O circo da Fórmula 1 vai chegar amanhã a Marina Bay para a disputa do GP de Singapura, 17ª etapa da temporada 2026 no fim de semana.

As atividades em pista decorrem entre sexta-feira (9) e domingo (11), com o formato Sprint e a tradicional corrida noturna da Fórmula 1 nas ruas da cidade de Singapura. Também designado de Singapore Street Circuit, é um percuso de rua localizado na baía da Marina e tem 5,2 kms de extensão.

O aspecto mais singular, que não deixa de ser interessante, prende-se com o fato desta ter sido a primeira corrida na história da Fórmula 1 a ser realizada à noite. O circuito totalmente iluminado deu aos pilotos um desafio adicional com o qual tiveram de aprender a lidar. Outro aspeto: esta corrida realiza-se no sentido retrógado (contrário aos ponteiros do relógio). Enfim, pormenores que diferenciam esta prova na Ásia das demais no resto do mundo.

Quanto a treinos, na sexta-feira realiza-se o único treino livre do fim de semana, começa às 09:30 hrs (horário de Portugal), enquanto a Qualificação Sprint será realizada a partir das 13:30 hrs.

No sábado, a corrida Sprint tem a largada agendada para as 10:00 hrs e a Classificação para definir a grelha de partida para o Grande Prémio começa às 14:00 hrs.

A corrida principal, correspondente ao GP de Singapura, será disputada no domingo, com a largada a ocorrer às 13:00 hrs, sempre pelo horário de Portugal (GMT+0).

Como habitualmente acontece, com a colaboração da F1Mania, dar-lhe-emos aqui no diariOnline Região Sul, o essencial da informação, desde treinos livres, classificações e corridas, naturalmente.

The Alfa Watan, a ship sailing under the flag of Togo, and the Able, a vessel flying the flag of Palau, were targeted by naval and aerial drones on Tuesday (6 October) morning in the Black Sea near the Bulgarian coast.

The Alfa Watan sank, and rescuers at the scene found only an overturned boat, life jackets, and fragments of the ship’s equipment, according to Bulgarian prime minister Rumen Radev.

The 18-member crew of the Able caught fire, but was successfully evacuated to the port of Varna.

“This is an unacceptable attack in Bulgaria’s exclusive economic zone,” Radev said after an emergency government meeting on Tuesday.

Bulgaria had discussed the drone attack inside the EU and Nato, he added.

It came after a drone also sank a Turkish-owned grain ship, the Royad Mammadov, killing two sailors, on Monday.

But even though Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelensky was quick to blame Russia, the perpetrators have not been formally identified yet, in a grey-zone conflict in which deniability is a tactic.

Russia and Ukraine have been escalating attacks on ships for several months in an effort to disrupt each other’s export economies.

And Moscow’s attacks have largely halted Ukraine’s maritime exports of agricultural products, while Kyiv’s attacks have forced Russia to seek alternative routes for exports.

“The situation in the Black Sea is increasingly concerning,” said EU Commission’s president Ursula von der Leyen on X on Tuesday.

Ukraine has “proposed concrete steps to de-escalate the situation”, also said Zelensky.

But for all his good will, the attacks were just part of a broader deterioration in Europe’s security environment, covering also Nato’s eastern and southern borders.

‘Shadow war’

For Czech president Peter Pavel, speaking to Czech daily Deník N on 22 September, the most imminent danger came from a false-flag attack in Estonia or Latvia, to test Nato’s resolve.

This article continues, but the full version is available only to EUobserver.com subscribers. Visit account.euobserver.com/membership

RT | October 7, 2026

The NATO Military Committee, the bloc’s highest military authority, has gathered in Kiev despite Ukraine not being a member.

The visit comes just a day after US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Ukraine’s NATO membership “is not on the table as we speak,” noting that accession would require unanimous backing.

Kiev’s potential NATO membership has been one of the central issues of the Ukraine conflict. Moscow has long opposed the US-led military bloc’s eastward expansion and has made Ukrainian neutrality a key condition of any settlement, arguing that NATO’s presence there would pose a direct threat to Russian national security.

Ukraine made joining NATO a foreign policy priority following the Western-backed Maidan coup in Kiev in 2014 and later enshrined the objective in its constitution. In September 2022, Vladimir Zelensky demanded “accelerated accession.” As recently as July, he argued that Ukraine’s membership would be “entirely natural.”

NATO continues to officially describe Ukraine as being on an “irreversible path” toward entry. However, former Ukrainian commander-in-chief Valery Zaluzhny, who now serves as Kiev’s ambassador to the UK, said in August that he saw no realistic prospect of it happening.

In a video address on Wednesday, Admiral Giuseppe Cavo Dragone, the chair of the NATO Military Committee, announced that he and military representatives from all 32 member states had arrived in Kiev. It is the committee’s first such visit to Ukraine in eight years.

“We are here in full strength with a clear message: the bond between NATO and Ukraine is stronger and stronger,” Dragone said.

According to the NATO official, the delegation discussed Ukraine’s military priorities with the country’s top brass, as well as lessons from the conflict that could be used to strengthen the bloc’s preparedness for “current and future threats.”

Despite being outside NATO, Ukraine has developed extensive military ties with the bloc, which has been pumping ever more sophisticated weaponry into the country since 2022. Moscow has accused the bloc, especially its European member states, of unnecessarily prolonging the bloodshed and waging a proxy against Russia to the “last Ukrainian.”

A number of influential member states, including the US and Germany, have repeatedly voiced opposition to NATO membership for Kiev. Speaking to the German newspaper Handelsblatt in early July, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte acknowledged that “there is no unanimous support now” for Ukraine’s admission to the bloc.

US President Donald Trump and other senior American officials have ruled out Ukraine joining NATO as part of a potential peace settlement with Russia. Speaking to reporters ahead of his February 2025 White House meeting with Zelensky, which infamously devolved into a shouting match, Trump reiterated: “NATO – you can forget about.”

By Uriel Araujo | October 7, 2026

The European Commission has now declared enlargement a “geopolitical imperative” – with important implications.

The bloc has just presented a package of reforms designed to prepare the Union for new members – with Ukraine and Moldova at the center of the effort, alongside Albania and Montenegro.

Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated that “Europe’s future depends on the choices we make today,” framing expansion as essential to making the bloc “more resilient” and better able to shape its own destiny.

Candidate countries are already advancing: Ukraine and Moldova opened their first negotiating cluster in June 2026, and in July, opened Cluster 6 on external relations, foreign policy, security and, importantly, defense. In the words of Vessela Cherneva: “Currently, EU membership is the only way to integrate Ukraine’s and Europe’s security systems.”

The Commission plans “indicative roadmaps” for these four frontrunners (Ukraine, Moldova, Montenegro, and Albania) in its 2026 Enlargement Package, provided reform momentum continues. Gradual integration into strategic sectors such as energy, transport, digital networks and defense is explicitly on the table

This is no longer presented as a purely technical or economic process. Again, Brussels itself now describes enlargement as a “geopolitical” tool linked to European safety, prosperity and security. One may recall that earlier enlargement rounds were often framed in terms of shared values and market access.

Political scientist John Mearsheimer has long argued that the West’s “triple package” of policies – NATO enlargement, EU expansion and Western-style democracy promotion – added fuel to a fire waiting to ignite – meaning the Ukrainian crisis since 2014.

Actually, in his view, the trouble over Ukraine began in earnest at NATO’s 2008 Bucharest summit, when the alliance announced that Ukraine and Georgia “will become members”.

Russian leaders treated this as an existential threat. Washington ignored the red line and continued to push Ukraine toward Western institutions, including closer ties with the EU.

Back in his 2014 analysis Mearsheimer noted that the Union’s eastward march and the Eastern Partnership initiative were viewed in Moscow as hostile enough. “In the eyes of Russian leaders, EU expansion is a stalking horse for NATO expansion,” he wrote.

In this framework, the West’s efforts to promote “democracy” and “peel Ukraine away” from Russia completed the package. When Yanukovych rejected an EU deal in 2013, the “spark”, as Mearsheimer puts it, came. The result was crisis, then war. If one applies that framework consistently today, the resulting picture is quite straightforward.

To be clear, EU membership is not identical to NATO membership. Yet from a Russian great-power perspective the distinction becomes less meaningful when the two institutions are moving in the same geographical direction.

EU accession after all entails progressive alignment on law, foreign-policy positions, sanctions, energy, borders and increasingly elements of security and defense cooperation. The point is that an EU-member Ukraine would be economically, legally, institutionally and politically embedded in a Western bloc – and the same applies to the other Eastern European states. That, in broad terms, is precisely the structural transformation process Mearsheimer argued helped fuel the 2014 and then the 2022 crisis.

Ukraine remains the clearest case in point: before 2014 it functioned as a contested buffer. Mearsheimer (as well as specialists of the caliber of Henry Kissinger and Stephen Walt) argued a neutral Ukraine would be preferable, from a Western perspective – akin to Austria during the Cold War. In any case, the trajectory now points toward full Western institutional integration.

Moldova is arguably just as sensitive: it has a Russian military presence in Transnistria, occupies a strategic position between Ukraine and Romania – and is accelerating toward EU membership while deepening practical cooperation with Western militaries.

The recent Independence Day parade in Chișinău illustrated the point (without Soviet symbology, for the first time), as I’ve commented: Moldovan troops marched with Western weapons and vehicles; contingents from the Ukraine and eight NATO members, including the US, took part. NATO’s Political Committee had visited just days earlier, describing intensified cooperation.

Moldova for its part remains formally neutral, yet it is simultaneously negotiating EU accession – including the cluster on external relations and defense policy – and publicly displaying Euro-Atlantic partnerships.The Western center of gravity (post-USAID) in Moldova is shifting toward Brussels, which has stepped in with a large Reform and Growth Facility.

From Moscow’s point of view, the cumulative process looks like progressive incorporation of its western strategic environment into a Western political-security system.

Historically, great powers care intensely about the direction of strategic change in their immediate neighborhood. They typically do not wait until the process is complete before reacting – as seen in 2022.

In any case, the EU now frames enlargement itself as a geopolitical and security instrument. This language reinforces the very security dilemma Mearsheimer identified over a decade ago. The buffer zone between Russia and the Western institutional order continues to shrink. The risks of further escalation keep rising eastwards – adding to the tensions farther north, in the Baltic.

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Uriel Araujo, Anthropology PhD, is a social scientist specializing in ethnic and religious conflicts, with extensive research on geopolitical dynamics and cultural interactions.

Cosa abbiamo imparato da questi 50 anni? È la domanda da cui sono partiti i protagonisti della conferenza stampa organizzata a Firenze, martedì 6 ottobre, per il mezzo secolo della Fondazione Menarini. Un bilancio che guarda indietro ma soprattutto avanti: ai giovani, alla ricerca, all’intelligenza artificiale.

Un congresso per mezzo secolo

La Fondazione è stata istituita nella primavera del 1976 per promuovere ricerca e conoscenza in biologia, farmacologia e medicina, ma anche in economia e scienze umane. E per l’anniversario ha scelto il suo strumento principale, il congresso internazionale: “Half a Century of Medicine Looking Towards The Future”, il 5 e 6 ottobre a Firenze.
Cinquant’anni di conquiste della medicina e uno sguardo rivolto alle sfide dei prossimi decenni per un appuntamento che ha riunito a Firenze circa 40 tra i massimi esperti internazionali, molti dei quali protagonisti diretti delle innovazioni che hanno trasformato la cura delle principali malattie croniche. Un percorso attraverso tre grandi aree – cardiovascolare, respiratoria e metabolica – nelle quali negli ultimi cinquant’anni la ricerca ha cambiato radicalmente diagnosi, terapie e aspettative di vita dei pazienti.

