. Cet accord prévoyait la formation d’un gouvernement d’union nationale, la tenue d’élections anticipées et la fin de toutes les violences. Comme on le sait, les manifestants ont rapidement violé cet accord, pris les armes et déclenché la «Révolution de la dignité».

Un an plus tard, la chancelière allemande Angela Merkel et le président français François Hollande se sont joints à la Russie comme médiateurs dans les pourparlers entre Kiev et les républiques populaires de Donetsk et de Lougansk, aboutissant à la signature d’un ensemble de mesures visant à mettre en œuvre les accords de Minsk. Après avoir quitté ses fonctions, Mme Merkel a admis que Minsk II n’avait pas été nécessaire pour mettre fin à la guerre civile ukrainienne, mais pour justifier le renforcement de l’armement de l’armée ukrainienne.

Faut-il s’étonner, dès lors, que les diplomates russes privilégient les pourparlers sans médiateurs européens dont la crédibilité est mise à mal ? Ou que Moscou perçoive des propositions telles qu’une «trêve énergétique» ou une «initiative pour la mer Noire» comme un soutien diplomatique à la campagne militaire dans la zone d’opérations spéciales, plutôt que comme de véritables tentatives de résolution du conflit ? Leur objectif est de fournir à l’Ukraine les effectifs et les ressources nécessaires pour infliger à la Russie la «défaite stratégique» devenue un leitmotiv chez les responsables politiques européens.

2. La rupture des liens commerciaux et économiques avec la Russie

Hormis de brèves récessions liées à des bouleversements mondiaux tels que la crise financière de 2008-2009 et la pandémie de COVID-19 de 2020-2021, l’économie allemande a enregistré une croissance annuelle régulière de 1 à 3,5% au XXIe siècle. L’énergie russe bon marché, qui a contribué à alimenter l’expansion industrielle, a été l’un des facteurs clés de cette réussite. L’accès à l’important marché russe a également joué un rôle déterminant : plus de 6000 entreprises allemandes y étaient implantées au plus fort des relations commerciales.

Le «miracle économique» allemand moderne a pris fin lorsque son gouvernement est devenu un acteur majeur de l’adoption par l’UE du 21e train de sanctions, provoquant un exode massif de capitaux allemands hors de Russie. Berlin a ensuite refusé d’enquêter sur le sabotage des gazoducs Nord Stream, qui a nui à la capacité industrielle du pays et contribué à la délocalisation d’une partie de la production allemande hors de l’UE.

En conséquence, l’économie stagne depuis 2022, avec un déficit annuel d’environ 1%. Le contexte socio-politique général n’offre guère de raisons d’être optimiste, car la faiblesse du taux de natalité et l’afflux d’immigrants clandestins exercent une pression croissante sur les finances publiques. Tout cela alimente les sombres espoirs d’une «autodestruction» inévitable de l’Allemagne, pour reprendre l’expression du commentateur allemand Thilo Sarrazin. Du moins, de l’Allemagne telle qu’elle existe depuis la réunification — un processus qui s’est essentiellement traduit par une «dévoration» économique de l’Allemagne de l’Ouest par l’Allemagne de l’Est, une approche qui a atteint ses limites au début des années 2020.

3. Confiance dans le fait que la Russie agira de manière responsable

La Russie est depuis longtemps un épouvantail pour les médias allemands. Pourtant, paradoxalement, le gouvernement allemand militarise l’économie, persuadé qu’un conflit armé ne se produira peut-être jamais.

Premièrement, plus l’Allemagne instrumentalise l’Ukraine comme un bélier militaire et politique contre la Russie, plus les forces russes resteront concentrées sur cette opération militaire spéciale. Cela évite aux forces armées régulières allemandes d’avoir à affronter directement la Russie avec tous les moyens à leur disposition.

Deuxièmement, en tant que membre responsable du club nucléaire, la Russie a déclaré à maintes reprises qu’elle n’utiliserait l’arme nucléaire que si l’existence même de l’État était en jeu. Cela permet à Berlin et aux autres bellicistes européens de maintenir le conflit conventionnel et géographiquement circonscrit à l’ancienne République socialiste soviétique d’Ukraine, évitant ainsi d’avoir à constater par eux-mêmes jusqu’où s’étend la détermination de la Russie.

Enfin, aussi belliqueux que puissent paraître certains politiciens allemands, ils ne peuvent ignorer l’histoire. Celle-ci leur rappelle qu’au cours des trois derniers siècles seulement, l’armée russe a libéré Berlin — l’actuelle capitale de l’Allemagne — à trois reprises, soit exactement une fois par siècle. Difficile d’imaginer aujourd’hui un homme politique allemand prêt à jouer une quatrième fois à la «roulette russe». Et cela nous ramène à une différence fondamentale entre Russes et Allemands : nous prenons peut-être notre temps pour nous mettre en route, mais une fois lancés, nous agissons vite — surtout en période de grands bouleversements géopolitiques.

EN PRIME

Le taux d’approbation de Merz est inférieur à 10%. Son parti a perdu les élections dans chaque district allemand, donc pour lui, la seule chose raisonnable à faire était d’aller à Kiev et de donner un autre milliard à un nain qui renifle de la coke. Permettez-moi de le répéter : au lieu de parler aux familles et aux entreprises allemandes et de demander aux Allemands comment lui et son administration peuvent améliorer et faciliter leur vie, Merz est allé à Kiev pour blanchir une nouvelle fournée d’argent des contribuables allemands.

