© DIOGO VENTURA/OBSERVADOR
Ukraine’s prosecution service has dismissed eight people named in connection with an anti-corruption probe into the alleged protection of scam call centers, acting Prosecutor General Anton Kovalskyi reported. His office is also running internal checks on several officials linked to the case. A separate probe covers the trip abroad of his predecessor, who left Ukraine in September.
Ukraine’s main prosecution service is auditing itself while the country’s anti-corruption agencies investigate an alleged scheme run from inside it. The National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) allege that a PGO official set up a criminal organization in mid-2025. They say it drew in serving prosecution employees and unofficial associates, took bribes for leaving scam call centers alone, and laundered the proceeds. The investigation is called Operation Carthage.
Ukraine’s main prosecution service is auditing itself while the country’s anti-corruption agencies investigate an alleged scheme run from inside it. The National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) allege that an official of the Prosecutor General’s Office (PGO) set up a criminal organization in mid-2025. They say it drew in serving prosecution employees and unofficial associates. The group allegedly took bribes for leaving scam call centers alone and then laundered the proceeds. The case is known as Operation Carthage, Espreso reported.
Seven of the eight dismissed people worked at the PGO, Kovalskyi said. Separately, four people were removed from administrative posts, including the heads of the IT department and the cybercrime directorate. Kovalskyi said 24 prosecutors took polygraph tests. The results went to a commission running an internal investigation. He wrote that trust in the prosecution service would be restored not through announcements of change but through consistent, balanced decisions and concrete results.
The internal probe concerning former Prosecutor General Ruslan Kravchenko covers his trip abroad. Investigators are checking whether he followed established procedure and how the business trip was organized. Kravchenko left Ukraine in an official car on the night of 13–14 September, Ukrainska Pravda reported, citing law enforcement sources. He explained his departure as an official trip to Lithuania.
On 14 September, Kravchenko announced he had signed a notice of suspicion against NABU director Semen Kryvonos. That evening, his own office said Kryvonos had never been properly served and that the register entries were cancelled.
On 15 September, lawmakers backed Kravchenko’s resignation 317–0. Two days later, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy assigned Kovalskyi the duties of prosecutor general by decree. Before that, Kovalskyi headed the Khmelnytskyi Oblast Prosecutor’s Office.
The PGO completed an internal investigation into Aidyn Khudiiev, a former deputy department head, Kovalskyi said. Its findings will go to the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of Prosecutors, and the PGO abolished his post. SAPO prosecutor Mykola Karas told a court hearing that detectives seized $50,000 at Khudiiev’s workplace during the Carthage searches.
The PGO is also investigating Serhii Kropyva, former deputy head of its international cooperation department. NABU detained him on 4 September, the first day of the operation. The internal probe looks at whether he used his powers for private interests and interfered in other prosecutors’ work. The PGO’s General Inspectorate has filed a disciplinary complaint against him with the same commission, and his post was also abolished.
US President Donald Trump announced a deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin for Moscow to supply millions of tons of diesel fuel to American and global markets.
The announcement would give Russia a major opportunity to sell fuel abroad at a time when Ukraine is targeting its oil industry to deprive Moscow of revenue and disrupt the resources sustaining its invasion. The US president has increasingly called for Ukraine to halt strikes on Russian oil infrastructure in recent weeks, blaming Ukraine for high fuel prices in the US.
Trump’s push for Kyiv to halt those attacks, alongside his effort to secure Russian fuel supplies, risks undermining Ukraine’s campaign to put economic pressure on the Kremlin while the US seeks to contain the fallout from its war with Iran.
In a 9 October post on Truth Social, Trump said Russia would immediately supply more than 300,000 tons of diesel, followed by another 500,000 tons in November and 1 million tons shortly afterward. He also announced a possible additional delivery of 3 million tons, conditional on the state of Russian refineries.
“Diesel Prices for Americans and, indeed, the World, will be COMING DOWN, IN RECORD NUMBERS, AND FAST!” Trump wrote, describing lower fuel prices as a top priority for American farmers, ranchers, and truckers.
Trump's announcement did not explain how the promised volumes would be reconciled with the condition of Russian refineries amid ongoing Ukrainian strikes, which he cited as a factor determining the timing of later deliveries.
The announcement comes after Trump repeatedly blamed Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil infrastructure for worsening global diesel shortages and driving up fuel prices.
Ukraine has continued targeting Russian oil facilities as part of its campaign to undermine Moscow's war economy. Ukrainian strikes have damaged refining capacity, contributed to fuel shortages inside Russia, and forced Moscow to restrict fuel exports.
Kyiv has argued that the attacks put pressure on Russia's ability to finance and sustain its war against Ukraine.
The rise in US fuel prices stems largely from the US-Israeli war with Iran and its disruption of global energy supplies, according to Reuters. The conflict has disrupted shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, a strategic waterway through which roughly one-fifth of the world's oil supplies normally pass, pushing energy prices higher.
Trump has nevertheless blamed Ukraine's refinery strikes for rising fuel costs while pressing Kyiv to halt them.
Ukraine's attacks on Russian oil infrastructure are intended to weaken Moscow's war economy. By contrast, the disruption to global energy shipments stems largely from the conflict with Iran.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy warned later on 9 October that allowing Russia to sell petroleum products abroad without securing a lasting de-escalation agreement would help finance Moscow's war against Ukraine.
“Allowing Russia to sell petroleum products is an investment in a war that must be ended, not prolonged,” Zelenskyy said, responding to Trump's announcement of a proposed Russian diesel supply deal.
Zelenskyy said Ukraine's strikes on Russian oil refineries and other oil facilities were a response to Russia's years-long campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure. He offered a reciprocal arrangement under which Ukraine would stop striking Russian refineries if Russia stopped destroying Ukrainian energy facilities, saying the United States had sufficient leverage to secure such an agreement.
“Ukraine will not burn Russian oil refining facilities if Russia does not destroy our energy infrastructure,” Zelenskyy said.
He also urged Washington to maintain pressure on Moscow, including sanctions under the proposed Graham legislation, and to continue supporting Ukraine's defense. Zelenskyy argued that easing sanctions without a clear, sustained de-escalation agreement would signal weakness and give Russia more time and resources to continue the war.
“Gifts to Putin will not bring peace,” Zelenskyy said, warning that Russia would respond to diesel supplies with further terror and attacks. He called on the United States to pursue a reciprocal de-escalation agreement and press Russia to stop its attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure.
Sputnik – 09.10.2026
US President Donald Trump says he reached an agreement with Russian President Vladimir Putin during a phone call for Russia to supply diesel fuel to American and global markets.
Russia will deliver more than 300,000 tons immediately, followed by 500,000 tons in November and another 1 million tons shortly afterward, he wrote on Truth Social.
Trump also announced plans for an additional 3 million tons of Russian diesel, depending on the condition of Russia’s refineries, claiming the agreement would help bring down fuel prices in the US and worldwide.
Following the announcement, the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced a temporary general license allowing Russian diesel supplies to global markets, effective immediately at Trump’s direction.
Trump believes the deliveries would help bring down diesel prices in the US and worldwide amid rising fuel costs and disruptions to global energy markets.
Illustrative image. (Bureau 1440)
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned on October 8 that China was helping Russia develop an alternative to SpaceX’s Starlink satellite internet system, as Moscow’s Rassvet network advances through testing and the presentation of subscriber terminals.
“They are making progress. They are passing this on to Russia,” Zelensky said.
The Ukrainian president’s remarks underscored Kyiv’s growing concern that Moscow could acquire advanced satellite communications capabilities.
Zelensky has already taken his concerns to U.S. President Donald Trump, asking him to impose sanctions on Russian and Chinese companies involved in Rassvet’s development, according to a recent Financial Times report. The request, raised during a meeting in New York in September, reflects Kyiv’s effort to prevent the Russian network from becoming a strategic asset for Moscow.
However, Washington has no straightforward way to stop the project outright. Sanctions would not automatically halt Russia’s domestic satellite program.
Zelensky’s appeals are unfolding as the project moves beyond development announcements and into public demonstrations of its capabilities.
Bureau 1440, the Russian company developing Rassvet, demonstrated a satellite video connection between Moscow and the southern Russian republic of Adygea on October 7. The call lasted about five minutes and used the company’s satellite network, showing that the system can support a live communications session.
At the same Moscow technology forum, Bureau 1440 presented three types of subscriber terminals for the network. One was identified as a serial-production device, while the company said its 1440.ULTRA terminal could support data transmission speeds of up to 700 megabits per second. The equipment is intended to connect users to the satellite constellation once the service becomes operational at scale.
Russia launched batches of Rassvet satellites in March and July, but the network has not yet reached full operational capability. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov noted in late September that the system was not yet operating effectively.
Zelensky’s repeated warnings and his appeal to Trump to block the Rassvet project point to growing alarm in Kyiv as Russia moves closer to establishing an independent satellite communications network.
With satellites already launched and the company testing connections and preparing user equipment, Zelensky faces the prospect that Russia could soon field a Starlink alternative that Kyiv may be unable to disrupt. His warnings about Chinese assistance suggest that Ukraine is increasingly concerned not only about Russia’s progress, but also about the possibility that outside support could accelerate it.
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The post Zelensky’s Alarm Mounts as Russia Advances Starlink Rival appeared first on South Front.
Russia’s strikes on October 9 covered Ukraine from west to east, hitting targets in Zaporizhzhia, Odessa, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, and reaching as far as Ivano-Frankivsk in the west. But the most consequential blows landed, as they increasingly do, in and around Kyiv.
The Trypilska thermal power plant was struck again, and attacks on the 750-kilovolt substation near Nalyvaivka continued. The cumulative effect on the capital is no longer abstract. Kyiv’s sewage system temporarily stopped accepting wastewater from one city district after power was cut to Kyivvodokanal facilities. Residents sought shelter overnight in metro stations. Mayor Vitali Klitschko issued a public warning about a serious threat to the city’s municipal infrastructure and recommended that residents who have the option to temporarily leave the capital consider doing so. Ukrainian authorities announced further restrictions on electricity supply to households, industry, and businesses beginning October 9. Elsewhere in the country, a food warehouse belonging to the Tavria retail chain was hit in Odessa, Kharkiv’s thermal power plant No. 5 was struck for the first time in a long period, an Epicenter shopping center in Chernihiv was hit by Geran drones, and a Geran-4 reached Ivano-Frankivsk, striking an industrial facility.