In 50 anni sono state realizzate oltre 750 conferenze internazionali, con 112.500 partecipanti e 26.250 relatori. Gli eventi sono trasmessi in streaming, registrati e disponibili gratuitamente per gli iscritti.
“È importante ricordare le radici da cui veniamo per riuscire a proiettarci nel futuro: una piccola azienda che voleva diventare grande. È cambiato il contesto in cui ci muoviamo, con la rivoluzione digitale, ma non cambia l’obiettivo di portare conoscenza e sostenere le nuove generazioni. Nostro padre sarebbe molto fiero”, ha detto Lucia Aleotti, azionista e componente del board del Gruppo Menarini, intervenendo in apertura della celebrazione accanto al fratello Alberto Giovanni Aleotti.

Sul rapporto con il territorio, Alessandra Petrucci, rettrice dell’Università di Firenze: “Menarini da sempre dialoga con la città con un approccio interdisciplinare che salda le scienze umane con quelle scientifiche”. È l’equilibrio tra interessi umanistici e scienze biologiche che la Fondazione indica come ragione del proprio logo, ispirato alla Novissima Iconologia del Ripa.

Le cinque proposte per i giovani

“Guardare al futuro significa, soprattutto, investire nelle nuove generazioni”: è il messaggio del testo di benvenuto firmato dal presidente Stefano Del Prato e da Giuseppe Caracciolo, direttore scientifico e operativo. Del Prato, già presidente dell’EASD (European Association for the Study of Diabetes), ha indicato cinque direttrici: trasformare i congressi in luoghi di formazione attiva; usare la mentorship per mettere in contatto generazioni diverse; creare una “Menarini young investigator Academy”; dare ai giovani reali possibilità di fare ricerca e favorire mobilità e contaminazione internazionale.

Dal diabete all’imaging

Alla conferenza stampa Del Prato ha parlato di un vero e proprio “rinascimento avvenuto nel campo dei trattamenti del diabete con la diminuzione del rischio cardiovascolare”. Filippo Crea – Ospedale Isola Tiberina e componente del comitato scientifico della Fondazione – ha ripercorso le trasformazioni della medicina cardiovascolare, il progresso degli strumenti diagnostici e la rivoluzione dell’imaging. Leonardo M. Fabbri – Università di Ferrara e nel Comitato scientifico – per la medicina respiratoria, è tornato sull’imaging, che “ha cambiato radicalmente la stessa classificazione delle malattie”.

L’IA e la sfida di governarla

Il confronto si è chiuso sull’intelligenza artificiale, a partire dalle previsioni di Elon Musk sul ruolo dei medici. Marianne Legato – della Columbia University e componente del Comitato scientifico della Fondazione – pioniera della medicina di genere, ha sottolineato la necessità di “nutrire l’IA con trial eseguiti non solo su pazienti maschi”. Del Prato ha dato ragione a Musk rispetto alla medicina di ieri: quella di domani, ha detto, cambierà totalmente con l’IA. Infine, Crea ha ricordato che, all’inizio del secolo scorso, con l’arrivo dell’elettrocardiografo il medico che non seppe usarlo fu messo da parte. Il riferimento a ciò che accade oggi è chiaro: l’IA bisogna saperla usare per governarla, altrimenti la si subisce.

Think tank, riviste, biblioteca

Accanto ai congressi, la Fondazione ha costruito altri strumenti. Il think tank On Radar, lanciato a settembre 2022, è diretto da Massimo Scaccabarozzi, già presidente di Farmindustria, che ne ha parlato nella sua lecture: osservare la società, individuarne i problemi e, attraverso il dialogo, promuovere cambiamenti reali, su temi sociali, economici e culturali, in incontri chiusi al pubblico. Poi la rivista Minuti, in edizione Scienza e Arte, cartacea e digitale, offerta gratuitamente a chi si iscrive all’area riservata, e la Scientific Library della House of Sciences, sviluppata con case editrici come Elsevier e BMJ e organizzata in otto aree, tra cui cardiologia e pneumologia.

NATO's Military Committee, the Alliance's highest military body, visited Kyiv on 6 October to reaffirm support for Ukraine, its chair, Admiral Giuseppe Cavo Dragone, said. It was the committee's first official visit to Ukraine's capital in eight years. The officers came to hear how Ukraine is fighting Russia and to draw lessons for NATO's own defense, and Dragone used the visit to warn Moscow.

Russia's war no longer stays inside Ukraine: its drones, saboteurs, and pressure campaigns increasingly reach NATO members. That turns Ukraine, the only European army facing Russia in combat, from a country the Alliance helps into one it learns from.

All 32 allies at the table

Dragone brought the military representatives of all 32 member states to hear the latest battlefield assessment directly from Ukraine's commander-in-chief, Mykhailo Drapatyi, and his staff. They also came to learn what more NATO can do to support Ukraine, he said in an address recorded in Kyiv.

"After eight years, the NATO Military Committee comes back to Kyiv for an official visit. But while we were not physically present here, Ukraine is in our thoughts, in our discussions, in our decisions and following action every single day," Dragone said.

The visit fulfilled a promise he made to Drapatyi during their last conversation in August, the admiral said. It also follows a June visit to Kyiv by the North Atlantic Council, NATO's main political decision-making body. "We are here in full strength with a clear message. The bond between NATO and Ukraine is stronger and stronger," he said.

With the whole NATO Military Committee, we visited Kyiv, yesterday, to reaffirm unwavering support for #Ukraine.

Discussions with Major General Drapatyi, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, focussed on Ukraine’s military priorities and lessons learned to strengthen… pic.twitter.com/kar2l1Xlq4

— Admiral Giuseppe CAVO DRAGONE - NATO CMC (@CMC_NATO) October 7, 2026

Lessons from Ukraine's commanders

The talks with Drapatyi focused on Ukraine's military priorities and lessons learned to strengthen Allied preparedness for current and future threats, Dragone wrote on X. The delegation also paid respects at the Wall of Remembrance of the Fallen for Ukraine in Kyiv.

In his address, Dragone said Ukraine's courageous and resilient spirit remains unbreakable and serves as an example to other nations.

"An example that combines with all the lessons we can learn from your commanders, from their experience, which will ultimately help our Alliance too to better face today's and tomorrow's threats," he said.

To Russia: "You are failing"

Dragone also addressed Russia directly. NATO stands unwavering with Ukraine in the face of Russia's continued aggression and its reckless hybrid activities in member countries, he said.

"To those who think that by perpetrating acts of sabotage, cyberattacks, and violation of the airspace in national NATO territory they will undermine this support and our resolve, I will respond: You are failing. NATO support for Ukraine continues to grow, and our unity is stronger than ever."

Russia bears full responsibility for such dangerous and unacceptable behavior, and allies will keep sharpening their tools and strengthening deterrence and defense, the admiral added.

Drapatyi became Ukraine's commander-in-chief in July, when President Volodymyr Zelenskyy replaced Oleksandr Syrskyi after a week of political turmoil.

Kyiv under fire, Russian troops pushed back near Lyman

The day after the visit, Russia struck Kyiv and 12 oblasts with about 70 missiles. In recent weeks, Russian attacks have cratered the capital's bridges and hit a school, a café, and warehouses, as well as a maternity hospital. Ukrainian troops also retook ground near Lyman in the Vivaldi counteroffensive.

By Eldar MAMEDOV

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

The right-populist leader deserves scrutiny but offers clarity on Russia–Ukraine and Iran.

The frontrunner in France’s 2027 presidential race—Marine Le Pen from the right-wing National Rally party—has laid out foreign-policy views that American supporters of realism and restraint can approve of, regardless of how they feel about the rest of her program.

While the National Rally has been successfully marginalized and kept out of power in recent decades, one shouldn’t take it for granted that the French political establishment will find a way to thwart Le Pen—meaning her views could certainly become policy. The latest polls show the consolidation of her lead: According to Toluna-Harris Interactive, in a runoff she would take 57 percent against the centrist candidate (and a former prime minister under President Emmanuel Macron) Édouard Philippe and a staggering 69 percent against Jean-Luc Mélenchon, a far-left firebrand.

Of course, the spring of 2027, when the elections are to take place, is still a long way off. Political fortunes can change—as the left-wing outlet Mediapart’s recent investigation into old social media posts written by a teenage Jordan Bardella, now the National Rally president, is meant to demonstrate—but the National Rally’s supporters see such attacks as evidence of the establishment’s ill-fated and cynical effort to derail Le Pen.

Whatever you may think of her, at least her foreign policy views are coherent. On Iran, Le Pen—once labeled a “Trump ally”—offered a far clearer assessment than Macron with his equivocations. “We would still need to know what Trump wanted to do there,” Le Pen said. “Because for now, we still do not know what he wanted to do. He clearly has not achieved his war aims and he is setting the whole planet on fire.” While Macron tends to caveat his criticisms of Trump’s war with accusations that Iran has sought to destabilize the Middle East, Le Pen simply condemns the war on grounds that it’s bad for the French people.

She’s also warned of global inflation “that will have consequences for all peoples” and argued it is “better to convince the U.S. not to go and wage war against a country and an ancient civilization, a complicated country, and probably much more powerful than Donald Trump imagined.”

The events have confirmed Le Pen’s judgement. A civilization of 90 million people with millennia of history cannot be simply bombed away, as Trump (and the Republican Party) are learning to their distress heading into a difficult midterm election season. Le Pen is well aware that the people in France, like elsewhere, are paying the price for this adventure.

On Ukraine, Le Pen has been equally direct while diverging from Macron more dramatically. She warned the conflict has only two possible trajectories: “Either NATO is drawn into this war, and it will be the Third World War, or we will witness a hundred years’ war.” She has called for a major peace conference, made clear she is willing to talk to both President Vladimir Putin of Russia and President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine, and insisted that Germany, Poland, and Turkey be brought into the negotiating process.

She has gone even further, promising to halt French military aid to Ukraine, on the grounds that France cannot afford to sustain the amount of assistance Macron has been authorizing. Here she will have to explain herself in greater detail. A blanket cutoff is not a serious policy if the goal is to bring the war to an end as soon as possible—any settlement would require Kiev’s consent, as well as Moscow’s.

But neither can “support Ukraine for as long as it takes” work without a clearly defined end-game, and France’s fiscal situation dictates it cannot remain the default policy. Negotiations with all parties, including Russia, should not be treated as an appeasement or betrayal. Any serious attempt to settle the war would require Ukraine to make painful compromises on its NATO aspirations and territorial integrity, while Russia would have to compromise too on credible security guarantees for Ukraine or at least a greenlight for Kiev to rebuild and maintain a credible conventional military deterrent. Le Pen has identified the problem and signaled openness to unavoidable parts of the solution, but she still needs to explain the strategy.

Compare that with what the mainstream is offering. Macron is playing up the “Russian threat” and apparent hybrid attacks by Moscow against Europe. Meanwhile, according to the well-informed Le Figaro journalist Georges Malbrunot, French intelligence officers, while acknowledging the threat, believe that Macron overstates it. Macron’s aim, Malbrunot writes, would be to “steer the choices of the French ahead of the presidential election, targeting Le Pen and Melenchon—the two extremes that are lenient toward Russia.”

In a similar vein, Le Pen’s center-right rival, Edouard Philippe, lashed out at her, saying that “weakening Ukraine, as Marine Le Pen wishes, is threatening the security of Europe and France. I will do everything to prevent it.”