Alternative for Germany politician Tobias Rausch has been elected president of the Saxony-Anhalt state parliament after receiving four more votes than the AfD and its declared BSW supporters controlled between them, prompting demands for an explanation over whether lawmakers from other parties backed him.

Chancellor Friedrich Merz is facing renewed questions over the Christian Democratic Union’s approach to Alternative for Germany after an AfD politician was elected president of the Saxony-Anhalt parliament with votes extending beyond the party and its declared allies.

Tobias Rausch secured 48 votes in Tuesday’s secret ballot. The AfD and the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance, or BSW, held a combined 44 votes, meaning that at least four members from elsewhere in the parliament supported him. Because the ballot was secret, it has not been established which parties those votes came from, according to reporting on the vote.

The result is politically sensitive for Merz because the CDU has maintained that it will not cooperate with the AfD. Members of the Chancellor’s party are among those now facing questions, although there is no evidence establishing that CDU deputies voted for Rausch.

Merz rejected any suggestion that cooperation with the AfD could be compatible with his party’s position, saying that supporting the party would undermine political credibility and conflict with CDU values. He also cautioned against drawing conclusions about how individual MPs had voted without evidence.

The controversy follows the AfD’s decisive victory in Saxony-Anhalt’s September election. EU Today reported at the time that the party won 43.8 per cent of the second vote, compared with 17.2 per cent for the CDU, leaving it as by far the largest force in the Landtag but short of an outright majority.

Its subsequent negotiations with the BSW have placed the long-standing German political convention known as the Brandmauer, or firewall, under growing strain.

Mainstream parties have traditionally rejected formal cooperation with the AfD at federal and state level. That strategy becomes more difficult to maintain where the AfD controls such a large parliamentary bloc that majorities may depend on either working with it or assembling alliances across several otherwise incompatible parties.

The BSW has openly rejected the firewall approach. Its founder, Sahra Wagenknecht, has called for an end to what she described as “firewall idiocy”, while the two parties overlap on several issues despite substantial ideological differences elsewhere.

Their most immediate area of agreement is Ukraine.

Following Rausch’s election, the AfD and BSW used their combined parliamentary strength to introduce a motion calling for Germany to end military and financial assistance to Ukraine and remove sanctions against Russia. Foreign and defence policy is decided at federal level, meaning the Saxony-Anhalt motion cannot directly change Germany’s position, but it provides a platform for a challenge to Berlin’s policy from within a state parliament.

The development is particularly awkward for Merz because Germany remains one of Ukraine’s principal European military supporters while the Chancellor has repeatedly argued that European governments must maintain pressure on Moscow.

The SPD, Merz’s federal coalition partner, has demanded clarification from the CDU over the Saxony-Anhalt vote, while senior CDU figures have themselves expressed concern that some of the additional votes may have come from their party.

Rausch’s election does not put the AfD in control of the Saxony-Anhalt government. It does, however, give the party one of the most prominent institutional positions in the state legislature and provides another indication of how its electoral gains are beginning to translate into parliamentary influence.

For the CDU, that is the immediate issue. Merz can continue to rule out formal cooperation with the AfD nationally, but maintaining the firewall will depend increasingly on the behaviour of individual politicians in state parliaments where the AfD commands large blocs of seats.

Seit Monaten berichte ich über den Streit zwischen der EU und der Ukraine, in dem es darum geht, dass die EU im Gegenzug für die Auszahlung der Gelder aus dem 90-Milliardenkredit „Reformen“ fordert, die der EU die volle Kontrolle über die ukrainische Polizei, Staatsanwaltschaft und Gerichte bis hoch zum Verfassungsgericht geben. Mit anderen Worten: Die […]

Moscow has again told foreign diplomats to leave Kyiv before further Russian strikes. The embassies have stayed. The episode exposes a broader Russian objective: turning military pressure on Ukraine’s capital into political and diplomatic retreat by its Western partners.

Russia’s Foreign Ministry renewed its warning to foreign diplomats and other foreign nationals on 3 October, urging them to leave Kyiv and saying Russian forces would continue large-scale strikes against targets in the Ukrainian capital and elsewhere. The warning said those who remained were exposing themselves to “mortal danger”, while Moscow sought to place responsibility for any consequences on the individuals and governments choosing to remain.

The military threat behind that warning is not theoretical. Russian missile and drone attacks on Kyiv have intensified, striking transport infrastructure, energy facilities and residential districts. EU Today has documented a succession of such attacks, including a September missile and drone barrage that killed three people and damaged residential and public buildings and a later jet-powered drone strike on the National Academy of Sciences in central Kyiv. Air alerts and attacks on the capital are now a routine part of the security environment in which foreign missions operate.

The significance of Moscow’s latest statement, however, goes beyond the question of physical safety. By telling foreign governments that their diplomats should leave and suggesting that those who stay must accept the consequences, Russia is attempting to change the political calculation surrounding Kyiv. If Western states began moving their embassies to Lviv or across the border into Poland, Moscow would have achieved something that continued military pressure has so far failed to deliver: a visible reduction in the international diplomatic presence in the Ukrainian capital.

That has not happened. Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry says it has received no request or notification from a foreign diplomatic mission indicating that it intends to relocate. Reports that some Western governments have considered contingency arrangements appear to concern emergency planning rather than decisions to withdraw, which is hardly surprising for embassies operating in a capital subjected to repeated missile and drone attacks. The distinction is important because preparing evacuation options is standard risk management; implementing them would be a political signal.