On the front lines, Russian forces maintain the initiative across key sectors. In the Chernihiv Oblast, Russian combat aviation and strike drones have been systematically hitting Ukrainian military positions — a pattern that Ukrainian and independent analysts describe as consistent with preparation for ground operations. On October 8, a drone storage facility near Kovchyn was destroyed, and strikes were recorded against positions of the 105th Border Detachment and the 143rd Mechanized Brigade near Sutky and Semenivka. The most significant confirmed strike, however, hit the command post of Ukraine’s 18th Army Corps near Bakhmach, with possible casualties among senior and flag-rank officers.
In Sumy Oblast, paratroopers of Russia’s 83rd Air Assault Brigade drove Ukrainian units of the 71st Air Mobile Brigade out of the settlement of Kyianytsia on October 9, bringing the entire settlement cluster under Russian control. With the leaf cover gone from surrounding woodland by late autumn, Russian forces will be able to move against Ukrainian positions in the forest south of the settlement with far greater effectiveness.
In Dobropillia, the battle has entered its decisive phase. On October 8, Russian assault units entered the city simultaneously from the north and south, splitting the Ukrainian garrison in two parts.
Kyiv’s mayor is advising residents to evacuate. A garrison has been cut in half. A command post has been destroyed. Russia is not approaching a decisive moment in this war — it is already inside one.
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The post Leave If You Can – Kyiv’s Mayor Speaks As Russia Strikes Deeper And Harder appeared first on South Front.
Russia is seeking support for its war effort abroad – and threatening retaliation beyond Ukraine. Reports of foreign labor in drone factories, proposals to counter Starlink, and allegations of overseas recruitment show different ways Moscow could sustain its military effort and put pressure on its opponents.
Nowhere Far Enough
On October 9, Mikhail Zvinchuk, founder of the Russian military Telegram channel Rybar, was detained in Montenegro. Montenegrin authorities accused his team of using media work to interfere in the country’s politics. Rybar said they had come legally to film at Cetinje Monastery and had submitted an official filming request. Moscow’s response explains why this matters: Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council, suggested replenishing an “exchange fund” with Europeans and Americans to recover detained Russians. One arrest became a warning about others to come.
Mikhail Zvinchuk, founder of Rybar, a Russian pro-war Telegram channel covering the war in Ukraine, was detained in Montenegro on October 9
Five days earlier, Medvedev had delivered the orbital version of that warning. If Russia’s Rassvet constellation were destroyed, American Starlink satellites would “come tumbling down like ornaments from a dried-up Christmas tree.” “Space is a very crowded place,” he added. “We need to be mutually courteous.” Kiev had sought sanctions and restrictions, not announced a satellite attack. Moscow was putting a military threat behind its demand that Russian communications infrastructure be left alone.
The link is not between a blogger and a satellite. It is between two threats of retaliation: damage our network and yours becomes a target; detain our people and yours may become bargaining chips. Moscow is challenging the assumption that pressure on Russia can remain a one-way transaction.
Partners Behind the Front
The space threat has a practical backdrop. Leaked documents published in July describe a closed Russian-Chinese military forum in Guangzhou in November 2023. Chinese researchers proposed several ways to counter Starlink, from legal pressure and jamming to cyberattacks and destruction. Their hardest problem was also the simplest: how to disable satellites more cheaply and quickly than SpaceX could replace them. They do not show that these systems were built or deployed.
Visualization of the planned Starlink Generation 2 constellation
Russia and China have different strengths to offer. Moscow brings battlefield experience and air-defense knowledge; Beijing brings electronics, artificial intelligence, and manufacturing capacity. Russia can show what works under fire. China can help turn those lessons into equipment made at scale. A sixth closed forum was reportedly planned for the fall in St. Petersburg.
This is why repeated technical meetings matter more than dramatic threats. A shared design, tested and improved over several years, could outlast the war that first made it useful. For Moscow, the goal is to weaken an American advantage. For Beijing, Russian experience offers lessons without having to fight the same war.
Discussion of leaked documents, the “one-to-many” concept and replacement costs
But destroying satellites is not a clean solution. Russia’s 2021 antisatellite test forced both astronauts and Russian cosmonauts to shelter aboard the International Space Station, according to NASA. Debris threatens more than the intended target. Jamming can offer a narrower response; smashing entire networks risks damaging the same orbital space Russia and China also need.
The factory floor shows another side of this partnership-building. A September report by the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team says North Korean workers are employed at Alabuga in Tatarstan, where Russia produces Geran-2 drones, and describes workers entering Russia as students. Pyongyang rejected the report as fabricated. If the findings are accurate, the bargain is straightforward: Russia gains workers, North Korea gains income. Foreign support does not have to arrive as a finished missile; it can help keep the assembly line moving.
September 2026 sanctions-monitoring report. Pages 31-32 discuss Alabuga and drone production. Pyongyang rejects the report
The Underground Price List
Recruitment abroad serves a different purpose. A September 15 U.S. indictment alleges that a Russian intelligence-linked network used Cuban and Venezuelan intermediaries to recruit inside America. Prosecutors describe payments of $1,000-$1,500 for surveillance and a $40,000 offer to kill a Russian dissident believed to be near Washington. Another alleged offer promised an American $25,000 to kill a target in Lithuania. These remain accusations, not court findings or proof of an officially declared bounty program.
Original U.S. indictment naming the alleged Russian, Cuban, and Venezuelan participants
The alleged network operated from at least 2024, before the Montenegro arrests. Its importance lies in the method: foreign intermediaries and local recruits, rather than an obvious Russian team. If substantiated, the charges would show Moscow reaching inside America through people who do not carry Russian passports.
The October 9 threat to expand the “exchange fund” signals that consular protests may no longer be Moscow’s only answer. It suggests foreign detainees could become leverage for recovering Russians. The warning to European and American governments is pointed: the detention of a Russian abroad may create a problem for their own citizens elsewhere.
Russia’s partners help it build weapons; alleged overseas networks extend its reach; threats against satellites and foreign detainees aim to raise the cost of confrontation. These are different tools, not proof of one master plan. But October’s warnings carry a common message: Moscow wants the other side to feel exposed too. Medvedev closed his latest message with a Russian proverb: “If you live among wolves, you must howl with them.”
MORE ON THE TOPIC:
The post NO SAFE REAR: Moscow’s Shadow War From Starlink to Prison Cells appeared first on South Front.
A eleição da nova Mesa Diretora da Câmara Municipal de Goiânia, marcada para este sábado (10), às 9h, chega à reta final com a candidatura de Thialu Guiotti (Avante) reunindo apoios e a tentativa de construir um acordo com o grupo de Ronilson Reis (Solidariedade). A votação definirá quem sucederá Romário Policarpo (Cidadania), eleito deputado estadual e atual presidente da Casa.
Thialu afirmou, em entrevista à Rádio Difusora Goiânia na quinta-feira (8), contar com 29 votos declarados entre os 37 vereadores. O número supera os 19 necessários para vencer a eleição. Apesar da vantagem que declara ter, o parlamentar disse que pretende ampliar a adesão e buscar uma composição que reúna todos os integrantes da Câmara.
O vereador conta com o apoio público do prefeito Sandro Mabel (União Brasil). Segundo informações divulgadas durante a semana, também recebeu apoio do governador eleito Daniel Vilela (MDB) e do presidente da Assembleia Legislativa de Goiás, Bruno Peixoto (União Brasil). Thialu, no entanto, afirmou que a decisão depende dos votos dos próprios vereadores.
Ronilson Reis mantém o nome na disputa e admite a possibilidade de uma composição com Thialu Guiotti. Em entrevista publicada em 7 de outubro, o vereador afirmou que as negociações caminhavam para um acordo, mas ressaltou que ainda não havia definição sobre quem encabeçaria a eventual chapa. Na ocasião, ele não havia anunciado a retirada de sua candidatura.
Os dois grupos tentaram construir um entendimento para evitar uma disputa entre blocos da Câmara. As conversas, porém, não haviam resultado em acordo até quarta-feira (7). Com o avanço das articulações em torno de Thialu, a negociação passou a envolver também a possibilidade de participação de aliados de Ronilson na composição dos cargos diretivos.
Outro nome citado no início das conversas foi o de Henrique Alves (MDB), que declarou apoio a Thialu, segundo a CBN Goiânia. Geverson Abel (Republicanos) também apareceu entre os possíveis interessados, mas não há confirmação recente de que mantenha candidatura própria.
A votação deste sábado não ficará restrita à escolha do presidente. Os vereadores também elegerão quatro vice-presidentes, cinco secretários e dois vice-presidentes corregedores. A composição das 22 comissões permanentes, do Conselho de Ética e das ouvidorias da Mulher e de Combate a Crimes Raciais também está na pauta.
Entre os espaços em negociação estão comissões estratégicas, como a de Constituição, Justiça e Redação, por onde passam os projetos apresentados à Câmara, e a de Finanças, Orçamento e Economia, responsável pela análise de matérias orçamentárias. A distribuição desses postos integra as conversas entre os diferentes grupos políticos.
A eleição marcará a sucessão de Romário Policarpo, que presidiu a Câmara por quatro mandatos consecutivos, um feito inédito no Legislativo goianiense. Ele foi eleito deputado estadual em 4 de outubro e assumirá o novo mandato em fevereiro de 2027.
A nova Mesa Diretora comandará a Câmara no biênio 2027-2028. A sessão especial está marcada para as 9h de sábado, será aberta ao público e terá transmissão pela TV Câmara.
The post Thialu Guiotti reúne apoio para presidir a Câmara de Goiânia appeared first on Diário da Manhã - O Jornal do leitor Inteligente.