Then there is Gabriel Attal, Macron’s protégé and a possible successor. He delivered a grand speech in Reims calling for a “United States of Europe.” Europe’s security, he said, is being attacked by Russia, its economy by China, and its values by the United States. The remedy is a federalist utopia that he promises to build in “a matter of years.”

There might be a compelling case for EU nations to deepen their economic and technological integration. But the grandiloquent federalism talk sounds tone-deaf when what the French voters care most about is purchasing power, immigration, and French security.

This is the state of France’s foreign policy debate. The mainstream candidates are frightening voters with threat narratives, selling unachievable federalist fantasies, and equivocating on the U.S. war with Iran. The one major candidate discussing how to end wars rather than prolong them, and how to engage non-Western great powers rather than simply pick “a good” side over “an evil” one, is described by the establishment as extremist.

This does not mean Le Pen deserves uncritical support. Her historic ties to Russia warrant scrutiny, and her promise to halt aid to Ukraine needs to be coupled with a more detailed policy proposal and a broader strategy to end the war.

She is right on Iran, but her party has also forged close ties with Israel, seemingly based on a common antipathy to Islamism and to fend off accusations of antisemitism. On the Middle East, it remains to be seen whether national interest or ideological anti-Islamism will primarily inform her policies should she be elected president. Also, given her party’s lingering toxicity among the French elites, it’s far from clear that a President Le Pen would be able to attract diplomatic talent from the center-right to translate her instincts into workable policies.

But these are debates worth having. It is no longer credible to simply dismiss Le Pen and offer fearmongering and fantasy as a substitute for a debate. Perhaps the French establishment should ask itself an uncomfortable question: Why is it that voices advocating for diplomacy and sanity come from the camps they call “extreme” (both on the right and on the left)? Instead, the mainstream should make the language of diplomacy and peace its own. If it doesn’t, it should not be surprised when voters turn to those who do.

Original article: www.theamericanconservative.com

Litauen ist militärstrategisch ausgesprochen wichtig, denn sollte es zwischen der NATO oder EU und Russland zu einem militärischen Konflikt kommen, wäre Litauen das erste Schlachtfeld. Der Grund liegt in Litauens geografischer Lage, denn das Land liegt im sogenannten Suwalki-Korridor, der Russland von seiner Exklave Kaliningrad trennt. Im Kriegsfall würde die NATO als erstes versuchen, Kaliningrad […]

Latvian Prime Minister Andris Kulbergs has been given the political mandate to begin forming the country’s next government after his United List alliance secured 41 of the 100 seats in the Saeima. President Edgars Rinkēvičs backed Kulbergs to lead coalition negotiations on Tuesday following consultations with all six political forces elected to parliament.

Kulbergs will now negotiate the composition of the coalition, the division of ministerial responsibilities and the programme of the next government. The formal constitutional nomination cannot take place until the newly elected Saeima convenes on 3 November and the present government relinquishes its mandate.

Announcing the decision on 6 October, Rinkēvičs said consultations with the incoming parliamentary parties had shown broad support for United List and Kulbergs taking the initiative. The President described the party’s 41-seat showing as an unusually strong mandate and said he expected substantial progress in coalition negotiations before the beginning of November. The President’s full statement following the consultations.

Rinkēvičs said he would like to see a new Cabinet formed by Latvia’s national day on 18 November, although he stressed that there was no formal deadline. The government will also need to begin work rapidly on the 2027 budget.

United List almost triples its representation

According to the provisional results published by Latvia’s Central Election Commission, United List received 283,892 votes, or 35.29 per cent, giving it 41 seats.

Latvia First finished second with 13.08 per cent and 17 seats, while Sovereign Power/Alliance of Young Latvians took 11.71 per cent and 15 seats. The National Alliance won 10 seats with 8.90 per cent, the Progressives also secured 10 with 7.88 per cent, and New Unity took seven seats on 6.36 per cent.

The result represents a substantial change from the 2022 parliamentary election, when United List won 11.14 per cent and 15 seats. New Unity was then the largest party with 26 seats; it has now fallen to seven. The Union of Greens and Farmers, which won 16 seats in 2022 and joined Kulbergs’s government earlier this year, received just 4.40 per cent this time and failed to cross the five per cent threshold.

United List has indicated that its first choice is to negotiate with the National Alliance and New Unity. Together, the three parties would command 58 seats, providing Kulbergs with a clear parliamentary majority. A narrower United List–National Alliance coalition would have 51 seats.

The choice of prospective partners points towards continuity rather than a major change in Latvia’s foreign or security policy. United List, the National Alliance and New Unity have all backed continued support for Ukraine, membership of NATO and higher defence expenditure.

Kulbergs became prime minister only in May following the collapse of Evika Siliņa’s government during a political crisis over Latvia’s response to repeated drone incursions. The government he subsequently formed brought together United List, New Unity, the National Alliance and the Union of Greens and Farmers.

The October election campaign was consequently dominated by national security, drone threats and the war in Ukraine, alongside domestic concerns over household finances and the economy. Kulbergs entered the election seeking his own mandate after only several months in office.

Security policy set for continuity

Latvia’s position on NATO’s north-eastern flank has given defence policy an unusually prominent place in domestic politics. The country borders both Russia and Belarus and has faced a series of drone incidents, border pressure and Russian information operations.

Earlier this year, Latvia’s intelligence service warned that Russia was increasingly viewing Latvia in terms similar to those it applied to Ukraine before the full-scale invasion. At the same time, Latvia has had to respond to unmanned aircraft crossing its territory from Russian airspace, incidents which contributed directly to the collapse of the previous government.

Russia subsequently alleged that Ukraine was preparing attacks from Latvian territory, an accusation rejected by Riga. The dispute further sharpened concern that drone incidents could be used to generate a wider confrontation involving a NATO member state.

Defence spending is therefore unlikely to be substantially altered by the coalition negotiations. Latvia’s 2026 defence budget stands at €2.16 billion, currently calculated at 4.73 per cent of projected GDP, with the government moving towards expenditure equivalent to five per cent. Rinkēvičs said after Tuesday’s consultations that he had heard a clear commitment among the parliamentary parties to maintaining the country’s security, defence and foreign-policy course.

Turnout reaches record low

The size of United List’s parliamentary victory contrasts with a marked decline in electoral participation. The Central Election Commission recorded 806,641 voters from an electorate of 1.56 million, producing turnout of 51.79 per cent. Detailed election figures show that 793,846 valid ballots were ultimately counted.

Turnout in the 2022 parliamentary election was 59.41 per cent, meaning participation fell by more than seven percentage points.

The immediate question in Riga is therefore no longer who will lead the government-building process, but what form Kulbergs’s second administration will take. With 41 seats of his own and potential partners able to provide a comfortable majority, the election winner enters the negotiations from a considerably stronger position than any Latvian prime minister in recent years.

Two merchant vessels have been attacked by aerial and maritime drones in Bulgaria’s exclusive economic zone in the Black Sea, sinking one ship and forcing the evacuation of another. The incident follows a deadly attack on a grain carrier off Romania a day earlier and has prompted concern over the growing risks to civilian shipping close to EU and NATO territory.

Two commercial vessels were struck by drones in Bulgaria’s exclusive economic zone early on Tuesday, 6 October, in the first known attack of its kind on merchant shipping in Bulgarian waters.

The Togo-flagged ALFA WATAN suffered severe structural damage and sank, while the Palau-flagged ABLE caught fire. Bulgarian Prime Minister Rumen Radev said the vessels were attacked at around 3am by both aerial and maritime drones about 70 nautical miles east of the coastal town of Byala. The Bulgarian government said a search-and-rescue operation was continuing for the crew of the ALFA WATAN, whose fate remained unknown.

All 18 people aboard the ABLE were rescued after abandoning the burning vessel. The Bulgarian-flagged passenger and freight ferry DIOSCURIA was diverted to the area and initially took the crew on board before Bulgarian Navy and Border Police vessels transferred them towards Varna.

The crew comprised 11 Turkish and seven Indian nationals. Two sailors were taken to hospital, including an Indian crew member suffering from burns and the Turkish captain, who sustained a head injury. Bulgarian public broadcaster BNT reported that the remaining 16 sailors subsequently arrived safely in Varna for medical checks.

The ABLE was reportedly carrying grain towards Istanbul. The cargo aboard the ALFA WATAN, which had been heading north towards Romania, has not been officially established.

Radev convened an emergency meeting involving the ministries of defence, interior, transport and environment, alongside the presidency and Bulgaria’s security services. He described the attack as an unacceptable violation of international and maritime law and warned of its effect on commercial navigation in the Black Sea.

Bulgarian authorities have not publicly identified who launched the drones. Investigations are examining both the weapons used and the circumstances surrounding the attack. One rescued Turkish sailor told Bulgarian television that he believed the ABLE had been hit by a Russian underwater drone, but that account has not been independently established and Sofia has made no formal attribution.

Foreign Minister Velislava Petrova said Bulgaria was in contact with its European and NATO partners and described Black Sea security as inseparable from wider European security. She said civilian crews and freedom of navigation must be protected and that Bulgaria would work with its allies to assess the wider consequences for maritime security.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen also condemned attacks against civilian shipping, saying the situation in the Black Sea was becoming increasingly concerning. She said commercial vessels and their crews were being targeted as investigations continued into the latest incidents.

Tuesday’s attack came less than 24 hours after another commercial vessel caught fire and sank in Romania’s exclusive economic zone. The Turkish-owned Royad Mammadov, sailing under the flag of Saint Kitts and Nevis, had left the Ukrainian Danube port of Izmail carrying corn for Ravenna in Italy.

Romanian authorities confirmed that two people died and 11 crew members were rescued. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said the vessel had been struck by two Russian drones, although Romanian authorities did not themselves publicly attribute the incident to Russia.

The two incidents in consecutive days mark a further geographical expansion of the risks facing commercial shipping in the western Black Sea. EU Today has previously reported how strikes near Romania have moved maritime war risks closer to NATO territory, while a separate maritime drone explosion at Constanța raised questions over the ability of coastal states to detect and respond to unmanned systems approaching commercial infrastructure.

The distinction between territorial waters and an exclusive economic zone remains important. The attacks occurred outside Bulgaria’s territorial sea and therefore do not amount simply to an attack on Bulgarian territory. They nevertheless took place in an area where Bulgaria has internationally recognised economic rights and responsibilities, including search-and-rescue and environmental obligations.

The immediate concern for Sofia is the search for the missing crew of the ALFA WATAN and the possibility of pollution from the wreck. The wider concern for the EU is the increasingly exposed position of civilian shipping routes linking Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey.

Ukraine’s maritime export routes remain particularly important for agricultural trade. Repeated attacks on merchant vessels can increase insurance premiums, discourage shipowners from entering the region and raise transport costs even when ports themselves remain operational. Russian attacks on Odesa and its export infrastructure have already placed Ukraine’s Black Sea grain corridor under sustained pressure.

With merchant ships now struck in the economic zones of both Romania and Bulgaria on consecutive days, Black Sea maritime security has moved further onto the agenda of EU and NATO governments along the western coast.

 Al Mayadeen| October 6, 2026

French President Emmanuel Macron touted France’s nuclear strength on Tuesday following the launch of an upgraded ballistic missile, as Paris seeks to expand its nuclear arsenal and deepen military coordination with European allies amid tensions with Russia.

“Today we are stronger. The message has been sent loud and clear for wherever it must be received,” Macron said in a video posted on X showing him watching the launch, according to Reuters.

His remarks accompanied the firing of an M51.3 missile from the submarine Le Vigilant off Brittany. The missile carried no nuclear warhead.