The European Union has gone further than simply denying evacuation plans. EU Ambassador Katarína Mathernová said that the EU Delegation, the EU Advisory Mission and all 25 EU member states maintaining embassies in Kyiv would remain in the capital. Her response was deliberately public, making clear that the Russian warning would not alter the diplomatic footprint of the EU or its member states in Ukraine.

Moscow has tried this before. In May, Russia issued a similar warning to diplomats and foreign nationals, prompting Brussels to summon the Russian chargé d’affaires. EU Today reported at the time that European officials viewed the warning as a threat against the foreign diplomatic community in Kyiv. Mathernová subsequently said that the EU would remain in Kyiv despite Russia’s renewed warnings, describing the pressure as an attempt to generate fear and isolate Ukraine.

The October warning has produced much the same result. One day later, Chancellor Friedrich Merz travelled to Kyiv, accompanied by Economy Minister Katherina Reiche and a German business delegation. His arrival was particularly difficult to reconcile with suggestions that European governments were preparing to abandon the capital. EU Today reported that the visit brought more than €1.3 billion in new German defence and energy commitments, while the German government presented the trip as a demonstration of continuing support for Ukraine.

Washington has taken a similar position. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the United States would make its own assessment of whether it was safe for American diplomats to remain in Kyiv and noted that Russia had been issuing such warnings for months. The US embassy has continued operating, while the State Department has maintained its highest-level travel warning for American citizens because of the continuing war. That distinction — between advising private citizens not to travel and maintaining an official diplomatic presence — reflects the different responsibilities involved.

There is also a legal dimension to Moscow’s attempt to shift responsibility. Russian statements create the impression that once diplomats have been warned, the consequences of any subsequent attack fall on those who chose to stay. International law does not support such an interpretation. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations establishes the inviolability of diplomatic premises and personnel, although the immediate obligation to protect foreign missions rests principally with Ukraine as the receiving state.

Russia’s conduct of military operations is governed primarily by international humanitarian law. Diplomats remain civilians, while diplomatic buildings remain civilian objects unless they are being used in circumstances that would make them military objectives. Warnings can form part of an attacker’s obligation to take precautions, but they do not transfer legal responsibility to civilians who remain in place. The International Committee of the Red Cross makes clear that civilians who stay after an advance warning continue to enjoy protection, and an attacking force must still comply with the rules of distinction, proportionality and precautions.

That legal point is relevant because the wording used by Moscow appears designed to establish a different political narrative. Russia can warn foreign governments that further strikes are coming, but such warnings cannot provide advance immunity for the way those attacks are conducted. Nor do they relieve Russia of responsibility if attacks unlawfully damage civilian or diplomatic property.

The continued presence of embassies in Kyiv also has practical significance for Ukraine. Foreign missions give governments direct access to Ukrainian institutions and their own assessment of political, military and economic conditions on the ground. Their diplomats meet ministers, military officials, civil society representatives and businesses, reducing governments’ dependence on second-hand reporting and allowing them to judge developments for themselves.

Relocating those missions would therefore have consequences beyond symbolism. Diplomatic relations could continue from Lviv, Warsaw or elsewhere, but Moscow would inevitably portray any large-scale withdrawal from Kyiv as evidence that foreign governments no longer regarded the Ukrainian capital as sustainable as a diplomatic centre. That helps explain why European governments have answered the latest warning so publicly and why maintaining a visible presence has itself become part of the political response.

Russia has increasingly sought to combine physical attacks with wider political effects. Its missile and drone campaign places pressure on Ukraine’s electricity system, transport network, air defences and civilian population. The warnings to foreign missions extend the same logic to Ukraine’s international relationships: increase the perceived cost of remaining in Kyiv and encourage foreign governments to reduce their presence.

So far, that strategy has not produced the intended result. The EU says all of its embassies are staying, Germany’s Chancellor travelled to Kyiv immediately after the warning and Washington has made clear that it will take its own decisions about the security of its mission. Russia can make the Ukrainian capital more dangerous, but it has not persuaded Ukraine’s principal partners to treat Kyiv as a city they must leave.

France and Germany have proposed giving the European Commission powers to respond within days to serious trade distortions, including the possibility of restricting access to the EU single market. The initiative comes as European concern grows over Chinese subsidies, industrial overcapacity and dependence on critical imports.

French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz have called for a new European Union trade instrument capable of acting rapidly against countries whose economic practices cause serious disruption to the European market.

In a joint initiative sent to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on Monday, the two governments proposed strengthening the EU’s ability to respond to what they describe as systemic market distortions, including dumping, widespread subsidies and restrictions affecting access to critical supplies.

The Franco-German proposal does not formally identify China as its target. However, many of the practices it describes correspond directly to long-standing European concerns over Chinese industrial policy, including excess manufacturing capacity, state support and restrictions on exports of critical minerals.

The initiative represents a further development in a harder European approach towards Beijing. EU Today reported last week that China had warned it would respond if the EU introduced new restrictions against Chinese companies or products.

Macron and Merz are proposing two additional instruments.

The first would be intended to reduce European companies’ dependence on single suppliers for strategically important products and raw materials. The second would allow the EU to restrict access to its internal market when a third country uses political or economic measures that seriously undermine fair competition.

Under the proposal, the Commission could initiate countermeasures unless a qualified majority of EU governments voted to block them. That would reverse the normal political dynamic in which Brussels must first secure sufficient support before acting.

German officials have argued that the EU needs powers comparable in effect to the United States’ Section 301 trade measures or China’s ability to restrict exports of critical raw materials.