Austrian police detained Ukrainian investigative journalist Mykhailo Tkach and cameraman Yaroslav Bondarenko in Vienna yesterday, on 8 October. Both were later released, but the circumstances of their detention remain unclear, and the prosecutor’s office said suspicion against them had not been substantiated so far.
The detention lasted more than 12 hours, the first time Tkach had been held that long while on a reporting assignment abroad. The case unfolded alongside a separate Austrian espionage investigation involving two men suspected of working for Ukraine’s military intelligence. Authorities have not said whether the cases are connected.
In a video published by Ukrainska Pravda, Tkach said seven people wearing masks and carrying weapons approached their car at a traffic light about 3–5 kilometers from central Vienna, broke its windows, and pointed weapons at them.
He said the people did not identify themselves or explain their actions. The journalists were pulled from the car, forced face down onto the road, searched, and had their hands taped behind their backs, according to Tkach. He said he initially thought they were being kidnapped because he did not see identification or have time to notice police markings. He realized they were police only after seeing police vehicles.
“As I felt it, they detained us like terrorists,” Tkach said.
He added that people shouted and pointed weapons, and there was no communication. He said one person put a knee on his neck and shouted at him to be quiet. He also saw glass from the broken window fly into Bondarenko’s face.
In a second report, Ukrainska Pravda said Tkach’s account of a document presented to him listed three allegations: espionage in the interests of Ukrainian military intelligence, participation in a criminal organization, and, as far as he remembered, causing harm to Austria. He said investigators did not explain the evidence behind the allegations.
Vienna prosecutor’s office spokesperson Nina Bussek told the Austrian Press Agency (APA) that suspicion against the two journalists had arisen during other investigations but had not been substantiated. She said it currently appeared that the suspicion was not holding up. Austrian officials have not publicly addressed Tkach’s account of the force used.
Tkach and Bondarenko were in Vienna on an assignment to find Ruslan Kravchenko, Ukraine’s former prosecutor general, Ukrainska Pravda reported. Kravchenko was dismissed on 15 September amid an investigation by Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau and Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office into alleged protection of fraudulent call centers. He denied involvement. Der Standard reported that it remained unclear whether the journalists’ detention was connected to their reporting on him.
Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Heorhii Tykhyi confirmed Tkach’s release and said the Ukrainian consul had requested access to him, according to NV. Musaieva said Bondarenko had been injured and hospitalized.
A statement signed by Ukrainian media and civil society organizations, including Euromaidan Press, called for an immediate, transparent, and independent investigation of law enforcement’s actions. The signatories also demanded an independent review of the force used, the return of seized equipment, and necessary medical and legal assistance.
Austrian Interior Minister Gerhard Karner confirmed the arrests of four Ukrainians, according to ORF. The two men detained on 5 October were placed in pretrial detention until 21 October on suspicion of secret intelligence activity against Austria. APA reported that they were suspected employees of Ukraine’s military intelligence service. Both deny the allegations.
The House of Saud is attacking Ansarallah to protect the death cult in West Asia, Pepe Escobar writes.
Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su
Let’s start with exclusive intel. On Thursday, Yahya Ali al-Ra’i, speaker of the Sana’a-based House of Representatives under Ansarallah, delivered a letter to Sardar Ayaz Sadiq, the speaker of Pakistan’s National Assembly, requesting Pakistani mediation between Ansarallah and Riyadh.
Ra’i, widely respected, has been the speaker in Sana’s since 2008. Sadiq began his current term as speaker in Islamabad in March 2024. This direct parliamentary channel is immensely significant as a diplomatic opening – as Pakistan faces enormous pressure, domestically and across the lands of Islam, over its real commitments related to the Saudi Arabia vs. Yemen clash as determined by the Mecca Defense Alliance.
As murky as the the whole situation really is, direct intel from both Islamabad and Tehran, at the highest levels, as I especifically requested, has established four key points:
Transiting Hormuz: use CIPS and pay in rials
On the wider U.S.-Iran front, diplomatic moves support what we have been reporting for the past few days on Transition Protocol. Pakistan in fact is desperate to maintain engagement with both Riyadh and Tehran, alongside non-stop coordination with Beijing. After all, China completely supports Pakistan mediation; and Araghchi keep speaking to Munir, as he did following talks with Wang Yi in Beijing.
Meanwhile, on the Washington front, speculation is feverish all over the spectrum over preparations for a Trump administration renewal of the war – including potential strikes on Iranian energy infrastructure and even, quite worrisomely, nuclear targets. There is no final decision yet by the Psycho/Sociopath in Charge, much less a launch date.
The immediate risks anyway are staggering.
Diplomacy – even in ersatz form – is mired in impasse. Tehran remains – and will continue to remain – anchored to its existing conditions, detailed by the dead cat MoU, but now carrying the threat of blocking transit routes along Oman’s coastline that it considers illegal. Washington for its part is obsessed with vast nuclear concessions.
Earlier this week, we confirmed that the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) in Tehran made two very consequential decisions.
The bottom line is that the escalation ladder could get out of control in no time.
Coming Yemeni Storm 1.0 in effect
On the Saudi-Yemen front, the Yemeni Armed Forces are absolutely ruthless. The Coming Yemeni Storm 1.0 is already in effect.
The damage at Jeddah refinery, close to Yanbu, is massive. Ansarallah is simultaneously hitting Saudi Arabia’s eastern and coast and western coast, plus the East-West pipeline in between.
For all practical purposes Sana’a is going for the whole key Riyadh infrastructure. The U.S. defense umbrella is a joke: remaining PAC-3 and Patriot batteries are useless against Yemeni ballistic missiles.
Saudi troops may number at best 75,000, plus 125,000 from the National Guard. The Yemeni Armed Forces command at least 350,000 that can be easily ramped up to 800,000. To expect “help” from the GCC petrosheiks doesn’t even qualify as a joke.
The Yemeni Armed Forces also unleashed two ballistic missiles plus explosive drones in the direction of Aden’s international airport. Ansarallah said the target was Saudi military supplies that had just arrived at Badr Camp, the mercenary HQ adjacent to the airport. An unspecified number of high-ranking Saudi officers and officials – perhaps even some Pakistanis – were killed.
Turkey for its part is also about to put boots, aircraft and air defenses on Saudi ground. These Turkish forces in thesis could protect Riyadh, the holy cities and the East-West pipeline. Ankara, just like Islamabad, insists it has no plans to enter the war inside Yemen.
The swift liberation by the Yemeni Armed Forces of the western coast close to the Red Sea also made it crystal clear how the so-called Saudi “coalition” – actually a gang of proxies/mercenaries – was deploying de facto terrorists all along.
Ansarallah recovered a wealth of foreign passports – especially from Kuwait, Qatar, Turkey and Syria – belonging to ISIS and Al-Qaeda goons. Call it the Terror Inc. Legion.
I’ts the same old song. Qatar and Turkey, in sync, instrumentalized the transfer of ISIS/Salafi-jihadi goons from Syria and Iraq: they were welcomed in Yemen by the Islah Party. Turkey was the key transit route; at least 2,100 of these ISIS assets are Turkish.
AQAP is back!
Way back in 2020, Ansarallah had already seized documents, maps, and videos showing ISIS/Daesh and Al-Qaeda jihadis directly supported by Riyadh roaming Yemen, with captured goons confessing they were paid, weaponized and logistically supported by the Saudis.
Now a new incarnation of the former al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is alread in effect – via at least 20,000 Daesh/takfiri terror goons “imported” from Syria. They will be sent to Aden governorate – following the request, actually the demand by MbS himself, fully approved by the Trump administration and its throat-slitter vassal turned President in Damascus, former ISIS al-Jolani.
The definitive headline of the whole affair though is that the House of Saud is attacking Ansarallah to protect the death cult in West Asia.
By controlling the Bab al-Mandab, Ansarallah de facto cuts off the Israeli port of Eilat. That had already happened before during the genocide of Gaza. Riyadh was furious because they had struck deals for the – now virtually scrapped – NEOM project that would connect up to Eilat once the Trumpian Abraham Accords were up and running.
Considering the whole picture, all hell could still break loose due to a single spark. Possibilities include: a Yemeni strike on Saudi Arabia causing massive casualties; a toll-enforcement mess in the Strait of Hormuz; an Iranian strike on a GCC petro-sheikh target, following an American provocation; an Iran-linked attack on a U.S. base, once again folowing an American provocation; and most of all a Sociopath-forced “land, air and sea” CENTCOM (mis)adventure.
Fasten your seat belts.
Diplomatie et monde
L’Allemagne réarme, elle renoue le fil coupe par la défaite c’est le fait le plus important de la période. Le reste n’est que distraction.
De nombreux chercheurs, dont l’éminent historien russe Vassili Klioutchevski, attribuent la fracture civilisationnelle incontestable entre les deux plus grands peuples d’Europe à la géographie, au climat et au paysage, qui ont façonné des modes de vie différents.
Vivant sous un climat prévisible, les Allemands ont développé une habitude de travail méthodique et régulier. Ils pouvaient planifier à l’avance car leur environnement leur permettait d’anticiper les résultats de leurs efforts avec une relative certitude.
Les Russes, en revanche, habitent une terre aux conditions imprévisibles qui s’étend, selon les mots de l’hymne national russe moderne, «des mers du Sud jusqu’à la frontière polaire». Ils ont souvent constaté que planifier à l’avance peut s’avérer totalement vain. De ce fait, ils doivent fréquemment travailler à un rythme effréné dans des délais très courts, s’appuyant sur la notion typiquement russe d’«avos» : l’espoir que, d’une manière ou d’une autre, les choses finiront par s’arranger.
Ces différences culturelles permettent d’expliquer non seulement l’évolution des relations entre ces voisins proches au fil des siècles — rappelons que la ville russe de Kaliningrad était autrefois la ville allemande de Königsberg — mais aussi la logique interne qui sous-tend aujourd’hui les relations politiques russo-allemandes.