France’s Defense Ministry described the operation as a certification test following the submarine’s extensive maintenance overhaul. While its announcement did not mention Russia, Macron presented the launch as a broader demonstration of French military power.

Moscow warns against threats to Kaliningrad

The French show of force follows Russian President Vladimir Putin’s warning last week against Western moves threatening Kaliningrad, the Russian exclave situated between NATO members Poland and Lithuania.

Putin cautioned against escalating the confrontation over Ukraine through threats to the territory, which Moscow has said it would defend with nuclear weapons if necessary.

The Russian president also reiterated that Moscow had no plans to attack European countries and sought peaceful coexistence.

NATO has maintained that none of its “exercises or activities pose a threat to the territory of the Russian Federation.”

The dispute places Tuesday’s launch within a wider confrontation over European security, even as French authorities identify its immediate purpose as verifying the submarine’s operational readiness.

Paris seeks broader nuclear role in Europe

Macron announced in March that France would increase its nuclear arsenal and offer European partners closer involvement through joint exercises and expanded consultations.

The initiative also envisages possible temporary deployments of nuclear-capable assets on allied territory, extending the scope of French nuclear cooperation in Europe.

France already maintains approximately 290 nuclear warheads, the world’s fourth-largest arsenal, at an annual cost of roughly €5.6 billion, according to Reuters.

Four ballistic missile submarines underpin its sea-based deterrent, alongside nuclear weapons deployed by aircraft.

Upgraded missile extends French strike capabilities

Tuesday’s launch was the M51.3’s first from a submarine. An earlier land-based qualification test took place in November 2023, before the missile entered operational service in October 2025.

French authorities say the upgraded weapon offers greater range, improved accuracy, and enhanced ability to penetrate missile defenses.

Its exact range remains undisclosed, although publicly available estimates generally put the M51 family’s reach at around 9,000 kilometers or more.

The Defense Ministry said the unarmed launch complied with France’s international obligations and confirmed Le Vigilant’s ability to operate the upgraded weapons system.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

Who asked, and who decided

There are phrases which, on their own, say more about a state than a Defence White Paper. One such phrase appeared in the Corriere della Sera on 4 October, in an interview with the Chief of the Army General Staff, Lieutenant General Carmine Masiello: “On the eastern flank, we were asked to deploy units capable of providing a real deterrent: we are leading the multinational battlegroup in Bulgaria and are present in Latvia and Hungary. War does not ask for permission, and the contingent must be ready to respond.”

A few lines earlier, the same general had opened the interview as follows: “We are at war. A hybrid war, but war nonetheless.” The attentive reader will pause to consider three words. We have been asked. By whom? Real deterrence. Compared to what deterrence, until now, has been unreal? We are at war. Who has declared it? These are questions that the Italian public debate should ask itself seriously, without indulging either in the caricature of the warmongering military or in the conditioned reflex that treats every doubt as enemy propaganda. The argument put forward in these pages is simple: the idea of direct involvement by Italy and European countries in an armed conflict with Russia is strategic folly, and the bellicose rhetoric that is making it seem conceivable protects no one. It makes the situation worse.

It is best to start with the facts, because the controversy surrounding the interview has misrepresented some of them. The contingents mentioned by Masiello are not a development from the past week. Italy has been participating in NATO’s forward presence in Latvia since 2017 and, since 2022, has been leading the multinational battlegroup in Bulgaria – established following Russia’s conflict with Ukraine alongside those from Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. The Madrid Summit in June 2022 then committed the allies to strengthening these groups to brigade level ‘where and when required’. The general’s statement that ‘we were asked’ therefore has a clear source: the Alliance’s planning, approved by the North Atlantic Council, to which the Italian government has given its consent.

Parliament, too, has formally expressed its view. Law 145 of 2016 stipulates that the government must approve international missions annually and that Parliament must authorise them. For 2026, the Council of Ministers’ resolution is dated 14 May; the Chamber of Deputies approved the authorisation resolution on 28 July, for missions valid from 1 January to 31 December. On closer inspection, this situation is more serious than the mere omission denounced by many commentators. Parliament was not bypassed: it was called upon at the end of July to ratify what had been in progress for seven months, as part of a single package bringing together dozens of different missions, from Lebanon to the Horn of Africa. Voting against the eastern flank means, in this context, voting against the whole package. It is a procedure that produces consensus without generating debate.

The problem, then, is not strictly legal. It is political, and concerns the quality of the decision. It is one thing to maintain a contingent in an allied country for reassurance purposes. It is quite another to publicly declare that that contingent must provide ‘real deterrence’ and be ‘ready to respond’ to a war that ‘does not ask for permission’. This shift in function – from a symbolic presence to combat readiness – has not been the subject of any specific parliamentary debate. Italians learnt of it from an interview published at the weekend, in a tone one might use to describe the modernisation of barracks.

A war that no one has authorised

Article 78 of the Constitution is so clear that it sounds almost embarrassing today: ‘The Chambers shall declare a state of war and confer upon the Government the necessary powers.’ Article 11 adds that Italy repudiates war as an instrument of aggression and as a means of resolving international disputes. In this context, the phrase ‘we are at war’, uttered by the head of the Armed Forces, is not merely a lexical detail. Neither House has declared a state of war. No government has been granted extraordinary powers. If words have any meaning, that phrase describes a condition that is not recognised by the legal system.

The contrast with Masiello’s own words from two and a half years ago is striking. In May 2024, in another interview, the general had been unequivocal in the opposite sense: ‘Let’s be clear: we are not at war,’ he had said, referring to a ‘sub-threshold’ conflict. The material reality described then and now is essentially the same: cyber-attacks, sabotage, disinformation, airspace violations. What has changed is the verbal framework. And in international politics, the framework is never neutral. Those who repeat every day that we are already at war accustom public opinion to the idea that actual war is merely the next step on a path that has already begun. This is precisely the process that the literature on threat construction describes as securitisation: a problem is shifted from the ordinary political sphere to that of emergency, where the usual rules – including debate – appear to be a luxury.

It is no coincidence that, in that very interview, the priority highlighted is the distribution to military personnel of a ‘cognitive self-defence manual’ against disinformation. The stated aim is to protect personnel. The side effect is to delimit the scope of what is conceivable: if every voice that questions the necessity of conflict can be interpreted as an emotional lever wielded by the enemy, dissent becomes a security issue. A democracy that fears manipulation should respond with more debate, not less.

Deterrence that produces what it fears

The strategic crux of the matter is the very concept of deterrence. Deterrence works when the adversary perceives our stance as both defensive and credible. It ceases to work – and indeed becomes counterproductive – when the measures a state adopts to feel secure are interpreted by the other as offensive preparations. This is the security dilemma: in a system without a higher authority, many of the means by which a state increases its own security reduce that of others, triggering a spiral that neither actor had intended.

The eastern flank is where this spiral is most visible. From Moscow’s perspective, allied brigades permanently deployed a few hundred kilometres from St Petersburg and the Belarusian border, exercises in the Baltic and attempts to stop Russian ships in transit are signs of encirclement. Putin stated this explicitly at the Valdai Forum in early October, describing the Western manoeuvres in the Baltic as an escalation. One might regard that interpretation as self-serving, and in part it is. But deterrence is not measured by our intentions: it is measured by the perceptions of those who are to be deterred. Ignoring them does not make them go away.

There is also one factor that should be of the greatest concern, and it is Masiello himself who articulates it. In hybrid warfare, the general explains, the risk is ‘not only to suffer, but to slip, by mistake, into an open confrontation’. This is a valuable admission. It means that the Italian military leadership considers the possibility of an unintended war – arising from an accident, a misinterpretation or a chain of automatic responses – to be very real. Thomas Schelling referred to this mechanism as ‘the threat that leaves something to chance’: the more forces are in contact and ready to react, the more control over the crisis slips from the hands of political decision-makers. If the main risk is error, the rational response is to reduce friction and increase the number of communication channels. Yet whilst the readiness of troops near the border is being stepped up, the tone of rhetoric is moving in the opposite direction.

In Moscow, Putin spoke clearly

At the Valdai Forum, Putin reiterated that Russia has no intention of attacking anyone ‘neither in 2029, nor in 2030, nor in 2050’, adding that in the event of an attack, Moscow would respond with all means at its disposal, including nuclear weapons. A few days earlier, in St Petersburg, he had said that Russia is in no way preparing to go to war with Europe. The usual response in the Italian press is that these reassurances are worthless: Formiche pointed out, for example, that even the 1994 Budapest Memorandum contained written commitments that were subsequently breached.

This argument deserves a serious response, not a slogan. No one is obliged to take the statements of a head of state – be they Russian or American – at face value. But mistrust of others’ words does not justify abandoning diplomacy: it makes it all the more necessary. Public statements serve precisely this purpose: to establish commitments that can be verified, negotiated, translated into measures of mutual trust, limits on troop deployments, notifications of military exercises, and direct military lines of communication. This is precisely what Europe did during the decades of the Cold War, with the Helsinki Final Act and the subsequent Vienna documents, when mistrust of Moscow was at least as great as it is today. Responding to every overture by increasing military readiness amounts to choosing not to verify. And those who fail to verify their adversary’s intentions end up planning for the worst-case scenario, which, by dint of being planned for, becomes the most likely outcome.

The reverse is also true. If it is genuinely believed that Russia is preparing an act of aggression against an EU member state, then the matter is of such gravity as to demand a public and parliamentary debate commensurate with its importance, based on the available evidence, intelligence assessments and the alternatives under consideration. Not an interview. The two things are mutually exclusive: either the threat is existential, in which case the nation must be mobilised; or it is not, in which case the language of imminence is a mistake.

To die for whom and for what?

The question currently circulating on social media – whether Italians are prepared to die for the Baltic states or for Zelensky – is phrased brutally, but it hits upon a real issue. European public opinion, and Italian public opinion in particular, has never given an explicit mandate for direct military confrontation with Russia. Surveys in recent years have consistently ranked Italy amongst the European countries most opposed to sending troops and most in favour of a negotiated solution. A democratic system that prepares for war against the prevailing will of its citizens, without even consulting them, accumulates a debt of legitimacy that would be called in at the worst possible moment: precisely when national cohesion is most needed.

Nor is there any need to demonise the Baltic states to recognise the problem. Their perception of the threat has historical roots that a Western European struggles to fully comprehend. The point is another: in a thirty-two-member alliance, the most hardline positions tend to set the tone for the whole, because no government wants to appear the least supportive. Italy has different geopolitical interests, focused on the Mediterranean, Africa, the Balkans and its energy ties with the East. A country in that position has everything to lose from a conflict in the Baltic and nothing to gain. Its historical role, from Andreotti to Prodi, has been that of a mediator, not an outpost. To abandon this role in order to align with the hardline stance is a choice that someone should openly advocate, rather than letting it seep out through an interview.

Finally, there is the practical reality, which the general himself does not hide. Masiello speaks of the return of the ‘importance of mass’: forces are quickly worn down, and without the capacity to replenish them, a prolonged conflict cannot be sustained. In short: a conventional war with Russia would be a war of attrition, fought with ammunition stocks that Europe does not possess and with an industrial base that would take years to reconvert. Against a nuclear power that has just reiterated that it regards nuclear weapons as part of its defence. There is no rational interpretation of Italy’s national interest in which this scenario is acceptable.

Alternatives do exist and do not require naivety. The first is institutional: to separate missions on the eastern flank from the annual budget and subject them to a specific vote, preceded by a public hearing of military and government leaders on the nature of the mandate. If Italian soldiers are asked to be ‘ready to respond’, Parliament has the right and the duty to know to what, under what rules of engagement, and within what limits.