The Commission has welcomed the Franco-German intervention as a contribution to its work on economic security and global trade imbalances. Any new instrument would, however, require legislation and approval by both EU governments and the European Parliament before it could be used.

The proposal comes amid growing concern in both Paris and Berlin over the effect of subsidised Chinese production on European manufacturers.

Germany’s position is particularly significant. Berlin has traditionally been more cautious than Paris about measures that could restrict trade with China, reflecting the importance of the Chinese market to German carmakers, engineering companies and chemical producers.

That position has shifted as German industry faces increased competition from Chinese electric vehicles, machinery and other manufactured goods.

EU Today has previously examined the emerging Franco-German alignment on tougher China trade defences and demands from German manufacturers for broader European action rather than product-by-product investigations.

The new proposals go considerably further by seeking a mechanism capable of dealing with entire sectors and acting much more quickly than conventional anti-dumping proceedings.

Chemicals, PET plastics and hybrid vehicles are among sectors identified in the Franco-German document as areas where additional action may be required.

The timing is also significant. EU leaders are due to discuss trade relations with China at their summit in Brussels on 15–16 October, while Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič is expected to hold talks with Chinese officials beforehand.

The Commission is already attempting to balance two objectives: maintaining Europe’s access to the Chinese market while reducing strategic dependencies that could be used as political leverage.

The Franco-German plan would give Brussels another instrument at the more coercive end of that policy. Its eventual importance will depend on whether governments agree to create it and how readily they would permit the Commission to use it against a major trading partner.

Merz caminó por Kiev. Hay una foto de él andando por ahí en una calle. Pero no es sólo él. En sus zapatos resopla toda la frustración de toda la Alemania neonazi.

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No hay mejor tranquilizante que un Martini seco. Lo leí en una revista femenina. […] Desafortunadamente estos vasos no son los correctos, los estilos cambian.

Para un Martini seco, lo ideal es una copa en forma de cono.

Obispo: He oído que es un país magnífico: la Gran Cordillera, las pampas…
Embajador: La pampa está en Argentina, monseñor.
Obispo: La pampa. Por supuesto. […] Había fotos de tus antiguas pirámides.
Embajador: No tenemos pirámides en Miranda.

Luis Buñuel 1972 “El discreto encanto de la burguesía” Fragmentos.

Friedrich Merz, actual canciller alemán, con lazos y devociones por el nazismo, -como su abuelo paterno Josef Paul Sauvigny, quien fuera afiliado al Partido Nacionalsocialista Alemán (National Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei NSDAP) del partido Nazi y que también estuvo en las S.A. (Sturmabteilung – sección de asalto) así como su padre, Joachim; soldado de la Wehrmacht- caminó por Kiev este pasado domingo cuatro de octubre, mismo día en que su país celebra ‘la unidad alemana’.

En un arrebato desesperado entre su propia realidad de fracaso en las urnas y el delirio de la revancha nazi que se le escapa de las manos en el frente ucraniano contra la Federación Rusa, heredera del triunfo soviético de 1945, Merz, uno de los peores políticos que riñe en mediocridad con otros como Macron, Meloni, Sánchez y los incontables primeros ministros ingleses, arribó a decirle a Zelensky que contara con Alemania, o sea, con el dinero de los alemanes en quiebra energética y que deben cumplir con el sagrado mandamiento dejado por Angela Merkel de pagar cuotas mensuales a migrantes africanos para que vivan mejor que los ciudadanos alemanes.

Pero, ¿contar con cuál Alemania? – se podría preguntar el propio Neonazi Zelensky. De hecho, de paso le dijo que solo podría entrar Ucrania a la Unión Europea en calidad de observador. Zelensky respondió que, o entran como socios con plenos derechos o no entran.

Merz viajó al menos dos veces como líder de la oposición a Kiev y tan pronto fue nombrado primer ministro -como lo hizo su par inglés, Andy Burnham- fue a Kiev en visita oficial a ofrecer más armas, dinero, cooperación industrial para desarrollo de drones y apoyo. Todo ello bajo el mantra de: ‘Rusia quiere invadir Europa’, o, ‘si no ayudamos a Ucrania, seremos los próximos’.

En otras ocasiones cuando iban de visita altos funcionarios europeos, Rusia mermaba las hostilidades y la capital ucraniana descansaba de los bombardeos; tal como señaló Zelensky durante la visita de Steve Witkoff y Jared Kushner en el mes de septiembre. Tales bombardeos intensificados como retaliación rusa a los ataques a civiles y centros energéticos en la Rusia profunda.

Es claro que los viajes a Ucrania de Merz, así como de otros europeos con herencias nazis, implica una peregrinación santa a esa punta de lanza que logrará, con la ayuda de las almas de todos los nazis bien muertos, sepultos e insepultos entre 1939 y 45, derrotar a los eslavos herederos soviéticos, a esos ‘orcos’ como suelen llamarles a los rusos.

Esta peregrinación es mística. Además, es el reto a ser un mártir por aniquilación de algún drone Geran, un misil Kinzhal, tal vez por un Skander M y por qué no, ser atomizado por un Oréshnik. Esto es una posibilidad latente. Los altos mandos rusos instaron a no viajar a Ucrania. Ya hay bombardeos a los puentes de Kiev. Quedará cerrada como una isla al otro lado del Dniéper. Es posible que esta sea la última vez que un europeo vaya a Kiev y salga vivo.

Así, Merz, un derrotado pronazi de hueso colorado se paseó una vez más por la capital ucraniana. La escena es tan absurda y cosmética como las escenas de la película de Buñuel, El discreto encanto de la burguesía, con las que inicio este escrito.