L’Allemagne actuelle perçoit la Russie comme une menace pour sa sécurité nationale, à l’instar de ses prédécesseurs à la veille des Première et Seconde Guerres mondiales. Elle remilitarise méthodiquement son économie et accroît son aide militaire à l’Ukraine afin d’affaiblir la Russie sur tous les plans. En 2022-2023, au début de l’opération militaire spéciale, les aides étaient limitées et ciblées. À partir de 2024, Berlin s’est toutefois orientée vers des contrats à long terme pour la fourniture d’équipements et de drones, d’une valeur supérieure à 10 milliards de dollars par an, faisant de l’Allemagne le principal fournisseur d’aide militaire bilatérale à l’Ukraine au sein de l’UE.
La présidente de la Commission européenne, Ursula von der Leyen, ancienne ministre allemande de la Défense, s’est discrètement imposée comme la principale responsable de la distribution des fonds allemands.
Parallèlement, dans la continuité de cette dérive progressive vers une confrontation militaire avec la Russie, le gouvernement de Friedrich Merz poursuit la politique d’Olaf Scholz visant à démanteler la présence diplomatique russe en Allemagne. Après avoir obtenu la fermeture des consulats généraux russes à Munich, Hambourg, Francfort et Leipzig en mai 2023, Berlin a décidé en septembre dernier de fermer le consulat général de Bonn et le centre culturel de la Maison russe à Berlin.
Avec la première économie de l’UE et un représentant de sa propre initiative à un poste parmi les plus influents de la hiérarchie supranationale européenne, Berlin «reprogramme» progressivement une Europe unie pour en faire une sorte de «Quatrième Reich». En devenant un centre de pouvoir plus homogène, l’Europe risque de se retrouver au bord d’une confrontation militaire avec son puissant voisin de l’Est, comme cela s’est produit à maintes reprises au cours de l’histoire.
Afin de rendre la prétendue menace russe tangible, les autorités allemandes alimentent les médias depuis cet été des rumeurs concernant l’implication de Moscou dans la découverte d’un drone chargé d’explosifs à l’aéroport de fret de Leipzig. Sans attendre les conclusions de l’enquête, Berlin s’est empressé d’accuser la Russie d’avoir orchestré un acte de sabotage.
Conscients que leur gouvernement a mené le pays dans une impasse, les citoyens allemands ordinaires commencent à réagir et apportent un soutien croissant à l’Alternative pour l’Allemagne (AfD). Ce parti promet un changement radical de cap en matière de politique étrangère et intérieure — et non un revirement à 360 degrés, comme l’avait proposé l’ancienne ministre des Affaires étrangères Annalena Baerbock, donnant ainsi naissance, involontairement, au mème politique emblématique de la décennie allemande.
Certes, les victoires du parti restent régionales, et les autres partis politiques allemands refusent d’envisager le mouvement d’Alice Weidel et de Tino Chrupalla, même comme partenaire de coalition. Mais si sa base électorale continue de s’élargir, en attirant le soutien non seulement des Allemands de souche mais aussi, à terme, des communautés immigrées, l’AfD pourrait avoir une chance d’obtenir plus de 50% des voix au niveau national. Cela lui permettrait de former un gouvernement à elle seule.
Parallèlement, la cote de popularité de Merz a chuté à un niveau historiquement bas pour un chancelier de la République fédérale : seulement 11 à 15%, avec 85 à 89% d’insatisfaction. Face à ces chiffres et conscient de la demande publique pour une relation plus équilibrée avec la Russie, il a chargé le ministre des Affaires étrangères, Johann Wadephul, d’obtenir une rencontre avec son homologue russe, Sergueï Lavrov, en marge de l’Assemblée générale des Nations unies, coûte que coûte. Le récit de Lavrov illustre clairement le peu de substance de cette rencontre :
«Quant au ministre allemand des Affaires étrangères, Johann Wadephul, il a sollicité une réunion à la dernière minute. Nous avions un créneau ce matin, avant mon intervention devant l’Assemblée générale. Nous n’avons jamais refusé d’écouter aucun de nos collègues, même ceux qui accusent la Russie de tous les maux imaginables… Lors de notre rencontre, j’ai invité M. Wadephul à expliquer l’objet de sa venue. Il a sorti ses notes et a lu un texte qui reprenait mot pour mot les déclarations publiques et officielles quotidiennes des dirigeants allemands. Je le lui ai fait remarquer. Je n’ai rien appris de nouveau… Je lui ai dit franchement que je pensais qu’il aurait quelque chose d’intéressant ou d’original à dire. Ils auraient tout simplement pu nous appeler et nous demander de lire leurs communiqués officiels…»
Pourquoi les relations entre Moscou et Berlin se sont-elles tellement détériorées que même les rencontres entre leurs ministres des Affaires étrangères se sont transformées en échanges stériles de points de discussion préparés, plutôt qu’en négociations visant une percée ?
Au moins trois facteurs méritent d’être examinés.
1. Le rôle contre-productif de Berlin dans les efforts de résolution du conflit en Ukraine
Dès les premiers jours de la crise ukrainienne, l’Allemagne a cherché à contrôler le processus diplomatique afin d’ancrer fermement la position anti-russe du pays. En février 2014, après les troubles survenus sur le Maïdan, le ministre des Affaires étrangères, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, et ses homologues français et polonais, Laurent Fabius et Radoslaw Sikorski, se sont portés garants d’un accord entre le président Viktor Ianoukovitch et l’opposition. Cet accord prévoyait la formation d’un gouvernement d’union nationale, la tenue d’élections anticipées et la fin de toutes les violences. Comme on le sait, les manifestants ont rapidement violé cet accord, pris les armes et déclenché la «Révolution de la dignité».
Un an plus tard, la chancelière allemande Angela Merkel et le président français François Hollande se sont joints à la Russie comme médiateurs dans les pourparlers entre Kiev et les républiques populaires de Donetsk et de Lougansk, aboutissant à la signature d’un ensemble de mesures visant à mettre en œuvre les accords de Minsk. Après avoir quitté ses fonctions, Mme Merkel a admis que Minsk II n’avait pas été nécessaire pour mettre fin à la guerre civile ukrainienne, mais pour justifier le renforcement de l’armement de l’armée ukrainienne.
Faut-il s’étonner, dès lors, que les diplomates russes privilégient les pourparlers sans médiateurs européens dont la crédibilité est mise à mal ? Ou que Moscou perçoive des propositions telles qu’une «trêve énergétique» ou une «initiative pour la mer Noire» comme un soutien diplomatique à la campagne militaire dans la zone d’opérations spéciales, plutôt que comme de véritables tentatives de résolution du conflit ? Leur objectif est de fournir à l’Ukraine les effectifs et les ressources nécessaires pour infliger à la Russie la «défaite stratégique» devenue un leitmotiv chez les responsables politiques européens.
2. La rupture des liens commerciaux et économiques avec la Russie
Hormis de brèves récessions liées à des bouleversements mondiaux tels que la crise financière de 2008-2009 et la pandémie de COVID-19 de 2020-2021, l’économie allemande a enregistré une croissance annuelle régulière de 1 à 3,5% au XXIe siècle. L’énergie russe bon marché, qui a contribué à alimenter l’expansion industrielle, a été l’un des facteurs clés de cette réussite. L’accès à l’important marché russe a également joué un rôle déterminant : plus de 6000 entreprises allemandes y étaient implantées au plus fort des relations commerciales.
Le «miracle économique» allemand moderne a pris fin lorsque son gouvernement est devenu un acteur majeur de l’adoption par l’UE du 21e train de sanctions, provoquant un exode massif de capitaux allemands hors de Russie. Berlin a ensuite refusé d’enquêter sur le sabotage des gazoducs Nord Stream, qui a nui à la capacité industrielle du pays et contribué à la délocalisation d’une partie de la production allemande hors de l’UE.
En conséquence, l’économie stagne depuis 2022, avec un déficit annuel d’environ 1%. Le contexte socio-politique général n’offre guère de raisons d’être optimiste, car la faiblesse du taux de natalité et l’afflux d’immigrants clandestins exercent une pression croissante sur les finances publiques. Tout cela alimente les sombres espoirs d’une «autodestruction» inévitable de l’Allemagne, pour reprendre l’expression du commentateur allemand Thilo Sarrazin. Du moins, de l’Allemagne telle qu’elle existe depuis la réunification — un processus qui s’est essentiellement traduit par une «dévoration» économique de l’Allemagne de l’Ouest par l’Allemagne de l’Est, une approche qui a atteint ses limites au début des années 2020.
3. Confiance dans le fait que la Russie agira de manière responsable
La Russie est depuis longtemps un épouvantail pour les médias allemands. Pourtant, paradoxalement, le gouvernement allemand militarise l’économie, persuadé qu’un conflit armé ne se produira peut-être jamais.
Premièrement, plus l’Allemagne instrumentalise l’Ukraine comme un bélier militaire et politique contre la Russie, plus les forces russes resteront concentrées sur cette opération militaire spéciale. Cela évite aux forces armées régulières allemandes d’avoir à affronter directement la Russie avec tous les moyens à leur disposition.
Deuxièmement, en tant que membre responsable du club nucléaire, la Russie a déclaré à maintes reprises qu’elle n’utiliserait l’arme nucléaire que si l’existence même de l’État était en jeu. Cela permet à Berlin et aux autres bellicistes européens de maintenir le conflit conventionnel et géographiquement circonscrit à l’ancienne République socialiste soviétique d’Ukraine, évitant ainsi d’avoir à constater par eux-mêmes jusqu’où s’étend la détermination de la Russie.
Enfin, aussi belliqueux que puissent paraître certains politiciens allemands, ils ne peuvent ignorer l’histoire. Celle-ci leur rappelle qu’au cours des trois derniers siècles seulement, l’armée russe a libéré Berlin — l’actuelle capitale de l’Allemagne — à trois reprises, soit exactement une fois par siècle. Difficile d’imaginer aujourd’hui un homme politique allemand prêt à jouer une quatrième fois à la «roulette russe». Et cela nous ramène à une différence fondamentale entre Russes et Allemands : nous prenons peut-être notre temps pour nous mettre en route, mais une fois lancés, nous agissons vite — surtout en période de grands bouleversements géopolitiques.