The second concerns language. The military leadership has a responsibility to prepare the forces, not to influence public opinion on the underlying political judgement – namely, whether or not Italy is at war. That assessment is the remit of the constitutional bodies. A return to verbal restraint is not a concession: it is the condition for deterrence to remain defensive even in the eyes of those observing it from Moscow.

The third is diplomatic. Any Russian declaration of non-aggression should be taken at face value in the technical sense of the term: put to the test with concrete proposals for risk reduction, starting with the Baltic, where the density of ships, aircraft and units in close proximity makes an incident more likely than elsewhere. Rome has the credibility and the history to champion such an initiative at European level. The fact that it is not doing so, and that the issue emerges only from the words of a general, is the real cause for alarm in this affair.

The enemy to be feared is not a country a thousand kilometres from our borders. It is the habit – which is taking root here – of deciding on the most serious matters without discussing them, and of presenting them as if they were inevitable; a psychopathology that is dramatically eroding the last remnants of common sense.

EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas has warned that Russia is intensifying hybrid operations across Europe, citing sabotage attempts, airspace violations and Russian drones and missiles crossing into Moldovan territory.

Her intervention adds pressure for a more coordinated European response to hostile activity below the threshold of conventional warfare.

Russia is putting lives at risk across Europe through an expanding campaign of hybrid activity, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said on Monday, after another series of Russian drones and missiles entered Moldovan airspace.

Speaking in Brussels alongside Moldovan Prime Minister Vasile Tofan and Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos, Kallas said Europe had experienced an increase in sabotage attempts and airspace violations during recent weeks.

“Russian missiles and drones violated Moldovan airspace again over the weekend,” she said, describing the incidents as unacceptable.

According to the official EU record of the press conference, Kallas said the Kremlin was seeking to create fear and interfere with European decision-making, and argued that the response should include greater resilience and continued support for Ukraine.

Her remarks follow Russia’s renewed large-scale attacks against Ukraine’s energy system and continued reports of drones crossing borders beyond Ukrainian territory.

Moldova’s defence authorities reported that three drones entered Moldovan airspace during Russia’s 30 September attack on Ukraine. Moldova, which shares a long border with Ukraine and is seeking EU membership, has repeatedly accused Moscow of attempting to destabilise the country.

The latest incidents broaden a European debate that has been developing for months: how governments should respond to hostile operations that are deliberate and potentially dangerous but fall short of an overt military attack.

EU Today reported on 28 September that European governments were discussing an emergency security protocol intended to improve coordination when member states face sabotage and other hybrid threats.

That followed earlier warnings concerning suspected attacks on infrastructure, cyber operations, interference campaigns and airspace violations across several European countries.

The problem is partly one of attribution and partly one of thresholds.

A conventional armed attack on a NATO member may trigger consultation under Article 4 or, in sufficiently serious circumstances, collective defence provisions under Article 5. The European Union also has its own mutual assistance provision under Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union.

Hybrid activity is frequently designed to remain below those thresholds.

Cyberattacks, covert sabotage, GPS interference, disinformation, drones and operations conducted through intermediaries can impose costs without giving governments an obvious basis for a military response.

Kallas’s warning comes as Germany has also reported an increase in activity it attributes to Russia.

Chancellor Friedrich Merz has warned that Germany faces growing hybrid pressure involving drones and cyber operations. European security services have separately investigated suspected Russian involvement in sabotage and attacks on infrastructure in several countries.

Moscow has denied Western accusations that it is directing such operations.

The EU has already used sanctions against individuals and entities accused of Russian hybrid activity, while governments are considering faster systems for sharing intelligence and attributing incidents.

EU Today examined the debate in September as the European Parliament considered proposals for quicker attribution, stronger intelligence-sharing and improved protection of critical infrastructure.

Moldova occupies a particularly exposed position.

The EU has provided €317 million through the European Peace Facility for Moldovan defence modernisation, according to Kallas, including €120 million allocated in 2026 for air defence. Brussels is also supporting Moldova through its EU Partnership Mission, which provides assistance against hybrid and cyber threats.

Unlike Ukraine, Moldova is not a NATO member and has constitutional neutrality. Its ability to counter Russian missiles or drones entering its airspace is therefore closely connected to the development of its own detection and air-defence capabilities.

For the EU, repeated incidents involving Moldova, NATO airspace and European infrastructure are increasingly being considered as parts of the same security problem rather than isolated events.

Spain is moving ahead with plans to rebuild its airborne signals intelligence (SIGINT) capability, with the Airbus A321 — part of the highly successful A320 twin-engine airliner family — selected as the basis for three new SIGINT aircraft.

The choice is disclosed in the latest issue of Spain’s Revista de Aeronáutica y Astronáutica, the Ministry of Defense’s official publication. Airbus and Indra are currently working on the program’s conceptual design under the Santiago II initiative, which aims to deliver a crewed platform capable of collecting and processing intelligence across the electromagnetic spectrum.

The program is intended to restore a capability Spain lost when its last Boeing 707 SIGINT aircraft was retired in 2014. Equipped with Israeli SIGINT equipment, this 707 was designated TM.17-4 in Spanish service, and nicknamed Reina del Espectro (Queen of the Spectrum).

También del #47Grupo el #Boeing 707-351C (TM.17-4 / 47-04) "BRUJO". #BASanJavier @EjercitoAire @SpottersMurcia pic.twitter.com/RB3Dcpn7Qp

— Salvador Marín (@05derecha) April 17, 2020

It served in the 47th Mixed Air Force Group, alongside four Dassault Falcon 20s (designated TM.11 in Spain), that were used for navigation aid calibration, remote sensing, and electronic warfare training.

The new aircraft will have to undergo extensive modification, including the installation of antennas, receivers, signal-processing equipment, operator consoles, communications systems and associated electrical and cooling infrastructure.

Indra is expected to provide much of the mission-system architecture. The company’s AirSign concept, unveiled in 2023, incorporated COMINT and ELINT sensors alongside data fusion, real-time signal analysis, communications, and command-and-control functions.

While COMINT is concerned primarily with collecting intelligence from communications, ELINT focuses on non-communications electromagnetic emissions, including radar signals. Together, these capabilities provide a much fuller intelligence picture of not only what the enemy is doing in terms of their electronic emissions, but what they are planning, and their processes of operation.

Bizjets have become the platform of choice for many new intelligence aircraft, particularly where operators want a relatively low-cost, long-endurance platform with a smaller logistical footprint. Aircraft such as the Bombardier Global 6000/6500, Gulfstream G550, and Dassault Falcon 8X have been adapted for electronic intelligence and special-mission roles.

Spain’s decision to use the substantially larger A321 points instead toward the other end of the spectrum, providing significantly more room for antennas, processing hardware and crew, and allowing the aircraft to carry a much larger and more power-hungry mission system than the typical bizjet-based SIGINT platform.

At one time, the A321 was envisaged as the platform for NATO’s Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system, which provides the alliance with reconnaissance capabilities, including synthetic aperture radar. However, this capability was eventually fielded on NATO’s fleet of five RQ-4D Phoenix uncrewed aerial vehicles, specialized versions of the Global Hawk.

Elsewhere in Europe, Airbus launched a risk-assessment study for France’s future maritime patrol aircraft (MPA), also to be based on an A321 platform. Billed as a “flying frigate” by the company, the new MPA is intended to replace the French Navy’s Dassault Atlantique 2 fleet and emerges at a time when NATO nations are increasingly adopting the in-production Boeing P-8 Poseidon for their maritime patrol requirements.

Airbus does, however, have relevant experience in the conversion of airliners for military roles. The company’s A330 Multi-Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) aircraft are modified at Airbus’s Getafe facility, providing an existing industrial base for converting commercial-derived aircraft into specialized military platforms.

The Santiago II program is currently in its definition phase. Spain awarded Airbus and Indra a €16-million ($17.9-million), 18-month contract to study the platform and define the overall system. A subsequent phase will cover modification and integration of the three aircraft. The Spanish Ministry of Defense estimates the complete program at approximately €436 million ($489 million).

The program also has an industrial objective. Spanish authorities want domestic industry to acquire expertise and control over the integration of the SIGINT system, rather than simply purchasing a finished foreign intelligence aircraft.

The A321-based Santiago II fleet is intended to address the shortfall left by the retirement of the specially modified Boeing 707, providing a substantially more modern platform, and with more airframes for improved availability.

The three new aircraft will also complement Spain’s emerging uncrewed SIGINT capability. The Spanish Air and Space Force is introducing the L3Harris Scalable Open Architecture Reconnaissance (SOAR) system on its Predator B drones, giving the fleet ELINT and COMINT collection capabilities. The two systems are likely to fill different niches: the Predator B offers a relatively persistent, lower-cost uncrewed collection option, while the much larger A321 will provide substantially greater payload capacity, onboard processing, and crewed mission-management capabilities. Together, they will give Spain a layered airborne SIGINT architecture.

Spain’s decision also reflects a broader drive to invest in long-range SIGINT platforms capable of collecting, processing, and fusing vast amounts of electromagnetic data, as competition over the electromagnetic spectrum becomes increasingly central to modern warfare.

If the program remains on schedule, three heavily modified A321s will eventually provide Spain with a persistent airborne capability to detect, classify, locate, and analyze electromagnetic emitters in support of a host of operations. Especially when paired with the Predator B, the capability will likely be of considerable interest to other NATO partners in Europe, too.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Spain Picks Airbus A321 For New Electronic Intelligence Aircraft appeared first on TWZ.

Cheap drones, heavy bombs, disrupted shipping, and vulnerable supply routes are challenging the idea that technological superiority guarantees military success. The emerging contest is not simply over who builds the smartest weapon. It is over who can adapt, produce, and keep fighting after the enemy learns how to break it. Washington’s Project Meridian offers one answer. Recent battlefields suggest a much harder test.

The Battlefield Rewrites the Blueprint

The war in Ukraine shows that military innovation does not always mean more sophisticated weapons. Sometimes it means finding a simple way around an enemy’s defenses. Russian forces did that with drones guided through fiber-optic cables instead of radio signals, allowing them to operate despite radio jamming.

During the fighting to push Ukrainian troops out of Russia’s Kursk region, fiber-optic drones threatened the roads supplying Ukrainian positions. Sustained attacks on transport made those positions harder to supply, reinforce, and evacuate. Ground that remained defensible against a direct assault became increasingly difficult to hold as supply routes came under pressure.

Drones did not replace infantry or artillery. Their value came from linking reconnaissance and strikes to a broader effort to disrupt Ukrainian logistics. A relatively small change in drone guidance helped Russian forces put pressure on the supply lines sustaining the defense, rather than just individual vehicles or positions.

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A separate example from eastern Ukraine shows how drone attacks can also threaten robotic supply vehicles

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Nor did the advantage remain exclusive. Ukrainian units expanded their own fiber-optic capabilities, turning a Russian breakthrough into another round of adaptation. Cable guidance removes the vulnerable radio-control link, but introduces weight, handling, and physical constraints. It does not make the aircraft invisible or indestructible. A solution to one problem creates a different set of tradeoffs.

Russia’s glide bombs demonstrate another route to military innovation. Instead of replacing existing weapons entirely, guidance and wing kits give older bombs greater reach and precision. Their heavy payloads perform tasks that small drones cannot. Their use against Ukrainian positions illustrates why the future battlefield will contain both cheap electronics and large quantities of conventional explosives.

The broader lesson is uncomfortable for anyone selling a universal replacement for the old military. New systems do not arrive on an empty battlefield. They must work with existing aircraft, artillery, engineers, supply units, and command structures. Their value depends on how those parts fit together.