Aquella comedia hecha por un renombrado surrealista, utiliza la sátira y el refinamiento sobreactuado de burgueses que cada vez que intentan cenar juntos son interrumpidos por situaciones absurdas. Como señalan en el análisis crítico de la película:

Cada vez que están a punto de sentarse a la mesa, algo absurdo o inquietante interrumpe el acto: confusiones de horario, la muerte del dueño de un restaurante, un pelotón militar, un obispo que aparece de repente, sueños que se confunden con la realidad, etc.

La película no tiene una trama lineal clásica. Es una sucesión de intentos fallidos de cenar, intercalados con sueños de los personajes y situaciones cada vez más surrealistas. El acto de comer (símbolo de civilización, placer y status) se convierte en algo imposible. […]

Pero es precisamente esto lo que la obra señala en última instancia: la vida que llevan los individuos que forman parte de la alta burguesía es irreal, un espejismo, un islote en medio del océano de la verdadera realidad. A pesar de que su aislamiento propicia el empobrecimiento del resto del mundo, ni siquiera de este modo logran ser felices y esta frustración se ve reflejada en especial en la imposibilidad de conseguir lo que con más ímpetu desean, simbolizado aquí por la comida que no consiguen disfrutar nunca y por la inconveniencia de practicar sexo cuando y con quien desean.

Merz vive el discreto ‘desencanto’ de encarnar a un nazi de tercera generación sin chance de ganar lo que tampoco ganaron abuelo y padre. Merz es como una película que además de hablar de la mediocridad y la derrota, es de bajo presupuesto, reforzando por inercia la idea de derrota y mediocridad.

Se pasea por Kiev, una vez más, con el anhelo y el espejismo febril, nada discreto de triunfar sobre Rusia.

Lo que en la película es para los burgueses el deseo frustrado de ser felices en una cena, como hecho imposible lo es para Merz el no ser un nazi triunfando sobre un heredero de los padres y abuelos soviéticos. Además, Merz en realidad ha encarnado ya la personificación del desfase, de la ubicuidad errática: ¿Por qué sale de Alemania el día que allí celebran el día de la unidad alemana?

Merz sale de allí porque esa Alemania, esa que lo derrotó en las urnas hace unas semanas, no sustenta a la nación germana de su imaginación. Aquel campo onírico de Buñuel toma sentido en este ‘loco’ transeúnte por Kiev. Lo que danza en la amplia frente de Merz está hecho de esvásticas, columnas enormes, águilas imperiales, runas, antorchas, cuerpos esculpidos a imagen del ario que soñó su ídolo, Adolfo.

El día de la unidad alemana, habrá negros y musulmanes, quizá latinos, fornicando con las mujeres alemanas. Eso sí, a la luz de ‘antorchas’, debido a la crisis energética que asumieron Olaf Schulz y su gobierno de abyectos, al avalar el ‘Ka boom’ del Nord Stream.

Cada vez que quiere sentarse a la mesa con Zelensky, éste le recuerda que es el monstruo que creó la Unión Europea y EE.UU. y que le han subestimado como un simple histrión. Entonces, la cena fracasa. El ‘duende verde’ acosado por los neonazis de Azov sólo repite los mantras de ‘más dinero’, ‘pago a funcionarios’’, dinero para la guerra’, ‘escudo antimisiles’, ‘ingreso a la OTAN y a U.E.’ etc. La cena se frustra, pero es necesaria la esperanza para continuar con la trama, el anhelo por lograr la gran cena final: derrotar a Rusia.

Como en la descripción de la película, la vida de estos capitalistas, tecnócratas, burgueses neonazis empobrece a sus sociedades. Mientras, la cena anhelada que costará mucho dinero, se escapa entre el realismo de la incapacidad alemana por un rearme eficiente y donde sus jóvenes no desean prestar servicio militar, no hay dinero y su base industrial está rezagada al menos quince años detrás de la rusa.

Siempre que Merz se quiere sentar a cenar sabe que algo pasará y está pasando: Rusia sigue avanzando hacia occidente, para ubicarse allí, en esas calles donde aún él y el neonazi Volodómir caminan. Sólo queda un 9% del Donbás en manos de los ucronazis respaldados por la OTAN. El sueño húmedo de este nazi está por finalizar.

Al igual que la forma en que Buñuel dispuso ese ‘encanto’ burgués, la trama hecha por Merz, y toda su camarilla europea sufre de confusiones de horario, no linealidad y coherencia en el discurso, lo que deviene en la eterna frustración de no lograr lo que con tanto ímpetu desean.

Por ejemplo, el señor Friedrich ha señalado varias veces que Rusia es débil y va perdiendo la guerra y que por eso es clave apoyar a Ucrania. Por otro, dice que de ganar Rusia avanzará hacia Europa. Entonces, o es débil y puede ser derrotada o es fuerte y puede avanzar hacia Europa. No puede ser las dos cosas.

En cuestión de tiempos, tampoco le da o les da a los nazis y europeos colaboradores de éstos. No hace falta sino ver las más de treinta mil sanciones impuestas a Rusia para comprender cómo sus cálculos de tiempo sobre una Rusia que caerá, cada vez de manera definitiva, han fracasado. Más de veinte veces la cena surrealista, la cena antropofágica devoradora de rusos y Rusia se ha frustrado.

También han apostado a que, con el tiempo, el presidente Putin perdería apoyo de la sociedad y, por el contrario, su partido Rusia Unida, lideró y aumentó posiciones en la pasada jornada electoral, que fue acechada por drones y ataques ucronazis. De nuevo, el burgués nazi no comió.