EN PRIME
Le taux d’approbation de Merz est inférieur à 10%. Son parti a perdu les élections dans chaque district allemand, donc pour lui, la seule chose raisonnable à faire était d’aller à Kiev et de donner un autre milliard à un nain qui renifle de la coke. Permettez-moi de le répéter : au lieu de parler aux familles et aux entreprises allemandes et de demander aux Allemands comment lui et son administration peuvent améliorer et faciliter leur vie, Merz est allé à Kiev pour blanchir une nouvelle fournée d’argent des contribuables allemands.
O Renault Boreal passa a ser o primeiro veículo produzido no Brasil a oferecer o Gemini de série. A inteligência artificial do Google amplia a experiência conectada a bordo, proporcionando interações mais naturais, intuitivas e personalizadas, transformando a cabine em uma verdadeira extensão digital da rotina dos ocupantes.
O SUV médio da Renault já havia elevado a experiência conectada a um novo patamar ao se tornar o primeiro veículo produzido no Brasil com Google Automotive Services (GAS), plataforma que integra Google Maps, Google Play e, agora, o Gemini como assistente virtual. O sistema substitui o Google Assistant e amplia suas capacidades com inteligência artificial generativa.
Agora, o Boreal dá mais um passo à frente com o Gemini. A tecnologia também está disponível como atualização opcional para os veículos Renault equipados com o openR link com Google integrado. Como evolução do Google Assistant, o Gemini amplia as capacidades do assistente virtual da plataforma, preservando todas as funcionalidades já disponíveis aos usuários e adicionando novos recursos baseados em inteligência artificial generativa.
Além de compreender contextos mais complexos e interpretar comandos mais naturais, o sistema passa a permitir o controle de um número ainda maior de funções do veículo por voz.
Além de realizar todas as tarefas já disponíveis com o Google Assistant, o Gemini integrado ao openR link amplia as possibilidades de interação com o veículo. Agora, os usuários podem controlar diretamente um número ainda maior de funções por comandos de voz, incluindo novas funcionalidades como abrir e fechar o teto solar e os vidros.
Com a nova tecnologia, o motorista não precisa mais recorrer a comandos específicos para interagir com o veículo. Em vez de dizer frases exatas, como “Ok Google, ligue o ar-condicionado”, basta utilizar a linguagem natural, por exemplo: “Ok Google, está muito calor aqui dentro”. O sistema compreende a intenção do usuário e pode ajustar automaticamente a climatização.
O comando de ativação por voz continua o mesmo. O Gemini pode ser acionado por meio das expressões “Hey Google” ou “Ok Google”, pelo botão de voz no volante ou pelo ícone do assistente na tela do openR link. Para iniciar uma conversa contínua com o Gemini Live, basta acionar o botão Gemini Live ou dizer: “Hey Google, vamos conversar” ou “Hey Google, vamos conversar ao vivo”.
O openR link com Google integrado é um sistema multimídia que oferece uma experiência conectada fluida, escalável e em constante evolução. O Gemini amplia ainda mais o conjunto de serviços disponíveis na plataforma, mantendo todas as funcionalidades já oferecidas pelo Google Assistant e adicionando novos recursos de inteligência artificial generativa e controle por voz.
Projetado para interagir de maneira mais natural com os ocupantes do veículo, ele é capaz de compreender o contexto das conversas, responder perguntas com maior precisão e lidar com solicitações mais complexas.
A atualização é gratuita, realizada remotamente por meio de tecnologia FOTA (Firmware Over-The-Air), e não altera a duração do pacote de conectividade. Sua implementação baseia-se em:
– Conexão à conta Google no openR link utilizando a conectividade nativa do Boreal, sem necessidade de visita à concessionária.
– Uma notificação na tela do openR link permite ao cliente decidir se deseja migrar para o Google Gemini.
– Disponível para todos os veículos compatíveis, de acordo com os idiomas suportados e a versão do openR link.
O sistema multimídia aprimorado está disponível sem custo adicional para clientes conectados a uma conta Google em um dos idiomas compatíveis. O usuário escolhe se quer ativar o Gemini e também pode retornar ao Google Assistant a qualquer momento.
Como evolução do Google Assistant, o Gemini representa um grande avanço nos assistentes de voz embarcados. Alimentado pela tecnologia de IA do Google, ele é capaz de:
– Compreender o contexto da conversa e as intenções dos usuários.
– Executar solicitações mais complexas.
– Manter conversas naturais e contínuas.
– Alternar idiomas durante a conversa.
Isso significa que os motoristas podem falar de forma natural, sem precisar memorizar comandos específicos. Os usuários também poderão ativar o Gemini Live para uma interação conversacional mais avançada. Esse recurso permite:
– Conversas livres e naturais.
– Interromper o assistente a qualquer momento.
– Fazer várias solicitações em sequência sem repetir a expressão “Ok Google”.
– Alternar idiomas durante a conversa.
– Uma experiência simplificada, projetada para segurança e conforto
Ao permitir tarefas mais complexas por comando de voz e reduzir a necessidade de interação por toque, o Gemini ajuda a:
– Minimizar distrações do motorista, mantendo o foco na estrada.
– Ampliar e simplificar o acesso às funções do veículo por comandos de voz.
– Melhorar o conforto e a praticidade no dia a dia.
Totalmente integrado ao veículo e ao ecossistema Google, o Gemini consegue responder a situações reais e executar várias tarefas em sequência sem necessidade de novas interações. Navegação inteligente com compreensão de contexto:
“Ok Google, leve-me para o centro de São Paulo, mas evite a Rebouças.”
→ O Gemini analisa o contexto e sugere uma solução adequada.
Controle por voz das funções do veículo:
“Está frio aqui dentro.”
→ O sistema ajusta automaticamente a climatização, elevando a temperatura da cabine.
Acesso a informações e conteúdos durante a viagem (modo Gemini Live):
“Ok Google. Está muito quente hoje. O que economiza mais combustível: abrir as janelas ou ligar o ar-condicionado?”
“Conte uma história sobre carros e dinossauros para meu filho de 8 anos.”
“Crie um quiz sobre a história do Brasil para adultos e adolescentes.” |
“Quais foram os resultados dos jogos do Brasileirão de ontem?”
→ O sistema consegue responder perguntas abertas, além de fornecer informações gerais, notícias e conteúdos de mídia.
O openR link com Google integrado é um sistema multimídia evolutivo que proporciona uma experiência conectada cada vez mais rica e intuitiva em qualquer lugar do mundo. Desde o lançamento, o Gemini oferece suporte a 16 idiomas, entre eles inglês, espanhol e português.
O Gemini contribui para uma experiência conectada consistente para clientes Renault em todos os mercados onde o sistema está disponível.
Os clientes Renault continuarão recebendo melhorias ao longo do tempo por meio de atualizações remotas, sem necessidade de levar o veículo à concessionária. Como plataforma de IA escalável, o Gemini recebe:
– Atualizações contínuas e automáticas.
– Capacidades e competências linguísticas ampliadas.
– Novos recursos ao longo do tempo.
The post Renault Boreal estreia sistema de Inteligência Artificial do Google appeared first on Diário da Manhã - O Jornal do leitor Inteligente.
Three years after Israel launched its genocidal aggression on the Gaza strip, massacres and mass destruction continue to take place on a daily basis, despite the US-brokered ceasefire deal that was reached in October 2025.
The nominal truce was preceded by two other short ceasefire agreements. The first was reached in November 2023 and lasted for only one week, while the second was sealed in mid-January 2025 and collapsed two months later.
For three entire years, the world has borne witness to one of the most heinous genocides in modern history, which has resulted in the killing of at least 75,000 Palestinians, according to the latest official health reports, with women, children, and the elderly comprising 56.2% of the death toll. Meanwhile, 82% of Gaza’s structures have been destroyed.
Starvation and the total blockade of aid have also been used as weapons of war against the Palestinian population in the war-ravaged territory.
As soon as it was launched, the US-backed fierce Israeli military campaign expanded beyond Gaza to include other parts of West Asia, including the occupied West Bank, Lebanon, Yemen, and Syria.
About 9,000 people have been killed in Lebanon, more than 1,136 in the West Bank, dozens in Yemen and scores of others in Syria.
The genocide in Gaza has been characterized by the systematic targeting of journalists and media workers, with the death toll reaching more than 260, according to Naser Abu Baker, President of the Palestinian Journalists’ Syndicate (PJS).
Abu Baker told BreakThrough News that over the same period, 550 journalists were wounded, and over 200 were arrested.
“All of this underscores a systematic policy implemented by the Israeli occupation, which primarily aims to prevent the truth about the crimes committed in the Palestinian territories by the Israeli occupation against the Palestinian people from being documented and transmitted, especially in the Gaza Strip,” he emphasized.
The chief of PJS noted that the targeting of Palestinian journalists by the Israeli forces began over one decade before the October 7 attacks.
“PJS documented more than 9000 assaults on journalists in the occupied Palestinian territories between 2012 and 2023. More than 56 journalists were killed during that period, including three foreign journalists,” Abu Baker clarified.
Simultaneously with the events in Gaza, the Israel Prison Service escalated a brutal crackdown against the Palestinian Prisoners’ Movement, intensifying a campaign that began in early 2023.
While around 5,200 Palestinian political prisoners were held in Israeli detention prior to October 7, 2023, the number jumped to 9,600 after the outbreak of the Israeli genocidal aggression on Gaza. Many of those prisoners have been placed under administrative detention without charge.
These latest figures only represent the prisoners whose whereabouts inside Israeli detention centers were documented by Palestinian prisoners groups. Thousands of additional Palestinians remain unaccounted for and are believed to have faced enforced disappearance amid the ongoing Israeli military operations in Gaza.
During the past three years, Palestinian prisoners have endured miserable detention conditions, including medical neglect, deprivation of adequate food and hygiene supplies, as well as physical and psychological torture.
This horrific situation culminated with the endorsement of an Israeli law mandating the execution of Palestinian prisoners by hanging.