That also limits what strike videos can prove. A successful attack demonstrates an outcome, not the average success rate, the number of failed missions, or the effort required to repeat it. The decisive question is whether an army can turn occasional success into a dependable military capability.

The Cost of Keeping Routes Open

The Red Sea offers a different warning. An attacker does not necessarily have to defeat a navy to impose strategic costs.

Houthi attacks pushed shipping companies toward longer routes around Africa. By late summer 2026, traffic through the Suez Canal was recovering but remained well below pre-crisis levels. Houthi attacks had pushed shipping companies onto longer, more expensive routes, showing how a regional armed group could disrupt global trade without defeating a major navy.

An interception can therefore be a tactical success without restoring normal commercial activity. The defender must protect ships and sustain confidence over time. The attacker may only need to keep the risk credible. Counting destroyed drones does not answer whether the shipping route is functioning.

The familiar comparison between a cheap drone and an expensive interceptor captures only part of this problem. Saving a merchant ship or warship can justify an expensive defensive shot. The deeper question is whether sufficient interceptors, maintenance capacity, crews, and replacement stocks remain available throughout a prolonged campaign.

Ukraine presents a related problem on land. Russian glide bombs combine substantial destructive power with relatively inexpensive conversion kits. Defending against every incoming weapon with a costly missile is not necessarily sustainable. But abandoning high-end air defenses would leave other threats unanswered.

The likely response is a layered force rather than a single miracle weapon. Different threats demand different combinations of detection, electronic warfare, physical protection, and interception. An army also needs to keep operating when some threats get through.

Kursk and the Red Sea are not interchangeable battlefields. One concerns a contested land campaign, the other pressure on maritime commerce. What connects them is the importance of maintaining a function under repeated attack. Delivering supplies and keeping shipping moving matter more than producing an impressive interception tally.

Washington Looks Upward

Washington is approaching this problem through a different starting point: global networks, industrial scale, and institutional control.

On September 30, Pete Hegseth announced Project Meridian alongside a proposed Autonomous Warfare Command and the Fortress America initiative. Meridian would examine future military capabilities, while the new command would organize the expansion of autonomous and robotic systems. Fortress America would address the resilience of bases and supply chains. These are related initiatives, not a single approved war plan.

Meridian’s advisers include Elon Musk, Palmer Luckey, and Newt Gingrich, under Pentagon technology chief Emil Michael. The study has 120 days to report. Its significance is not that three men can invent the next war. It is that major technology suppliers are being invited to help define the military capabilities Washington should pursue.

Some of the supporting infrastructure already has funding. On May 26, Space Systems Command awarded SpaceX a $2.29 billion agreement for the Space Data Network Backbone. A fully operational prototype is due by the end of 2027. The intended function is to connect military sensors and weapons through a high-capacity orbital communications network.

That addresses a real military requirement. Information has limited value if it cannot reach the people or systems that need it. But a larger network does not automatically become a more dependable one. The test is whether useful connections survive disruption, and whether units can continue operating when they do not.

Heavy-lift rockets could support the deployment of larger satellite constellations, although these programs do not yet amount to a single publicly defined architecture. Starship Flight 14 reached orbit on September 28 and deployed 26 Starlink V3 satellites. That demonstrated payload delivery, not every capability promised for the rocket. Reaching orbit once and providing dependable, economical military infrastructure are different milestones.

Starship’s final descent, landing burn, and splashdown during Flight 14, September 28, 2026

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Golden Dome extends the ambition to missile defense. In May, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that a notional system consistent with the administration’s stated objectives could cost about $1.2 trillion over 20 years. Crucially, this was not a price tag for the Pentagon’s approved design. The final architecture had not been publicly disclosed.

The policy risk is not simply excessive ambition. It is defining military problems in ways that favor the products already offered by influential suppliers. That deserves scrutiny without assuming that commercial involvement makes every proposal useless. A contract is evidence of spending. It is not evidence of battlefield superiority.

Machines Still Need Factories

The American approach emphasizes integrating ambitious systems through large institutions. The battlefield experience points toward an equally important requirement: changing ordinary systems quickly.

These approaches are not mutually exclusive. Satellites and inexpensive drones can support the same force. The tension lies in their development cycles. A major space program cannot be redesigned every few weeks. A frontline drone or its communications equipment may lose effectiveness if updates take years.

The industrial base must therefore support both continuity and rapid revision. Ukraine’s drone sector demonstrates the importance of close feedback between operators and developers, but also the vulnerability of assembly dependent on imported components. A domestically assembled aircraft is not necessarily an independently sustainable capability.

Russian developers are also discussing the problem in terms broader than individual weapons. In September, the Ushkuynik center presented a drone assembly line housed in a modified shipping container. The proposal illustrates an effort to distribute production rather than concentrate it in a single factory.

These are developer proposals, not independently demonstrated solutions at national scale. Nevertheless, they identify two important problems: distributing production and closing gaps between separate defensive systems.

A workshop, a repair team, and a reliable component supplier may therefore matter as much as another model advertised as revolutionary. Military adaptation requires people who can identify a failure, explain it to engineers, approve a modification, and return workable equipment to service.

Autonomy does not remove these obligations. The meaningful question is which task a machine can perform reliably without continuous human input, under what conditions, and with what consequences when it fails. “Autonomous” should describe a tested function, not serve as a substitute for explaining one.

Fortress America recognizes another dependency. Hegseth’s stated aim is for military installations eventually to operate under their own power, alongside stronger protection and domestic supply chains. Yet independence from the civilian grid would not by itself eliminate the need for fuel, spare parts, communications, or skilled maintenance. Resilience must extend beyond the perimeter fence.

The same principle applies at the front. Engineering and logistics deserve attention alongside strike footage. They show how forces sustain movement and support combat units, rather than merely how they destroy a target.

From Remote Control to Robotic Forces

The next stage of warfare is unlikely to resemble an army of humanoid machines replacing soldiers. A more plausible future is a force in which people fight alongside growing numbers of specialized robots, from reconnaissance aircraft to ground vehicles carrying ammunition, evacuating casualties, and supporting assaults.

That transition is already underway. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces are using ground robots for logistics, evacuation, and other battlefield tasks. In September, Ukraine’s Defense Ministry reported that its ground systems had completed more than 25,000 supply and evacuation missions in August alone. The figure is an official claim, not an independently audited total, but it illustrates how far the ambition extends beyond occasional demonstrations.

Over the next five years, the important change may be the organization of these machines into working formations. Aerial drones could scout ahead while ground robots move supplies and support troops. Humans would still set objectives and handle situations the machines cannot reliably interpret. The advantage would come from coordinating those different roles, not simply putting more unmanned vehicles on the battlefield.

Remote control, however, is not autonomy. A vehicle that needs continuous steering from an operator remains dependent on communications and human attention. Greater autonomy could allow machines to navigate, avoid obstacles, or complete limited tasks when a connection fails. None of those functions automatically makes a robot capable of independently identifying legitimate targets or deciding when to fire.

The likely result is a race between robotic capability and countermeasures. More machines may reduce the number of soldiers exposed on supply routes, but those machines will themselves become targets. Communications, batteries, maintenance, and replacement parts will remain constraints. Robotization moves some risks away from people; it does not abolish the costs of war.

Nor will inexpensive robots make heavy weapons obsolete. Small drones, armored vehicles, artillery, and aircraft perform different jobs. The stronger force will be the one that combines them effectively and changes that combination faster than its opponent.

Meridian should be judged against this prospect, not the grandeur of its language. Can Washington build systems that cooperate, survive disruption, and remain affordable enough to replace? Can its procurement machinery adapt as quickly as the battlefield demands?

The next war will not be won by whoever unveils the most impressive robot. It may favor the side that can lose machines without losing momentum, preserve human judgment without slowing every decision, and turn battlefield lessons into production before the enemy does. The real revolution is not a machine that looks like a soldier. It is an army that learns to fight differently because machines are now part of its ranks.

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MORE ON THE TOPIC:

• Democracy’s Emergency Exit: Germany Revisits An AfD Ban
• Sirens Over The Autobahn: Germany Rehearses For The Next War?
• The Spokeswoman Who Remembers Too Much: Zelensky’s Bunker Blowback

The post The Future of War: What the Battlefield Teaches and the Pentagon Wants to Buy appeared first on South Front.

Dass die NATO Russland bei Kaliningrad immer heftiger provoziert, wird von westlichen Medien zwar verschwiegen, ist aber nicht zu bestreiten. NATO-Staaten führen bei Kaliningrad fast ununterbrochen Manöver durch, in denen sie die, Blockade, Bombardierung und Eroberung der russischen Exklave üben. Russland hat daher letzte Woche eine deutliche Warnung an die NATO ausgesprochen, über die ich […]

Il GOP parte da una maggioranza di 53 a 47, ma oggi deve difendersi anche in Ohio, Alaska, Iowa, Texas e perfino Kansas

Merz caminó por Kiev. Hay una foto de él andando por ahí en una calle. Pero no es sólo él. En sus zapatos resopla toda la frustración de toda la Alemania neonazi.

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No hay mejor tranquilizante que un Martini seco. Lo leí en una revista femenina. […] Desafortunadamente estos vasos no son los correctos, los estilos cambian.

Para un Martini seco, lo ideal es una copa en forma de cono.

Obispo: He oído que es un país magnífico: la Gran Cordillera, las pampas…
Embajador: La pampa está en Argentina, monseñor.
Obispo: La pampa. Por supuesto. […] Había fotos de tus antiguas pirámides.
Embajador: No tenemos pirámides en Miranda.

Luis Buñuel 1972 “El discreto encanto de la burguesía” Fragmentos.

Friedrich Merz, actual canciller alemán, con lazos y devociones por el nazismo, -como su abuelo paterno Josef Paul Sauvigny, quien fuera afiliado al Partido Nacionalsocialista Alemán (National Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei NSDAP) del partido Nazi y que también estuvo en las S.A. (Sturmabteilung – sección de asalto) así como su padre, Joachim; soldado de la Wehrmacht- caminó por Kiev este pasado domingo cuatro de octubre, mismo día en que su país celebra ‘la unidad alemana’.

En un arrebato desesperado entre su propia realidad de fracaso en las urnas y el delirio de la revancha nazi que se le escapa de las manos en el frente ucraniano contra la Federación Rusa, heredera del triunfo soviético de 1945, Merz, uno de los peores políticos que riñe en mediocridad con otros como Macron, Meloni, Sánchez y los incontables primeros ministros ingleses, arribó a decirle a Zelensky que contara con Alemania, o sea, con el dinero de los alemanes en quiebra energética y que deben cumplir con el sagrado mandamiento dejado por Angela Merkel de pagar cuotas mensuales a migrantes africanos para que vivan mejor que los ciudadanos alemanes.

Pero, ¿contar con cuál Alemania? – se podría preguntar el propio Neonazi Zelensky. De hecho, de paso le dijo que solo podría entrar Ucrania a la Unión Europea en calidad de observador. Zelensky respondió que, o entran como socios con plenos derechos o no entran.

Merz viajó al menos dos veces como líder de la oposición a Kiev y tan pronto fue nombrado primer ministro -como lo hizo su par inglés, Andy Burnham- fue a Kiev en visita oficial a ofrecer más armas, dinero, cooperación industrial para desarrollo de drones y apoyo. Todo ello bajo el mantra de: ‘Rusia quiere invadir Europa’, o, ‘si no ayudamos a Ucrania, seremos los próximos’.