Las declaraciones de Merz acerca de Rusia nunca han sido amables. El gobierno alemán se encuentra en pie de guerra con los puños apretados, impotente y alucinando. En la asamblea anual de Naciones Unidas, la parte alemana solicitó a los rusos una reunión. La misma duró veinte minutos, tiempo suficiente para insultar al canciller Lavrov y fijar ultimátum a Rusia:

El contenido de la conversación se centró en la guerra en Ucrania y las relaciones bilaterales. Wadephul exhortó al Kremlin a “abandonar la peligrosa senda de escalada frente a Alemania, Europa y la OTAN (Organización del Tratado del Atlántico Norte)”, citó una fuente alemana recogida por Reuters y AP. El ministro germano también insistió en que Rusia debe facilitar un acuerdo para reactivar las exportaciones de cereales por el mar Negro, afectadas por ataques a infraestructuras y barcos de ambos países.

No obstante, Lavrov aseguró que “no surgió nada nuevo” tras el diálogo, y posteriormente aprovechó su discurso ante la Asamblea General para reforzar la postura rusa sobre la guerra e intensificar las críticas contra Occidente, incluida Alemania. El ambiente previo al encuentro estuvo marcado por señalamientos bilaterales: Wadephul denunció crímenes de guerra rusos en Ucrania y abogó por incrementar la presión internacional sobre Moscú, al tiempo que expresó desconfianza sobre la voluntad real del Kremlin de negociar la paz.

Es una clara ofensa al canciller y el pueblo rusos, citar a éste a una reunión en donde le exige lo que se vio en los párrafos anteriores. Los alemanes neonazis quieren cenar y no pueden. Se frustran y explotan a su pueblo.

En contra eso sí de cualquier libreto surrealista de Luis Buñuel, quien no tuvo tanta creatividad o no conocía ni imaginaba este tipo de burgués, los alemanes mientras izan su brazo derecho con los dedos puestos como una saeta para saludar el alma de Hitler, de una esvástica o a la raza blanca superior, entregan los vientres de sus mujeres y los impuestos de sus ciudadanos a comensales no arios. Otra escena absurda de esta película de bajo presupuesto.

Merz caminó por Kiev. Hay una foto de él andando por ahí en una calle. Pero no es sólo él. En sus zapatos resopla toda la frustración de toda la Alemania neonazi; el discreto y terrible desencanto de ser perdedores, para fortuna del mundo una vez más en menos de cien años y nuevamente gracias a Rusia. Ojalá ahora desaparezcan para siempre. ‘Good Bye Merz’.

Merz è un uomo già condannato. La paura e il bellicismo non fanno guadagnare voti.

Segue nostro Telegram.

Dopo aver imparato a proprie spese cosa significa ricevere uno schiaffo in faccia alle elezioni in Sassonia-Anhalt, la CDU ha subito una vera e propria disfatta il 20 settembre nel Meclemburgo-Pomerania Anteriore (Meck/Pomm) e a Berlino.

Analizzando innanzitutto i dati del Mecklenburg/Pomerania Anteriore, l’affluenza alle urne è stata del 78,1%, circa la stessa registrata in Sassonia-Anhalt con il 77,8%.

Il risultato finale ufficiale, seppur ancora provvisorio, può essere considerato una piccola sorpresa rispetto a quello della Sassonia-Anhalt, ma comunque illuminante. Quattro partiti occuperanno dei seggi nel parlamento regionale.

AfD 38,2% = 32 seggi

SPD 35,5%, con il ministro-presidente uscente che punta a rimanere in carica = 29 seggi

Die Linke (Sinistra) 6,5% = 5 seggi

Die Grüne (Verdi) 5,7% = 5 seggi

Il parlamento statale è composto da un totale di 71 seggi.

Ora la parte interessante: CDU 4,9%, zero seggi grazie alla soglia del 5%; così come FDP 1,0%, anche in questo caso zero seggi.

Ora cerchiamo di inquadrare la situazione in una prospettiva più ampia.

L’AfD ha vinto le prossime elezioni, anche se non con un margine così ampio come in Sassonia-Anhalt, ma si tratta comunque di una vittoria.

Manuela Schwesig, attuale presidente del partito dal 2017, appartiene all’élite dell’SPD. In precedenza, dal 2013 al 2017, ha ricoperto la carica di Ministro dell’Istruzione, della Famiglia, degli Anziani, delle Donne e dei Giovani a livello federale, e un incarico analogo nel parlamento regionale del Mecklenburg dal 2008 al 2013. Ha attraversato un periodo difficile quando l’SPD si è allontanato dall’essere un partito dei lavoratori per intraprendere le cosiddette riforme sociali che hanno drasticamente ridotto il sistema di sicurezza sociale, cercando di attenuare il più possibile gli effetti negativi dei tagli. Il suo ruolo in politica è sempre stato caratterizzato da sincerità e attenzione, dando l’impressione di essere una persona onesta.

Lei appartiene alla ristretta cerchia di politici dell’SPD da cui ci si aspetta un futuro più roseo per il partito, ma sembra intenzionata a rimanere al suo posto nel Mecklenburg/Pommarding, almeno per il momento.

I Verdi e la Sinistra hanno ottenuto ciò che ci si aspettava da loro: i Verdi in difficoltà, e la Sinistra ancora impegnata a risollevarsi dopo un periodo di turbolenze interne seguito all’abbandono del partito da parte di Sahra Wagenknecht, che ha fondato il suo movimento, BSW, portando con sé alcuni elettori di sinistra.