On the third anniversary of October 7, Raed Abu al-Hummus, head of the Palestinian Commission of Detainees and Ex-Detainees Affairs, delivered a message to international human rights organizations via BreakThrough News.
“I call on international human rights organizations to practice their stated objectives, to truthfully convey our message, and to form a parallel front to our heroic prisoners’ front inside the prisons, in an attempt to protect them from these violations, from this far-right monster seeking to slowly kill them,” Abu al-Hummus stated, referring to Israel’s Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir.
While some media outlets and political analysts suggest that Israel’s intensified atrocities in recent years represent the policy of the far-right wing solely, the Palestinian grassroots believe that they constitute the very core of the Zionist movement.
Palestinian political activist, freedom fighter and former prisoner in Israeli jails Omar Assaf argued that “the genocide does not reflect a policy of an individual or a current within the Israeli government. It rather reflects a general policy, because the Zionist movement as a whole was founded on the exclusion of the Palestinian people, expelling them, and looting their land.”
“Therefore, if this far-right government is practicing genocide, this does not mean that the next government will be a government of peace,” Assaf asserted.
Despite three years of unspeakable atrocities and over 78 years of military occupation amid the total silence and inaction of the international community, the Palestinian people remain steadfast and resilient in their homeland, refusing to leave or surrender.
L’Europa ha già conosciuto questa strada, nell’estate del 1914. Sarebbe imperdonabile percorrerla di nuovo, stavolta con le testate nucleari in fondo.
Tutto è pronto a esplodere
A Copenaghen, davanti ai capi di stato maggiore dei trentadue Paesi dell’Alleanza atlantica, l’ammiraglio Giuseppe Cavo Dragone ha scelto le parole con cui presentarsi all’opinione pubblica europea. Presidente del Comitato militare della NATO dal gennaio 2025, ha annunciato che l’Alleanza dispone di «4.000 pagine di piani» per il fianco orientale, che quei piani coprono ogni scenario «da una crisi minima o un intervento sul nostro territorio all’attivazione dell’articolo 5 e alle successive azioni», e che «il personale militare, i sistemi e le armi sono pronti». Poi la chiusa: in caso di attacco, i russi «hanno molto più da perdere che da guadagnare. Questo è assolutamente certo. Ed è questo che costituisce la deterrenza».
Nelle intenzioni dell’ammiraglio doveva essere un messaggio rassicurante. Letto con attenzione, è una delle dichiarazioni più imprudenti pronunciate da un vertice militare europeo dalla fine della Guerra fredda. Vale la pena smontarla pezzo per pezzo.
Le parole di Copenaghen non cadono nel vuoto. Poche ore prima il premier polacco Donald Tusk aveva previsto che Mosca potrebbe lanciare droni o missili sul territorio di un Paese NATO «nei prossimi mesi», per dimostrare che l’articolo 5 è una promessa di carta; Parigi, intanto, preparava un piano contro gli attacchi con droni. In un’atmosfera del genere, il compito di un militare di rango sarebbe raffreddare, distinguere l’ipotesi dal fatto, ricordare ai governi che la guerra tra potenze nucleari non è uno scenario da pianificare ma da impedire. L’ammiraglio ha fatto l’opposto: ha aggiunto combustibile.
E non è la prima volta. Nel dicembre 2025, in un’intervista al Financial Times, lo stesso Cavo Dragone spiegava che l’Alleanza stava valutando di diventare «più aggressiva» contro la guerra ibrida russa, che un «attacco preventivo» poteva essere considerato un’«azione difensiva» e che essere più aggressivi della controparte «potrebbe essere un’opzione». Mosca, per bocca di Marija Zacharova, parlò di un passo irresponsabile verso l’escalation, arrivato mentre si negoziava sull’Ucraina. Dieci mesi dopo il registro non è cambiato. Si è solo fatto più esplicito: prima l’ipotesi dell’attacco preventivo, ora l’inventario delle armi pronte.
La deterrenza non si fa con i proclami
L’ammiraglio chiama tutto questo «deterrenza». Ma la teoria della deterrenza, quella seria, dice altro. Thomas Schelling ha spiegato che la deterrenza è un atto di comunicazione in cui la credibilità conta quanto la forza, e che la minaccia efficace lascia sempre all’avversario una via d’uscita. Nel dilemma della sicurezza, ciò che una parte vive come difesa venga letto dall’altra come preparazione all’offesa. Quattromila pagine che arrivano fino alle «azioni successive» all’articolo 5 sono, viste da Mosca, piani di guerra contro la Russia. Nessun analista del Cremlino le leggerà in altro modo, e nessuno dovrebbe stupirsene.
C’è poi una questione di ruolo. Il presidente del Comitato militare è il principale consigliere militare del Segretario generale e del Consiglio Nord Atlantico: non decide la politica dell’Alleanza, la serve. Quando un ufficiale di questo livello usa la tribuna pubblica per lanciare avvertimenti a una potenza straniera, invade uno spazio che appartiene ai governi e ai parlamenti, cioè a chi risponde ai cittadini. In una democrazia la decisione sulla guerra non spetta alle stellette. Oppure dobbiamo intendere che è la NATO, tramite Cavo Dragone, a provocare lo scoppio di una guerra, invocandola a più non posso?
E soprattutto c’è l’arma nucleare. Dal novembre 2024 la dottrina russa considera l’aggressione di uno Stato non nucleare, condotta con la partecipazione o il sostegno di una potenza nucleare, come un attacco congiunto, e abbassa la soglia per l’impiego dell’atomica. Si può giudicare quella dottrina come si vuole. Ignorarla è impossibile. Chi parla di «azioni successive» all’articolo 5 contro un Paese che ha scritto nero su bianco queste regole sta parlando, che lo voglia o no, di guerra nucleare.
Tutta la costruzione retorica di Copenaghen poggia su una premessa mai dimostrata: che la Russia si prepari ad attaccare l’Alleanza. Gli indizi citati sono violazioni dello spazio aereo, sabotaggi, rapporti d’intelligence che parlano di un attacco «nei prossimi anni». Il Cremlino ha smentito piani del genere, e la smentita da sola non prova nulla. Ma la logica strategica sì. Mosca è impegnata in Ucraina da oltre quattro anni e mezzo; un’aggressione diretta contro un membro NATO la porterebbe contro gli arsenali di Stati Uniti, Regno Unito e Francia, senza alcun guadagno proporzionato al rischio. Che una simile scelta sia altamente improbabile lo capisce chiunque ragioni in termini di costi e benefici, a Mosca come a Bruxelles.
Perché allora insistere sull’imminenza della minaccia? Una risposta, difficile da scartare, sta nei bilanci. Al vertice dell’Aia del giugno 2025 gli alleati si sono impegnati a portare la spesa per la difesa al 5% del PIL entro il 2035. Un obiettivo del genere si giustifica davanti agli elettori solo con un nemico alle porte. La paura è diventata una voce di bilancio.
Resta l’altra metà del problema, la più grave. Se un attacco russo alla NATO è improbabile, una guerra della NATO contro la Russia è impensabile. La Federazione Russa possiede, secondo le stime della Federation of American Scientists, il più ampio arsenale nucleare del pianeta. Non esiste una vittoria militare contro una potenza di questo tipo: esiste solo la distruzione reciproca, e la sua geografia è già scritta. Si combatterebbe qui.
Ammiraglio, ci dia qualche spiegazione
Ammiraglio, adesso si calmi, si pulisca la bava che le è uscita dalla bocca, e ci spieghi esattamente cosa abbiamo noi da perdere da un confronto con la Russia. Lei ha misurato con certezza assoluta le perdite altrui. Le nostre non le ha nominate.
Proviamo a farlo noi. L’Italia ospita basi che le fonti aperte indicano da anni come depositi di armi nucleari statunitensi, ad Aviano e a Ghedi; ospita Sigonella, il comando alleato di Napoli, porti e infrastrutture che in qualunque pianificazione avversaria sono bersagli di prima fila. La Polonia, i Baltici, la Germania sono il teatro stesso delle «4.000 pagine». Gli Stati Uniti hanno un oceano di mezzo. L’Europa ha le sue città, le sue fabbriche, i suoi figli. In una guerra con la Russia l’Europa non è un attore: è il campo di battaglia.
E allora la seconda domanda, quella che nessun comunicato di Copenaghen affronta. Cosa otterremmo da un confronto nucleare combattuto sul nostro territorio, per l’esattezza? Quale obiettivo politico, quale interesse nazionale italiano, quale principio europeo varrebbe Milano, Monaco, Varsavia? La risposta onesta è una sola: niente. Una guerra che non si può vincere non è una politica. È un suicidio con un piano operativo allegato.
In 77 anni di storia, che l’ammiraglio rivendica, l’Alleanza ha prodotto piani per ogni contingenza. Mancano altre pagine, quelle che l’Europa dovrebbe pretendere dai propri governi: un’architettura di sicurezza continentale che includa anche la Russia, misure di fiducia reciproca, canali militari di comunicazione permanenti, trattati sul controllo degli armamenti da ricostruire dopo che quasi tutti sono stati lasciati decadere. Nel 1975, con l’Atto finale di Helsinki, due blocchi armati fino ai denti seppero sedersi allo stesso tavolo. Non era debolezza. Era la consapevolezza che la sopravvivenza del continente valeva più di qualunque vantaggio tattico.
Oggi quella consapevolezza sembra scomparsa proprio da chi, per mestiere, dovrebbe conoscere meglio di tutti il prezzo della guerra. Quando i generali parlano come ultimatum e i governi tacciono, il rischio non è che la guerra venga dichiarata. È che arrivi da sola, per inerzia, trascinata da parole che nessuno ha avuto il coraggio di ritirare.
L’Europa ha già conosciuto questa strada, nell’estate del 1914. Sarebbe imperdonabile percorrerla di nuovo, stavolta con le testate nucleari in fondo.
Se não fosse o devastador terramoto de 1755, provavelmente esta igreja não existia.
O conteúdo Foto do dia: a igreja surgida da maior tragédia que atingiu o Algarve aparece primeiro em Algarve Marafado.