En otras ocasiones cuando iban de visita altos funcionarios europeos, Rusia mermaba las hostilidades y la capital ucraniana descansaba de los bombardeos; tal como señaló Zelensky durante la visita de Steve Witkoff y Jared Kushner en el mes de septiembre. Tales bombardeos intensificados como retaliación rusa a los ataques a civiles y centros energéticos en la Rusia profunda.

Es claro que los viajes a Ucrania de Merz, así como de otros europeos con herencias nazis, implica una peregrinación santa a esa punta de lanza que logrará, con la ayuda de las almas de todos los nazis bien muertos, sepultos e insepultos entre 1939 y 45, derrotar a los eslavos herederos soviéticos, a esos ‘orcos’ como suelen llamarles a los rusos.

Esta peregrinación es mística. Además, es el reto a ser un mártir por aniquilación de algún drone Geran, un misil Kinzhal, tal vez por un Skander M y por qué no, ser atomizado por un Oréshnik. Esto es una posibilidad latente. Los altos mandos rusos instaron a no viajar a Ucrania. Ya hay bombardeos a los puentes de Kiev. Quedará cerrada como una isla al otro lado del Dniéper. Es posible que esta sea la última vez que un europeo vaya a Kiev y salga vivo.

Así, Merz, un derrotado pronazi de hueso colorado se paseó una vez más por la capital ucraniana. La escena es tan absurda y cosmética como las escenas de la película de Buñuel, El discreto encanto de la burguesía, con las que inicio este escrito.

Aquella comedia hecha por un renombrado surrealista, utiliza la sátira y el refinamiento sobreactuado de burgueses que cada vez que intentan cenar juntos son interrumpidos por situaciones absurdas. Como señalan en el análisis crítico de la película:

Cada vez que están a punto de sentarse a la mesa, algo absurdo o inquietante interrumpe el acto: confusiones de horario, la muerte del dueño de un restaurante, un pelotón militar, un obispo que aparece de repente, sueños que se confunden con la realidad, etc.

La película no tiene una trama lineal clásica. Es una sucesión de intentos fallidos de cenar, intercalados con sueños de los personajes y situaciones cada vez más surrealistas. El acto de comer (símbolo de civilización, placer y status) se convierte en algo imposible. […]

Pero es precisamente esto lo que la obra señala en última instancia: la vida que llevan los individuos que forman parte de la alta burguesía es irreal, un espejismo, un islote en medio del océano de la verdadera realidad. A pesar de que su aislamiento propicia el empobrecimiento del resto del mundo, ni siquiera de este modo logran ser felices y esta frustración se ve reflejada en especial en la imposibilidad de conseguir lo que con más ímpetu desean, simbolizado aquí por la comida que no consiguen disfrutar nunca y por la inconveniencia de practicar sexo cuando y con quien desean.

Merz vive el discreto ‘desencanto’ de encarnar a un nazi de tercera generación sin chance de ganar lo que tampoco ganaron abuelo y padre. Merz es como una película que además de hablar de la mediocridad y la derrota, es de bajo presupuesto, reforzando por inercia la idea de derrota y mediocridad.

Se pasea por Kiev, una vez más, con el anhelo y el espejismo febril, nada discreto de triunfar sobre Rusia.

Lo que en la película es para los burgueses el deseo frustrado de ser felices en una cena, como hecho imposible lo es para Merz el no ser un nazi triunfando sobre un heredero de los padres y abuelos soviéticos. Además, Merz en realidad ha encarnado ya la personificación del desfase, de la ubicuidad errática: ¿Por qué sale de Alemania el día que allí celebran el día de la unidad alemana?

Merz sale de allí porque esa Alemania, esa que lo derrotó en las urnas hace unas semanas, no sustenta a la nación germana de su imaginación. Aquel campo onírico de Buñuel toma sentido en este ‘loco’ transeúnte por Kiev. Lo que danza en la amplia frente de Merz está hecho de esvásticas, columnas enormes, águilas imperiales, runas, antorchas, cuerpos esculpidos a imagen del ario que soñó su ídolo, Adolfo.

El día de la unidad alemana, habrá negros y musulmanes, quizá latinos, fornicando con las mujeres alemanas. Eso sí, a la luz de ‘antorchas’, debido a la crisis energética que asumieron Olaf Schulz y su gobierno de abyectos, al avalar el ‘Ka boom’ del Nord Stream.

Cada vez que quiere sentarse a la mesa con Zelensky, éste le recuerda que es el monstruo que creó la Unión Europea y EE.UU. y que le han subestimado como un simple histrión. Entonces, la cena fracasa. El ‘duende verde’ acosado por los neonazis de Azov sólo repite los mantras de ‘más dinero’, ‘pago a funcionarios’’, dinero para la guerra’, ‘escudo antimisiles’, ‘ingreso a la OTAN y a U.E.’ etc. La cena se frustra, pero es necesaria la esperanza para continuar con la trama, el anhelo por lograr la gran cena final: derrotar a Rusia.

Como en la descripción de la película, la vida de estos capitalistas, tecnócratas, burgueses neonazis empobrece a sus sociedades. Mientras, la cena anhelada que costará mucho dinero, se escapa entre el realismo de la incapacidad alemana por un rearme eficiente y donde sus jóvenes no desean prestar servicio militar, no hay dinero y su base industrial está rezagada al menos quince años detrás de la rusa.

Siempre que Merz se quiere sentar a cenar sabe que algo pasará y está pasando: Rusia sigue avanzando hacia occidente, para ubicarse allí, en esas calles donde aún él y el neonazi Volodómir caminan. Sólo queda un 9% del Donbás en manos de los ucronazis respaldados por la OTAN. El sueño húmedo de este nazi está por finalizar.

Al igual que la forma en que Buñuel dispuso ese ‘encanto’ burgués, la trama hecha por Merz, y toda su camarilla europea sufre de confusiones de horario, no linealidad y coherencia en el discurso, lo que deviene en la eterna frustración de no lograr lo que con tanto ímpetu desean.

Por ejemplo, el señor Friedrich ha señalado varias veces que Rusia es débil y va perdiendo la guerra y que por eso es clave apoyar a Ucrania. Por otro, dice que de ganar Rusia avanzará hacia Europa. Entonces, o es débil y puede ser derrotada o es fuerte y puede avanzar hacia Europa. No puede ser las dos cosas.

En cuestión de tiempos, tampoco le da o les da a los nazis y europeos colaboradores de éstos. No hace falta sino ver las más de treinta mil sanciones impuestas a Rusia para comprender cómo sus cálculos de tiempo sobre una Rusia que caerá, cada vez de manera definitiva, han fracasado. Más de veinte veces la cena surrealista, la cena antropofágica devoradora de rusos y Rusia se ha frustrado.

También han apostado a que, con el tiempo, el presidente Putin perdería apoyo de la sociedad y, por el contrario, su partido Rusia Unida, lideró y aumentó posiciones en la pasada jornada electoral, que fue acechada por drones y ataques ucronazis. De nuevo, el burgués nazi no comió.

Las declaraciones de Merz acerca de Rusia nunca han sido amables. El gobierno alemán se encuentra en pie de guerra con los puños apretados, impotente y alucinando. En la asamblea anual de Naciones Unidas, la parte alemana solicitó a los rusos una reunión. La misma duró veinte minutos, tiempo suficiente para insultar al canciller Lavrov y fijar ultimátum a Rusia:

El contenido de la conversación se centró en la guerra en Ucrania y las relaciones bilaterales. Wadephul exhortó al Kremlin a “abandonar la peligrosa senda de escalada frente a Alemania, Europa y la OTAN (Organización del Tratado del Atlántico Norte)”, citó una fuente alemana recogida por Reuters y AP. El ministro germano también insistió en que Rusia debe facilitar un acuerdo para reactivar las exportaciones de cereales por el mar Negro, afectadas por ataques a infraestructuras y barcos de ambos países.

No obstante, Lavrov aseguró que “no surgió nada nuevo” tras el diálogo, y posteriormente aprovechó su discurso ante la Asamblea General para reforzar la postura rusa sobre la guerra e intensificar las críticas contra Occidente, incluida Alemania. El ambiente previo al encuentro estuvo marcado por señalamientos bilaterales: Wadephul denunció crímenes de guerra rusos en Ucrania y abogó por incrementar la presión internacional sobre Moscú, al tiempo que expresó desconfianza sobre la voluntad real del Kremlin de negociar la paz.

Es una clara ofensa al canciller y el pueblo rusos, citar a éste a una reunión en donde le exige lo que se vio en los párrafos anteriores. Los alemanes neonazis quieren cenar y no pueden. Se frustran y explotan a su pueblo.

En contra eso sí de cualquier libreto surrealista de Luis Buñuel, quien no tuvo tanta creatividad o no conocía ni imaginaba este tipo de burgués, los alemanes mientras izan su brazo derecho con los dedos puestos como una saeta para saludar el alma de Hitler, de una esvástica o a la raza blanca superior, entregan los vientres de sus mujeres y los impuestos de sus ciudadanos a comensales no arios. Otra escena absurda de esta película de bajo presupuesto.

Merz caminó por Kiev. Hay una foto de él andando por ahí en una calle. Pero no es sólo él. En sus zapatos resopla toda la frustración de toda la Alemania neonazi; el discreto y terrible desencanto de ser perdedores, para fortuna del mundo una vez más en menos de cien años y nuevamente gracias a Rusia. Ojalá ahora desaparezcan para siempre. ‘Good Bye Merz’.

NATO Edge 26 in Izmir merges civilian tech with war-fighting. AI, cloud, cybersecurity now serve the military-industrial complex.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

The summit NATO held in Ankara in July continues to make its impact felt in our country — a summit marked by the lockdown of the city, red carpets rolled out for imperialist leaders, Janissary marches, the narrative of a “great Turkey” constructed around hosting the event, and arrests that continue to keep people behind bars.

As has often been pointed out, the July summit marked the beginning of a “new era” both internationally and for our country.

It looks like we will be discussing this important turning point for a long time to come. Meanwhile, NATO’s “work” in our country is not yet finished. Another critical NATO event is approaching, one that has received little attention in the mainstream media — and when it does, it will once again be framed through the narrative of “Turkey’s importance”: NATO Edge 26…

NATO Edge 26, which will be held in Izmir in November 2026, is being promoted using concepts such as “innovation,” “readiness,” and “the security of the future.” Or, to put it in plain language: the marketing and integration of military technologies, the defense industry, and war-fighting capacity…

The official promotional text of the event, organized by the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA), lays out its purpose quite clearly:

“NATO Edge 26 will focus on strengthening NATO’s readiness and war-fighting capacity through faster, smarter, and more scalable collaboration with industry.

…NCIA is excited to carry this legacy forward in Türkiye in 2026 and take the event a step further with a renewed format focused on delivering effective solutions and prioritizing industry partnerships.

Industry participation will be at the heart of the 2026 edition, providing more opportunities for direct engagement, focused information sessions, a more comprehensive understanding of NATO’s upcoming procurement requirements and priorities, as well as greater opportunities to showcase industry solutions to NATO decision-makers, end users, and potential partners.”

A military ecosystem operating according to market logic, with partnerships and participation at its core. Defense companies, states and military commands are expanding their cooperation in order to strengthen “war readiness”…

What exactly is NATO Edge?

NATO Edge is the flagship technology event of NATO’s technology and cybersecurity center, the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCI Agency).

“Edge” can be translated into Turkish as “edge,” “frontier,” “advantage,” “superiority,” or, depending on the context, “cutting-edge” or “advanced.”

It was first held in 2022 in Mons, Belgium. The event was created by merging two previously separate events: the NATO Information Assurance Symposium (NIAS) and an industry conference known as NITEC.