I Verdi, nati come partito pacifista, si opposero al riarmo militare e al degrado ambientale. Dal 2022, tuttavia, sono diventati uno dei principali sostenitori del regime ucraino e del riarmo tedesco ed europeo, talvolta superando persino i conservatori tradizionali. Questo ha comportato una perdita di consensi tra gli ambientalisti, soprattutto tra i giovani elettori. I sostenitori della pace si sono rivolti all’AfD e, in una certa misura, alla Sinistra, gli unici partiti che propongono una soluzione più pacifica e diplomatica.

La vera sorpresa di queste elezioni non è l’FDP. Al momento non ha un ruolo di rilievo, essendo stato in numerosi governi di coalizione dal 1949, aiutando sempre i due partiti principali a raggiungere le maggioranze necessarie. Sembra aver perso la propria identità, cercando di allearsi con gli avversari in campagna elettorale e finendo per smarrire la strada.

Il problema principale è che la CDU, il partito di governo a livello nazionale, ha ottenuto un misero 4,9% ed è stata quindi estromessa dal parlamento statale. È una sconfitta enorme. Il signor Merz è praticamente un uomo morto che cammina, e il suo destino è segnato per tutti.

Gli ex stati della Germania dell’Est si sentono ancora abbandonati e traditi dopo la riunificazione. I programmi istituiti per modernizzare e risanare la vecchia DDR hanno beneficiato soprattutto aziende e istituzioni della Germania occidentale. Gli appalti furono truccati e centinaia di imprese finirono in amministrazione controllata, per poi essere vendute a prezzi stracciati a investitori occidentali.

Questo è uno dei problemi di fondo ancora presenti nella mente degli ex cittadini della DDR e viene spesso addotto come spiegazione di tali risultati elettorali. Tuttavia, questa giustificazione è valida solo come pretesto per nascondere le carenze dei partiti tradizionali, ignorando i veri problemi come lo spopolamento dei villaggi, la mancanza di infrastrutture adeguate per assistere una popolazione che invecchia, le scarse opportunità di lavoro, le problematiche legate ai migranti e la sfiducia nei confronti dei partiti al potere. La forza trainante al momento della riunificazione era la CDU, le cui promesse non si sono avverate. Pertanto, le opzioni disponibili all’epoca erano un programma socialista o, in alternativa, un programma conservatore.

A prima vista, le elezioni a Berlino non hanno colpito la CDU con la stessa intensità degli altri due Länder tedeschi. Tuttavia, essendo Berlino la capitale, i risultati assumono un’importanza particolare. Anche qui, i partiti di governo hanno subito perdite significative a favore dei partiti di sinistra, AfD e Linke. I risultati sono i seguenti, con l’aggiunta di guadagni e perdite a scopo di chiarezza:

Die Linke 25,7% 47 seggi +13,5%

CDU 18,8% 34 seggi −9,4%

AfD 16,3% 29 seggi +0,1%

Grüne 14,3% 26 seggi −4,1%

SPD 12,1% 22 seggi −10,1%

BSW 4,7% sotto la soglia del 5%, nessun seggio

FDP 2,5% sotto la soglia del 5%, nessun seggio

La partecipazione è stata del 74,2%.

Il parlamento statale ha 158 seggi e la maggioranza si ottiene con 80 seggi. Ciò significa che ci sarà sicuramente un governo di coalizione. Al momento, tutti gli indizi puntano a una coalizione tra Linke (Sinistra), SPD e Verdi.

L’AfD non è riuscita a ottenere gli stessi risultati delle precedenti elezioni. Ciò è dovuto principalmente a due fattori.

Berlino ha un ambiente urbano e, come tale, un elettorato più concentrato, con una popolazione più giovane e composta da molti nuovi residenti provenienti da altri stati tedeschi.

Il secondo problema riguarda le enormi difficoltà specifiche di tali contesti. La disponibilità di alloggi a prezzi accessibili è una delle questioni centrali. L’AfD non ha esperienza nella gestione urbana e non propone concetti innovativi sufficientemente diversi da convincere gli elettori a votare per l’AfD.

È sorprendente che partiti con perdite così ingenti come l’SPD riescano comunque ad arrivare al potere. A parte la CDU, i partiti che hanno subito le maggiori sconfitte in queste elezioni finiscono comunque al governo. Questa è la bellezza di una coalizione.

Il partito di sinistra Linke non gode di grande fiducia da parte dei partiti tradizionali e degli elettori conservatori, poiché aleggia ancora intorno ad esso un’aura di comunismo. Ciononostante, i risultati elettorali sono chiari e sarà interessante vedere come Linke riuscirà a tradurre in realtà i temi della sua campagna elettorale, incentrata principalmente sul problema abitativo. Gli altri partner della coalizione faranno del loro meglio, quindi non sono previsti cambiamenti troppo radicali.

Anche in questo caso si può constatare che i partiti al governo a livello federale hanno ricevuto un messaggio chiaro, e le sconfitte dipingono un quadro desolante. Sarà un’impresa ardua cambiare l’opinione pubblica in tempo per le prossime elezioni di aprile. Ascoltando le dichiarazioni di questi partiti, sembra più che probabile che questi risultati si ripeteranno nella primavera del 2027, e a quel punto governare la Germania diventerà un’impresa pressoché impossibile.