Si la puerta que, según Moscú, está abierta, en realidad está cerrada, es por este lado; y no fue Roma quien la cerró por iniciativa propia.
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Escríbenos: info@strategic-culture.su
Una cumbre de Valdai fuera de la sede
Lo que voy a compartir en este artículo es menos técnico y más personal de lo habitual. Se trata de la información recopilada a lo largo de varios días de diálogo, debate y, al parecer, una pregunta «escandalosa» que se convirtió en una sensación mediática en Europa, porque le pregunté al presidente de la Federación Rusa, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, qué será de Europa.
Puedes encontrar el video completo del discurso de Vladimir Putin en el Foro de Valdai aquí.
Puedes encontrar mis comentarios y las respuestas de Putin aquí.
Este año, el Foro de Valdai no se reunió en Sochi. Las invitaciones enviadas en el verano aún indicaban esa ciudad del Mar Negro como sede, pero luego, a finales de agosto, los organizadores anunciaron el traslado a la región de Moscú.
Según el FT, el Servicio Federal de Protección exigió el traslado, preocupado por la amenaza de los drones ucranianos tras un verano de ataques contra refinerías costeras. Este detalle logístico tiene su propia importancia.
La guerra —que en Valdai siempre se discute en términos del sistema internacional— ahora también está influyendo en la organización práctica del foro.
La 23.ª Reunión Anual se llevó a cabo del 28 de septiembre al 1 de octubre bajo un título que, para un europeo, suena casi como una pregunta personal: «Responsabilidad por el futuro: ¿Los límites de lo posible o posibilidades ilimitadas?».
La inauguración contó con la presentación del informe anual del Club, Keep Calm. El Estado y la responsabilidad por el futuro, que los autores presentan —con un guiño a Kubrick— como un manual para dejar de preocuparse y aprender a amar el caos. A esto le siguieron nueve sesiones temáticas, una sesión especial y, el último día, la sesión plenaria con el presidente.
Llegué como italiano y como europeo, sabiendo que en esos salones ambas identidades tienen un peso diferente. A lo largo de la semana, hablé, en particular, con cuatro interlocutores de alto nivel: Sergey Karaganov, Maksim Oreshkin, Sergey Lavrov y, durante la sesión plenaria, Vladimir Putin.
Las tres primeras conversaciones tuvieron lugar al margen de las sesiones, y las relato a partir de mis notas —en esencia, no palabra por palabra—. El cuarto intercambio es público y está documentado mediante una transcripción, de la cual cito directamente.
Tomados uno por uno, los cuatro diálogos transmiten cosas con las que ya está familiarizado cualquiera que siga el debate ruso. Sin embargo, cuando se observan en secuencia, pintan un panorama más claro: una evaluación compartida de Europa y cuatro formas diferentes de sacar conclusiones de ella. Y, sobre todo, un futuro que de ninguna manera es prometedor.
Karaganov: Europa como fuente del mal
Sergei Karaganov es uno de los fundadores del Club Valdai, presidente honorario del Consejo de Política Exterior y de Defensa, y desde hace años ha sido la voz más radical del realismo ruso.
Con él, la conversación comenzó de inmediato con el punto más polémico. Europa, dijo, es la raíz de todos los males. Si fuera destruida, nadie la extrañaría. Un conflicto nuclear táctico en su territorio no involucraría a otros actores.
Los europeos han tenido tiempo de sobra para encontrar una solución a sus propios problemas; ahora que han optado por prepararse para la guerra contra Rusia, es demasiado tarde para ofrecerles otra oportunidad.
Debo ser honesto: nunca he sido admirador de Karaganov; a menudo he considerado que sus puntos de vista son demasiado radicales y anticuados.
Pero a partir de un café juntos después del almuerzo —y a lo largo de una semana de discusiones— descubrí que pensamos de manera muy similar y que sus puntos de vista no son en absoluto triviales.
Cualquiera que haya leído sus declaraciones recientes reconocerá esta línea de pensamiento.
En junio de 2023, Karaganov había argumentado públicamente que Rusia debería bajar el umbral para el uso de armas nucleares a fin de restaurar la credibilidad de su disuasión e inducir a Occidente a retirarse del conflicto en Ucrania.
Parte de ese enfoque se incorporó posteriormente a documentos oficiales: los Fundamentos de la política estatal de la Federación Rusa en el ámbito de la disuasión nuclear, actualizados en noviembre de 2024, tratan un ataque por parte de un Estado no nuclear, llevado a cabo con la participación o el apoyo de una potencia nuclear, como un ataque conjunto.
Sus palabras, sin embargo, contienen tres afirmaciones distintas, y vale la pena diferenciarlas.
La primera es un juicio histórico y civilizatorio: Europa como fuente de las grandes catástrofes de la modernidad, desde las guerras mundiales hasta el colonialismo. Se trata de una tesis que Karaganov ha defendido desde hace tiempo y que puede ser cuestionada, pero que pertenece al ámbito de la interpretación.
La segunda —que nadie lloraría la pérdida de Europa— es una predicción sobre las reacciones de los demás; por lo que observé durante esos días, encuentra eco en una parte significativa de los participantes asiáticos, africanos y latinoamericanos.
La tercera es una hipótesis estratégica que sustenta todo lo demás: una escalada nuclear en Europa se mantendría confinada a Europa.
Sobre este punto, la literatura sobre la disuasión lleva setenta años debatiendo y —afortunadamente— carece de evidencia empírica. El factor que complica esta hipótesis se encuentra dentro de la propia Europa.
Francia y el Reino Unido poseen arsenales nacionales, y en marzo de 2025, París abrió formalmente el debate sobre la dimensión europea de su propia disuasión.
Un conflicto nuclear «exclusivamente europeo» presupone que dos potencias nucleares europeas se quedarían de brazos cruzados. Esta es la suposición más débil de todo el argumento, independientemente de cómo se evalúen las otras dos.
También cabe señalar que Karaganov no habla en nombre del gobierno. En el Foro de Valdai, representa al ala del debate ruso que empuja al Kremlin hacia posiciones más definitivas, y una de sus funciones es precisamente ampliar los límites de lo que se puede decir. Visto así, su «demasiado tarde» es un indicio de una tendencia más que de una doctrina.
Oreshkin: El mercado que ya no existe
Con Maksim Oreshkin, el tono ha cambiado por completo. Subjefe de la Administración Presidencial, exministro de Desarrollo Económico y posteriormente asesor económico del presidente, Oreshkin razona en términos de flujos de efectivo y balances.
Su evaluación fue contundente: Europa está acabada. Ya no existe una competencia viable en el mercado energético, porque China e India ocupan ahora los primeros lugares entre los clientes de Rusia.
Y no hay razón para invertir en un rescate europeo, ya que los europeos, hasta la fecha, no han mostrado interés en encontrar una solución pacífica y razonable.
La pregunta que le había planteado durante la reunión con los participantes de Valdai fue: «Dado que el gasoducto Nord Stream 2 ya no está disponible —porque fue saboteado—, ¿pretende encontrar un nuevo sistema de transporte de energía, suponiendo que Europa se reconcilie y la situación diplomática mejore?». Su respuesta directa —y tal vez brutal— es como una daga de verdad clavada en la conciencia de cada europeo.
«Se acabó» debe entenderse en un sentido técnico. Oreshkin no se refería directamente a la civilización europea, sino a Europa como socio comercial: un mercado que ha dejado de ser fundamental para Rusia y que, por lo tanto, no justifica concesiones políticas para recuperarlo.
A partir de 2022, el petróleo crudo ruso encontró a sus principales compradores en China y la India, mientras que Bruselas, mediante el acuerdo entre el Consejo y el Parlamento Europeo de diciembre de 2025, se comprometió a eliminar gradualmente las importaciones de gas ruso —incluido el gas por gasoducto y el GNL— para 2027. La interdependencia energética que había mantenido unidas a Europa y Rusia durante medio siglo —incluso en los peores momentos de la Guerra Fría— ha sido desmantelada por ambas partes.
El razonamiento de Oreshkin resume la consecuencia más simple de esto: quien ya no es el cliente principal, ya no tiene influencia. Estas son las leyes del mercado, y ni en Londres, ni en Berlín, ni en Bruselas quedan políticos o grupos de poder que puedan decirle a Rusia «qué hacer» .
La otra cara de la moneda también es bien conocida en Moscú. Un mercado dominado por dos grandes compradores les permite exigir descuentos, y sustituir a Europa por Asia tiene un costo en términos de precio y acceso a la tecnología.
Pero según la lógica que me presentaron, la pregunta ya no es si Europa le conviene a Rusia. Es cuánto costaría hacer que vuelva a ser beneficiosa, y la respuesta implícita es que los europeos deben asumir ese costo.
Lavrov: la puerta cerrada a «este» orden
Con Serguéi Lavrov, la discusión pasó de la economía a la diplomacia, sin cambiar la conclusión.
Europa, dijo, tuvo muchas oportunidades para restablecer un diálogo con Rusia y, en cambio, optó por avivar la confrontación directa. Ahora es demasiado tarde para dar marcha atrás: se han cruzado todos los límites y, con el orden europeo actual, no hay forma de volver a las relaciones anteriores.
Me gustaría que hiciéramos una pausa por un momento para reflexionar sobre el peso de estas palabras.
Quienes conocen a Lavrov saben que es un político capaz de sopesar cada palabra con gran inteligencia, incluso en entornos más relajados como la Cumbre de Valdai. «Se han sobrepasado los límites». Sería inútil enumerar estos límites, porque son tan obvios para todo el mundo que simplemente sería una pérdida de tiempo.
Pero la mirada en los ojos de Lavrov mientras hablaba de Europa… eso nunca lo olvidaré. Me he reunido con él muchas otras veces, pero en esta ocasión hubo algo diferente.
El ministro cuenta con un historial de acontecimientos a los que la diplomacia rusa hace referencia con regularidad: los acuerdos de Minsk, los borradores de tratados sobre garantías de seguridad presentados a Estados Unidos y a la OTAN el 17 de diciembre de 2021, y las negociaciones de Estambul en la primavera de 2022.