According to NATO’s official documents, NIAS focused on cybersecurity, while NITEC carried the technology-and-industry dimension. In other words, NATO Edge explicitly targets both the technology and industry/commercial spheres.

At the first event, held in Mons, Belgium, on October 25–27, 2022, more than 2,100 registered participants and over 100 companies took part in the exhibition area. The program included topics such as the use of artificial intelligence in military applications, cybersecurity, and digital transformation.

At the second event, held in Tampa, Florida, in the United States, on December 3–5, 2024, cloud technologies, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, and the strategic use of resources were discussed. According to NCIA’s 2024 annual report, approximately 60 percent of participants came from industry, while 31 percent represented NATO, governments, and armed forces.

This picture is a clear indication that artificial intelligence technology — whose development in the United States has accelerated since the early 2000s and exploded in recent years — is being systematically taken up by the military-industrial complex.

Moreover, this system has been developed directly under NATO’s military leadership, in cooperation with civilian industry, using resources so vast that civilian initiatives seeking to use technology — particularly artificial intelligence — “for the benefit of humanity” cannot compete with them.

In the United States, for example, many companies unable to find investment have begun receiving funding from military institutions such as the CIA and NATO and developing technologies under their direction. The fact that the CIA has been the “first investor” in numerous technology startups is a striking example of this system.

In short, the path of technological development has largely been left at the mercy of military leadership and the American technology giants.

A similar picture will emerge at NATO Edge 26. Many small startups participating in the event will seek agreements with major players and attempt to secure financing from them. Naturally, this will come at the price of working for NATO’s military interests.

For the “domestic, national, and highly nationalist” technology companies whose numbers have grown tremendously in our country in recent years, the “justification” is equally clear: Turkey is now a country on the verge of a major breakthrough, hosting major international events, supposedly becoming not their subordinate but their master, and possessing qualities that make it indispensable to everyone… So why not devote all our strength and labor to the strategy drawn up by NATO? We will make money, and we will take yet another step forward in a world order in which we are already supposedly such an important player…

This is more or less the logic behind the seemingly contradictory and irrational rhetoric of the Turkish defense industry about “challenging the world” and its actions that ultimately amount to working for imperialist powers.

Put simply, NATO Edge is precisely the embodiment of this logic through events, sessions, and corporate exhibition stands.

Why is it being held in Izmir?

NCIA has not given a specific reason for choosing Izmir as the venue for NATO Edge 26. However, it is possible to understand why Izmir was chosen by looking at the institution’s own documents.

First, a NATO Industry Forum was held during the Ankara Summit on July 7–8, where new procurement decisions worth tens of billions of dollars were announced. The decisions taken by NATO in July are intended to translate the political and financial commitments made in Ankara into operational capacity, while in Izmir, NATO and industry are to work together to accelerate that capacity.

Second, the Ankara Summit adopted a new Strategy for Industry-NATO Cooperation (SYNC). This document moves the NATO-industry relationship to an earlier stage. Through this mechanism, companies will not merely submit bids for tenders that have already been announced; they will be brought into the process from the point at which future capacity requirements are identified.

Third, the Turkish Ministry of National Defense presented NATO Edge 26 as an event aimed at “the international promotion and increased visibility of the Turkish defense industry’s ‘high-tech’ capabilities.” NCIA also signed, during the Turkish Industry Day it organized in Türkiye, one of the first contracts of its history concerning the modernization of very-low-frequency air-surveillance equipment for Allied Maritime Command with ASELSAN.

In other words, Izmir should be viewed not merely as an “event venue,” but as a point of contact for tying Turkey more tightly into imperialism’s defense-technology supply chain.

This is also where NATO Edge 26 differs most significantly from previous meetings. NCIA is openly telling companies: “You can learn about NATO’s requirements before they become official tender specifications,” while offering more than €1 billion in upcoming “NATO procurement opportunities.”

NATO Edge 26 is creating an early-stage matching mechanism between NATO’s military requirements and the private sector’s product-development and investment decisions.

Who is taking part?

The official NATO Edge participant list is still being updated, and in its publicly visible format, not all of the more than 270 companies known to be participating appear simultaneously. Nevertheless, a number of notable companies can be confirmed either through the official list or through the companies’ own NATO Edge announcements. Names appearing on the official list include Airbus, AWS, Anduril, ASELSAN, ASFAT, BAE Systems Digital Intelligence, BlackBerry, Booz Allen Hamilton, Cisco, Cloudflare, Broadcom, Armis Federal/ServiceNow, Atos, and Barikat Cyber Security.

Among the industry speakers on the program are Helsing co-founder and CEO Gundbert Scherf, Planet Labs CEO Will Marshall, UiPath founder Daniel Dines, AWS Global Defense executive Christian Hoff, Leonardo technology executive Alessandro Massa, Thales cortAIx Factory executive Mickael Brossard, and BlackBerry Chief Security Advisor Christine Gadsby.

The danger of ‘dual-use’

One of the concepts that stands out particularly in NATO’s 2026 event materials is “dual-use” technology.

NATO Deputy Secretary General Jean-Charles Ellermann-Kingombe said that NATO Edge 26 would be particularly attractive to “companies that have a credible military application alongside their primary commercial business.” In other words, NATO is no longer targeting only traditional defense companies; it is also targeting technologies that can be transferred from the commercial market into the military sphere.

What this means is that a technology company no longer needs to be a “weapons company” from the outset. A company can operate in data analytics, satellite imagery, cloud systems, communications, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, automation, or computing, while simultaneously entering the NATO system and working for NATO.

This significantly broadens the scope of what has long been described as the “militarization of technology.”

The NATO Edge 26 participant profile makes this clear. On one side are defense giants such as Airbus, Anduril, ASELSAN, Leonardo, and Thales; on the other are civilian technology companies such as AWS, Cisco, Cloudflare, Broadcom, BlackBerry, UiPath, and Planet Labs.

In other words, military technology no longer means merely “producing military products for armies”; it increasingly means placing the products you create at the service of military interests.

How are the market and militarization being merged?

In this new system, in which the private sector is also being drawn into the defense industry, the formula is clear:

Public funding, NATO demand, corporate investment, technology development, military integration, public procurement, larger-scale production, new investment…

At this point, we need to make a brief detour. Combining private enterprise with military requirements, when military needs are given priority, means the emergence of new economic crises in capitalist societies. Because this entire chain of needs will ultimately be paid for at the expense of workers and their social needs, which are placed at the bottom of the priority list.

The competitive strength of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which has made its own breakthroughs in artificial intelligence, technology, and military technology, stems not only from those advances but also from the leadership of the Communist Party, which directs the public and private sectors from a single center. What provides China’s “speed,” as well as the threat it represents to the Atlantic alliance, is the Party’s control over and direction of the private sector.

This “threat” posed by China is pushing capitalism to take faster and harsher steps in new areas of civilian-military cooperation similar to Edge.

The ‘domestic and national industry’ is being tied to the NATO market

The enthusiasm of the “domestic and national industry” mentioned above is also being directly tied, under this new system, to the NATO market and its military requirements.

It is repeatedly argued that Turkey is expanding its own defense industry. But what kind of expansion is this?

The defense industry is being internationalized through NATO standards, NATO procurement mechanisms, NATO operational requirements, and access to the NATO market.

For this reason, “domestic production” and “NATO integration” do not necessarily have to be opposites. On the contrary, under today’s model, the two can take place simultaneously. The “domestic” character being referred to is, for a country whose entire military strategy has already been built for years in accordance with NATO interests, a very particular kind of domesticity.

Interestingly, a June 2026 announcement by the Aegean Region Chamber of Industry reveals that the quota initially allocated for 100 booths for Turkish defense-industry organizations at the event was reduced to 40 after fewer applications than expected were received from domestic companies.

This data is important in two respects.

First, the assumption that the Turkish defense industry is automatically and intensively turning toward the NATO market does not apply equally to every company. It is possible to guess which types of companies can afford to apply.

Second, it shows that presenting NATO Edge 26 simply as a “giant exhibition opening all of Turkey’s defense companies to the world” does not reflect reality.

What does the Ukraine connection show?

NATO Edge 26 also contains important signals regarding the war in Ukraine. Although our country has repeatedly sought to position itself as a mediator at every major turning point in the Russia-Ukraine war, it is quite clear that no one — NATO above all — has taken this intention seriously.

Among the Edge participants are Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense Innovation and Defense Technology Development Center and Brave1. Established in 2023, Brave1 is an official platform through which the Ukrainian government brings together defense-technology developers, the military, investors, and technology companies. Their participation also means that NATO will directly transfer the technological experience of the war in Ukraine into its own innovation ecosystem.

This, too, is no coincidence. Under the UNITE–Brave NATO program, NATO and Ukraine have already established a joint contract pool worth a total of €10 million, with plans to expand the program to as much as €50 million in subsequent stages.

Whose interests is technology serving?

Treating NATO Edge 26 in Izmir simply as an event where next-generation weapons, artificial intelligence applications, or digital defense systems are put on display would be a serious oversimplification. The “bigger picture” shows civilian and military capacities being merged into the same pool, with companies, states, military institutions, and technology developers jointly participating in the construction of a new war-fighting capacity under the name of “partnership.”

Thus, the scope of war ceases to be limited to weapons systems used on the battlefield; data, artificial intelligence, cloud systems, communications, satellite technologies, software, and logistics are all becoming components of war preparation and military planning.

From the perspective of our country, it is possible to say that Ankara’s “domestic and national” rhetoric points toward NATO’s requirements, standards, procurement mechanisms, and international defense-industry networks. The limits of the narrative that Turkey is an independent power capable of challenging the world through its own defense industry are ultimately being determined by the decisions taken at NATO events.

At the same time, events of this kind once again expose another reality that Marxists have repeatedly pointed out — and repeatedly demonstrated in practice: how conditional capitalism’s rhetoric of the “free market” really is.

When the issue is war and military requirements, the traditional claim that the market should be left to its own devices can suddenly be pushed into the background. Production capacity can be directed according to strategic priorities, and private capital can be encouraged to work for “security” needs.

In short, the “real question” posed by NATO Edge 26 is not which new technology is being developed, but according to whose needs, according to which political and economic priorities, and ultimately in whose service this technological capacity is being developed.

People involved in organized struggle used to be told: “Forget all this, get yourself a job first.” Now the phrase has changed: “Forget politics, we are living in the age of artificial intelligence — learn technology.”

And yet, although technological development and changing times transform the tools and needs at our disposal, they do not change the fact that the ruling classes use every instrument of “progress” to preserve their power.

From this perspective, the political purpose underlying the monopolization of artificial intelligence by military and economic giants is the same as the purpose underlying the control of machinery by the owners of capital in the early stages of the Industrial Revolution.

In our country, where changing times, tools, and needs are pregnant with major crises, these “devilish deals” to be made in Izmir will open the door to yet another new era.

Ultimately, NATO Edge 26 is a contemporary example not only of technological development itself, but of the organization of technology for “pre-war” purposes and the socialization of its costs — that is, the shifting of those costs onto the backs of working people.

Our political predecessors, who once observed what the giant machines in factories were actually being used for alongside production, also passed down to us what needed to be done in response.

What needs to be built today is the stick that will be thrust into the digital gears of our age.

Die Ukraine bekommt immer mehr Probleme, weshalb Kanzler Merz mal wieder nach Kiew gefahren ist, um über eine Milliarde Euro deutscher Steuergelder zu verschenken. Deutschland bekommt auch immer mehr Probleme, aber für die Deutschen hat Merz kein Geld, denn sonst reicht es nicht für Kiew. Aber was sind die Gründe für die aktuellen Probleme der […]