Qualunque cosa accada, una cosa è ormai chiara. Una politica di paura e guerrafondaia, di fronte a un futuro con tagli drastici ai sistemi sociali, alla sanità e alle pensioni, e a una situazione economica che sembra peggiorare costantemente, non porterà il consenso degli elettori. Soprattutto quando non c’è una nuova visione da affrontare e risolvere, ma solo tagli e riduzioni, spacciati per riforme.

Il cancelliere tedesco, subito dopo la chiusura dei seggi, si è presentato davanti alla stampa e ha dichiarato: la stagione elettorale del 2026 è finita. Sembrava sollevato.

In fin dei conti, la CDU ha poche alternative. Se Merz fa marcia indietro sulle sue “riforme”, sembrerà debole e si arrenderà all’SPD, rafforzandola ulteriormente.

Se si avvicinasse maggiormente all’AfD, cercando di sottrarre voti, non gli sarebbe d’aiuto, dato che l’AfD è nata inizialmente da membri scontenti della CDU.

Se continua così, è assolutamente chiaro che Merz e la CDU non vinceranno le prossime elezioni federali, e Merz avrà un compito arduo per far sì che il governo segua la linea della CDU. Se l’SPD non riuscirà a dimostrare quanto sia realmente diverso dalla CDU, anche loro andranno incontro al disastro. I pericoli di essere un partner minore nelle coalizioni. Una lezione che l’FDP ha imparato a sue spese.

Nascondere la mancanza di una visione o persino di un piano chiaro per il futuro non ha mai giovato a nessun partito al governo, soprattutto nel momento in cui idee alternative, proposte da un forte partito di opposizione, guadagnano terreno a ogni elezione.

Se le prossime elezioni dell’aprile 2027 dovessero avere lo stesso esito delle ultime due, all’interno della CDU la paura si trasformerebbe in panico, e si potrebbero persino tenere elezioni federali alla fine della primavera. L’esito è imprevedibile. Tuttavia, tentare di mettere al bando l’AfD significherebbe la fine di un partito politico un tempo glorioso e la fine della democrazia come la conosciamo in Germania.

German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier has warned that political division and disinformation are placing growing pressure on the country’s democratic institutions after a succession of state elections weakened Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s Christian Democrats and strengthened parties outside Germany’s traditional political centre.

Speaking during German Unity Day celebrations, Steinmeier compared the present political climate with divisions associated with the Weimar Republic, while stopping short of saying that Germany had reached such a point.

His intervention follows a difficult September for Merz.

Alternative for Germany won 43.8 per cent in Saxony-Anhalt, while in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania the AfD finished first with 38.2 per cent. Merz’s CDU recorded just 4.9 per cent in the latter state, leaving it outside the regional parliament for the first time.

Berlin produced a different winner but a similar problem for the established parties, with Die Linke taking first place.

The combined results have accelerated the fragmentation of a party system that for much of the post-war period revolved around two large political blocs.

EU Today examined that shift after the September elections, arguing that Germany’s political centre was losing voters in several directions at once.

Steinmeier did not confine his warning to electoral arithmetic.

He criticised the use of political demagoguery and warned that organised disinformation was damaging democratic debate. He referred to material originating from Kremlin-linked actors, domestic extremists and other networks using digital platforms to amplify manipulated information.

The remarks come during an increasingly difficult period for Merz.

The Chancellor took office promising to restore economic momentum and political stability. Instead, Germany continues to face concerns about industrial competitiveness, living standards, energy costs and the ability of its political system to absorb an increasingly fragmented electorate.

The pressure is particularly evident in eastern Germany.

Before September’s elections, EU Today noted that Merz was approaching a political reckoning in the east, where the CDU was losing ground while the AfD converted dissatisfaction over migration, energy, economic policy and distrust of established institutions into electoral support.

The subsequent results were worse for the CDU than many in the party had anticipated.

In Saxony-Anhalt, the AfD finished more than 26 percentage points ahead of the CDU. In Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, the CDU failed even to cross the threshold for parliamentary representation.

The consequences extend beyond German domestic politics.

Germany remains the EU’s largest economy and one of the principal states shaping European decisions on Ukraine, defence, migration, fiscal policy and industrial competitiveness. Political instability in Berlin can therefore affect negotiations in Brussels as well as the domestic legislative programme.

Economic policy is central to the dispute.

Germany’s manufacturing sector has faced stronger competition from China, while the rupture of the previous economic relationship with Russia has increased costs for energy-intensive industries. Russia’s continuing war against Ukraine has simultaneously required Berlin to spend more on defence and provide substantial assistance to Kyiv.

The German cabinet’s 2027 budget reflects that change. The government has approved federal expenditure of €555.4 billion, including €109.7 billion for the Defence Ministry and €11.6 billion for continued support to Ukraine.

The political difficulty is that higher security expenditure comes alongside pressure to invest in infrastructure, public services and an economy struggling to recover stronger growth.

The rise of the AfD has consequently become more than a debate over whether other parties should maintain the so-called firewall preventing formal co-operation with it.

The more difficult question for Germany’s established parties is why voters are abandoning them and whether economic and political dissatisfaction can be reversed through government policy rather than coalition arrangements designed chiefly to exclude competitors from office.

Steinmeier’s intervention places that argument inside a historical frame familiar to Germans.

The Federal Republic’s post-war institutions were deliberately designed to avoid the failures of the interwar period. But constitutional safeguards alone cannot prevent political fragmentation if large groups of voters cease to regard established parties as capable of responding to the issues that concern them.

Germany enters the final months of 2026 with that question moving from the margins of its politics to the centre.