La interpretación rusa de cada uno de estos acontecimientos es controvertida y es cuestionada en Europa. Lo que me interesa aquí es otro elemento: una salvedad que, al releerla después de la sesión plenaria, resultó ser la clave de toda la semana.
Un regreso es imposible bajo este marco europeo. No con Europa, en su forma actual —es decir, la UE y la OTAN—. El rechazo se refiere a una clase dirigente y a una arquitectura institucional, no a los países que forman parte de ella.
Me pregunto: ¿hasta qué punto se ha abusado de la paciencia rusa para llegar al punto de decir tales cosas? La literatura clásica rusa nos ofrece ejemplos admirables de cómo los políticos rusos son capaces de dar largas, ignorar y ser pacientes.
Y no se puede negar que esta ha sido sistemáticamente la actitud de la clase dirigente rusa durante los últimos años de conflicto.
Llegar al punto de decir que se ha sobrepasado el límite —algo que Putin reiteraría más tarde en la sesión plenaria de la cumbre— significa que ya no hay más recursos que desperdiciar en una espera paciente; significa que el Oso ha sido despertado de su hibernación en el momento equivocado; significa que las consecuencias de estas acciones tendrán una importancia trascendental.
Lavrov agregó una cosa más:
Estamos listos para atacar a Europa de manera ejemplar, no como lo hicimos en Ucrania».
Tomen nota de estas palabras, queridos amigos europeos. Vuelvan a leerlas y reflexionen sobre su peso. No hace falta decir nada más.
Un profesor italiano le hace una pregunta a Putin
Llegamos ahora a uno de los momentos más peligrosos de mi carrera. La sesión plenaria se llevó a cabo, como es tradicional, con la presencia del presidente ruso y con Fyodor Lukyanov como moderador. Tomé la palabra y formulé una pregunta de dos partes:
Vengo de Italia, un país que actualmente no tiene buenas relaciones con Rusia. Como europeo, me gustaría preguntarle: ¿Qué condiciones establecerá Rusia para desarrollar un nuevo sistema de seguridad para los países europeos? Y, si imaginamos una Europa post-Unión Europea, ¿la considerará parte de una gran asociación euroasiática o, en su opinión, Estados Unidos y Rusia siempre estarán compitiendo por estos territorios?
Putin comenzó con la segunda parte, y el orden no es una coincidencia:
Italia se encuentra, de hecho, en Europa, y yo estoy hablando de una alianza euroasiática: por lo tanto, no hace falta decir que consideraremos —y ya consideramos— a Italia también como un socio euroasiático.
Inmediatamente después, aclaró que el destino de la Unión Europea, y la permanencia de Italia en ella, «no es asunto nuestro». Moscú ni siquiera tiene la intención de discutirlo, porque cualquier comentario al respecto se interpretaría como un intento de desintegrar a la UE, «mientras que nosotros no queremos desintegrar nada en absoluto. Solo queremos construir y cooperar».
Sobre las condiciones para un nuevo sistema de seguridad, la respuesta fue clara:
No tenemos condiciones previas». El obstáculo, en su opinión, está del otro lado. Algunos políticos europeos consideran inaceptable que un solo país entable un diálogo con Rusia, y Putin ha calificado esta exigencia como un dictado aún más severo que el de la era soviética. La comparación fue cuidadosamente elaborada: la URSS era un Estado unitario y altamente centralizado, cuyas repúblicas formaban parte de una única estructura estatal; la Unión Europea, en teoría, no lo es, pero en la práctica se comporta como si lo fuera. «Nadie nos lo prohíbe; estamos listos».
En ese momento, Lukyanov intervino con un comentario provocativo típico de un moderador experimentado: dado que Bruselas lo prohíbe, ¿no sería mejor contribuir un poco a la desintegración de la UE, para que sea más fácil tratar con los países individualmente? La respuesta llegó sin vacilar: «Pero no hay necesidad: se desmoronarán por sí solos».
Entonces Putin se dirigió directamente a mí. «Nuestro colega italiano sabe esto mejor que nosotros», dijo, y comenzó a dar las cifras: la deuda pública italiana en el 140 %, el déficit en torno al 3 %, y en otros países europeos cerca del 5 %. Las cifras estaban redondeadas, pero no muy lejos de la realidad.
Según Istat y Eurostat, a finales de 2024, la deuda pública de Italia se situaba en el 135,3 % del PIB y su endeudamiento neto en el 3,4 %. Sin embargo, el punto central de ese pasaje no eran los decimales.
Todos los problemas comienzan con la economía: el nivel de vida baja, el desempleo aumenta y los ciudadanos de las principales economías europeas lo sienten en carne propia; y esto, dijo,
también socava los cimientos mismos de la Unión Europea. Pero eso no es asunto nuestro; no nos entrometemos.
Concluyó reiterando la oferta de manera equilibrada: diálogo con la Unión en su conjunto, si así lo desea la Unión, o con países individuales, sin condiciones previas. «Pero tampoco debe haber condiciones previas por parte de Europa».
Tratar de comprender la magnitud de estas palabras, el equilibrio político que revelan y la fortaleza de un estadista que se preocupa no solo por el bien de su propio país, sino también por el de todo un continente, es una verdadera lección sobre lo que significa la política.
Escucha el discurso completo de Putin y comprenderás cómo, en menos de cinco minutos, es posible captar el declive de toda Europa, en todas sus facetas, al tiempo que se reitera con nostalgia que Rusia ha hecho todo lo que estaba a su alcance para ofrecer su ayuda.
Pero las decisiones de los europeos son suyas, sea cual sea la bandera que enarbolen. Rusia respeta y siempre respetará los principios fundamentales de su política exterior y su tradición política. Nada de mesianismo milagroso, nada de salvadores improvisados.
Europa —o más bien, los europeos de esta Europa—: ¿qué pretenden hacer?
Releyendo mis notas de viaje
Al releer mis notas a mi regreso, lo primero que llama la atención es la convergencia de puntos de vista.
El estratega, el economista, el ministro de Relaciones Exteriores y el presidente han expresado, cada uno con sus propias palabras, la misma evaluación: la Europa actual ha agotado su crédito ante Moscú. Lo segundo que llama la atención es que cada uno saca una conclusión diferente de ese diagnóstico.
Para Karaganov, la conclusión es coercitiva y toma un tono casi escatológico: Europa ha tenido su oportunidad, y lo que siga ya no es asunto de la diplomacia.
Para Oreshkin, es una cuestión de cálculo frío y duro: Europa no vale la inversión necesaria para recuperarla.
Para Lavrov, se trata de un retroceso diplomático limitado, centrado en la estructura política más que en la gente.
Por último, para Putin, la puerta sigue abierta —pero hacia los estados individuales, no hacia Bruselas—, acompañada de la expectativa de que la erosión económica hará el resto.
La aparente contradicción entre la postura de «ya es demasiado tarde» de los tres primeros y la postura de «sin condiciones previas» del cuarto se resuelve precisamente en la caracterización de Lavrov.
El resultado es una línea coherente, que yo llamaría «bilateralización»: Moscú no tratará con la Unión como entidad política mientras su liderazgo actual permanezca en el poder; ofrece a los estados miembros individuales canales sin condiciones previas y deja que las dificultades internas de Europa hagan que esos canales resulten atractivos.
La referencia a Italia como socio euroasiático «ya hoy» debe entenderse dentro de este marco: no es una cortesía; es una indicación de qué interlocutor prefiere Moscú.
Ciertamente no puedo afirmar que los cuatro interlocutores excepcionales hubieran llegado a un acuerdo —eso no hace falta decirlo—, pero esta convergencia me pareció verdaderamente «profética».
Valdai siempre ha sido el escenario donde se muestra la amplitud del debate ruso ante una audiencia extranjera. Puedo afirmar que estas perspectivas son compatibles y se refuerzan mutuamente: la postura firme de Karaganov hace que la oferta de Putin parezca moderada; las cifras de Oreshkin dan credibilidad a la idea de que Moscú no necesita hacer concesiones; y la fórmula de Lavrov equilibra la firmeza con la apertura.
La crisis de la deuda soberana de 2010–2012 dio lugar al Mecanismo Europeo de Estabilidad y a la unión bancaria; la pandemia condujo a Next Generation EU y a la primera deuda común a gran escala. Dentro de la Unión, las crisis han generado al menos tanta centralización como fragmentación.
Por lo tanto, «se desmoronarán por sí solos» es una apuesta, no una observación —aunque la apuesta les cueste poco a quienes la hacen—: si la UE se mantiene unida, Moscú al menos ha ofrecido diálogo; si se derrumba, ya cuenta con canales bilaterales establecidos.
Los indicadores a los que hay que prestar atención durante los próximos doce a dieciocho meses son bastante claros.
El primero se refiere a las visitas bilaterales a Moscú de los jefes de gobierno de la UE, además de las visitas previas de Viktor Orbán en julio de 2024 y Robert Fico en mayo de 2025.
El segundo es si se mantiene la unanimidad durante las renovaciones semestrales de las sanciones, donde un solo veto basta para abrir una grieta.
El tercero se refiere a las exenciones nacionales del cronograma para la eliminación gradual del gas ruso.
El cuarto —y el más significativo para nosotros— es la posible apertura de un canal estructurado por parte de una capital importante, incluida Roma.
¿Qué concluyo de todo esto? Como italiano, la frase que me quedo no es la que habla de desintegración; es la otra: «Ya consideramos a Italia también un socio euroasiático».
Contiene tanto una oferta como una observación dirigida a nosotros. Si la puerta que Moscú dice que está abierta en realidad está cerrada, está cerrada por este lado —y no fue Roma quien la cerró por su propia cuenta.
¿Cuánto tiempo puede permitirse un país con una deuda que supera el 135 % del PIB dejar que otros decidan quién puede hablar con quién?
Nadie en Moscú me preguntó eso. Es una pregunta que me traje a casa por mi cuenta. Y todo italiano de buena conciencia, todo europeo que aún tenga corazón, conoce la respuesta.
Traducción: Observatoriode trabajador@s en lucha
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